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## FORT PUPO: A SPANISH FRONTIER OUTPOST

by **JOHN M. GOGGIN**

From the viewpoint of anthropological analysis one of the most interesting aspects of the study of man is what happens when two cultures meet. When is there an integration of elements, and when an overwhelming of one culture by the other? Precisely what happened when the Spanish and Indians came together has been a fascinating subject of study by many archaeologists in Florida in recent years. It was exactly this problem which turned us from our study of the missions where Spanish priests and Indians came together to a consideration of the similar meeting of Spanish soldiers and Indians. Fort Pupo, being a small outpost, has been examined with the hope of shedding some light on this problem. Our historical and archeological study, although limited, gives us information on this problem and also archeological evidence which parallels the historical accounts for the region.<sup>1</sup>

The remains of Fort Pupo (Cl 10) are situated on the west bank of the St. Johns River about three miles south of Green Cove Springs, Clay County, Florida.<sup>2</sup> This is on the west side near the end of Bayard Point, a major promontory extending into the river opposite Picolata. At the present time the area is relatively unoccupied; a small fishing camp about a half mile south is the only nearby habitation. The site and surrounding

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1. This is a contribution from the research program of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Florida, made possible by a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc. (formerly The Viking Fund, Inc.) The *Quarterly* thanks the Foundation also for the cost of publication of the plates in this paper. We are grateful to John P. Hall, Green Cove Springs, owner of the site, for permission to make our excavations. This paper was facilitated in its preparation by the use of class reports on the site prepared by Eugene Miles (MS) and Donald Kokomoor (MS). The contour map of the site was prepared by Mr. Miles. The aid of the many students who participated in the excavations is gratefully acknowledged.
  2. Cl 10 is the site number in the joint archeological site survey of the University of Florida and Florida State University.

area are covered with a beautiful thick hammock of oak, magnolia, and other typical trees of the region.

A visitor here for the first time is surprised at the magnitude of the small fort. Apparently, it once sat some distance back from the river but recent shore erosion has cut into the bank and even washed away part of the original structure. What was once a square earthwork is now a nested series of U-shaped moats and embankments opening into the river.

The heavy covering of leaves and humus effectively hides any artifact trace of man, and only careful search along the eroded river bank reveals broken bits of Indian, Spanish, and English pottery. Nevertheless, as our excavations finally revealed, there are plentiful archeological data present to tell the story of man's occupation here.

Utilizing various Spanish and English 18th century maps, Eugene Miles attempted to locate Fort Pupo, using strictly historical source material.<sup>3</sup> In this he was quite successful because the location is very clearly depicted on several maps. Actually this was not a "discovery" in the sense of being something new that was not known before, since the fort has been mentioned by various writers since the time of John Bartram (Bartram, 1942. See Bibliography for all references to sources.) and its location is fairly accurately given in *The Florida Guide* (Federal Writers Project, 1940: 352). Nevertheless, it was a good field of problem and rediscovery working from early source materials. A series of small test excavations, made by Mr. Miles, around the earthwork produced mixed Spanish and Indian material substantiating the belief that the earthwork was really of Spanish construction and undoubtedly Fort Pupo.

In the following summer the University of Florida Archeological Field School visited the site, excavating a 5 by 15 foot

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3. Mr. Miles's work was carried out as part of a student research problem at the University of Florida under the direction of the author in the spring of 1950 (Miles, MS).

trench, finding interesting material yielding valuable data. A preliminary analysis was prepared by Donald Kokomoor (MS).

After the initial study, fruitful possibilities of more intensive work appeared so attractive that another series of excavations was made by the writer and a group of students on a week-end in April, 1951. This time a total of 12 five-foot squares was excavated to an average depth of 30 inches.

Between our two periods of excavation, Mr. W. M. Jones, an amateur historian of Jacksonville, did some limited digging at the site, finding several large iron objects by means of an electronic metal locator. He has generously turned his material over to us for use in this study.

The present paper represents a historical introduction to the site and a summary of the archeological findings.<sup>4</sup> A detailed and complete report on the latter will be included in a manuscript on the late archeology of the region that is now in preparation (Goggin, MS). The summary presented here will spare the general reader many technical details necessary in the final report on the archeological aspect.

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## HISTORY

### *Spain's Defense Problems*

Spain occupied Florida primarily for two important reasons: first to protect her shipping route through the Straits of Florida,

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4. The writer is grateful to Mr. Albert C. Manucy of the National Park Service who aided by reading the historical section of the manuscript and in advising on the use of military terms. He also brought to my attention the Sanford Mace material at the University of Georgia. We are grateful to that institution and Mr. Wymberly W. De Renne, for sending photographs of the Mace drawings and transcripts of manuscript material from the Phillipps Collection to the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida. Special recognition is due Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate of Sea Island, Georgia, a long-time student of General Oglethorpe. It was through her interest that the manuscript material in the Phillipps Collection was first brought to Manucy's attention, and thus to mine. She later very generously allowed me access to her full file of notes on General Oglethorpe in Florida.

and second to bring Christianity to the numerous Indian inhabitants. For the first hundred years of settlement both aims were accomplished in a fairly successful fashion, although the colony was always poverty-stricken and many times was only barely existing.

St. Augustine was established in 1565 by Pedro Menendez de Aviles and thereafter was the seat of Spanish power in the colony. With the quick elimination of the Huguenots on the St. Johns, Florida's entire defense program during its first hundred years was oriented toward hostility from the sea. Missionaries moved northwards along the coast, then westward reaching Potano (present Alachua County) by 1606, and moving into the Tallahassee region after 1633. In general this penetration was peaceful; often the priests traveled and lived alone, isolated from other Spaniards except for occasional contact with passing military patrols and less common visits with fellow priests and religious superiors. Indian troubles flared out in hostilities on a few occasions with some loss of life, but the revolts were quickly put down and apparently represented no major military problem to the administration.

This seaward orientation of defenses was rudely by-passed in 1670 when the English settled at Charleston in Carolina. Even before this they had initiated contacts with Indians to the west, and the combination of English and Indians on the exposed northern frontier posed a serious threat on the Spanish flank. One response to this threat was the building of the first stone fort at St. Augustine, the present Castillo de San Marcos; a second, the construction of Fort San Marcos in the Apalachee Country, south of present Tallahassee; and a third, the maintenance of a small outpost in Guale, on the Georgia coast, not far from the Carolinas themselves. Some time in the period shortly after 1700 there were also built two outposts opposite each other on the St. Johns River, Forts San Francisco de Pupo,

and Picolata.<sup>5</sup> They controlled the ferry crossing on the main east-west road across the province, and blocked possible enemy movement by water up the St. Johns.<sup>6</sup>

Spanish apprehensions concerning the English were well founded, for the latter immediately formed alliances, based on trade, with the Creek Indians to the west. These they armed and encouraged to raid Indians and Spanish to the south. Then at the beginning of the 18th century, the Carolinians themselves joined with the Indians in several expeditions against the Spanish. Fort Pupo, guarding the St. Johns River, astride the westward trail, played an important part in these events.

*Spanish, Indians, and English*

The Apalachee trail crossing of the St. Johns River became a significant point only with increased British pressure from the north on the Spanish colony. This pressure was first manifested in various isolated raids on missions and Indian towns friendly to the Spanish, then in the destruction of the missions of the Timucua and Apalachee provinces, and finally in a series of direct attacks on the St. Augustine itself. Fort Pupo (and Picolata) played a role only in the last events however, the former can be briefly reviewed to provide a background.

The initial hostility inspired by the British in interior Florida was the destruction of the Timucua mission of Santa Catalina

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5. The form, *Pupo*, used in this paper is the variation of the name favored by the Spanish; *Pupa* is the usual name given by English writers. The word is presumably of Indian derivation but its meaning is unknown. Other variations include *Pupe*, *Poppa*, *Puppo*, and *Puppa*.

The only other occurrence of the name is its use for an estate which later encompassed the present site and extended from south of the fort to Black Creek. Late in the first Spanish period it belonged to the heirs of Don Franco Ligarroa (Crown Collection, Map, no. 128; photostat from Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).

6. An excellent discussion of the defense problems and their development is found in Chatelain (1941).

and robbery of San Francisco in 1685 (Barcia, 1723: 287).<sup>7</sup> This, and the destruction of San Juan de Guacara on the Suwannee River a few years later (Boyd, 1951: 11), were but a prelude to the final annihilation of all the missions and Indian towns in the area.

With the formal outbreak of hostilities in Europe known as Queen Anne's War, certain elements in Carolina decided that this was the opportune time for an attack on their Spanish enemies to the south. Under the leadership of Governor James Moore a force of several hundred men and a like number of Creek allies left Port Royal in October 1702. This group converged on St. Augustine by land and sea, causing its inhabitants to flee to the Castillo de San Marcos for shelter. For eight weeks the British laid siege to the fortress but being without sufficient artillery, they were unable to take it and finally withdrew, burning the city as they left.

Smarting from this defeat, Moore had his revenge two years later when he invaded, again with Creek allies, the Apalachee and Timucua mission provinces. Mission stations were attacked and destroyed, resulting in numerous Indian and Spanish casualties (see Boyd, 1951). On Moore's retreat he took with him hundreds of Apalachee Indians as slaves.<sup>8</sup> Within the next couple of years other raids followed, forcing Spanish withdrawal to the St. Johns River, and by 1706 even the crossing of Salamatoto, at the later Fort Pupo, was abandoned (Boyd, 1951: 90). The end of the war in 1714 brought uneasy peace to the frontier and it is about this time that Fort Pupo was constructed. In any case the name is first mentioned in 1716.

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7. Santa Catalina was probably in southern Columbia County but as yet it has not been located, while San Francisco was in Alachua County.

8. These apparently included dissatisfied Indian deserters from the Spanish cause. They were all established in a town on the Savannah River. See Milling (1940) for its history.



*Building of the Fort*

The story of Fort Pupo is closely tied to the history of the river crossing, often called the "pass" of Salamatoto (after the nearby town), and is also connected with events at Fort Picolata across the river. Unfortunately we do not have good evidence when Pupo was constructed; it must have been early in the eighteenth century.

The crossing is noted as early as 1675 but there is no evidence of a fort at that time, although there was the settlement of Salamatoto on the east side of the river, probably on or near the later site of Picolata. Captain Juan Fernandez de Florencia writing in that year noted that "The river of Salamatoto is very large and about a league in breadth at the crossing. On the side of the Presidio [St. Augustine] there is a place which with great labor ferry and transport the people which go and come from the said provinces is [nevertheless] nearly uninhabited, and would not have more than forty persons in all" (Boyd, 1948: 187). The same year Bishop Calderon notes Salamatoto as a village and mission (Wenhold, 1936: 8). Again a few years later, in 1680, we find another mention of the pass of Salamatoto, but there is no indication of a fortification (Brooks, n.d.: 139).

As has been discussed, English pressure in this region increased to such an extent that missions to the west were abandoned early in the eighteenth century and even the palisade fort of Salamatoto was attacked in 1706, causing the Spanish to withdraw the infantry stationed there, (Brooks, n.d.: 166; Boyd, 1951: 90). There is still no evidence of any fortification on the west bank at this time, and the palisade fort was probably the later Fort Picolata or a predecessor.

Pupo as a name first appears in 1716 as a place on the river where Lt. Diego Pena camped (Boyd, 1949: 13). It was perhaps the same site as the fort but there is no clear statement that a fortification had been built.

Regrettably there are no references to Pupo in the next few years, since it was apparently in these years that Fort Pupo was constructed. In any case by the time of Arredondo's visit in 1737 the fort was already falling to pieces.

*Description and Garrison of the Fort*


No adequate description of the first fort is available, but it appears to have been little more than a sentry house. An excerpt from a letter written by the Royal Engineer, Antonio de Arredondo on January 22, 1737 gives some idea of its nature and location.

"Further to the south, southwest, at about 19 leagues from the mouth of the bar, and at about eight from the city of San Agustin, on each side of the river, there is a sentry box built of boards, eight feet in diameter, named respectively Pupo and Picolata, both of them surrounded by a palisade, very small and light - I saw them myself, and I can vouch that they are ready to crumble down owing to the supports being completely rotten, at the lower part - So that it can easily be seen how unfit they are to show the least resistance [*sic*] or defence against even a small force - Not only on account of their defective construction and size, but also on account of their delapidated condition - Each one is garrisoned by a squad of eight men, hardly large enough to hold them - There are also two Swivel guns which are used to protect the courriers [*sic*] and the passengers who go and come from Apalache by land, (as it can be seen on the plan) while they cross the river from one side to the other on piroques [*sic*], as they are often harassed by the Indians while in the act of crossing . . ." (Lowery, 1912: 272).

A somewhat fuller idea of the fort's nature is obtainable from Don Pedro Ruiz de Olano's plan of the new fort drawn the




# *Plan and Elevation of Fort. S.<sup>t</sup> Francisco de Pupo*



- A Parapet of timber 1 foot Thick and 12 high
- B Place of Arms raised 6 feet higher than the natural ground without
- C The Tower of 16 feet Square
- D Port holes in the middle floor for cannon
- E Parapet of timber above mentioned with loop holes for small arms, and Sloped in such manner as to be forwarded from bottom to top by the Manchicolas at F.
- G Middle floor with its port and loop holes

*Scale of Feet*



*Sanford Mace*

Fig. 2. "Plan and Elevation of Fort San Francisco de Pupo," by Sanford Mace, [January, 1740.]

following year (Fig. 1). On this, the first structure's plan and profile is indicated by dotted lines. These show it to have been a hexagonal structure 10 feet across and 16 feet high. It was closely surrounded by what probably was a palisade wall in the form of a six-pointed star measuring 31 feet from point to point. This coincides closely in size to the 8 foot structure of Arredondo's letter.

Although the "palisade of Salamatoto" was the forerunner of Picolata, that fort by this time at least was apparently a star-shaped structure similar to Pupo. Neither was stronger than a sentry house nor large enough to hold a good garrison or any refugees.

As a military engineer, Arredondo was charged with surveying the defense problems of Florida and recommending improvements. Apparently as a result of his survey, and in part spurred by increasing Indian pressure, Pupo was soon rebuilt as depicted in Olano's "Plan and Profile of the New Fort of San Francisco de Pupo," reproduced here in Figure 1.

This shows a fairly impressive structure built directly on the site of the first. It was composed of a wooden blockhouse surrounded by palisades and perhaps a moat. The blockhouse was about 15 feet square and 32 feet from the base to the peak of its hip roof, with an upper story or manchicolation, projecting over the lower walls.<sup>9</sup> A large window and an embrasure are shown in one wall on the plan. The surrounding palisades have an inward batter and are seven feet above the ground on the inside and 12 feet high on the outside, apparently above a moat. They measure about 33 feet from top to top. Loopholes seem to be indicated just above the tie beam, are at about the conventional height of 4 1/2 feet above the firing step. Although constructed of wood, the structure looks well made and practical.

According to the map the structure was only about 7 feet

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9. Figures in feet were derived by measurement from the plan.

from the river bank. No gate or entrance is shown but the "Road that goes to San Marcos de Apalache" starts at the water's edge at the middle of the palisades, runs along that side then goes inland along the west side.

The details given in Olano's plan apparently represent the structure as it was finally completed. Oglethorpe's (1873: 107) description is very close. He states that "The Fort consisted of a strong new built Tower about 30 foot high 16 foot square within with a Manchicolis above which flanked the foot of the Tower, without that a Rampart faced with Timber a foot thick and 12 foot high, filled up within side with 6 foot earth . . ." These figures are very close to the plan.

The plan of the fort made by Sanford Mace, after its capture (Fig. 2) is very close to the Olano plan. He gives the size of the blockhouse as sixteen feet square with three floors. The middle had embrasures for cannon while the top floor in the manchicolas commanded the tower base and the insloping timber palisade.

The garrison as listed by Arredondo in 1737 was comprised of 8 men. The previous year (1736) there were reported 8 infantrymen and 1 artilleryman, while Picolata had 7 infantrymen and 1 artilleryman (Chatelain, 1941: 164). At the time of its capture there was 1 sergeant, 10 men, and an Indian scout in the garrison.<sup>10</sup> Certainly few more could be accommodated within the structure. However, Oglethorpe was told by his captives of a former garrison comprising an officer and 30 men (Oglethorpe, 1873: 108). They must have camped nearby and were probably not the normal detachment.

### *Developing Troubles*

The first years of the fort's existence were restless ones. Although nominal peace existed, many causes of trouble were

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10. These are the Spanish figures (M. to H., Jan. 31, 1740, in Willcox, 1909: 39-40) but Oglethorpe (1873: 107) reports a sergeant, a corporal, 8 soldiers and an Indian.

present. The increasing number of English in their colony was not reassuring to the Spanish and both sides do not seem to have desired or exercised much control over raiding activities of Indians under their nominal jurisdiction. A new problem, too, was the fleeing of runaway Negro slaves to Spanish Florida. There they were given shelter by the authorities who refused to return them to the Georgians and Carolinians.

In reprisal for various injuries, resentful English with Indian allies made a quick raid into Florida in 1728. Led by Col. John Palmer, they made their way to St. Augustine itself destroying and looting all the Yamasee Indian towns they encountered, but were unable to penetrate the inner defenses of St. Augustine.

While the Spanish in the past had not been strong in their diplomacy with the northern Indians, they now attempted to correct this fault. Considerable attention was given to the Creeks, erstwhile English allies, which had some effect and certain of the Creek groups established nominal friendly relations with the Spanish.<sup>11</sup> Fort Pupo appears in the final chapter of this relationship. A Spaniard, the fort's master gunner, was murdered by some Creek Indians at Pupo in 1735 (Anon. 1859; various Spanish documents), and in retaliation the Spanish made a punitive sortie into Creek country. When the Indians shortly afterwards objected, they were severely reprimanded by the Spanish governor, Francisco del Moral Sanchez. Diplomacy might have saved the Spanish cause but none was shown and subsequently the Creeks openly raided the Spanish (Corry, 1936: 116).

Arrendondo's recommendation for the strengthening of Pupo, and other Spanish posts, was none too soon (Chatelain, 1941: 90), for the very next year Pupo was engaged in the first of a steady series of conflicts. In July of 1738 the fort was reinforced by Don Pedro Lamberto and a group of soldiers from Apalachee.

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11. A thorough discussion of the Indian-Spanish-English problem may be found in Corry (1936).

They reached the little outpost only after having lost two men enroute to Yuchi Indian attacks. These Indians were reported in close contact with the English. (M. to H., July 22, 1738, in Willcox, 1909: 21-22).<sup>12</sup> A few days later the post itself was assaulted by the Yuchi on the night of July 18 but they were driven off (M. to H., Aug. 31, 1738, in Willcox, 1909: 25).

Shortly after these events Governor Montiano ordered Don Pedro Ruiz de Olano to fortify Pupo, and presumably this work was carried out as depicted in his plan (M. to H., Aug. 8, 1738, in Willcox, 1909: 24). The job was soon under way, for early in the following year Montiano reports that work was then advancing at Pupo and Picolata, but was apparently only progressing at the former (M. to H., Jan. 3, 1738, in Willcox, 1909: 28).

### *The Oglethorpe Invasions*

The growing pressure between the Spanish and English reached its peak by 1739. News of the War of Jenkin's Ear (declared upon Spain by England) reached Georgia in September. This was all that James Oglethorpe, founder of that colony, was waiting for. He soon gathered together a considerable force of Georgians, together with several hundred Indian allies, and late that fall set out southwards.

A camp was established on the St. Johns River near its mouth (Oglethorpe, 1873: 105), and from there his troops and Indians ranged in all directions harrassing Spanish couriers and Florida Indian villages such as Ayamon (M. to H., Jan. 31, 1740, in

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12. The best Spanish sources for this period are a series of letters between Governor Montiano of Florida and Governor Horcasitas of Cuba. The complete letter book is in the East Florida Papers, Library of Congress (microfilms at P. K. Yonge Library, University of Florida, and Castillo de San Marcos National Monument). These will be referred to as M. to H. Many of these have been translated by C. DeWitt Willcox and published in the Georgia Historical Collections. They are referred to as Willcox (1909).

It should be remembered that the Spanish often used the term Yuchi (Uchee) as a generic one for not only that tribe but related Creeks as well. It is difficult to say who was involved here.



Willcox, 1909: 33-34). One such force led by Lt. George Dunbar attacked Picolata on December 28. The fort's 7-man garrison gallantly held out against a force estimated to be from 150 to 240 English and Indians. Despite mortar fire which "fell inside the fort, and finished its ruin" the Spaniards held out from 10 A.M. until 5 P.M. when the English retired, having lost two men (three wounded, according to Oglethorpe, 1873: 106).<sup>13</sup> The Spanish casualty was a wounded artilleryman who later died (M. to H., Jan. 31, 1740, in Willcox, 1909: 34, 40). According to English sources their withdrawal was due to the lack of artillery (Oglethorpe, 1873: 106), which hardly jibes with the Spanish account or with the following eyewitness account of Thomas Syre, a member of Dunbar's party:

'We rowed up the River untill the 16th at night, when we came to an Anchor, about 3 in the morning our Indians went a Shore, and by the light of the morn found the Tract of a mans foot, which they pursued untill they discovered the Fort about 4 miles distance from where we lay, we landed and got every thing ready with the Greatest Expedition for the attack, which we made about ten a Clock, the fire continued very hot on both sides for near 3 hours, we were within fifty yards of the Fort without the least Shelter, and the Enemy under Covert, and as we judged by their fire near equal our No. Lieut. Dunbar finding that our Shells the Several of them burst in the Fort did but little Execution, and that Several of our men were wounded, gave orders to go on Board and leave nothing behind, which we did with a great deal of Regularity, and at our Return, gave them a triple discharge of our Arms, which they never returned, and killed their horses within sight of their Fort. This Fort lies on the narrowest pass on the River, and here it is at least two miles wide, in no other

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13. One of the wounded, a sergeant, later died (Stephens, 1906: 483).

place less than 7, its banks are Coverd with Orange Trees which are loaded with Fruit" (letter; Thomas Eyre to his brother, December 23, 1739, in Phillipps Collection manuscripts, vol. 5, pp. 211).

Finally, Oglethorpe himself with a large force sailed up the St. Johns to attack Forts Pupo and Picolota. His group included Chickasaw, Yuchi, and Creek Indians. The initial attack was made on Picolota, January 7, 1740, and the little sentry post was taken by surprise and burnt (Oglethorpe, 1887: 107).<sup>14</sup> Fort Pupo was then invested, and according to the English, twice bombarded with four artillery pieces. After the second bombardment it is said to have surrendered.

No better description of this attack can be given than the words of Oglethorpe himself.

"At 10 the same day [as the attack on Picolata] I landed and invested Saint Francis de Pupa with the Indians and Rangers, and formed the Regular Troops and landed four pieces of Cannon, posted them and marked out a Battery in such manner that they were sheltered from the sight of the Garrison by the Woods. In the mean time the Indians advanced as near as they could under the shelter of trees, some of which stood within 100 yards of the Fort, but in most places the ground was cleared 300 yards around. The Indians fired very briskly upon the Fort and the Spaniards

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14. The exact time of this attack is confused since New Years day is often given as the date. It is probable that January 7, 1740, is more likely since that is the day most frequently given by Oglethorpe and others, although Oglethorpe has given January 8 in one account (General Assembly of South Carolina, 1887: 114, 139). Other factors also tend to discount the New Years day date. It would have been quite difficult for Lt. Dunbar to have left Picolata on December 28, return to the main camp and for Oglethorpe then to gather his large group together and be back at Picolata on New Years day. Furthermore, Montiano's first awareness of the fort's loss was on Jan. 21, 1740 (M. to H., Jan. 31, 1740, in Willcox, 1909: 39-40). This late date of his knowledge of the attack is more understandable if it took place on the 7th or 8th. Some of the confusion may be due to differences in the English and Gregorian calendars.

returned the same day very hotly till towards 3 of Clock when their Fire lessened considerably. This kept the Spaniards so amused that they did not discover till 5 of clock when the Spaniards began to fire upon them but the Breat work being then finished they did no mischief. Before sun set the Battery fired on the Fort when I offered them terms but they refusing the Cannons fired a second time which had so good an effect that they cried out for Quarter, became Prisoners of War and surrendered the Fort with two Pieces of Cannon, one Mortar, three Swivel Guns, 150 Shells, a number of glass bottles filled with Powder, and artificial Fireworks, a sufficient Quantity of Ammunition, Provisions,&ca. for a long Defence" (Oglethorpe, 1873: 107).<sup>15</sup>

More details of the attack may be gained from a contemporary plan of battle executed by Sanford Mace, an engineer in Oglethorpe's army (Phillipps Collection, photocopy, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History). This sketch shows the disposition of the troops quite clearly. After landing north of the fort, around the point, Oglethorpe set his batteries, consisting of one cannon and the swivel guns from the boats, directly west of the fort. Behind these and eastward along the river were the regular troops, "the Regiment." On the river bank, to the northeast, in front of the regiment were the Creek Indians under Nicolansa.

On the right of the guns, in a semicircle extending to the river west of the fort, were the remainder of the forces. These were in order, from the guns, another group of Creeks, the Yuchi, the Chickasaw, the White Rangers, and Hillispilly with the third group of Creeks. Meanwhile the boats patrolled the river in front of the fort.

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15. Elsewhere, Oglethorpe (letter to Duke of Newcastle, Jan. 22, 1740, *Colonial Records of Georgia*, vol. 35, p. 242) gives a figure of "50 Glass bottles full of Gunpowder with fuzes" and notes that there were sufficient provisions for two months.

The officers of the regular troops included Captains MacKay and Desbrissy, Lt. Dunbar, and Ensigns Mackay, Sutherland, and Maxwell. Mr. Sanford Mace was in charge of the artillery. Other Indian leaders were Walby of the Creeks, the Squirrel King and Mingo Stobo of the Chickasaw, and the Yuchi King of that tribe (letter of Oglethorpe to Duke of Newcastle, Jan. 22, 1740, Colonial Records of Georgia, vol. 45, p. 241). Oglethorpe elsewhere (letter to Col. Stephens, Feb. 2, 1740, in Philipps Collections, vol. 5, p. 342) mentions other Indian leaders, Faunee Mico of the Chickasaw and Santouchey with the Creeks, and identifies the Yuchi King as Captain Grey.

Oglethorpe's ascent of the river appears to have been missed by Governor Montinao's scouts. In any case, for several days he was unaware of events at Pupo and Picolota. Finally, an Indian scout brought word on the 21st that Picolota was in ashes and that numerous people in red coats could be seen across the river at Pupo (M. to H., Jan. 31, 1740, in Willcox, 1909: 36).

The Spanish account of Pupo's fall related that its 12-man garrison held out for two days under continuous artillery fire until after a salvo of seven guns there was capitulation. When Montiano wrote he was still uncertain as to the fate of Pupo's garrison, regretting their loss; but lacking details he based his account of their fate on scout reports (M. to H., Jan. 31, 1740, in Willcox, 1909: 39-40).

Oglethorpe himself had a narrow escape at Pupo, barely missing death from a cannon shot (Letter of Capt. Mackay, Jan. 24, 1740, in Colonial Records of Georgia, vol. 35, p. 183). After capture, the fort seemed so significant that he established a garrison of 40 men and "added to the Fortification" (Oglethorpe, 1873: 107; General Assembly of South Carolina 1887: 114) by laying out "an intrenchment round the fort" (letter from Oglethorpe to Duke of Newcastle, Jan. 22, 1740, Colonial

Records of Georgia, vol. 30, p. 242). The maintenance of this garrison seemed to be "of great consequence, since thereby the Communication with the Creek Indians is secured and their [Spanish] means of invading by land the Northern parts of the Colony is taken away, and if any party of Horse comes from Carolina, they may be here sheltered 'till they be ferried over and Picolata at which they land, is within 21 miles of Augustine, and the Country between is full stocked with Cattle and Horses" (Oglethorpe, 1873: 108).<sup>16</sup>

The importance of the forts in holding the Spanish line to Apalachee and discouraging the Creeks is emphasized again and again in various English reports. As Hugh MacKay wrote (letter, Jan. 24, 1740, Colonial Records of Georgia, vol. 35, p. 182) the English capture of the forts "gives likewise entrance to the Creek Indians into Florida which before was cut off by them."

Exactly how long the English maintained their garrison is not clear, but the Spanish still mention the English in possession as late as the end of March (M. to H., March 25, 1740, in Willcox, 1909: 48). Sometime after this Pupo was either recaptured or more likely the English withdrew.

Encouraged by their assault on St. Augustine's flanks, Oglethorpe soon afterwards moved south with another group of Georgians, and Creek and Cherokee Indians, early in May. By the middle of that month Pupo was again in English hands. Picking off other small fortifications, Oglethorpe besieged St. Augustine. However, the Castillo de San Marcos and its outer works now proved their worth and the English were never able to enter the town. After several weeks' bombardment of the town, Oglethorpe withdrew.

Pupo apparently played no active part in events during the

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16. Subsequently Pupo was used as a rallying point for Oglethorpe's Indian allies, the English using the fort to the advantage denied the Spanish (letter of Oglethorpe, June 30, 1740, in General Assembly of South Carolina, 1887: 33).

siege of St. Augustine, other than cutting the normal line of Spanish communication westwards. It was commanded successively by Lt. Hugh MacKay, Ensign Anthony Morelon, and Captain George Dunbar. The final commander demolished it after the siege was lifted (Kimber, 1935: 28), about July 22 or 23, 1740 (General Assembly of South Carolina, 1887: 110).

This was apparently the last of Fort Pupo. During Oglethorpe's second futile raid on St. Augustine, in 1743, a patrol was sent to Pupo to see if the Spanish had rebuilt it, but apparently they had not (Kimber, 1935: 28).

Following Oglethorpe's final invasion there was a general strengthening of defenses throughout the province and this included the rebuilding of Fort Picolata with a stone tower.<sup>17</sup> Chatelain (1941: 92) suggests that Pupo was rebuilt at this time but there is no evidence for that.

In 1755 the Spanish Crown authorized the reconstruction of both Picolata and Pupo, but the commencement of that activity was contingent on the finishing of work elsewhere (Crown to Governor, August 6, 1755, photostat 990-44, St. Augustine Historical Society). Apparently work on Pupo was never begun.

#### *Later History*

With the easing of tension between the Spanish and British after the Oglethorpe invasions there was less need for Fort Pupo and the remains seem to have been neglected by the Spanish; in any case, when the British took over Florida in 1763 the fort was in ruins.<sup>18</sup> Most of the English maps for the period clearly mark Pupo at the location of the site under consideration.

Despite this there is some confusion still attached to the site of Fort Pupo because of John Bartram's description of "Popa fort" specifically located on the east side of the St. Johns River

17. A plan of Picolata, dated 1765, is reproduced in both Chatelain (1941, map 15) and Bartram (1942, Fig. 25).

18. This is in contrast to Fort Picolata occupied during the whole British period.

a little north of the present site. He "landed at Popa fort, a small shallow entrenchment almost filled up with length of time; 'tis 20 yards square; and as many from the river; a few yards back of it there is another about twice as big; here is a grove of orange trees" (Bartram, 1942: 46). The most obvious explanation, and one that Chatelain (1941: 166) tacitly makes, is that Bartram was confused in his writing and is talking about the generally accepted site of Pupo on the west bank. However, as Francis Harper notes (in Bartram, 1942: 75), the statement is clear, and furthermore the use of the name Popo Point at the present time for the point described by Bartram lends some credence to the view that another fort existed.<sup>19</sup> Supporting Bartram's site on Popo Point is a notation on an anonymous map (Anon., MS.) of the British period. This clearly indicates the "Remains of Da Puppoo Fort" at the present Popo Point.<sup>20</sup>

It is not possible to state for sure exactly what we have here. Bartram's description neither fits the present site nor Olano's plan, which gives credence to the supposition that he is actually dealing with another site. If so, it may have been hasty Spanish defenses of the Oglethorpe period which had no permanency and thus found little, if any, recognition in the documentary sources.<sup>21</sup>

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19. Eugene Miles has been unable to find any sign of structures or artifacts at the present Popo Point.
  20. Serving more to confuse the problem is Forbes' account of "Fort Poppa" which he places across from Picolata. He calls it "a shallow intrenchment twenty yards square, and as many from the river. At a small distance back is another turret of the same size and some groves of orange trees and oaks of large size" (Forbes, 1821: 81). However, Forbes is well known for lifting data from many sources without giving references. In this case he may have done so, taking Bartram's description, altering it somewhat, and moving it opposite Picolata.
  21. One such projected fort was at Mojoloo, downstream from Pupo; apparently it was never built (M. to H., Feb. 23, 1740, in Willcox; 1909: 44). Certain Indian towns such as Ayamon also had small forts (M. to H., Jan. 31, 1740, in Willcox, 1909: 35). The location of this town is not exactly known, but it was probably east of the St. Johns River.

The key position of Pupo at the ferry crossing spot of the Spaniards was also the ferry on the first American road across the State, often called the Bellamy Road. Vignoles (1823: 67), writing early in the American period, remarked then that scarcely a vestige remained, and Williams (1837: 302) noted that the fort (miscalled San Fernando) lay within the environs of the new town of Bayard. Thirty-odd years later Brinton (1869: 192) mentioned that its earthworks were still visible, as did Fairbanks (1871: 192) who noted its location near the ferry-house.

In modern times it has attracted little attention, being off the beaten path. Yet, the often remarkably thorough Florida Guide (Federal Writers Project, 1940: 352) accurately gives its location.

#### *Historical Summary*

The site of Fort Pupo was occupied as a ferry landing from late in the seventeenth century and perhaps earlier. It was then undoubtedly a camping spot of Indians and Spaniards. At an unknown date, about the second decade of the eighteenth century, the first fort was built. Occupation was more or less continuous with a small Spanish garrison and presumably local Timucuan Indians who ran the ferry. Occasional Creeks and other Indians camped here and the "Yuchi" on occasion attacked the fort. By 1738 the original wooden structure had rotted to such an extent as to be almost useless; in addition it was too small to hold an adequate garrison. These factors, plus increasing Indian pressure, led to the building of a larger structure on the same site. It appears to have been completed early in 1739.

The following year the fort was captured, occupied, and strengthened by the English and their Indian allies. On their withdrawal, later in the summer, they destroyed Pupo. Inasmuch as the fort was in ruins twenty years later, it is probable that the Spanish never repaired nor reoccupied the site. Thus its






Fig. 3. Map of Fort Pupo, 1951, showing approximate location of excavations.

terminal date is 1740, giving a total life span of the two structures of 20 to 30 years.

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#### ARCHEOLOGY

Fort Pupo at the present, lying in a thick shady hammock, stirs in most onlookers a feeling of respectable antiquity. Although only abandoned about two hundred years ago, the remains of the fragile wooden structure quickly disappeared leaving rounded but impressive embankments.

The fort was originally square but erosion by the river has removed half, leaving a U-shaped structure (Fig. 3). These remains can be divided for discussion purposes into five parts. As one approaches the fort the ground rises gently to the edge of the moat. This slope was probably in part of deliberate construction, the beginning of a glacis. Dropping off from this rise is a moat approximately 4 to 5 feet deep and 40 feet wide. Still further inside an embankment rises about 11 feet above the river, and within that is another deep moat surrounding a small central platform with an elevation 7 feet above the river. This platform is about 50 feet in north-south measurement and probably was that length east and west, but erosion has removed all but 25 feet on the western side.

The soil profile at the site is simple. Four to six feet below normal surface level and extending to an unknown depth is a deposit of consolidated sand, apparently held together by clay. This distinctive, tan-colored, sandy, hard-pan is penetrated by the moat and is exposed along the river front.

The hard-pan is overlain by white quartz sand, variously stained by human occupation in the area. Between this and the hard-pan the sand is light grey in color with some brown mottling. This soil contains no cultural material.

Stream erosion has caused extensive damage here by the river's cutting into the bank on this point when blown by heavy winds. The growth of cypress trees and knees along the bank

and the shallow water extending some distance off shore fails to act as a buffer. Heavy storms in North Florida in the fall of 1950 were apparently responsible for new erosion activity. Assuming that the whole structure was square, a little more than one half has disappeared to date and its erosion is actively continuing.

### **EXCAVATIONS**

Actual digging at the site has been limited. Such as has been carried out was done to delimit the site and to provide a knowledge of its stratigraphy. Two small test pits (1 and 2) were made by the author, Eugene Miles, and Nanci Goggin in May, 1950. Subsequently, Mr. Miles made a series of 16 small test holes (numbers 3 to 18) around the whole fort area. These served to limit areas of refuse.

The first major excavation at the site was made in the summer of 1950.<sup>22</sup> This comprised a trench 5 feet wide and 15 feet long. Designated as Trench 1, it was laid out at right angles to the eastern moat, close to the river. Three five-foot sections were numbered 5, 6 and 7, and the first (Sec. 5) was just beyond the crest of the moat's outside edge. A small test (no. 19) was made in the fort interior at a corner of the central platform.

On a weekend in April, 1951, further excavations were carried out.<sup>23</sup> These consisted of 12 five foot squares in the vicinity of the first excavation. The numbering system first used was expanded to include trenches 0, and -1 on the river side and 2 to 5 on the other, all parallel to Trench 1. The section organization was also followed with the following squares being excavated: Section 5 in Trenches 2 to 5, Section 8 in Trench 1, Sections 5 to 9 in Trench 0, and Section 7 in Trench -1. In

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22. The following students participated: William Arnold, John Canton, Jo An Hahn, Paul Hahn, Donald Kokomoor, Morton McDonald, and Lillian Seaberg.

23. The field party consisted of the writer and Nanci Goggin, Kenneth Peabody, a fellow faculty member, and the following students: Jo An Hahn, Paul Hahn, John Hennes, Mary Godwin, William Plowden, Rita Porter and Walter Porter.

addition a square in the bottom of the moat on the Trench 1 line was excavated and designated as Section 2' (continuing from Section 1 the designation was changed to prime numbers).

Mr. Jones's digging was confined to points of major metallic reaction found in the immediate area of the fort's structure and the area inland behind the fort.

In this paper it will be impossible to present a complete discussion of the whole excavation. However, a general summary will be given and the following parts are discussed in some detail. Tests 1-19 will be summarized for the data they yield on the distribution of refuse. Of the major excavations Sections 5 to 9, Trench 0 will be considered as a stratigraphic unit. This gives a typical picture of the major excavations demonstrating the stratigraphy of the site and the history of moat construction. Section 2' in Trench 1 will be considered for its contribution to the history of the fort, and finally the Jones excavations will be presented. These data will be an adequate sample of our work and will present all significant results of our work. The complete report on the excavations will appear in another paper now in preparation (Goggin, MS). No data are omitted here which seem to do other than further substantiate points brought out by the material given. In the general discussion of material, consideration is given to all the artifacts found. All data are used in making the reconstruction and drawing the final conclusions.

*Tests 1 to 18.* These small excavations were generally about 18 inches deep and two feet square. A series were made along the river's edge from the eastern side of the fort, 3 behind the fort, 3 on the western side, and several in the fort's interior. Those east of the fort yielded considerable cultural material, but no cultural remains were found elsewhere except nails in the bottom of the innermost moat and a couple of sherds west of the fort near the river.

The cultural remains included Indian, Spanish, and English material. The first two groups of materials demonstrated that the site had been occupied in the St. Augustine archeological period, circa 1650-1763 (Smith, 1948). The English material was definitely of the eighteenth century. These data, in conjunction with historical records of its location, were sufficient to substantiate this site as being Fort Pupo, since that fort is known to have had both Spanish and British occupation in the eighteenth century.

The results of these tests then were to stimulate interest in the site and to indicate the value of more intensive study. This led to excavations in the summer of 1950 and again in the spring of 1951.

*Trench 0.* As has been noted this 25 foot long trench will be discussed in detail for the sample picture it gives of the moat, close to and parallel with the river bank. Its distance from the bank varies with the irregularity of that edge but is from 5 to 10 feet.

Excavation commenced with section 5, closest to the moat, and was extended into 4 other five-foot squares, sections 6, 7, 8, and 9. Each was excavated in 5 six-inch levels to a depth of 30 inches. These may be called, for discussion purposes, starting at the surface, levels 1 to 5. All material was screened to recover as complete a cultural sample as possible.




Fig. 4. Profile, West side of Trench 0, Sections 5 to 9, Fort Pupo. (Vertical scale twice horizontal scale.)

Digging revealed a series of distinct layers of soil (Fig. 4). From the surface down for a varying depth from 6 to 8 inches

the sand was very dark, stained with organic material. Deeper was a grey sand horizon and below that an even lighter sand deposit. Intruding between the dark surface layer and the grey horizon was a lense of tan-colored sand with occasional clay-like lumps of hard-pan. This was 4 to 5 inches thick next to the moat, tapering off to nothing in Section 7. A small patch of the same material appeared in Section 9, and in between were scattered lumps.

Artifacts found in this trench were mainly potsherds, a total of 1532 in all, together with 210 other objects. In addition as a result of human occupation there were numerous fragments of bone, charred corn cobs, flint chips, brick fragments and pieces of rock.

The pottery has been classified by types and these are grouped together in series for discussion. Table 1 presents the percentile

TABLE 1. - PERCENTILE FREQUENCY OF POTSDHERDS, TRENCH 0

Level Number	Orange Series	St. Johns Series	San Marcos Series	Unclassified Indian Series	Spanish	English Introduced	Total Sherds (by number)
1. ....	.....	5.48	50.7	8.22	5.48	30.1	73
2. ....	.....	6.34	85.0	1.50	3.16	4.0	599
3. ....	.....	14.2	79.5	4.88	0.95	0.40	737
4. ....	4.85	32.0	49.5	8.73	2.91	1.94	103
5. ....	40.0	15.0	40.0	5.00	.....	.....	20

frequency of each series in terms of level for the whole trench. Such a presentation reveals interesting historical details of the various pottery series. Orange series material is confined to the earliest levels; it is relatively abundant in the bottom level, less so in level 4 and absent elsewhere.

The bulk of the pottery is comprised in the St. Johns and San Marcos series.<sup>24</sup> These have distinct histories in this site. As can be seen from Table 1, the St. Johns series reaches its peak

24. A description of these will be found in a following section.

(32.0%) early in the site in level 4. From there the type decreases in importance to the top level. On the other hand, the San Marcos material increases steadily in frequency from the lowest level (40%) to its highest frequency in level 2 (85%). Unclassified Indian forms fluctuate within a small range and are never numerically important.

The two groups of European material have also a distinct history. Spanish pottery, all olive jar fragments except for one small piece of majolica, ranges from the level 4 to level 1. It varies in quantity but is never important.

English introduced pottery (which includes Chinese porcelain) is relatively unimportant until level 2 (4%) and then increases greatly in level 1 (30.1%).

Other remains of man include 210 miscellaneous artifacts and fragments. These can be divided into two groups, those clearly of Indian manufacture and those made of European materials. The Indian material includes small flint projectile points, a sandstone hone, worked flint fragment, a possible disk made of Busycon shell, and clay pipe fragments. The first three items were all found in levels 3 to 5 while the others were in levels 1 to 3 (Table 2).

European material was found only in levels 1 to 3. There was relatively little in level 3, and most came from level 2 (Table 2).

The distribution of bones was throughout the site. Until a full study of these is completed little can be said as to the distribution by type. Corn cobs (4) came from levels 2 and 3. A few possible brick fragments and pieces of stone foreign to Florida (ballast?) were present in levels 1 to 3.

Evidence from Trench 0, indicates that changes took place throughout the deposition of material. In pottery one group, the Orange Series, is found only in the bottom levels. Another, the St. Johns series, decreases in quantity throughout the site while a third group, the San Marcos, series increases in quantity from the earliest to the next to surface level.

TABLE 2.—NUMERICAL FREQUENCY OF ARTIFACTS OTHER THAN POTTERY, TRENCH 0

Level	Flint point	Sandstone hone	Worked flint	Shell disk	Indian pipe fragments	Glass	White trade pipe fragments	Gun flint	Brass buckle	Silver object	Jet bead	Iron knife fragment	Nails	Iron fragments	Brick(?) fragments	Lead fragments	Brass fragments	Worked bone(?)	25 cent coin	Total
1.....					1	20	11			1	1	1		2		1	13		1	52
2.....				1		53	24	2	1				38	8	7	3	1			138
3.....		1			1	2	2	1					5	2	2		1	1		18
4.....	2																			2
5.....			1																	1
Total.	2	1	1	1	2	75	37	4	1	1	1	1	43	12	9	4	15	1	1	211



European ceramics are found on all but the lowest levels. Of these the Spanish material shows little change throughout but after a scattered showing the English introduced ceramics suddenly are important in the surface level.

Purely aboriginal objects of worked flint have an early position. European metal, glass, and clay objects occur only in the upper half of the site.

*Test 19.* A small test was made by Donald Kokomoor, at the same time Trench 1 was excavated, on the northeast corner of the interior platform. This was made with the view of determining if any occupational level could be found there. An irregularly shaped area was excavated the eastern 3 by 5 feet section to a depth of 6 inches and a western, L shaped section 4 by 1 1/2 by 2 feet was carried down to a depth of 12 inches in two levels.

No distinct occupational level was found. Several stained areas possibly were remains of posts. Artifacts included one St. Johns Check Stamped sherd and a large iron spike.

*Test in Section 2' Trench 1.* In order to obtain some idea of the outer moat's history a single square was excavated near its center on Trench 1 line. The first 10 inches of soil was humus stained sand, then a light tan sand, and by 13 inches hard-pan, a yellow sand with much clay, was struck.

A few artifacts were found in level 1 (0 to 6 inches): 1 San Marcos Plain, 1 San Marcos Stamped, and 1 English creamware sherd, along with a nail and a peach pit. There was considerable charcoal in the level. No artifacts were found in either the second or third level but charcoal continued into the second.

*Jones Excavations.* As has been mentioned, W. M. Jones made a series of test holes around the site unaware that a scientific study was in progress. When told of our work he very generously turned over his material for inclusion in our report and showed us where it was obtained.

His pits are marked on the map as Jones 1, Jones 2, etc. (Fig. 3). Mr. Jones used an electronic metal locator and only dug where a substantial response indicated a large piece of metal. Thus this digging was shallow and limited.

Pit 1, on top of the embankment yielded a rifle barrel and in nearby pit 2 was found a large brass button. In pit 3, on the slope, were found 2 iron axes and further down the slope, pit 4, was an iron lock. At the extreme corner of the moat in a limited area, Jones 5, were found 2 large and 2 small iron hinges and down the moat edge, pit 6, was found a hoe.

Jones 7 is an area along the edge of the interior platform. Here were found a number of large iron spikes.

*Discussion of other excavations.* The sequence found in Trench 0 is substantially that found in all of the other sections excavated. Some minor differences in presence or absence of material was found; the more significant can be noted.

The greatest concentration of artifacts (from either Orange or St. Augustine times) occurs in Trench 0 and -1. Going from these inland, away from the river, there is less and less material. Very likely a point of even higher concentration was formerly present in the area now eroded away by the river.

In the major excavation area few traces of structures were seen. Some pieces of daub were found indicating mud and wattle type structures which burned, hardening the clay plaster. This material was limited to Trench 1, again suggesting concentration of human activity, in terms of houses or other structures near the original river bank. No post holes were found.

A few pits contained bones, sherds, and other refuse. Most distinctive was one with a large mass of charred corn cobs.

#### *Artifacts*

The great bulk of the man-made objects found in the excavation are fragments of pottery. These are mainly Indian types, with some Spanish forms and even less English fragments.

These potsherds are all examples of well known forms described in the archeological literature so their details will not be repeated again. For the purposes of the general reader, a brief note on the forms and a reference to other descriptions should suffice.<sup>25</sup>




Fig. 5. Various Artifacts, Fort Pupo. A, black glass bead; B-C, jet bead; D, blue glass bead; E, glass scraper; F, soapstone effigy head; G, stipple punctuated basalt ware; H, flat brass button; I, hollow brass button. (Scale: F, twice life; remainder life size.)

Archeologists in Florida have classified Indian pottery into various wares on the basis of the clay composition used. These wares are further subdivided into types on the basis of absence of decoration or its nature when present. We will discuss these types in their related groups which are called series.

*St. Johns Series.* The St. Johns Series is characterized by a fine paste, almost completely without sand, grit, or other inclusions. It is smooth to the touch and when weathered it has a chalky feeling. Plain forms are known as St. Johns Plain, while the most common decorated form is called St. Johns Check Stamped (James B. Griffin, 1945; Griffin and Smith, 1949; Rouse, 1951). This latter type is decorated with a grid-like pattern formed by the impression of a carved wooden paddle. Less common in our excavation were St. Johns Simple Stamped and St. John Scored (Griffin and Smith, 1949).

25. A technical discussion of the ceramics and their distribution will be given in a forthcoming monograph which is now in preparation by the author (Goggin, MS). However, all major details are mentioned here.


The usual vessel form of the St. Johns series is a wide shallow bowl with a simple lip and rim. Most specimens seem to have been from such vessels. Two unique forms should be mentioned. One is represented by sherds from two large deep jars of St. Johns Check Stamped pottery, distinctive for their folded rims and reed punctations (Fig. 7, B). This is the normal rim treatment for San Marcos Stamped but never reported before on this type. The second form worthy of comment is a plate shaped vessel of St. Johns Simple Stamped represented by several sherds. Again this is not an uncommon San Marcos Stamped shape, adopted from Spanish vessels, but never previously reported on this type of pottery.

Three incised sherds of this ware are unique. Although small, they appear to be local copies of Aucilla Incised, a mission period type from the Tallahassee area (Smith, 1951: 172-173).


*San Marcos Series.* This series has a distinctive thick ware in which the clay is mixed with abundant quantities of coarse quartz sand and sometimes crushed limestone. Plain examples occur, San Marcos Plain, and rarely red painted forms, San Marcos Red, are present; but the most common type is San Marcos Stamped (Smith, 1948).

In this type the surface is impressed with a carved paddle leaving a bold distinctive design. The paddle is generally carved with a row of deep narrow grooves and may be impressed neatly, leaving an impression of raised bars called simple stamping (Fig. 6, E, F). Even more commonly a double impression was made, the second being at an angle to the first, usually a right angle, leaving a series of raised squares (Fig. 6, C, D). Much less commonly the paddle was carved with an elaborate curvilinear or rectangular design or even a grid which produced the check stamped effect.

Vessels are shallow or deep bowls. They usually have folded rims with punctation or pinching at the base of the fold (Fig. 6,



**Fig. 6. Potsherds and other Artifacts, Fort Pupo. A-F; San Marcos Stamped pottery; G, brushed pottery; H, flint arrowpoint; I-J, gun flints; K, brass buckle; L, English basalt ware pottery. (Scale: A-G, one-half life size; H-L, slightly more than life size.)**



**Fig. 7. Iron objects and other Artifacts, Fort Pupo. A, C, front and back view of lock; B, St. Johns Check Stamped pottery (San Marcos rim style); D, trade pipe; E, rifle barrel; F-G, hinges; J-K, axes; H-I, spikes; L, hoe. (Scale: A, C, E-L, one fourth life size; B, three-tenths life size; D, slightly more than one-half size.)**

A, B). Sherds have been found from several plate-shaped vessels, in both San Marcos Red and San Marcos Stamped. Those of the latter type are of the usual "soup-bowl" forms, well smoothed on the inside with the flange painted red and the outside stamped.

*Orange Series.* The Orange Series, represented by Orange Plain and a single Orange Incised sherd is a fiber-tempered ware; that is, grass or other vegetable fiber was added to the clay. During firing this material burnt out, leaving many fine holes in the vessel. A total of 22 sherds were found, usually in the lowest levels of the site and mainly in sections nearest to the river. This material has no relation to the historic occupation of Fort Pupo but remains from an earlier Indian occupation, sometime before the Time of Christ (Goggin, 1950). Its mixture, in some levels, with St. Augustine Period materials is accidental.

*Miscellaneous Indian Types.* In addition to the numerous well known types, a number of undescribed forms and several other types were present. A number of smooth black plain ware sherds may be Miller Plain (Smith, 1951: 165-166), a late type from the Tallahassee area. They were presumably traded here or brought in by Apalachee Indians during the fort's occupation.

Several groups of sherds are difficult to interpret. These include a number of plain fine grit-tempered sherds; red-painted, grit-tempered sherds; well smoothed grit-tempered sherds; and well smoothed, yellow to brown, grit-tempered sherds. These last are distinctive and not found elsewhere in the region. They are suggestive of late 19th and early 20th century Seminole pottery from Oklahoma. It is possible they may have been brought in by some of the Creek peoples.

Much more likely to have been introduced by the Creeks (or related peoples) are three sherds (Fig. 6, G) from Test 2. These are a grit-tempered ware with mica inclusions. The surface has been brushed and then smoothed over.

*Spanish Ceramics.* Most pottery sherds identifiable as being

Spanish are fragments of large storage and shipping vessels called "olive jars," from their use, at times, as olive oil containers. These were tall slender vessels of a red or tan colored paste, often white slipped and usually bearing on the inside the distinctive marks made when "throwing" the vessel on the potters wheel. A total of 82 sherds were present.

A second form, represented by only a very small sherd is majolica. It is a red paste earthenware with thin, white enamel or glaze on both surfaces. The scarcity of this ware, common in mission sites, is not unexpected at this poor frontier military outpost.

*English ceramics.* English earthenware, while not abundant, did occur in some quantity, 98 sherds in all. These include several forms.

The most abundant of these, represented by 84 sherds, is a relatively thin, well-made, glazed pottery called Creamware or Queen's Ware. This was made in Staffordshire and Leeds during the eighteenth century, but reached popularity only after its improvement by Josiah Wedgewood in the 1760's. The sample from here seems to be of the earlier forms. The surface often has a distinctly pitted glaze, many pieces show throwing marks (not present on later forms), the walls are not uniform in thickness, and flowing streaks appear in the glaze.

Vessel shapes in general are less sophisticated than later forms<sup>26</sup> and include small cups or bowls, rarely plates, a large basin or bowl with a rolled lip, and teapot (?) fragments (represented by a possible body sherd and a cover fragment, although the latter may pertain to another covered vessel.)

White-bodied, brown slip ware is represented by 5 sherds. These all seem to be from large cups or mugs decorated below the rim with large dots done in brown slip which ran under an

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26. For comparison we have a later series of many thousands of sherds from Spaldings Lower Store, a British trading post, circa 1763-1783, further up the St. Johns River (see Goggin, 1949).



amber colored lead glaze. The type has a long history in Staffordshire, dating at least from the seventeenth century (Wedgwood and Ormsbee, 1947: 2) and ranging to near the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>27</sup>

The third type represented by only 7 sherds is black basalt ware. This is a hard, black, stone ware with decoration in relief. Like creamware, this type is well known because of its development by Wedgwood. However, the introduction of this ware is generally given as around 1760. This is somewhat later than its presence here at the fort would indicate.

Designs are rather rococo in representation but naturalistic and floral and included human figures derived, for the most part, from Renaissance and Classical Greek and Roman styles. The cherubs represented (Fig. 6, L) are typical. The 2 sherds of the cruder stippled form (Fig. 5, G) have no counterpart in the available literature. Vessel shapes are uncertain but several sherds are of a vessel lid, perhaps from a teapot.

Other possible English forms include a single small fragment of a salt-glazed, brown, hard, earthenware vessel. Another is a very small sherd from the rim of a white glazed vessel. This is a white ware, and has a checked design in black. A few similar sherds come from Spaldings Lower Store.

Undoubtedly derived from the English occupation are six small porcelain sherds. One is a white ware with remnants of yellow overglaze painting. It is most likely Oriental in origin, probably Chinese. The remaining sherds have blue underglaze decoration on white. They may be European porcelain in Chinese style, rather than Oriental imports.

*Objects of Indian origin.* The major group of Indian artifacts is chipped stone. This includes four small triangular flint points (Fig. 6, H), three fragments of worked flint and an unusual

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27. It is common at Spaldings Lower Store and is found at plantation sites of the British period in Florida.

narrow triangular point or drill. This is worn smooth on all sides as if it had been exposed to long stream rolling.

A small piece of soapstone seems to be a fragment of an effigy (Fig. 5, F). It is unique. Other objects of probable Indian origin are two small fragments of sandstone grinding stones, a worked deer (?) phalange, and a roughly shaped dish of *Busycon* shell.

Indian workmanship is found in a small scraper chipped from crystal glass apparently piece of a goblet (Fig. 5, E). Such use of glass is not uncommon since it can be treated like flint and is easier to work.<sup>28</sup>

*European Objects.* These include many types of objects made from a variety of materials. Pieces of white clay pipes are numerous, 77 in all. They all appear to be of a single type (Fig. 7, D) with only slightly more than a 90 degree angle between the stem and the bowl, no spur, and no marks or decoration of any kind.

Buttons include one large (Jones 2) and one small flat brass (Fig. 5, H) specimen and one hollow brass specimen (Fig. 5, I). A brass buckle (Fig. 6, K) probably is from a shoe. It has a simple incised design on top. A small unidentified object apparently of silver may be part of a clasp.

One modern coin was found in the top level of Trench 0. It is an 1856 United States quarter.

Three beads include one of black glass (Fig. 5, A) and a fragment of a blue glass pitted-surface specimen (Fig. 5, D). A flat square bead, apparently of jet, has a low pyramidal top and two diagonal longitudinal perforations (Fig. 5, B, C).

Glass fragments were numerous with 139 sherds of three main types. Most common were 56 dark olive green pieces from bottles. These are the form with concave bottom often called rum or wine bottles. Clear, or crystal glass, numbered 52 frag-

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28. Other glass scrapers have been noted in east Florida at Spaldings Lower Store (Pu 23), the Fountain of Youth Site, St. Augustine (SJ 31), and the Zetrouer Site (A 67) near Gainesville.

ments from large and small bottles, goblets and perhaps other forms. Thirdly, are 31 pieces of pale water-green glass with many large and small bubble inclusions. They may be from bottles.

Thirteen fragments or whole gun flints were collected. All except three are the usual English type, but rather small (Fig. 6, 1, J). They came from the top two levels. There are three gun flints (1 from level 2, 2 from level 3) which appear to be made from local flint using local techniques. Two musket balls were found.

Small fragments of sheet brass appear to be scraps, perhaps cut from kettles. There are 20 pieces. Six small pieces of lead were also present.

A number of objects and fragments of iron were found. In our excavations we obtained 32 nails. Those in good condition are small square handwrought examples. Jones obtained many large spikes (Fig. 7, H, I). A fragment of a knife blade, perhaps from a clasp knife and several small unidentified objects of iron were also found.

A short distance from the area in which we excavated was a small hole dug following our first visit. Nearby on the surface, and apparently taken from the pit was an iron spear with a single barb. This is a common type at historic sites on the river (Rouse, 1951, Pl. 8, V).

The most interesting metal pieces are those obtained by Mr. Jones. They include 2 pairs of hinges. The largest is 14 1/2 inches long, with an overall width of 17 1/2 inches (Fig. 7, F). They range in thickness from 1/8 to 3/16 of an inch. The smaller pair is similar in form, 6 inches long and 6 inches wide (Fig. 7, G).

The lock is a complete mechanism in a metal box and consists of a rectangular bolt to be thrown by a key (Fig. 7, A, C).

The rifle barrel is only a fragment 12 1/2 inches long. It is of large bore and octagonal in shape (Fig. 7, E). It probably had a flint lock, judging from its side touch hole. The two axes were

of the usual "trade" form (Fig. 7, J, K) measuring 5 5/8 and 5 7/8 inches respectively.

Spikes were square, with various shaped heads and measured from 5 3/4 to 13 inches long. Hoes (Fig. 7, L) were 9 3/4 and 10 1/4 inches long.

A hollow iron cannon ball was 1/2 inch thick and about 3 1/2 inches in diameter.

#### *Food Remains*

Animal and vegetable remains still preserved give some idea of the foods eaten by the inhabitants. As might be expected vegetable remains are rare. However, a number of scattered fragments of charred corn cobs were found and one cache of burnt cobs (Tr. 5, Sec. 5, 30"-36") comprised over 50 specimens. Peach pits came from the moat (Sec. 2', Tr. 1), from level 2 (Sec. 6, Tr. 1), and from level 4 (Sec. 5, Tr. 4). Both are remains that would be expected. Corn was the basic Indian and, later, Spanish staple. Peach pits are found in many archeological sites with Spanish contacts and peaches are known to have been a favorite fruit of the Spanish and widely introduced wherever they went.<sup>29</sup>

Animal remains, represented by bones, were numerous in all parts of the site and formed by bulk the greater part of the material found. Material from Trench 1 is in process of study at the present time so only a preliminary statement can be made. The bulk of the remains are of deer and domestic cattle. However, there is at least one bison bone, part of the head of a humerus. It came from Tr. 1, Sec. 6, 12"-18" (communication, June 16, 1951, H. B. Sherman).<sup>30</sup>

The presence of buffalo remains is not too surprising in view of their presence to the west in Alachua County in 1716 (Boyd,

29. Elsewhere in historic Florida sites, a few were found at the Scott Miller site (Smith, 1951: 124) and several hundred have come from Fig Springs (Co 4).

30. I am grateful to Professor H. B. Sherman and Pierce Brodkorb who have made preliminary studies of the animal remains.

1949: 14). This find represents their first archeological occurrence in Florida.

*Archeological Summary and Conclusions*

Archeological data presented here indicate a general distribution around the fort structure of cultural remains characteristic of the St. Augustine period, ca. 1650-1763. Stratigraphic excavation in the area of heaviest refuse concentration showed St. Augustine material to be dominant throughout the history of the deposit. However, scant Orange Period remains in the lower two levels indicate a brief occupation at that time.

Throughout most levels of the site the presence of Spanish pottery and San Marcos series Indian pottery shows the range of the St. Augustine period. The gradual contrasting change in frequency of the St. Johns and San Marcos pottery series suggests a gradual change in ceramic types that took place during this period.

It is possible that the peaks of St. Johns and San Marcos pottery represent separate periods of occupation as do the peaks of Orange and English material. However, if that were so the changing frequency of St. Johns and San Marcos series would be more abrupt instead of gradual. In no two levels is there a change in frequency of either St. Johns or San Marcos pottery which is as abrupt as that between levels 4 and 5 for the Orange series (a ratio of about 1 to 8) or between levels 1 and 2 for the English introduced wares (a ratio of about 1 to 7.5). The St. Augustine period thus seems to be a changing fluid pattern in ceramic terms. At the top the sudden appearance of European material of types usually associated with the English, indicates a changed cultural situation. This is characterized by little (non-Floridian) Indian material and a high percentage of European remains. The presence of these mixed with St. Augustine period pottery types may be due to two possible factors, among others. One is that such refuse was actually deposited by the English

group, being material captured in the fort. Another explanation is that the sherds were those on the surface of the ground and were intermixed while English material was being discarded. This last is the most probable explanation, but the former may have taken place at the same time.

A test pit in the outer moat quickly reached hard-pan after penetrating a shallow, almost refuse free layer, characterized only by the presence of charcoal. The presence of a lense of similar hard-pan in our excavations, thickest close to the moat, suggests that this hard-pan was thrown out in digging the moat. Its presence above and below English material indicates that this excavation was carried out during the English period.

#### DISCUSSION OF THE FORT STRUCTURE

Inasmuch as our excavation in the fort itself has been limited, any consideration of its details can only be tentative and general. Nevertheless, some points can be considered. The Olano plan of 1738 depicts a wooden structure on a platform surrounded by a palisade at the edge of the platform and apparently a shallow moat outside. No outer embankment or moat is shown. Since this is our only Spanish plan of the site, dating but two years before its destruction, and since it compares well with Oglethorpe's description and Mace's plan, let us examine the plan in terms of the existing remains.

Olano's blockhouse, including the palisade, scales out as a square structure, about 38 feet long on each side at the base. This correlates fairly closely with the remnant of the interior platform. Precise correlation of the platform and the plan is difficult because in its present weathered condition, the platform outlines are so amorphous that points to measure from are only arbitrary. Despite this, the remnant of the platform indicates that it was close enough in size to Olano's structure to have been the same. Mace's plan scales very close to Olano's in most details.

No correlation is possible between the remainder of the site and Olano and Mace plans. The outer embankment and moat are so much larger that any identification must be rejected. On the basis of size, then, the interior platform must be considered as the site of blockhouse with the stockade following the edge of the present platform.

Some archeological data exist to support this contention. Test 19, at the northeast corner of the platform yielded a very large spike. W. M. Jones, in his digging, found similar spikes scattered along the whole north edge of the platform. These spikes are of such a size as would have been practical for holding crosspieces to the palisade timbers. Their presence here suggests a former structure, most likely the palisade around Olano's blockhouse.

There still has to be explained, however, the outer embankment and moat, certainly the most distinctive features of the site. They do not fit Olano's plans made only two years before the fort's capture, they are not on Mace's plan nor are they described by Oglethorpe when he captured the fort. Therefore, they must be later additions, but who constructed them, the Spanish or English?

Our study of Spanish source material yields no accounts of Spanish supplementary construction at the fort, but we do know that Oglethorpe added to the fortification after he decided to garrison the captured structure. One contemporary reported that Oglethorpe "caused some new works of Fortification to be made" (Stephens, 1906: 501), and Oglethorpe himself said he "laid out an intrenchment round the fort" (letter from Oglethorpe to Duke of Newcastle Jan. 22, 1740, Colonial Records of Georgia, vol. 35, p. 242). Perhaps the clearest statement is Captain Mark Carr's that General Oglethorpe "strengthened it much [the fort] by throwing up a large bank" (letter to Gen. J. Campbell, Jan. 28, 1740, in Phillipp's Collection manuscripts, vol. 5, p. 329).

These statements make it probable that the present outer works were those added at this time.<sup>31</sup>

In support of this theory we have some archeological evidence. It will be recalled that in our excavation in the moat (Trench 1, Section 2') only a thin layer of sand with scant cultural material was found resting on the hard pan. This is worthy of comment in two respects; first, the lack of more refuse is indicative of the brief period the moat was in existence. Moats seem to have been the handiest receptacles for refuse near a fort, and were commonly used for this purpose, as in the case of the Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine.

The second point of interest is the hard pan at the bottom of the moat. It will be recalled that in our main excavation, just off the moat we found a very distinct soil profile. This consisted of a thin layer of humus stained sand on the surface overlying a tan sand layer of varying thickness. This layer which contained occasional lumps of hard pan thinned out rapidly with distance from the moat (Fig. 4). Further it will be recalled that it was in and above this layer that most British material was found.

The similarity of the tan colored layer with the hard pan from the moat bottom indicates that it came from that source and was thrown out in the excavation of the moat. The close association of English material with and above this layer suggests that this material was thrown out during or after the British occupation. The presence of some British material in the moat means

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31. Since the above was written the following information (brought to my attention by Albert C. Manucy) tends to corroborate these conclusions: "Being come within seven small Leagues of the Place [St. Augustine] he took two Castles, both situate on a large lake: That on the South Side he demolished, but kept the other on the North Side, called Manchicolas, [Pupo] defended by some Pieces of Cannon, one Serjeant, and ten Men, who surrendred [sic] on the second firing. It was surrounded by strong Palisadoes above eight Foot high, having Loopholes seven Foot from the Ground: but by means of a Parapet within, near three Foot in height, they became Breast-high. The General caused a Ditch to be made round it, leaving thirty Soldiers and a Boat well manned to guard it, in order to straiten the Enemy." (Anon. 1741) pp. 188-189.



that it probably was deposited there during British occupation, leaving the period of moat building to the brief months the English were there, not before and not after.

In summary, our interpretation of the structure is as follows: the central platform was apparently the site of the first sentry box and Olano's second blockhouse. During British occupation, in 1740, the defenses were strengthened by building a surrounding embankment and moat. Most material from the moat was thrown up on the large embankment, but some, from the bottom, was thrown outwards forming a distinct and easily recognizable layer in the soil profile.

Whether additional palisades were added cannot be determined from either historical sources or our limited work. However, the discovery by W. M. Jones of the hinges and lock at the outer northeast corner of the structure suggests a large gate and smaller door, presumably in a stockade. Excavation is needed to clear up this point.

The British note that they destroyed the structure on their departure but no details are given. It probably was by burning which was the easiest method. The hinges found show the effect of fire.

### RECONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL LIFE

Our archeological and historical data have been sufficient to throw considerable light on the life of the people at Fort Pupo. In order to discuss this properly it is first necessary to outline the temporal range of Pupo's occupation and to consider the various occupants of the site.

#### *Duration of Occupation*

*Orange Period.* Orange series potsherds concentrated in the lower levels of our excavations indicate that the site was occupied in the Orange Period, some thousand or so years previous to the time of Christ. This does not seem to have been an

intensive occupation and in any case was not continuous into later times.

*St. Augustine Period.* The bulk of the cultural materials of the site, especially the San Marcos Stamped pottery, have been placed in a time ranging from about 1650 to 1763 (Smith, 1948; Goggin, 1948). Since this material is abundant throughout our excavation we can conclude that the major occupation began in St. Augustine times.

How early in the period it was we can only approximate. Within the history of the site an increase in the frequency of the diagnostic San Marcos series can be noted (see Table 1) which suggests that the first occupation was not too late in the St. Augustine period. On the other hand it was not too close to the beginning of the period, judging from the stamping techniques used on the San Marcos pottery. Smith (1948, 314) found complicated stamping to be a fairly common method of decorating San Marcos Stamped pottery previous to 1686. At Pupo complicated stamping is an unimportant technique, so presumably occupation here is post-1686.

Our historical data are vague for either a date of founding or date of possible village occupation. As was noted, references to the ferry crossing become more numerous in the late seventeenth century and probably some people were more or less regularly camping or living here at that time. With the construction and occupation of the fort, *circa* 1715-1725, a permanent settlement was then present until its capture by the Georgians in 1740.

English occupation was for only a few months, then the Georgians departed late in July, 1740, after destroying the fort, and ending our record of continuous occupation.

*The British Period, 1763-1784.* There is no historical evidence of any occupation at Pupo during this period. Bartram's Pupo, wherever it was located had no occupation at his time and even

if his site was not our Pupo, it seems improbable that any occupation at our site would have passed unnoticed. We have no references to any plantation or settlement here and the absence of archeological materials such as is found at both Spaldings Lower Post and Egmont Plantation (Mt. Royal) supports the theory of no British occupation in this period.

*The Second Spanish Period, 1784-1821.* No historical evidence for occupation here is known, nor can any archeological signs of occupation be recognized.

*The Early American Period, 1821-1845.* Although we have general references to the site during this period, it seems to have been far enough away from the ferry and Bellamy road to have escaped occupation.<sup>32</sup> In any case distinctive chinaware of this period is absent.

*The Late American Period, 1845-1951.* Documentary evidence for occupation at this time has not been found. Moreover, the large growth of trees suggest that no extensive clearing was made within the last 50 to 75, or more, years. Local tradition (reported to W. M. Jones) states that the only recent occupation was a mule pen, northwest of the fort. Surface indications support this; an old hog trap northwest of the fort, and some modern refuse in its vicinity suggest brief occupation and no more.

Archeological material from our digging indicates no significant modern occupation other than casual hunters or other visitors. The 1856 quarter may have been lost by one, and the series of modern shotgun shell bases from the top level of Trench 0 suggests recent duck hunters shooting from the river bank. Absolutely no other recent refuse, other than a modern nail, came from our excavations, although glass bottles and cans may be found along the water's edge.

*Summary of Occupation.* After a brief or intermittent occupa-

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32. The Bellamy road shows up quite clearly on modern airphotos. It headed inland from the river several hundred yards south of the site.

tion in the Orange Period, man seems to have ignored our site for some 2,000 or so years. Late in the 17th century it was occupied at least sporadically by bearers of the St. Augustine culture; by the first or the second decade of the 18th century this culture was well established. In 1740 after a few months of British ownership the site was deserted and, as far as our evidence goes, was never inhabited except by casual visitors even into modern times.

### *Peoples at the Site*

*Early Indians.* The bearers of the Orange culture were Indians, beyond that we know little of them. In our story they play an unimportant role.

*Spanish and Indians.* The major occupants of the site, bearers of the St. Augustine culture, were Spanish and Indians. They occupied the site together for much of the time.

Presumably the Indians were, at least in the 17th century, members of one of the Timucuan speaking groups. Originally they were possibly from Salamatoto. After the disruption of the interior and western missions in 1704-1706 so many varied refugees came to the St. Johns valley that the Indian occupants of the site may have been Potano, Timucua proper, other tribes of the Timucua province, Apalachees, or even Muskogean peoples from the far west. Then, too, at the same time refugees from the north increased in numbers, spreading into this territory. Prominent among these were the Yamassee. Thus, during the Spanish occupation, their Indian associates at the fort could have been members of almost any tribe in northern Florida and southeastern Georgia.

In addition to these, Creeks apparently stopped at the fort enroute to St. Augustine during occasional periods of peace. Yuchi, too, were associated with the fort, if only by attacking it.

How many Indians were ever at the fort is not clear, some apparently ran the ferry and others acted as scouts. We are safe

in counting, though, a number of Spanish, an average perhaps of eight men, who formed the nucleus of the population. Around them fluctuated a varying unknown number of Indians.

*English.* The English who finally occupied the fort were primarily settlers from Georgia, born in the old country. Most were of Scotch ancestry.

*English Indians.* On Oglethorpe's initial and later occupation of the fort he was accompanied by Indian allies; and during his second occupation these allies met at the fort. On the first visit they included Chickasaw, Yuchi, and Creek Indians, while the second time Cherokees and Creeks were in his group.

*Summary of Peoples.* In Pupo's brief span of existence it played host to, or was attached by the majority of Indian tribes in north Florida and adjacent states, including Yuchi, Creek, Chickasaw, and Cherokee. Among the major tribes of the Southeast only the Choctaw failed to appear in association with the fort, and they too may have visited it. Both the Spanish and English played their role on Pupo's stage and with the Indians they made the little site a brief crossroads of Southeastern peoples. There is no comparable site in Florida or the adjacent Southeast.

#### *Cultural Reconstruction*

Since occupation was minimal in early times and equally unimportant in later times, we have only the St. Augustine Period as the time of major occupation. Although many Indians of various tribes were in and out of the fort's picture, the center of activity revolved at all times around the two European groups. Let us then consider our interpretative picture in terms of the Spanish and English. This makes good sense for a number of historical and cultural reasons, and above all it follows an archaeological distinction which can be made in the site.

*Life in Spanish times.* As has been pointed out in the section on archeology, excepting for English material mainly confined to the upper foot of the excavations, the bulk of occupational

remains are of the St. Augustine Period. Historical data indicate a small predominantly European garrison. Remains of actual Spanish cultural materials are very scarce; outside of ceramics we have nothing that can positively be identified with the Spanish, and Spanish ceramics comprise only a small percent of the total in the site. Certain objects such as thick green bottle fragments and iron nails are undoubtedly in part of Spanish origin. Examples of the former were captured by the English and the latter held the fort together.

The most impressive thing about the cultural remains of Spanish times is the small quantity of actual Spanish material present. If we had no historical evidence for the nature of the inhabitants at Pupo in Spanish times, the most reasonable assumption would be that the site was one purely of Indian occupation.

What did the Pupo inhabitants cook in and eat out of? The single small sherd of majolica was probably a plate, but all the other Spanish ceramics were olive jars for storage or transportation. Indian pottery then must have served for cooking and eating purposes since no other was present in our sample. The Spaniard did at least make his influence felt in ceramic form for the remains of at least four individual vessels (2 San Marcos Stamped, 1 San Marcos Red, 1 St. Johns Simple Stamped) in the deep plate or soup bowl shape are present in our collection. It is easy to envision them made by Indians to Spanish order.

Worked flint, principally small triangular arrow points indicates use of the bow and arrow by the site's inhabitants, Indian or Spanish, probably the former. Houses of Indian type are also suggested by burnt daub fragments.

The Indian's corn was equally as important to the Spanish as was the deer as a source of food. Cattle bones are numerous and indicate beef raising for food purposes. Bison and deer bones suggest the occasional hunting of these animals. Little

else is present in the way of food remains except two peach pits, typical Spanish fruit.

Evidence from Pupo clearly suggests for the first time in Florida a picture typical of many other parts of Spanish America. That is, a picture of two-way acculturation where the Indian culture has often had as much or more effect on Spanish culture, especially that of the poorer classes, than did the Spanish on the Indian. The picture at Pupo is one of a small Spanish group leaving cultural traits basically Indian.

These archeological remains are not a static picture, but are of changing culture. We see the intrusive San Marcos pottery influencing the St. Johns series with the latter copying the folded punctated rim. Evidence clearly shows too the declining importance of the St. Johns pottery while San Marcos becomes more popular. The Spanish life reflected the changes in that of the Indian.

*Life in English times.* Occupation by the Georgians was limited to only a few months, yet they left numerous indications of their presence. Distinctive broken and discarded European pottery of several kinds is present. Probable teapot fragments suggest the favorite English drink. Crystal goblets, a frontier luxury, were used by these people. The buckle and buttons are typical of the English. Food remains, deer and beef bones, represent the living off the country reported in contemporary letters.

Of the English Indians there is little trace. The beads perhaps belong to them and a few Indian sherds are non-Floridian types. However, this is not surprising since by this time the Creeks and other Georgia Indians had adapted many items of European culture; moreover, the Indians were on a war party and accustomed to traveling light.

With supply boats able to come as close to the fort it is not surprising that the English had such a variety of material goods when they went to war. In many respects the British have been

known to surround themselves, in most distant places, with the typical English culture and accessories. The relative abundance of material from such a short period suggests that here as elsewhere, the officers and perhaps others ate from old country pottery, prepared tea in teapots, and drank their wine or water from crystal goblets. The time and place interfered as little as possible with the usual ways of life.

*Contrasting European cultures.* The high points of life in Spanish and English times may be reviewed. Spanish cultural remains on the St. Johns River, as far as archeological evidence goes, stems to a great extent from native Indian sources. Food, pottery, and housing all were influenced. English life was one surrounded by familiar things from Europe. Discarded buttons, a buckle, chinaware, and porcelain sherds all are evidence of the "normal" way of life brought to the frontier. This in part, but apparently not wholly, is perhaps due to the comparative wealth of the two groups. The Spanish were common soldiers while the English group included many officers, presumably better off materially.

Nevertheless the Spanish seem to have been more provincial and closer to aboriginal life in many ways. The English on the other hand clung firmly to their European customs and material goods.

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#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A time-rounded earthwork on the west bank of the St. Johns River on Bayard Point can be identified, through historical and archeological study as Fort San Francisco de Pupo. The first structure at the site, a small sentry box, was probably built within a few years of 1720.

Its purpose was, with the aid of Fort Picolata on the opposite bank, to protect the ferry crossing on the St. Augustine-Apalachee road and to serve as the northwesternmost outer



defense of St. Augustine. Its presence made raids by Creek Indians more difficult.

To meet this problem even better a larger and stronger structure was built in 1738-9. However, under its first major attack the fort fell to the massed artillery of General Oglethorpe and a mixed group of Georgians and Indians on January 7, 1740.

The English garrisoned the fort and reinforced it by the construction of a high earthen wall and outer moat. But their occupation was brief, ending on July 22 or 23, 1740, with the razing of the structure.

Archeological data parallel the historic sources very closely. Stratigraphic tests clearly indicate an early Orange Period occupation underlying the major deposit of the St. Augustine period. On top of this a deposit of English material climaxes occupation. The outside moat construction is seen to have taken place during the English period.

Our major purpose in excavating the site was achieved in the study of the remains of the St. Augustine Period. These indicated a steady change in ceramic history during the period, the St. Johns pottery decreasing through time and San Marcos pottery increasing. Most surprising was the complete artifact complex of the period. There is nothing in its nature, either qualitatively or quantitatively, to distinguish it from Indian sites of the same time. It was predominantly occupied, according to scant records, by a small Spanish garrison with a minimum of Indians.

Apparently, the contact between the Indians and Spanish in Florida resulted, in case of the common soldier level at least, in a strong influencing of the Spanish culture by the Indians. How important this impact was elsewhere in Spanish America may be seen in Mexico and other Latin American countries. The same Indian influence seems to have been an important factor here. Perhaps it is only one of those quirks of history,

determined over conference tables in Europe, that kept present Florida from having a distinct Hispano-Indian culture such as is found in varying form and degree from New Mexico to Tierra del Fuego.

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CONFEDERATE FINANCE: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY  
OF A PROPOSAL OF DAVID L. YULEE

by **ARTHUR W. THOMPSON**

The growth of total war in the twentieth century has increasingly focused our attention on the importance and role of domestic economic relationships, particularly those concerned with fiscal policy. The problem of financing a war effort is not a new one however, and the outcome of many a struggle has hinged upon its effective solution. In the case of the American Civil War, a contemporary historian has written: "One of the most fundamental causes of the ultimate failure of the Confederacy lay in its unwise financial policies."<sup>1</sup> That the failure to devise an effective fiscal structure was a contributory factor in the collapse of the Confederacy, will be doubted by few historians.

There were many obstacles that loomed large in blocking the creation of an orderly system of Confederate finance. The proposition "that the Confederacy was a firmly established government instead of merely one in the making was . . . fatal . . ."<sup>2</sup> Foreign trade and international loans were effectively curtailed by the blockade, while Federal invasion disrupted the collection of taxes and the marketing of bonds. Furthermore, in an agrarian, debtor area, whose assets could not be liquidated with ease, the raising of sufficient funds proved an almost impossible task.

The paths open to the new government, therefore, were limited. Bond issues, paper money, and taxation were available for interest payments, purchasing, and governmental operation. The issuance of paper money had not been planned as a war measure.<sup>3</sup> Yet the failure of the first bond issue by the Spring of 1861 made it evident "that the Treasury could not depend on

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1. E. M. Coulter, *The Confederate States of America* (Baton Rouge, 1950), p. 149.

2. *Idem.*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

the sale of bonds to provide cash for the needs of the government.“<sup>4</sup>

The first Confederate Secretary of the Treasury, Christopher G. Memminger, had planned a diversified financial program that included "bonds, a paper currency, and taxes," yet Congress rapidly "embarked on the easy road of paying its debts in unsecured paper and bonds."<sup>5</sup> To his repeated pleas for some tax legislation, the "economy-minded" Congress turned a deaf ear. It was easier to print money and bonds than to set up a tax system. Besides, tax returns would be slow and would not be of any consequence in what was expected to be a short war.

Nevertheless, early in 1861, with the pressure for taxation growing, indirect and, more and more, direct levies were gradually instituted. An 1861 tariff produced altogether about \$1,000,000 in specie.<sup>6</sup> A small export tax on cotton, however, served to embitter the planters. Direct levies, established early in the war on real estate, livestock, slaves, and certain personal possessions had produced only \$18,000,000 by 1863. The permanent Constitution, adopted on March 11, 1861, contained provisions against further direct taxation unless "apportioned among the several States."<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, by 1863, the demand for a tax program could not be stemmed any longer. Davis, Stephens, Toombs and Memminger recommended it; large portions of the press advocated it; and leading citizens of the community supported it. As a result, on April 24, 1863, and in defiance of the Constitution, the Confederate Congress enacted a comprehensive system of taxation. Its provisions included an 8 per cent *ad valorem* tax on farm and forest products, occupational and license taxes, a low, graduated income tax, and a retroactive tax

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4. R. W. Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet* (Baton Rouge, 1944), p. 211.

5. Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

7. *Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States*, I, 910 (Constitution of the Confederate States; Art. I, Sec. 2, par. 3).

on excess profits. Congress also provided for a tax on agricultural production - reminiscent of the tithe - to be paid in kind.

In February, 1864, still another unconstitutional tax law was passed providing for an additional 5 per cent on real and personal property. A year later, Memminger's successor, Secretary Trenholm, was still pleading for more tax revenue to raise a necessary three-quarters of a billion dollars.<sup>8</sup> But by that time the end had come. In all, it has been estimated that approximately 1 per cent of Confederate income came from taxation.<sup>9</sup>

In retrospect, it is clear that the Confederate Congress had been unwilling to face the reality of a tax program adequate to the needs of the situation. Whether or not the public would have supported an extensive tax scheme cannot be said. Yet there were those who did advocate such a program, among them former United States Senator David L. Yulee, and his wife, Nancy Wickliffe Yulee. Whether the high tax proponents, including the Yulees, would have maintained their ardor in the face of such a program is impossible to say.<sup>10</sup>

In December, 1863, Mrs. Yulee wrote to her old friend in Richmond, Mrs. Clement C. Clay, wife of a Confederate Alabama senator : -

Homosassa [Florida]  
Dec 9 1863

My dear Mrs Clay

You have not forgotten me I know, and will be glad to know we are happy & well in spite of all the evil the Yankees have done my people. I pity those who . . . dont know the happiness of dwelling among their own people.

8. Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

9. Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

10. On a number of occasions during the War, Yulee's patriotism was called into question. His initial refusal to turn over to the Confederate government 50,000 pounds of sugar produced on his Homosassa plantation as well as his strong objections to the removal of iron from the Florida Railroad of which company he was president, tends to leave some doubt as to whether his "pay as we go" proposal would have continued to enjoy his enthusiastic support.

I pity those who have no country to love, to fight for, to die if need be, for.

It is this very country of yours and mine, that induces me to write this letter. I want you to use your influence, (you have much) to induce those faulty [?] law makers to come up to our necessities, and put our currency right. Your husband is all right I know. Tax, tax, tax our people to half we have if necessary but let the *World* know we ARE paying. Ten victories will not give the Yankees such a blow as this fact. Now Mrs Clay I don't ask you to step out of your way, but God has given you many friends, stir them up to their duty and let us be the proudest people, because the most honest.

Mr Yulee is surrounded by difficulties. Our plantation is only four miles from the gulf. The Yankees could come up in barges any moment, but we have some sharp shooters on the bank and they know it. They think Mr Yulee has a rifled cannon but that is a mistake. Well if he moves us in the interior we have a more unhealthy climate and less to eat, for our fine fish and oysters are worth a little risk, and then our children have perfect health on the coast. Besides on all our little rivers the Yankees have got whipped and they are afraid. I have been here now two years hearing their guns chasing blockaders or firing on Tampa or Bay Port. But I am not afraid. A trouble is upon us however which if it succeeds Mr Yulee says he must abandon his home and seek in South Georgia perhaps a refuge. The Gov has demanded the iron from one of our roads and I think part of another. The people of East Florida will then be left without any means of bringing corn or troops to our assistance in case of an invasion and the enemy can take possession as soon as he learns our roads have been taken by our Gov. Mr Yulee has always said if the roads were taken, it would lead to a military abandonment of Florida. I do believe I would regret this move, more for my country's sake than my own; but the heart is so deceitful I will not declare it. However I believe our people will appeal to the *law* . . . . Do write me a long letter in your own delightful style. How I would like to have a long talk with you. I am



forty miles from a neighbor and a pleasant letter is my only society. Bragg's defeat fills us all with gloom, yet we are not discouraged. I have never felt a doubt of my country. But dark and painful trials are yet before us perhaps. Dear Mrs Clay have you given your heart to Jesus! Do use those talents he has-given you for His glory? Soon this Earth will perish but we shall live forever. May it be with the blessed Lord.

Yours very truly  
Sincerely

N. C. Yulee <sup>11</sup>

Less than three weeks after this letter was written, Thomas J. Semmes of Louisiana reported to the Confederate Senate his Finance Committee's bill on ways and means "to provide for a new issue of Treasury notes, and for funding all such notes now outstanding." <sup>12</sup> Coming on top of Memminger's December 7, 1863 report calling for "a comprehensive scheme of funding," <sup>13</sup> Semmes' proposal finally called forth a lengthy letter from Yulee to Florida's Senator James M. Baker. <sup>14</sup> In contrast to his wife's earlier letter touching upon the same subject, it is not as personalized or emotional in its appeal, nor is it as religiously oriented. Rather, it reveals an aspect of the economic mind of a mid-Nineteenth century Southern entrepreneur. <sup>15</sup>

11. Original in Duke University Library. Photostatic copy in P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida.

12. *Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States*, III, 492 (28 December 1863).

13. Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

14. In contrast to Semmes' position, David L. Yulee was more in agreement with Senators W. S. Oldham (Texas) and G. A. Henry (Tennessee) who favored higher tax proposals. Pamphlet in the P. K. Yonge Library (Yulee Papers) University of Florida. *Speech of Hon. W. S. Oldham of Texas, on the Subject of the Finances, Senate, December 23, 1863.*

15. Retained copy in Yulee's hand in Yulee Papers: Yulee to Baker, Homosassa, Jan. 12, 1864.

This exceptional collection of papers for the study of Florida's history during the period of Yulee's life was presented to the University of Florida by Senator Yulee's daughter, Mrs. Florida Yulee Neff, through Professor Rembert W. Patrick of the University, who generously made the papers available to this writer, now at work on a biography and documentary study of Senator Yulee.

Homosassa, Jany 12. 1864

Dear Sir:

I promised that I would write you after seeing the plans proposed by the Govt for settling the finances. Having seen these, & the plan also of the Senate Committee, I now briefly give you my opinion; not because I think it specially valuable, but because in this critical conjuncture of our affairs, we should all throw in our mite to the general stock of thought upon the subject.

All the plans strike me as faulty in the policy of saddling our young Confederacy with the duty of paying in coin the nominal sum of our existing liabilities. A funded debt of fifteen hundred million, with the increase which this policy once entered upon will compel, THE CONFEDERACY CANNOT BEAR. It will be death to its credit now, when it needs credit, and crippling in all its future career: besides that it may lead to an oppressive and consolidated government.

What the Govt justly owes it must liquidate at every hazard, I agree. But for the Treasury notes now out, or the bonds which represent funded treasury notes, the Government has not received value upon the metallic basis, and therefore ought not in equity to be expected, at the cost of the country's ruin, to pay them in coin, or to establish as a permanent debt upon the standard of the metals.

As I wrote you a year ago, *a sufficient taxation* is the necessary basis of all our financial policy. We must make the tax adequate to the requirements of the day. To "pay as we go" is a rule which no people can discard without commensurate injury to their permanent prosperity: and this rule should be observed in War as in Peace. The burthen may be very great in time of war - but better to bear it in our own day, than to saddle our posterity with the evils of debt. The Country can bear, and bear profitably for so great a boon as Independence, *a tax equal to the whole net income of the capital and industry*

*of the Confederacy.* And this will be sufficient, in a healthful state of values, to support the war, last as long as it reasonably may. What, after all, will such a tax amount to, but a mere contribution, for the short period of the war, of our annual excess, to the common treasury for a purpose essential to the preservation of the principal from which the income is derived, and its future enjoyment. It is simply the sacrifice [*sic*] of *accumulation* during the war, for the success of the cause; and rests upon the idea that in this struggle for existence, we should regard the Confederacy as one common field or encampment, in which every person should contribute his efforts & resources; either to fight, or to support the fighters: and until we settle down upon this idea, in a practical way, we have not reached the ultimate duty and necessity of the day. Draw then upon the people for their whole net income, or as much of it as will furnish their Government, under the Providence of God, with "its daily bread."

But you may reasonably object that to convert the production or income of the country into money for the payment of taxes to the extent of the large annual contribution required by the war, will be a difficult operation. The difficulty is avoided by receiving the income of the country in kind, so far as it may be of a kind suitable for the consumption of the army, or the supply of the Government wants. Let the banks & capitalists pay in money, the farmers in breadstuffs, wool, cotton or other product, the manufacturer in iron, cloth, or whatever he produces, the stock raiser in beef & hides, the railroads in transportation, and so on. Each man surrendering to his Government the required share of his excess: for upon *excess of income* I would throw the whole burden. In order to reach a just estimate of net income, settle how much of the gross income of each citizen is properly required for the support of his family, according to its number & other circumstances, and

let so much of the rest as may be required, all if necessary, be taken for the support of the War, as a small price for the Liberty we are to win, and a no less small counterbalance for the contribution which those make who give thier *[sic]* blood in the cause!

So much for the future.

Now, how shall we deal with the debt of the past, which a postponement of this duty of taxation has created? Is there not some plan by which the actual debt of the Government can be reduced to its proper description in coin, without injustice or injury to the holders of the debt? It seems to me it should be possible to reduce it to a specie standard, with entire justice to its holders, and without leaving upon our new Government an undue burden, or one from which it cannot soon relieve itself.

Why may not a reasonable plan be founded upon the undisputed principle in economical science that no matter to what extent the circulating medium of a country may, at any time, have been augmented or diminished, *its value always remains unaltered?*

Suppose the Government to have determined, as the Secretary's plan implies, that a circulating medium of two hundred million in amount, is the proper sum of currency for conducting the exchanges of commodities in the country, and suppose it shall then call in the outstanding Treasury notes and put into the hands of thier *[sic]* holders, in due individual proportion, two hundred millions of Government notes payable after the war, in coin at the existing standard value, with a strict pledge upon the face of the new issue that no more shall be put out, wherein would the holders of the circulation be injured? The two hundred million of new issue would represent precisely the same exchangeable value as did the eight or ten hundred million for which it was substituted - and *would*

*buy the same amount of other property in market.* Guarded against increased & excessive issue it would be of fixed and certain value, would be the effective sign of the same amount of coin, and would be nearly as satisfactory as coin, serving most of its functions, so long as we remain without foriegn [*sic*] commerce; and as soon as Peace may reinstate our commerce with foriegn nations, the Government would be in condition to redeem with specie. This new currency would be liable to only one risk or disadvantage in comparison with gold, and that would be the contingency of Independence. If we fail in the struggle [*sic*], the debt would be obliterated; but as it is only a home debt, this consequence would be immaterial, if we lost our Liberty. / The chief inconvenience and damage would be to those who have become debtors since the war. They would have to pay a larger relative value for the consideration they recieved [*sic*] than if the volume of circulation had not been reduced, unless equitable relief is provided. For this class the States might provide a rateable reduction, according to the date when the debt was incurred [*sic*], for payments in coin. But generally those who have contracted debt since the war, have done so mostly in pursuit of speculative purposes. The farmer and others engaged in regular & productive employments have not had occasion to go in debt; for the exigencies of the war has created a market at remunerative prices for all the fruits of thier [*sic*] labors. While, under the plan suggested, the holders of the Treasury notes would, in the two hundred million of new issue, hold a volume of currency of equal utility with that which they surrender for extinguishment, and therefore would have suffered no appreciable loss, the Government, left with an indebtedness comparatively so small to be provided for after the war, would be restored to a vigor of credit and hope that would be felt, in all its future administration, upon the destinies of the Confederacy. Who would not sacrifice to such an end!

But what can be done with that portion of the Treasury debt which consists of interest bearing bonds. Those bonds were issued for treasury notes, not for coin, & representing in truth funded *treasury notes*, ought not to have advantages over the current notes. Can anything be more reasonable than that the nominal amount of this debt should be at once reduced, by the same rule applied to the current notes, to actual coin value?

The whole point of my advice is that we who are carrying on the war shall provide for its current cost: that we should return at once to the standard of values which a properly limited currency establishes, and from which we should never have departed: and that in the moment of doing so we should conform the outstanding debt resting upon past transactions, so far as they have varied from it, to the same standard.

I confine this letter to the matter of the public finances, because *money is the sinew of war*; and if the Government cannot sustain its revenues and currency, the revolution that brought it into existence must fail, and Independence and Liberty fall.

Very truly yours

D. L. Yulee

Hon James M Baker

Senator from Florida

## FRANCE TO THE RESCUE

AN EPISODE OF THE FLORIDA BORDER, 1797

by RICHARD K. MURDOCH

The reversal of international alliances pursuant to the Treaty of Basel of 1795 returned Spain to her former position as an ally of France. By the terms of this document, however, Spain found herself in a position considerably more subservient than that assigned her by the alliances of 1761 and 1762.<sup>1</sup> Her Caribbean colonies, heretofore the prey of France, were now opened to possible English attack. East Florida lying close to Cuba and the Bahama Channel, thus in a strategic position, was one of the points most exposed to enemy attack. Constant troop withdrawals rendered the defense of this outlying area most difficult. Fearful of an easy enemy victory in the Florida region, the French government ordered its representatives in the United States to render all possible assistance to the Spanish in uncovering and frustrating hostile English projects.

As a result of the Pyrennes campaigns of 1794, French officials did not have a high opinion of Spanish military capabilities.<sup>2</sup> This lack of confidence was openly voiced by the French diplomatic officials in the United States, particularly by those in the southern portion of the country. These men or their predecessors in office had worked hard to create an anti-Spanish atmosphere in the years 1793 and 1794. They had discovered that it was a fairly easy matter to find citizens of the United States who were willing to give more than lip service to French Republican schemes directed against Spanish territory.<sup>3</sup> With

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1. These treaties are more commonly referred to as the Family Compact of the Bourbon monarchs.
  2. The rapid advances of Generals Dugommier and Muller drove the larger Spanish forces out of southwestern France and resulted in the easy capture of San Sebastian and Irun.
  3. For an account of French efforts directed against East Florida in 1793 and 1794, see Richard K. Murdoch, "Citizen Mangourit and the Projected Attacks on East Florida in 1794," *The Journal of Southern History*, XIV (1948), 522-540.

the new turn of events in Europe, it now seemed logical to take advantage of this atmosphere favorable to the French and hostile to the English. Three obstacles blocked the path to complete success, however: the anti-Spanish views of the French sympathizers must be converted, the rising tide of anti-French sentiment among the merchant class must be checked, and Spanish officialdom in the new world must be convinced of the necessity to employ the proffered support. This paper is in no way concerned with the first two problems. The third problem reduced itself to the question of admitting recruits, mostly non-Spanish, into Spanish territory in direct contradiction to established practice of several centuries. This paper is written as an attempt to relate the efforts of the French officials in the United States to bolster the defenses of East Florida with recruits drawn from the Charleston region of South Carolina.

Enrique White, the recently appointed governor of East Florida, had taken up his duties early in 1796 at a moment when that province was settling down after the incipient threat of a French invasion.<sup>4</sup> Within a few month there came rumors of English plans to seize St. Augustine and construct a naval base for privateers and warships. These rumors indicated that English agents intended to make use of the identical groups of American volunteers who had been engaged by the French in their earlier venture against St. Augustine. It therefore behooved the governor to initiate steps to prepare his province for the new eventualities. A rapid survey of the situation revealed the necessity of making use of every method of defense available. One of the first steps considered essential was the re-establishment of the defense line along the south-

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4. White had received information late in 1796 about the probability of a war between Spain and England. Irujo to White, September 19, 1796, East Florida Papers, b103 L8. All future reference to this documentary source will be abbreviated as EF and then the box number.



ern bank of the St. Marys River, opposite the Georgia shore.<sup>5</sup> A second step, one long recommended by the captain general in Havana, was the reoccupation of Amelia Island with an armed force sufficiently large to hold off a seaborne attack.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately for both these plans, the military situation in East Florida had deteriorated steadily because of constant withdrawal of garrison troops to the island of Cuba and to the European continent. Although the efforts of his predecessor to obtain assistance from Cuba had generally met with failure, White continued to send urgent requests for both ground and naval re-enforcements.<sup>7</sup> The successful defense of the province with a handful of able-bodied troops in 1794 and 1795 was a strong argument against the urgency of sending fresh troops to St. Augustine. It mattered little to the captain general that the successful defense had resulted from the failure of the enemy to put forth a vigorous offensive campaign.

While the governor was attempting to put his province in a state of readiness, unexpected assistance was being prepared outside the province. There were many residents of the southern portion of the United States, discontented with their economic and social status, some veterans of the American Revolution and frontier Indian wars, who were ready to take up arms for any cause, even a foreign one. In addition to these citizens of the United States, there was a fairly large number of French refugee families recently arrived from Haiti where they had been forced to abandon everything in the face of the growing

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5. All troops except mounted Patrols had been withdrawn behind the St. Johns River in 1795 when it seemed out of the question to Governor Quesada to attempt a defense of the region lying between the two rivers. No concerted effort had been made by either Quesada or White to reoccupy this region in force.
  6. The island had been abandoned in 1795 as lying outside the defense perimeter as established by Governor Quesada and his military advisers.
  7. Little effort was made after February, 1794, to send fresh troops to St. Augustine. One ship loaded with re-enforcements was captured by a French privateer hovering off the coast of East Florida. See Las Casas to Campo Alange, February 13, 1794, Archivo General de Simancas, legajo 7235.

slave insurrection. These new arrivals had mingled with numerous French settlers already in the United States, many of them also veterans of the American Revolution. They had preferred to remain in the new republic rather than return to the France of Louis XVI. A large number of these war veterans had married into local families and thus had personal connections with individuals of importance in local, state and federal governments. South Carolina because of its heavy French Huguenot population acted as a magnet for later French migration. As a result of a combination of these factors, Charleston became the center of foreign efforts to raise recruits within the United States.

Many of these settlers of European origin had been approached by the French consul in Charleston in 1793 with the prospect of rendering aid to a France-American expedition against St. Augustine. Although this project had been nipped in the bud, these people were still of a mind to take up arms in the name of the French Republic.<sup>8</sup> Many of them were not finding their new existence to be to their liking, especially among the rather conservative and anti-revolutionary Charleston families. It was among these seemingly discontented people that the French consul, Victor DuPont, planned to propagandize the cause of France-Spanish friendship. He knew from personal investigation that many of these French refugees feared that a rupture in Franco-American relations was a definite possibility and that they were therefore willing to leave the United States for a more friendly haven. With this consideration in mind, East Florida seemed to offer just such a location. Thus it was that early in April, 1797, DuPont sent a note to the lodgings of Diego Morphy, the Spanish vice-consul in Charles-

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8. It might be noted in passing that a goodly number of the newly arrived refugees from Haiti were monarchists and were not in sympathy with French Republican schemes. Some of these people made vigorous efforts to uncover and betray French schemes to the American and English governments.

ton, requesting that the latter prepare passports for four French citizens who desired to pass from that city to St. Augustine.<sup>9</sup> Although the information contained in Dupont's note stated that the four men were either carpenters or blacksmiths, only one of the group was known personally to him. DuPont vouched for this man's character and professional skill.<sup>10</sup> Nothing was mentioned in the note about these men being desirous of volunteering for military service in East Florida. As there was nothing unusual about this request, Morphy sent the necessary papers to DuPont by special messenger. Similar requests had been made of him at various time, usually for French refugees who desired either to return to Europe by way of St. Augustine and Havana or to continue to New Orleans and the safety of Spanish Louisiana. Spanish restrictions on alien settlers did not apply to persons of this sort.

On the other hand vague rumors had already reached Morphy about possible projects to send large numbers of French settlers to East Florida. In order to protect himself, he wrote to White in East Florida requesting advice as to what course of action to follow if DuPont made an increasing number of such requests in the future.<sup>11</sup> While waiting for a reply from St. Augustine, Morphy received a dispatch from the Spanish minister in Philadelphia with instructions to cooperate in every way with the local French authorities in suppressing English efforts to prepare an attack on St. Augustine.<sup>12</sup> Since these instructions were couched in vague generalities, it is no wonder that he interpreted them to mean Franco-Spanish cooperation in building up a potent defense force for East Florida. He had the wholehearted support of DuPont in this interpretation of his orders.

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9. DuPont to Morphy, April 9, 1797, enclosed in Morphy to White, April 10, 1797, EF b103 L8.

10. According to DuPont's note to Morphy, this man's name was Abadie Tachon. *Ibid.*

11. Morphy to White; April 10, 1797, EF b103 L8.

12. Irujo to Morphy, April 7, 1797, EF b103 L8.

Prior to April 25 the two men held at least one conference at which time, according to one of Dupont's reports, it was agreed that in the spirit of cooperation, the two of them should strive to raise at least two companies of French volunteers in the Charleston area.<sup>13</sup> It was likewise agreed that once these men were assembled, they should be sent off as soon as possible to East Florida with passports prepared by the Spanish consul.<sup>14</sup> Strained relations between the United States and France made it seem wiser to find passage for the volunteers on Spanish vessels. Apparently Morphy was enthusiastic enough about the entire scheme to agree to prepay passage and subsistence allowances with the expectation of later reimbursement from the royal treasury in St. Augustine. He was either ignoring or forgetting frequent warnings from White that the provincial treasury was completely depleted and that under no circumstances was Morphy to embarrass the governor or himself by making additional purchases on credit. In order to abide by the neutrality laws of the United States, it was decided that these volunteers, not to be referred to as troops, should proceed to East Florida in civilian garb where the governor would equip and train them with an ultimate goal of integrating them into the regular Spanish army in the provincial garrison.<sup>15</sup>

These manifestations of unity and understanding actually hid a basic difference of interpretation which soon put the entire scheme in jeopardy. The French consul understood that by the integration of all volunteers into the regular Spanish army Morphy meant that these men with their officers would be armed and trained by the Spanish, but would be allowed to function as independent cadres within the Spanish armed forces. It was also his belief that the corps of volunteers would be

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13. Both men seemed to be a bit vague as to just how many men would constitute two companies. At one time DuPont used the number 200 which would indicate 100 men to a company.

14. DuPont to Clark, April 25, 1797, EF b103 L8.

15. Assereto to Clark, May 9, 1797, EF b103 L8.

permitted to select their own officers.<sup>16</sup> In this manner these men would retain their citizenship while fighting under a foreign but friendly flag. Quite to the contrary, it was Morphy's understanding that DuPont realized that any volunteers in the Spanish army would be integrated individually into the regular army and would be assigned to units that had need of replacements. All would then be under the command of Spanish officers. It is to be doubted that any Spanish official would have dared consider the use of volunteer forces in any other capacity without the express agreement of the authorities in Madrid. Although this vast difference of views was not at first apparent, it was soon brought to light by the comments of Governor White upon receipt of Morphy's various dispatches.

The information contained in Morphy's dispatch of April 10 was not of an unusual or alarming nature. On the other hand, the suggestion that an increasing number of French refugees might request passports to enter East Florida did cause the governor considerable misgivings as he feared that this might lead to conflict with the terms of the various royal orders governing the admission of alien settlers to Spanish colonial possessions. He hastily penned a message to Havana requesting the captain general to send the latest information about the admission of French refugees to his province. He emphasized perhaps erroneously that these people desired to enter the province as settlers.<sup>17</sup> The governor's unwillingness to take personal responsibility for advising Morphy on this matter was due in part to the changed situation in Europe. The treaty recently concluded with France rendered null and void the royal orders forbidding the entry of all French citizens on the grounds

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16. DuPont's correspondence with General Elijah Clark of Georgia indicated that he expected the French volunteers to function as an independent body under the command of Clark. DuPont to Clark, April 25, 1797, EF b103 L8.

17. White to Captain General [Conde de Santa Clara], April 28, 1797, EF b103 L8.

of their being "revolutionists". After sending of this request to Havana, White then informed Morphy that under the unsettled wartime conditions then prevailing, he as governor was willing to risk admitting the four Frenchmen and any others of the same sort who might apply for passports. The presumption on his part was that there would not be a rush of applications before a reply could be received from Havana. Morphy was urged, however, to make absolutely certain that all those who applied for passports were prospective settlers willing and able to abide by the terms of the various royal orders that applied to alien settlers.<sup>18</sup> The general tone of the governor's note indicated little enthusiasm over the projected arrival of French settlers. Food supplies were short, there was no demand for skilled labor, the local treasury was depleted, and the royal hospital was filled with sick military personnel. If charity was available, it was needed for the resident Spanish population of St. Augustine.

A short time later White received further information of a nature sufficiently disturbing as to compel him to hold an immediate consultation with the members of his provincial council. A copy of one of DuPont's letters to a military figure in Georgia reached the governor on May 21.<sup>19</sup> After reading the contents, White was convinced that DuPont had misled Morphy into agreeing to issue passports for a large French volunteer force which was to cross to the south bank of the St. Marys River. The subsequent actions of the governor indicated that he presumed Morphy had mistaken potential soldiers for settlers. It was alarm over the numerous dangers involved that resulted

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18. White to Morphy, April 29, 1797, EF b103 L8. The basic royal order referred to by White was promulgated in 1790, and dealt with land grants, religious observance, the taking of oaths of allegiance, etc., of all alien settlers in East Florida. *Spanish Land Grants in Florida* (Tallahassee, Florida, 1940), I, xxi.

19. The "military figure" in Georgia was none other than General Elijah Clark who was known to be in direct communication with DuPont concerning the leadership of the projected volunteer group.

in the calling of a meeting of the council. This group was to sit as a *junta de guerra* to determine the line of action to adopt to thwart DuPont's plan to send such a force to St. Augustine. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that the governor should write at once to Morphy to emphasize two points: one, the inadvisability of sending any volunteers to East Florida; and second, if it turned out to be beyond Morphy's power to prevent volunteers from starting out, he was to try to prevent them from travelling in a single large group. With these problems settled, the council then proceeded to the matter of how to deal with any volunteers who might then be on the way or who might depart from Charleston before the governor's instructions could reach that place. Rather than turn these people back at the frontier, it was agreed that they might remain in the province to be armed and trained in St. Augustine prior to integration into the regular Spanish forces. They would be given no special consideration in the matter of pay or armament. It was likewise decided that although there might be men of potential officer qualifications among the volunteers, they would have to prove their metal before being considered as candidates for commissions.<sup>20</sup> In accordance with the advice of the *junta* White immediately forwarded a copy of the findings to Morphy together with a brief summary of his own views. He stressed the urgency of avoiding any agreement with DuPont the terms of which might not be within Morphy's authority to carry out.<sup>21</sup>

While the letter with the enclosed decisions of the *junta* was on its way to Charleston, Morphy was requested to issue another passport; this one to a Major Bert, a French veteran of the American Revolution, and a man well known along the southern border of the United States. Because of previous associations with Georgia and South Carolina military leaders and a knowl-

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20. *Junta de Guerra*, May 22, 1797, EF b277.

21. *White to Morphy*, May 22, 1797, enclosed in *White to Assereto*, May 22, 1797, EF b103 L8.

edge of the Spanish language, Bert was commissioned by DuPont to explain to the governor of East Florida all the advantages of admitting a large organized group of French volunteers. Bert reached St. Augustine on June 1 and at once requested and was granted an interview with White. His purpose was to discuss all aspects of DuPont's schemes both for recruiting volunteers in the United States and for the defense of the province. The major's plan of action called for the protection of the northern frontier of the province by establishing the headquarters of the volunteer force on Amelia Island which lay across the mouth of the St. Marys River. After listening patiently to Bert's long discourse, the governor limited himself to pointing out that there were many difficulties involved which rendered DuPont's suggestions unacceptable to the Spanish authorities. The fundamental difficulty was financial, as the treasury of the province was empty and he as governor could not authorize any activities that might result in the expenditure of additional funds. After this conversation Bert was then requested to wait in another room while White conferred with his council. This group sitting as a *junta de guerra* listened to the executive's account of his interview with the French officer. Little debate was needed to reach agreement that DuPont's schemes were impossible of implementation at that time and that both consuls in Charleston should be so informed.<sup>22</sup> White then asked Bert to return to Charleston to deliver dispatches to both Morphy and DuPont suggesting that the entire matter be dropped before more complications developed.<sup>23</sup>

While the governor and his council were pondering measures to take and advice to proffer Morphy, the latter was in frequent communication with his French colleague in Charleston. DuPont apparently convinced the Spaniard that there was great need for

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22. *Junta de Guerra*, June 2, 1797, EF b277.

23. White to Morphy and White to DuPont, both dated June 2, 1797, EF b103 L8.



speed in getting the French volunteers to St. Augustine. Morphy agreed to hasten the issuance of the necessary papers to permit the entry of this group into East Florida, but he asked that he be informed as to the names and exact number of the applicants. By making these stipulations Morphy really refused to issue an unlimited number of blank passports that DuPont might fill in at his leisure. A new difficulty soon developed, for the Frenchman came to Morphy's office with a proposition that the Spaniard advance the necessary funds to pay the passage of the volunteers to St. Augustine. DuPont's personal bank account was overdrawn and the prospective volunteers were all without funds. The consul promised that all accounts would be squared just as soon as the French minister in Philadelphia could send a draft to cover DuPont's outstanding commitments. With these paid, the consul indicated that he could then negotiate an additional loan. Morphy was unwilling to touch his official funds, but he did agree to advance sufficient funds from his personal account to cover the cost of passage of a "small number" of French volunteers.<sup>24</sup> It was agreed that when the first group of volunteers had been collected in Charleston, DuPont should come to Morphy who would then turn over the necessary papers and the requisite passage money. These people would then be taken to the south by Major Bert.

Before these preparations could be undertaken, the major arrived in Charleston with White's dispatch of June 2. If the governor's recommendations to the two consuls had been followed, the future of the volunteers would have been settled then and there. DuPont, not a man to be put off so lightly, penned a quick reply to the governor in which he protested that he was trying to save East Florida for the Spanish government in accordance to the new treaty of friendship between the two countries. In his opinion, a well organized group of French

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24. Morphy to White. June 17, 1797, EF b103 L8.

volunteers was the answer. He completely ignored the governor's statement that people of this sort were not wanted in East Florida and he went on to stress the need for more money to hasten the departure of his countrymen. As he put it: "Your Excellency knows that money is the principal nerve of all military operations; I find that amongst the number of French citizens who had expressed to me their desire of serving in Florida, several cannot go for want of a small advance of money to discharge their debts here."<sup>25</sup> After this demand for money, DuPont turned his attention to the passports that Morphy had agreed to issue. He urged that when the volunteers reached St. Augustine, White collect the passports and return them to Charleston in order that they might be used a second time. To complete this rather arrogant dispatch, the consul suggested that White place those of the volunteers who preferred to remain in East Florida as settlers in the urban or rural militia. In this way they could render a double service to the Spanish government. These people, the prospective settlers, were having to pay their own passage money for the trip to the south as Morphy did not feel that they were migrating primarily to aid in the defense of the province. The remainder of the group who were going to St. Augustine to fight for the Spanish, might be organized and armed by White in any way that he might desire. In this the consul appeared to be agreeing that the Spanish should have the last word on the disposition of the volunteers once they reached St. Augustine. He closed this long dispatch with a special recommendation for the two men whom he had picked to be the leaders of the group, Captains Lavalette and Greinel.<sup>26</sup> As an after-thought, DuPont included a blank copy of the form that he was giving to each of the volunteers. The wording in-

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25. DuPont to White, June 9, 1797, EF b103 L8. There is some indication that DuPont may have been trying to borrow passage money from Morphy at the same time that he was trying to get White to pay passage funds. This would have netted the consul a neat profit.

26. *Ibid.*

cluded at least one obvious untruth and was couched in rather arrogant terms.<sup>27</sup>

DuPont's disregard of White's comments seemed to be contemptuous, for Morphy likewise ignored what amounted to a direct order from his superior. In a meeting between these men in the week immediately after DuPont's lengthy remonstrance to St. Augustine, agreement was reached whereby the Spanish consul provided passports for a group of twenty French refugees then present in the town. DuPont wrote to White to inform him of the decision but by employing generalities, he managed to avoid mentioning the exact number and names of the prospective volunteers.<sup>28</sup> A more complete report of these arrangements was prepared on the next day by Morphy. According to his dispatch, there were twenty men involved, all listed by name,<sup>29</sup> who were about to depart from Charleston on board a Spanish merchant ship, the *Santa Rosa de Lima*, commanded by Captain Jose Taaneda.<sup>30</sup> It had been necessary for Morphy to haggle with Taaneda over the exact amount the latter demanded as passage money for the twenty volunteers. The amount finally agreed upon was 340 pesos, 200 to cover the fare and 140 to provide the necessary provisions for the seven day voyage. The consul promised that the governor would pay this amount to Taaneda when the *Santa Rosa* reached St. Augustine. It was

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27. "The undersigned Victor DuPont, consul of the French Republic in the Carolinas and Georgia, certifies to all to whom it may be of concern that Citizen ..... has declared to me [his intention] to depart for Florida where he intends to remain in conformity to the invitation offered by Don Enrique White, governor of that province, to whom I take the liberty of recommending [the bearer]. Signed in Charleston in the consular office of ....."  
Enclosed in DuPont to White, June 9, 1797, EF b103 L8.

28. DuPont to White, June 16, 1797, EF b103 L8.

29. According to Morphy's report, the names of the twenty volunteers were as follows: Lavalette, Mauroy, Remboeut, Ferdinand, Dalifouret, Erambert, Girard, Chabert, Allige, Buisson, Levuval, Soumere, Goutrau, Daix, Armelin, Pinsun, Waek, Reveilla, Faure and Fleury. Morphy to White, June 17, 1797, EF b103 L8.

30. The *Santa Rosa* was often employed as a dispatch vessel on the Havana-St. Augustine-Charleston route.

Morphy's expressed hope that White would fulfill this promise to the *Santa Rosa's* captain.<sup>31</sup>

There were other French refugees in Charleston who apparently left at about the same time on board a small American coastal vessel which landed them at Savannah where they sought out Manuel Rengil, the local Spanish vice-consul. Major Bert who accompanied these people from Charleston had paid their passage at the rate of 10 pesos each. This money had been given him by Dupont without mention of its source. Six members of this group indicated their desire to continue to East Florida as settlers but not as recruits for the Spanish service. This decision was not to the liking of the major as it was his impression that these people were supposed to be soldiers under his command. For the time being he lost interest in their efforts to find transportation from Savannah to the south. It may be that it was through Rengil's assistance that they eventually found a small vessel to take them as far as the northern end of Amelia Island.<sup>32</sup> Once transportation was found, the Frenchmen were able to convince Bert that he should accompany them to East Florida where he was known to the authorities. He agreed that a proper introduction to the governor would be the first step in settling in the province.

Two days after the departure of this small group, Rengil reported to White that the *Santa Rosa* had passed Savannah and had gone on to the St. Marys estuary where it was rumored that several additional French volunteers would be embarked for St. Augustine. Evidently the vice-consul was referring to Bert and his six companions. The *Santa Rosa* still lay at anchor off the town of St. Marys several days later while the captain tried to ascertain whether or not he was going to be paid for having brought the volunteers to Spanish territory. He appears

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31. Morphy to White, June 17, 1797, EF b103 L8.

32. Rengil to White, June 29, 1797, EF b103 L8.

to have prevented his French passengers from landing and from communicating with friends in the town.

On the basis of the information contained in Rengil's messages about the *Santa Rosa* and her passengers, White wrote a hasty note to Morphy in which he ventured that as the French volunteers had not arrived in St. Augustine to be questioned by him, he could reach no decision on the matter of the royal treasury making good the consul's promise to Taaneda of a payment of 340 pesos.<sup>34</sup> White was obviously referring to his earlier warning not to make commitments that could not be kept. Five days later, he repeated this same information in another letter to Charleston, this time mentioning the arrival of Major Bert and his companions.<sup>35</sup> He had summoned Bert for a consultation and the latter had revealed that those on board the *Santa Rosa* were not coming as volunteers but as settlers. They had no interest in fighting to assist the Spanish hold the province. After the conclusion of this interview with Bert, the governor questioned Bert's companions individually. In summing up the statements of the French refugees, the governor wrote Morphy that they lacked all interest in and knowledge of international affairs, especially as far as current Franco-Spanish relations were concerned.<sup>36</sup> He doubted very much that DuPont had attempted to inform them of the conditions incumbent on all aliens entering Spanish territories. These remarks were undoubtedly directed in part at Morphy for his failure to take greater precautions prior to granting passports.

In order to ascertain that he was doing the proper thing in admitting these new settlers, Bert's traveling companions, White called a session of his council to meet as a *junta de guerra*. This

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33. Rengil to White, July 1, 1797, EF b103 L8.

34. White to Morphy, July 7, 1797, EF b103 L8.

35. Obviously Bert and his companions had not embarked on the *Santa Rosa* at St. Marys.

36. White to Morphy, July 12, 1797, EF b103 L8.

group decided that since the number of Frenchmen already arrived in the province was negligible, far below the two company figure promised by DuPont, there was no need to consider setting up independent French units. It was agreed that if the new arrivals so chose, they would be trained and armed at the government's expense, and then be integrated into the Third Battalion of the Cuban Infantry Regiment.<sup>37</sup> The same offer was to be made to the major, in case he preferred remaining in East Florida to returning to Charleston. Any additional arrivals in the province would receive a similar proposition, but the members of the *junta* did not consider it likely that many more would appear once the news reached Charleston that French volunteers were not in demand in East Florida.<sup>38</sup>

Much of this information was included in a note sent by the governor to Morphy. As an after-thought, he wrote a separate letter containing an amplified statement to warn the French consul that the Spanish government in East Florida had no intention of honoring the debts contracted by the representatives of the French Republic in the name of the Spanish consul in Charleston. Once again White emphasized that there was no need for a large volunteer French force in East Florida and that the royal treasury had no funds available to pay for the transportation of additional settlers. He urged greater consideration of the results of hasty action and more consultation with Morphy before taking any new measures. Finally, in answer to repeated questions from DuPont, White reported that the Santa Rosa with its twenty volunteers was still at anchor off the town of St. Marys on the Georgia side of the river.<sup>39</sup> He did not indicate, however, why the Spanish captain refused to take his ship to its agreed upon destination.

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37. The Third Battalion of the Cuban Infantry Regiment formed the main body of the garrison in Fort San Marcos.

38. *Junta de Guerra*, July 8, 1797, EF b277.

39. White to DuPont, July 17, 1797, EF b103 L8.

This vessel finally crossed the bar at St. Augustine some days after the governor's last dispatch to Charleston. The twenty passengers were not on board, however. It appears that Bert had made up his mind to undertake a personal investigation of the cause of the delay in reaching East Florida. He received permission from the governor to travel overland to the St. Marys River where he met with Captain Taaneda and apparently reached an agreement, for a short time later he returned to St. Augustine with the twenty volunteers who had been stranded on board the *Santa Rosa*. White then summoned Bert to clear up the mystery of the long delayed arrival of these French volunteers in his province. After a lengthy and apparently stormy interview, Bert retired to his quarters to draw up a memorandum covering all that had transpired at the governor's residence. This was done at the request of the governor to make certain that there had been no misunderstandings and no misinterpretations due to language problems. According to Bert's testimony about what had transpired at St. Marys, he had found that the twenty Frenchmen were reluctant to proceed further after hearing a rumor that the governor of East Florida was contemplating the enforced incorporation of all French volunteers into the regular Spanish army.<sup>40</sup> As Bert had informed the governor during their meeting, the volunteers were firm in their determination not to submit even provisionally to any form of incorporation into Spanish units. In addition, the twenty had no desire to start training under any conditions until more of their friends arrived from the north. The major expressed apprehension lest the attitude of the governor and his council in this matter might discourage further departure of French volunteers from Charleston.<sup>41</sup>

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40. This rumor was obviously based on the decision of the *junta* held on July 8, information of which must have leaked out to the St. Mary region.

41. Bert to White, July 23, 1797, EF b103 L8.

As White had always shown himself to be a man of considerable patience, he gave Bert's memorandum careful attention and then wrote a most courteous reply refuting the Frenchman's arguments point by point. He reiterated his contention that it was impossible to organize a few scattered French volunteers into independent units, unless at least eighty-five arrived to form an entire company. As only twenty were on the spot, it seemed advisable to incorporate them in the manner determined by the *junta* in its meeting of July 8. As a clinching argument he stressed the amity and cooperation that their respective governments were trying to achieve. As he asked rhetorically, "What better way [was there] for a perfect union than in arms with Spanish soldiers."<sup>42</sup> By employing language of this sort, the governor was copying a leaf from the book of Genet, Mangourit and DuPont.

The governor's arguments were weighty enough to dissipate all Bert's contentions and the latter took up quite a different line of argument. His next request to the governor stressed the miserable financial state in which the French volunteers now found themselves as a result of their refusal to enter the Spanish armed service under the conditions laid down by White. Most of them were foraging for themselves among the sympathetic townspeople, many of whom were of French or American origin. According to the major's story, they were split into three groups as far as their desires for the future were concerned. Two or three had decided that they wanted to return to Charleston and then to Europe, if the governor would pay their passage as far as the first place; another small group wanted to join the urban militia as career soldiers; and the remainder were determined to settle in or near St. Augustine as permanent residents. This last group believed that as artisans they could manage to make their own way

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42. White to Bert, July 24, 1797, EF b103 L8.



in the town, if given the necessary permission by the governor to practice their respective trades.<sup>43</sup> A few days later, a second dispatch from Bert requested medical assistance for one of the volunteers who apparently was mortally ill and utterly destitute. The major asked that he be admitted to the local military hospital for emergency treatment.<sup>44</sup>

Still indicating his desire to be as helpful as possible, White replied to Bert's first note with a suggestion that all those volunteers dissatisfied with conditions in East Florida, apply to him for the return of their passports and permission to leave the province. He would be glad to allow them to retrace their steps to Charleston with everything they had brought with them into the province, all free of taxes. But he made no mention of prepaying their transportation or of granting them permission to sail off to Europe by way of Havana. As to those who desired to remain in the province, he was willing to assist them if they would take the required oath of allegiance to the Spanish king, and if they would abide by the laws established to govern East Florida. He failed to mention offering them positions in the local militia, perhaps recalling what had happened in 1794 and 1795 when the militia was composed largely of alien American settlers.<sup>45</sup>

Although the proffered assistance was most generous, Bert was not at all satisfied, as his reply to the governor indicated. He stressed the importance to a Frenchman of not losing his citizenship by swearing allegiance to a foreign monarch, although, as he hastened to note, Spain was a nation most friendly to his own. He suggested that White permit the French to remain in the province if they agreed to swear to a modified form of oath which guaranteed faithful service to the Spanish flag, but without loss of citizenship. The implication was that

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43. Bert to White, July 26, 1797, EF b103 L8.

44. Bert to White, July 29, 1797, EF b103 L8.

45. White to Bert, July 31, 1797, EF b103 L8.

no self-respecting Frenchman could take an oath to support the person of a monarch as the latter represented an institution utterly abhorrent to the French Republic.<sup>46</sup> The governor's answer was a polite but definite refusal to compromise his position by violating the royal order of 1790 concerning the residence and employment of aliens in East Florida. As a result of this fruitless interchange of notes, Bert sent a hasty dispatch to Charleston to inform DuPont that under no circumstances was he to permit further departures of French citizens for East Florida. Conditions in that area were not propitious for friendly cooperation between the two powers.<sup>47</sup>

This depressing news reached Charleston during a lull in the recruiting activities of DuPont and Morphy. All the French refugees willing to migrate to East Florida had been included in the twenty volunteers on board the *Santa Rosa* and in the small group that had accompanied Bert. It would appear that neither of the consuls extended themselves to convince additional French citizens of the advantages of taking up an abode in Spanish territory. Being without funds, both of them were embarrassed when it came to making promises and presenting gifts. After reading Bert's latest dispatch DuPont decided to await the major's arrival in Charleston before taking additional measures concerning the recruiting program. When Bert did finally return, he and DuPont held a conference during which all phases of the scheme for Franco-Spanish cooperation were discussed. The news from East Florida was of such a conclusive nature that the two agreed that any further prosecution of their plans would be utterly fruitless. Having reached this decision, they next informed Morphy that there would be no further requests for passports for French volunteers to pass to St. Augustine. DuPont pressed the Spaniard for a final settlement of accounts, claiming that Bert had paid several sums

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46. Bert to White, July 31, 1797, EF b103 L8.

47. White to Morphy, August 2, 1797, EF b103 L8.

from his personal funds. Morphy agreed to investigate these claims and take appropriate action.

With these decisions, the entire fabric of DuPont's scheme to render aid to the Spanish in defending East Florida fell to pieces. No further correspondence on this subject seems to have passed between the two consuls. All that remained was for Morphy to keep his part of the bargain in settling accounts. Apparently White remained firm in his determination not to be forced into acknowledging a debt contracted by the French consul in the name of the Spanish government. As late as November, DuPont was still urging Morphy to appeal to his superiors to repay Bert the \$64 that he had advanced to enable the French volunteers to reach St. Augustine.<sup>48</sup> Renewed appeals by Morphy brought no reply from East Florida. Finally, in the middle of December, the Spanish consul agreed to repay Bert with funds then in his possession in his official account. He reported to White that he had taken this step to maintain friendly relations with an ally and to bring a close to a long and rather fruitless chapter of intrigue and negotiation.<sup>49</sup> Evidently White permitted this agreement to stand as the draft was honored and the money paid.

Thus was brought to a conclusion an interesting although fruitless French effort to implement on a limited scale her policy of mutual assistance and cooperation with Spain. As later events were to prove, Spain may have been wise in resisting these offers of assistance.<sup>50</sup> Perhaps the highlight of these events in 1797 was the manner in which Governor White of East Florida managed to maintain full authority over his province in the face of a friendly but aggressively dangerous French foreign policy. French influence was on the rise in Madrid but East Florida remained staunchly Spanish. White

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48. DuPont to Morphy, November 21, 1797, EF b103 L8.

49. Morphy to White, December 14, 1797, EF b103 L8.

50. The retrocession of Louisiana to France might be considered the result of a French offer to "assist" Spain.

was merely continuing a successful policy laid down by his predecessor and one that was to be continued by his successor.

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*The governors of East Florida during the period of the second Spanish occupation deserve much credit for their loyal efforts to combat forces far stronger than their meager military potential. The efforts of these men belie the too often accepted theory of Spanish decay and collapse in the new world.*

## BOOK REVIEWS

***A Diary from Dixie.*** By Mary Boykin Chesnut. Edited by Ben Ames Williams. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949. pp. xiv, 572. Frontispiece and index)

It is interesting to note that Mrs. Chesnut begins her diary by stating that she was off to Florida to visit her mother. This was in November of 1860. Before reaching Fernandina she received the news that Lincoln had been elected and remarked, "I now wish I had a chronicle of the two delightful and eventful years which have just passed. Those delights have fled, and one's breath is taken away to think what events have since crowded in." For the next four and a half years this charming Southern woman was destined to become one of the foremost diarists of her time.

For this particular task she had unusual qualifications. Through her background she was well identified with the way of life in the South and knew personally most of its leaders in both the army and in civil life. Her father had been governor of South Carolina and her husband a United States Senator and later became a military aid to Jefferson Davis. In the second place she was a keen observer, expressed herself easily and clearly, and never failed to say what she thought as though her conscience dictated an opinion on all matters. Her descriptions of places, events and people, the almost overbearing loyalty to her friends, her scathing comments with spicy bits of gossip and ***risque*** side remarks lend color to her penetrating observations. The impact of the war on morals, the confusion in Richmond with its vice, black markets, drunken soldiers and petty politics caused her great concern. However, throughout it all there was a sense of humor which seemed anchored in the daily lives of people. People, it seems, were her principal if not her consuming interest.

When first introduced to Stephen Mallory, Mrs. Chesnut liked

him in spite of what she had been told of his "unpleasant reputation." She found him witty and his stories rich and racy though no doubt spiced for her benefit. Men as a whole attracted her and she was not beyond trying out her feminine wiles for the sake of a conquest. Childless and pampered by her husband throughout her entire married life, Mrs. Chesnut sought an escape through the pages of her diary. For President and Mrs. Davis she had a blind loyalty that would tolerate not the faintest suggestion of criticism.

The first edition of Mrs. Chesnut's diary was brought out in 1904 by Isabella D. Martin and Myrta Lockett Avary. Portions of the original manuscript were eliminated because it was felt that it might offend persons then living or perhaps certain passages shocked the editors. The love affair of General Hood and "Buck" Preston was barely mentioned in the first edition though it was accorded considerable space in the original. Letters from Mrs. Jefferson Davis were also deleted as well as many an off-color remark from the pen of Mrs. Chesnut herself. In the fuller edition edited by Ben Ames Williams considerable of the original material has been restored. This is particularly true between September 1861 and February 1862.

There is no question but that the newer edition is a great improvement over the old. However, there are many things yet to be desired. For example, some passages have been omitted from the Williams edition on the grounds that they have no appeal for the reader. This is unfortunate. From time to time, the editor by his own admission has made minor changes without an explanation in a footnote or an insertion in the body of the text. A more judicious use of footnotes to identify places and people would have added greatly to both interest and interpretation. This same criticism is true of the index where titles of Captain or Mr. are used with last names but with no initials given. Despite these minor faults the editor is to be commended

for making available a more complete edition of one of the most remarkable diaries which was produced in the Confederacy.

CHARLES S. DAVIS

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*Florida's Indians*

This is the title of a brief but comprehensive and authoritative review of what is known of that subject by John M. Goggin, which should be read in connection with his study of *Fort Pupo* in this issue of the QUARTERLY, and with Mark F. Boyd's *The Seminole War* in the last number.

For some years Dr. Goggin has been studying the aborigines of Florida, both in what has been recorded and through field work. First, as an archeologist, his interest was mainly in the prehistoric Indians of the Florida area, but there is no break between the Indians the Europeans found here, their immediate ancestors, and those with whom the Spaniards lived for long years. So all must be studied; hence, the author, as an anthropologist, continued his studies, and includes a short statement regarding the Indians now in Florida.

*Florida's Indians* was published as vol. x, no. 8 of *Economic Leaflets*, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Florida, These *Leaflets* may be obtained on request to the Bureau by any resident of Florida. Though a leaflet, it is a good length article of 5,000 words.

## REGIONAL AND LOCAL HISTORICAL SOCIETIES

The recording of local history is of more importance in the aggregate than that of the State as a whole. It is more interesting as well as of greater historical value, to know what the people of a period were thinking of and doing than any records of their rulers and representatives. Florida is behind many other states in historical effort at the county, town, and community level. But the recent organization of several county historical societies and commissions, which have been noted in the *Quarterly*, in addition to those already active, shows a realization of this lack in our State and the effort to fill the need.

*Numerous other counties and localities have a long and interesting history still unrecorded and steadily and rapidly being forgotten.*

*Historical markers.* A foremost activity of these societies should be the marking of historic sites in their areas. It is often surprising that many, even of the older residents of a region, do not know of these sites, and sometimes are quite ignorant of the events occurring there. There is no better way of increasing or arousing interest in the past of a community among its own people than by markers commemorating what has happened right here where perhaps they pass every day. Many visitors look for these markers, and when none are to be found, often inquire why.

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## TALLAHASSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY

### *Apalachee*

The third of the present series of publications of the Tallahassee Historical Society is a double number: *Apalachee, 1948-1950*. This issue, which includes a selection of the papers read at the program meetings of that organization during the past two years, was assembled and edited by Dr. Dorothy Dodd who has served on the editorial board throughout the series. The contents



of this volume is of the same high interest and historical worth which have characterized the former publications of that organization. The papers and their authors are:

*Battle Flags of Florida Troops in Confederate Service*

Daisy Parker

*The Tallahassee Fire of 1843*

Fred P. Ley Jr.

*Horse Racing in Middle Florida, 1830-1843*

Dorothy Dodd

*The Leon County Court, 1825-1833*

Daisy Parker

*Social Aspects of Leon County Wills and Inventories,  
1826-1845*

Arthur R. Seymour

*Ring Tournaments in Tallahassee*

William G. Dodd

*Confederate Post War Organizations and History of*

*Anna Jackson Chapter, U.D.C.*

Clara Ryder Hayden

*The Corporation of Tallahassee, 1826-1860*

Dorothy Dodd

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#### JACKSONVILLE HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Number Four of the *Jacksonville Historical Society Newsletter* was issued in May last by Miss Dena Snodgrass, with notes of their activities and the announcement of the annual meeting which was held on May 9, when a historical program was presented and the annual election of officers held. Officers elected were: Frank H. Elmore, president; James A. Austin, 1st vice president; Joseph E. McCarthy, 2nd vice president; Margaret

Segui, recording secretary; Mrs. James R. Stockton, corresponding secretary; Dena Snodgrass, treasurer; Audrey Broward, archivist; Herbert Lamson, historian.

The feature of the program was a historical narrative "The Voice of St. Augustine" written by Mrs. Eleanor Philips Barnes. The cast, representing four notable historical characters in St. Augustine history, included Judge David R. Dunham, Felix de Ron Solla, Harold Colee, and Albert C. Manucy, all of whom are descendants of early St. Augustine residents.

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#### **THE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA**

The Historical Association of Southern Florida has begun a Historical Markers Program. On August 3 there was dedicated the first marker in Miami Bayfront Park, commemorating the Indian village of Tequesta which occupied the site of present-day Miami, where a number of mounds, both dwelling and ceremonial, survived into the historical era.

Oliver Griswold is chairman of the Committee on Historical Sites and Markers, with Mrs. Roy V. Ott, George J. Deedmeyer, and Justin P. Havee. Adam G. Adams, president of the Association, presided, and the plaque was unveiled by Mrs. Frank Stranahan and Mrs. George E. Merrick.

The address was made by Hon. Frederick M. Hudson.

Several program meetings were held during the past season by the Association, the last on June 22 was featured by an address of John W. Griffin, Florida State Archeologist, on "Missions and Mills," in which he carefully explained why and how it has come to be known that several surviving ruins in Florida are not the remains of Spanish missions, as formerly thought, but sugar mills of a later era. A color-sound film was shown, "Our Heritage," relating to the effort now being made in Florida to conserve wild life.

**AN OLUSTEE MARKER**

During the War for Southern Independence only one large-scale battle was fought in Florida. At Olustee, hastily gathered Confederate forces under General Joseph Finegan roundly defeated a Federal army coming from Jacksonville with the purpose and expectation of cutting Florida in half and halting the flow of food on which the Confederate armies to the north were partly dependent, and the further hope of the administration in Washington of bringing Florida back into the Union.

A marker was placed in Olustee Battlefield Park on March 5 last, the gift of the United Daughters of the Confederacy of Florida. The address was made by Miss Dena Snodgrass who told of General Finegan's life.

## THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

A called meeting of the Board of Directors of the Society was held in our headquarters at the University of Florida on June 16. The greater part of our Board attended coming from various parts of the State, indicating their active interest in the Society's work. President Daniel and Miss Snodgrass came from Jacksonville, Vice president Blocker from St. Petersburg, Vice president Thrift from Lakeland, Mr. Keen from Tallahassee, Judge Dunham from St. Augustine, and Mr. Lesley from Tampa, in addition to the Gainesville members of the Board.

Numerous questions were discussed and some decisions reached which, with other matters, will be referred to the next Annual Meeting.

Several committees were reactivated, the appointments for which will be announced in the next *Quarterly*. A committee was created to study the Bylaws and suggest revisions and additions.

President Daniel extended an invitation from the Jacksonville Historical Society to hold our next Annual Meeting as their guests, and the invitation was accepted unanimously, with the date to be announced in the next *Quarterly*.

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### NEW MEMBERS

*Nominated by*

James Kytle Williams, Jr. - student member,

Univ. of Fla. .... Mrs. M. A. Johnson

Mrs. W. A. Smith - Marianna

Mrs. Mary J. White - Cocoa

Adam G. Adams - Coral Gables ..... Justin P. Havee

Frank B. Sessa - Miami ..... Charlton W. Tebeau

James W. Covington - University of Tampa

Ruth D. Scudder - Winter Park

J. Kenneth Ballinger - Tallahassee ..... J. Velma Keen

Mrs. Tod Swalm - Winter Park

Mrs. C. E. Strickland - Daytona Beach  
Madison High School Library - Madison  
Hillsborough County Historical Commission -  
Tampa ..... T. L. Lesley  
Ocala High School Library - Ocala  
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William T. Cash, Florida State Librarian, and former member of the Board of Directors of the Florida Historical Society, died on July 8. He served as one of our directors for the term 1947-1949, and also on several committees from time to time.

Mr. Cash was born in Jefferson county in 1878. In his youth he taught in the public schools of Taylor county, where he was County Superintendent, 1921-1925. He represented that county in the Florida House of Representatives for several terms and was a member of the Senate 1919-21. He was also editor of the *Perry Herald*.

Mr. Cash was at the head of the Florida State Library from its organization in 1927 until his death, as Secretary of the State Library Board and as State Librarian. His *Story of Florida* (2 vols., 1938) is one of the principal Florida histories, and his *History of the Democratic Party in Florida* (Live Oak, 1936), the only work in this field, was written partly from his own experiences and first-hand knowledge as a legislator.

**CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER OF THE QUARTERLY**

**John M. Goggin**, Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Florida, has specialized on Florida archeology and early Indian history for a number of years.

**Richard K. Murdoch**, of the Department of History, University of North Carolina, has specialized on the Latin nations in America.

**Arthur W. Thompson**, Assistant Professor of Social Sciences, University of Florida, is writing a biography of Senator Yulee.

**Charles S. Davis**, Professor of History, Florida State University, is Assistant and Acting Dean, College of Arts and Sciences.