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. . . To explore the field of Florida history, to seek and gather up the ancient chronicles in which its annals are contained, to retain the legendary lore which may yet throw light upon the past, to trace its monuments and remains, to elucidate what has been written to disprove the false and support the true, to do justice to the men who have figured in the olden time, to keep and preserve all that is known in trust for those who are to come after us, to increase and extend the knowledge of our history, and to teach our children that first essential knowledge, the history of our State, are objects well worthy of our best efforts. To accomplish these ends, we have organized the Historical Society of Florida.

GEORGE R. FAIRBANKS

Saint Augustine, April, 1857.

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BRITISH DESIGNS ON THE OLD SOUTHWEST: FOREIGN INTRIGUE ON THE FLORIDA FRONTIER, 1783-1803

by J. LEITCH WRIGHT, JR.

IT IS WIDELY recognized that for years after the American Revolution Britain played an important role in the affairs of the Old Northwest. In spite of the peace treaty's provisions, she continued to occupy military posts ceded to the United States. Using these posts as centers, Canadian traders continued to monopolize most of the Indian commerce north of the Ohio, and the Indians in this vast region still looked to Detroit, Niagara, and Quebec, rather than to New York, Pittsburgh, or Philadelphia for commercial and political leadership. In theory the Old Northwest was an integral part of the United States; in fact from 1783 until the mid-1790s this region was actually dominated by Britain's Indian allies. After ceding the Northwest posts in the Jay Treaty, and after Anthony Wayne's victory over the Indians, Britain's influence waned in the area, though it revived just before and during the War of 1812.

Less well known, and denied or unrecognized by some historians, is that there was in some measure a similar situation south of the Ohio in the Old Southwest - a large part of which Spain claimed was either directly part of Spanish Florida or a Spanish sphere of influence. At the same time, the United States insisted that much of this area had been ceded to her in the 1783 peace treaty. Here, too, after the Revolution, British interest and influence were still manifest and remained so until 1803 with the French cession of Louisiana, which the Americans said included West Florida, to the United States. Later British involvement waned, but, as in the Northwest, it was revived just before and during the War of 1812. There were two aspects of this British involvement: directly on the scene in the Old Southwest there were the activities of merchants, land speculators, and adventurers; while some distance away at Whitehall occasionally there was concern over the ultimate fate of the Old Southwest in which immediate gains from the fur trade or land speculation were secondary. The purpose of this article is to analyze Britain's role in the Old Southwest from the Revolution until the Louisiana

Purchase. Subsequent British activities during the War of 1812, another story in itself, are omitted.

Complicating any discussion of British, Spanish, or United States sovereignty of the Old West - the area between the Appalachian Mountains and Mississippi River - is the fact that in the period under discussion most of this region actually was controlled by Indians. During the Revolution the British had been well aware of this and under the leadership of Indian superintendents had formed a loose alliance of western Indians to help combat the rebels. The Indians, however, were completely ignored at the Paris peace negotiations in 1783, even though, at least for the time being, they still dominated most of the Old West. The Western Indians were furious. Those in the Old Northwest-the Six Nations under Chief Joseph Brant, and especially the Shawnee, Ottawa, Miami, and other tribes to the west-did not recognize the Paris settlement and demanded that the United States treat them as an independent confederate nation with the Ohio River as the boundary.¹ The Indians in the Old Southwest-Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws-likewise did not recognize the provisions of the Paris peace treaty, and maintaining they were independent, attempted to uphold their ancient boundaries.

After 1783 Britain was supposed to evacuate all the Old West and to stop subsidizing the Indians. Because of a long association with these Indians and because of the lure of trade, this only partially occurred. Britain had made wartime commitments to the Indians in the Old Northwest, and Canadian traders were loath to relinquish their profitable trade. Britain, therefore, retained the forts on American soil, and her traders used them to further their commerce, all the while insisting they had the right to use the Mississippi River.² Britain retained no forts in the Old Southwest-but here too her traders remained in the Indian country. Before the war British merchants at Charleston, Savannah, and Pensacola dominated Indian trade in the hinterland. These merchants supplied scores of local traders who frequently lived among

1. An excellent treatment of the northern Indians is Randolph C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: a Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795* (Pittsburgh, 1940).

2. Alfred L. Burt, *The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812* (New Haven, 1940), 85-93.

the Indians, had Indian wives, and in many instances were part Indian. Most of these white or mestizo traders were Tories, and their number was augmented during the Revolution. Though affluent South Carolina, Georgia, or Florida merchants, usually Loyalists, frequently were forced to withdraw to the Bahamas or elsewhere, the local traders continued to live among the Indians, to supply them with the indispensable guns, powder, and clothing, and to exert a powerful influence at their councils. These traders and the wealthy exiled merchants hoped that by swapping the Floridas for Gibraltar or by some other adjustment there might be at least a partial return to pre-Revolutionary conditions.³ It was because British traders remained among the Indians and because these Indians in fact controlled most of the Old Southwest, that British influence was not immediately dissipated here after 1783.

Naturally these local traders could have little influence over the Indians unless they continued to exchange manufactured goods for deer skins in the accustomed fashion. The most important British firm engaging in the southern fur trade was Panton, Leslie, and Company, which shortly after the war was given a monopoly of this commerce by Spain. Acquisition of Florida posed difficult problems for Spanish officials, and among the foremost was the Indian trade. After expending so much blood and treasure in acquiring the Floridas, whatever their boundaries, certainly it would be absurd to allow Britain to continue reaping the benefits of this commerce. But what were the alternatives? The ideal one was to replace British merchants with Spanish ones. Spain, however, in spite of an eighteenth century economic revival, was unable to supply the manufactured needs of the Floridas or her other colonial possessions. Another alternative was to look to France, her Bourbon ally. But the French firm awarded this commerce at the end of the Revolution suffered many setbacks and was not a success. The Indians could not be expected to wait indefinitely, and if Spain could not make arrangements for a dependable trade, then Georgia or the United States soon would find a way. American designs and expansion alarmed Spain and it was with

3. Marques del Campo to Conde de Floridablanca, March 16, 1784, Archivo General de Simancas, Simancas, Spain, estado, legajo 2619. Cited hereafter as AGS. Floridablanca to Campo, March 23, 1784, AGS, estado, legajo 2617.

some misgivings that she allowed the Loyalist firm of Panton, Leslie, and Company, formerly of Georgia but now of St. Augustine and Nassau, to remain in Florida with a monopoly on its commerce.⁴

Panton's monopoly was not the only way Britain had retained influence in the Old Southwest. Other British merchants located in the Bahamas eyed Panton's monopoly and intrigued with the Indians and Spaniards to break it. Having less to lose than Panton's Florida firm, their conduct was more reckless, and at least some of them did not confine their attention solely to the southern Indian trade. They hoped to restore Florida and the entire Old Southwest, either directly or indirectly, to Britain and possibly to link it with a British-dominated state north of the Ohio. At least a few were interested in cooperating with dissatisfied Westerners who might separate from the East and form a western state with close British ties.

Britain could play a role in the Old West after 1783 because United States authority here was weak. At the end of the Revolution there were relatively few Americans west of the Appalachians, though with the return of peace they began streaming through Cumberland Gap and down the Ohio, forming infant settlements in what would become Knoxville, Nashville, Lexington, and elsewhere. Though these immigrants pouring rapidly into the West were one of the marvels of the time, they, from their isolated log cabins listening to every sound in the nearby forest, from their stockaded forts warding off a full-scale Indian attack, or from within armed barges floating downstream and observed by hostile eyes ashore, would be the first to affirm that, at least for the time being, it was not the whites who were masters of most of the West.

It did not automatically follow that settlement of the West would soon bring this region under effective American control. Geography separated the West from the East; the Mississippi and its tributaries were vital western arteries. That the East was not sufficiently aware of this, as evidenced by the Jay-Gardoqui

4. Crown to Vicente Manuel de Zespedes, May 8, 1786, included with Zespedes to Jose de Galvez, March 22, 1784, Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid, Spain, estado, legajo 3901. Cited hereafter as AHN. Photostat in the Library of Congress. Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783-1795* (Boston, 1927), 38-46.

negotiations with Spain in 1786, when the United States offered to forego immediate free navigation of the Mississippi, was a prime reason why Westerners were dissatisfied. It was not just a handful that considered the possibility of completely separating from the United States and perhaps forming a close connection with Britain or Spain. The obvious advantage of a western alliance with Spain was that she controlled New Orleans and the Floridas and therefore all routes to the Gulf of Mexico. The motive for allying with Britain was that cooperation between western militiamen and a British fleet could soon yield New Orleans, and the British navy in the future could insure that the sea lanes to New Orleans remained open.⁵

Holding forth assurances of British sympathy combined with vague promises of support, and capitalizing on western dissatisfaction, Dr. John Connolly in 1788 journeyed from Detroit to Louisville in an attempt to secure western cooperation. Connolly was a Tory, a close friend of Governor Dunmore of Virginia, and like Dunmore an avid speculator in western lands. At the Revolution's onset, Connolly and Dunmore had contrived to raise the western Indians against the rebels, but Connolly was captured en route to the West and the plot collapsed. The doctor, like other militant Tories, had his lands confiscated. Never far from his mind as he traveled from Detroit and talked with James Wilkinson and other prominent Kentuckians, was the expectation that if the West separated from the East and linked up with Canada, he would have his confiscated lands or their equivalent restored. With the Kentucky legislature barely defeating a resolution for independence, and with the leaders of the unsuccessful State of Franklin at loose ends, Connolly was hopeful that a Canadian alliance might come into being.⁶ His mission attracted interest, and his proposals—apparently more extensive than authorized by the Canadian governor, Lord Dorchester—had a real appeal.⁷ But in

5. An example of western dissatisfaction is "Letter from a Gentleman at the Falls of the Ohio to His Friends in New England," December 4, 1786, Samuel C. Williams, *History of the Lost State of Franklin* (Johnson City, 1924), 123-24.

6. Arthur St. Clair to John Jay, December 13, 1788, William H. Smith, ed., *The St. Clair Papers*, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, 1882), II, 104-05.

7. The Canadian governor had instructed Connolly to gather information about western dissatisfaction and to establish contacts valuable for the future. It may be, as both the Americans and Spaniards charged, that the doctor, liberally interpreting his instructions, actually tried to enlist Westerners for a New Orleans attack. George Morgan to Diego de Gardoqui, December 19, 1788, AHN, estado, legajo 3888

spite of genuine western dissatisfaction, the frontiersmen at this time were reluctant to throw themselves into the arms of the Canadians who were frequently notorious Tories and who allegedly still incited the Indians to hostility.

Connolly's proposals were not accepted, and it is necessary to put aside temporarily possible British designs on the lower Mississippi Valley, conceived in Canada or the West Indies, and to make a critical examination of affairs in the Old Southwest itself. For the Indians the overriding concern was to maintain their hunting lands in face of relentless American expansion. The Creeks and Cherokees immediately adjacent to the frontier settlements in Georgia and Tennessee had most cause for alarm, though in view of the Yazoo land speculation none of the southern Indians could be complacent. The Spaniards no less than the Indians were concerned with western immigration: the question, or rather the dilemma, was how to contain the Americans. An obvious solution was to support and cooperate with the Indians, which had been the normal policy since the Revolution. In practice it was difficult to make the southern Indians pliant tools of Spanish diplomacy, and there was always the danger that furnishing munitions to the Indians might lead to a crisis with the United States. Dorchester and Connolly confronted the same hazard in Canada.

Another way to stop the Americans was to fight fire with fire - encourage them either to settle on Spanish soil or to separate from the East, thereby providing a Spanish-dominated buffer to the United States. During the same period that Connolly was in Louisville, and for the same general reasons, Spain was encouraging western discontent and holding forth the lure of free navigation of the Mississippi River. To further placate the Westerners, Spain in 1788 drastically reduced her supplies of arms and powder for the Indians. These Indians were not as interested in the subtleties of Spanish diplomacy as they were vitally concerned with securing ample supplies of powder and ball - necessary for both sustenance and defense.⁸

bis, photostat, Library of Congress; Dorchester to John Connolly, January 15, 1788, Public Record Office: Colonial Office 42/60. Cited hereafter as PRO:CO. Microfilm is in Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

8. McGillivray to Miro, August 12, 1788, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles Procedentes de Cuba, legajo 1394. Cited hereafter as AGI, Cuba.

It was at this juncture that ex-Loyalist William Augustus Bowles and his Providence Island backers, merchant John Miller and the governor, the Earl of Dunmore, stepped in and offered the distracted Indians ample supplies of munitions. Bowles' immediate objective was to break the Panton, Leslie monopoly and to reap the profits of the southern fur trade. But there were other considerations, especially for Dunmore. He had been governor of New York and Virginia, had an avid interest in the West, and had acquired extensive holdings there. As a result of the Revolution he had lost all his possessions, and now from his vantage point of Nassau, he viewed the West in the same light as did his fellow land speculator and comrade-in-arms, Doctor Connolly from Detroit. Both would like to see some type of independent Mississippi Valley state linked to or directly under the control of Britain. There would be profits for Canadian and Nassau merchants, and Dunmore and Connolly could resume their western land speculation which had been interrupted by the Revolution.⁹

Bowles' expedition to Florida in September 1788 began auspiciously. Earlier he had met with the powerful Indian half-breed, Alexander McGillivray, in Creek country and arranged for Bowles to furnish munitions and soldiers to aid in the Georgian conflict. In Nassau Bowles had enlisted almost fifty ex-Loyalists and seamen, with the assistance of Dunmore who had opened the doors of the island prison. John Miller and his partner Bonnamy provided two vessels stocked with arms and powder.¹⁰ The expedition sailed first to the Indian River half-way down Florida's east coast, where the half-breed John Galphin appeared with over 100 pack horses to transport the goods inland. Bowles hoped to continue the trade by building a fortified trading post between the Altamaha and St. Johns rivers, but after the initial success things began to go awry. The Spaniards, alarmed by Indian dissatisfaction and Bowles' intrusion, reversed their policy and promised the Indians ample presents, regardless of the effect on frontiersmen. And McGillivray, who in desperation had turned to Bowles, gladly went back to Panton and the Spaniards. Most of Bowles' followers, after undergoing great privation in the woods,

9. Dunmore to Dundas, August 28, 1792, PRO:CO 23/31.

10. Memorial of William Panton, John Leslie, and Thomas Forbes to William Wyndham Grenville, June 19, 1789, PRO:CO 23/29; Stephen Haven to John Wells, August 20, 1789, *Bahama Gazette*, August 15-22, 1789.

deserted to Pantón's St. Johns store and to the Spanish outpost; only a few of the leaders remained with Bowles, who had to report this initial failure to his Nassau backers.¹¹

Except for continuing Indian hostility on the white frontier, for a brief period there was relative calm in the Old Southwest. Then unexpectedly the threat of a general war loomed and all the latent ambitions of the British, Spanish, Americans, both eastern and western, and Indians toward the Old Southwest were revived. This international crisis was triggered by Spanish seizure of British vessels at Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island, and it opened up the question of ownership of the entire Pacific Northwest. War seemed likely unless Britain or Spain backed down. With France, Spain's Bourbon ally, in turmoil as a result of revolution, British statesmen thought it a good time to settle old scores with Spain. How to do this was the question. Britain was aware that Spain, likely to obtain only partial or no support from the French fleet, would be pressed to defend her extensive colonies. Francisco de Miranda, a revolutionary Creole from Venezuela, counseled Prime Minister Pitt on the best way of ousting Spain from all America, including Louisiana and Florida.¹² In a British assault against any part of Spanish America, the British navy naturally would be required. But British troops were another matter. Profiting from prior failures in West Indian campaigns and from the disaster of the American Revolution, Britain had qualms about committing large numbers of troops anywhere in America.

These troops did not necessarily have to be British. Miranda emphasized creole eagerness to fight for independence. Regarding seizure of Louisiana and Florida, one source of soldiers was the nearby Americans who were anxious to open up the Mississippi River to navigation. It was primarily because of this possibility that George Beckwith, an informal agent from Canada, held several conferences in the summer of 1790 with Alexander Hamilton. In any joint Anglo-American venture the United States would obtain free navigation of the Mississippi River and at least some territory; Britain would acquire New Orleans, or at least extensive

11. "Declaraciones referentes a Guillermo Bowles," AGI, Cuba, legajo 1395.

12. Francisco de Miranda to William Pitt, September 8, 1791, Chatham Papers, CCCXLV, British Museum.

commercial rights there, and could expect to dominate commercially, and perhaps politically, the entire Mississippi Valley.¹³ While there were good reasons why the United States and Britain should cooperate, there were also reasons why they would not. Britain continued to occupy the Northwest posts, and there was the question whether Britain at New Orleans, even though she allowed free navigation, would be in the long run more desirable than Spain. In the end the Hamilton-Beckwith negotiations bore no tangible results.

One of Britain's drawbacks to cooperating with the United States would be confusion over the relative position of each nation in Louisiana and Florida in the aftermath of a successful campaign. Aligning with dissatisfied Westerners and not with the American government, by-passed this dilemma, and was the course urged by Phineas Bond, British consul at Philadelphia: "Nature, my Lord, seems to have pointed out a plain line of division between the Eastern and Western parts of this continent-that wonderful range of mountains which runs between the Atlantic Ocean and the river Mississippi."¹⁴ At the same time that Beckwith was feeling out Hamilton in New York, other Canadian agents were conferring with George Rogers Clark and his son-in-law, James O'Fallon, wanting to know how many Westerners they could raise for an attack on New Orleans and Florida, and if after a successful campaign, whether the Westerners would become in effect a British protectorate.¹⁵ Had Spain not backed down in the Nootka crisis, one can only speculate as to the result of this British intrigue.

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13. George Beckwith's memo in Lord Dorchester to Crown, September 25, 1790, PRO:CO 42/69, microfilm in Public Archives of Canada; Beckwith to Grenville, November 3, 1790, *ibid.* 42/21; Julian P. Boyd, *Number 7: Alexander Hamilton's Secret Attempts to Control American Foreign Policy, with Supporting Documents* (Princeton, 1964), clearly demonstrates that Beckwith was a secret, unofficial British agent, that his conversations - especially those before 1790 - were with Hamilton as a private individual, and that Hamilton at times misrepresented these conversations to his superiors.
 14. Phineas Bond to Duke of Leeds, November 10, 1789, Public Record Office: Foreign Office, 4/7. Cited hereafter as PRO:FO. Microfilm in Library of Congress. "Occurrences from July 5 to August 3, 1790," *ibid.*, 4/8.
 15. James O'Fallon to Miro, February 18, 1791, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2371; Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier*, 143. In this same period when it appeared the United States might break up, Levi Allen was in London discussing the possibility of annexing Vermont to Canada.

Another way to avoid committing British regulars to an American campaign was to follow Warren Hasting's maxim for India by using native Sepoys for the bulk of the land fighting. This is what Bowles, Dunmore, and Miller, their hopes revived at the possibility of a Spanish war, proposed. Their Sepoys would be Indians, but in this case Creeks, Cherokees, and perhaps Choc-taws and Chickasaws, reinforced by a liberal sprinkling of ex-Tory Indian traders and disgruntled Westerners. With Dunmore's blessing, Bowles and five Creek and Cherokee chiefs set out for London to plead their case.

But they did not go directly to Europe. By stopping first at Quebec they went hundreds of miles out of their way, but in all likelihood Bowles would have come here to confer with Governor Dorchester even if there had been no possibility of a Spanish rupture. The Six Nations and other northern Indians, as well as the southern Indians, were alarmed by American expansion, and there were frequent hostilities all along the frontier. After 1783 there had been much Indian talk about forming a general confederation to contain the Americans: recently Mohawks had been in the Creek country for this purpose, and Creek and Cherokee delegations frequently were at important northern Indian councils. What Bowles urged was that Dorchester give presents to the southern as well as the northern Indians so that all the western Indians, under British auspices, could cooperate more effectively against the Americans. With the possibility of a Spanish war there was even more reason why Dorchester should support the southern Indians. Dorchester received Bowles' request with mixed emotions. The governor had problems enough with the northern Indians and was not inclined to add the southern ones to his Canadian sphere. But should hostilities break out with Spain, Bowles and his Indians would be valuable allies. Another consideration was the Beckwith-Hamilton negotiations in New York. If Britain aided the southern Indians it would be more difficult to reach an agreement with the United States. With misgivings Dorchester finally agreed to pay the fare of Bowles and his fellow chiefs to London.¹⁶

When they arrived at the end of October 1790, the Spanish crisis was at its peak, and Bowles, greatly exaggerating, insisted

16. Dorchester to Grenville, July 26, 1790, PRO:CO 42/68. Microfilm in Public Archives of Canada.

that his 20,000 man Creek-Cherokee army, easily reinforced by a like number of Choctaws and Chickasaws and several thousand frontiersmen, was eager to serve under the British banner. With only limited British reinforcements, Florida, Louisiana, and even Mexico should fall.¹⁷ In part this might have occurred had not hostilities been averted by the Spanish capitulation. News of Spain's concessions at Nootka reached London shortly after Bowles' arrival, and he had to lower his sights. What he asked for and finally obtained was permission to have vessels flying the flag of the independent Muskogee Indian state bring colonial produce to Nassau in exchange for British manufactures. Although less than reaffirming Britain's pre-Revolutionary treaties with the Creeks, this was an indirect recognition of Muskogee's independence.¹⁸

With the Spanish crisis resolved, Bowles, having obtained all he could reasonably expect, concluded his conferences with Home Secretary Grenville and bid farewell to London's cosmopolitan delights. The Creek and Cherokee chiefs stopped at Nassau and again conferred with Dunmore and Miller before returning to Florida. Bowles, stretching the truth, told the Indians he had been commissioned British superintendent and proceeded to proclaim the mouths of the Indian and Ochlockonee rivers free ports. At the latter site, Bowles and his Indian and white followers constructed warehouses to facilitate trade with Nassau. These free ports were in areas controlled by the Florida Seminoles and Lower Creeks, and it was from these Indians that Bowles drew his main support. They were dissatisfied with Alexander McGillivray's recent American treaty whereby Creek lands were ceded and were alarmed by the activities of land speculators in Georgia and elsewhere along the Florida frontier.¹⁹

Many natives therefore eagerly looked to Bowles who denounced McGillivray's treaty and promised ample presents and cheap goods. But his promises were one thing and his performance another. Militant opposition by both Spain and Panton, Leslie, and Company curtailed Bowles' Nassau commerce, and the seizure

17. London *Daily Advertiser*, October 30, 1790.

18. Bowles to Grenville, January 13, 1791, PRO:FO 4/9. Microfilm in Library of Congress. Grenville to Dorchester, March 7, 1791, PRO:CO 42/73. Microfilm in Public Archives of Canada; *Bahama Gazette*, August 2-5, 1791.

19. Bowles' proclamation, October 26, 1791, Personal miscellaneous, account 6662, photostat in Library of Congress.

of Pantón's warehouse at St. Marks, Florida, only temporarily changed matters.²⁰ Unless Bowles could make good his promises to the Indians regarding presents and trading goods, his following would soon dissipate. Taking a gamble, he began negotiating with the Spaniards, who, induced him, under a safe conduct pass, to go to New Orleans. The Spaniards, wondering how to maintain their influence over the Indians, were sincere to some extent in treating with Bowles and considered backing him instead of Alexander McGillivray. Finally, however, they decided to ignore

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20. The best published account of this seizure is Lawrence Kinnaird, "The Significance of William Augustus Bowles' Seizure of Pantón's Apalachee Store in 1792." *Florida Historical Quarterly*, IX (January 1931), 156-92. Arthur P. Whitaker in *The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803* (New York, 1934), 164-65, insists that Bowles' 1791-92 incursion represented nothing more than rivalry between competing British merchant houses and that Britain would not gain a farthing should Bowles succeed. In a narrow sense this is true, but it should be emphasized that Bowles and his backers expected to see the British or Muskogee banner flying over the Old Southwest in order to oust Pantón, that they and others expected the Old Southwest would be linked to the British dominated Upper Mississippi Valley, and that in this period it was still widely held that the United States would break up or lose part of its territory. The Canadian fur traders who almost monopolized trade in the Upper Mississippi Valley were interested in New Orleans for the same reasons as the American frontiersmen and had much to gain should Britain replace Spain on the Gulf Coast. Pantón, of course, was doing quite well under Spain and was not, and in fact could not be, so zealous to see the British flag restored in the Old Southwest. It also must be recognized that Pantón's Spanish concession could be revoked at any time. Kinnaird considers that in a general way Bowles reflected British imperialism, but he does not stress the connection between the Upper and Lower Mississippi Valley.

Whitaker's contention that there was no need for Britain to try to take Florida because Spain willingly would have parted with this unprofitable colony at best is misleading. There is no question that it was a financial drain and that there were proposals to get rid of it at any price - or none. But these were old arguments dating from shortly after the time of Menendez de Aviles. What is significant is that, in spite of these arguments, from the sixteenth century on Spain retained Florida and that twice since the American Revolution she had almost gone to war with Britain to preserve fringe areas of her American empire - Nootka and the Mosquito Shore - having no more immediate economic consequence than Florida. A careful examination of the diplomatic documents in Simancas, Seville, and London does not indicate that Spain was pressing Britain to take Florida gratis. It would be entirely another matter if Florida could be exchanged for Gibraltar. There are numerous documents in Boyd, *Number 7, 94, 116, 132*, indicating that Jefferson, Jay, and Hamilton were convinced that Britain after the Revolution was planning to take the Floridas and Louisiana by force. All of the evidence refutes the thesis that Spain would willingly give the Floridas to Britain without compensation.

Bowles' safe conduct pass and sent him as prisoner first to Spain, and ultimately to the Philippines.²¹

Though Bowles did not return to Florida within the forty days allocated in his safe conduct pass, his followers were still active. Leadership now fell on the ex-Loyalist, George Wellbank, who remained at the mouth of the Ochlockonee River trying to maintain commercial intercourse with Miller and Dunmore. He had even less success than Bowles, and finally the combined pressure of the Spanish and Creek supporters of McGillivray forced Wellbank to seek refuge among the Cherokees. Those Cherokee towns on or near Chickamauga Creek where Wellbank now resided became the most militant against land-hungry Americans, and, in contrast to a majority of the tribe, often refused to make peace with the United States. Some of the chiefs from here had accompanied Bowles to London.²²

From his base near Lookout Mountain on the Tennessee River, Wellbank endeavored to promote British and his own interests among the Cherokees and other western Indians. Now a connection with the British at Detroit rather than at Nassau offered the best possibility. The northern Indians, flushed with victories over American Generals Harmar and St. Clair, and encouraged by Britain, were demanding more insistently than ever that the Ohio River become the boundary, and at the same time were encouraging the southern Indians to unite in a general war against the whites. These pleas had a genuine appeal to many Indians in Florida and throughout the South. In the past, Creek and Cherokee delegations were represented at conferences in or near Detroit, and small parties had fought against Generals Harmar and St. Clair.²³ Wellbank strove to increase this cooperation among all western Indians - naturally under British auspices - and expected that first the Cherokees, then the Creeks, and ultimately all the southern Indians would join their northern counterparts. Should this occur, then it was hoped that the western Indians would safeguard their lands, and British merchants at

21. Jose Hevia to Bowles, February 22, 1792, AHN, consejo, legajo 21,067, Spanish transcripts in Library of Congress. Bowles to Floridablanca, June 18, 1792, *ibid.*

22. Wellbank to Miller, June 10, 1792, PRO:CO 23/31; Baron de Carondelet to Conde de Aranda, December 15, 1792, AHN, estado, legajo 3898, apartado 3/25, photostat in Library of Congress.

23. Grenville to Hammond, April 25, 1792, PRO:FO 115/1; James Carey to William Blount, November 3, 1792, *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1832-1834), I, 327-29.

Nassau and Detroit would dominate western trade without reference to Spain. And Spain, briefly allied with Britain against French Jacobinism, might even give its stamp of approval.²⁴

With this sweeping vision before him and the more limited objective of increasing commercial ties between Detroit and the Chickamaugas, George Wellbank, accompanied by several chiefs, made the long journey to Detroit in 1793. This was a critical period. The northern Indians were demanding, more belligerently than ever, the Ohio as a boundary. The United States commissioners were trying to negotiate a peace with these Indians but were making no headway. The northern Indians were at the same time stepping up their overtures to their southern counterparts (Shawnee emissaries without authority already had promised Canadian aid to the southern Indians).²⁵ And Britain, in view of her prior commitments to the Indians and the increased likelihood of war after her seizure of American merchant ships in the West Indies, was resolutely supporting the Indians and insisting that the United States accept most of the Old Northwest as an Indian buffer state. Wellbank conferred with John Graves Simcoe, the aggressive lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, and urged closer ties between Detroit and the southern Indians, and either a resumption of Canadian commerce with the Tennessee area which had been cut off by the advancing Americans, or the lieutenant governor's endorsement of direct British trade between Nassau and the Creeks. Simcoe was impressed with Wellbank and was sympathetic to his plea. For the present, however, continued British meddling with the northern Indians could easily plunge the mother country into a war with the United States—something British statesmen hoped to avoid. Detroit's support for the Cherokees and Creeks would further complicate matters. In the future, perhaps after General St. Clair's fate was meted out to General Anthony Wayne and the United States became more reasonable, Wellbank might expect more tangible aid from Detroit.²⁶

24. Charles Stevenson to John G. Simcoe, July 12, 1793, Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., *The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe, with Allied Documents relating to His Administration of the Government of Upper Canada*, 5 vols. (Toronto, 1923-1931), I, 384.

25. Simcoe to Alured Clarke, July 29, 1793, *ibid.*, I, 392-93.

26. Benjamin Lincoln, "Journal of a Treaty Held in 1793, with the Indian Tribes North-West of the Ohio, by Commissioners of the United States," *Colonial Massachusetts Historical Society*, V (1836), 3rd ser., 169ff; Philip M. Hamer, "The British in Canada and the Southern Indians, 1790-1794," *The East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications*, II (1930), 109ff.

Wellbank's dreams in 1793 were dashed to pieces the following year. Wayne roundly defeated the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, forcing them to sue for peace on American terms. In the aftermath of Fallen Timbers, Britain signed the Jay Treaty with the United States and agreed to relinquish all posts on American soil. Finally Wellbank, who had returned to the Chickamaugas, ventured among the Upper Creeks, and in a dispute, was killed when he was knocked on the head with a "lightwood-knot."²⁷ The outcome of the Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Jay Treaty were of great significance to the Old Northwest, and in the aftermath British influence decreased in this area. The Treaty of San Lorenzo, the Pinckney Treaty, had equally profound effects on the Old Southwest. Spain acceded to American demands and agreed to the thirty-first parallel as West Florida's northern boundary and promised the United States free navigation on the Mississippi River.²⁸

American influence seemed assured now from the Atlantic to the Mississippi and from Detroit to the Florida border. In reality Indians still controlled much of this region, and British traders, though not so numerous, were still present both north and south of the Ohio. And the violently fluctuating international diplomacy in the aftermath of the French Revolution again posed the possibility of British involvement in the Old Southwest. The main reason Spain had made the important Florida and Mississippi River concessions in the Pinckney Treaty was that her British alliance was broken and she was once again a French ally. The danger of an Anglo-American attack on Louisiana and Florida was reason enough to conciliate the United States. With Spain in France's camp, Britain, as expected, declared war, and the outbreak of this Anglo-Spanish conflict in 1796 again threatened to involve Britain in the Old Southwest.

Since the English were openly at war with Spain, Louisiana and Florida were fair game, and there were the customary strategic and economic reasons why they should seize these provinces. But there was a new concern at Whitehall: if Britain did not

27. Diary of John Hambly, June-August 1794, New York Historical Society, B. Smith Papers, transcript in the Lockey Collection, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville, Florida.

28. Samuel F. Bemis, *Pinckney's Treaty: A Study of America's Advantage from Europe's Distress, 1783-1800* (Baltimore, 1926), 332-35; Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier*, 205-06, 221-22.

take Louisiana and Florida by force, then France might acquire these provinces by negotiation. This could pave the way for French acquisition of Spain's other American colonies, making Revolutionary France the dominant power in both the Old and the New Worlds. The activities of French General Victor Collot in the West,²⁹ and the fact that France, for the time being unsuccessfully, was pressing Spain for the retrocession of Louisiana, gave Britain cause for concern.³⁰

On the eve of the new war with Spain, Britain, asserting that the Pinckney Treaty was violating her rights of navigation on the Mississippi River, again intrigued with frontiersmen and Indians toward establishing an independent western state linked to Canada.³¹ Once again Dr. John Connolly journeyed down to the Ohio.³² That Britain was, or at least should be, contemplating an attack on Louisiana and Florida was obvious to many Westerners - certainly to the land speculator, Senator William Blount who was being threatened with bankruptcy. He urged that Britain furnish warships, while he, leading both red and white Westerners, descended on New Orleans and East and West Florida. It is quite likely that the senator made overtures to William Panton in Florida. But Blount's machinations were exposed and he was expelled from the United States Senate.³³ At the same time, John Chisholm, an ex-Loyalist Indian trader, independent of William Blount, had been advocating the same project. Robert Liston, the British minister in Philadelphia, sent Chisholm on to London,

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29. Carlos Martinez de Irujo to Prince of the Peace, February 18, 1797, AHN, estado, legajo 3889 bis, expediente 10, photostat, Library of Congress.
 30. Elijah Wilson Lyon, *Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804* (Norman, 1934), 89-90; Phineas Bond to Grenville, December 20, 1795, PRO:FO 115/4.
 31. Duke of Portland to Simcoe, October 25, 1795, PRO:WO (colonial, secret entry book); Frederick J. Turner, ed., *Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1903*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1904), II, 990.
 32. St. Clair to James Ross, September 6, 1796, Smith, *St. Clair Papers*, II, 411.
 33. Blount to Carey, April 21, 1797, Marcus J. Wright, *Some Account of the Life and Services of William Blount . . . together with a Full Account of His Impeachment and Trial in Congress, and His Expulsion from the U.S. Senate* (Washington, 1884), 15-16; William H. Masterson, *William Blount* (Baton Rouge, 1954), 303-07.

where, after some deliberation, the government turned down his offer.³⁴

The British realized that an expedition against Spain's Florida and Louisiana possessions, organized on American territory, might involve her in a war not only with the Spanish but with the United States also. One possible way of resolving this problem was to combine with the United States against Spain; and when, in 1798, because of seizure of American merchant ships, the United States was on the verge of war with France - and France's Spanish ally - such cooperation seemed probable. In an Anglo-American attack the United States would acquire at least part of the territory that Britain could have secured through the Blount-Chisholm-Liston project; but in any case Britain would obtain advantages for her efforts, and France would be denied a foothold on the American continent. But because the United States patched up her difficulties with France in the convention of 1800, Anglo-American cooperation never got beyond the discussion stage.³⁵ However, the mounting fear of French acquisition of Spanish America, particularly Louisiana and Florida, and the appeal of obtaining New Orleans and the West Florida ports, establishing commercial supremacy over the entire Mississippi Valley, thus dominated Britain's thinking whenever the Old Southwest was considered at Whitehall.

In view of Napoleon's designs on all Spanish America in general, and Louisiana in particular, the Old Southwest was receiving more attention in London. Miranda had returned to England from the Continent and, as during the Nootka crisis, was pressing for the liberation of Spanish America, thereby keeping it out of French hands and enriching the British exchequer.³⁶ To com-

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34. Robert Liston to Grenville, May 10, 1797, PRO:FO 115/5; Grenville to Liston, April 8, 1797, Bernard J. Mayo, ed., *Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States, 1791-1812, Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1936*, 3 vols. (Washington, 1941), III, 132.
35. Grenville to Liston, June 8, 1798, PRO:FO 115/6; Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King, August 22, 1798, Charles R. King, ed., *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, 6 vols. (New York, 1894-1900), II, 659. The United States always assumed she would acquire New Orleans and the Floridas, while Britain would be rewarded elsewhere. There was never any formal agreement, and, should a British expedition have appeared in the Gulf of Mexico, it was quite uncertain how Spanish territory would be divided.
36. William S. Robertson, *The Life of Miranda*, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1929), I, 165-70.

plete the picture, Bowles, the Florida adventurer, had escaped his Spanish captors and was also in London, urging the conquest of Florida and Louisiana. During the Nootka crisis, Bowles had hoped to include the Old Southwest in a general Mississippi Valley state or protectorate which would be dominated commercially and politically by Britain. But by 1799, Britain had abandoned the Northwest posts, and Americans, encouraged by this withdrawal and by Spain's agreeing to the thirty-first parallel, were more numerous and more firmly entrenched than ever in the West. It was less likely now that Westerners would want to separate from the East. Bowles had hope that with British backing he could be instrumental in keeping Florida and Louisiana out of French hands. Rumor had it that the French flag was already flying over Pensacola. It was also obvious to Bowles that these provinces in British hands could supply naval stores and food necessary for the French war.³⁷

Whitehall never openly supported Bowles' project, but highly placed government officials, usually associated with the ultra-conservative, anti-Jacobin faction, did.³⁸ It was they and the merchants in Nassau who obtained Bowles' passage to Jamaica in a man-of-war and who furnished him with a store of munitions and Indian goods. The Royal Naval sloop *Fox* then conveyed Bowles and his handful of white followers from Jamaica and Nassau to Florida. Here misfortune struck. The *Fox* ran aground and sank near the mouth of the Apalachicola River, and only part of the cargo was salvaged. Discouraged, but undaunted, Bowles made his way upriver into the heart of the Lower Creek-Seminole country. Again he told the Indians that he held a British commis-

37. Liston to Grenville, April 2, 1798, PRO:FO 115/6; Bowles to Grenville, June 5, 1798, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2371.

38. John Reeves, the king's printer and founder of the Association for Preserving Liberty and Property against Levellers and Republicans, was Bowles' most important backer. Also he could expect support from Grenville, the Duke of Portland, and William Windham, who were the most extreme anti-French cabinet members bent on an aggressive campaign against the enemy. Bowles to Reeves, March 1, 1799, Add. mss. 37.878, Windham Papers, British Museum; Henry Dundas, memorandum, March 31, 1800, Chatham Papers CCXLIII; Windham to ?, November 3, 1802, Earl of Rosebury, ed., *The Windham Papers; The Life and Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. William Windham, 1750-1810* . . . , 2 vols. (London, 1913), II, 200-02; Ferdinand Smyth Stuart to Henry Dundas, February 25, March 27, 1798, Great Britain Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, Preserved at Cirencester Park* (London, 1923), 23.

sion, that William Panton was a traitor to both Britain and the Florida Indians, that by following him they would not have to give up land to the Americans, and finally that beneficial commerce with Nassau would ensue. Bowles, eloquently addressing the Indians in their native tongue, told them what they most wanted to hear.³⁹ In order to facilitate communications with the Nassau competitors of Panton, Leslie, and Company, Bowles first captured Panton's store in St. Marks on the Gulf coast. Then he and his followers, a sizeable force of Indians and whites, laid siege to the Spanish fort several miles away. Surprisingly enough, the Indians maintained a prolonged siege, and even more astounding, the Spanish commander, whose garrison was in good health and who still had food and ammunition, surrendered in May 1800.⁴⁰

This marked the high tide of Bowles' success in Florida. The Spaniards soon retook the fort, and the combined opposition of Spain, Panton, and the American Indian agent, Benjamin Hawkins, made Bowles' life unpleasant. But a hard core of Lower Creeks and Seminoles remained loyal to him, and he maintained the fiction of the Muskogee nation's independence. Privateers, flying this Indian banner, preyed on Spanish shipping, keeping Bowles supplied with munitions and Indian presents.⁴¹ With mounting evidence that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France, Bowles kept hoping, with some justification, that Britain would strike at Louisiana and Florida - an operation which he knew would make him a prominent participant.⁴² But in 1802 there was a general European peace, and it now became expedient for

39. Bowles to Reeves, November 26, 1799, Add. mss. 37,878 Windham Papers, British Museum.

40. Vicente Folch to Marques de Casa Calvo, June 2, 1800, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2355. The best published account is in Whitaker, *Mississippi Question*, though the author makes no distinction between Bowles' objectives now and in the 1791-92 incursion, and he considers that Britain officially was not backing Bowles. As far as outside powers are concerned this was technically correct; yet it is hard to explain why the government paid his way to Florida, sent him there on a ship of the Royal Navy, and why the governors at Barbados, Jamaica, and the Bahamas each entertained him and paid his expenses. There is the strong probability that the Jamaican governor gave him munitions. Gov. Dowdeswell to Portland, November 12, 1799, PRO:CO 23/29; Gov. Ricketts to John King, June 20, 1799, PRO:CO 28/65; Gov. Balcarres to Bowles, July 15, 1799, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2371.

41. "State of Muskogee," March 4, 1802, Cruzat Papers, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville.

42. Dundas memorandum, Chatham Papers; Windham to ?, November 3, 1802, Rosebury, *Windham Papers*.

Britain to consider Bowles' vessels pirates rather than privateers. And Napoleon, frustrated in his designs upon Haiti and of reestablishing France's American empire, sold Louisiana to the United States. Bowles' hopes were shattered and, through the influence of Hawkins, he was captured in 1803 while attending an Indian council. The American Indian agent turned his prisoner over to the Spaniards who in turn shipped him off to Havana where he soon died.⁴³ With Bowles' death and the Louisiana cession, which the United States insisted included West Florida, British involvement in the Old Southwest abated. Forbes and Company, successors of Panton, Leslie, and Company, remained, and many of the traders among the southern Indians maintained their British sympathies. Possibly Aaron Burr expected their cooperation in his conspiracy. And once again, just before and during the War of 1812, the Floridas and Louisiana received marked attention at Whitehall. Yet 1803 ushered in a lull of British involvement in the Old Southwest, the first definite abatement since the end of the Revolution.

43. John Halkett to John Sullivan, October 13, 1802, PRO:CO 23/42; Manuel de Salcedo to Someruelos, June 11, 1803, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2355.

BRITISH STRATEGY AND SOUTHERN INDIANS: WAR OF 1812

by JOHN K. MAHON

HARDLY HAD LAND operations commenced in Canada during the War of 1812, when British officers in North America and adjacent waters began to recommend a diversion somewhere to the southward to relieve the pressure at the north. As early as November 1812, Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, British commander on the North American station, suggested the shores of the Gulf of Mexico as the proper place, especially New Orleans. Seizure of that city, he said, would throttle the states of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, which were then spearheading the war against Upper Canada.¹

Admiral Warren, who had served on the American station during the Revolutionary War, had little sympathy for Americans. He thought it only sensible to use racial minority groups, disaffected toward the United States, in the fight. Especially the Indians! Britain, the admiral believed, ought to reconquer territory from the Americans and give it back to the Indians to create a buffer against future aggressions. The Negroes, too, were natural allies of any enemy of the United States, and Warren proposed using them to garrison New Orleans, once it was captured. Black troops would put the fear of slave insurrection into the southern states and would quickly bring them to terms.²

The British had, from the earliest times, used the North American Indians against their enemies, but a milder spirit was overtaking them bit by bit, and they were beginning to suffer pangs of conscience when allied with "savages." Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, claimed that he was willing to engage the Indians only because the Americans would snap them up if England did not; he would have preferred it had they remained neutral.³

1. J. B. Warren to Viscount Melville, November 18, 1812, Warren Letters, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England.

2. *Ibid.*; Warren to Melville, February 25, 1813, *ibid.*

3. Bathurst to Sir George Prevost, August 10, 1812, Public Record Office: Colonial Office, 43/23, 70.

British influence radiated out among the Indians principally from the Great Lakes region. There, England had powerful allies in Tecumseh, a Shawnee chief, and his brother, the Prophet. Tecumseh realized what few other Indians ever saw: only if all tribes made common cause could they hope to contain the United States as it exploded out of its borders. He first formed an association of tribes in the Old Northwest, and then sought to extend it throughout the Mississippi Valley. On August 5, 1811, he took a picked delegation and started southward to bring the southern tribes into a united front against the Americans. The British Promised war supplies and other assistance. His visit to the Chickasaws and Choctaws was fruitless because of the opposition of their important chiefs. But Tecumseh's mother was a Creek, and a warmer welcome was accorded him among her people. Tuscanea or Tusca Heneha, eldest son of Big Warrior, head chief of the Creek Confederation, sponsored his mission, and some 5,000 Creeks gathered at Tuckabatchee on the Tallapoosa River in September 1811, to hear his appeal.⁴

Impressive as this number was, the Creek Confederation was too deeply divided to make a united stand. The faction sponsoring Tecumseh's visit came in the main from the Upper Creek towns along the Coosa, Tallapoosa, and Alabama rivers. Foreseeing the ultimate downfall of their life and the triumph of the white men, most of these towns resisted the white innovations introduced by Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins. Opposed to them were the majority of the Lower Creek towns along the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers, who had accepted Hawkins' "civilization" and who sought a closer attachment to the United States. This rift turned into civil war, which quickly affected the white settlers in the Gulf area. At Ft. Mims in Mississippi Territory, on August 30, 1813, a war party of "Red Stick" Creeks surprised an ill-prepared stockade and massacred about 500 persons, most of them white. This atrocity turned the Creek civil war into a Creek war against white men, and many Americans were determined to exterminate the Red Sticks.⁵

4. Robert S. Cotterill, *The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Removal* (Norman, 1954), 166; Glenn Tucker, *Tecumseh: Vision of Glory* (Indianapolis, 1956), 187-208; Anna Lewis, *Pushmataha* (New York, 1959), *passim*.

5. Cotterill, *Southern Indians*, 166ff; Henry S. Halbert and T. H. Ball, *The Creek War of 1813 and 1814* (Chicago, 1895), 143-76.

In the war against the Upper Creeks, the Lower Creeks generally cooperated and provided war parties. The Choctaws also supported the United States but, no more than 200 of them ever fought the Red Sticks. The United States with Indian support, an association Tecumseh had tried to avoid, overpowered the Red Sticks, killing nearly 800 warriors at the Battle of Tohopeka or Horseshoe Bend on March 27, 1814. A party of Cherokees aided Major General Andrew Jackson of the Tennessee militia in this slaughter.⁶ Great as this defeat was, there were intransigent Creeks who still refused to bow to the United States. The inhabitants of eight Upper Creek towns, more than a thousand Indians, escaped to Spanish Florida and settled among the Seminoles, their southern cousins. Florida Indians had been at war with the United States since 1811, and the transplanted Red Sticks joined willingly in this congenial occupation.⁷

Incomplete reports of the Creek War reached the British, including Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, who had replaced Warren as commander of the North American station on April 1, 1814. While he did not know how badly the Creeks were divided, nor that Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees were siding with the United States, he was impressed with the fact that a sizeable body of Indians in the Gulf region was fighting the same foe as England. He knew of Warren's proposals to strike the Gulf coast and shared his determination to use the disaffected southern Indians to create the diversion so badly needed by the strategists in Canada.

Captain Hugh Pigot, with an extra complement of men and arms for the Indians, anchored on May 10, 1814 near the mouth of the Apalachicola River. He quickly established contact with the chiefs in the area, who, together with interpreters came aboard on May 20. They agreed on the issuance of British arms, to begin immediately. They requested also a small British force among them. George Woodbine, with the temporary rank of lieutenant of marines and the local rank of brevet captain when ashore, became the British agent for those Indians willing to op-

6. Henry T. Malone, *Cherokees of the Old South* (Athens, 1956), 71; Lewis, *Pushmataha, passim.*; Merritt B. Pound, *Benjamin Hawkins, Indian Agent* (Athens, 1951), 218.

7. Cotterill, *Southern Indians*, 188. For Seminoles at war with Americans, 1810-1814, see Rembert W. Patrick, *Florida Fiasco* (Athens, 1954), *passim.*

pose the United States. He had orders to feed the Red Sticks who had fled south after the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, and who reportedly were starving in the swamps near Pensacola. Under his direction, a sergeant and a corporal drilled the warriors, and even trained them in the use of the bayonet.⁸

Pigot enthusiastically reported that 2,800 Creek and Seminole warriors could be organized and trained within eight to ten weeks. To the west were the Choctaws, (Pigot did not know that they had swung away from England), and he gave the impression that they would be a source of aid. Pigot felt that a small detachment of British soldiers supporting Creeks and Choctaws, could advance inland, seize Baton Rouge, and swoop down on New Orleans from the north. He estimated that no more than 2,000 United States regulars and three or four wooden forts stood in the way. Arm and train the Indians, tickle their vanity by the issue of a few hundred military packets, and let them rupture the American frontiers. This was Pigot's plan of strategy. A small armed vessel to keep in touch with and supply the troops would be the only support necessary.⁹

Pigot forwarded letters from several Creek chiefs, which in essence said: "Thank you for the weapons! We have always been Englishmen, and ask the chance to remain such. Land a few British troops and we shall help them drive the Americans out of the Gulf region."¹⁰

Captain Pigot recommended the issue of cavalry equipment for warriors. While the Gulf coast Indians did not use horses extensively, nor did they fight on horseback, the captain thought he detected a cavalry potential in them. He saw all Indian boys from ten upwards as useful to the cause and recommended that carbines be issued to them. In addition to the Indians, he reported that the smugglers at Barataria Bay, 800 strong, who were regarded as pirates by the Americans, would light against the United States.

Meanwhile, Captain Woodbine had worked his way about fifteen miles up the Apalachicola to a place called Prospect Bluff. There, he started what was to become a center of British, Indian,

8. Hugh Pigot to Alex. Cochrane, June 8, 1814, Public Record Office: Admiralty, 1/506, 394-97. Cited hereafter as PRO: Admiralty.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, 402, 403.

and Negro opposition to the United States for the next two years. He also made an agreement with two chiefs in which they promised to turn all prisoners over to him. One chief, Thomas Perryman, marked the agreement as "King" of the Seminoles, and the other, Cappachamico, as "King" of the Mikasuki. They claimed to represent all the Indians of the region ". . . now assembled in arms against the Americans."¹¹ The term "king" was the translation by white interpreters of the Creek word "mico," but the micos were not really kings.

Pigot's report had a profound effect upon his superiors. It turned Admiral Cochrane toward a line of strategy which was to end in the fateful fight at New Orleans six months later. In a letter to The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Cochrane claimed that with 3,000 troops, he could land at Mobile, rally Indians and disaffected Frenchmen and Spaniards about him, and drive the United States out of both Louisiana and the Floridas. October and November, he thought, would be the best time for such a venture. In the meantime, he would issue 1,000 muskets, ammunition, and two cannon to the Gulf Indians.¹²

The more Cochrane thought of the Indians as the key to penetration of the Gulf coast, the better the idea appeared. These Indians, after all, had been subjected to relentless aggression by Americans ever since the Revolutionary War, and they could now be utilized to support England's cause. If they were restored to the condition they had enjoyed when the British were in Florida from 1763-1783 their loyalty would remain intact. Any Anglo-American treaty should include provisions for the return of Indian lands, Cochrane insisted.¹³

While waiting for his government to act, the admiral engaged in limited exploitation of the restless conditions on the borders. In a rousing proclamation, he told the Indians, "America

11. Indian Agreement, May 28, 1814, Cochrane Papers, folio 2328, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh. Cited hereafter as Cochrane Papers. Both Seminoles and Mikasukis were in the beginning formed from migrated bands of Creeks. They spoke different dialects of the Muscogee language, but are regarded as part of the Seminole "Nation." The Seminole for whom Cappachamico signed probably came from as far away as the Suwanee River, while the Mikasukis lived in the area between the Aucilla River and Lake Miccosukee.
12. Cochrane to J. W. Croker, June 20, 1814, PRO: Admiralty 1/506, 391.
13. Cochrane to Croker, June 22, 1814, *ibid.*, 343.

forges chains for you," while England is sending a detachment to aid you against this aggressor. He hoped Negroes from Georgia and the Carolinas would join the fight against the Americans.¹⁴

The date probably had no significance to the admiral, but it was July 4 when he penned his instructions to Edward Nicolls, the officer designated to take the Indian-aid party ashore. Nicolls was brevet major in the Royal Marines and would have the local rank of lieutenant colonel; if he succeeded in raising a battalion of 500 warriors, he would become a colonel. Nicolls was warned not to assume too much authority among the Indians, but to hold their good will; try to prevent them from committing barbarous acts; find out as much as possible about the vulnerability of New Orleans, and whether or not the Indians would aid in capturing it; avoid hostile acts toward England's ally Spain; and, actively aid Spain if she warred upon the United States. His detachment would be supplied from the *Hermes* and *Caron*, under command of Captain Henry Percy. With four war vessels at his disposal, Percy was also to blockade the mouth of the Mississippi River. Woodbine was under Nicolls' command, and the entire detachment was carried on the supplementary list of the Third Battalion of Royal Marines.¹⁵

Before Nicolls was ready to land, Admiral Cochrane recalculated his estimate of the force needed to secure control of the Gulf coast. In mid-July, he wrote Earl Bathurst that he could do the job with only 2,000 British soldiers, aided by Indians and anyone else opposing the United States. This was 1,000 less than he had requested three weeks earlier. Many Negroes would support Britain, and because of their deep hatred of their white masters, they would make effective soldiers, the admiral thought. He insisted that he had no desire to incite a Negro rebellion; he only wanted to enlist those erstwhile slaves who were willing to take up arms or to become British colonists.¹⁶

Admiral Cochrane felt he was offering the ministry a wonderful chance to save British soldiers. Too many of these men had already been expended in the conflict against Napoleon. Co-

14. Proclamation of July 1, 1814, Public Record Office: WO 1/143, 156-57. Cited hereafter as PRO: WO.

15. Cochrane to Ed. Nicolls, July 4, 1814, PRO: Admiralty 1/506, 480-82; Cochrane to Henry Percy, July 5, 1814, *ibid.*, 486.

16. Cochrane to Bathurst, July 14, 1814, PRO: WO 1/141, 15-24; Bathurst to Robt. Ross, August 10, 1814, PRO: WO 6/2, 6-8.

chrane's plan was accepted, and on August 10, 1814 the admiralty directed him to proceed with the invasion of the Gulf coast, relying heavily on Indians, Negroes, Spaniards, Frenchmen, and anyone else who opposed the United States. He would have 2,000 more British troops than he had asked for, 5,000 soldiers in all. Under the new conditions opened up by Cochrane's enthusiasm, it would no longer be necessary to send southward the much larger force under Lord Rowland Hill as originally planned.¹⁷

September 1814 was the happiest month the harried administration of Lord Liverpool had known. Napoleon had been erased, and a glittering Congress was meeting in Vienna to ease Europe back into a peaceful posture. Twenty thousand troops were in Canada under Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, the governor general, which would certainly force a British peace upon the feeble United States. To aid them, a mobile detachment under Admiral Cochrane himself, Rear Admiral George Cockburn, and Major General Robert Ross, was harassing the Chesapeake Bay region. Now came Cochrane's proposal for the Gulf coast. To cap everything, news of the expedition against Washington reached London on September 27. Full of elation, Liverpool sent off praises to General Ross for his daring conduct, ordered a command of not 5,000 but 10,000 British soldiers, and gave him and Admiral Cochrane a virtual free hand in the Gulf operation.¹⁸

All the while, Woodbine was at work among the Gulf Indians, but without good results. During the previous five months, he had been seriously hampered by a lack of provisions. Mobile, he claimed, could have been captured if there had been enough supplies. When he first landed, he found the Red Sticks dying of starvation in the swamps around Pensacola, and he saved them with the small quantities of supplies he could spare. But Woodbine complained that there were no weapons for the 800 potentially effective warriors.¹⁹

While his report showed little progress, Woodbine promised more in the future. With 2,000 British soldiers who could rally the disaffected peoples, the whole area from the St. Marys River

17. Croker to Cochrane, August 10, 1814, PRO: WO 1/141, 15-24; Bathurst to Ross, August 10, 1814, PRO: WO 6/2, 6-8.

18. Croker to Cochrane, September 28, 1814, PRO: WO 6/2, 19-24.

19. Geo. Woodbine to Cochrane, July 25, 1814, Cochrane Papers, folio 2328, 35.

to the Mississippi could be seized. Already one of the forts at Pensacola was being manned, and the Indians were encamped around it. With arms, they would be an even more effective force. To the west were the Choctaws, with which Woodbine planned to attack the rear of Andrew Jackson's army. This would have to wait, however, until Mobile was taken and turned into a weapons-depot.²⁰

Captain Woodbine estimated that he would need 2,000 men, in addition to Indian support, to conquer the Gulf coast. Admiral Cochrane had already proposed this same figure to the government. With all his enthusiasm, Woodbine revealed major blind-spots. Although he was aware of the broken condition of the Creek nation, he continued to regard Creeks as potentially powerful allies. Similarly, he counted upon the Choctaws, even though they were already aligned with the United States.

The very day that Woodbine was writing most optimistically to the admiral, Andrew Jackson, meeting with certain Indian leaders at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers, forced the Creeks to cede 20,000 acres of land west of the Coosa.²¹ Jacksonian "diplomacy" should have driven the Creeks into an alliance with England, since the Lower Creeks, who had supported the United States against the Red Sticks, also lost land. Woodbine's expectation of a Creek alliance was, therefore, reasonable. However, he did not adequately measure the wreck of the Red Sticks, more likely allies, nor did he comprehend the deep hatred between Lower Creeks and Red Sticks, which made reunion forever impossible. Contrary to Woodbine's assumptions, whatever Indian aid the British received would have to come from the Florida bands - Mikasukis, Alachuas, and recently migrated Red Sticks - all loosely known as Seminoles.

Captain Henry Percy's squadron, with Edward Nicolls and his command aboard, arrived off Pensacola early in August 1814. Nicolls wanted to make Pensacola the base for his inland operations, but Percy would not agree unless the Spanish requested a landing on their soil. Since the Spanish governor had virtually turned Pensacola's defense over to Woodbine, he had no hesitancy in inviting the British to come ashore. Percy then sailed to the Apalachicola to pick up men and material from Prospect Bluff and transfer them to Pensacola.

20. Woodbine to Cochrane, August 9, 1814, *ibid.*, 56.

21. Cotterill, *Southern Indians*, 188.

At Pensacola, Nicolls, three officers, a surgeon, four noncommissioned officers, and ninety-seven enlisted men, occupied Fort San Miguel. Besides their own arms, the detachment carried three field pieces, 1,000 stands of arms, and 300 British uniforms for the Indians. Every member of the party had received a month's pay in advance, and Nicolls carried with him \$1,000 in specie to meet extraordinary expenses.²²

Shortly after arriving in Florida, Nicolls issued a statement proclaiming Britain's power to punish insolent America. Citizens who wished to escape punishment should display a French, Spanish, or English flag. England, he insisted, was fighting for the freedom of the world, and Kentuckians especially should heed this fact and rally to the honorable cause. They had borne the brunt of the war in the West, he reminded them, yet received nothing for it. But as neutrals, if they would not become allies, they could grow rich trading with England for silver and gold. He also exhorted Louisianians to liberate from a "faithless, imbecile government your paternal soil!" Nicolls promised to help all persons and groups oppressed by the Americans.²³

The very day, August 29, 1814, that Nicolls published this proclamation, Captain Percy dispatched Captain Nicholas Lockyer aboard the *Sophia* to woo the Baratarian "pirates" under Jean Lafitte to the British cause. Lockyer's mission failed, and eventually the outlaws actively aided the United States. Thus, another of the disaffected splinters had disappointed Admiral Cochrane.²⁴

Meanwhile, English statesmen were considering the future of the American Indians. British emissaries were also negotiating with the United States. Lord Liverpool claimed that it was America's eagerness to expand in all directions that had caused the war; to allow ruthless expansionists to have their way with the Indians would be dishonorable. When the United States negotiators insisted that it was contrary to the law of nations to fix boundaries for the Indians, Liverpool countered that it was contrary to the

22. Nicolls to Cochrane (continuous report begun August 12, 1814), Cochrane Papers, folio 2328, 59. Percy to Cochrane, August 13, 1814, PRO: Admiralty 1/505, 152-53.

23. Proclamation by Lt. Col. Nicholls [*sic*], August 29, 1814, *Niles Register*, VII, 134-35; also printed in A. Lacarriere Latour, *Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-1815* (Philadelphia, 1816), vii-viii.

24. Percy to Cochrane, September 9, 1814, PRO: Admiralty 1/505. For detail on the Baratarians, see Jane L. DeGrummond, *The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans* (Baton Rouge, 1961), *passim*.

laws of nature not to do so.²⁵ The foreign secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, sought to demolish America's claim that setting up an Indian buffer state between the United States and other nations would violate the Treaty of Paris after the Revolution. Establishment of a common Anglo-American boundary in 1783 did not prevent changing it in favor of a new one.²⁶

Nothing, in the meantime, had cooled Admiral Cochrane's enthusiasm. He wrote to Earl Bathurst on September 2, 1814, that the Carolinas, Georgia, and Louisiana all were vulnerable to attack. Employ 1,000 Negroes and whites against the coast of Georgia and South Carolina, he advised, and use this force to cut American intercoastal communication by seizing Cumberland Island and fortifying it. This enterprise would also provide a diversion in favor of the Gulf coast Indians. Thousands of warriors would aid in taking Mobile and New Orleans and in finally expelling of the United States from the region altogether.²⁷

Meanwhile, Earl Bathurst was issuing cautious, statesmanlike directives to General Ross to carry out the thrust in the Gulf. Ross was to court the goodwill of both the Spaniards and Indians. He was to enlist as many Negroes to military service as he could handle, discouraging, however, slave insurrection. The prime objects of his mission were to bring the back settlements under control by shutting off the Mississippi River and to occupy terrain which might be bargained away for other desirable objectives in the peace negotiations. The route to New Orleans would be left entirely to the discretion of Ross and Cochrane, and they could decide on future operations after New Orleans was in British hands.²⁸

Bit by bit the pivots upon which Admiral Cochrane had built his Gulf strategy were breaking down, although he did not realize it at the time. Captain Percy reconnoitered Fort Bowyer, commanding the entrance to Mobile Bay, and decided it was vulnerable. He put ashore an assault party under Lieutenant Colonel Nicolls on September 12, 1814, but, because of wind and tide, he

25. "Draft of note to American Emissaries in reply to theirs of 24 Aug. 1814," Liverpool Papers, folio 38259, 51-53, British Museum; undated and unsigned note concerning Indian boundaries, *ibid.*, folio 38365, 156.

26. Castlereagh to Liverpool, August 14, 1814, *ibid.*, folio 38259, 44.

27. Cochrane to Bathurst, September 2, 1814, PRO: WO 1/141, 66.

28. Bathurst to Robt. Ross, September 6, 1814, PRO: WO 6/2, 11.

discovered he could not support it from the sea. Three days later, Percy sailed into the bay with four war vessels and began to bombard the fort. Three hours later the cannonade ended. Percy had lost one ship and withdrew the others the next day. Nicolls, too ill to stay ashore, had come aboard, and while watching the cannonplay, he was wounded in the head and leg and blinded in the right eye. Although the British had failed to reduce the fort, Nicolls claimed that the attempt had drawn the American garrison out of Creek country.²⁹ But Mobile was essential to British plans. If Fort Bowyer could not be captured, there was little chance of taking the city.

Before and after the attempt on Fort Bowyer, and in between bouts with fever, Nicolls tried to raise an effective body of Indians. Woodbine, his subordinate, asked for funds to pay them: Micos would receive two dollars a day, and from that high point the scale would drop to fifty cents a week for each Negro in service.³⁰ At the same time, Nicolls sought to patch up matters among the Indian factions. In April, he informed Cochrane that Big Warrior of the Lower Creeks had made peace with the Seminoles. If true, this was a significant feat, but it had no lasting advantages. Nicolls, however, continued to believe that it would, and he looked forward to penetrating into Georgia soon with Seminole and Lower Creek support. But as the month passed, and he did not advance in any direction, he explained to the admiral that his health was wretched. He also said that the pro-British Indians had been in desperate plight and needed much succor.³¹

Nicolls also wrote to Andrew Jackson accusing him of inciting the Indians to barbarous acts and of paying a bounty for scalps, while the British were doing all in their power to prevent their allies from scalping. The English were not able to suppress barbarous practices, and, in spite of Nicolls, a party of Red Sticks cooked and ate selected parts of some Americans they had killed. Such a menu, not uncommon among northern tribes, was by this time somewhat rare among the Creeks.³²

29. Percy to Cochrane, August 29, 1814, PRO: Admiralty 1/505; Percy to Cochrane, September 16, 1814, Cochrane Papers, folio 2328, 83; Nicolls Report to Cochrane, *ibid.*, 59.

30. Woodbine to Nicolls, October 27, 1814, *ibid.*, 99, 171a.

31. Nicolls Report to Cochrane, *ibid.*, 60.

32. *Ibid.*

Cochrane's plan of strategy was weakened when on September 12, 1814, General Ross was killed as he was leading his forces toward Baltimore. Ross was a skilled military leader and his death jeopardized the success of the southern expedition. Preparations for it, however, continued.

Andrew Jackson, in recognition of his defeat of the Red Stick Creeks, was commissioned a major general in the regular service on May 28, 1814, and he became the next agent to destroy one of the props of Cochrane's strategy. Passionately interested in liberating Florida from Spain and attaching it to the United States, Jackson advanced upon Pensacola. The Spanish governor revealed only slight willingness to resist the American attack. Nicolls and Woodbine reported that Pensacola's defense had been virtually turned over to them. Without Spanish aid, however, they could not make an effective stand, and finally when Jackson was all but in view, the Spanish governor began to demand a full scale effort from the British military. By this time, however, Nicolls and Captain James A. Gordon of the Royal Navy had already begun to shift their power elsewhere.³³

Jackson appeared before Pensacola on November 7, 1814, with 3,000 men and five cannon. Nicolls and Gordon blew up Forts Barrancas and San Miguel and withdrew, and the American force occupied the town with almost no opposition. Thus, another spot from which British power might have radiated from the sea inward was denied England.³⁴

The British commanders now concentrated their forces at Prospect Bluff on the Apalachicola River. Nicolls undertook to strengthen this position which he had selected six months before, indicating however, that the construction would cost the government nothing but tools and labor. Spain complained of this violation of her sovereignty, but as she had no power to back up her protests, the Liverpool ministry let the installation proceed. From it Nicolls began to incite small forays by the Indians across the Florida boundary into the United States. While these attacks accomplished little, the attackers returned with reports that thousands of Georgia and Louisiana Negroes would rally to the cause the moment a British force invaded.

33. J. A. Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, *ibid.*, 109-10.

34. *Ibid.*

Nicolls gathered as much data as possible concerning New Orleans. He assured Admiral Cochrane that the only feasible route was via Lake Pontchartrain, and he placed a resident who knew that approach well at the admiral's disposal. Nicolls even proposed himself to lead the expedition against the city. Little did he realize how ambitious the British designs upon the place were, and how far up the scale of rank the ministry had already gone to pick the commander.³⁵

Even as the props of Admiral Cochrane's strategy fell one by one, the parts of the expedition to carry it out were assembling. A rendezvous took place at Negril Bay on the west end of Jamaica on November 24, 1814. Two days later, Admiral Cochrane sailed with the advance fleet toward the Gulf of Mexico. Major General John Keane had brought the first reinforcements from England, and for the time being was in command of the ground forces. He and the admiral issued a joint proclamation on December 5, 1814, addressed "To the Great and Illustrious Chiefs of the Creek and Other Indian Nations," asking for their active support and cooperation: "The same principle of justice which led our Father to wage a war of twenty years in favor of the oppressed Nations of Europe, animates him now in support of his Indian children. And by the efforts of his Warriors, he hopes to obtain for them the restoration of those lands of which the People of Bad Spirit have basely robbed them."³⁶

Some of the pro-British chiefs came aboard, but Captain Edward Codrington, Cochrane's "fleet captain" or executive officer, thought them poor creatures for a great power to have as allies. Chief, Cappachamico, Hopsi or Perryman, and the Prophet Francis (Hillis Hadjo), put on their clothes, one layer upon another, simply tying the trousers around their waists without bothering to get into the legs. Codrington liked their native head-dress, the skin and plumage of a handsome bird, with the beak pointing down the forehead and the wings spread over the ears. These had been taken off, however, in favor of gold-laced cocked hats. With this millinery and the sergeant's jackets supplied by

35. Nicolls Report to Cochrane and Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, *ibid.*, 60, 61, 117; Hamilton (for Castlereagh) to Bathurst, December 14, 1814, PRO: WO 1/143, 197.

36. Proclamation of December 5, 1814, PRO: WO 1/141, 249.

the admiral they were described as "dressed up apes" by Codrington in a letter to his wife.³⁷

Whatever Admiral Cochrane thought of the Creek chiefs, it must have been apparent to him by this time that the Gulf coast Indians were not the formidable pro-British force he had reckoned them. Nicolls had failed to create the uprising along the Florida frontier which the admiral had expected. Thus, had he received only the soldiers he had originally requisitioned, he would now have had to reconsider his plans; 2,000 would not have been enough unless aided by Indians and Negroes. But with the promise of 10,000 men - of whom about 8,000 were at hand - it seemed no longer necessary to travel through Indian country and attack New Orleans from the rear. With so large an army of British regulars, the admiral concluded that he did not have to rely upon the natives. He preferred sailing his fleet into the waters somewhere close to New Orleans, and then selecting an advantageous route to the city.³⁸

The consequences of his new policy, important as they were, are not an essential part of this narrative. They included the several actions known together as the Battle of New Orleans. When these were over, the British had lost six soldiers for every American casualty, and still had to give up their attempt to capture the city. Following the disaster, Admiral Cochrane focused his attention elsewhere on the Gulf coast.

Both before and after the Battle of New Orleans, the British commanders made the flank attacks which Cochrane had recommended. They successfully landed on Cumberland and St. Simons Islands,³⁹ and in mid-January 1815, the line of the St. Marys River was secured.⁴⁰ After the failure at New Orleans, Fort Bowyer was assaulted again, this time successfully. Mobile could be taken, and it would be a better point from which to project British influence inland than the Prospect Bluff fort on the Apalachicola.

37. Ed. Codrington to wife, December 14, 1814, printed in Lady Bouchier, *A Memoir of the Lifts of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington*, 2 vols. (London, 1873), 1, 329.

38. For the most detailed and useful account of this series of actions, see Charles B. Brooks, *The Siege of New Orleans* (Seattle, 1961).

39. Lt. Col. Williams to Robt. Barrie, January 14, 1815, PRO: Admiralty 1/509, 163; R. Ramsey to Geo. Cockburn, February 16, 1815, *ibid.*

40. *Niles Register*, VII, 361ff.

Cochrane also now returned to heavy reliance upon Indian allies. He directed Major General John Lambert (the only one of four British generals who had been at New Orleans still able to exercise command) to organize two bodies of Indians and Negroes combined with British soldiers. One was to harass the interior of Georgia, and try to make contact with Admiral Cockburn, who was operating from Cumberland Island. The other was to take Fort Stoddert on the Tombigbee River, and thence work downstream toward Mobile, where General Lambert was expected to be by that time. The Prospect Bluff fortification could protect the families of the warriors who were fighting for Britain, and could also serve as a base for either of the two columns to fall back on in case of some unforeseen disaster. This activity, the British hoped, would hold a large American force immobilized for the defense of New Orleans and Mobile, and would occupy the militias of Tennessee and Kentucky, thereby keeping them out of Canada. Lying behind this strategy, too, was English assurance that it meant to recover the lands for the Indians which greedy Americans had taken from them.⁴¹ English negotiators did insist that Article IX, favoring the Indians, be inserted in the Treaty of Ghent. It stipulated that at the end of hostilities the warring nations would restore to the tribes "all possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811 previous to such hostilities."⁴²

By the middle of February 1815, Admiral Cochrane learned the terms of the Treaty of Ghent, and he was determined to see Article IX honored. If the Indians did not keep closely allied to England, he informed them they would lose the chance to get their lands back. The fort on the Apalachicola was to be their point of contact, and he promised that they would grow rich by trading through it with Britain. Cochrane went north to Chesapeake Bay, so as to better keep in touch with all parts of his North American command, but he carefully instructed Rear Admiral Pultney Malcolm to move cannon and stores into the fort. If peace endured, he was to pick up Nicoll's command, but

41. Cochrane to John Lambert, February 3, 1815, PRO: WO 1/143, 53-63.

42. Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the U.S.A. 1776-1863*, 8 vols. (Washington, 1930-1948), II, 581.

must leave three war vessels to protect the fort until the lands were returned to the Indians.⁴³

Cochrane's orders laid the basis for the development of a formidable stronghold at Prospect Bluff. Meant for the Indians, it fell instead, complete with cannon and ammunition, into the hands of free, renegade Negroes. Thus, it came to be known to Americans as the "Negro Fort." For more than a year - until blown up by an armed expedition from the United States on July 27, 1816 - it was a source of tension on the southern border.⁴⁴

Nicolls stayed on at the fort during the first half of 1815, firing numerous letters to Benjamin Hawkins, United States agent to the Creek Indians. In one, he transmitted a complaint of "Simanole" Chief Bowlegs that mounted Americans had invaded Florida villages in April 1815, killing and looting. Creeks and Seminoles, Nicolls reported, wanted to cut off every thread of communication with the United States, since it was obvious that the American government was neither making efforts to curb its citizens, nor evacuating Indian lands pursuant to Article IX.⁴⁵

Seeing little possibility of a change in American behavior, Nicolls reminded Hawkins that the Indians had an offensive-defensive alliance with Great Britain, and he described them as being well-armed and provisioned, with a stronghold to fall back upon. Consequences to the United States if she failed to live up to the treaty would be dire indeed, Nicolls threatened. In June 1815, probably shortly before embarking for England, Nicolls protested the running of the boundary lines set by the Treaty of Fort Jackson. That document, he insisted, was not binding since Andrew Jackson had forced a few minor, unrepresentative chiefs to sign it. Moreover, it was in flagrant violation of Article IX.⁴⁶

It probably had become apparent to Nicolls and to other British commanders in the Gulf region by mid-1815 that they could not enforce Article IX. The government at home was not willing to back them; a firm stand could conceivably have reopen-

43. Cochrane to Pultney Malcolm, February 17, 1815, PRO: WO 1/143, 37-43.

44. See Mark F. Boyd, "Events at Prospect Bluff on the Apalachicola River, 1808-1818," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XVI (October 1937), 77-81; Rembert W. Patrick, *Aristocrat in Uniform: General Duncan L. Clinch* (Gainesville, 1963), 27-33.

45. Nicolls to Benj. Hawkins, April 28, 1815, PRO: WO 1/143, 161.

46. Nicolls to Hawkins, May 12 and June 12, 1815, *ibid.*, 151, 165, 166.

ed hostilities. It is also likely that most Americans, particularly those in a position to influence policy, never intended to honor that article. No group was likely to try to annul Jackson's treaty and return 20,000,000 acres to the Indians.⁴⁷

Nicolls arrived in England, accompanied by the Prophet Francis, (Hillis Hadjo) and three of his followers. He also carried an Address to George III from thirty Creek chiefs asking for help to avert famine. So many displaced Red Sticks had settled among them that all would starve unless the king intervened. Along with this plea went a denunciation of Panton, Leslie and Company, and especially John Forbes, its principal proprietor. The company, based in Pensacola and chartered by Spain, was operated by Englishmen. But they were traitors, the Creeks claimed, and their treachery was so flagrant that they were forbidden to enter Creek territory.⁴⁸ Nicolls agreed with the Address: the Red Sticks had been defeated at Horseshoe Bend only because they had run out of ammunition, and Forbes had traitorously failed to live up to his agreement to supply them.⁴⁹

Try as he might, Nicolls failed to secure an audience with any high officials for Hillis Hadjo. In the end, he presented the chief's claims in writing: Hillis' father was an Englishman, as was McQueen's and both these two chiefs were among the first to attack the Americans. With eighty warriors, they had defeated General Floyd and his 2,700 militiamen and had failed to stop Jackson only because of Forbes' treachery. So valuable was their help that the United States still offered a price of \$5,000 for the head of each. Yet, they had been forced to flee their villages, and the Red Sticks were dying of starvation.⁵⁰

Nicolls not only supported the Indians, but he also began to plead his own cause. He submitted a bill for \$1,952, less \$500 already paid, for expenses he had born personally to entertain chiefs at Pensacola and Prospect Bluff in England's interest. When questioned by auditors, he regretfully admitted that he could show no written orders authorizing him to extend this hos-

47. PRO: WO 1/144, 145 and also 174, 175.

48. Address of Muskogee Chiefs to the King, August 10, 1815, PRO: WO 1/143, 147, 148.

49. Nicolls to Bathurst, September 25, 1815, *ibid.*, 137, 138.

50. *Ibid.*

pitality. He insisted, however, that what he had done was vitally necessary, and that Admiral Cochrane had approved it.⁵¹

Next, he forwarded a "Memorial" to the admiralty, claiming that while Admiral Cochrane had allowed him the rank and pay of a lieutenant colonel, the government had never honored it. In fact, he had received no pay at all during the previous year. He also reiterated his claim for reimbursement for entertaining the chiefs and pointed out that even then he was entertaining four Indians in his own home at his own expense. Financial ruin would engulf him unless the government approved his claims. In reckoning the amount due, he asked that his twenty-three years of service as an officer and his action in one hundred engagements be taken into account. He also wanted the anguish of a broken left leg, a wounded right leg, a shot through the body and the right arm, a sabre cut on his head, a bayonet puncture in his chest, and his blind right eye to be remembered.⁵²

He itemized his recent service on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. Upon his arrival the Indians had been in deplorable plight, but he had succored them, which made them better allies. While at Pensacola, he had armed the natives and kept General Jackson distracted. He had done his best to keep Jackson out of Mobile, had retreated fighting, and had established a strong point on the Apalachicola. Using the latter as a base, he had harassed the frontier as long as the war lasted. His activities, he claimed, had pinned down an American army of 5,000 men and had brought 5,800 Creek warriors to the British side. All of this had cost only 9,000 pounds.

Nicolls did not receive all that he considered due him. He had exaggerated the importance of his own activities and had persistently overrated the potential of the Indians as allies. He was not the only officer, however, who had magnified the role of the Indians. Admiral Cochrane had done the same thing. But whereas Nicolls' overestimation had only incidental consequences, Cochrane's shaped the British strategy, and led to an amazing disaster for the British forces at New Orleans.

51. Nicolls account sheet, and Nicolls to J. Barrow, August 24, 1815, *ibid.*, 127, 131.

52. PRO: WO, 1/144, 419-21.

THE FLORIDA MILITIA'S ROLE IN THE BATTLE OF WITHLACOOCHEE

by GEORGE C. BITTLE

THE BATTLE OF Withlacoochee, fought in a swampy wilderness on the last day of 1835, generated a controversy which was more heated than the engagement itself. It was the Florida militia's first relatively large-scale battle, and unfortunately, a subsequent bitter exchange of recriminations took place between Brigadier General Duncan Lamont Clinch, the regular army commander, and Brigadier General Richard Keith Call, Florida militia commander and territorial governor. Thus the role of the Florida men in their first serious military test became a matter of debate.

From the beginning, General Call denounced the army's method of marching to the Indian village that the joint regular-militia maneuver hoped to destroy. Call wanted to execute a rapid march so that full advantage might be taken of the element of surprise. The soldiers carried only four days rations and had left their baggage at Fort Drane where the combined regular-militia force had assembled. On the other hand, General Clinch decided that his regulars needed a heavy, slow-moving baggage train to transport their supplies. General Call claimed Clinch had agreed to a rapid march with no baggage train, and then took every wagon he could find. In addition to this problem, many of Clinch's men owned dogs which they insisted upon taking with them, thus destroying all possibility of surprise.¹

It took three days to march the thirty-five miles to the Withlacoochee River since part of the time was consumed when the troops lost their way. Clinch was accused of not having taken advantage of earlier opportunities to secure adequate topographical knowledge of the area when the column went astray only a few miles from Fort Drane, which was located on Clinch's own plantation. Obviously, personal relations between the two commanders were not altogether pleasant as they proceeded on their way to battle.

1. Richard Keith Call Journal, typescript, 351-52. Henceforth to be referred to as the Call Journal. A microfilm copy is in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville, Florida. See also *Niles' Weekly Register*, August 19, 1837, 395.

2. Call Journal, 329, 351-53.

To reach the column's goal it was necessary to cross the Withlacoochee River. Indian and Negro guides led the soldiers to a ford of the river, supposedly waist-deep, only to find that because of flood conditions, it would be impossible to make a crossing. On the opposite bank was a 200 yard-wide hammock in which the guides thought Seminoles were lurking. However, a reconnaissance party which managed to traverse the river found no Indians but did discover a number of fresh moccasin tracks. Signs that Indians were somewhere nearby led to the regular troops being ferried across the river in a small, leaky Indian canoe, the only available facility. It was a dawn-to-noon operation to transport the 260 regulars.³ After crossing, the regulars marched about a quarter of a mile through the hammock to an open area bounded on two sides by a swamp and on one side by heavy scrub timber. Stacking their arms, they scattered into small groups.⁴

After the regulars had crossed the river, the militiamen followed in the same canoe. Lieutenant Maxey Dill of Colonel John Warren's Florida militia command swam across on his horse, but had to leave his weapons behind. The feat required much daring, but the technique was impractical if arms could not be carried over. In order to facilitate the militia's crossing, Clinch and Call ordered the construction of a log bridge, but, as it turned out, the battle began before this bridge was finished.⁵ At the time of the Indian attack, approximately twenty-seven militiamen had crossed the river and were guarding the horses and baggage.⁶

When the Indians first began shooting, it was not clear on which side of the river there would be the heaviest fighting, since some of the opening shots were fired at the bulk of the militia force which were waiting transportation across the water. General Call temporarily halted his crossing operation and formed his remaining men into a line of battle, standing with their backs

3. Ellen Call Long, *Florida Breezes; or, Florida New and Old* (Jacksonville, 1883), 202. See also Mark F. Boyd, "The Seminole War: Its Background and Onset," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXX (July 1951), 81-2.

4. John Lee Williams, *The Territory of Florida* (New York, 1837), 222-23.

5. Long, *Florida Breezes*, 202. See also Boyd, "The Seminole War," 81-2.

6. *Niles' Weekly Register*, January 30, 1836, 366. See also the Tallahassee *Floridian*, February 20, 1836; Williams, *The Territory of Florida*, 222-23.

to the river.⁷ Call's action was perhaps the wisest under the circumstances, since no one seemed to know where the Seminoles were hiding.⁸

When it became apparent that the main segment of the militia force would not be seriously attacked, Call resumed his efforts to move his force across the river. At one point, Call ordered his men to mount their horses and charge across, but the steep bank plunged the horses directly into swimming depth, and weapons and ammunition were soaked. Obviously this technique had little value. Even Call was forced to use the canoe, rather than go across astride his horse.⁹ In a letter written three years later (January 1838) to Call, Militiaman Thomas Johns insisted that no man could have swum the river without losing his arms or wetting his powder.¹⁰ The actual battle lasted approximately an hour, and the hardest part of the fighting occurred during a twenty-five minute period. Thus it would seem that it would have been impossible for General Call to have gotten all his men across the river, using the single canoe, in so short a time.¹¹

While moving his force, General Call also had to contend with an attempted desertion effort by a number of his men. John Bemrose, a regular army medical attendant, revealed that a group of mounted Florida men came to his hospital camp demanding rations. Suspecting them to be deserters, Bemrose said that he refused their requests. The men then threatened to use force, but the sick and injured regulars in the hospital scared them off.¹²

When the battle actually started, Colonel John Warren and Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Mills, militiamen who had crossed the river voluntarily, took up the defense of the regulars' flanks.¹³ General Call, who made his crossing during the action, played an important role in the defense of the right flank. General Clinch admitted that the militia who joined in the battle met the Indian

7. Tallahassee *Floridian*, February 20, 1836. See also Myer M. Cohen, *Notices of Florida and the Campaigns* (Charleston, 1836), 82.

8. Cohen, *Notices of Florida and the Campaigns*, 82.

9. Long, *Florida Breezes*, 204.

10. *Tallahassee Floridian*, January 1, 1838.

11. *Ibid.*, January 9, 1836. See also Niles' *Weekly Register*, August 19, 1837, 395-96; Rembert W. Patrick, *Aristocrat in Uniform: General Duncan L. Clinch* (Gainesville, 1963), 105.

12. John Bemrose, "Reminiscences of the Seminole War," 56-7. Microfilm copy in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville.

13. *Jacksonville Courier*, January 7, 1836.

attack with firmness and vigor.¹⁴ Call credited the militia's role in the fight with preventing the regulars from having their retreat route to the river bank cut.¹⁵ What General Call claimed is probably true; defending this flank was an important service. However, the fact remains that very few militiamen actually took part in the fighting.

There is no question that the regulars bore the brunt of battle. However, even these soldiers were at least partly under the command of militia officers. Colonel Samuel Parkhill, Florida Militia, served as Clinch's adjutant, and Colonel Leigh Read, also of the militia, was inspector general.¹⁶ At the first Indian volley, the regulars retreated pell-mell about a hundred yards before General Clinch or Colonel Parkhill could reform them. As the regulars' rank were thinned, the soldiers forgot their discipline and huddled together. Realizing what was happening, General Clinch ordered a charge, followed by a second one that ended the battle.¹⁷

It was not until after this victorious charge that Call advised Clinch that he would not support pursuit of the Seminoles with his militia. In his report General Call argued that the large number of wounded and the lack of supplies made retreat necessary. However, on the battlefield, Call gave as a reason for his decision the fact that many of his men's enlistments ended the following day, making their further services of limited value. From the beginning of the campaign, Call had informed Clinch that his militiamen could serve only a few days.¹⁸ It is difficult to determine which of Call's stated reasons was the one he really believed. There is also the fact that Call probably was not exactly sure when the enlistments ended.

14. General Duncan L. Clinch Papers. Henceforth referred to as the Clinch Papers. Microfilm copy in the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville. See also *Niles Weekly Register*, January 30, 1836, 366.

15. R. K. Call to John H. Eaton, January 8, 1836, *House Documents*, 25th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 78, 324. See also *American State Papers: Military Affairs*, 7 vols. (Washington, 1832-1861), VII, 220.

16. Clinch Papers. See also *Niles' Weekly Register*, January 30, 1836, 366.

17. Long, *Florida Breezes*, 203-04. See also R. C. Stafford, "The Bemrose Manuscript on the Seminole War," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (April 1940), 289-90.

18. Williams, *The Territory of Florida*, 221, 223. See also Samuel E. Cobb, "The Florida Militia and the Affair at Withlacoochee," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XIX (October 1940), 133; Call to Eaton, January 8, 1836, *House Documents*, 25th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 78, 324; *American State Papers: Military Affairs*, VII, 220.

Let us return to a chronological account of the battle events before exploring the problems connected with militia participation. Clinch accepted Call's plan of retreat across a makeshift log bridge, partially built during the fight. The line of battle was now formed in the shape of a horseshoe, the left flank resting on the bridge and the right on the river bank. The retreat was accomplished from left to right with the men defending their perimeter by facing the enemy. The last man to recross the river was Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Mills, a Florida soldier. Call actually commanded the retreat; Clinch was fatigued from the battle and was among the first to recross the river.¹⁹ Meanwhile, some Indians were still present on the battle side of the river, and no one was sure whether the Indians might not try to regroup and renew the attack.²⁰

On the return journey to Fort Drane, the wounded soldiers received almost no medical attention, although the Florida militiamen did what they could to make them comfortable. During the retreat, the militiamen were not the careless outriders they had been en route to the fight. Stationed as flankers, they pressed in close to the edge of the main column, and Bemrose claimed that they would have fled if they had been attacked by the Indians.²¹

It is a debatable question as to which side won the Battle of Withlacoochee since both the Indians and the Americans withdrew. Likely the Indians will have to be credited with victory; at least they achieved their objective of stopping the white military advance into their area. General Clinch's failure to achieve a decisive victory also increased the confidence of the Seminoles.²²

The three companies of Florida Militia that arrived at Fort Drane after Call's men had left for home were discharged by General Clinch since they showed signs of mutinous and insubordinate conduct.²³ The conduct of Call's soldiers may not have been completely the cause of their discharge, however, since there were questions about their terms of enlistment. In a letter to Andrew

19. Tallahassee *Floridian*, January 11, 1838. See also Long, *Florida Breezes*, 205.

20. Tallahassee *Floridian*, January 11, 1838.

21. Bemrose, "Reminiscences of the Seminole War," 70, 74.

22. *Niles Weekly Register*, February 6, 1836, 395.

23. J. A. Quigg, "Brevet Brigadier General Duncan Lamont Clinch and his Florida Service" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Florida, 1963), 53.

Jackson on December 22, 1835, Call stated that he had raised his force only for a four-week period and that the men were not happy about being assigned to an offensive campaign. Call feared that many of his men would desert and go home to defend their families. Ellen Call Long said that her father, General Call, told her the men were so hastily enlisted that no stipulation concerning the length of their service had been made, and, that as the novelty of camp life wore off and the dangers of a campaign became apparent, many men decided to return home. Call lectured his men on the need of punishing the Seminoles for their actions, and thanked the soldiers for what they had already done. The militiamen, according to this account, finally agreed to serve an additional ten days.²⁴ Considering the lack of organization of the Florida Militia at this time and the traditionally independent attitude of most frontiersmen, Mrs. Long's version was probably nearer the truth than her father's correspondence with Jackson would have one believe.

When the discharge dates of the companies in Call's command are examined, there is even more reason to believe that the men had agreed upon an indefinite term of service. While the first company was discharged on January 13, the final group was not mustered out until February 6.²⁵ It would seem that even the first of the men scheduled to be discharged could have been utilized in pursuit of the Indians, at least on the day following the fighting at Withlacoochee. This might have helped convince the Indians that the whites really intended to pursue and to win the war.

Another matter relating to the militia's activities at Withlacoochee is the question of why more militia troops did not cross the river and join the fighting. Immediately after the battle there does not seem to have been any conflict between the militiamen and the regular soldiers. Even Colonel John Sprague, whose account of the war was not published until 1848, believed that the

24. Call to Andrew Jackson, December 22, 1835, Clarence E. Carter (ed.), *The Territorial Papers of the United States*, 26 vols. (Washington, 1834-1962), XXV, 216-17. See also the Call Journal, 350-51; Call to Jackson, December 22, 1835, *House Documents*, 25th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 78, 319.

25. *American State Papers: Military Affairs*, VI, 1068. See also *Niles' Weekly Register*, February 6, 1836, 394.

few Florida men who had managed to cross the river rendered efficient service.²⁶

The West Florida militiamen were honored with a public dinner in Tallahassee after their return from the fighting. Toasts were made to the good relations between the Florida and regular soldiers. *The Pensacola Gazette* reported, January 16, 1836, that all the militiamen behaved well under fire and that many officers and men had distinguished themselves on the occasion. The *St. Augustine Examiner* also praised the Florida men and said that by the standard of Indian fights, this one had been severe. The *St. Augustine Florida Herald* reported that the fighting was mainly between the regulars and the Seminoles, but levelled no criticism of the militia. In a second article, the paper said General Clinch had distinguished himself at Withlacoochee. The *Key West Inquirer*, at least through March 1836, made no mention of the battle.²⁷ Apparently the controversy over the conduct of the Florida militia at the battle developed at a later date.

The debate over the militia's failure to cross the Withlacoochee did not become widespread until some time later, in 1837 and 1838. There were rumblings, however, in newspapers in 1836. The *Savannah Georgian* in January 1836 claimed that about 300 Florida men had crossed the river, only to huddle together on the river bank and then to flee back across at the first shots.²⁸ The *Washington Globe* asked why the bulk of the militia did not take part in the fighting, but placed the blame on no one.²⁹ In his 1836 annual report, General Alexander Macomb, commander of the United States Army, said he did not know why only twenty-seven Florida men had been involved, but that if all of the militia troops had shown the zeal of those men, the war, in all likelihood, would have ended with this battle.³⁰ In answer to a letter from General Call, Macomb, on August 23, 1837,

26. John T. Sprague, *The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War* (New York, 1848), 92. While Sprague was not in Florida at the time of the battle, he is considered an authority on the war.

27. *Pensacola Gazette*, January 16, 1836. See also the Tallahassee *Floridian*, January 9, 16, 1836; *Key West Inquirer*, December 1835 through March 1836; *St. Augustine Florida Herald*, January 6, 1836, and *American State Papers: Military Affairs*, VI, 21.

28. *Niles' Weekly Register*, January 30, 1836, 369.

29. Tallahassee *Floridian*, February 13, 1836.

30. Call Journal, 326-27.

wrote that at the time of his report he had not known all the facts but would now be glad to publicize Call's views.³¹

General Clinch wrote to Secretary of War Lewis Cass on July 22, 1837, and stated that after the fighting began, he had sent Colonel Leigh Read to find out why the volunteers were not crossing the river. At the end of the fight, Clinch claimed Call had appeared and said that the volunteers were at their posts. Several militiamen, according to Clinch, stated that Call had ordered them not to cross the river. As a further insult to Call, Clinch asked why he had ever been appointed governor of Florida when his military reputation was being seriously questioned by the federal government.³² In reply, General Call published an open letter in the *Niles' Weekly Register* on August 19, 1837, explaining that it had taken all morning to cross the almost 260 regulars in a canoe. He wondered how Clinch expected the Florida Militia to cross in the twenty-five minutes while the battle was at its peak.³³ This exchange of public letters included much personal recrimination, particularly on Call's part, that had little or nothing to do with Clinch's professional competence. *Niles' Weekly Register* published letters to Call from Samuel Parkhill and R. G. Wellford, both Florida militia officers, supporting Call's statements.³⁴

The crux of the crossing argument was reached on January 11, 1838, when the Tallahassee *Floridian* devoted three pages to letters from General Call and his fellow militiamen, all giving essentially the same reasons why the bulk of the Florida troops had not joined in the fighting. From this correspondence, it is concluded that General Call had never given an order forbidding his men to cross the river, and that every effort, including the constant use of the one available canoe, was made to reenforce Clinch's regulars.³⁵ John Bemrose's statement that only a few of the Florida militiamen tried to cross the river appears to be true in a strict sense, but at best is misleading.³⁶ During the

31. Major General Alexander Macomb Letter, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina. Microfilm copy in P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville.

32. Tallahassee *Floridian*, July 22, 1837.

33. *Niles' Weekly Register*, August 19, 1837, 395-96.

34. *Ibid.*, 397-98.

35. Tallahassee *Floridian*, January 11, 1838. See also Call Papers for the original letters and copies.

36. Bemrose, "Reminiscences of the Seminole War," 68.

one-hour battle, only a few men could have made use of the canoe and no other practical means of crossing the river was at hand. It seems that with the exception of a potential pursuit of the Indians after the fighting, the Florida militia participated to the fullest extent possible in the Battle of Withlacoochee.

THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY COMMISSION, THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER, AND THE FLORIDA SEMINOLES, 1799

by JACK D. L. HOLMES

WHEN THE PRESSURE OF European affairs mounted during 1795, Spain's Minister of State, the erratic Manuel de Godoy, was persuaded to sign the Treaty of San Lorenzo (Pinckney Treaty) with the United States in an effort to neutralize that power in the approaching struggle with the English. Whatever its utility to Spain in Europe, this treaty marked the beginning of the end for Spain's North American empire by yielding control over the Mississippi and by surrendering the strategic posts north of the thirty-first parallel and east of the Mississippi.

President Washington appointed the experienced surveyor Andrew Ellicott in 1796 as his commissioner to draw the thirty-first parallel in cooperation with a Spanish boundary commission. Appointed as Spanish commissioner was the Mississippi scientist-planter William Dunbar, but he was shortly replaced by Stephen Minor. By May 31, 1798, Governor-General Manuel Gayoso de Lemos had met with the boundary commission near Clarksville and had agreed to the astronomical observations which established the initial point of the thirty-first parallel on "Union Hill." The boundary commission gradually began moving eastward to Mobile, erecting markers along the boundary line. By 1799, the commission had reached the Chattahoochee River where mounting Indian opposition changed markedly the character and progress of the line.

An early indication of Seminole resistance to the advancing tide of white settlers in Florida was furnished by the hostile activities of bands of "bandetti" among the tribe who effectively halted the commission near the confluence of the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers in 1799. The journals, diaries, and correspondence of those connected with the southern frontier at that time clearly indicate the emergence of the Seminoles as a major threat to white settlement.

The boundary commission had already been menaced by the Choctaws after the initial point along the thirty-first parallel had

been agreed upon in May 1798. The commissioners had suffered unfavorable weather, a lack of money and supplies, and the mounting opposition of the Indians as they wended their way toward a confrontation with the bellicose Lower Creeks.¹

The Choctaws' opposition was allayed somewhat by the get-tough policy of the Spanish Governor-General of Louisiana and West Florida, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, who warned that regular troops and militia would be used to punish the Indians for any insult to the American or Spanish boundary commission members. The Creeks were not intimidated by such statements. The commissioners encountered no Indian opposition as long as they operated in the domain of the Choctaws, but when they reached the Tombigbee, where the Creek territorial claims began, the story was different.²

Ellicott, realizing the serious nature of the opposition, called for aid from the American commissioner to the Creeks, Benjamin Hawkins. Earlier conferences at Colerain led Ellicott and Hawkins to believe the Creeks would support the boundary commission with warrior escorts as far as Seminole territory at the Chatahoochee River.³ William Panton, the British merchant who controlled trade with the Indians, wrote Governor Gayoso in 1798, "I do not find that the Creeck Nation have given their assent to the running of the Line betwixt Spain & America, neither does it appear that they have given an absolute negative." According to Panton, "they grumble about it from one end of the Nation to the other, but are seized with a kind of Stupor and are undecided what to do, whither to resist or permit it. . . ." ⁴ The following spring Panton wrote, "After some hesitation the Chiefs present agreed to let it [the boundary line] be extended to Chatahoochy but as the Country beyond that belongs to the Seminolia Indians, they recommended an other talk . . . on the Chatahoochy

1. The background and activities of the boundary commission are recounted in Jack D. L. Holmes, *Gayoso: the Life of a Spanish Governor in the Mississippi Valley, 1789-1799* (Baton Rouge, 1965), 231-37.

2. R. S. Cotterill, *The Southern Indians* (Norman, 1954), 125.

3. Negotiations concluded at Colerain, July 29, 1796, are described in the *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1832-1834), I, 586-616. A brief summary is in Cotterill, *Southern Indians*, 114-16.

4. Panton to Gayoso, July 19, 1798, D. C. Corbitt (ed.-trans.), "Papers Relating to the Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1784-1800," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, XXV (March 1941), 68.

with those tribes, most of whom will fall within the Spanish limits.”⁵

At the Escambia River, the boundary commission split into two parties: one continuing overland to the meeting point near the Chattahoochee, the other going to Pensacola and from there up the Apalachicola River by water to rendezvous with the first party. Ellicott remained at Pensacola unaware of the increased harassment which the land party suffered at the hands of the lurking Seminoles. Ellicott stayed at Pensacola during April, May, and June 1799. In a letter to his wife he described the frontier village:

This country is hot both day and night, and cursed with poverty, and muskittoes; - The inhabitants of this town have to import earth to make their gardens with. What Bartram has described as a Paradise appears to me like purgatory, but somewhat worse! A Principality would not induce me to stay in it one hour longer than I can possibly avoid it. - If it had not been for pride I would certainly have ran away from it six months ago. It might do for a place of Banishment.⁶

Similar comments were expressed in his official report to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering:

This sandy country is intensely hot both night and day and was it not for the sea breezes which commonly set in about 10 o’Clock in the forenoon would be altogether insupportable. - Man, and almost all other animals that inhabit it lose their vigour, and enterprize and become languid: and if they were not constantly goaded by the muskettoes, and flies, into motion would generally become lethargic. - White men are much more affected than black; but even the lat[t]er fall far short of the blacks in our country in manly athletic exercises. And notwithstanding the exertions of the French, British and Spanish governments, the country on the sea coast is yet in a state of infancy, or rather decrepitude. . . . The beauties which Bartram and other travellers have discovered are merely imaginary,-they have no existence in truth.⁷

5. Panton to Gayoso, May 12, 1799, *ibid.*, (June 1941), 162.

6. Catharine Van Cortlandt Mathews, *Andrew Ellicott: His Life and Letters* (New York, 1908), 169-70. Additional biographical information and bibliographical references on Ellicott in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), *Dictionary of American Biography*, 21 vols. (New York, 1928-1936), VI, 89-90.

7. Ellicott to Timothy Pickering, June 18, 1799, Southern Boundary, U.S. and Spain, Andrew Ellicott mss., U.S. National Archives, Record Group 76, 3 vols., III. Cited hereafter as Ellicott, Southern Boundary.

As much as Ellicott disliked Pensacola, he soon wished he was back there under the protection of Commandant Vicente Folch y Juan's garrison. Ellicott left to meet the other commissioners on June 20. In the meantime, the Seminoles had adopted guerilla tactics to harass the commission; at one point armed encounter seemed unavoidable. Evidence of what occurred is contained in the correspondence of Ellicott,⁸ Stephen Minor,⁹ and Benjamin Hawkins.¹⁰

On August 21, Ellicott wrote an account of his activities in the Chattahoochee camp, which goes considerably beyond the information recorded in his journal,¹¹ and sheds much light on the Chattahoochee situation and the Seminole dispute:¹²

"The boundary between the U.S. and his C.M. was extended to this river some weeks ago, and the Astronomical Journal for this point was closed yesterday. The weather has been uncommonly unfavourable. There has not been more than ten clear days at this place since the 24.th of June last. We are constantly deluged with rain: Our tents and bedding have not been completely dry since our arrival here.-

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8. Ellicott's correspondence to Pickering in *ibid.*, I-III; to his wife, in Mathews, *Ellicott, passim*; to Gayoso and other Spanish officers, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles procedentes de Cuba. Cited hereafter as AGI, Cuba, legajo 215-b and other legajos, most of which are cited in Holmes, *Gayoso*, 174-264.
 9. Stephen Minor was born in Green County, Pennsylvania (then part of Virginia), February 8, 1760, and died at Natchez, November 29, 1815. An American volunteer who fought under Captain William Pickles in West Florida, Minor joined the Spanish service under Bernardo de Galvez in 1779 and fought at Manchac, Baton Rouge, Mobile, and Pensacola. After the war he was named adjutant of the Natchez fort where he served until his interim-appointment as governor in 1797. He was the leading Spanish boundary commissioner from the withdrawal of Dunbar in 1798 until 1801. Later named commandant of the Spanish post of Concordia (opposite Natchez), he evacuated that post to the Americans in 1804. He was a leading Mississippi planter and at one time president of the Bank of Mississippi.
 10. Biographical data on Hawkins in Merritt B. Pound, *Benjamin Hawkins - Indian Agent* (Athens, 1951); Johnson and Malone, *Dictionary of American Biography*, VIII, 413; *Letters of Benjamin Hawkins, 1796-1806, Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, 10 vols. (Savannah, 1840-1916), IX; Benjamin Hawkins, "A Sketch of the Creek Country in 1798 and 1799," *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society* (Savannah, 1848) III, part I.
 11. Andrew Ellicott, *The Journal of Andrew Ellicott* (Chicago, 1962 edition), 213-17.
 12. Ellicott to Pickering, August 21, 1799, Ellicott, *Southern Boundary*, III.

“Our business has been very much delayed by the Indians, we have already held these treaties with them at each of which they affected to be perfectly satisfied but the result has constantly been the loss of our provision, and horses, and a great encrease of the expense ¹³ - In the whole of our business with the Indians I have constantly been directed by our agents, who I am confident have done their duty. - After arriving at this place, and finding the disposition of the Uphales, and Seminoles, I had serious thoughts of relinquishing a further prosecution of the business on account of the expense which would necessarily be incurred, by the delays owing to so great a number of our horses being stolen by the Indians, and the probability of losing the greater part of the remainder between this, and S.¹ Mary’s, which event would effectually put an end to our operations, and reduce us to the necessity of of [*sic*] carrying our apparatus and baggage on our backs to some settlement in Georgia - Upon dropping some hints to the foregoing effect to the Spanish Commissioner ¹⁴ I found him totally adverse to it. - From that circumstance, I saw that the attempt to proceed must be made, and that it may be attended with some degree of certainty, I have this night written to Col. Hawkins to join us immediately at the mouth of Flint River, which is supposed to be about twenty miles below our present encampment: - the survey down the River was finished yesterday, but the return has not yet been made. - The opinion of Col. Hawkins will have great weight with us, and from his influence with the Indians I am not yet without some hopes of success. - I do not apprehend any personal danger from them, nor think any other opposition will be attempted than the stealing of our horses, deranging our instruments, and carrying off every thing from our Camp they can lay their hands on: On each of those particulars [*sic*] we have suffered considerably and had I not have been an instrument maker myself, our business would have terminated some time ago: Under this censure of the Indians I would not be understood to include the Upper Creeks. - They have uniformly behaved well, except the Talesee King, commonly

13. This was no small point with Ellicott. Before 1798 he had already spent \$12,000 above the \$30,000 voted by Congress for the completion of his task. Holmes, *Gayoso*, 177; Pickering to Ellicott, April 26, 1798, Ellicott, *Southern Boundary*, II.

14. Stephen Minor.

called the Tame King,¹⁵ - he has constantly been divided in his opposition, fortunately his influence is but trifling [*sic*], he is a great Medal Chief, and a pensioner of the U.S. - Upon a report being spread, that some of the lower towns, and Seminoles, intended plundering our Camp, and abusing us, a considerable body of the Upper Creeks armed themselves, and almost flew to our assistance - the lower towns, and Seminoles were alarmed, but the protection cost us a large quantity of flour, and beef.-

"The lower towns, and Seminoles, are perhaps a set of the most unprincipled villains in existance [*sic*], while partaking of hospitality, they will secret and carry off every article of value which they can lay their hands on belonging to their entertainer. - Much the greater part of those Indians are on the Spanish side of the line. The Spanish government has no agent with them, nor has any thing been done from that quarter to prevail upon them to listen to reason, or explain the nature of our business, except what has been done in our camp by Maj.^r Minor. The agents of the U.S. on the contrary have been indefatigable in their exertions in favour of both Governments.-

"I shall write to you more fully the first leisure moment I have, and send on the astronomical journal which at this place has been very lengthy.¹⁶ - I am positively almost worn out by the excessive heat of this country, want of sleep, long laborious calculations in which I have no assistance, added to the worst of all plagues, that of Indians;-It was not till after eight o'Clock this evening that I got them all out of my tent, and this is the third letter since that hour which I have written and copied.-At three hours since, which will be near three o'Clock in the morning, I shall observe an immersion of the first satellite of Jupiter if it should be clear-immediately after the observation I shall call up my people, load our canoes, and proceed down to the mouth of Flint River. -

"If the Indians had complied with their stipulations at Colerain, the boundary would have been completed with ease next month."

15. The Tame King's reaction to the boundary commission is mentioned in Cotterill, *Southern Indians*, 126.

16. Ellicott's astronomical and thermometrical observations on the Chatahoochee and Flint, May 9, 1799-September 17, 1799, are in Ellicott, *Journal*, appendix 85-115. Compare with those of Minor, July 30-August 15, 1799, in AGI, Cuba, legajo 2355.

Stephen Minor lacked the experience of Ellicott in scientific and surveying matters, but he was a keen observer of political, economic, and Indian events. He had been sent by Gayoso in 1792 to pave the way for the important conference at Natchez which welded several of the Mississippi tribes into a defensive-offensive alliance, and the following year was widened to include nearly all the southern Indian nations. Minor knew Indian customs, and, since he was known to be a protege of Governor-General Gayoso, he was the recipient of much affection and respect. Minor's report of August 5 forms an interesting compliment to that of Ellicott:¹⁷

"After innumerable, unforeseen difficulties we arrived at this camp on the 25.th of last month, not having been able to leave the work before the 2.^d because of the strong southeastern winds which have blown for a space of two weeks previously. On the 8.th of the present month we arrived almost opposite to the mouth of this river, but we were three days employed in trying to find the true navigable channel, deceived by the large number of branches through which it empties into the Gulf, despite having on board a man whom Don Vicente Folch¹⁸ recommended as a good pilot, although actually he had no more knowledge of the coast than I did. Our old pilot, Mathias, had remained ill in the Hospital of Pensacola.¹⁹ The coast seems clean and free of rocks, low, but very flat. It has three good ports: the Bay of Santa Rosa, that of San Jose, and that of San Andres. Doubling the cape of San Blas, the island of St. George can be seen as well as Dog Island and several other smaller ones which form the Bay of Apalachicola, in which there are a large number of sand bars and

17. Minor to Gayoso, August 5, 1799, *ibid.*, translated from Spanish by the writer.

18. Folch, commandant of Pensacola, was born in Reus, Tarragona (Spain). His campaigns included Africa, Algiers, and Mobile, the last of which he commanded from 1788 to 1792. He reconnoitered Tampa Bay in 1793, and led a small detachment of ships defending the Mississippi River against a possible French invasion the following year. After serving as commandant of San Fernando de las Barrancas (Memphis) during 1795 and 1796, he assumed command of Pensacola, where he remained until 1811. He died at Havana on November 8, 1829. Jack D. L. Holmes, "Three Early Memphis Commandants: Beauregard, Deville Degoutin, and Folch," *Papers of the West Tennessee Historical Society*, XVIII (1964), 14-26.

19. An account of the Pensacola hospital in 1799 is given by Vicente Folch, June 8, 1799, AGI, Cuba, legajo 160-a.

oyster banks when the water is at low tide. Dog Island is located eight miles south of the mouth of this river, situated in North latitude 29 degrees, 3 minutes, 6 seconds.²⁰

"After we entered the Chattahoochee we mistakenly took a branch which led us to a small lake of fresh water, and we wandered up and down three days before finding the principal channel, the navigation of which had always been described to us by those who claimed to know it well, as offering no difficulty whatsoever, which formed a wide bay of sorts until its confluence with the Flint, and in which the tides can be noted even farther above. We have learned that all this is entirely false. The greatest width of the river is no more than 200 yards. The current in general is rapid and ten miles above the entrance the tides are no longer perceptible. It is so twisting that we were unable to ascend under sail for more than one or two miles by the most direct route, and we have seen ourselves forced to ascend by means of a tow-line to the sloop, almost inch by inch. The boat is presently at the Indian village Hicawash, about 50 miles below this camp, although within a few days I hope to find it at the mouth of the Flint River. Nevertheless, in order not to defer the operations on the line, we have rented a number of canoes to carry up the instruments, baggage, etc. The distance from the Gulf to the confluence of the Flint is something over 120 miles via water. The boundary line cuts the river more than thirty miles above the Flint and passes through the middle of an Indian village, the lands on both banks of its western river ascending over swampy lands covered with beautiful cypress groves. Because the land is generally flooded, it is not suitable to cultivation. On ascending, we frequently find high bluffs which are never covered by water, although the pines groves are suitable for various settlements. At Hicahah, 50 miles below this camp, the lands begin to be better. Actually, those along the bank are of excellent quality and ought to be extremely fertile since we have found along them cane-brakes

20. Minor's description of the coast followed the instructions of Gayoso, who wrote, "Remember that You promised me a plan of all the Coast with all the outlets &c I do not relinquish my Claim to this engagement. Send me a Copy as far as Panzacola & in an other sheet will continue the rest as far as St. Mary's. Sound as you go along the Coast & keep a private journal for that part of the voyage." Gayoso to Minor, April 25, 1799, Gayoso mss., Louisiana State University Archives.

equal in size to those of the Mississippi. Unfortunately, they are no more than a narrow band which never extends more than a mile in width, from which point all is pine-barren. Nevertheless, there is a place to form the most beautiful settlements. Now from one side to the other of the river along almost the entire extent of the road to this camp may be found Indian plantations on which may be seen good fields of corn, rice, peas, beans, potatoes, melons, watermelons, cucumber, etc., and most of them have chickens, pigs, and cattle in abundance. Some of them have very good herds with various Negro slaves, indicating to me that they live in reasonable comfort. The river abounds with various delicious fish. All these details convince me that white settlements in these areas would prosper greatly. I am sure that on the eastern bank of the Mississippi there are no better lands on which to raise cattle.

“The weather since we have been here has been constantly overcast and rainy, so that it has been necessary to delay our astronomical observations and it continues thus without promising improvement, so that I fear that we will find ourselves delayed here several days longer, much to our consternation.

“Only with difficulty can Your Excellency form an idea of how disagreeable and unfortunate our situation is. We are camped next to an Indian village, and below it is another one. Our camp, our tents, are continually filled with Indians, who are not only not desirable guests, but who are the most skillful and subtle thieves that I have ever seen. Not only have they robbed us of a large number of our horses, but they have also pillaged many articles from the tents. They take as much as they can carry when they come to see us if we do not watch them carefully. Moreover, we are forced to give daily supplies to a considerable number. Presently we have ninety among us.

“Before our surveyors arrived here, a party of sixty Indians led by a chief called Kuiache or Kuiage, crossed the river with the intention of robbing our people of all they had and forcing us to halt in drawing the line. Those absent had informed them that they went in a direct line to the mouth of the Flint River where it intersected this road in such a manner that they didn't encounter our people, who arrived at this village while the Seminoles were looking for them 30 miles farther down. At their arrival, their chief received them in the most friendly manner

and informed them of the design of the war party which was seeking them, advising them to camp in his vicinity and promising them all the protection possible. Later, the Seminoles from below appeared in our camp in large numbers. They behaved in the most insolent fashion by making the most terrible threats. Twelve chiefs of the nearby villages above and below the camp, who are our friends, conferred among themselves and, being informed that a large number of chiefs and warriors were disposed to oppose our running the line across the river, they said it was absolutely essential to have a conference with these chiefs, not only to settle the business, but also to recover our stolen horses, and they offered to send a message to each one of them to invite them to meet here within twelve days, which they presently did, inviting them to meet with the chiefs of the villages above this camp on the 8.th of the present month. In this interval the principal chiefs and warriors of the hostile villages have maintained conversations constantly against us, determined amongst themselves to rob us of whatever we brought and force us to turn back. These words, their insolent and insubordinate conduct with us, their intention of attacking us, and their daily depredations came to the notice of our friends, the Creeks, from above, who after having consulted with Durouzeaux, our agent or interpreter in the nation, they determined to send to our assistance a party of 80 of their best warriors, led by two of the most resolute and experienced chiefs, completely armed and equipped for war. We have had this news from Mr. Barner, who received it in a letter from Durouzeaux.²¹ Barner is the first subaltern of Colonel Hawkins, superintendent of the Indians, who sent news to us because he was obliged to go to Fort Wilkinson on public business.

“I should observe to your Excellency that in Pea Creek the parties of the surveyors were found by a detachment of Upper Creeks, who had come to relieve the escort, which had accompanied them from Koenekuik.²² But, as the hostile designs and threats of the Seminoles reached camp before their arrival, it was judged desirable that they all remain there for greater security, and it is the reason why they have paid a larger number than

21. James Darouzeaux was described by Hawkins as “an old residenter and interpreter in the nation.” *Letters of Hawkins*, 170.

22. Coenecuh was commonly but erroneously called the Escambia River. Ellicott, *Journal*, 200.

those who agreed at the beginning. All have conducted themselves in a manner that does them much honor. They have served us in everything on all occasions and they have been ready to give, in whatever difficulty, all the assistance which they have been able to, and obeyed the orders that they have been given.

"The foregoing should be sufficient to give your Excellency a complete idea of our business. As soon as our conference with the Seminole chiefs is concluded, I shall give your Excellency a dispatch containing the results with an account of all that happened since our departure from Koenikeuk. These despatches I will send in the sloop *Castor*, together with the despatches from Power to the Intendant.²³ For this effect, I propose to send this boat within a few days.

"Permit me, your Excellency, now to observe that not having received an answer to my letters, I find myself in the most cruel perplexity. It is true that I received from your Excellency a friendly letter in which you assure me you remain satisfied with the measures that I was going to take relative to this expedition and that you would write me officially on the matter through Power, who arrived in Pensacola without a single letter. Whatever it may be, I should represent to your Excellency that I find myself very embarrassed and it is impossible to continue without having on hand the necessary funds for it, and it would be madness, and even dishonorable to turn back under the present circumstances as we have negotiated them. On the first of May I had only 523 *pesos* left after, as the occasion presented, I have had to borrow from our own people in order to pay the necessary costs, promising them to return their money before I left this place. We owe them four months back-pay to September 1.st, and I am unable to find how they will be paid, nor how to conduct this business without money. They are unable to take leave without being paid, and if your Excellency does not provide by sending me the necessary funds before I leave for St. Mary's River, it is more than probable

23. Juan Buenaventura Morales, intendant ad-interim of Louisiana, had a stormy career which involved him in almost continual disputes with governors, officers, and officials of Spanish Louisiana and West Florida. Born in Malaga in 1756, he came to Louisiana as an officer in the tobacco receipts section of the royal treasury. His service was spent at Malaga, Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, and Havana. A brief account of his career is in his service sheet, February 28, 1796, AGI, Cuba, legajo 565. For his quarrels with Gayoso, see Holmes, *Gayoso*, 200-29.

that the King will have to pay several thousand *pesos* more which could be saved. In addition, I ought not to press forward without receiving instructions on what I ought to do with the horses and other public effects on concluding the operations of the line.

“Mr. Ellicott has agreed with me that we change to the chain the distance from the mouth of the Flint River to that of the St. Mary’s in a direct line eastward, so as to be able to insure it as close as possible in case some difficulty presents itself to impede our making the necessary observations at its origin. Afterwards we will run and assure the line from the head of St. Mary’s to the mouth of the Flint, and finally a third line to correct this one, which operations will produce the true royal dividing line. We understand that the country through which we are to travel is impenetrable because of the thick, extended cypress groves with which it is covered. Part of the year it is almost completely under water, while in the other season you can’t find a teaspoon of water for more than twenty miles. Thus, the intermediate season is the only time that it is passable. From here your Excellency can form an idea of the difficulties which we will have to overcome and of the time which we would necessarily take. The distance is at least two hundred miles. When I consider all these circumstances, I fear sometimes that the expedition will last even more than another year. If, unfortunately, this be the case, I reiterate my petition to your Excellency that I made in Pensacola concerning the sums necessary to conclude it, for your own judgment.

“At this very moment four of our men have come to me requesting leave, which I certainly would have had to extend to them, if I had the money, since I could have rented Negroes here which would have been of equal service and at less price. If, when we finish this matter, I have no funds to pay the people, I shall be forced to subsidize them and pay them.”

Minor also wrote Gayoso an official dispatch on August 14, from the same camp which, he reported, was 386 1/16 miles from the Mississippi. Except for some descriptive passages, it contained little new information:

“In order to supply the camps it has been necessary to buy and rent canoes in which to transport the supplies, instruments, and other effects of the commission. The entrance is found at

more than forty leagues distance from the confluence of this river with the Flint and the line falls at ten leagues further North, passing through the center of an Indian village called Clisteofa. Many Indian villages can be seen along the banks of the river and notwithstanding the numerous cypress bogs and swampy land along both banks, there is no dearth of sites ideal for the establishment of towns. There is no country more suited for the cultivation of all species of livestock, especially cattle. . . .

“It is impossible to appreciate the disappointment, the embarrassment and the uneasiness which we find ourselves in here. We are surrounded and threatened by Indians. Not content with taking, virtually by force, their daily rations, whenever they enter the tents they take away everything they can carry. . . .

“The Seminoles have appeared repeatedly in our camp and behaved with the greatest insolence and insult. The Chiefs of this neighborhood have advised us that other Seminoles are resolved to oppose the continuation of the line, and that it is indispensable to conduct a conference with them as much on this matter as for persuading them to return the horses which they have stolen from us, and accordingly we have invited all the chiefs to a conference on the 8th of this month, and all have answered us that they will meet in this camp on the set day. Nevertheless, it seems that they have agreed among themselves to ravage us completely and force us to retreat. Their hostile plans, their daring and unusual conduct, their threats and their thefts have come to the attention of our friends the Creeks from above; and they, having consulted on the crisis with our interpreter in the nation, have decided to send eighty warriors. This determination of the Creeks was disclosed by a letter which Mr. Bernard, first assistant of Colonel Hawkins, received from Mons. Durouseaux, interpreter of our nation to the Creeks, a copy of which I have already sent you.

“It is essential to advise your excellency that on the 18th of June two chiefs and twelve warriors of the same nation arrived at our camp on Pea Creek to relieve an equal number of those who had accompanied us from Koenekeuch River; but after informing them of the contrary and unfriendly menaces of the Seminoles, they considered it prudent to join the escort for the greatest security for both commissions. I ought to add that they have behaved with the greatest fidelity and zeal in all occasions and

have given us unequivocal proof of their support in fulfilling all they have been asked to do. . . .

“What has been written above was on the 5th of the current month. The same day thirty of the warriors mentioned in Mr. Durouseaux’s letter arrived and the following day the rest came in. On the 8th Kiniachic Panie and other Seminole Chiefs met at the camp and joined at the Plaza in the vicinity with neighboring chiefs and those of the upper villages; but nothing was accomplished in the meeting because of the opposition of Kiniachic and the absence of the Yufalies chiefs. The latter arrived the following day and held another assembly on the same day, but nothing was decided again and we were further frustrated in having Kiniachic attract several followers by his maneuvers. They met again on the 11th. Observing that Kiniachic was using his efforts to disrupt and destroy the expedition, and fearful that he would succeed in his attempt, I sent him word through Mr. Barnard that I was not unaware that he was inciting the other chiefs to oppose the line’s being drawn, and consequently he was resisting the sovereign will of the King of Spain, and as he lived in His Majesty’s territory, and had received from him his medal, he ought to consider himself a Spaniard and our friend; but that his conduct was that of an enemy. For all his Nation had not only agreed that the line be drawn, but they had also agreed to help us in its execution and in sending an escort of two chiefs and twenty warriors for the protection of both commissions, yet only he was found opposed to what the Creek Nation had agreed on with us and with the United States.

“That the Upper Creeks had complied with their obligations according to the Treaty of Colerain; and that some time ago they had returned to their homes - those who had accompanied us from the Koenekueh River. That now it was up to him to hasten to join us with his warriors to the St. Mary’s River, that before his Nation I named him Kiniachic, Chief of Our Escort, and that I wanted no one else to come but him. But that first it was necessary to return to us all the horses that those of his village had stolen from us. That it was hateful for him to give specious reasons to excuse himself and them, for we would not accept any excuses, and that if he refused to do so, I would inform the first governor-general of these provinces of his conduct and all the Spanish commandants that he should never be admitted to any of our posts

in the future, that he would never be given a single gift, that all commerce, all trade between his people and the Spaniards would be suspended, and that finally he would have his medal taken away and his rank as Chief.

"Kiniachic became upset and confused and answered not a word, this discourse having made the impression that was desired, for without opposition or debate whatever, they resolved unanimously to continue the line without opposition or impediment whatever for their part; and they set the following day for informing the commandants of the commission of that decision. The 12th Andrew Ellicott and I attended the conference and the assembled Chiefs told us that, 'They consented that the Line be continued; that they would relieve the escort with another composed half of Seminoles and the rest of Upper Creeks, and they would return to us the horses which they had stolen.' Then addressing Kiniachic with a stern visage, I told him, 'Are you really a man of honor and truth?' He replied that he was. 'Should I have confidence in you that you will fulfill your promises?' He answered yes. 'Then,' I told him, 'come here and give me your hand.' And thus the treaty was concluded. Nevertheless, the same day they stole five horses from us. But as soon as Kiniachic returns to his village, surely he will order them returned to us with the rest.

"I believe that the results of this conference will allay all the fears and difficulties and opposition, not only from Kiniachic, but also from the rest of the chiefs.

"The insolence, hostile disposition and obstinacy of Kiniachic originate in the information spread some short time ago by a white man who passed through the Seminole villages, to the effect that Bowles²⁴ was soon to arrive with two large ships loaded with presents and merchandise for the Creeks.

"You will see in the paragraph from the Philadelphia newspaper of May 7, of which I include a copy in my personal letter today, that this rumor has some basis. Nevertheless it is necessary to confess that it has little truth in it. For if Bowles had left Lon-

24. Biographical data on Bowles in [Benjamin Baynton], *Authentic Memoirs of William Augustus Bowles Esquire* (London, 1791); "The Life of General W. A. Bowles, A Native of America - Born of English Parents, in Frederic County, Maryland, in the Year 1764," *Public Characters for 1802* (London, 1803); Elisha P. Douglass, "The Adventurer Bowles," *William & Mary Quarterly*, 2d Series, VI (1949), 3-23; and Johnson and Malone, *Dictionary of American Biography*, II, 519-20.

don on February 21 to come to this land, he would have appeared already.²⁵

"The only expense occasioned by the conference which we have just concluded with the Seminoles consists in extraordinary rations of flour, meat, whiskey and salt which we supplied them with, amounting on some days to 419, with some small presents of coffee, sugar, rum and wine for the Chiefs and their families."²⁶

Minor's optimism at settling the dispute with the Seminoles was not warranted. The following month in a letter to William Panton, he wrote: "I wish I had the time to acquaint you with all the difficulties and obstructions the Seminoles have been endeavoring to throw in our way, but it would take a volume. Sufficient it is to say that on the 11th they consented to all our demands, and stipulated to furnish a guard for our protection. However, the very same day they stole five horses from us. This is really encouraging and calculated to inspire confidence in their good faith. . . ."²⁷

Subsequent hostilities and increasing menacing activities by the Seminoles in September succeeded in accomplishing the Indians' ambition: to stop the boundary commission at all costs. Not even the good offices of Benjamin Hawkins could protect the commission from Indian attacks. In a letter to Panton, Hawkins described these incidents:

Irwin arrived here the 4th of this month and proceeded on the next day. . . . I returned here early in this month from a visit to the Commissions at the mouth of Flint river. Just after they had finished their observations there and had fixed the day for their movement to the source of St. Marys they

25. The American frontier officers were likewise interested in Bowles' movements. Captain Bartholomew Schaumburgh, commandant of Fort Stoddard on the Tombigbee River, and Major Thomas H. Cushing, commander of American troops on the Mississippi and Alabama rivers, exchanged news on Bowles' whereabouts, supposed plans, and possible effects on the American frontier. Schaumburgh to Cushing, August 31, 1799, Jack D. L. Holmes, (ed.), "Fort Stoddard in 1799: Seven Letters of Captain Bartholomew Schaumburgh," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XXVI (Fall-Winter, 1964), 238-39. Cushing to Schaumburgh, February 12, 1800, *ibid.*, 251.
26. Minor to Gayoso, No. 81, August 14, 1799, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2355, translated from Spanish by the writer.
27. Minor to Panton, [September 1799?], portion of a manuscript belonging to Marie de Vergas, from a typescript copy owned by Mrs. C. Grenes Cole, New Orleans.

were visited by twenty mischief makers from Talasee, who created a momentary alarm. This banditti aided by some Semanoles stole fourteen horses and plundered a vessel of property of the value of 3 or 400 dolls. I met them on the night of their arrival in the vicinity of our camp with the armed force under command of Capt. Boyer, rebuked them for their improper conduct and ordered them to return home and to conduct themselves agreeable to the voice of their nation. They for a short time seemed obstinately bent on mischief but determined as soon as they discovered we possessed the means and were determined to punish them. . . .

The next day I sent out some chiefs for the stolen horses and they [-----] the hole and brought a message from this Banditti; that they should return home, that what they had done did not [two words torn from mss] with themselves, that they had been out for, that the greatest part of the mischief done was by Indians in our neighborhood and that they had taken but two horses which they returned.

I advised Mr. Ellicott with his unwieldy accumulation of baggage to go round by water, and for Major Minor to go through with their escort by land. When they shall have ascertained the source of St. Marys and completed their observations there, they can with a few hands under the direction of a surveyor and guarded by Indians trace out this point of the boundary and put up the mounds.²⁸

Some few days after this on our march to St. Marys we were visited by the Semanoles who stole some horses from us and altho' they returned the most of them this separation [sic] determined me to call on the chief of the lower towns for fifty warriors arrived. And I met the chief attending with the Indians of the escort for this force, as soon as he delivered my message to the Cowetahs and Cusetahs²⁹ they ordered out their warriors and added 150 to the requisition and sent them to receive such orders as I might give.

The escort proceeded and has by this arrived in safety . . . [words torn] . . . returned a few days past, and brought with them ten of the stolen horses, and report that they alarmed the mischief makers very much.

I have now the great towns of this [Nation?] convened at Cupituh [Coweta?], this little affair has agitated the whole

28. In most cases, the boundary commission used mounds of earth, surmounted by wooden markers, with which to indicate the thirty-first parallel, but near Mobile they erected a stone marker still in existence today. Jack C. Gallalee, "Andrew Ellicott and the Ellicott Stone," *The Alabama Review*, XVIII (April 1965), 92-105.

29. The towns of Coweta and Cusseta are listed as two of the twelve mother towns of the Lower Creeks in *Letters of Hawkins*, 171.

nation and roused the well-disposed into action and I expect much good will result from it. . . .³⁰

In a later report to the Secretary of War, Hawkins wrote:

. . . the officers of his Catholic Majesty have no just cause of complaint against the Creek nation, and have received substantial and repeated proofs of a disposition here friendly and determined to carry their national engagements into effect. On the 17 September, 1799, a banditti from Talassee, in this agency of 21 only, went to the Simanolees and there, conjointly with the Simanolees, insulted the Commandants of Spain and the United States, at their encampment on the Spanish side of the Line of Limits in East Florida near the confluence of Flint and Chattahoochee. I called on the chief, being myself a witness to the fact, to punish immediately the leader and his associates in an exemplary manner; they sentenced the leader to be roped and whiped, his property destroyed, and his associates whiped; and this sentence was carried into effect on him and three of his associates by 72 warriors, under directions of their great chief, and in presence of Mr. Cornell, one of my assistants and interpreters. The whole was reported to the Commissioners, to the Secretary of War, and to the Governor of Pensacola, with such assurances as were proper on my part.³¹

Andrew Ellicott gives a brief description of the events which befell the boundary commission during September,³² but he omits considerable information which was included in his rather lengthy report to the Secretary of State:

“It is with the most sensible mortification I have ever yet experienced that I have to inform you of our failure in part of our business owing to the Hostile disposition of the Indians.- By what secret spring this people has been brought forward I shall not undertake to determine;-but I give you as correct a statement of facts and all the information I received antecedent to our retreat from our Camp near the Mouth Flint River, as I am able.

“The morning after the arrival of Co.¹ Hawkins at Pensacola we waited upon Gov.^r Folch who in very short time informed us

30. Hawkins to Panton, October 14, 1799, Panton-Forbes Papers, Special Collections, Mobile Public Library.

31. Hawkins to Secretary of War, May 8, 1802, in *Letters of Hawkins*, 417.

32. Ellicott, *Journal*, 217-33.

that he had to give audience to two Seminole indians. - Upon this we withdrew to Major Minors quarters which were within the Governors inclosure and in a few minutes saw two Indians go into the Gov.^r ⁸ house. Major Minor followed and heard their conversation with the Governor.

"In less than an hour Minor joined us and observed they gave strong talk in opposition to the running of the line and that they were Seminoles. The subject then passed over. - On our arrival at the head of Pensacola Bay which was about 8 o'clock in the evening Co.¹ Hawkins went on shore to meet the Mad Dog Chief ³³ who we were informed had just arrived. The Mad Dog informed the Co.¹ that two indians had just gone to the Tallesees with bad talks from the Governor. - Co.¹ Hawkins told him it was impossible: - that the two Indians he alluded to were Seminoles, and had gone on to their nation. - An Indian standing by observed that the Mad Dog was right that he himself saw the two Indians at Pensacola and conversed with them and that they were Tallesees.

"The Mad Dog wanted immediately to come on board and give Major Minor and myself the information but Col. Hawkins put him off till the next morning when he came on board our vessel and gave each of us the information and proposed sending a runner after them, but as Major Minor still continued in the opinion that the Mad Dog was mistaken and that the two indians were actually Seminoles no more notice was taken of it at that time. Of our Treaty with the Indians at Millers place on Coe, ne, cuh and the assemblage of the Tallesees at Pensacola last June I have allready pericularly [*sic*] informed you - by the assemblage of the Indians at Pensacola we were detained at that place till the 24.th of June when we proceeded to the Bar, but could not cross it on account of head winds till the 2.nd of July. - On the 4.th about Noon we arrived in St. George's Sound but could not find the navigable mouth of the River till the 13.th when we proceeded up with a fair wind about 20 miles. We then warped for three days when I left the vessel and proceeded up the river in a small canoe with the instruments and arrived at camp on the 25.th

"Mr. Timothy Bernard, one of our Deputy agents arrived five days before me. - We found the work would be suspended till

33. On the activities of Mad Dog, see Cotterill, *Southern Indians*, 106, 117, 129, 137-38.

the Chiefs could have a meeting and an explanation from us respecting the nature of our business. - This meeting took place the beginning of August and the Indians departed apparently well satisfied. - But previous to our arrival they assembled in considerable numbers to stop and plunder our surveyor, but his movement was so rapid that he had arrived at the river and was well posted before their main body had crossed and their skies were looking out too low. - Their depredations upon our horses began at Co, e, ne, cuh and continued till our final retreat.- from this circumstance added to their uniform stealing and insolence I frequently doubted their sincerity, and as frequently communicated those doubts to our agent M.^f Bernard who on his part had none. - Before I left that camp to proceed to the mouth of Flint River M.^f Burgess lately one of our depty. agents and interpreters, informed me confidentially that we should certainly be plundered on our way to S.^t Mary's, and requested me to write to Co.¹ Hawkins to join us immediately as his influence would effect our safety if any man could do it, this I did on the 22.nd of August. - On the 23.rd Major Minor and myself proceeded down to the mouth of Flint River. - A few days after we had been encamped Major Minor dismissed his Military escort agreeably to instructions which he received from the late Gov.^r Gayoso ³⁴ as early as the 14.th of May last, he also discharged almost the whole of his Labourers, and sent away part of the baggage of their department, and the only valuable part of their apparatus. ³⁵ - As soon as this was done he became very impatient to set out for S.^t Mary's. - In one of our conversations upon that subject I told him the work must be done before we left that place, that the Geographical position of the mouth of Flint River could not be accurately determined before the morning of the 14.th of that month (September) supposing the weather to be very favourable and more over that I was desirous of seeing Co.¹ Hawkins before I ventured upon a journey the success of which was in my opinion at best but doubtful, and further that M.^f

34. Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, former governor for the Natchez District (1789-1797), was governor-general of Louisiana and West Florida from August 1797, until his sudden death from yellow fever on July 18, 1799. See Holmes, *Gayoso*; and Jack D. L. Holmes, "Gallegos notables en la Luisiana," *Cuadernos de Estudios Gallegos* (Spain), XIX, No. 57 (1964), 103-10.

35. Gayoso to Minor, April 25, 1799, Gayoso mss., Louisiana State University Archives.

Anderson had reported to me that our remaining number of horses were not sufficient supposing no more to be stolen to transport baggage, stores and apparatus to S.¹ Mary's. - but that he was differently situated at present. - His Military escort dismissed, almost the whole of his labourers discharged, part of the baggage and the valuable part of their apparatus sent away, which was not the case with me. - To which he answered, 'I suppose you will be angry, but I must now tell you those men of yours are no longer necessary.' - I replied that my situation from some circumstances were embarrassing, that M.^r Gillespie ³⁶ was back on the correction if we went on before his arrival he and his party might be plundered and abused, that they would have no place to retreat to, nearer than Pensacola, or S.¹ Mary's. ³⁷ - That some money was wanting, for which I had sent to Pensacola. - and further that I had the most valuable apparatus upon the continent to account for ³⁸ and had no idea of trusting it under present appearances [*sic*] to the mercy of the indians.

"That I was similar to a passed pawn in the game of chess, and conceived it prudent to be supported by a piece before I made a move, and if Co.¹ Hawkins on his arrival, should think appearances favourable, I would immediately proceed. - About this time M.^r Burgess paid us a visit. - After dinner he took me into the observatory and asked me this question, 'Did you write to Co.¹ Hawkins while at the upper camp?' to which I answered in the affirmative. 'You have says he not written as pointedly as necessary or he would have been here before this time, you must write again immediately, and procure support which may be had from the Cowetas, and if this is not done you will positively be plundered on your way to S.¹ Mary's. You may think me a fool, but mark the end.' - I told him that I could add nothing to the letter which I had written to Co.¹ Hawkins, and if he was well, I was confident he would be with us in a few days, - on the 14th he arrived. - He was of the opinion that every thing was in a good train, and that we might go on with

36. David Gillespie was surveyor pro-tempore for the United States boundary commission and later chief surveyor, replacing Thomas Freeman. Ellicott to Gayoso, November 24, 1798, AGI, Cuba, legajo 215-a.

37. Ellicott probably meant St. Marks instead of St. Marys.

38. Ellicott described the equipment used in his part of the observations in Ellicott, Southern Boundary, III; and Ellicott, *Journal*, Appendix, 44-48.

safety. - I then yielded up my opinion, arranged the Astronomical Journal,³⁹ that it might be understood if any accident should happen to myself, and it be preserved, and began to make the necessary preparation to move on the 20th - On the 17th early in the morning we received a message from Indian Willy a man of property who lives on the Chat, ta, ho, cha several miles above its junction with Flint River to the following effect.- 'Gentlemen I have sent my Negro to inform you, that about 20 Indians lay near my place last night they intend mischief.- many more are behind, they call themselves Choctaws be on your guard and remember that I have nothing to do with it.- my negro goes at midnight.' Altho' this information was not slighted it was not pointedly attended to.- About 2 o'clock in the afternoon some of our Indian escort were sent over the river to make discoveries.- They returned in two or three hours without making any, some were satisfied but I was not, the information from Burgess still kept possession of my mind.- About sundown we received intelligence that a number of strange Indians had just crossed the river;-a few minutes after one of our Indians reported that he had met a number of strangers who refused either to speak to or shake hands with him. - My escort was immediately called to arms, and my son⁴⁰ and Labourers who were armed with rifles joined them. - The Big Lieutenant who commanded our Indian escort, was directed to go and halt the strangers, and demand their Business and give us immediate information.

"They halted a short time, and declared their object was to plunder the camp, scatter the people, and let them go home what way they pleased.

"They then proceeded to within about 200 yards of our camp where they were again halted by our Indian escort and interpreter, the evil disposed were then joined by some others, particularly by the long warrior and some of his people, in whose neighbourhood we lived, and who we before supposed to be well inclined.- Untill that instant we but little dreaded a direct attack, our

39. Ellicott's *Astronomical Journal for the Chattahoochee* is in Ellicott, *Journal*, 89-115; cf. Minor's observations made with the short sector, July 30-August 15, 1799, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2355.

40. Andrew A. Ellicott, the eldest son, was seventeen when he accompanied his father on the boundary expedition. Mathews, *Ellicott*, 234-35.

situation now became serious. - A variety of opinions were brought forward. Major Minor and myself thought a compromise the most prudent and safest measure, for if we should beat them for the present, they could reinforce and renew the attack and by taking the remainder of our horses, render our retreat impracticable, in short that the commencement of hostilities would occasion the destruction of all our party. - At that instant we received information that the whole number of Indians armed, and determined to plunder our Camp, did not exceed thirty, my armed party, including Labourers, amounted to at least 40.- Co.¹ Hawkins then requested Cap.^m Bowyar to arrange his men in the best manner he could, and march them near the Hostile indians this was done with uncommon expedition and the enemy found a party much stronger than themselves directly between them and our Camp. - and at about 20 yards distance, Co.¹ Hawkins stepped forward, and addressed them.- They persisted in plundering the Camp, and declared if we let them do it quietly, they would shed no blood, but that vengeance should follow resistance.

“The Co.’ told them we would trust to that, and if any one of their party should attempt to remove any article from the Camp, he should instantly be put to death, and that if the party attempted to march one inch further, it would be instantly fired upon.- They then became more mild, and at length agreed to remain quiet till the next morning when they would hold a Talk; but that they were determined to carry their plan of Plunder into effect, which they would be able to accomplish, as their strength was constantly increasing. - Upon the assurance of their remaining quiet till the next morning our armed party marched back and guarded the Camp till next morning. - About 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the arrival of the Indians, Major Minors riding horse, with another very valuable one, were stolen from within two hundred Yards of the Camp upon which I immediately ordered all the horses belonging to our party, to be brought up and tied in the Camp, when we found 8 or 10 already missing.- The Spanish horses were also collected, and put in a pen made for that purpose near to the Spanish side of the Camp.- The Hostile indians kept moving about in small parties the whole night about gun shot from our tents.

"They threw down the contractors ⁴¹ Bullock-Pen and let his cattle out and opened the Pen which contained the Spanish horses, and haltered four of them, but were drove away with two only. - Three of my horses broke loose, and ran without the camp, and tho every exertion was made to bring them back, the indians mounted them, and rode them off. - A small party collected the contractors cattle, and secured them a second time.- In this manner the night was spent.- From suspicion that we should meet with some difficulties at that place, I detained a small Schooner, which was in the employ of our Commissary M.^r Anderson, it lay at our landing, about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from our Camp. - The U.S. Schooner was too large to ascend the river, and I had ordered it to Appalachy a few days before, and wait for further orders.- The loading of the principal part of the small schooner had been taken to our Camp several days previous to the alarm.- The fate of the Schooner we did not learn till early in the morning of the 18th when we were informed that it had been plundered about midnight, that the sails were cut to pieces, and the running rigging carried away, upon receiving this information my son, with two of the labourers, armed with their rifles, went to repossess the Schooner, - on their way, they saw a small party of armed Indians who fled at their approach.- As they drew near to the vessel they discovered three armed Indians preparing to go on board the Schooner, no doubt to complete the work they had begun in the night.- Seeing their numbers were equal our party sprung forward with a whoop in the indian manner.- At which the Indians fled with precipitation into the woods.- Our people then repossessed the vessel, and upon examination, found a keg of powder, about 20 lbs. lead which had been overlooked.- The Indians stripped the people on board of all their cloathing, even the handkerchiefs from their heads, and necks, with all their bedding.- The public property taken was of no great value, 12 or 15 Guns, which wanted repairing, a Case of Claret, a small quantity of Brandy, and Ginn, a chest of axes, and other tools, with a few blanketts are the principal articles.- We waited impatiently till 9 o'clock A.M.

41. The American contractor for the boundary commission was Charles Anderson; for the Spaniards, George Cochran. An interesting contract for supplying the commission between Cochran and Gayoso (similar to that of Anderson's), was dated New Orleans, June 1, 1798, AGI, Cuba, legajo 2365.

of the 18th but heard nothing of any Indians coming to the conference. - We then called upon the Big Lieutenant, who has already been mentioned, and asked his opinion of our present situation; he answered 'it is far from being Good.- The Indians on the river about us have taken the Talks of the hostile Tallesees, that he had no dependence but upon his own, and our people with them he thought he could take us safely to St. Marks.'- Upon receiving this information Major Minor, and myself, thought it best to retreat.- It was agreed that he should proceed by land to Colerain, if not followed for the two first days by the Indians. - but in case he was to proceed to S.^t Mark's and wait for a vessel to carry him, and his party to S.^t Mary's.- The vessel he had hitherto used, was discharged, I believe by order of the late Gov.^f Gayoso.

"To render his journey as safe, as possible, I sent Captain Bowyer with all my escort, a corporal and three Privates excepted, with him.- I went on board the small schooner, in which I put the apparatus with the principal part of the baggage of our party; and a small quantity of provisions, determined to force my way down the river if opposed. I had the corporal and three already mentioned with my son, and seven or eight expert riflemen.- The Pack-horses moved at 4 o'Clock P.M. of the 18th and the Schooner was under weigh at 5 o'Clock the same afternoon, I had eight oars, and 15 armed men but my chief dependence was on those already mentioned. Immediately after we left the shore, it began to rain, but we soon made such a covering with our tents, the cut sails, and some oil cloths, that the people and their arms were kept dry, we proceeded down the River till after dark when we stopped for fear of injuring the vessel against logs. - The next next [*sic*] morning before day, altho' it was raining, the moon gave us so much light as to enable us to proceed, and about 11 o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th we passed the lowest indian village on the river. The rain continued without intermission, and so heavy, that it would have been impossible for the Indians to attack us with success in open canoes, and they have no other.

"It did not cease raining till we came near S.^t George's Sound on the 21st where we stopped to repair the sails, and rigging of the vessel.- Before I left camp, I wrote a letter to

M.^f Gillespie to be forwarded to him by Co.¹ Hawkins, who proposed to remain on Flint River a few days and endeavour to give a more favourable turn to the disposition of the Indians.- I likewise sent a message to the people on board the U.S. Schooner to meet me with all possible expedition in S.¹ George's Sound.- Thus ended this disagreeable business alarming because we had Savages to deal with. - It was to my party, (who a few days before we had been declared useless), that both camps were indebted for their safety, and public and private property to a considerable amount, together with a great number of valuable papers, and important documents, were preserved. - The Spanish party was too small to make even the shew of resistance, those few however behaved with great firmness, to which I must add that it is my opinion that the Spanish Commissioner, and his party are as much in the dark respecting the conduct of the indians, as we were, and if any thing improper has been done by other officers of his Catholic Majesty, it has been kept secret from them.

“There may perhaps be some light thrown upon the subject by the following facts. - *First* in May last Major Minor received instructions from Gov.^f Gayoso to dismiss his escort on his arrival at the Chat, ta, ho, cha, and return himself to Pensacola, and wait there til he could be furnished with a passport from the Bahama Islands, that he might be enabled to go with safety round Florida Point, to S.¹ Mary's by water.- That their surveyor should go by land, and carry on an east line till it intersected the Appalachy, after which he should proceed on to the source of S.¹ Mary's. After that point was determined, the work might be considered as complete. - These instructions were shewn separately to Co.¹ Hawkins, and myself, What the Col.^o comments on them were I know not.- Upon the Majors asking my opinion, I answered nearly as follows.- ‘I do not wonder at Gov.^f Gayosos giving those instructions, I only wonder how he came to think of them!- That delay appeared yet to be in contemplation. - which was evident by his the Majors being directed to return to Pensacola and wait for a Bahama passport, and the Gov.^f appeared contented with having an East line carried on till it intersected the Appalachy, a piece of business wholly inconnected [*sic*] with ours, and embracing an absurdity, because

in all probability an east line would pass a number of miles north of the source of the Appalachy.' - The Major was not pleased with the instructions, and wrote to Gov.^r Gayoso on the subject, who dispensed with that part relative to his returning to Pensacola to wait for a passport and the Surveyor carrying on the East line. - his directions relative to the Military escort were certainly improper, it was a subject which by the Treaty ⁴² rested with the Commissioners. - *Secondly* the two Indians which Gov.^r Folch informed Co.^l Hawkins and myself were Seminoles, were two Tallassees, and brothers in law to his interpreter Antonio.- *Thirdly* Instead of going to the Seminoles they returned home to their own town.- *Fourthly* Immediately after their return the Tallesee King, with about 200 of his people proceeded to Pensacola, and menaced our surveyor and his party. Of their proceedings at Pensacola, I have already given you an account.- *Fifthly* the Party who came down to plunder us were a part of those who came to Pensacola with the Tallesee King. *Sixthly* Gov. Folch last June promised Co.^l Hawkins and myself, that he would send agents among the Indians, particularly to the Seminoles to quiet their minds.-this he has not done! *Seventhly* The information given to Mr. Seagrove ⁴³ by the Indians relative to the design of the U.S. and Spain upon their persons, and lands, which they say they had from the Commandant at S.^t Marks, ⁴⁴ does not appear to be true so far as it respects that officer; but is certainly so with regard to the Interpreter.- This I have from M.^r Lawrence, one of M.^r Panton's clerks, who was present at the time of the conference.-

42. A reference to the Treaty of San Lorenzo (Pinckney's Treaty) of 1795.

43. Seagrove was American agent to the Creeks from 1791. Daniel M. Smith, "James Seagrove and the Mission to Tuckaubatchee, 1793," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, XLIV (March 1960), 41-55.

44. Commandant of St. Marks was Thomas Antonius Ignatius Guillelmus Portell, born in Gerona, Cataluna (Spain) on February 12, 1739. He fought during the African campaigns of Oran and Algiers and in the siege of Gibraltar before coming to America in 1780. Named commandant of New Madrid in 1791, he was transferred in 1796 to the command of St. Marks. His surrender of the fort to Bowles on May 19, 1800, received newspaper publicity, an angry retort by Portell, and his subsequent court-martial and dismissal from the army. Jack D. L. Holmes, ed., *Documentos ineditos para la historia de la Luisiana, 1792-1810* (Madrid, 1963), 111, fn; A. P. Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803*. . . . (New York, 1934), 169-70; *South-Carolina State Gazette and Timothy's Daily Advertiser*, March 11, 1800.

Eighthly had the officers of his Catholic Majesty been as careful in having agents with the indians to cooperate with ours, in keeping up a good understanding, and allaying their fears, and suspicions.-our business would have been completely successful. ⁴⁵

- *Ninthly* The injudicious circulation of the reports respecting the escape of M.^r Bowles, and his design of coming into this country, has had a panicious [pernicious?] effect.- *Tenthly* The Indians complain that the Spaniards are already marking out their land near Pensacola, and when they remonstrated against it, they received for answer.- 'You have already been told that when the line was run, the land on the south side of it would belong to Spain, and that on the other side of it to the U.S.'- This is indian information and tho it may be false in the first instance, the effect is equally bad with those who now believe it.

"The foregoing statement of facts was drawn up at the mouth of the Chattaho, cha, whilst some of my people were repairing the rigging of the vessel; at the moment I closed the last paragraph, two letters were put into my hands, which appeared of considerable importance, and induced me to write

"Particularly to Co.^l Hawkins, a copy of the letter is inclosed and marked A which likewise incloses copies of the letters alluded to, with a copy of a letter of mine to Gov.^r Folch.

"In consequence of the arrival of M.^r Bowles in the Nation, I am of the opinion that no more can be done at present in completing the boundary, than to discover the source of the S.^t Mary's and determine its Latitude, and Longitude correctly, the position of the mouth of Flint River being already fixed, and at some future day, those points may be joined.

"My Astronomical Journal at our two last points is very lengthy or I should have sent on a copy of it.- I have taken a survey of the Chat, ta, ho, che, from the 31st Degree of North Latitude down to the mouth of Flint river the Latitude of which is 30° 42' 42.8" so that part of the Southern Boundary of the U.S. extends at least 17' 17.2" South of 31 Degree of N. Latitude.

45. Ellicott is in error. Gayoso ordered the frontier officers to do all they could to allay Indian fears over the boundary commission and even authorized the use of force against them if necessary to protect Spain's commitments to the United States on the southern frontier. Gayoso to Minor, June 6, 1798, and Gayoso to Prince of Peace (Manuel Godoy), No. 22, June 6, 1798, Archivo Historico Nacional Madrid, Spain, Seccion de Estado, legajo 3900.

"I have just learned with great satisfaction that M.^r Gillespie has completed the correction between the Chatta, ho, cha and the Co, e, ne, cuh and joined the party on the way to S.^t Mary's.- Several more Horses have been taken.

"My passage from the mouth of Chatta,ho,cha to this place was truly disagreeable, being part of the time at sea, in an open boat, and detained 13 days by a violent easterly wind on dry Islands of sand, which was blown about like snow filled our Blanketts, and fell in great quantities in what little victuals we had, which for seven days was dry bread and coffee except what few fish were caught.- On my arrival at this place which was on the morning of the 7.th- I was informed that the Indians had taken my riding horses, which I directed to be sent here that I might still have it in my power to proceed thro' the country by the way of S.^t Augustine if it should appear the most eligible.- I have now no alternative left.- One of the horses is a remarkable fine one and perhaps not inferior to any one in the two Floridas.

"The Southern Creeks, commonly called Seminoles, with the Tallesees and some individuals in the Upper Towns are certainly hostile towards the U.S. and nothing but the firm language of our Executive will prevent a war with them if encouraged by M.^r Bowles. - But I am far from being certain what part he will act.

"I know he dreads a war with our Country, but his ambition may get the better of his prudence, and if that should be the case, many of the young men who are under no controul from their Chiefs, and panting for war names will certainly join him.- Neither have I any faith in their being restrained by the officers of his Catholic Majesty agreeably to Treaty.

"They have not been educated in the habits of candour and plainness like our Hawkins, whose indefatigable exertions have been equally directed to the Benefit of both Nations.- Many of the most sensible and best informed of the Chiefs, look upon the loss of their Country as inevitable, and that it will be brought about by the bad conduct of their young men, who equally abhor restraint and despise advice, such people are only brought to reflection by being beaten - and as we have men enough underpay at present, it might probably be done now, and at a less expence than at any future period.

"This instant 8 o'clock in the evening of the 8th two of my men who were three miles up the river, at M.^r Pantons store, with his people, arrived being driven away by the Indians, the valuable property had been previously brought in to the Fort.- We prepared to defend the vessel.

"The Indians began the war whoops in the morning and we frequently bear it at this time.- I am not certain whether it is the Spaniards or our party or both that are the objects of their dislike. I have five Cowetas with me, who continue firm, they conceive themselves in much danger.

"At 9 o'Clock a piece of artillery was discharged at an indian. - I have only to add that we have been politely received and hospitably treated by the commandant of this Fort, whose protection if necessary I am sure we may rely on. . . .

"P.S. Oc.^{br} 12.th The Indians have been quiet for two days and propose a conference in a day or two." ⁴⁶

The experiences of Ellicott, Minor, and the members of the boundary commission are worthy of noting. Within a year Bowles would strike at Fort San Marcos and, with his Seminole allies, capture it. Although a Spanish expedition would be able to recapture the post and take Bowles prisoner, the Seminoles had been aroused. ⁴⁷ The rapidly growing Seminole hostility toward white men, particularly Americans, was generated by their reaction to the joint boundary commission at the Chattahoochee in 1799.

46. Ellicott to Secretary of State, October 9, 1799, original and duplicate in Ellicott, *Southern Boundary*, III.

47. Contemporary newspapers were filled with stories about Bowles and the Seminoles. See the *Columbian Museum and Savannah Advertiser*, January 21, 1800; *The Augusta Chronicle and Gazette of the State*, January 25, 1800; *Savannah Georgia Gazette*, May 29, 1800. Governor Enrique White of East Florida wrote of Bowles' arrival to Panton, November 20, 1799, Panton-Forbes Papers, Special Collections, Mobile Public Library; and Commander-in-chief-of-Engineers Joaquin de la Torre proposed firm defenses against Bowles, [1800], AGI, Cuba, legajo 1659. In all these accounts, the role of the Seminoles is clearly seen.

BOOK REVIEWS

Indian River: Florida's Treasure Coast. By Walter R. Hellier.
(Coconut Grove: Hurricane House Publishers, 1965. xii, 128
pp. Foreword, illustrations, map. \$4.95, paperback \$2.95.)

Two recent developments have turned the fierce spotlight of publicity on the Indian River Country and have threatened to rearrange its history in short order. Prior to this generation of hustle and bustle the hundred miles of the Atlantic coast from Titusville, once called Sand's Point, south to St. Lucie Inlet was best known for its quiet tranquility and natural beauty. First came the missile test center, later the whole complex of space probing activities at Cape Canaveral, which became Cape Kennedy, and the rapid industrial development of the region, causing the end of the old slow and easy-going days, and much rearrangement of the old familiar landscape. Partly because of the capital and skills accumulated at the Cape, treasure hunters using modern techniques began to hunt for the remains of Spanish ships sunk on the reef. Their spectacular finds gave nationwide publicity to an ancient part of the history of the coast when Spanish treasure ships made their way along this coast to a point near the Cape from which they turned homeward across the Atlantic.

The author concentrates upon more recent events. Indian lore, including the Seminole War which resulted in some exploration of the region, some dramatic episodes, and some place names, receives relatively little space. Tribute is rightfully paid to the Dummitts, father and son, and the establishment of the Dummitt Grove on Merritt Island early in the nineteenth century. This orange grove, one of the many that far north, survived the big freezes of the winter 1894-1895, to become the source of much stock for replanting. In some thirteen pages the reader finds himself able to reach Titusville by railroad which marks the beginning of the modern era for that and all other settlements along the right of way of the Florida East Coast Railroad which reached Miami in 1896 and Key West in 1912.

Thereafter Mr. Hellier, who came to Fort Pierce in 1903 at the age of fourteen tells the story of the settlements along that

hundred mile stretch. He relies chiefly upon first hand accounts of pioneers and their descendants and thereby does his greatest service to history. Here are related tales of steamboat days as well as early railroading. Growing pineapples, commercial fishing, boating (freight and passenger) and generally catering to a growing army of tourists, with some vegetable and fruit growing, constituted the basis of the economy until World War II and its aftermath began to transform the land and the life of its people.

Scratch a native Floridian anywhere along this coast and one is likely to uncover a treasure hunter at heart if not in fact. In spite of this and the subtitle of the book, "Florida's Treasure Coast," this subject does not receive disproportionate attention. Chalk up another contribution to the growing number of local studies that will one day make possible an entirely new and different history of Florida.

CHARLTON W. TEBEAU

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The Memoire Justificatif of the Chevalier Montault de Monberaut: Indian Diplomacy in British West Florida, 1763-1765. Translated and Introduced by Milo B. Howard, Jr. and Robert R. Rea. (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1965. 187 pp. Foreword, introduction, notes, index. \$5.95.)

The inter-colonial transfer of Florida from Franco-Spanish to British control, 1763-1764, was complicated by a number of international and Indian issues. Many of the international problems passed away with the French and Spanish migrations to Havana, New Orleans, and Vera-Cruz. As Franco-Spanish supremacy over the Florida peninsula and gulfcoast ceased with the Paris Peace Treaty of 1763, the new British provinces were primarily concerned with the pacification of the indigenous population and the settlement of English colonists in the recently acquired areas. All future settlement of Florida required peaceful Indian relations, especially in this era of the "Pontiac conspiracy" in the northern colonies. Chevalier Montault de Monberaut, former French commander of Fort Toulouse and famous Indian negotiator, thus received requests from the British colonial ad-

ministration to assist His Britannic Majesty in the arrangement of congresses and treaties with the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks.

Chevalier Montault de Monberaut agreed to serve the colonial government of Great Britain, and the French resident of Mobile thereafter became Deputy Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the Province of West Florida. After only a few months of service, Montault de Monberaut helped organize the 1765 Indian congresses at Mobile and Pensacola. At the end of six months of employment, the deputy superintendent and his English employers negotiated peace pacts with the Indian peoples of West Florida; the Indian treaties included generous land cessions to the new southern colony. Montault de Monberaut was subsequently relieved of his commission with the West Florida administration.

The *Memoire Justificatif* is an enlightening contemporary account of Indian affairs in West Florida in the first two years of English occupation. This memorial which is splendidly introduced and translated, also presents a fascinating story of Franco-British cooperation and conflict on the colonial frontier. Finally, Chevalier Montault de Monberaut's report to the British crown inadvertently provides a detailed portrait of frontier life in Florida at the middle of the eighteenth century.

Actually, the *Memoire Justificatif* is Chevalier Montault de Monberaut's dossier and service record for George III of England. It is also his convincing refutation of the charges made against him by Governor George Johnstone of West Florida concerning his employment in the British colonial government; the long refutation includes his interesting correspondence with the officialdom of West Florida and British America, as well as speeches to the 1765 Indian congresses. Finally, this memorial offers an unusual insight into an eighteenth-century man, mind, and age.

ROBERT L. GOLD

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Battlefield and Classroom: Four Decades with the American Indian, 1867-1904. By Richard Henry Pratt. Edited with an introduction by Robert M. Utley. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. xix, 358 pp. Maps, illustrations, introduction, index. \$7.50.)

This is the reminiscence of Richard Henry Pratt, dictated by him at the age of eighty-two. His age and probable failure of memory might make the value of his words questionable, except that the most telling parts of the book are sustained by contemporary correspondence. Pratt served throughout the Civil War, and thenceforth was a professional soldier until his death, at eighty-four. In 1867 he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Tenth U. S. Cavalry, a Negro regiment, and sent with it to serve upon the Indian frontier in the West. There he took part in the Washita Campaign of 1868 and in the subsequent conflicts which stemmed from the government's determination to confine the Indians to reservations.

Pratt's enduring significance arises from his unswerving belief in the ability of the two minority races, Indians and Negroes, with which he worked and fought, and he insisted that they must be desegregated and moved into the stream of American white-life. His belief extended itself into a crusade to educate Indian children so that they might migrate out of savagery and into civilization: "What brighter glory could shine from our national escutcheon than to give the native people we found here foremost privileges to become a part of our citizenry under our benign Declaration of Independence and Constitution!"

The story touches Florida twice. In the mid-1870s he was sent with Plains Indian prisoners to Ft. Marion (Castillo de San Marcos) at St. Augustine, and there served as their warden for three years. At this time, his idea of advancing the Indian through education first developed. In 1879 he was sent by the government to try to reestablish contact with the small band of Seminoles who remained in Florida.

Pratt received permission to educate some of his young prisoners, but the utmost concession the government could make was that the red pupils be segregated from white youths and paired with Negroes at Hampton Institute. This did not satisfy Pratt, but it was the best he could get and he accepted it. Here, as throughout his military life, he displayed the wonderful resilience sometimes found in professional soldiers. He could face the brutal realities of war and the "establishment," but at the same time could continue to await new opportunities and exploit them to advance a notch or two, meanwhile making do with what was at hand. Following this sort of tender-minded realism, he succeeded

in persuading the government to let him use the empty barracks at Carlisle as an Indian school. At this point, his narrative becomes exciting, even thrilling, because it relates the old, old fight, which never grows tiresome, against prejudice, vested interest, and greed. Pratt fought those ogres for the next twenty-seven years, and in the end made so many enemies that he was removed from the Carlisle school - but not before he had trained 4,903 Indian children from seventy-seven different tribes.

Some persons with humane instincts opposed him because of his theory. He wanted to eliminate the old savage Indian ways and meld the Indians into our "civilization." They wished to see the Indian culture, at least some of it, preserved as a thing in itself, and thus preferred that the redmen remain segregated from white society on reservations. The Bureau of American Ethnology apparently so believed, and Pratt considered it his nastiest foe. The Indian Bureau was a villain also, but less due to theory than to vested interest in the reservation system.

All in all, this is a noble and an exciting story. The reader nearly cheers out loud when he reads Pratt's sentence to President Hayes, no less, in March 1880: "Knowing as I do that I am supremely right, it would be wicked to falter, even though pressure to that end came in threats from the General of the Army." He never did falter, and so he is, or should be, in the hall of heroes of those who believe in equal opportunity. Readers of this same persuasion cannot fail to find inspiration in his book. Anyone can learn a good deal of useful history from it.

JOHN K. MAHON

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Baroness von Riedesel and the American Revolution: Journal and Correspondence of a Tour of Duty, 1776-1783. By Baroness von Riedesel. A revised translation with Introduction and Notes by Marvin L. Brown, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1965. xlvii, 222 pp. Illustrations, preface, maps, introduction, index. \$6.00.)

Baroness von Riedesel's journal and letters represent one of the more unique memoirs of the American Revolution; they were

written by a woman who was present on the battlefield, by a foreigner of noble birth who was keenly conscious of the social differences between her native Prussia and Brunswick and republican America, and by the only German wife with the mercenary forces serving under General John Burgoyne who had the presence of mind to record her impressions of the Saratoga campaign of 1777. While this account covers her activities from the time she left Brunswick in 1776 to join her husband in America until her return to Europe in 1783, most historians, no doubt, will be interested in the military aspects of her writings rather than in the social commentary. Daughter of a Prussian general, and wife of the commander of the Brunswick contingent in America, the Baroness felt qualified to comment upon military men and matters, and, in a way, her remarks constitute a history of the Saratoga campaign from a German point of view.

Leaving Brunswick with two small children and a new baby, the Baroness arrived in Quebec in June 1777, and set out by galley, carriage, and canoe to find her husband who was on the fighting front near Chambly. Eventually the two were reunited, and after some wifely pressure had been applied the Baroness was permitted to join Burgoyne's army on its advance toward Albany. As a result, she was an eye-witness at both battles at Saratoga. After the surrender at Saratoga, she followed her husband into captivity as the Convention Army moved from Massachusetts to Virginia. When General Riedesel was exchanged as a prisoner of war in 1780 and restored to active duty, his wife followed him. For six years she remained by her husband's side and the very length of time covered by her memoirs makes them a singular contribution.

Madame Riedesel's journal is especially intriguing for her comments on the military situation during the Saratoga campaign. Every American, she noted, "is a born soldier and good marksman; in addition, the thought of fighting for their country and for freedom made them braver than ever." Burgoyne's army, on the other hand, was incapable of keeping military secrets and "even the Americans were acquainted with all our plans in advance." Between the first and second battles of Saratoga, she described the soldiers in Burgoyne's army as singing and jolly, "burning with the desire for victory." Even after his army was

defeated and was attempting to retreat to Canada, Burgoyne spent "half the night singing and drinking and amusing himself in the company of the wife of a commissary, who was his mistress and, like him, loved champagne." The Baroness' bias against Burgoyne is pronounced and her remarks, while interesting, are not always accurate.

Madame Riedesel's journal sheds light on the manners and mores of eighteenth-century Americans. She notes on a number of occasions the respect accorded to her sex in this country, the hospitality extended to her and her family, and the different way in which various social classes reacted to the presence of a woman of noble blood. Like many foreign observers, she was impressed by the flora and fauna in America, the vastness of the country, and the interesting local customs of its inhabitants.

Her memoirs merit greater attention than they have received in the past. Marvin L. Brown, Jr. has provided an excellent new translation of her journal and included previously unpublished letters as well as portions of letters which were omitted from earlier editions. Although Brown is aware that Thomas Anburey's account of his tour of duty in America has plagiarized passages, he seems to have relied a bit too heavily on this work. But in the main, Brown has done his work well and reproduced an important primary source to which American historians will turn for many years to come.

GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS

Clark University

John Williams Walker: A Study in the Political, Social and Cultural Life of the Old Southwest. By Hugh C. Bailey. (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1964. 228 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. \$5.95.)

John Williams Walker was not the typical pioneer, but he was representative of a small group of men who moved to the southern frontier with considerable education and some wealth. These men, through their ability and wealth, quickly became the leaders of their communities and soon controlled the political life of the area.

Walker, born in Virginia and reared in Georgia, was educated at Waddell Academy and at Princeton University. In 1810 he married Matilda Pope, daughter of the well-known LeRoy Pope, and the young couple moved to Madison County in the Mississippi territory. A young lawyer of exceptional ability and with full membership in the politically experienced "Georgia faction," Walker soon came to have much influence in the area around Huntsville and in the territory. Although he was defeated in his race for the Mississippi territorial legislature in 1811, Walker gained the chance to succeed in politics with the creation of the Alabama territory in 1817. His friendship with men of national importance such as William Crawford moved him into immediate prominence. Walker was elected to the Alabama territorial legislature, where he played an active part. He gained fame by preparing the charter for a bank in Huntsville, increasing the militia, and supporting internal improvements. In the second legislative session, he was elected speaker of the house.

After being elected to the constitutional convention as a delegate from Madison County, Walker was unanimously elected president of the convention. Following this, he was elected first United States Senator from Alabama, being chosen by lot for the six-year term. While he served only one term in this office, Walker played significant parts in the Missouri Compromise, the acquisition of Florida, and the public land law of 1821. His most outstanding contribution in the Senate was his support of and additions to this land law. Walker's rapid rise to political fame came in spite of chronic ill health, but his career came to an abrupt end when he died in 1822 at the age of forty.

Dr. Bailey has written a readable account of an interesting and significant individual. The book, both well written and well organized, shows extensive research in manuscript materials. At first the reader may feel that too much time has been spent describing the numerous relatives and friends of the Walker family. However, as the book develops, it becomes apparent that a major basis of a political career in this period was indeed family connections and friends. The author tells his story well, although he assumes that the reader already has some knowledge of the political activity of the period. Dr. Bailey has made a contribution to the knowledge of the southern frontier and the work should be of interest to students of the South.

Slavery in the Cities: The South 1820-1860. By Richard Wade. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. x, 340 pp. Preface, bibliographic essay, notes, appendix, index. \$6.75.)

Slavery in the Cities represents a significant contribution to American historical research and scholarship because it illumines a much neglected dimension of "the peculiar institution." Most people identify slavery almost wholly within the warp and woof of the plantation system. The institution, however, was also part of the fabric of urban life almost from its inception in North America. "Every southern town and city had a large complement of slaves, and contemporaries considered them as much a part of the system as those who toiled in the fields or served in the mansion."

Professor Wade's book is neither a study of the rise of cities in the Old South nor is it a history of "the peculiar institution." Instead, it is a comprehensive treatment of essentially the problem of what happened to slavery in the South's urban environment and the texture of Negro slavery in its cities. The author's research demonstrates an assiduous and exhaustive examination of a variety of sources located chiefly in the cities themselves. These include court records, police dockets, real-estate conveyances, tax and assessment books, minutes of city councils, municipal ordinances, and local newspapers.

Wade's analysis centers on the principal cities of the South, and his reconstruction of the slave's daily life is vivid and lucid. The author achieves a rare balance between the range and scope in his coverage of subjects such as the slave's housing, conditions of employment, religious and social life, and the penalties and punishments suffered when he violated the rules which governed his actions and movements.

The fluctuations and changes in the slave population, patterns of ownership, and the imbalance between male and female slaves are some of the aspects of urban slavery which are brought into sharp relief in the period 1820-1860. In particular, the author asserts that a watershed occurred about 1840 relative to the variation in the speed and the extent of the growth of urban slavery. Prior to that time, urban slavery resembled the plantation system in that the incidence of ownership was high, the size of holdings

was often substantial, and the presumption of the institution's permanence was widespread. Professor Wade reveals that though slavery encountered some difficulties during this period, no one predicted, much less advocated its abandonment.

After about 1840, however, signs of change began to appear, and Wade discusses these changes and the reasons thereof with care, meaning, and insight. He analyzes the causes of the decline in the number of Negro slaves, the decrease in the number of ownerships, and the decrease in the size of holdings, and he concludes that the vitality of the system clearly was gone after 1840. Statistics are employed effectively to show the marked contrast between urban and rural slavery, but more importantly, the author penetrates beneath the statistical layer to the factors which produced this sharp cleavage between ways of living. He points out that the city created its own kind of world, with a pace, sophistication, and environment that separated it from rural modes. In the process, the city transformed the Negro as well as the white, slave no less than freeman.

Professor Wade provides ample evidence strongly supporting the contention that segregation began both legally and practically in the cities at least a decade before the Civil War. Lastly, and of paramount interest and significance, Professor Wade traces the beginnings of Negro leadership in the churches - a leadership that has proven so vital in the Negro's struggle for liberty and equality. The book affords rich and meaningful insights into this area of the America experience, particularly as they relate to present-day issues and problems.

ROBERT GOLDSTEIN

University of South Florida

The Mind of The Old South. By Clement Eaton. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. xii, 271 pp. Preface, illustrations, bibliographical essays, index. \$6.00.)

Clement Eaton is one who believes that history is primarily the story of people. In this latest work he attempts to trace the development of the southern mind through fifteen individuals who he thinks represented the major points of view of the southern mind of 1860. Only ten of these receive extended treatment

as symbolic of major traits: liberalism and radicalism (John Hartwell Cocke, Henry A. Wise, Cassius Marcellus Clay, Hinton Rowan Helper); narrow conservatism (James H. Hammond); romanticism (William Gilmore Simms); emotionalism (William Lowndes Yancey); the scientific mind (William Barton Rogers, Joseph Le Conte); and the commercial mind (Maunsel White).

One might take issue with Professor Eaton's assumption that "representative" men reflect the mass "mind" of any people but for several qualifications which he makes. He asserts that none of these men were completely typical or were consistent, and that their story is "largely a story of its representative men themselves being bent and warped by powerful economic and social forces." The forces which operated to bring a great deal of homogeneity to the southern mind were, as Eaton sees them: an exaggerated sense of honor, profound religious orthodoxy, intense attachment to local communities, extreme conservatism, intolerance of any questioning of slavery or orthodox religion, and a powerful race feeling. Two chapters not centering on great men, in which Eaton explores the yeoman and poor white mind and the evangelical, Calvinist, and genteel religious traditions, further document the widespread presence of these characteristics and values. To his credit, Eaton's work is to some degree comparative in that southern qualities are frequently portrayed in light of those of other parts of the country or of other parts of the world. Influences working upon the South were frequently found to be present in the North, leading Eaton to conclude that, "Regional traits are usually . . . an exaggeration or an understatement of certain aspects of national character, arising from the peculiar conditions of life within the smaller unit."

Florida history buffs will be disappointed in the paucity of references to their state. The only individuals to receive even passing notice are Richard Keith Call, for his ardent nationalism, and A. W. Chapman, for his studies of southern flora. Lack of interest in science in Florida was pointed up by reference to the fact that Florida and Louisiana alone among the southern states failed to conduct state geological surveys in the ante-bellum period. These few references, however, point up the real sterility of a raw frontier region for intellectual endeavor as well as the neglect by Florida scholars of what little such activity there was, rather than any neglect on Professor Eaton's part.

Clement Eaton today is one of the more respected practitioners of history working in the area of southern cultural history. Though this volume produces no surprises or major revisions of his earlier works, it is an example of sound, mature scholarship which will be a worthy addition to every bookshelf.

HERBERT J. DOHERTY, JR.

University of Florida

Jefferson Davis, Tragic Hero: The Last Twenty-Five Years, 1864-1889. By Hudson Strode. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. xx, 556 pp. Introduction, illustrations, sources, index. \$7.50.)

It is difficult to be objective in a review of Professor Strode's concluding volume on the life of Jefferson Davis primarily because objectivity is conspicuously absent throughout this and Strode's two previous volumes on the eminent southern statesman.

The fatal flaws of Strode's biography can be found in an introductory statement by the author. "Delving into the mind and heart of Jefferson Davis these past dozen years, and refusing to accept the stereotypes of former commentators, I have come to have such enormous respect and admiration for this misunderstood man that I may appear at times to lack objectivity."

Within this one sentence are a number of provocations: by his own admission the author at times forsakes the all-important ingredient necessary for any true historical work; Strode easily discounts the judgments of a host of historians - and this in spite of the fact that he himself is a professor emeritus of English, not of history; he offers no explanation of why commentators of old would and did arrive at "stereotype" analyses of Davis; admiration, while a commendable sentiment, can also be a dangerous motivation in the writing of biography.

Especially in this volume, which follows Davis from January 1864, to his death in December 1889, are the eulogistic weaknesses of Strode's presentation most pronounced. The author is obviously more interested in exonerating Davis than in explaining him. His narrative too often takes the form of idolatry rather than interpretation. Jefferson Davis - of all the leading figures in

the Civil War - most needs understanding; and in this era when glorification of Abraham Lincoln has accelerated to a detrimental pace, it should be apparent that the mantle Davis least needs is one of whitewash.

Strode claims to have had sole access to "almost a thousand private letters that no other historian or biographer has as yet seen." This new Davis collection, however, must be more quantitative than qualitative, for relatively few of the letters seem to have made their way into the narrative. But since the author did not annotate his study, we cannot know how much emphasis he placed on manuscript sources.

This volume doubtless will give new strength to the avid sect of Davis worshippers. At the same time, it should jar historians of the middle period into a fuller realization of the need for a well-researched, scholarly, and interpretive biography of an American patriot who regrettably remains an enigma.

JAMES I. ROBERTSON, JR.

Montana State University

The American Civil War: An English View. By Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley. Edited with an introduction by James A. Rawley. (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1964, xxxvii, 230 pp. Index. \$5.00.)

During the American Civil War, Garnet Joseph Wolseley expressed annoyance, as befitted a person from a nation rich in history and proud of the international reputation of its heroes, with the American propensity to inflate a backwoods skirmish into a decisive battle and puff up a very ordinary soldier with a plain sounding name into the proportions of a Wellington. If nothing else came from the war, it would, he predicted, give American historians a worthy subject. Wolseley himself contributed significantly to the literature of the war, and the present work is a compilation of his writings.

Wolseley, a veteran of many campaigns, had been sent to Canada during the "Trent" crisis. In the autumn of 1862, he slipped into the Confederacy, spent some time at Lee's headquarters, and subsequently published his impressions in an article

for *Blackwood's Magazine*. The article reveals the pro-southern sympathy common to one of his class and position. As a British officer, sensitive to the vulnerability of Canada, he saw advantages in the breakup of the American Union. Interestingly enough, in later life he modified this position and came to appreciate the importance to England and the world of a single, strong American republic.

The second article, written more than two decades after the war, is a valuable picture of Robert E. Lee as he appeared to a great British soldier. Lee was the very embodiment of Wolseley's "true hero." Dedicated, courageous, chivalrous, and God-fearing, he was, to the Englishman, the greatest soldier of his age, and "the most perfect man I ever met." One cannot help but notice the resemblance between Lee's background and the forces that shaped his life, especially the influence of his mother, and Wolseley's own early life.

The remainder of the book consists of his essays written for the *North American Review* as a review of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. The result is an instructive analysis. The articles aroused interest and provoked controversy then, and present-day readers will surely find them interesting and provocative. Some will find certain evaluations and conclusions unacceptable. In Wolseley's eyes, for example, Lincoln did rise from an "insignificant lawyer" (*Blackwood's*, 1863) to a "far-seeing statesman of iron will" (*MacMillan's Magazine*, 1887), but he never saw him as the master strategist depicted by T. Harry Williams.

The work includes a well-written and useful introduction; and Professor Rawley has performed a real service in drawing these articles together, enabling us to see the Civil War as it appeared to a contemporary foreign observer.

LAWRENCE E. BREEZE

Jacksonville University

Aboard the USS Monitor: 1862 - The Letters of Acting Paymaster William Frederick Keeler, U. S. Navy, to his Wife, Anna. Edited by Robert W. Daly. (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1964. xvii, 278 pp. Preface, introduction, appendices, diagrams, index. \$6.50.)

With the spate of Civil War literature which has poured upon the market within the past few years, both in new contributions and reissues, any offering in that field needs some special quality to commend it for notice. This book possesses such merit in abundance. The first of the Naval Letters Series of the U. S. Naval Institute, it contains the letters of William Frederick Keeler, an Illinois merchant converted into a naval officer as an Acting Assistant Paymaster to his wife during his service on the *USS Monitor*, the navy's first seagoing ironclad. The letters contain a fine blending of a homesick young fader and a proud and impressionable civilian turned naval officer, written without the consciousness of the audience which will read and evaluate his writing, and thus without the stilted posturing and banal acknowledgment of accepted opinions which too often accompany accounts intended for public consumption.

The letters detail service on the *Monitor* from its first day until its sinking off Cape Hatteras on New Year's eve, 1862, and full and vivid detail is given to its highly important encounter with its southern counterpart, the *Merrimac (Virginia)* at Hampton Roads on March 9, 1862.

Dr. Robert W. Daly of the U. S. Naval Academy is the editor of this volume, and he has inserted interesting and useful material at the appropriate position within the body of the letters themselves. This somewhat novel departure is a pleasant relief from the tedious practice of bobbing down to footnotes, or leafing to the proper reference in the rear portion of a book.

There is something in this book for everyone, even for historians and scholars interested in Florida history. Paymaster Keeler retired in 1869 to Mayport, Florida with his handsome disability pension of ten dollars a month, where he acted as deputy collector of customs, inspector of elections, auditor of post office funds, and even found time to garden. He wrote letters to Jacksonville's *Florida Times-Union*, and died of heart disease in 1886.

WILLIAM M. GOZA

Clearwater, Florida

Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment. By Willie Lee Rose. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964. xviii, 442 pp. Map, illustrations, notes on sources, appendix, index. \$6.50.)

This distinguished, well-written book, for which the author received the Allan Nevins History Prize in 1963, fills a gap in historical information. It is well known that when the federal fleet captured, and troops subsequently occupied Port Royal, South Carolina, the planters fled, leaving one of the largest cotton crops ever produced and more than 10,000 slaves. What happened to the Negroes - their sufferings, employment as free laborers on the abandoned plantations, enlistment and service in the United States Army, and transformation from slave to free citizens under federal guardianship and the guidance of abolitionists, missionaries, and teachers - is presented in detail for the first time in *Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment*.

The author, however, does more than present a well-documented account of the developments that weakened in many Negroes and shattered in others "The Old Allegiance." With rare perception and detachment, Mrs. Rose describes the slave's response to freedom, the effects of years of repression and submission on his personality, and the subtle changes that took place as he became a person instead of chattel under the new order inaugurated after northern occupation of the Sea Islands. Although there were generally few opportunities for slaves to develop their special talents, there were ways of getting around the master and there were independent spirits among the bondsmen.

The author also portrays the missionaries and teachers, the "Gideonites," who came to assist the freedmen but who "found themselves, almost in spite of themselves, in the same social relation to the Negroes that the late masters had occupied." With the same understanding and insight previously revealed, Mrs. Rose analyzes the conflicts that arose between the teachers and missionaries from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. The former were more evangelical than the latter and, since most Negroes were Baptist, the New Yorkers enjoyed a distinct advantage. This group also believed in extending maximum assistance to the Negro while the Bostonians were more businesslike. Despite the divisive

sectarian force, relief societies organized in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston rendered invaluable assistance to the freedmen and led to the formation of the Freedmen's Aid Union, the Freedmen's Inquiry Commission, and the Freedmen's Bureau.

Especially valuable are the chapters - "Confiscation, Publicity and Close Calculation," "Squatter Rights," or "Charitable Purposes"?, and "Plantation Bitters" - which consider efforts by the missionaries to provide Negroes with land, the various policies and plans advanced by the federal government to provide heads of families of the African race with small plots of land at \$1.25 per acre, the abandoned land policy, homestead and preemption, the confusion due to the zeal of the men who meant to help the Negro, and the disillusionment that ensued when former owners claimed their lands on which Negroes were settled. Indeed, what happened at Port Royal was in effect a rehearsal for Reconstruction, and Mrs. Rose has made an important contribution to the history of that era.

ELSIE M. LEWIS

Howard University

Southern Sketches from Virginia, 1881-1901. By Orra Langhorne. Edited by Charles E. Wynes. (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1964. xxxix, 145 pp. Illustrations, preface, bibliography, index. \$3.75.)

All but one of the selections in this book first appeared in the *Southern Workman*, a paper published by Hampton Institute in Virginia. The selections are rather brief for the most part, and are, for that reason, all the more readable. Although they mainly concern the status, living conditions, and progress of Negroes in Virginia during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, other topics are touched upon, and there are occasional glimpses into the ante-bellum past.

These excerpts from the published writings of Orra Langhorne reflect the views of a Virginia-born and bred gentlewoman who disapproved of slavery and who wanted to see Negroes as well as whites given the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Mrs. Langhorne was an ardent admirer of her fellow-Virginian, Thomas Jefferson. At one point she gives, through the

eyes of a Negro musician, an attractive glimpse of Jefferson as friend and mentor of a gifted Negro family.

Mrs. Langhorne's maiden name was Orra Henderson Moore Gray. She was born on March 8, 1841, in Rockingham County just outside the town of Harrisonburg in the Shenandoah Valley. In 1859 she graduated from Hollins Institute, now Hollins College. She was a young woman of twenty when her father, Algernon Gray, pleaded the Union cause at the Virginia secession convention. His stand made him fear for his life, and he went to live in Baltimore. Before he left, he voluntarily freed many of his slaves and sent them to Ohio.

During the war, Orra helped care for the sick and wounded in Harrisonburg. After the war, she wrote to the president of Hampton Institute, asking admission for several former slaves of her family. Her interest in Hampton Institute continued, and in time she became a regular contributor to its paper, the *Southern Workman*.

In 1871 Orra Gray married Thomas Nelson Langhorne of Lynchburg, Virginia. Many of the columns that she wrote for the *Southern Workman* were penned while she was traveling back and forth by train from Lynchburg to Harrisonburg, with occasional stopovers in Charlottesville or Lexington. She took advantage of these trips to talk with fellow passengers, often Negro passengers. In that way she was able to increase the fund of information she had gained by living in different places in Virginia. Her articles, as the book's editor points out in an introduction, "were a faithful record of the contemporary social and economic status of Virginia as seen through the eyes of a woman of extraordinary insight, perceptivity, and toleration."

The selections have the charm, but transitory quality, of day-to-day impressions. There is, however, one searching essay in the book called "Changes of a Half-Century in Virginia." This essay was presented as a paper before the American Social Science Association on May 10, 1900. It is a seasoned, flavorful reflection on years through which she had lived in the state she loved so much.

MARY LOUISE FAGG

Jacksonville, Florida

Defender of the Faith, William Jennings Bryan: The Last Decade, 1915-1925. By Lawrence W. Levine. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. ix, 386 pp. Illustration, bibliographic note, index. \$7.50.)

As an act of conscience William Jennings Bryan resigned as Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State in the summer of 1915; as an act of conscience a decade later Bryan likewise undertook the harrowing confrontation with Clarence Darrow in the symbolic and sensational Scopes Trial. Professor Levine's study derived primarily from the Bryan papers and of necessity, therefore, a review of the man's public career, skillfully concentrates on the essential consistency of one of the country's most beloved and most caricatured sectional leaders through the last ten years of his life, a period, according to Levine, during which subsequent images of Bryan tended to become fixed. Never divorced in these years from a political milieu, Bryan retained deep emotional, although they were hardly deep intellectual, commitments to a gamut of traditional American causes. He continued the ardent championing of pacifism, prohibition, majority rule, Christian morality, and the virtues, indeed, the primacy of the so-called rural way of life.

Yet involved as he was, his career withered and grew anomalous precisely because, as Levine suggests, he kept faith with a segment of America which during the first quarter of this century began to appear increasingly defensive, parochial, moralistic, and disfunctional. One of the "old Americans" but scarcely much of an inner-directed one, Bryan was satisfied to represent rather than to lead. Preeminently democratic, he was quite consciously the captive of his narrowing environment, too much so to be able either to plumb the main currents of change or to grasp the alternatives or perspectives which it posed. Bryan and his rural constituencies worked for the expansion of an America that was pacific, dry, progressive, and godly in a century in which events appear to have made a mockery of each; for many, in fact, the century seemingly mocks the very state of mind that produced each of these social phenomena. The Pentagon, a pervasive wetness, the smugness and complacency of the social scene through the fifties and early sixties, the ready expediency of Mr. Johnson's peculiarly American style of politics, or the billboard moralisms disfiguring highways might all partially suffice as modern counter-

points to Bryanism at its best. At its worst Bryanism was mawkish, superficial, sententious, intolerant, and, as Levine has shown, it was not devoid of ordinary political expediency. Somehow, as the author suggests, Bryan failed properly to gauge the thrust of new forces or new standards, many of which were so transparent between 1915 and 1925. Change which affronted him he simplistically classified as mere aberration or as the machination of venal interests or petty cliques. Bryan's provincial world, shaped in the relative homogeneity of rural towns and their immediate settings, suffered from the attrition of its old critique and was left to substitute slogans and devils for complexities. For the "luxury of his faith," Levine feels that Bryan paid a very high price; by sticking to his principles the standard-bearer of '96 risked becoming irrelevant, a nuisance, or a clown; he risked cavorting in a world redrawn to suit his self-deceptions. Had Bryan and his followers carried a presidential election one wonders what price the country might have paid for rural and sectional leadership feeding on simplicities, moralisms, and delusions, stamped by Bryan's peculiar combination of reform and reaction, and yet obliged to lead a plural community.

Conceived principally as a biographical account, Mr. Levine's study far more capably confirms this reviewer's impressions of Bryan than it contributes much that is strikingly new; the confirmation, however, is extremely useful. In his minor excursions aimed at unraveling some of the enigmas of South and West in the years after 1918, Mr. Levine, still scholarly and engaging, is perhaps less successful. Overall the book is a fine summary statement of Bryan's career.

C. K. YEARLEY, JR.

University of Florida

F. D. R. and the South. By Frank Freidel. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. x, 102 pp. Preface. \$3.25.)

One of the anomalies of southern politics was the immense popularity of the liberal Yankee, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Yet the South's role in the New Deal and in twentieth century liberalism has drawn only passing attention. Frank Freidel provides more

material for such a study in his 1964 Walter L. Fleming lectures at Louisiana State University. Published as *F. D. R. and the South*, Freidel applies his wealth of research and careful writing to a southern agrarian setting.

Freidel's interpretive study maintains that President Roosevelt drew from the South almost as much as he gave her. His initial affection for Warm Springs, Georgia, deepened during the 1930s. He saw the ugliness of despair and depression first hand in his "cracker" neighbors. The recognition that the economic plight of people denied them education, culture, and a better life was driven home during his trips south. Even the Tennessee Valley Authority resulted partly from Roosevelt's concern about Georgia's outrageous utility rates. As president, F.D.R. chose to work through southern congressional committee chairmen, and from them he learned that politics is an art and that procedure and decorum sometimes count for much.

Roosevelt's affection was returned in kind. Something of his rugged determination to overcome a seemingly hopeless obstacle, and his quick humor and simple tastes won most Southerners. To Roosevelt, poor folks were more than an abstraction, and he conversed with uneducated "crackers" and made them feel important. Only the Negro divided the president from the whole South, and F. D. R. breached the problem by largely ignoring white supremacy in order to eliminate the poverty which plagued both races.

The most ironic and contemporary theme of this short volume depicts a South, loyal to its old traditions, but caught in economic stagnation and desperately desiring federal help. To join the nation economically meant abandoning her treasured shibboleths, and Roosevelt made this momentous transition as painless as possible for the South. It is in examining this confounding dilemma that Freidel makes his greatest contribution, and if the author spends almost all his time on Georgia, it hardly lessens the impact of the book.

WAYNE FLYNT

Howard College

Mr. Crump of Memphis. By William D. Miller. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. xiii, 373 pp. Illustrations, critical essay on authorities, index. \$6.75.)

This is an insightful biography of the man who "bossed" Memphis and Shelby County with astonishing effectiveness for over a generation; it is also a running history of Memphis and of state politics, because for a time Crump's lop-sided majorities in Shelby County made and unmade Tennessee governors, as Tom Watson had once made and unmade Georgia governors.

In some ways Crump was closer to the church-business "respectables," so distasteful to Lincoln Steffens, than he was to the stereotype of the big-city boss. Crump was a moral absolutist and thundered the eternal verities like a prophet of old. He had a bookkeeper mentality, and he hated waste, disorder, and inefficiency as passionately as a John D. Rockefeller. Public officials were made to work as hard as employees in private industry and were forbidden to take any personal favors of value. There were no rake-offs, no kick-backs, no levies on vice. Crump's own highly successful insurance and brokerage firm did no business at all with the city or county government. Rowdy Memphis, of river-front and Beale Street fame, was "cleaned up," and the vagrants, beggars, and whores driven to cover. Crump was close with the taxpayer's dollar; the tax rate was kept low; mounting government costs were financed through bond issues. All of this was vastly pleasing to the church folks, local businessmen, and national business concerns seeking cheap power, low transportation costs, a "stabilized" labor market, and a "settled" political climate.

But there was another Crump, more in line with the big-city bosses who aligned themselves with the underprivileged. Crump entered politics in the Progressive era as the "red-snapper," doing battle with the privately-owned public utilities; and he never lost his suspicions of them. He built parks and playgrounds; widened health, educational, and other social services; insisted that the Negroes, on a segregated basis, be given their fair shares. Gambling and prostitution were quarantined but not suppressed, and Crump opposed Sunday blue laws. He also vigorously opposed prohibition and the Ku Klux Klan, and he championed Al Smith against the bigots. Despite the anguish of the cotton brokers of Front Street, Crump went down the line for the New Deal to the

very day of Roosevelt's death, and in its early stages he was probably the most effective advocate of TVA in Tennessee. Although local business was always Crump's most important support, he had effective tie-ins with the A. F. L. unions (but not the C. I. O.), the Baptists, the Catholics, the Jews, and the Negroes; and his concern for the interests of these various groups was concrete and sincere.

Like the traditional bosses, Crump put first emphasis on meticulous organization; he had a prodigious memory for names, faces, and detailed personal connections; he was absolutely loyal to his friends and ruthless to his enemies; and he made a great show of benevolence - although in his case he derived a boyish delight in the boat-rides, picnics, and junkets for his organization cronies and for the kiddies, the oldsters, and the poor.

Although Crump never lost his hold on Memphis and the county, and most residents could make no sense of the charges that he was a "dictator," his last years were frustrating. He was growing more conservative; his realism recoiled at federalized "racial equalitarianism"; his candidates for the governorship and the Senate lost state-wide in 1948; and his long-time co-worker, Senator Kenneth McKellar, was defeated for reelection in 1952. Accustomed to "getting even," Crump suddenly found his old-style, personalized, flamboyant statements and paid advertisements in the local and state press no match for the national press, which depicted him as a reactionary, a racist, and a despot. But now, in death, Crump has again had "the last say"; he has found in Professor Miller a fair, objective, perceptive, and on balance sympathetic biographer.

At the author's touch, Crump comes vividly to life - a combination of Old South courtliness and Redneck demagogue, of methodical practicality and swelling city pride, of iron will and sentimentality, of extroverted showmanship and introverted hypochondria.

WILLIAM G. CARLETON

University of Florida

A *History of Georgia Agriculture, 1732-1860*. By James C. Bonner. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1964. xvii, 242 pp. Preface, notes, selected bibliography, index. \$6.00.)

The principal theme throughout this volume is man's age-long struggle to wrest a living from the soil. Instead of depicting the average Georgia farmer as either an affluent planter or a landless laborer, the author shows that a majority of the farmers were practical men striving to succeed.

In making this noteworthy contribution to the history of southern agriculture, Dr. Bonner has used a wide variety of sources, including official state records, archival materials, travel accounts, agricultural journals, plantation records, newspapers, and diaries. Most of the study came from widely scattered and unclassified sources, all of which appear in the footnotes. The author was perspective in his analyses, and by the proficient use of his materials he has produced a monograph which should interest the general public as well as the historian.

The contents of the book are arranged in a combination of the chronological and topical procedure. After describing the futile attempts of the Georgia Trustees to create a utopia in which slavery and large land grants were forbidden and the disappointing endeavors to cultivate silk and other exotic commodities, the author traces the introduction and disappearance of rice as a major crop along the Georgia coast. By 1830 the state's center of population, wealth, and political influence had shifted to middle Georgia, the heart of the upland cotton belt. Subsequently this area, with its counterpart in southwestern Georgia and in the valleys of north Georgia, provides the main setting for the story of Georgia agriculture. Soil exhaustion caused a heavy emigration to lands west of the state, partially counterbalanced by immigration from states north and east of Georgia. The search for knowledge about new crops and the striving for economic self-sufficiency by experimenting with agricultural diversification and soil conservation are subjects that are fully treated. The last chapters discuss the quest for grasses and improved livestock, the expansion of horticulture, architectural trends, and finally "Cotton, Corn, and Slavery."

The reviewer was impressed by the constant experiments of Georgians with many species of field crops, fruits, vines, and cattle to determine what plants and animals could be produced profitably in the climate and soils of the state. Efforts were made to secure improved tools and better methods of soil culture. In the late ante-bellum period, agricultural societies were formed and five farm journals were established.

The concluding pages contain a survey of plantation slavery in Georgia during the 1850s. Motivated by both economic and humane considerations, most of the slaveholders improved the working conditions and general welfare of their slaves. Even native-born Northerners, transplanted to farm life in Georgia, found much to commend in the practice of slavery in the waning years of its existence.

For one who desires knowledge concerning early agrarianism in the Southeast, *A History of Georgia Agriculture* is the book to read. Here a highly competent research scholar has separated the facts from traditional assumptions.

T. CONN BRYAN

Western Carolina College

HISTORICAL NEWS

The Annual Meeting

The 1966 annual meeting of the Florida Historical Society will be held in Clearwater at the Lagoon Motel on May 6 and 7. The Board of Directors will meet on the evening of May 5. The chairman of the program committee is Dr. James W. Covington of the University of Tampa. Several papers will be read. William Goza and Milton D. Jones of Clearwater are in charge of arrangements.

Tampa Bay Hotel Diamond Jubilee

The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Tampa Bay Hotel (now the University of Tampa) was noted in ceremonies held in Tampa on January 22, 1966. Florida veterans of the Spanish-American War were guests of honor at the rededication of the Spanish-American War cannon. State Representative Sam Gibbons spoke on this occasion. The hotel building was renamed Henry Bradley Plant Hall in honor of its founder. Mrs. A. Sidney Roberts of Palm Beach, Plant's great-granddaughter, was present as guest of honor. On January 31, the Rough Riders Room was dedicated in honor of Colonel Theodore Roosevelt who stopped at the hotel in 1898 while en route to the fighting in Cuba. Morris White, prominent Tampa attorney and a member of the Board of Directors of the Florida Historical Society, received an honorary degree from Tampa University on the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee.

National Library Week

Warren H. Pierce of the *St. Petersburg Times* was state chairman of National Library Week celebrated April 17-23. In Florida, the occasion was used to focus attention on the needs of Florida's libraries. The Florida Library Association's president is Miss Margaret Chapman, executive secretary and librarian of the Florida Historical Society. The Florida Library Association's goals include local library service available to every resident within fifteen minutes of his residence, a large library source in an hour's

drive, and a resource center within a day's round trip from his home.

According to Florida Library Association statistics, only seven of Florida's 138 libraries have a book collection of over 1,000. One out of every five citizens has no public library service. Statewide, libraries have less than one book per capita while minimum standards set by the American Library Association call for at least two. Personnel, both professional librarians and clerical staff, are inadequate; only forty-three libraries in Florida have sufficient staff to meet minimum standards. At least 2,000 trained librarians are needed in Florida today to provide adequate service.

Honorary chairman of this year's National Library Week was James W. Walter, board chairman of the Jim Walter Corporation of Tampa. Miss Julia L. Schwartz of the University of South Florida Library was executive director of the educational campaign in Florida.

Local and Area Societies and Commissions

Bradford County Historical Society: A group of interested Bradford County citizens met in February 1966 to organize the Bradford County Historical Society. County Judge T. A. Yawn was named chairman, and he is being assisted by Eugene Matthews, Mrs. Fremont Tolles, and Connie Clark. The membership hopes to encourage the study and preservation of the rich history associated with its area of Florida.

Clay County Historical Society: Recently organized, the Clay County Historical Society held a meeting on February 17 at the Women's Club in Green Cove Springs. Residents of Green Cove Springs, Orange Park, and Doctors Inlet organized the society in January. Mrs. Virginia Denton was named temporary chairman. Mrs. Joe Hayes, Green Cove Springs Junior High School art instructor, presented a program using photographic slides of the area at the meeting.

Florida Anthropological Society: The Florida Anthropological Society held its annual one-day meeting on February 19 on the Clearwater campus of the St. Petersburg Junior College. Among

those giving papers at this conference were James Covington, University of Tampa; L. Ross Morrell, state archaeologist; David White, R. Smith, P. Stacy, D. Phelps, Florida State University; William Verity, Fort Lauderdale; Carl J. Clausen, state underwater archaeologist; Ripley P. Bullen, Florida State Museum; D. Bartels, Fernandina; Charles H. Fairbanks, University of Florida; Charlton W. Tebeau, University of Miami; C. Hoffman, Florida Atlantic University; and Charles W. Arnade, University of South Florida.

Dr. Arnade is president of the Florida Anthropological Society. Dr. William H. Sears, Florida Atlantic University, was chairman of the nominating committee.

Jacksonville Historical Society: The society held two important meetings during February 1966. On February 9, Dr. Charles H. Fairbanks, head of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Florida, discussed "Spanish Gold from Florida Waters" at the regular program meeting. Dr. Fairbanks, editor of the *Florida Anthropologist* and assistant editor of *American Antiquity*, has been serving as advisor to the Jacksonville Historical Society's archaeological program. Dr. Fairbanks used color slides to illustrate the treasure that is being salvaged off Fort Pierce. The second program, February 16, was a special showing of early films of Jacksonville and Duval County in the screening room of the Florida Theatre Building.

Martin County Historical Society: Both the Elliott Museum and the House of Refuge Museum continue active and varied programs. In addition to many visitors, the museums, operated by the Martin County Historical Society, have received a number of church, school, and Scout groups so far this year. On December 31, 1965, the society was host to the participants of the Florida Science Study Program. Fifteen science teachers and 120 honor students, representing seventy schools in seven states, were present.

Palm Beach County Historical Society: Ralph Renick described early Miami and Miami Beach at the December meeting of the society. At the January meeting, Dr. Richard D. Mudd of Saginaw, Michigan, grandson of Dr. Samuel D. Mudd, was the

speaker. He discussed the subject "Dr. Mudd-Conspirator or Good Samaritan?" At the program meeting on March 24, 1966, Colonel Harry E. Cannon, U. S. Air Force (Ret.), of Melbourne, spoke on "Spanish Gold From Florida Waters."

The Board of Governors of the Palm Beach County Historical Society and Mrs. Marjorie Merriweather Post honored the directors of the Florida Historical Society at a reception at Mar-a-Lago, Mrs. Post's Palm Beach home, on Saturday, February 12. The officers and directors of the society were in Palm Beach for their regular winter business meeting. They met at "Whitehall," the Henry Morrison Flagler Museum.

Peace River Valley Historical Society: Among the speakers at recent meetings of the Peace River Valley Historical Society have been the Honorable J. Hardin Peterson of Lakeland, former United States Congressman, and Vernon E. Peeples of Punta Gorda. Mr. Peeples, vice-president of the society, spoke at the January meeting held in Arcadia. Colonel Read D. Harding, secretary of the society, reports a membership of eighty-four.

The Peace River Valley Historical Society and the Polk County Historical Commission sponsored the dedication of a memorial to the late Billy Bowlegs III in the Glades County Ortona Cemetery on February 19, 1966.

Pinellas County Historical Commission: At the November 1965 meeting of the Pinellas County Historical Commission, E. Reinhold Rogers, Jr. announced that two historical places in the county have been marked: the Gandy Bridge and the site of the William Miranda House. At the January meeting, Walter Fuller, member of the Board of Directors of the Florida Historical Society, described the marker dedication at the place where Father Luis Cancer was martyred in the sixteenth century. It was noted that the Boca Ciega Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution had dedicated a marker at the Calusa Indian Mound at Pinellas Drive South near 19th Street.

The commission is supporting a move to preserve the old courthouse building and develop it as the historical museum. Harvey L. Wells reports that the study that he is making of the 1830 census of Florida is progressing satisfactorily.

St. Augustine Historical Society: Albert Manucy, former president of the Florida Historical Society, discussed his recently published biography, *Florida's Menendez: Captain General of the Ocean Sea*, at the annual meeting of the St. Augustine Historical Society on January 11, 1966. At the business meeting preceding the program, W. W. Wilson was elected president; A. J. McJhin, Jr., vice-president; W. J. Winter, secretary; Roy Barnes, treasurer; and J. Tyler Van Campen, librarian. Milton E. Bacon, W. I. Drysdale, and Frank D. Upchurch, Sr. were elected directors.

Mr. Manucy and X. L. Pellicer, former president of the St. Augustine Historical Society, recently received George Morgan Ward Medals from Rollins College in recognition of their outstanding contributions to Florida, particularly in the writing of Florida history and the preservation of historical sites.

College News

Central Florida Junior College: The Florida History Club, organized by Dr. Ernest H. Jernigan of the Central Florida Junior College, is continuing its active program. On February 18, Mrs. Elaine Steinberg of the geography department, spoke on the "Geography of Florida." At the March meeting, Lowell Wikoff gave a paper entitled "Demographic Aspects of Florida," and Edward Simonds discussed "John Jackson Dickison - Symbol of the Confederacy in Florida" at the April meeting. Officers include George Green, president; Nanci Hord, vice-president; Jessica Haymaker, secretary; and Ann Denson, treasurer. Florida Supreme Court Justice Richard E. Irvin, Ross Allen, Ben Waller, and Dr. Jernigan have spoken to the Florida History Club in the past few months.

Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University: James N. Eaton is returning to the history faculty of the university after a two-year leave of absence. He has been studying at Duke University under a Danforth Teacher Study Grant. Joseph A. Jones, associate professor of history, will serve as assistant director for the Summer Institute in American History at Miles College, Birmingham, Alabama. Dr. Leedell W. Neyland, professor of history, is working on a history of the Negro in Florida.

Florida Atlantic University: The University of Florida Press has recently published *Independence or Death: The Story of the Paraguayan War* by Charles J. Kolinski, associate professor of history. Robert Schwarz, chairman of the Department of Philosophy and professor of history, has contributed several chapters to the recently published *Problems in Western Civilization: The Challenge of History*. Professor Schwarz participated also in the seventh annual Social Studies Workshop at South Carolina State College in March and will be discussion-coordinator at an NDEA Institute at Georgetown University this summer. Dr. Samuel A. Portnoy, chairman of the Department of History, is advisor to the recently organized History Society on campus. He was also lecturer and coordinator of a lecture-discussion series at Temple Israel, West Palm Beach, on the subject of "Jewish Life in the United States." Dean Benjamin F. Rogers of the College of Humanities and a former member of the Board of Directors of the Florida Historical Society and Dr. Portnoy participated recently in a one-day conference on world peace sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee in West Palm Beach.

Florida Atlantic University sponsored a Model United Nations on April 8-10. William Marina, assistant professor of history, was coordinator, and representatives from colleges and universities throughout the South were present.

Jacksonville University: Dr. Frederick Aldridge, a graduate of American University, has joined the history faculty and is teaching courses in United States history and American foreign policy. Dr. Aldridge formerly held the rank of marine colonel and served as a member of the United States delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Lawrence Breeze, professor of history, was recently named Professor of the Year and was honored at a university convocation.

Miami-Dade Junior College: The college's new class in Florida history is being taught jointly by Professor Leon Prior and Mrs. Marjory Stoneman Douglas. Dr. Thelma Peters, member of the Board of Directors of the Florida Historical Society and chairman of Miami-Dade Junior College's Department of Social Sciences, reports a sizeable enrollment in the course.

Stetson University: Dr. Serge Zenkovsky of the history department is at Heidelberg, Germany this year on a Guggenheim grant and is completing his book *The Old Believers*. Dr. Evans C. Johnson is developing a history institute, focusing on a series of problems in United States history, to be presented at the university this summer. Dr. Malcom W. Wynn is studying the Huguenot movement in seventeenth-century France. Dr. Harold Schultz will take a group of students from Stetson and other Associated Mid-Florida Colleges to Europe this summer. William R. Carden, who is receiving his doctorate from Emory University, and Dr. Gary L. Maris, a graduate of Duke University, are new members of the history and political science faculty at Stetson.

University of Miami: Dr. Nathan D. Shappee, a member of the Department of History since 1945, died on February 14. Dr. Shappee's articles on Florida history have appeared in the *Florida Historical Quarterly* and in *Tequesta*.

Dr. Robert E. McNicoll, a graduate of the University of Miami, has joined the history faculty. He will also be associated with the Center for Advanced International Studies. Dr. John A. Harrison, former chairman of the Department of History of the University of Florida, was named dean of the Graduate School of the University of Miami in February.

University of Tampa: The University of Tampa celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of the Tampa Bay Hotel Building in January 1966, and President David Delo renamed the building the Henry Bradley Plant Hall. Dr. J. Ryan Beiser participated in the NDEA History Institute at Chadron State College, Chadron, Nebraska. Dr. James Covington, also of the history department, is program chairman for the 1966 annual meeting of the Florida Historical Society.

Florida Conference of College Teachers of History

The fourth annual meeting of the Florida Conference of College Teachers of History was held at the Daytona Beach Junior College on March 4 and 5, 1966. A reception at the Holiday Inn and an executive session opened the conference on Friday

evening. The theme of the Saturday morning session was "The Historian and Community Service," and the Honorable Fred Karl spoke. Professors Duane Koenig of the University of Miami, Miles Malone of the Daytona Beach Junior College, and Robert Schwarz of Florida Atlantic University participated in the panel. The luncheon speaker was Dr. Dumas Malone of the University of Virginia who talked on "Jefferson and Education." The theme for the afternoon session was "Articulation," and the chairman was Dr. Ernest Jernigan of the Central Florida Junior College. The panel included Professors Thelma Peters of Miami-Dade Junior College, Kathleen Montpelier of Mainland Senior High School, Gilbert Lycan of Stetson University, and John Mahon of the University of Florida.

Dr. Robert L. Gold, president of the Florida Conference presided at the luncheon meeting. The program committee included Rembert W. Patrick, Merlin G. Cox, and Ernest Jernigan. Merlin Cox, Henry B. Watson, and W. Lawrence Reynolds were in charge of local arrangements.

San Marcos Museum

The Florida Park Board, the Florida State Society, and Dominic Everardus Bogardus Chapter of the Colonial Dames of the Seventeenth Century dedicated the San Apalache State Museum at St. Marks on January 11. Mrs. Aubry Morse of Tallahassee was in charge of arrangements. N. Earl Jones of Titusville, chairman of the Park Board, presided, and State Supreme Court Justice B. K. Roberts was the main speaker.

The fort, built by the Spaniards at the junction of the St. Marks and Wakulla rivers, played a key role as European powers struggled among themselves for colonization and control of Florida. The fort was utilized until after the Civil War when it was allowed to crumble. Now, the state has constructed a road to provide easy access to the installation and the museum.

Florida Park Board Marker

An historic marker was recently rededicated by the Florida Park Board noting where Christmas was first celebrated in America. State Park Board Director Bill Miller and Secretary of State

Tom Adams were present at the ceremony on December 21, 1965. The marker is located near what was once the Indian village of Anhayea on Lake Jackson. Ney Landrum, director of the State Outdoor Recreational Planning Committee, announced that Florida is attempting to purchase the 120-acre tract covering the historic site, so that it can be utilized as a state park.

Webster Merritt Collection of Floridiana

The Jacksonville Public Library has recently acquired the Webster Merritt Collection of Florida History. The late Dr. Merritt, a well-known Jacksonville physician, was an important collector of Floridiana and a noted Florida author. His large and valuable library of rare books, pamphlets, and manuscripts have been added to the already important collection of material dealing with Jacksonville and Florida history in the Jacksonville Library. Miss Audrey Broward is the librarian in charge of the Florida collection.

Lucius S. Ruder

Lucius S. Ruder, honorary vice-president and member of the Board of Directors of the Florida Historical Society, died on December 3, 1965 at the Emory University Hospital in Atlanta. A native of Hamilton, Ohio, where his family was associated with the steel and banking businesses, Mr. Ruder came to Florida in the early 1930s. He served for many years on the Morton F. Plant Hospital Board of Directors, and at the time of his death was secretary-treasurer of the Cincinnati Sheet Metal Company. His hobby of growing rare orchids resulted in his becoming one of the largest commercial suppliers of orchids to florists in Florida.

Quiet, retiring, never seeking the glare of public attention, Mr. Ruder was a major figure in the development of the Tampa Bay area. He had extensive real estate holdings in Tampa and Clearwater. A true intellectual, Mr. Ruder had a particular interest in American and Florida history. His collection of early American papers and documents is extremely valuable. His holdings in Florida history, particularly the nineteenth century period,

are especially important. Mr. Ruder was an ardent enthusiast and supporter of local history. Interested in seeing that important Floridiana was published so that it would be available to the scholar and researcher, Mr. Ruder was a generous contributor to the Julien Yonge Research Fund.

Colonel William Morrison Robinson, Jr.

On September 24, 1965, Colonel William Morrison Robinson, Jr., historian, engineer, and retired Army officer, died at his home in Quincy, Florida. Colonel Robinson was a graduate of the Georgia School of Technology, with degrees in science and civil engineering. He had received the honorary degree of Doctor of Humanities from the Florida State University. Colonel Robinson was regarded as an authority in Confederate history. Two of his books, *The Confederate Privateers* and *Justice in Gray, a History of the Judicial System of the Confederate States*, are considered primary sources in historical writing. His most recent publication was *The First Coming to America of the Book of Common Prayer, Florida, July 1565*, the first part of a contemplated history of the Episcopal church in Florida. Since 1961, Colonel Robinson had served as registrar-historiographer of the Diocese of Florida. He was a member of the Florida Historical Society and often contributed to the pages of the *Florida Historical Quarterly*.

Arthur W. Thompson Memorial Prize

Mrs. Arthur W. Thompson and Miss Margaret Thompson of Gainesville and Mr. and Mrs. Jacob Siegel of New York have established the Arthur W. Thompson Memorial Prize in Florida History as a memorial to the late Professor Thompson, distinguished American historian and writer and Director of the American Studies Program at the University of Florida. Dr. Thompson, a nationally known authority on American intellectual history, had done considerable research and writing on Southern and Florida history. His articles appeared in the *Journal of Southern History* and the *Florida Historical Quarterly*. Dr. Thompson was editor of the University of Florida's Social Science Monograph Series, and he edited and wrote an introduction for the Quadri-

centennial Edition of *The Exiles of Florida* in the University of Florida Press's Facsimile and Reprint Series. Dr. Thompson's study of Senator David Levy Yulle has been recognized as a major contribution to American and Florida scholarship and history.

The Arthur W. Thompson Memorial Prize will be given annually to the author of the best article appearing each year in the *Florida Historical Quarterly*. The recipient of the award will receive a check for \$100. The judges will announce their selection at the annual meeting of the Florida Historical Society.

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