By early 1862 the coastline of Florida was virtually undefended. Simultaneously, Federal forces were moving toward the port city of Fernandina. By mid-March the Florida coastline from St. Augustine north was under northern control. The cover picture is from a sketch by the periodical's artist, "Mr. W.—. Crane," which appeared in Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, August 16, 1862. It bears the caption: "National Troops Marching Through Second Street in New Fernandina, Florida."
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THE SOUTHERN INDIANS IN THE WAR OF
1812: THE CLOSING PHASE

by JOHN SUGDEN

It has been conventional to equate the conflict between the southern Indians and the United States during the War of 1812 with the Creek war of 1813-1814. More correctly, however, there were three stages of the fighting, each emanating from standing grievances against the Americans nursed by Creek and Seminole bands, but receiving their initial impetus from separate sources. In 1812 and 1813, the Seminoles and their Negro allies, rallied by the Spanish who were concerned to protect their possessions in the south from American filibusters, participated in a number of skirmishes. A second phase of Indian hostility to the Americans, and that most widely known, was ignited primarily by the admonitions of Tecumseh and his followers from 1811 to 1814. The fighting of the so-called Creek War commenced with an engagement at Burnt Corn in the summer of 1813, and lasted until the American victory at Horse-shoe Bend in March 1814. Within a few months of their defeat, however, the Indians were reinvigorated by the arrival of British forces in Florida, and the cooperation of the dissident natives with the British forms the closing stage of the conflict. To the collapse of this relationship, consummated by a British failure to uphold those clauses in the Treaty of Ghent which protected the Indians, a subsequent exchange between Indians and Americans, the Seminole war of 1818 acted as a finale, but this last lies outside the scope of the present article.

A clarification of the Indian resistance to the United States in the south during the closing phase of the conflict is here intended. Several previous examinations of this area have been published, but the emphasis of this study, as far as possible, has been upon the Indian viewpoint. However, since the natives left no written records, it necessarily is inferred from the re-

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ports of their British allies. The episode is best interpreted as part of the last, and the largest, of several desperate attempts made by the Indians of the eastern woodlands to arrest the social disintegration, cultural decay, depopulation, and loss of land occasioned by their protracted contact with the white frontier. A militant pan-Indian nativist movement, led by Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, two Shawnees, developed in the northwest in the years preceding the War of 1812. Assisted by the outbreak of fighting between England and the United States, it eventually swept in some of the southern Indians, those who rose against the Americans in the Creek war. This movement was defeated in the north at Moraviantown in 1813, and in the south at Horseshoe Bend in 1814, but in neither theatre was it completely crushed.

In the summer of 1814 British forces arrived in the south to fortify the remaining Indian dissidents and to supply them with arms and provisions. The Indians welcomed the British as stronger and more steadfast allies than were the Spaniards, their immediate wants were relieved, and there were prospects of driving back the enemy and regaining their lands. Moreover, while many tribesmen in the south refused to commit themselves to war against the United States so long as the Americans retained the military ascendancy, the harsh policies of Andrew Jackson strengthened the hostile nativist faction. Nevertheless, the British invasion failed, and Indian hopes rested upon the Treaty of Ghent of 1814 which invalidated the dispossession of the Creeks by the Treaty of Fort Jackson signed earlier that year. But the Americans continued to uphold the Fort Jackson agreement, and the Indians were unable to persuade the British

to take up their cause as an infringement of an international treaty. Without that support the nativist movement in the south was powerless to contest further American aggression and the stage was prepared for the Indian removals of the ensuing decades.

Both of the principal Indian groups actively in opposition to the Americans at the time of the British invasion of the south in 1814 had been involved in the earlier conflict with the United States. One, the Seminole, had probably heard of Tecumseh’s inflammatory talk to the Creeks in 1811, and according to tribal tradition two of the influential Seminole chiefs, Ben Berryman and Cappachamico, had been among those who heard the Shawnee at Tuckabatchee. But whatever support Tecumseh might have reaped for his inter-tribal confederacy among the Seminoles and their Negro allies, a more potent influence was that of the Spanish. Spain, at this time, controlled the Florida peninsula and a strip of land south of the thirty-first parallel running westwards along the Gulf to the Mississippi. Between 1810 and 1813, however, Georgians and Tennesseans, supported cautiously by the American government and aware of internal unrest among the Spaniards, managed to wrest Baton Rouge, the area west of the Perdido, Mobile, and Amelia Island from Spain. To secure his country’s possessions from further aggression the Spanish governor, Sebastián Kindelan, incited the Seminoles and Negroes against the American interlopers in 1812. Many of the Negroes were refugees from American plantations who had found considerable freedom and status among the Seminoles; they particularly feared the increase of American interference in Florida. Furthermore, the destruction of some Indian towns by American forces in 1813 gave additional cause for Seminole hostility towards the United States.

The other major Indian opponents of the Americans were the “Red Stick” Creeks of Alabama. Their resentment had been long brewing. Creek society had been fraught with excessive

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interference from the United States since the Treaty of Coleraine in 1796. Benjamin Hawkins, the American agent, tried to dominate the Creek National Council, to which delegates from all the Creek towns were invited. He also wanted to centralize Indian society by issuing certificates to Creeks intending to hunt or trade, testifying to their reliability. By the administration of public order rather than the allowance of its management to the clan, town, or individual, Hawkins also contributed towards this trend. Further, he encouraged agricultural development and production for the market. His efforts tended to promote the settlement of the Indians outside of the villages, away from the communal influences, and the development of ownership of private property and individualism. Many of the traditional Creek villages went into decline, some of the land was exhausted, and the sense of communal responsibility among the Indians was eroded. 4

A schism rapidly appeared in Creek society. The so-called “progressive” faction, strong among the Lower Creeks of the Chattahoochee, Flint, and Ocmulgee rivers, adhered more strongly to the American program; the nativist or Red Stick Creeks, prevalent among the more remote Upper Creeks of central Alabama, espoused tribal independence and a separate cultural identity. The anger of the Red Stick Creeks against the Americans was enhanced by incursions onto Indian lands. Not only were the Spaniards being pressed in the south by the United States, but the newly organized Louisiana Territory, the growth of American settlements along the Cumberland River, and the perennial expansion attempts by Georgians, created among the Indians the feeling that they were being encircled by the United States and that such activity would lead to

exorbitant demands for Indian land. Tracts on the Georgia frontier, along the Ocmulgee and the Oconee, were ceded to the United States by the Creeks in 1802 and 1805, and a horse path was blazed across Indian territory between the Ocmulgee River and Mobile. In 1811, the Americans peremptorily demanded that the Creeks allow a north-south road to pass through their lands to connect white settlements on the Tennessee River with Fort Stoddert near Mobile.

This was the situation into which Tecumseh, in 1811, introduced his call for the tribes to unite, to reassert traditional Indian values and culture, and to resist further territorial encroachment by the Americans. Before the close of 1812, the Red Sticks had developed a militant, anti-American nucleus of warriors who looked to Tecumseh for leadership and who were able to increase their influence among the Creeks. In 1813 a civil war between the Red Stick and Americanized Creeks broke out, which in the summer escalated into a confrontation between the nativists and the Americans. The fighting ended with Jackson’s victory over the Red Sticks at Horseshoe Bend and the cession of some 23,000,000 acres of Creek land to the United States at the Treaty of Fort Jackson on August 9, 1814.

The defeated Red Sticks made their way into Pensacola where the Spanish afforded them a refuge. There they heard of the Fort Jackson treaty and their anger increased. The terms were imposed upon Red Sticks and friendly Creeks alike, and without the representation of the former, whose presence, no doubt, was considered unnecessary. About half of the Creek territory was ceded in reparation to the United States and no payment was to be made for it. Later, in 1817 and 1853, $195,417.90 was given to the friendly Creeks as compensation for the damage done them by the Red Sticks but during the forty years following the annexation, the United States Treasury realized over $11,250,000 from the land.\(^5\) Naturally, the Red Sticks repudiated the cession immediately and it served to alienate some Creeks, such as the Big Warrior, who had been friendly to the United States.

It is difficult to estimate how many Red Sticks survived the war of 1813-1814. Various assessments of the size of the Creek nation, and the census of 1832, when the population may have

\(^5\) Debo, Road to Disappearance, 83.
recovered, would indicate that the tribe consisted of some 25,000 people. At the most there were about 5,000 warriors. At the most there were about 5,000 warriors. More than half, perhaps sixty per cent of these, went over to the Red Sticks during the conflict. Many, undoubtedly, were lost in the fighting although the casualties ascribed to the hostiles by American commanders during the campaigns were grossly inflated. Hundreds of them managed to escape to the south, reportedly those from eight towns. In June 1814 some 200 warriors were believed to be at Pensacola and about 1,500 more were reportedly on the Escambia River. British reports indicated that about 800 warriors eventually gathered about Pensacola and that 1,300 others remained on the Alabama as "prisoners of war," although this last figure is likely not very accurate. It seems, however, that in the late summer of 1814 perhaps as many as 1,000 warriors who had resisted the American forces remained at large as potential enemies of the United States. Among those at liberty were some of the most implacable of the Red Stick leaders. A number of the principal hostile chiefs, such as High Head Jim, had been killed, and others, among them Menawa and Paddy Walsh, were in hiding. Some, such as William Weatherford, whom British reports suggest later fought for the Americans against his former colleagues at Pensacola, had surrendered. But two of the most influential Red Sticks remained prepared to resume the conflict, Peter McQueen and Josiah Francis (Hillis Hadjo), both of whom had been fomentors of the rebellion.

Both men had a history of antagonism to the United States. Francis, the son of an Englishman and a Creek, was a leader of the Tuskegee Creeks and had risen to prominence as a prophet ministering the revitalization cult introduced by Tecumseh. Early in 1813, he had been in contact with the Spanish, and

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6. Ibid., 103; Mary Jane McDaniel, Relations Between the Creek Indians, Georgia and the United States (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Mississippi, 1971), 2-3.
7. Akers, Unexpected Challenge, 137.
8. The British estimate of 1,800 warriors killed was also too high. "Return of the Muscogee or Creek Indians," War Office, Public Records Office, London (hereinafter cited as WO), class 1/folio 143/ pp. 174-75.
9. Cotterill, Southern Indians, 190; Harry Toulmin to Andrew Jackson, June 22, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 9-11.
in the summer he may have accompanied the expedition to Pensacola which led to the first skirmish of the Creek war at Burnt Corn.\textsuperscript{12} His movements, thereafter, are obscure and controversial. It has been asserted that at the time of the attack on Fort Mims in August 1813, he led a party against Fort Sinquefield, or that he was busy establishing his Indian town known as the "Holy Ground."\textsuperscript{13} However, according to Edward Nicolls, a British agent who knew the chief well, "Frances told me that while he was attacking Fort Mims the blacks were the first in, and I have one man who killed seven Americans in that affair."\textsuperscript{14}

McQueen, probably the son of James McQueen, a Scots frontiersman, was a leader of the Tallahassee Upper Creek band and had been present at the Creek victories at Burnt Corn and Fort Mims. According to Nicolls, he and Francis led the Creeks, who, in a three-day battle on January 24-26, 1814, turned Jackson's army back to Fort Strother, and who, with eighty warriors, defeated General John Floyd's superior force at Calabbee Creek on January 27, 1814. Both chiefs fled to Pensacola after the defeat at Horseshoe Bend: McQueen escaped after he was captured on the Tallapoosa in April.\textsuperscript{15}

At Pensacola the Indians depended upon help from the Spanish. By the middle of 1813 there were only about 500 Spanish troops in West Florida, and Spain, locked in combat with the French in Europe, was unable to send them any substantial reinforcement. Confronted with the obvious American threat, Juan Ruiz Apodaca, captain general of Cuba, and Mateo González Manrique, the governor of Pensacola, were ready to arm the Indians and provision them in case they would be needed to bolster the weak Spanish defenses.

Another possible source of support for the Red Sticks was the British. As early as the previous September and November, the Indians had appealed through Governor Charles Cameron, at New Providence in the Bahamas, for assistance, suggesting that contact might be made through the Apalachicola River. Not

\textsuperscript{12} Halbert and Ball, Creek War of 1813 and 1814, 125.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 184; Nunez, "Creek Nativism," 168.
\textsuperscript{14} Edward Nicolls to Alexander Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-62; see also Nicolls to John Philip Morier, September 25, 1815, WO/1/143/137-39.
\textsuperscript{15} George Stiggins, a Creek half breed, is in error in suggesting that Francis fled to Pensacola after the destruction of his town in December 1813. Nunez, "Creek Nativism," 172-73.
until early in 1814, however, did Earl Bathurst, secretary of state for war in London, give instructions to the British navy to support the Creeks. The delay caused the Indians to despair, but their defeat in March, the loss of their fields and homes, and the appalling material conditions in which they were compelled to cluster about Pensacola merely accentuated their need for the British. Red Stick resentment of the United States was also growing. “Our Case is really miserable and lamentable,” they told the British who eventually arrived at Apalachicola, “driven from House and Home without Food and Clothes to cover our Bodies by disasters and an Enemy, who has sworn our ruin, and hovering about Pensacola and its Vicinity, where We can get now [sic] Assistance, as the Spanish Government tells Us that it is scarcely [sic] able to support its Own Troops.” Nevertheless, they “have Determined to make no Peace with the United States of America without the British Government’s Consent.” The same truculent attitude was forcibly put to Benjamin Hawkins, the American Indian agent: “We have lost our country and retreated to the sea side, where we will fight till we are all destroyed.”

Both the Seminoles and the Red Stick Creeks, despite their defeat in an unequal contest with the United States, were spoil-ing to renew the fighting, and the British were willing to oblige them. In Europe the war with France was drawing to a triumphant close, and an able admiral, Alexander Cochrane, had been appointed commander in chief of the American station to coordinate a campaign against the United States seaboard. Cochrane, as well as his predecessor, Admiral John Borlase Warren, had been aware of the possibilities of using southern Negroes and Indians in the subjugation of the American south, and he now moved quickly to respond to Bathurst’s instruc-tions. A British expeditionary force was sent to assist the Indians.

Captain Hugh Pigot, of the frigate Orpheus, was employed to make the first contact. He was given a message from Cochrane

17. Joshua Francis, Yahollasaptko, Hopoyisifyiyholla to British Com-mander at St. George’s Island, June 9, 1814, CP, 2328, 28-29.
18. Debo, Road to Disappearance, 82.
19. Wright, Britain and the American Frontier, 162-65; Cochrane to George, Earl Spencer, March 13, 1797, CP, 2568, 49-50.
to the Indian chiefs and carried blankets and other presents, supplied by Governor Cameron, together with 2,000 muskets and ammunition. Accompanied by Lieutenant David Hope of the *Shelbourne*, Pigot sailed for Apalachicola Bay, and anchored there on May 11, 1814. He landed his acting lieutenant of Royal Marines, George Woodbine, who had been given the shore rank of brevet captain of marines and a provisional appointment as British agent to the southern Indians. Woodbine quickly induced some Indians aboard the British vessels on May 20. The following day Corporal James Denny and Sergeant Samuel Smith of the marines were set ashore to instruct the warriors in the use of small arms. A loghouse was erected upon Vincent Island, stores were landed, and ammunition distributed.\(^{20}\)

The base was then extended up the Apalachicola River. On May 25, Woodbine reached Prospect Bluff, where he accepted from the local Indians power to direct operations. He urged them to spare the lives of any American prisoners in the forthcoming campaigns. A start was made upon erecting a fort with a powder magazine. Since provisions for the Indians, including flour and red paint, were inadequate, an important feature of the bluff was the existence there of the trading store belonging to John Forbes and Company of Pensacola. It was eventually seized, and its caretakers, Edmund Doyle and William Hambly, entered Woodbine’s service as interpreters. Nevertheless, there were neither field pieces nor the supplies necessary to begin an offensive against Fort Mitchell, eighty miles upriver, and the Indian parties had to be content for some time with their capture of one Wilson, an American “spy.”\(^{21}\)

Predictably, the advent of the British was welcomed, particularly by three groups, the Seminoles, the Red Stick Creeks, and many of the Negroes. The Indians and Negroes who first rallied around Woodbine were mainly Seminoles, under the old chief Thomas Perryman, and Cappachamico, head of the Mikasuki Seminole band. The chiefs were pleased to support the

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\(^{20}\) Hugh Pigot, April 13, 1814, CP, 2328, 1-2; Pigot to George Woodbine, May 10, 1814, ibid., 3-6; Pigot to James Denny and Samuel Smith, May 21, 1814, ibid., 9; Pigot to Cochrane, June 8, 1814, Admiralty Papers, Public Record office, London (hereinafter cited as ADM), class 1/folio 506/ pp. 394-99.

\(^{21}\) Woodbine to Pigot, May 25, 1814, CP, 2328, 14-15; Boyd, “Events at Prospect Bluff,” 74-75; Woodbine to David Hope, May 31, 1814, CP, 2328, 13.
campaign against the Americans. The hostility of the Seminoles to the United States, as well as the attraction of British presents, arms, and provisions, guaranteed immediate support for Woodbine. The agent was also aware of the recalcitrant Red Sticks, who, destitute and unarmed, sheltered about Pensacola. They were unable apparently to obtain supplies from either the Spaniards or John Forbes and Company, the Indian traders. Consequently, a young warrior called Yellow Hair was dispatched by Woodbine to Pensacola to carry the news of the British landing to the followers of Francis and McQueen. There was an immediate response. McQueen, with twenty-five men, left for Apalachicola by boat. Durgan with a party of twenty, and other groups, followed shortly afterwards. Francis found passage to Apalachicola on a British schooner, and as word spread, numbers of Negroes fled from American plantations to join the British standard.  

An estimate of the Indian forces in alliance with the British at this time reveals the continued hostility of the Seminole and Red Stick bands to the United States. Woodbine assessed his support from villages along the upper Apalachicola River as: Yawolla, ten warriors; Tamathe or Tamathla and Ochessie, 150; Tochtohuli, 100; Oaketee Ockanee, 250; Saockulo, fifty; Fowl-town, 300; Euchee, twenty; Tallasee, thirty; Canholva, fifteen; and Emasee, fifty, for a total of 975 warriors. To these were added the men of other Seminole and Creek villages: the Chihaw Lower Creeks on the upper Flint River, 400; the Indians at Red Ground, twenty; Cheskee Tallosa, sixty; Kivah Rawon and Cedar Creeks, 100; Mikasuki Seminole, 700; the Tallasees, 200; and the Pensacola Red Sticks, 800. In all there were 3,255 men, of whom 2,800 were immediately ready to take up arms. While these estimates included some boys between the ages of ten and fourteen, they were not disconcerting to the British, who believed that only some 1,200 Creek warriors remained faithful to the Americans.  

The forces enumerated by Woodbine represented the survivors of the Indian bands who had already tried their

22. Woodbine to Pigot, May 25, 1814, ibid., 12-13; Woodbine to Hope, May 31, 1814, ibid., 13; Toulmin to Jackson, June 22, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence to Jackson, II, 9-11; letter from Pensacola, June 8, 1814, ibid., 7; John Gordon to Jackson, July 20, 1814, ibid., 17-18.

23. Woodbine-Pigot information, CP, 2326, 151-59.
strength against the Americans, and it was possible that others might later join them. An attempt was made to sow disaffection among the Creeks who, under Big Warrior, had remained friendly to the United States and whose strength the British estimated to be some 1,200 men. These Indians, however, had not yet been alienated from the Americans by the Fort Jackson treaty, which lay in the future, and the bitterness which they felt to the Red Sticks as a result of the Creek civil war had not been forgotten. More important, they had witnessed the futility of nativist resistance to the United States and were shrewd enough to realize the danger of committing themselves to the British while the Americans remained in control of the south.

At the same time, even the “progressive” Creeks were disturbed by the repeated encroachment upon Indian land, and they were willing to court the British. Woodbine dispatched emissaries to the main Lower Creek towns of Coweta and Cussita, conveying the message of pan-Indianism that had once belonged to Tecumseh. The Creeks, he said, should unite with the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees against the Americans. Meetings were held in the Creek country, and thanks were returned to the British for the presents that had been received. It was acknowledged that the unification of the tribes had long been the cherished desire of the Creeks and that they had never ceased their fidelity to the British crown and their claims upon British protection. But for the time being, that was as far as they were willing to go.24

The Indians assembling at Apalachicola, in the meantime, were amenable to British suggestions. On May 28 Woodbine harangued the local Seminoles, emphasizing the strength of the British king and his determination to help the Indians. “He wants to protect all Indians,” the warriors were told, “and to make them into one family that they may unite and drive the children of the bad spirit out of their lands and hunting grounds.” But the war must be fought according to the standards of British humanity, and rewards were offered for prisoners delivered to the soldiers.25

The chiefs signed a bizarre document

25. Woodbine to the Indians, May 28, 1814, CP, 2328, 15.
pledging themselves to preserve the lives of captives: “In the name of all the chiefs of the Creek Nations now assembled in arms against the Americans we promise to spare the lives of all the prisoners taken, whether man, woman or child, and to give them up to Captain Woodbine of the Royal Marines who has informed us that they would be a grateful present to our Father King George.”

The Indian response to Woodbine convinced Pigot that if sufficient stores could be arranged the tribesmen could become an important military force. Forty pistols, powder and ball, eleven barrels of cornpowder, drums, a launch and equipment, 100 pounds of tobacco, seventy-five blankets, sixty gallons of wine, a coat, and an epaulet were unloaded, and Pigot left Apalachicola carrying Seminole addresses to Cochrane. He left Woodbine, Denny, and Smith behind to work with the Indians. He ordered Captain Nicholas Lockyer of the sloop Sophie to take under his command the Childers and Shelburne, make contact with the Pensacola Red Sticks, and maintain a supply from New Providence to Apalachicola.

Cochrane was no less enthusiastic than Pigot, whose report he forwarded to the Admiralty together with his own observation that if 3,000 British troops were landed at Mobile, and were joined by the Indians, Jean Lafitte’s Baratarian privateers, and the Spanish, they “would drive the Americans entirely out of Louisiana and the Floridas.” To follow up Pigot’s mission, the admiral organized an expeditionary force of 114 men, two howitzers, and a field piece to convey to Apalachicola 300 suits of clothing, 1,000 stand of arms, and other provisions for the Indians. In an exhortation to the chiefs, Cochrane explained that “your Father King George will not suffer his Indian Children to be made Slaves of by his rebellious Subjects” and that the men and arms had been sent to support them. He contended that the United States would leave the Indians “not one foot

26. Thomas Perryman and Cappachamico, pledge, May 28, 1814, ibid. These chiefs were Seminoles, but at this time the Seminole bands regarded themselves as part of the Creek Nation.
27. CP, 2326, 160; Pigot to Nicholas Lockyer, June 11, 1814, CP, 2328, 24-25; Thomas and William Perryman, Cappachamico and other chiefs to Cochrane, 1814, ADM/ 1/ 506/ 402-03; Pigot to Cochrane, June 8, 1814, ibid., 394-99.
28. Cochrane to Admiralty, June 20, 1814, ADM/ 1/ 506/ 390-93.
29. Ibid., July 23, 1814, ADM/ 1/ 506/ 478-79.
of land . . . to the Eastward of the Mississippi” and that the message must be circulated to the Negroes of Georgia and the Carolinas and to any Indians friendly to the Americans. Significantly, Cochrane referred to the large British forces being prepared for the attacks on the American seaboard and added that, in the event of a peace, “your rights will not be forgotten.” These promises were to be important to the Indians, who would, in time, expect the British to fulfill them.  

On June 30 Woodbine was appointed auxiliary captain of the Corps of Colonial Marines, of which the expeditionary force to be embarked was the basis; the balance would be recruited from loyalists and Negroes. To command the expedition, Cochrane selected from his flagship, Tonnant, Major Edward Nicolls of the Royal Marines, a man of attested gallantry, known as “Fighting Nicolls.” He has been described by one historian of the marines as “possibly the most distinguished officer the corps ever had.” In July 1814 Nicolls was ordered to place himself at the head of the irregular operations in the American South and was empowered to raise 500 men as a colonial regiment in support of the Indians. During the next four years, Nicolls developed a close relationship with the Indians, and he became their most consistently outspoken white champion.

His instructions enjoined him both to raise and command a colonial regiment and to instruct, assist, and direct the Indians in military matters. He bore with him a copy of Pigot’s report and of Cochrane’s proclamation to the natives which would serve as letters of introduction. Cochrane permitted Nicolls considerable freedom of action, providing he refrained from acts of hostility to the United States within Spanish territory, except in self defense. The troops and stores were embarked at New Providence aboard the Hermes (Captain William Henry Percy), and the Carron (Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer), largely upon the orders of Governor Cameron. Cochrane had Cameron

30. Cochrane to Indian chiefs, June 29, 1814, ADM/1/505/163-64.
31. P. C. Smith, Per Mare Per Terram: A History of the Royal Marines (St. Ives, Huntingdon, 1974), 45. A sketch of Nicolls is contained in ibid., 45-47. See also William James, Naval History of Great Britain, 6 vols. (London, 1876), III, 197-99, 291-96, IV, 221, 347, 431; Admiralty Navy Lists (London, issues between 1814 and 1864); Cochrane to Woodbine, June 30, 1814, CP, 2326, 190-91; Nicolls, Memorial, 1817, WO/1/144/419-22; Nicolls, Commission, July 4, 1814, CP, 2326, 192-93.
informed that Britain’s only intention was to “preserve the Indians from being destroyed by the United States.” The admiral, in his proclamation, had promised the Indians two field pieces, 2,000 stand of guns, and 1,000 swords, and Nicolls drew upon Cameron for two long twenty-four pounders, launches and flatboats, belts, fowling pieces, powder flasks, flints, sabres, buttons, jackets, epaulets, vermillion, and $100 worth of presents.32

Before Nicolls reached Apalachicola Bay in August 1814, a new development had increased the prospects of the Indians’ engaging the American forces, and they were, themselves, the cause of the changing circumstances. Andrew Jackson, district commander of the American troops, had viewed with alarm the resurgence of the Indian cause. He complained to Governor Mateo González Manrique of Pensacola that the British had been allowed to mobilize upon Spanish soil against the United States, and that the Spaniards themselves were harboring refugee Red Sticks. McQueen and Francis, Jackson maintained, should be surrendered to the Americans. In view of the aggressive attitude of Jackson and the Americans to both the Creeks and the Spaniards in recent years, these aggrieved protestations failed to impress Manrique.33 Nevertheless, the governor was alarmed. The solution to the problem was not easy to find. While the Spanish were too weak to successfully contest the United States, they feared that an attempt to improve their position might cost them any remaining American goodwill. Confronted by the threat from Jackson, but unwilling to act in any way that might antagonize the Americans, they vacillated. Governor Manrique refused to sever connections with his Creek allies and sent appeals for help to his superior, Apodaca, at Havana, but he shrank from too vigorous a defense of Pensacola. Apodaca, on his part, was willing to allow Nicolls’s Indians and British to operate as they desired, provided that they recognized Spanish control of St. Marks, St. Augustine, and Pensacola, but he refused to give direct aid.34

32. Cochrane to Nicolls, July 4, 1814, ADM/1/506/480-85; Cochrane to Admiral, July 23, 1814, ibid., 478-79; Cochrane to Cameron, July 4, 1814, CP, 2328, 30; Nicolls to Cochrane, July 27, 1814, ibid., 54-55; Cochrane to William Henry Percy, July 5, 1814, ADM/1/506/486-87.
33. Jackson to Mateo González Manrique, July 12, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 15-16; Gordon to Jackson, July 20, 1814, ibid., 17-18; Manrique to Jackson, July 26, 1814, ibid., 20-21.
34. Cameron to Ruis de Apodaca, July 29, 1814, CP, 2328, 40; Percy to
Unaware of the frustrations to be imposed upon them in their dealings with the Spaniards, the British were determined to employ their Indian allies, if necessary, in a resolute defense of Pensacola. Learning of the apprehensions of the Spanish governor there, Woodbine, at Apalachicola, abandoned his plans to attack an American post, Fort Hawkins, and set his forces in motion towards the Spanish town. Sergeant Smith, who had been given the local rank of lieutenant, and the Seminole leaders, Thomas and Benjamin Perryman, were instructed to march from Apalachicola to Pensacola with 300 men, while Woodbine embarked with the stores on the Sophie and the Cockchafer to arrive at his destination on July 28.\(^{35}\)

When Nicolls arrived at Prospect Bluff in August, therefore, Woodbine was absent, although Smith and Denny were drilling Indians in the adjacent countryside and other natives were daily arriving to receive provisions and arms. For the first time Nicolls was awakened to theanimosity many of the destitute Indians bore the United States. Commenting upon one group of eighty who arrived at the Bluff, he wrote, “such objects I never saw the like of, absolute skin and bone, but cheerfull [sic] and resolved to do their utmost against the common enemy. An old man told me, when I asked him how far it was to where the enemy were, and if he new [sic] the way to lead me to them, he said it was seven days journey to them [about 300 miles] that he could not miss the way for it was marked by the graves of his five children.” However, attention was now pivoted upon Pensacola, and Nicolls did not remain at Prospect Bluff. Leaving some arms there, he sailed for the Spanish town, arriving there on August 24 and manning one of the forts.\(^{36}\)

The arrival of Nicolls at Apalachiola had marked a further advance in the fortunes of the Indians hostile to the United

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35. Woodbine to Lockyer, July 30, 1814, CP, 2328, 39; Woodbine to Smith, July 21, 22, 1814, ibid., 33-34; Woodbine to Cochrane, July 25, 1814, ibid., 35-36; Woodbine to Cameron, July 26, 1814, ibid., 37; Woodbine to Cochrane, August 9, 1814, ibid., 56-57.
States. Their requests had been partly responsible for bringing the British to Apalachicola, and the advent of Woodbine and Nicolls helped them satisfy their immediate needs of food, clothing, and arms. There were also prospects of reversing the military position in the south. Excited by the thought of major British conquests and the promise of being included in any peace settlement, the Indians saw a possible opportunity to regain their lost territories and to expel the rapacious American invaders. Nor was their confidence in the British entirely misplaced. Cochrane had remonstrated with his government on behalf of the Indians in June 1814, and on December 7, 1814, reiterated his concern: “The imbecility of the Spanish Government in West Florida and their natural jealousy leave the Americans every opportunity of encroaching upon the Indians, and as it appears to be the object of the American Government, to cut off all communications between the Indians and Great Britain, by driving the Creeks out of their country and possessing both sides of the Apalachicola, I trust that in any future negotiations of a pacific nature, stipulations will be made for repossessing the Indians of the Territory they have been deprived of.”

Not the least important consequence of the British intervention, therefore, was the renewed hope and the fillip it gave to the nativist morale. Cochrane received a proclamation from Nicolls, McQueen, Francis, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico which voiced their intention to “live or die free of which we have given hard proof by choosing to abandon our Country rather than live in it as slaves.” They described the Spanish as “weak, frail friends,” but the Indians had been impressed with British verve: “since your sons came here... we walk like men in their streets.”

If the arrival of the British had stiffened the resolve of the Indians, it was not, by itself, sufficient to win over to the nativists those tribesmen who had been willing to accept American domination. The battle lines remained largely as before, the difference being simply that the belligerent Seminoles and surviving Red Sticks could now call upon the British,

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37. Cochrane to Admiralty, December 7, 1814, ADM/1/505/150-51; Cochrane to Admiralty, June 22, 1814, ADM/1/506/343.
38. Peter McQueen, Francis, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico to Cochrane, September 1, 1814, ADM/1/505/165-66.
as well as the Spanish, for support. Their morale and prospects had improved, but military superiority in the south still remained firmly with the United States. That being so, the Creeks under the Big Warrior, the Choctaws, the Chickasaws, and the Cherokees continued overtly to remain friendly to the Americans. If they were to align with the nativists, a major military breakthrough by the British would be necessary. There are reasons to believe that had the British achieved such a success most of the southern Indians, despite the machinations of American agents, would have joined their Seminole and Red Stick brethren. Much restrained discontent existed among the tribesmen, and it was enhanced in the summer of 1814 by the harshness of Jackson’s Indian policy.

To some extent the extremity of Jackson’s dealings with the Indians reflected his concern at the implications of the British arrival at Apalachicola. As early as July, after receiving definite news of the landing, Jackson induced the United States to re-appraise its plans to disband the militia. He argued that Pensacola should be occupied since it provided a haven from which hostile Indians might raid American settlements; Jackson issued an ultimatum to the remaining recalcitrant Creeks, demanding that they surrender by August 1. At Fort Jackson on August 9 he imposed upon the tribe his treaty, seizing about half of their land in order to separate the Indians from their potential allies, the Spaniards. The belief that the treaty of Fort Jackson would cement the Indians in friendship to the United States was, perhaps, a cynical one. On August 10 Jackson recommended that food and clothing be distributed to the neutral Creeks, “or necessity will compel them to embrace the proffered friendship of the British. . . . To clothe the whole number will cost a considerable sum; but this sum would be very inferior to the Value of the territory ceded to the United States; in addition to which I may observe, that the cession has made them our friends, and will in future effectually prevent their becoming our enemies.”

Unable, however, to understand the form of friendship that deprived them so unjustly of about half of their land, even the

39. Jackson to Armstrong, July 24, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 19-20; Jackson to David Holmes, ibid., 18-19; Jackson to Armstrong, July 30, 1814, ibid., 22-23.
40. Jackson to John Coffee, July 17, 1814, ibid., 16-17.
41. Jackson to Armstrong, August 19, 1814, ibid., 24-26.
pacific Creeks grew restless. The Big Warrior, who had held fast to the Americans throughout the Creek war, was regarded with suspicion by Jackson’s colleagues. The general even demanded a liberal policy to be pursued with the Choctaws, hitherto considered as a neutral or friendly tribe, to check the growth of dissension. While Jackson alternated a cool hand of charity with an iron fist, Indians were reported to be “pouring” into the British camps for arms. The Big Warrior established amicable relations with the Seminoles and was alleged to have “cut” with the Americans; plans were afoot to reconcile him with the Red Sticks. Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw delegates contacted Nicolls, and some Shawnees from the north relayed the news that “they are coming to join us right through the enemy’s country. The chiefs all believe it but it appears very improbable to me. . . . When I asked one of their messengers what they did for provisions he replied most seriously that in their first attack they destroyed 500 of the Americans and barbecued [sic] the fattest of them and since that they never were in want.”

There were, therefore, constant demands upon the British for supplies. At Apalachicola British vessels unloaded provisions and arms for transportation in shallow boats up the river to Prospect Bluff where Lieutenants Mitchell and Sergeant were strengthening the fort there. Ships also visited Pensacola. Yet at both places it was necessary to send out parties of Indians to forage, and on September 4 one group attacked a house near Mobile, killing or capturing a white man and three Negroes. The incident prompted Jackson to demand the seizure of Pensacola and the construction of an American fort upon the Apalachicola.

The Treaty of Fort Jackson probably pushed many wavering Indians towards the nativists and the British, and it multiplied the resentment of others. Cochrane and Nicolls appeared to be the only immediate means whereby lost lands might be regained, but, notwithstanding this, if an intertribal alliance was to be

42. Ibid., August 5, 1814, ibid., 30-31; Jackson to Rachel Jackson, August 28, 1814, ibid., 35; W. C. C. Claiborne to Jackson, August 29, 1814, ibid., 35-36; Big Warrior to Hawkins, August 25, 1814, ibid., 36; James Monroe to Jackson, September 5, 1814, ibid., 43; Jackson to Monroe, October 14, 1814, ibid., 72-74.

43. Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61. The reference is presumably to the battle of Frenchtown, January 22, 1813.

44. Jackson to Monroe, September 5, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 42; Jackson to Manrique, September 9, 1814, ibid., 44-56.
consummated, the necessity for British victories in the field was paramount. Unfortunately, their first attempt to both display their own martial prowess and to employ their existing Indian allies degenerated into a humiliating fiasco. To strengthen his hold upon the Gulf coast, Nicolls attempted to capture Mobile, a garrison with only some 158 fit men at the time of his attack. At Pensacola Nicolls had at his disposal a number of men from his colonial marines, a few British vessels, and the Indians. The latter were daily increasing. They arrived as destitute refugees, many in so poor a condition that they were not immediately serviceable as a military force. It was estimated in August by Captain Lockyer that 1,000 Indians were at Pensacola, of whom 700 were warriors, Woodbine placed their strength even higher at 2,000, of whom 800 were fighting men. Some of these Indian forces had come from Apalachicola. Their chiefs were McQueen, Francis, John of the Attassee, Old Factor of the Euchees, Hopoeth Mico of the Four Nations, and Colonel Perryman of the Seminoles. It is probable that they were respectably armed. Lockyer distributed six cases of arms and eight kegs of powder to the Pensacola Red Sticks, and munitions had also been ferried from Apalachicola. A setback, however, to Nicoll's attempts to recruit men for an assault upon Mobile occurred at the beginning of September when Lockyer failed to win the allegiance of the Baratarian pirates under the command of the Lafitte brothers.

About 190 Indians participated in the attack upon Mobile on September 12-15, 1814; 130 warriors were on board the four British ships and sixty were ashore with Lieutenant Castle. During an engagement between the vessels and the batteries of Fort Bowyer both Percy and Nicolls, aboard the Hermes, were wounded. Nicolls lost the sight of his right eye. Nor more successful were Captain Robert Harvey and a shore party, who advanced on September 14 with a howitzer to within 800 yards of the fort but who were compelled to retreat before heavy American fire. The following day the vessels stood in while

45. Jackson to Monroe, September 17, 1814, ibid., 50-51.
46. Lockyer to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 67-68; Woodbine to Cochrane, August 9, 1814, ibid., 56-57; Nicolls, expenses, enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21, 1815, WO/1/143/123-27.
the troops approached along the beach to fire upon Fort Bowyer with the howitzer. The latter expended all its available shells and case shot without success, and an attempt was made to storm the American positions by landing parties from the boats supported by Indians on the shore. When these efforts also proved futile, the whole British and Indian force fell back to Pensacola. Their performance had been a lamentable one; they had lost the Hermes, which ran ashore, and thirty-two men killed and thirty-seven wounded aboard the ships. Scant casualties—four killed and five wounded—had been inflicted upon the enemy. Indian participation in the affair seems to have been minimal.\footnote{Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61; Percy to Cochrane, September 16, 1814, ibid., 83-87; Robert Harvey to Nicolls, September 20, 1814, ibid., 91; Cochrane to Admiralty, December 7, 1814, ADM/1/505/150-51; list of casualties, ibid., 161-62.}

The reverse at Mobile deprived the British of an opportunity to advance their cause among the uncommitted Indian tribes, but it was scarcely significant compared with the importance attached to the defense of Pensacola. This Spanish town had been a traditional prop of Creek independence of the United States since the post-revolutionary time of Alexander McGillivray. It had supplied ammunition and shelter to the Red Sticks in their war of 1813-1814, and its capture could not fail to impress Indians throughout the south. It became increasingly clear that the Americans would make an attempt against Pensacola, and the debacle at Mobile served to increase the necessity for Jackson to do so. Aware of the weakness of the Spaniards, he was prepared to force the issue with Governor Manrique. On August 24 Jackson repeated his allegations that the Spanish were harboring Indians hostile to the United States.\footnote{Jackson to Manrique, August 24, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 28-29.} Manrique, in reply, recalled recent American aggression against Spain’s possessions and declared the Treaty of Fort Jackson to be void, a matter that would be taken up with his home government in Spain.\footnote{Manrique to Jackson, August 30, 1814, ibid., 37-40.} Jackson was unimpressed. He mobilized his militia, which included, significantly, 700 Choctaws, and eventually marched upon the town. An admonition of October 21 from Secretary of State James Monroe ordered the general not to take “measures which
would involve this Government in a contest with Spain” but arrived too late to interfere with the expedition.  

The British and Indian participation in the defense of Pensacola proved to be both ineffective and fraught with difficulties. Provisioning the large numbers of Indians assembling there was perennially embarrassing, for, although some supplies were brought in by sea, most had to be purchased locally and shortages and profiteering drove up prices. Difficulties were constantly encountered in procuring clothing, blankets, needles, vermillion, ammunition, salt, and food. Woodbine lacked sufficient ready cash and found himself dredging his private resources and borrowing to meet the outlay, and, since American supplies were gradually stifled, Nicolls reported the necessity of smuggling flour into Pensacola.  

British inability to meet all the accounts of the Pensacola merchants immediately did not improve their relationships with the local residents, but a more contentious matter still was Nicolls’s recruitment of slaves to the fury of the slaveholders. The blacks had not rallied to the British standard as readily as had the Indians, and only about eighty of them were at this time assembled at Prospect Bluff. Others were with Nicolls at Pensacola, and some of them were claimed as the property of local dignitaries, such as the Indian trader John Forbes. Since the British had announced on August 26 and August 29 that neutral rights would be safeguarded, and Nicolls was present at Pensacola as an ally of the Spaniards, there was logic in the complaints of Forbes and other slaveowners that they had been poorly treated.  

It is impossible to determine how far the Negroes had been impressed by Nicolls, or whether they were simply enlisting with the British to take advantage of their standing offer of land in the colonies open to slaves volunteering for service. Whatever the truth of the matter, however, it held important implications for Indian resistance in the south, because during the ensuing decades the communities of largely

51. Monroe to Jackson, October 21, 1814, ibid., 79-80; Jackson to Monroe, October 26, 1814, ibid., 82-83.
52. Woodbine to Nicolls, October 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 95; Woodbine to Nicolls, September 27, 1814, ibid., 93; Woodbine accounts, ibid., 100, 107; Nicolls to naval commissioners, October 1814, ibid., 102.
free Negroes located in the Seminole country were to be principal forces in the fight against tribal removal.54

The Negro issue at Pensacola intensified difficulties which had already developed among the Indians, the British, and John Forbes. The Red Sticks charged that Forbes had so stifled supplies of ammunition to Indians during the Creek war that they had been compelled to retreat to Pensacola. This was all the more irritating, since lands on the Apalachicola River had been ceded to Forbes's company by Seminoles and Creeks in 1804 and 1811 conditional upon Forbes's operating an Indian trade with regulated prices. Under this front, the warriors alleged, Forbes had attempted to settle Indian land. In addition to the native grievances, the British had evidence that Forbes was now committed to a south dominated by American rather than British, or even Spanish, suzerainty, although his company continued to operate out of Pensacola. One partner, James Innerarity, was, in 1816, major of the American town of Mobile and colonel of the Mobile militia, and he was in regular contact with his brother, John Innerarity at Pensacola. In an intercepted letter of 1814 to Doyle and Hambly at Apalachicola, it was revealed that Forbes himself, in St. Augustine, had urged his employees to dissuade the Indians from joining the British. It was comparatively easy, therefore, for the Indians and the British to regard the Forbes company as a source of espionage and as an obstruction to their efforts.55

The problems with Forbes and other Pensacola residents did not end when the British eventually departed. At that time Nicolls made efforts to settle debts with the local merchants, and in February 1815 Cochrane appointed a committee to investigate and liquidate claims upon the British. However, the admiral declared that he had no power over any Negroes except those actually taken by the British Marines; he assumed no responsibility for those still with the Indians. This did not appease all slaveowners, and Forbes and Company continued to agitate

upon this account and was able to obtain the arrest and imprisonment of Woodbine at New Providence in October 1815 on charges of appropriating slaves. As late as 1854, John Innerarity was claiming indemnification for forty-five slaves from the British. Such discontent was probably due in part to the attempt of the British after the war to fulfill their obligations to the enlisted Negroes. Although an effort was made to persuade the latter to return to their former masters, they were offered the choice of enlisting in the West Indian Regiments or of taking small pieces of land in the West Indies as free settlers. Alternatively, they might remain at the fort at Prospect Bluff, or on the Suwannee River, or live with the Indians. To the chagrin of Innerarity and his colleagues, many of the Negroes preferred these courses to returning to their masters.56

More important than these disputes, however, in the defense of Pensacola, was the friction between Nicolls and Governor Manrique. Strained relations between the two made any concerted effort impossible. Manrique was unwilling to antagonize Jackson unnecessarily realizing his weak position in the event of an American attack. He sought to retain control of the defense of Pensacola: whereas Nicolls and Captain James Alexander Gordon of the Seahorse, who arrived with the Mars and the Shelburne, demanded a more aggressive approach to the problem. The Spanish, Nicolls reported, were “slumbering amidst the threatened storm,” but, apart from launching weak Indian sorties against American forces which flitted about the area, there was little he could do without more cooperation.57

In an attempt to reverse the lethargy in the defense, the British, somewhat arbitrarily, interfered with Manrique’s supervision of the preparations to resist Jackson’s army. On November 2, they threatened to evacuate their forces unless Fort Barrancas


57. Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, CP, 2328, 199-11; Nicolls to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ibid., 103-04.
and the harbor entrance were placed under the joint control of Manrique and Nicolls. In reply the governor explained that “it was not in the power of the Governor to declare war.”

On November 3-5, the Indians and their families were moved across Pensacola Bay to a place of greater safety, and the next day the Americans opened fire upon Fort St. Miguel, near the town, partly manned by the British. Jackson called upon the Spaniards to surrender and while Manrique replied that he would repel any attack upon the town, his hand was weakened by the attitudes of his British allies, who believed that a successful defense was no longer possible. Gordon brusquely informed the governor that 600 Indian warriors had been sent to Apalachicola, and that “the enemy had already got possession of a post that he [Manrique] should have defended, that from his conduct, I was certain he had betrayed his trust, and as it was my duty to provide for the safety of the troops and the ships under my orders, I should destroy the Barrancas and the Fort on Santa Rosa, embarking the Spanish troops who choose to come off whenever I saw the enemy in possession of the town. By my direction the fort on Santa Rosa was destroyed that evening.”

Pensacola was stormed by Jackson’s force on November 7; little resistance was offered. The following day Nicolls sent away the Indian rear guard, 200 Spanish soldiers were embarked from Barrancas, the guns were spiked, surplus arms and stores destroyed, and the fortifications blown up. The squadron remained in the harbor only long enough to cover the retreat of the Indians. Then it left with all but one of the ships sailing for Apalachicola with the British and Spanish forces. Because the British vessels were busy elsewhere, Manrique’s soldiers did not leave Apalachicola and return to Pensacola until the summer of 1815.

58. Nicolls and Gordon to Manrique, November 2, 1814, ADM/1/505/71; Nicolls and Gordon to Manrique, October 11, 1814, CP, 2328, 96; Nicolls to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ibid., 103-04.
60. Ibid.; Manrique to Jackson, November 6, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 93.
61. Gordon to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ADM/1/505/169-70; Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, CP, 2328, 109-11; Jackson to Monroe, November 14, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 96-99; Cochrane, February 17, 1815, ADM/1/508/556-61.
Jackson's occupation of Pensacola represented the second defeat for the infant British-Indian alliance, and a more serious one than Mobile. It strongly indicated the military preeminence of the United States, and must have counteracted the headway which the British and their Indian allies had made among the neutral tribes. Seven months earlier, the fall of Pensacola would have been disastrous for the nativists, since it had been the major source of succour for Francis and McQueen's Red Sticks. In November, however, Apalachicola offered an alternative, especially as the position was being gradually strengthened. The British, supervised by Lieutenant Christie of the Royal Artillery, completed their fort at Prospect Bluff on the east bank of the river, and another fort was built at the forks of the Apalachicola. The immediate consequence of the fall of Pensacola, therefore, was a transfer of the Indian strength to Apalachicola, where they continued to assemble and arm. Jackson was disturbed by the concentration, but an American expedition against the Indians under Major Uriah Blue was not successful.62

In November Nicolls's principal objective was to maintain a force which could collaborate with Cochrane's invasion fleet, then assembling in the West Indies. At Apalachicola three companies of Negro Colonial Marines had been formed, and a fourth was in the process of organization. There was still hope of harnessing the neutral Creeks, for whom £500 worth of presents were being prepared, and the Cherokees, who received British arms. It is not inconceivable that the arrival in the Gulf of Mexico of Cochrane's forces at the end of the month encouraged more Indians to join the British. On December 22, 1814, for example, the 1,100 warriors, 450 women, and 755 children at Apalachicola were joined by 500 newcomers, "several wavering towns" having "lately joined us from the American Lines," and early in January "two different Indian tribes from the neighbourhood of the American lines," some 1,100 men, arrived.63 Probably there were over 2,000 Indian fighting men gathered at the Bluff at the time, although British

estimates held that 3,551 warriors were available for service. Of these 1,421 resided on or near the Apalachicola River, 800 were Red Sticks, 400 were Chihaw Lower Creeks, 760 were Seminoles or Mikasuki, and 170 were Negroes from the area eastwards of the Flint and the Apalachicola rivers. None of the neutral tribes had come over to the British, although it is possible to argue that the Choctaw were substantially with the Americans. The most promising recruits were still the Big Warrior Creeks, who were believed to have 2,540 warriors, of whom some 1,300 had been with the Red Sticks during the Creek war.64

During this period the relationship between the nativists and Nicolls and Woodbine matured into one of mutual affection. Working daily with the Indians, the two British officers developed a respect for their allies which stands in stark contrast to the bigoted arrogance with which they were regarded by many British leaders.65 Among the chiefs at Apalachicola who were frequently in British company were McQueen, Francis, John, Old Factor, Hopoeth Mico, Perryman, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico; the latter two, both Seminoles, had remained at Prospect Bluff during the operations at Pensacola. Cappachamico and Perryman were reported much annoyed with John Forbes, and with other Indians, confiscated the company’s property at the Bluff and rescinded the land grants made earlier to the traders. In particular, the “brave and faithful old Chief” Cappachamico, as Nicolls called him, bore such a grievance against Forbes that he vowed his death. It was this warrior, who, with Perryman, Francis, and others, visited Cochrane’s flagship, the Tonnant, when it arrived in Apalachicola Bay late in 1814, and who, in company with Hopoy Mico, Francis, and some colleagues, was entertained aboard the Erebus when it arrived in the bay in January 1815.66

For all their understanding, however, Nicolls and Woodbine, like most white men who met Indians, did not doubt that aboriginal society was inferior to that of their own. A philanthropic sentiment was present. Woodbine, for instance, proudly

64. “Return of Muscogee or Creek Indians,” WO/ 1/ 143/ 174-75.
65. For example, compare Mahon, War of 1812, 352, with Jane Lucas de Grummond, The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1961), 68-69.
66. Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 117-18; David Ewen Bartholomew to Cochrane, February 6, 1815, ibid., 145; Nicolls, expenses, enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21, 1815, WO/ 1/ 143/ 123-27.
declared that “the lessons of humanity, inculcated in the minds of our aggrieved red brethren have not been thrown away.” As he confided to Nicolls, “Their having given up unhurt to yourself all the prisoners captured by them since your arrival, makes me feel not a little proud in having been the first instrument of inducing them to lay aside the tomahawk and the scalping knife.” The warriors were even willing to “liberate their slaves, tho’ they were to lose what they cost them.” “The Indian character,” he believed, “has been much mistaken and has been most unjustly stigmatized as bloody and ferocious. You have been long enough among them to observe many most amiable traits in them, which only want the fostering hand of instruction and the light of Christianity to mature. You often said that with a little trouble and expense these our loyal brethren might be civilized. Be assured, Sir, it is the truth and a very few thousands expended on that laudable object would insure to Great Britain thousands of most faithful and obedient subjects whose loyalty has stood unshaken to our Sovereign [in] spite of all the allurements held out to them by the Americans.”

Patronizing as many of these remarks may have been, they reflect a recognition by both Nicolls and Woodbine of qualities in the Indians missed by many contemporaries.

Inevitably, the concentration of men at the Bluff posed the usual problem of supplies. Considerable quantities of provisions and munitions were required. The Alceste, for example, landed thirty-seven cases of arms and casks of flints, five bales, nine cases, four casks, eighteen bundles, ten cradles, and four bags of “sundry stores,” 200 barrels of ball cartridges, 1,600 sand bags, three cases of tools, seventy-five shovels, and other implements. In November the Seahorse and the Childers deposited stores, three six-pounder pieces, and $4,000; $3,000 was for the use of Woodbine and the balance for Nicolls. The attrition was particularly severe upon food supplies. In December twelve barrels of flour were consumed each day, and in times of acute stress Nicolls was compelled to send the warriors into the woods to hunt. Even the river exacerbated the difficulties, for the

67. Woodbine to Nicolls, October 27, 1814, CP, 2328, 145.
68. List of goods aboard the Alceste, ibid., 108.
69. Gordon to Cochrane, November 19, 1814, ibid., 111-12.
70. Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, ibid., 117-18; Rawlins to Senior Officer, Pensacola, January 16, 1815, ibid., 138.
ebbs in the Apalachicola obstructed the shallow-draught vessels which conveyed provisions to Prospect Bluff, and the bar in the bay sometimes necessitated the lightening of the victualling ships before they could pass towards the river mouth. Thus, the Erebus, which arrived off St. George’s Island on January 22, 1815, was not able to shift supplies up the Apalachicola until the twenty-eighth.71

Nevertheless, a formidable force of men was assembled and maintained at Prospect Bluff, and their use was planned as part of the British invasion of the south. On December 5, 1841, Cochrane and Major General John Keane issued a proclamation to the Indians asserting that the war aims of the British included “the restoration of those lands of which the People of Bad Spirit have basely robbed them [the Indians]” which was to act as a clarion call for battle.72 The Indians were to harrass the Georgian frontier and to link up with Admiral George Cockburn, who was operating upon the Atlantic seaboard against Florida and Georgia, while Cochrane himself struck at New Orleans. Later, in February, it was envisaged that they might act in a diversionary role by attacking Fort Stoddert on the Tombigbee River and threatening Mobile. Unfortunately, although, as late as January 1815, Prospect Bluff was strengthened by the addition of two long sixes and a company of the West India Regiment, the forces there were used in a fragmentary and ineffective manner. During the period November to February, fifty Mikasukis moved south to attack the frontier, Woodbine tried to make contact to the northeast with Cockburn, Nicolls took fewer than 100 Seminole, Creek, and Choctaw warriors to participate in the abortive British attack upon New Orleans, and some men were sent towards Mobile to cooperate with General John Lambert’s troops there. Nothing of importance was achieved by any of these parties.73 Worse still, the major British invasion of the south misfired. In December and January General Edward Pakenham’s army was disastrously defeated at New Orleans, and

71. Bartholomew to Cochrane, January 31, 1815, ibid., 142; Rawlins to Cochrane, December 21, 1814, ibid., 122.
72. Cochrane and John Keane, proclamation to the Indians, December 5, 1814, WO/1/143/159.
73. Cochrane to John Lambert, February 3, 1815, ADM/1/508/566-69; Cochrane, February 14, 1815, ibid., 535-38; Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 117-18; Bartholomew to Cochrane, January 31, 1815, ibid., 143.
while Cockburn raided the coasts in January, and Lambert's force captured Fort Bowyer the following month, no major progress had been made before hostilities between Britain and the United States finally came to an end.

At the close of the War of 1812, therefore, the Indian service with the British had been singularly unsuccessful. Large numbers of Seminoles and Red Sticks had assembled to fight their American foes, and although they had loyally accepted British direction, they were witness to a series of reverses: the repulse at Mobile, the loss of Pensacola, and the rout at New Orleans. The warriors themselves had hardly been in battle, and their losses were trivial. "I have had 4, 8, and 13 of them killed in different affairs," wrote Nicholls more than a year later.\footnote{Nicholls to Cochrane, March 1, 1816, WO/1/144/139-42.} In February 1815, the Americans may have appeared far from secure, but they had preserved their control of the south, and in such circumstances the Seminoles and the Red Sticks could expect little support from the other Indians who were more amenable to the United States.

At best, the nativists could claim to have been rescued from distress and to have received food and arms. But their lands were still in the hands of their enemies, and their ability to maintain their independence was almost as precarious as it had been before the British arrived. Nevertheless, there were still those promises made by Cochrane that the Creeks would not be forgotten in the event of peace. If the British had failed the Indians militarily, it remained to be seen if, by diplomacy, their pledges could be fulfilled.

When Admiral Cochrane had first written in June 1814 to Whitehall, arguing that the Indians should be included in a peace, he was preaching to the converted. As early as August 29, 1812, General Isaac Brock, who owed so much to Tecumseh and his followers in the campaign which saved Canada from invasion that year, had urged the British government to protect his Indian allies in peace negotiations, and by the end of 1812 he had obtained from Earl Bathurst, colonial secretary, a promise to that effect. The lesson was reinforced by the Canadian fur trade interest. It agitated for the preservation of Indian hegemony over the lands of the lakes and the northwest which would afford the traders, access to that prime hunting area. In 1814, when the war in Europe ended, such ideas seemed feasible;
Britain would be free to concentrate its resources towards a military victory sufficient to warrant the imposition upon the United States of a settlement that would protect the Indian lands. Catching this mood, in May and June interested parties clamoured in the British press for the creation of an Indian buffer state in the northwest.75

However, Viscount Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, was in no position to ask prolonged military operations of a war- and tax-weary Britain. While he hoped that the 1814 campaigns would weaken the hand of the United States, he feared that an extensive war would raise opposition to his government at home. Moreover, he had, of course, little if any commitment to the Indian cause. Nevertheless, he instructed his three commissioners negotiating with the American diplomats at Ghent to insist "as a sine qua non of peace" upon "an adequate arrangement" of Indian interests. This, he suggested, might be obtained by both Britain and the United States guaranteeing "the Indian possessions as they shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part of either state," thus creating between Canada and the United States a buffer which would reduce, he believed, tension between the two countries.76

The Americans were, naturally, astonished by such suggestions when the peace negotiations opened in Ghent in August 1814, and the British commissioner, Henry Goulburn, coupled the idea of the barrier state with the sine qua non. Indeed, as late as January 1814, James Monroe had been proposing his own solution to British and American friction over the Indians by means of a British cession of Canada.77 By August, the Americans


were on the defensive, but their commissioners undoubtedly considered the idea of an Indian barrier state, which would pose a threat to the expansion of the United States, as preposterous. It would restore to the Indians a recognition of their sovereignty over the lands they occupied, and it would impeach American jurisdiction over the northwestern territory, concepts satisfactorily conceded to the advantage of the United States by the British in 1783. Moreover, since the Americans were determined to settle the northwest, the creation of the barrier state would amount to a virtual cession of territory by the United States. As described by Goulburn on August 9, the Indian land would not be alienable either to Britain or the United States, and Castlereagh was persuaded to consider the Greenville treaty line of 1795 as a basis for discussion of boundaries. Although the American diplomats lacked instructions which would enable them to deal with the matter, they expressed contempt for the British proposals. Henry Clay, one of the American commissioners, referred to “the absurdity, to say the least of it, of Great Britain attempting, without powers, to treat for savage tribes, scattered over our acknowledged territory, the very names of which she probably does not know.”

On August 25 the American commissioners rejected the conditions of the Indian buffer state and British control of the lakes, leaving Britain with the alternatives of climbing down over the Indian issues or of risking what Castlereagh termed an “imprudent” military campaign. Lord Liverpool, the British prime minister, doubted that his government could guarantee inalienable Indian lands, since the tribes themselves might wish to sell territory to the United States. Concerned that the peace negotiations would be ruptured, he suggested a modification to the sine qua non which established it in its final form. It would certainly have been difficult to justify to the British public the maintenance of the war on a question so remote to them as the fate of the American Indian. Sir James Mackintosh, for one, expressed agreement with the Americans, and stated in the

78. Henry Clay to Monroe, August 18, 1814, ibid., 962-68; Castlereagh to the British commissioners, August 14, 1814, Vane, Papers of Castlereagh, X, 86-91.
79. Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, August 28, 1814, ibid., 100-02.
House of Commons that it was impossible to contemplate prohibiting land sales "from the savages." It would, he suggested, "arrest the progress of mankind" and "condemn one of the most favoured tracts of the earth to perpetual sterility." His views were similar to those of one of the American commissioners, John Quincy Adams.81

Article 9 of the final treaty was the crucial item. "The United States of America," it read, "engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification, and, forthwith, to restore to such tribes or nations respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811, previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly."

Its implications for the southern Indians were evident, even though the British diplomats envisaged that they were working on the behalf of the northern tribes alone. The Treaty of Fort Jackson of August 9, 1814, had already been declared by the nativists and the Spaniards to be null. Now, by international treaty, the United States also invalidated Jackson's dispossession of the Creeks, since, by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent, the Indians were to be restored "all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811."

Cochrane received news of the peace in February 1815, but he remained ready to resume operations if the treaty was not ratified. On February 14 he wrote Nicolls, requesting him to advise the Indians to cease hostilities and await the consummation of the treaty and the consequent restoration of their lands. Various precautions were, in the meantime, to be taken to ensure the safety of the Indians at Apalachicola. The munitions, presents, and stores were to be turned over to them, and the warriors might be permitted to retain the field guns if they considered them necessary for their defense. Nicolls's marines,

82. Parliamentary Debates, XXX, 216-17.
the coloured colonial marines, and the company of the 5th West India Regiment at the Bluff were not to be withdrawn until the peace was finally concluded. In addition, General Lambert was asked to place a British regiment and two more West India regiments at Apalachicola, and the ships were to remain in support. In March additional supplies of corn were sent to the Indians in the Norge and the Meteor. That military campaigning was not yet considered inconceivable is indicated by a scale of allowances devised only a little before this time to provide inducements to the Indian chiefs.

The Indians and some of the British seem to have been sufficiently naive to believe that the Americans would restore the lands “ceded” in 1814, but from this delusion they were rapidly awakened. On April 28, 1815, Nicolls, who had remained at Apalachicola after the troops were withdrawn, felt obliged to protest to the American agent, Benjamin Hawkins. He enclosed a copy of Article 9 and complained that a few days previously a number of Americans had attacked a Seminole town of Chief Bowlegs, killing a man and wounding another, and stealing cattle. The Indians, however, had refrained from any acts hostile to the United States, and, indeed, had resolved to communicate with the Americans as little as possible. Consequently, Nicolls warned the latter not to encroach upon Indian territory or to communicate directly with the natives, and to evacuate the lands Jackson had sequestered as guaranteed by Article 9. To emphasize the point, Nicolls enclosed an Indian pledge, signed by Hopoeth Mico, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico, in which the Indians, declaring themselves “a free and independent people,” gave their promise to abide by the treaty.

Unfortunately, Nicolls’s tone was likely to aggravate rather than to placate the American temper, and his letter was treated

83. Cochrane to Nicolls, February 14, 1815, ADM/1/508/531-32; Cochrane, February 17, 1815, ibid., 556-61; Cochrane to Pulteney Malcolm, February 17, 1815, ibid., 562-63; Cochrane to John Lambert, February 17, 1815, ibid., 564-66.

84. Malcolm to Nicolls, March 5, 1815, Foreign Office Papers, Public Record Office, Kew, England (hereinafter cited as FO), class 5/folio 139/p. 181; Cochrane, instructions to Nicolls, March 9, 1815, ibid., 185; Scale of Allowances Proposed to be Given to the Indians when Assembled to Aid in Operations against the United States, 1815, CP, 2330, 171a.

with derision. Hawkins commented that the Indian signers were Seminoles, not Creeks, rather speciously, since the former tribe had lost lands on the lower Chattahoochee and the Flint as a result of the Fort Jackson treaty, and Jackson himself resented the continued interference of the British agents and the "bare faced effrontery" of the letter. As a result, Nicolls again wrote Hawkins on May 12, complaining that while one of the Indians had executed a tribesman for stealing cattle belonging to the United States, Chief Bowlegs's village had once more been attacked by American filibusters, and two people had been murdered. Notwithstanding, he continued, he had the previous day arranged for four chiefs in different parts of the Indian country to be designated upholders of the law and to accept responsibility for its maintenance. In view of this, the Americans should evacuate the lands of the Indians according to the Ghent treaty. More antagonistic was the tactless announcement by Nicolls that he had furnished the Indians with arms and ammunition for their defense and had prepared an offensive and defensive treaty between Britain and the chiefs which was to be taken to London for ratification.86

The new "treaty" was an attempt to provide for the needs of both Nicolls and the Indians, and it proclaimed also its value to British interest generally. With the war over, Nicolls faced the prospect of unemployment with half pay, and he had neither received his salary for the last year nor a confirmation of the pay and allowances offered him by Cochrane when he was appointed to the provincial rank of colonel of the colonial regiment. Furthermore, service with the Indians had enjoined severe expenses which had eroded Nicolls's personal resources. The cost of his entertainment of leading chiefs alone, up to December 7, 1814, had amounted to $1,952, of which Cochrane had repaid $500 in February 1815. As late as August of that year, however, Nicolls was in debt to the extent of £442. To banish these embarrassments, he hoped to remain in the south as an Indian superintendent, representing British interests, and, from the confiscated land formerly occupied by Forbes and Company, to administer a profitable Indian trade.87

86. Jackson to Hawkins, August 14, 1815, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 214-15; Nicolls to Hawkins, May 12, 1815, WO/1/143/165-66. 87. Nicolls to Bathurst, May 5, 1817, WO/1/144/417-18; Nicolls, Memorial, ibid., 419-22; expenses enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21,
The treaty was drafted at the British fort on the junction of the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers on March 10, 1815, and signed by thirty chiefs, including Hopoeth Mico, Hopoy Mico, Cappachamico, and Francis. The Forbes grants were declared invalid, and the British were asked to provide trade through, the Alabama, Apalachicola, and St. Marys rivers. The Indians swore obedience to the British, and denounced sales of native land without British consent. They offered to grant territory to any subjects of Britain sent to stay with them. The chiefs promised to “do our best to protect and defend them in their lands and property.”

There can be no doubt that the chiefs feared the loss of British support, especially as famine, accentuated by the large numbers of Red Stick refugees in Seminole country, was still present. The document also drew attention to some of their earlier grievances predating the Creek war of 1813, such as the wagon road blazed through the Indian land from Hartford, Georgia, to Mobile, and the activities of Creek Chief William McIntosh. The latter, the Indians stated, had been sent by the Creeks to remonstrate with the Americans over the road and the encroachments upon the Tombigbee, Coosa, and Alabama rivers, but he had been bribed and had sold a large tract about the Oconee and the Ocmulgee rivers to the United States.

Nicolls had shown little discretion in detailing the trade agreement to Hawkins, because the Treaty of Fort Jackson, which the Indians considered anulled, had itself been concocted as a device to separate the Creeks, by a land cession, from interference by the Spaniards. To demand the restoration of those territories and in the same breath to provide further evidence for the necessity of the cession was the ultimate folly. Couched in such a truculent manner, and furnishing further grounds for suspicion of the Indians, Nicolls’s communications only served to reinforce the political expediency of the Treaty of Fort Jackson, and the Americans found it convenient to ignore Article 9.

After one more attempt to protest at the running of the Fort Jackson line, Nicolls, accompanied by Francis, his son, his in-
interpreter, and his servant, who had been deputized by the Indians to place their complaints before the British government and to give a calumet of peace to the prince regent, left for England. Early in August Nicolls installed the Indians at his home, Durham Lodge, near Eltham, Kent, and then hurried to London, where he arrived on the evening of August 14. He solicited an interview with Bathurst, but there was little response apart from an order from the earl that some pistols be presented to Chief Francis for his trouble. In a detailed letter, Nicolls explained that the chief had been delegated to present a communication to the British government on behalf of the southern Indians. Various needs of the natives were articulated, including winter clothing for the visitors, the desire for an Indian trade and a communication line with the British in the West Indies through Apalachingola, and the wish of Francis that his son remain in England to receive an education. Probably hoping to invoke ministerial responsibility, it was stated that before the Creek war the Red Sticks had obtained from the governor of Canada a letter urging them to commence the war but that none could read it.90

It appears that Nicolls was also canvassing for monetary rewards; according to a memorial to Bathurst, in which he itemized the remuneration which the leading chiefs and agents should receive. Hopoeth Mico, “the young king of the Four Nations,” he hoped, would be awarded £300 and the half pay of a major, £146 per annum. This last perquisite should also be bestowed upon Cappachamico and the Mikasuki, Hopoy Mico. Francis and Talmuchees Hadjo (presumably McQueen) were each worth £300 and the half pay of a captain, £95.16.3 per annum. Pensions of £63.17.6 per annum, the half pay of a lieutenant, it was suggested, should be assigned to each of six other chiefs, and to First Lieutenant William Hambly of the Colonial Battalion of Black Marines, head interpreter, and to Lieutenant Castle. Nine other interpreters should each receive £40 and Woodbine, £95.16.3 a year. Finally, rewards of 5,831 each of hoes, axes, and

90. Nicolls to Hawkins, June 12, 1815, WO/1/143/151; Nicolls to John Philip Morier, September 25, 1815, ibid., 137-39; expenses of Nicolls; ibid., 141; Nicolls to John Wilson Croker, August 15, 1815, ibid., 103; Nicolls to Bathurst, August 1815, ibid., 107-08.
knives were requested for the Indians and the issuance of a license for regular trade.  

To these appeals the government turned a deaf ear, although on March 12, 1816, Cochrane himself wrote in support of the Creeks, highlighting the disparity between the Fort Jackson and Ghent treaties, and explaining that he had not known of the former agreement when Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer had finally withdrawn the troops. The Red Sticks, he stated, could not be bound by a treaty they had not signed. Eventually, in the early summer of 1816, Francis did obtain an interview with Bathurst. He was accompanied by one Faden as interpreter, since Nicolls was ill, but received little more than sympathy. Although the chief received handsome presents during his visit, the central aims of his mission had been frustrated.  

Fired as he was by an almost fanatical hatred of Americans, he could not induce the British government to enforce the stipulations made on behalf of the Indians in the Treaty of Ghent, nor bring them to underwrite the establishment of a permanent British trade with the southern Indians which would have enabled them to remain independent of the United States. The shallow altruism which had characterized the cabinet’s Indian policy was at last exposed, and further attempts by Francis to obtain a hearing do not appear to have been successful. Nicolls fared the worse for the visit, for he entertained the Indians at his house during the whole period of their stay in England at great personal expense, and he was compelled eventually to memorialize the treasury for relief from a debt of £378.2.6 in 1817.  

Francis did not, however, sail for the West Indies until De-

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91. Nicolls, Memorial to Bathurst, 1815, CP, 2575, 120-21.  
92. Cochrane to Bathurst, March 12, 1816, ibid., 140-41; Nicolls to Cochrane, July 26, 1816, ibid., 157; letter to Henry Goulburn, May 13, 1816, WO/1/144/263. A list of presents considered suitable for the Indians (ibid., 21-28) refers to two ploughs and two harrows in addition to numerous agricultural and domestic utensils, blankets, and cotton. Some of these items, axes, spades, shovels, scythes, hammers, grindstones, rakes, hoes, and nails, were shipped out for Francis, according to J. Barker to George Harrison, January 2, 1817, ibid., 409. In addition the three Indian delegates received suits, sabres, dirks, rifles, and a few agricultural and household instruments while they were in London (Nicolls, expenses, WO/1/143/141).  
93. William Pole to Bathurst, August 16, 1816, WO/1/144/309-10; Nicolls to Bathurst, enclosing memorial, May 5, 1817, ibid., 417-22. Francis’s attitude is revealed in Nicolls, December 19, 1815, CP, 2328, 182, which states: “He (Francis) sweares he will kill every American in the province as soon as he returns.”
cember 30, 1816. In September of that year, when he was preparing to leave, Nicolls attempted to retrieve more from the visit by requesting Bathurst to supply funds for the education of the chief’s son in England, and eventually he managed to procure a sum of £100 which was to be given to Francis by Governor Cameron at New Providence. The Creek’s ensuing departure marked a further retreat of the British on the matter of the Indian allies, and the point was underlined by the cabinet responses to protests lodged by Indians at Apalachicola even before Francis had left London. Early in 1816 a memorial, allegedly from some of the head chiefs of the Choctaw, Creek, and Cherokee, was sent to Cameron pleading for British interference in the question of their rights as guaranteed by the peace.Significantly, the three signers included, at last, the leaders of the hitherto pro-American Creek faction, including Big Warrior (Tustennuggee Thlucko) and Little Prince. Bathurst seemed disposed to act upon the complaint. He forwarded it to the foreign office, observing that the Indians possessed a claim to British intervention, and he instructed Governor Cameron to inform the Indians that the British minister in Washington would raise the matter with the United States.

Nothing, apparently, was done, however, and the inactivity brought two Indian deputies to the Bahamas in January 1817, reporting that the Americans had destroyed the fort at Prospect Bluff and were building posts upon Indian land, while the warriors lacked muskets, ammunition, and British help. Although their message was passed through the usual channels to the foreign office, neither it nor further representations of the Indians for a trade with the West Indies or even the removal of the Creeks to another British colony appear to have accomplished anything. With the refusal of the British to uphold the provisions made for the Indians in the Treaty of

94. Nicolls to Goulburn, December 21, 1816, WO/1/144/399-400; Nicolls to Goulburn, January 7, 1817, ibid., 403-04; Nicolls, September 24, 1816, ibid., 347-48; Bathurst to Cameron, January 11, 1817, FO/5/127/151.
95. Cameron to Bathurst, March 23, 1816, ibid., 142-44; Goulburn to William Hamilton, May 17, 1816., ibid., 145; Bathurst to Cameron, June 8, 1816, ibid., 147.
96. Indian chiefs, December 19, 1816, ibid., 157-58; Cameron to Bathurst, January 10, 1817, ibid., 153; Goulburn to Hamilton, June 26, 1817, ibid., 155.
Ghent, the War of 1812 among the southern Indians may be said to have come to an end.

British promises to the Indians that their rights would not be ignored in the event of a peace had come to nothing. At the time of the so-called first Seminole war of 1818 a final appeal was made to the British through Alexander Arbuthnot, a trader from Nassau, New Providence, then residing with the southern Indians. According to the wishes of the chiefs, especially “King Hatchy,” but presumably also Francis, who “has been called by his people to put himself at their head” and was camped “at Spanish Bluff” with 1,000 to 1,200 men, mainly Red Sticks, word was sent to Cameron, Charles Bagot, and Nicolls that the Indians were in desperate need of assistance. Nicolls, in particular, was stung by the American execution shortly afterwards of his “noble” friend Francis, and he tried hard to persuade his government to intercede on behalf of the natives but without success. For the cabinet the affair became nothing more than another passing incident.

In resigning their interest in the Indian problem, the British signalled the passing of aboriginal America east of the Mississippi. The expansion of the United States could have been arrested only by a bulwark of overwhelming power, one which, conceivably, only the British, with the aid of large numbers of Indians, would have been capable of establishing. Without Britain’s aid, Indian confederacies could not hold the west; their efforts to do so were gallant, but futile. Within a few decades, in both the north and the south, the remnants of the once-proud tribes were dispossessed and removed to areas west of the Mississippi.

It is possible that the dispossession of these Indians might have been deferred had Britain and her native allies enjoyed greater military fortune in the War of 1812. In the northwest, Tecumseh and his warriors had helped contain the American offensive for over a year with few British troops to support them, while in the south the Creeks had employed thousands of American soldiers before their defeat at Horseshoe Bend in March 1814. In both theatres, the principal nativist strength had been broken before the arrival of the major British forces in 1814. Had the

98. Nicolls, June 27, 1818, ibid., 173.
maximum Indian and British power in the north and the south coincided, and greater success attended some of their efforts, it is possible that a defeat of sufficient magnitude might have been inflicted upon the Americans to have at least delayed the dis-possession of the Indians.

The result, in the final reckoning, would have been the same. It is true that many of the British officers had learned to like and sympathize with the Indians, men such as General Isaac Brock, the Indian agent Matthew Elliot, Cochrane, Nicolls, and Woodbine, the men who knew them best. But no nation would, of course, have been prepared to commit the resources that would have been necessary to preserve the Indian homelands, not even Britain, which owed so much to the natives for the defense of Canada. The British, no less than the Americans, adhered to the principles of economic and population growth and territorial expansion which had no place for aboriginal America. Given the proximity of the aggressive nations of America and Europe, bent upon fulfilling “manifest destiny,” the Indian might, briefly, be able to capitalize upon international rivalries to his advantage, but the ultimate preservation of his homeland was not possible.
ON the night of October 8, 1861, in the harbor of Pensacola Bay, long columns of gray clad soldiers marched slowly aboard steamers moored by the dock. Officers whispered orders, and the enlisted men spoke in hushed tones. Aside from their voices, only the rattle of canteens and the lapping of water against the steamers broke the silence of the autumn darkness.

General Braxton Bragg, Confederate commander at Pensacola, had dispatched this expedition in response to increased Union activity in the area. His orders to the commander of this expedition, General R. H. Anderson, were to destroy the enemy encampments on Santa Rosa Island. Anderson, a former West Pointer, divided his force of slightly more than 1,000 men into three battalions. Although none of his battalion commanders were professional soldiers, they were about to participate in their first military engagement. However, one of these men, Colonel James Patton Anderson, had come into service with a variety of experiences which had prepared him for the leadership role he was about to assume.

Born on February 16, 1822, in Winchester, Tennessee, James Patton Anderson was one of the seven children of Colonel William Preston Anderson, a veteran of the War of 1812. He spent his early years on the family farm, and when his father died in 1831, he moved with his mother to his grandfather’s place in Kentucky. He attended a private school in Frankfort, and then in 1836, his stepfather, Dr. Joseph Bybee, a local physician, sent him to Jefferson College in Cannonsburg,
Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, before he finished his education, family financial problems forced him to withdraw from school.\(^2\)

Returning home, Anderson worked for his stepfather at a variety of jobs, including driving him on his medical rounds. Anderson learned something of the medical profession himself, and this probably contributed to the belief that he was a physician.\(^3\)

Dr. Bybee decided to move his family to Hernando, Mississippi in 1839, and there his financial situation improved enough to allow him to send his stepson back to Jefferson College. After graduation, Anderson returned home to study law in a local attorney’s office. At the age of twenty-one, he was admitted to the bar. Anderson began his career in public service by serving as deputy sheriff of De Soto County, Mississippi, and by serving as colonel in the county’s militia regiment.\(^4\)

When the Mexican War broke out, Anderson expected to be called into service, but the state’s military quotas were filled rapidly, and he had to wait until late 1847 when the state issued a call for more troops. Anderson was authorized to raise a company, but he never saw combat, spending the remainder of the war in camp at Tampico.\(^5\) Suffering from malaria, Anderson was mustered out and discharged in July 1848.

He resumed his law practice and entered politics as an advocate of states’ rights. He would soon become an ardent secessionist.\(^6\) He was elected to the Mississippi legislature in 1850, but was defeated in the next election.\(^7\) Anderson’s health continued to deteriorate, and his doctors urged him to seek a colder, drier climate. With the help of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, Anderson received an appointment as United States marshal to the Washington Territory.

Before leaving on his assignment, Anderson married his first cousin, Henrietta Buford Adair of Memphis on April 30, 1853.\(^8\)

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3. Interviews with Margaret Anderson Uhler, Milledgeville, Georgia, August 1978.
5. Ibid.
6. Etta Anderson to Mr. Earle, April 11, 1889, Palatka, Florida, JPAP.
8. Interviews with Margaret Anderson Uhler.
Upon their arrival in the west, the Andersons set up rough housekeeping, and Anderson began his official duties which included the taking of a territorial census. He traveled throughout the territory on foot and by canoe, usually in the company of Indian guides. This outdoor activity quickly restored Anderson's health, much to the relief of Etta who accompanied him on many of his journeys. The young couple loved the open, free life in the territory and made a successful adjustment to rugged frontier conditions.9

After two years in Washington, Anderson was elected territorial delegate to Congress. While he served in the Capitol, Etta lived with their aunt, Mrs. Ellen Adair White Beatty, who owned a large plantation near Monticello, Florida.10

In Washington, Anderson became caught up in the throes of the heated political controversies that were rising between the North and the South. He was alarmed by the growing strength of the abolitionist Republican Party and was fearful of what might happen if it came to power in 1860. Anderson decided he had to return to the South. In 1857, he turned down an invita-

10. Margaret Anderson Uhler, ed., “Civil War Letters of James Patton Anderson,” Florida Historical Quarterly, LVI (October 1977), 151. Ellen Beatty was aunt both to James Patton and Etta Anderson. Her plantation, Casa Bianca, built in 1828, was one of the largest in Florida. Reports conflict, however, concerning the exact acreage and number of slaves that she owned. Jerrell H. Shofner in his History of Jefferson County (Tallahassee, 1976), 117-18, states that Casa Bianca had 3,000 acres, of which 700 were under cultivation, when Anderson became manager in 1856. A letter listing 118 slaves at Casa Bianca as of December 31, 1855, is in the Anderson papers, Box 64. Another list, dated January 7, 1856, shows 121 slaves leased from Ellen A. Beatty. Probably many of the same slaves were on both lists. In 1860 Anderson and Mrs. Beatty sold the plantation to Robert W. Williams of Tallahassee for $18,000. Mrs. Beatty sold her slaves to Anderson for $20,000, and he continued to manage the property with the assistance of an overseer, A. G. A. Godwin. Since Williams lived in Tallahassee, Anderson likely was working the land for him. A check of the slave schedule for Jefferson County, compiled as part of the 1860 census, yields the following information: Mrs. J. P. Anderson owns seven males (p. 71); Mrs. J. P. Anderson owns forty slaves (p. 72); Mr. J. P. Anderson owns a total of thirty slaves, E. A. Beatty owns ten, and Mrs. E. B. Anderson (probably Etta Beatty, Anderson's wife), owns six slaves (p. 80). Assuming that these entries refer to Mr. and Mrs. James Patton Anderson and their aunt, the total number of slaves is ninety-three. This is less than the 350 mentioned in other works. It is, of course, possible that Robert Williams purchased slaves as well as land, and if so, these would be listed with his other slaves in the 1866 Leon County slave schedule.
tion to become territorial governor of Washington, and entered into an agreement with Mrs. Beatty to manage her Florida plantation.\textsuperscript{11} Anderson prospered as a sugar and cotton planter. The family also increased, and by 1861, there were three sons—William Preston, Theophilus Beatty, and James Patton, Jr.\textsuperscript{12}

As the war clouds which Anderson had so feared began to gather following the presidential election of 1860, Florida Governor Madison Starke Perry called a convention to meet in Tallahassee in January 1861 to consider seceding from the Union. Although Anderson was a newcomer to Florida, he had already become an influential person in the state by virtue of his political experience and economic position. Consequently, he was elected convention delegate from Jefferson County as an avowed supporter of secession. While the convention was still in session in Tallahassee, the governor ordered the seizure of all federal forts and arsenals within the state and the formation of two volunteer companies including one from Jefferson County. Anderson was named captain of this company, but his orders to proceed to Pensacola were countermanded when the governor appointed him one of three delegates to represent Florida at the General Convention in Montgomery to create a new Confederate government.\textsuperscript{13} Anderson immediately made his presence felt there as one of the most active members. He served on the committee of military affairs, recommending the raising of troops and the use of slaves to serve as cooks and teamsters. This, he reasoned, would free more white men for military service.\textsuperscript{14}

When the work of the convention was complete, Anderson returned to Monticello where he found orders from Governor Perry directing him to reassemble his company for duty in Pensacola. So anxious was Anderson for military service that he declined to serve in the Confederate Congress.\textsuperscript{15}

The various state militia companies rendezvoused at the Chattahoochee Arsenal, and on April 5, 1861, they were mustered into Confederate service as the First Florida Infantry. Anderson was unanimously elected colonel. The troops boarded river
boats and were traveling via Columbus, Georgia, to Pensacola, as the opening shots of the war were being fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor. \(^{16}\) General Braxton Bragg, department commander, ordered the new troops into camps of instruction.

Both Confederates and Federals at Pensacola received reinforcements, but there was no significant action until late summer. On September 2, a Federal raiding party burned the dry dock anchored near the Navy Yard. Twelve days later a larger force made another assault at the Yard. The party boarded and burned the Confederate schooner Judah and escaped with small losses. \(^{17}\) Bragg responded to this increased Federal activity by organizing an assault on Santa Rosa Island, and this brought Colonel Anderson and his men into action for the first time.

Shortly after midnight on October 9, 1861, the Confederates landed on Santa Rosa at a point about four miles east of Fort Pickens. The southern force was divided into three columns, and Anderson was ordered to move his force along the beach south toward the enemy camps. The march through the palmettoes and sand was not easy, but the Confederates were ready to launch their assault around 3 a.m. Overrunning Colonel Billy Wilson's Zouaves, the Confederates drove back a force of regular infantry which had moved up as reinforcements. Despite these successes, the Southerners lacked organization, and shortly before dawn, they were ordered to withdraw. \(^{18}\) Both sides claimed victory, but the chief advantage was probably the battlefield experience gained by all the participants.

After this action, the opposing forces settled down again to the rather mundane routine of drill, parade, and strengthening defenses. On the morning of November 22, Fort Pickens opened fire on the Confederate position. The southern troops replied, but the Union fire caused serious damage to Forts Barrancas and McRee. The Union bombardment continued the following day, and many private buildings were set afire. \(^{19}\) In January 1862, the Union forces bombarded the Confederate positions again, and the Southerners returned fire, but only briefly in an effort

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\(^{17}\) Ibid., 126-27.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 129-32.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 134-37.
to conserve their ammunition. On February 12, 1862, James Patton Anderson was promoted to brigadier general, and Bragg placed him in command of R. H. Anderson’s brigade.

In early March 1862, Bragg and his 10,000-man army joined General Albert Sidney Johnston in northern Mississippi. Anderson’s brigade remained in Bragg’s Corps as part of General Daniel Ruggles’s Division. The Confederates, over 40,000 strong, left Corinth, Mississippi, on April 3, but rain mired the roads and the march became both miserable and difficult. The attack on General Ulysses Grant’s forces, originally planned for April 5, was postponed until the following day. Anderson reached his assigned position as a reserve brigade late on the afternoon of April 5. The rain had stopped, and according to Anderson, “the night was clear, the air cool and bracing.” The Confederate forward movement began at 5:30 a.m. when General William J. Hardee led the first wave against the Union right. Bragg’s Corps was deployed about 1,000 yards to the rear of Hardee. Anderson slowly moved his men forward over the rough terrain toward the enemy positions. He closed to within 300 yards of Hardee’s line but halted until the proper interval could be regained. Fierce rifle fire reverberated through the woods as Bragg ordered the advance to resume. Despite Anderson’s efforts and those of the other commanders, the southern movements were uneven and uncoordinated. Rough ground separated the men, and there were wide gaps between the brigades. Anderson led his force against the first Union camp without support, and was forced to halt his men temporarily when he realized this dilemma. When two other brigades appeared, he swept forward again. A swamp lay between Anderson and the Union force; surrounding the swamp were dense thickets which made it difficult to maintain formation. Ignoring these obstacles, Anderson pushed into the swamp with Russell’s brigade supporting his right. In the deep, nearly impassable swamp, many men lost their way and Anderson’s command emerged badly scattered. Before order could be restored, a Union battery opened fire and Anderson was driven back. Reforming his men, Anderson renewed his advance, now with reinforcements on his right. The

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20. Ibid., 138.
21. Anderson’s commission in possession of Margaret Anderson Uhler.
23. Ibid., 497.
Federals slowly moved back as Anderson and his men pushed through the enemy camp.\(^{24}\)

Anderson continued to assault the Union right. Troops to his right wavered as if they might fall back, but realizing the danger, Anderson began waving his hat so his troops would easily see him as he rode across the front line. "This gesture seemed well understood," he said, "and the command, ‘Forward’ which it implied was most gallantly executed."\(^{25}\) The Confederates surged ahead, and Anderson’s force overwhelmed a battery. He then wheeled his brigade to the right, and captured another portion of the Union line in flank.\(^{26}\)

Anderson withdrew from the front around noon as the fire around him slackened and the Union right retreated toward Pittsburg Landing. He wanted to rest his men and replenish his ammunition, but, as he was withdrawing he received orders from Bragg to "go wherever the fight is thickest."\(^{27}\) Anderson accordingly marched his force to the right where Union soldiers held out against a succession of Confederate assaults in what became known as the “Hornet’s Nest.”

Throughout the long afternoon, Anderson participated in the series of bloody assaults on this position. After an unsuccessful brigade assault around 3:30, he called for artillery support. General Ruggles was already massing eleven batteries to blast the Union position. The guns thundered and infantry assaults followed. The Federals crumbled under this pressure, and the exhausted but triumphant Southerners rounded up prisoners and guns. The first day’s fighting ended with the Union army huddled around Pittsburg Landing, and the badly disorganized Confederates, now led by General Beauregard, Johnston having been killed earlier in the day, in command of the field.

Anderson made bivouac near Bragg’s headquarters and spent most of the rainy night rounding up stragglers and reorganizing his brigade. He ate with his men and slept under an apple tree with his saddle for a pillow and a blanket over his head.\(^{28}\) During the night, thousands of Union reinforcements arrived and Grant decided to attack in the morning. Soon after dawn, Anderson

\(^{24}\) Ibid.
\(^{25}\) Ibid.
\(^{26}\) Ibid.
\(^{27}\) Ibid.
\(^{28}\) Ibid., 499.
and the other brigadiers moved their commands to the front to meet the Federal counterattack. The Confederates stubbornly contested their hard-won ground, and the Union advance was cautious. As the Confederate right weakened, Anderson was sent to strengthen it. There he observed that Federal artillery was playing havoc with the exposed southern infantry. He wanted to charge the battery and silence it but could get no support from nearby troops. Angrily, he withdrew his own men over a small hill to protect them somewhat from the destructive fire. While thus sheltered, he rallied scattered fragments from other commands to meet the impending Union advance. When the Federals cleared the crest of the hill over which he had withdrawn, Anderson's men inflicted heavy casualties, and the Union advance was temporarily checked. As the afternoon wore on, the Federals continued to push the weary Southerners back. The tide of battle turned against the Confederates, and Anderson noted that "large numbers of stragglers could now be seen in all directions making their way to the rear." The men were exhausted, disorganized, and nearly out of ammunition. About 3:30 p.m. Beauregard ordered a withdrawal. Anderson's men joined the march down the muddy roads to Corinth. The route was crowded by long lines of wagons filled with wounded soldiers and as the army marched, a torrential downpour added to the misery of the men.

Anderson restored his brigade as quickly as he could to fighting trim. Although he had displayed rashness at times, he had distinguished himself by his performance at Shiloh. He emerged, along with several other officers, as a promising brigadier. The Federals, having been reenforced, soon advanced on Corinth. The Confederates were outnumbered and remained on the defensive waiting for an opportunity to strike exposed enemy columns. Two such opportunities arose near the village of Farmington, and Anderson participated in both engagements. Each time he advanced and drove the enemy in his front, but on both occasions General Van Dorn failed to support these attacks and the Confederates were unable to exploit their advantage.
Faced with a large sick list and the prospect of a formal siege, Beauregard abandoned Corinth and marched to Tupelo. During these operations, Anderson commanded Ruggles's division until Major General Sam Jones was formally named division commander. Anderson resumed brigade command, but this was the first of several times he would be called upon to serve as a temporary division commander. At Tupelo, Bragg replaced Beauregard as army commander and made preparations for a new campaign.

During the summer months of 1862, Anderson's wife and children came from Florida to visit. They lived in camp with him, and they spent many pleasant days together. Etta shared news from home, and her husband and the boys enjoyed the excitement which naturally accompanied life in any army camp. This peaceful interlude ended when Bragg ordered the army to Chattanooga in response to a Federal advance which threatened that vital communications center. Anderson bid farewell to Etta and the boys and departed with the army.

The Confederates reached Chattanooga near the end of July 1862, and Bragg decided to join forces with Kirby Smith and invade Kentucky. When the army moved out, Bragg left Sam Jones in command at Chattanooga, and Anderson once again commanded the division. His troops, along with the division of Simon Buckner, comprised Hardee's Corps.

The Confederates met with great initial success in the Kentucky campaign, defeating Federal forces at Richmond and Munfordville and seizing the state capitol of Frankfort. Louisville lay open to capture, but the scattered Confederates allowed the Federals to sidestep them into that city. After receiving reinforcements, Union General Buell marched from Louisville on October 1, anxious to give battle in the vicinity of Bardstown.

At this time, a crisis in the Confederate high command occurred which directly involved Patton Anderson. Bragg was at Frankfort preparing to inaugurate a Confederate governor. Buell sent one of his columns toward that point as a feint to draw attention from his primary thrust against Bardstown. Polk held

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33. Autobiography, JPAP, 12.

that town with a portion of the Confederate army. Bragg, expecting imminent attack, ordered Polk to march on Frankfort and to attack Buell in flank. Polk felt himself too closely pressed to comply with the order, and he called a council of war to discuss the situation. He wanted to disregard Bragg’s order, but Anderson was reluctant to do so. Anderson later wrote that the “order just read did not seem to admit of any course other than that of compliance.” He argued that failure to comply with Bragg could be disastrous since it would upset his plan. Anderson also noted that the council did not know how serious Bragg’s situation was. Nevertheless, Polk eventually decided to disobey the order, and he finally convinced Anderson to go along with the majority view.\(^{35}\)

Bragg, confused as to Buell’s intentions, kept his army badly scattered, and on October 7, Hardee’s Corps reached Perryville closely pursued by the vanguard of Buell’s army. Bragg ordered reinforcements to Perryville, and on the morning of October 8, after heavy skirmishing began, he arrived on the scene.\(^{36}\) General Benjamin Cheatham was ordered to assail the Union left, while Hardee, with Buckner and two of Anderson’s brigades, attacked the center. Anderson protected the army’s left with the remainder of his division. In the early afternoon the attack began as the Confederates smashed into the Union left and center. Anderson conducted himself as an aggressive flank guard by advancing and occupying the Federals in his front for the balance of the afternoon. Near sundown, the Union forces massed on Anderson’s front, outflanked his brigades, and forced him to withdraw to Perryville. There, with the aid of reinforcements, Anderson secured the army’s flank.\(^{37}\) Despite the tactical advantage gained at Perryville the Confederates retired to Harrodsburg, Kentucky, and on October 13, Bragg ordered a withdrawal from the state.

The march back to Tennessee proved uneventful for Anderson until he reached Franklin County. There, he visited the grave of his father at Craggy Hope, the old family farm. After spending a pleasant few days near his birthplace, Anderson marched into camp near Eagleville where his division was broken

\(^{35}\) Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat (New York 1969), 1, 102.

\(^{36}\) Horn, Army of Tennessee, 180.

up to strengthen other units. He took command of one of General Jones Wither’s brigades.  

The Confederates, now positioned northwest of Murphreesboro, watched the Federal forces in Nashville and remained in this position during November and December 1862. The day after Christmas, General William S. Rosecrans moved out of Nashville in the direction of Murphreesboro. Bragg covered the roads northwest of town and prepared for battle. The terrain was not well suited to infantry movements; the ground was rough and uneven, and strewn with large boulders while dense cedar glades presented difficult obstacles.

Anderson marched his brigade to its assigned position, but on December 27, he received orders to take command of General E. C. Walthall’s brigade, that officer having fallen sick. The men of this brigade, many of whom had served under Anderson at Shiloh, had petitioned their superiors requesting that Anderson take over. His new brigade was in line of battle next to his old one near the Wilkinson Turnpike. Heavy skirmishing began as the Union army approached, and even though the weather was cold, rainy, and miserable, Bragg ordered an attack for early morning of December 31.

The fighting began shortly before dawn. Anderson heard the rising volume of fire on the left and around 9:00 a.m., he received his orders to advance. Riding to the front of his brigade, he lead his men forward along with the rest of Wither’s division. The Union line was well posted and amply supported by artillery. Anderson was instructed to take the batteries in his front. Withers later wrote: “No brigade occupied a more critical position, nor were the movements of any invested with more consequences.”

The brigade had to cross an old cottonfield in order to reach the Union position. This advance across open ground proved very costly, and the Union troops threw back Anderson’s men time and again. He called for support from an additional brigade and renewed the assault. The two brigades pushed vigorously forward, and this time swept over the Union batteries and drove off their, supporting infantry.

38. Autobiography, JPAP, 12.
39. Horn, Army of Tennessee, 197-98.
After this initial success, Anderson, still supported by A. P. Stewart's brigade, pursued the retiring Federals and struck their second line. This line also gave way and the Federals moved through a cedar grove with the Confederates hard on their heels. The Southerners' lines were now almost at right angles to the original lines of battle. Anderson pursued the enemy cautiously through the trees as his brigade had suffered heavy casualties and he was almost out of ammunition. Worried at the prospect of continuing battle with such a battered command, Anderson requested permission to withdraw from the line. In the late afternoon he was permitted to retire with his men.\(^\text{42}\) At the end of that winter day the Confederates appeared to have won a complete victory. Bragg expected Rosecrans to retire during the night, but he did not. No significant fighting occurred on New Year's Day, however, and Anderson was not engaged.

On January 2, 1863, Bragg ordered General J. C. Breckinridge to attack an elevated Union position that threatened Polk's right flank. When Breckinridge advanced his division unsupported across open ground, the result was complete repulse. About 4:00 p.m., Anderson received orders to cross Stones River and support Breckinridge. After crossing the river, he pushed his men forward and found Breckinridge's brigade retreating as he reached the field. He threw forward a line of skirmishers to halt any Federal advance and maintained this position throughout the night. He reported to Bragg that the lines on his side of the river were too thin and were fronted by the enemy. Despite this situation, the Federals did not attack. The Southerners' position remained perilous, though, and after meeting with his corps commanders, Bragg decided that the army was too weakened to continue fighting.\(^\text{43}\) After remaining in position throughout the bleak, rainy day of January 3, Anderson received orders to withdraw in the direction of Shelbyville.

When the troops were safely encamped, Anderson telegraphed Etta to tell her he was safe. He followed this with a letter some days later, telling her that he was very pleased with the achievements of his brigade. "They behaved most gallantly as Mississippians have always done in this war." He told her that

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 765.
the results of Murphreesboro were being squandered by their withdrawal, and that as a result, Bragg was even more unpopular than before. The general deplored his separation from his family. "I don't know when I can get home... I do want to see you and the boys so badly. Kiss them all a thousand times for me." 44

In the aftermath of Murphreesboro, Bragg praised the Florida brigadier for the manner in which he had interposed his men between the Federals and Breckinridge on January 2. 45 Bragg and other friends credited Anderson with saving the army from disaster, but he replied saying "General Bragg founded his report upon some exaggerated statements of some partial friends of mine, and hence attributed to me more than I deserved." 46

The army settled into winter quarters around Shelbyville and Wartrace and remained there for six months. Anderson assumed command of Withers's division when the latter left on a month-long sick leave. Bragg indicated that the position would be permanent, but Anderson expressed doubts of this in a letter to Etta, pointing out that there were already enough major generals in the army. 47 Nevertheless, he spent much time drilling Withers's division and boasted to Etta that he had the best division in the army. When Withers returned to the army in March 1863, Anderson received and accepted, for a second time, a request from rank and file soldiers, that he command them. 48

This request came from the men of Chalmers's brigade following the transfer of that officer to another department.

During this extended encampment, Bragg quarreled with Polk, Hardee, Breckinridge, and many of the lesser generals in the army over the outcome of the Kentucky and Murphreesboro campaigns. These personal recriminations placed men like Patton Anderson in a ticklish position. Bragg was not only his commander, but his friend. At the same time, Anderson felt a professional loyalty to his corps commander, Polk. When the question of Polk's disobedience in Kentucky arose, Anderson reminded Bragg that he had been opposed to the disobedience

44. Anderson to Etta Anderson, Winchester, Tennessee, January 8, 1862, JPAP.
47. Anderson to Etta Anderson, Shelbyville, Tennessee, January 11, 1862, JPAP.
48. Uhler, "Civil War Letters," 163-64. The men of Walthall's brigade had made a similar request on the eve of the Battle of Murfreesboro.
but admitted that the council had agreed to disregard the order. He sent copies of his correspondence with Bragg to Polk and met with the bishop-general to compare recollections of the council. Anderson’s only other activity during these command controversies was to sit as a member of the court-martial which convicted General John McCown of misconduct at Murphreesboro.49

While engaged in these various activities, Anderson made arrangements for Etta and the boys to come up from Florida to join him in camp. They left Monticello by train and traveled to Savannah and from there by buggy to Tennessee. Once again the family lived in tents with the general. They saw many of the other officers’ wives and children and attended the parties and reviews staged by the various army corps. The boys often dressed in Confederate uniforms that had been cut down to their size, and their father instructed them in the manual of arms outside their tents. Anderson remained hopeful that a peace agreement could be reached, but he continued steadfast in his belief in the southern cause.50

This peaceful interlude ended in June 1863, when General Rosecrans moved out of Murphreesboro and advanced on the Army of Tennessee. The Confederates were flanked out of their position, and they fell back to Chattanooga where they prepared to resist an attack. None was forthcoming, and the summer passed without a major engagement. When General D. H. Hill wondered at the long intervals between battles in the west, Anderson airily replied: “Oh, we out here have to crow and peck straws awhile before we use our spurs.”51

Vicksburg fell while the Confederates huddled around Chattanooga, and some of Anderson’s staff recalled an incident dating back to his service in Washington Territory. Once when Anderson was in the field taking the census, he met some soldiers who told him that their commander, Captain Ulysses Grant, had disappeared during the night. Anderson and his Indian guides joined in the search, and they soon located the captain, who was suffering from “delirium tremens” and had

49. Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 81, 89.
50. Interviews, Margaret Anderson Uhler.
stumbled to the edge of a steep cliff. Anderson climbed down to the edge of the precipice and rescued Grant from certain death. Anderson received much jesting from his staff who delighted in telling this story in camp.\textsuperscript{52}

At this stage of the campaign, Anderson was ordered to guard the river crossing near Bridgeport, Alabama.\textsuperscript{53} He discharged these duties to Bragg's satisfaction, but the Confederates failed adequately to cover all the western approaches. When Rosecrans divided his army and undertook a wide sweep through north Georgia, he completely turned Bragg's left flank and forced the evacuation of Chattanooga. Bragg concentrated his forces in the rough wooded terrain between Dalton and Chattanooga as reinforcements arrived from other departments.

As these new troops arrived, Bragg sought to strike the divided Federal army. He ordered General Thomas Hindman, now commanding Withers's division, to attack in the vicinity of McClemore's Cove. Hindman was strengthened by other units, and Anderson took command of the division. Bragg ordered a daylight attack with D. H. Hill joining in to ensure success. Both Hindman and Hill procrastinated and never actually advanced against the enemy during two days of frustrating inactivity. The Union troops in the cove discovered their peril and hastily withdrew as Anderson advanced in a fruitless attempt to cut off the retreating Federals. Bragg was furious at these failures, and Anderson admitted later that a great opportunity had been lost.\textsuperscript{54}

After several more days of maneuvering in which Anderson again commanded Hindman's division due to the latter's illness, Bragg decided to attack Rosecrans's now united army along the banks of Chickamauga Creek. Knowing the battle was imminent, Anderson ordered his family to leave the army and arranged for them to stay in Marietta.\textsuperscript{55} The action began on the morning of September 19, and though the action surged back and forth through the damp, creek bottom thickets around Chickamauga Creek, neither side was able to gain a decisive advantage. Anderson led the division but was not engaged. That night,

\textsuperscript{52} Etta Anderson to Mr. Earle, April 11, 1889, JPAP.
\textsuperscript{53} Autobiography, JPAP, 14.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Uhler, "'Civil War Letters," 165.
Hindman returned to the field, and the division moved to the west bank of the creek where it joined the rest of the army’s left wing.\textsuperscript{56}

Late on the morning of September 20 the attack continued, and General James Longstreet threw his left wing divisions into action shortly after Polk became heavily engaged. The assaults through the dense thickets proved devastating as Longstreet’s men smashed through a gap in the Union right and swept all before them. Anderson’s brigade played a decisive role in this advance. He burst through the thickets, with his men and drove the Federals from their breastworks.\textsuperscript{57} As Anderson led his men across the shell-torn field, he spotted the body of a Union general. Upon inquiry, he discovered that it was General William H. Lytle, an old friend with whom he had been associated before the war at the Democratic convention of 1860. More recently, he had parlayed with Lytle while on picket near Bridgeport. Deeply saddened, Anderson ordered the body removed from the field. Later he tried unsuccessfully to secure some of Lytle’s personal effects for his family.\textsuperscript{58}

Putting this incident aside, Anderson led his men onward. Only Union General Thomas, on the left, remained in position. Anderson wheeled his brigade to the right and joined in the assault on Thomas. Scattered over the field to the front and rear of Anderson were the shattered remnants of two Federal divisions. Anderson had captured two batteries, several stands of colors, and scores of prisoners.

The Confederates spent the remainder of that bloody afternoon trying to drive Thomas from his position on Snodgrass Hill, but their assaults were repulsed until nightfall. During the night, Hindman, who had been wounded, again turned the division over to Anderson. The door lay open for the re-capture of Chattanooga, but Bragg delayed his pursuit, and the armies settled down to a formal siege. While the adversaries glared at one another over the entrenchments, Bragg relieved Polk for failing to attack promptly on September 20, and Hindman for reluctance to move forward at McClemore’s Cove. Anderson, as before, was placed in a peculiar position. He re-

\textsuperscript{56} Official Records, XXX, 1, 137.
\textsuperscript{57} Glenn Tucker, Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West (New York, 1961), 288-89.
\textsuperscript{58} “An Incident,” JPAP.
vealed his attitude in a letter to Etta, saying that he would not assign any guilt to Hindman beforehand, and that he was content to await the developments of the trial. As to Polk’s predicament: “In his case too, we must wait for the proof. I like Genl. P. personally very much—and am inclined to think that Lt. Genl. Hill is the true party to blame for the delay. . . .” In the aftermath of these quarrels, Bragg replaced Polk with Hardee, and Buckner and Hill were transferred. Hindman remained under arrest, and Anderson continued to lead the division. He informed Etta that he was hopeful that there would be no fight at Chattanooga; he confidently declared that, “The troops were never in better fighting trim—spirits excellent.” He hoped he might be able to see his family again before they left Georgia to return to Florida. He was particularly anxious about their welfare as Etta was pregnant with their fourth child. Despite Anderson’s hopes for no fighting, the Union army received significant reenforcements and prepared to attack. From his position on Missionary Ridge, Anderson watched the Union troops with concern.

Though battle threatened daily, he arranged for his family to visit him the night before they left for Florida. He took them for a ride along Missionary Ridge, pointing out the lines of battle. Later he found a place where the boys could play safely while he and Etta talked. Mother and children spent the night in camp with the general, and the next day he escorted them to the railroad. Just as they were preparing to leave, firing began on the front, and Anderson hastily bid them goodbye and hurried to join his men.

That day, the Union army seized Orchard Knob, a strong-point in Anderson’s front. The following day, the Federals stormed Lookout Mountain, and Anderson was concerned over the disposition of his troops in the face of these Federal successes. In addition to advanced rifle pits, Bragg had divided the troops on Missionary Ridge into two lines to correspond with the levels of the Ridge, one near the base and another near the crest. The men were spaced more than three feet apart and neither line was, alone, strong enough to resist a vigorous assault. On

60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 169.
November 25, Anderson protested these dispositions calling them “the worst I have even seen.” Nevertheless, the Confederates remained in position.

The Federals soon opened their final assault on the Confederate right flank, and at about 3:30 p.m., the Union center advanced against Missionary Ridge. The Confederate artillery took a heavy toll, but the Federals could not be stopped and Anderson’s worst fears were confirmed. The thin Confederate lines snapped, and by the time the Federals reached the crest, Anderson’s division was badly broken. He fought to stem the rout, but nothing could halt the soldiers’ headlong flight. Soon the entire Confederate center was routed, and they were driven from the ridge in great disorder. This marked the low point in Anderson’s military career. He managed, however, to rally his men, and put them in motion for Dalton, Georgia, which they reached on November 28. On that cold and rainy autumn day, Bragg resigned his command and left the army.

The Army of Tennessee settled down to winter quarters, and the officers worked to rebuild the army. Anderson was mortified by the conduct of his troops at Missionary Ridge, but no one attached any blame for the disaster to him. He and the rest of the forces took heart from the news that General Joseph Johnston had been given command of the army. Johnston improved the army’s morale and the ranks increased their strength. Anderson looked forward to the time when he could avenge the defeat at Missionary Ridge.

It was during this encampment that General Patrick R. Cleburn proposed that blacks be enlisted in the army to fight and be freed at the war’s end as a reward for service. Some of his brother officers were surprised but most made little response. Anderson, however, was outraged. He termed the proposal, “a startling project [which was] revolting to Southern sentiment, Southern pride and Southern honor,” and he predicted that if the troops became aware of the plan the “total disintegration of the army would follow within a fortnight.” He believed strongly in the institution of slavery and could not understand why some

63. Connally, Autumn of Glory, 275-76.
people thought that blacks would be better off in anything but their servile condition. Cleburne’s proposal was quietly shelved, but the incident gives a revealing insight into Anderson’s support for slavery.

In February 1864, Anderson finally received his promotion to major general and was formally assigned to Breckinridge’s old division. He looked forward to leading that command to further glories but events in Florida, his adopted state, soon changed his plans. The Federals invaded Florida in February 1864, hoping among other things to establish a loyal government. General Beauregard rushed troops to the state and the Confederates defeated the Union troops at the Battle of Olustee, February 20. Governor John Milton of Florida urged that “some competent officer of rank . . . be sent to command in Florida.” Three days after Olustee, Anderson received orders to take command of the District of Florida. He quickly departed to take up his new assignment.

Anderson inherited a complex military situation upon his arrival in Lake City on March 1. Florida had been stripped of troops very early in 1862 to aid other departments, and the Federals had seized control of many of the coastal areas. They also occupied most of the territory between the St. Johns River and the Atlantic Ocean. Federal ships could land troops almost anywhere along the coastline with impunity. In addition, roving bands of deserters from both armies roamed the countryside robbing the defenseless inhabitants.

When Anderson arrived at Camp Milton (between Baldwin and Jacksonville) on March 3, he met General Beauregard, who informed him that the Federals still held Jacksonville. Beauregard ordered him to give battle to the enemy only if they advanced. When Anderson formally assumed command, Beauregard returned to Charleston. The Confederate forces numbered approximately 8,000 men divided into three infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade, and four artillery batteries.

Anderson immediately began completing fortifications along McGirt’s Creek about twelve miles from Jacksonville. He ordered

66. Commission in possession of Margaret Anderson Uhler.
the impressment of 700 slaves to assist in constructing these works. 69 Baldwin, a rail center located eight miles west of McGirt's Creek, was also fortified. On March 10, the Federals occupied Palatka, and Anderson dispatched Company H, 2nd Florida Cavalry to that point to observe enemy movements. Company H was led by Captain J. J. Dickison, a skilled fighter, who had built up a reputation in Florida as a guerilla leader. Dickison skirmished frequently with these Union troops and reported their activities. 70

Although he expected a renewal of the Federal advance from Jacksonville any time, Anderson made plans to take the offensive. First, he cut off river traffic between Jacksonville and Palatka by placing a large number of torpedoes in the channel of the St. Johns River. 71 On April 1, a Federal transport struck a torpedo and sank, and the following day Anderson set a portion of his force in motion for Palatka. But poor roads and inadequate rail transport delayed the advance, and when scouts reported increased Federal activity around Jacksonville, he quickly recalled the expedition. 72

On April 12, the Federals abandoned Palatka and also began withdrawing their troops from Jacksonville. They departed in a steady stream throughout April and May 1864. Consequently, Anderson received orders to send most of his troops back to General Beauregard. These developments left Anderson's Florida forces too small to contest any sizable Federal invasion from any point. Accordingly he was ordered to defend only the interior areas of the state if they were threatened by enemy thrusts. 73 Places such as Tampa Bay and Appalachicola were left to fend for themselves despite the protests of Governor Milton.

Despite the reduction in forces, skirmishing and other activity continued with the Confederates scoring a number of successes. On April 16, and again on May 9, two more Union transports struck torpedoes and sank. Pursuant to Anderson's orders to strike the enemy wherever possible, Captain Dickison captured Federal garrisons at Welaka and Saunders. This forced

69. John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville, 1963), 151.
70. Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction, 299.
71. Ibid., 300.
73. Johns, Florida During the Civil War, 202.
the dispatch of a relief expedition from Jacksonville to Volusia on May 21. The following day, Dickison's men attacked and captured the gunboat Columbine.\textsuperscript{74} Near Jacksonville light skirmishing continued.

Union troops were not Anderson's sole worry during this period of department command. By 1864, whole sections of Florida, notably Taylor and Lafayette counties, were virtually controlled by Confederate deserters and Union sympathizers. The Federal government supplied many of these bands as they raided plantations, carried off slaves, and generally terrorized the local populations. Confederate sympathizers appealed to Anderson for protection from these outlaws. Accordingly, he undertook a systematic and often merciless campaign against the deserter bands. Led by Colonel Henry D. Capers, the Confederates used bloodhounds to track deserters through dense swamps. Camps and homes were destroyed, and at times a few prisoners were taken. The soldiers drove deserters' families into Federal lines or sent them to refugee camps.\textsuperscript{75}

The deserters in southwest Florida threatened the vital Confederate cattle herds, and Anderson sent Colonel Theodore Washington Brevard to Fort Meade to stamp out these deserters and to protect the cattle. Brevard was unable to fight the deserters in the open, and the expedition failed.\textsuperscript{76} To make anti-guerilla operations more effective, Anderson ordered the construction of shallow-draught boats that could be used along the coastline to raid the deserter's rendezvous points.

This vigorous activity against the brigands resulted in a clash between the civil and military authorities. When Governor Milton learned that Colonel Capers had imprisoned several deserters' families, he protested to Anderson, saying: "I cannot approve of a warfare on women and children." Nevertheless, these people were held until shortly before Anderson's departure from Florida in July 1864.\textsuperscript{77}

Another conflict arose over the seizure of property belonging to the Florida Railroad. The Confederate war department ordered the impressment of railroad iron, spikes, and bolts to

\textsuperscript{74} Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction, 302.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 259-62.
\textsuperscript{76} Johns, Florida During the Civil War, 163.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 167.
complete rail connections in north Florida as a "military necessity." Anderson issued a permit to Lieutenant J. M. Fairbanks of the Confederate engineers, to tear up private track. The railroad owners and their political allies, including former United States Senator David Levy Yulee, who was president of the cross-state line, sought injunctive relief in state court. The court granted their request and ordered Fairbanks to cease his activity. Anderson then supplied Fairbanks with a military guard, impressed a locomotive for his use, and Fairbanks ignored the injunction. The Confederate military also ignored a subsequent summons for contempt and continued tearing up track despite a growing popular sentiment for the railroad. Anderson's support prevented the court from enforcing its decrees, and in June 1864, the case was dropped. 

Although Anderson was close to his Monticello home during this time, these months were not pleasant. Financial difficulties forced him to sell Casa Bianca, and he was unable to purchase another home. His children were often ill, and he worried about their health. In May he had assured Etta, "I have never applied to be sent away from Florida. . . . You know my doctrine is not to apply for anything." But in the summer, he solicited command of his old division, and on July 25 he was ordered to Georgia to replace the ailing General Hindman. 

Arriving in Atlanta on July 28, he joined his troops near the battlefield at Ezra Church. His division was part of Stephen Lee's Corps and held position as the left flank of the army. From the time of Anderson's arrival, and throughout the month of August, siege operations continued without letup.

In late August Sherman moved to sever Atlanta's southern rail connections at Jonesboro, and General John B. Hood, now commanding the Army of Tennessee, ordered Hardee to that point with his own and Lee's Corps. The Federals arrived first and entrenched themselves. Hardee arrived later in the morning of August 31, and was hesitant to attack this strong Union position. Hood was adamant, however, and Hardee reluctantly
deployed his troops. Anderson's division, now reduced to 2,000 men, formed the first line of Lee's Corps.

Shortly after 2:00 p.m. heavy skirmishing began on Cleburne's front, and Lee, mistaking this fire for the signal to attack, ordered an advance. His divisions were not supported, however, and they soon came under a galling fire. Anderson led his men to within pistol range of the Union breastworks, but the forward units wavered and he ordered up his reserve brigade. As the advance stalled and losses mounted, he rode along the division front trying to inspire the men by personal example. The Federal troops paused and saluted him. Despite these efforts, the division's right began falling back and as Anderson tried to rally these men, a bullet passed through his jaw, nearly severing his tongue, and he fell from his horse. Seeing this happen, the soldiers retreated in disorder. The general was carried to the rear in dangerous condition; he lost so much blood the surgeons thought he was mortally wounded. Etta received news of her husband's plight by telegram and quickly traveled by buggy to Thomasville, Georgia, and from there, by train, to the front. Anderson's wounds proved serious but they were not fatal, and he and Etta were able to move around the Union army's position by going to Marietta. The general continued to improve a bit, and in late fall, he and Etta returned to Monticello.

Anderson slowly recovered his strength, and he busied himself writing his battle reports as well as a brief autobiographical sketch. He was growing restless, however, and he talked about the possibility of returning to active duty. Etta and the doctors urged him to remain at Monticello, but he declared himself fit for duty. Still weak and subsisting mainly off liquids, he left Monticello in March 1865, and joined the remnants of the Army of Tennessee near Bentonville, North Carolina.

The Confederate forces under Johnston proved too weak to arrest the Union advance. They fell back to the vicinity of Greensboro, North Carolina, where they learned of Lee's surrender. Johnston asked for terms. Anderson remained defiant to the last, and his brother officers concealed the surrender from

82. Horn, Army of Tennessee, 365.
84. Etta Anderson to Mr. Earle, April 11, 1889, JPAP.
85. Interviews, Margaret Anderson Uhler.
86. Ibid.
him until it was an accomplished fact. After the surrender, the men began the long journey home.

Anderson returned to Florida with almost no money and in frail health. He had never invested the proceeds from the sale of Casa Bianca, and his Confederate currency was now worthless. Nevertheless he made arrangements to leave Florida when his doctor told him he needed a more bracing climate, and he moved with his family, first to Mississippi and then to Memphis. While in Mississippi, Anderson tried to raise cotton with some relatives, but this proved an unsuccessful venture. Because he had refused to sign his presidential pardon, he could not practice law or hold public office. No amount of urging from Etta, his mother, or friends, could induce him to change his mind about this matter. He said to sign it implied a regret for what he had done, and he had none. Ultimately, he became an insurance agent and edited an agricultural magazine. His wound caused him to lisp slightly, but this did not adversely affect his work. He was able to devote much time to his family, especially his youngest daughter, Margaret, born in 1866. He also remained close to his old acquaintances like Generals Nathan B. Forrest and E. C. Walthall.

Anderson’s postwar contentment was brief. In 1872, he began to suffer severely from his old war wounds, and in September his condition deteriorated seriously. With family and a few friends at his bedside, he died on September 20. It was the anniversary of the great victory at Chickamauga. Following a large funeral in which General Forrest served as a pallbearer, Anderson was buried in a Memphis cemetery far away from his adopted state of Florida. Many old comrades sent expressions of sympathy to the family, but none described Patton Anderson’s career any better than Braxton Bragg when he wrote Etta, “Your fine boys need no richer inheritance than to bear their father’s name.”

88. Ibid.
89. Interviews, Margaret Anderson Uhler.
90. Etta Anderson to Mr. Earle, April 11, 1889, JPAP.
91. Funeral notices, undated newspaper clippings, JPAP.
92. Braxton Bragg to Etta Anderson, June 15, 1873, JPAP.
"The decade of the nineties is the watershed of American history," wrote Henry Steele Commager in The American Mind. The case of Tampa, Florida, in this period reinforces Commager’s suggestive thesis that the ten years before the beginning of the twentieth century ushered in modern values accompanied by a profound population change, economic transformation, and urban problems. War, immigration, urbanization, racial turmoil, labor strife, and industrialization—crises of the nineties—helped forge the transformation of Tampa during this era which resulted in the 1899 “Huelga de la Pesa,” (the Weight Strike) and its aftermath.

Hernando de Soto’s discovery of Tampa Bay in 1539 aroused interest about Florida’s west coast. Yet despite the geographical advantages of a good port, a rich hinterland, a sunny climate, and cheap land, Tampa stood outside the major areas of growth in Florida for 350 years. In 1880, census takers reported 720 inhabitants, a loss of seventy-six people from the previous count. Naturalist Kirk Munroe noted in 1882 that “Tampa once reached is found to be a sleepy, shabby Southern town.”

When the first of Henry Bradley Plant’s trains reached Tampa in 1883, visitors saw a city “as dead as a fishing village... the sidewalks were poor, the houses weather-beaten... things were generally rusting instead of wearing out.” Changes began in

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1886, when Vicente Martinez Ybor chose it for his new cigar factory.⁵ Dissatisfied with the labor climate in Key West and uncertain of the political future of Cuba, Ybor selected Tampa over other southern rivals—Galveston, Mobile, and Pensacola. The fateful decision forever changed the direction of Tampa and awakened the Gulf coast port town from its slumber.

Ybor moved more than his factory to Tampa; he built a new city which lured thousands of Cubans and Spaniards from Key West and Havana. Economic opportunities brought other groups to the area, including several thousand Sicilians who arrived in the 1890s. By 1890, Tampa (which then included the consolidated Ybor City) contained 5,532 inhabitants, making it one of the fastest growing communities in the nation. Significantly, over one half of the population was immigrant stock or the offspring of immigrants.⁶ Tampa's destiny was linked to the cigar factories and their laboring forces.

By the turn of the century, Tampa contained five distinct ethnic groups: Cubans, Spaniards, Italians, Afro-Americans, and white natives—the last of these predominantly of southern descent. Demographically, almost three-quarters of Tampa's 15,839-person population in 1900 claimed first or second-generation immigrant status or were of Afro-American background.⁷ West Tampa, which would not be incorporated into Tampa until 1924, boasted an almost exclusively Latin population; in 1910 its 8,258 residents included only 626 whites of native parentage.⁸ Thus, Tampa lacked ethnic groups traditionally associated with industrial cities. Irish and Germans, familiar working-class groups, shunned Tampa; in 1900 they numbered fewer than 200 individuals. The Tribune noted in 1896 that Tampa would again ignore St. Patrick's Day, certainly a rarity in urban America.⁹

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⁸ Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population, Table 4, 332. See also Tampa Morning Tribune, June 23, 1895.
⁹ Tampa Morning Tribune, March 17, 1896.
Tampa was an island in the South: a Latin enclave in a region dominated by native Southerners, an industrial town amidst rural poverty. Cigar manufacturing had changed Tampa, and the economic well-being of the community would henceforth be measured by the public's smoking habits, the availability of Cuban tobacco, and the mood of the Latin work force. More and more, the economics of Tampa were a result of decisions made in Washington, Havana, or on Wall Street, not downtown on Franklin Street. The evolution of Tampa from an obscure, self-contained backwater port in the 1880s to an integrated, modern, industrial complex parallels the urban transformation described by Robert Wiebe in The Search for Order.¹⁰

Quantum gains had been achieved in the cigar industry since the first factories had opened. In 1886 customs receipts (the value of the city's exports) at the port of Tampa totalled $2,508; by 1900 the duties (chiefly tobacco related) approached a million dollars a year.¹¹ The McKinley tariff of 1890 had spurred several foreign cigar manufacturers to transfer their plants to Tampa where they could import bulk tobacco and convert it into finished products with the aid of skilled immigrant labor. By the turn of the century, 111,000,000 cigars were being produced annually in Tampa's factories, a staggering amount since the cigars were individually handrolled.¹² In 1900 Tampa received 1,180 tons of Cuban tobacco valued at nearly $3,000,000, which was transformed into $10,000,000 worth of cigar exports.¹³ Tampa ranked tenth in the nation in custom's collections, due largely to the burgeoning cigar industry. As the Tribune noted in 1896: “The cigar industry is to this city what the iron industry is to Pittsburgh, or cotton mill industry to

¹² Willis Baer, The Economic Development of the Cigar Industry in the United States (Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1933), 137; Tampa Morning Tribune, February 8, 1900.
Manchester, and it is truly gratifying to note that summer business is holding up wonderfully well.¹⁴

When compared to the rest of Florida the Tampa cigar industry loomed even more impressive. In 1900 cigarmakers earned $2,000,000 in wages, making them the highest paid and most heavily concentrated work force in the state. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Tampa had emerged as the leading industrial center in Florida and the unrivalled producer of clear Havana cigars for the world.¹⁵ Tampa’s industrial profile reflected the unique characteristics of the cigar industry. No soot-belching factories blackened her skyline; rather, the city’s factories were populated by craftsmen who carried on traditional skills of handrolling cigars. In New York and Philadelphia machines were used mainly for the manufacture of the cheaper five-cent cigars. Tampa’s “El Príncipe de Gales” and “La Floridana” factories targeted their production for discriminating consumers, a clientele willing to pay a premium price for craftsmanship.

In many ways Tampa’s economy stood in a transitional stage in the 1890s from the preindustrial cottage factories to the modern, mechanized complexes of the twentieth century. Clear Havana cigars were rolled at wooden desks, usually by men, although the industry also employed many women. Cigarmakers worked side by side at benches in the gallera (work-floor), cutting, filling, rolling, selecting, and placing their products by size and color. Only hand tools were used — la chaveta (curved knife) and la mequina (cutter)—and workers owned their tools. The skill to roll several hundred maravillas a day came only after years of apprenticeship.¹⁶

¹⁴. Tampa Morning Tribune, July 30, 1896.
¹⁵. U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Statistics of Manufacturers, Part II (Washington, 1902), 126-29. The term “clear Havana” cigar referred to the exclusive use of the more expensive Cuban tobacco. In 1899 the Florida Cigarette Law was passed, prohibiting the sale of cigarettes in the state. Tampa Morning Tribune, July 12, 1899.
¹⁶. U.S. Recovery Administration, Division of Review, Industries Studies Section, Tobacco Unit, The Tobacco Study (Washington, 1936), 142; Interviews with Joseph Maniscalco, April 3, 1980; Alex Scaglione, April 2, 1980; Paul Longo, June 12, 1980. Interviews were conducted by the author in Tampa and are part of the University of South Florida and University of Florida Oral History Programs. Tapes may be consulted at the Florida Historical Society Library at the University of South Florida and in the oral history office, Florida State Museum, Gainesville.
The workers jealously guarded an assortment of unwritten fringe benefits which further accentuated their unique place in American industry. Cigar workers, for instance, indulged in frequent coffee breaks—the cafetero—a privilege scarcely shared with other laborers at that time. Between cups of cafe con leche, workers indulged in still another fringe benefit—complimentary smokes. Most symbolic of the pre-industrial nature of the craft was the lector. Cigarmaking revolved around a series of monotonous tasks. To relieve the boredom, workers elected a paisano (countryman) to read aloud from an elevated perch. Since the machineless gallera was relatively quiet, a lector could easily read the classics and novellas to over 500 workers at a time. The readings were sprinkled with strong flavorings of Zola, Hugo, Kropotkin, and Cervantes, as well as items from the radical and labor press. To the cigarworkers, the work atmosphere symbolized a way of work and a life filled with ritualistic meaning.

The inspiration and drive behind Tampa's economic livelihood was due to a group of first-generation Spanish and Cuban cigar barons. The illustrious career of Vicente Martinez Ybor embodied the origins and development of the industry. Born the son of wealthy parents in 1818 in Valencia, Spain, Ybor emigrated to Cuba to escape the draft. There, displaying the deft touch of a man on the move, he helped to modernize a primitive economy. He capitalized on a cottage industry by first organizing the farmers in the rich Vuelta Abajo region and then encouraging them to move into Havana to become full-time cigarmakers at his new factory. He began manufacturing his famous “El Principe de Gales” brand in 1853.19 Political intrigue and revolu-

18. Interview with Jose Vega Diaz, May 2, 1980, Tampa; interviews with Paul Longo, Joseph Maniscalco, and Alex Scaglione, tapes at the Florida State Museum.
tion forced Ybor to move his factories from Havana to Key West, Florida, in 1868. His success there lured other Spanish and Cuban patrones to the island. Yet it was Key West’s inaccessibility and growing labor problems that brought Ybor to Tampa in 1886.20 That community promised to fulfill both his social demands and his economic considerations. He planned Ybor City as a company town, modeled after a successful example at Pullman, Illinois. Access to rail and sea transportation and cheap land motivated the move, but also, the “isolation” of Tampa would help to control the work force.

Control, of course, was buffered by benevolent paternalism. During the industry's early years in Tampa, ownership remained predominately first-generation Latin patrones. Men such as Eduardo Manrara, Ignacio Haya, Serafin Sanchez, Emilio Pons, Jose Morales, and Joseph Seidenberg followed Ybor’s example and located their factories in Tampa. Latin workers followed. Owners and craftsmen functioned in a symbiotic relationship during this formative period. The benevolent paternalists cared deeply for the welfare of their workers, who were also their countrymen. It is no accident that most cigar manufacturers supported the popular Cuban Revolution—obviously for economic reasons—but also for patriotic and personal satisfaction.

Paternalism underscored the cigar barons’ relationship with their Latin kin during the period 1886-1899. In a variety of ways, the Ybors and Hayas eased the difficult transition from the pre-industrial villages of Sicily, Spain, and Cuba to the frontier-urban-industrial setting of Tampa. High wages (skilled cigar-makers earned handsome wages for that period) attracted thousands of immigrants to Florida. In other tangible ways as well, the patrones demonstrated their paternalistic touch. Examples abound. When Ybor’s first cigar factory was completed he donated the temporary wooden structure to his workers for use as a theatre, and later as the “Liceo Cubana.” When financial problems threatened the intra-city railway connecting Ybor City with Tampa, Ybor and Manrara bought the system, partly to allow workers to visit parks on weekends. The three

20. Ibid., 21-46.
21. Interview with Emilio Del Rio, August 3, 1979, tape at Florida State Museum; Emilio Del Rio, Yo fui uno de Los Fundadores de Ybor City (Tampa, 1950), 11; “Early Days in Ybor City, narrated by Fernando Lemos,” Federal Writers’ Project, 53.
and one-half mile line ran to the doors of every factory in town.22 Ybor and Sanchez solved the persistent housing shortage by building homes and selling them to the workers for between $750 and $900.23

The volatile Latin temperament required Ybor’s adroit skills in the intangible areas of morale and custom. In 1888, dissatisfaction, yellow fever, and homesickness gripped the Cuban workers, and a mass exodus threatened to depopulate Ybor City. Ybor masterfully invited the low-spirited Latins—several hundred in all—to a gala fiesta at his farm. Reportedly, Ybor personally fetched each worker in his private carriage and escorted him to his retreat for a night-long hog roast. To further mollify his employees, Ybor distributed $6,000 in presents to the group.24

The Tampa Morning Tribune, a bastion of conservatism, trumpeted the economic harmony that existed between Ybor City cigars and New South prosperity, between simpatico Latin patrones and cheerful yet obedient immigrants. In a number of editorials, the Tribune ballyhooed Tampa as the shiniest of the New South constellations: “Tampa’s prospect of being a city with a population of 100,000 is as bright as an incandescent light.”25 “In less than ten years,” the paper predicted, “the whir of the loom, the ring of the anvil and the whistle of the engine will break the silence of centuries. . . . Yes, for the first time in the history of our country, the dear old Southland is a choice spot of the immigrant, farmer and timber cutter.”26

A prosperity built on cigar smoke, as some Tampa civic leaders cautioned, was an economy resting on a weak foundation. “Experience has taught the farmer that he must diversify his crops if he would prosper,” wrote a Tampa Morning Tribune reporter in 1896. “It has also taught cities in more instances than one that they must not depend solely on one line of business or industry, for prosperity. Tampa has now got itself into a place where it is likely to be taught the same lesson whatever the cost may be. For three years now the TRIBUNE has

24. Tampa Journal, January 12, 1888; “Early Days in Ybor City, as narrated by Fernando Lemos,” Federal Writers’ Project, 56.
25. Tampa Morning Tribune, June 13, 1897.
26. Ibid., February 12, 1895.
urged that our leading . . . men should use all honorable means to establish other manufacturing enterprises other than the cigar industry in this city.”

Tampa, represented by the Tribune, leading merchants, and old families, initially welcomed the cigar industry to the area. Indeed, during the formative period, the Tribune staunchly defended the Latin workers and their customs. In 1890 when a strike threatened the Ybor factory, the Tribune counseled, “There are two sides to every question.” That same year, some Hyde Park residents complained that immigrants sullied the town’s good name by engaging in “Sunday circuses” on the Lord’s day. “We are convinced,” the Tribune noted in an editorial, “that the most orthodox Christians of Tampa recognize the fact that the ideas and habits of the Cuban population in our midst are quite different from theirs. We sincerely believe that if the citizens of Ybor City are left alone, there will never be any clash between them and the people of Tampa on this score. After a long and intimate acquaintance with a majority of the cigar manufacturers . . . we are confident that they do not desire or intend to insult the moral or religious sense of this community.” In conclusion, the Tribune underlined the basis of future harmony: “The people of Ybor City and Tampa will understand each other if let alone.”

In good times the Ybor City-Tampa nexus functioned harmoniously, but what might happen when the factory gates closed? In truth, the relationship between the WASPish Tampa community and the Latin factory town was a thin veneer, hiding deeply-ingrained prejudices, nativist suspicions, and competing philosophies. As long as immigrant cigarmakers toiled cheerfully and remained in their Latin ghetto, town-worker harmony prevailed. Ybor City was a self-contained enclave, and Latins seldom strayed from its insular borders. But to guard against future labor-ethnic strife, the Tampa Board of Trade promised

27. Ibid., May 23, 1896.
28. Tampa Tribune, January 15, 1890.
29. Ibid., January 9, 1890.
Ybor and his associates that the police would be available to ferret out agitators and radicals from their industries.\(^{31}\)

The influx of thousands of aliens, the creation of company towns where once there had been primeval forest, and the pace of urban life profoundly shook the Tampa establishment. A series of disturbances in the late 1890s caused consternation in the Tampa establishment. The Cuban insurrection in 1895, which culminated in the Spanish-American War, affected Tampa as it did no other American city. A hotbed for Cuban revolutionary activity throughout the 1890s and a favorite port for filibustering patriots, Tampa was selected as the chief port of embarkation for American military forces. This political plum, which advertised Tampa to the world, brought major problems along with the commercial advantages which accrued to the community.\(^{32}\)

Tampa was not prepared to serve as a staging ground for the navy and army. Inadequate port facilities, an overburdened one-track railroad, tropical weather, profit-gouging merchants, and an ill-conceived battle plan gave the city infamous publicity. Correspondents from Europe and Asia (even the Daily Iowa Capitol sent a reporter to Tampa) arrived in town and unleashed a barrage of unabashed, fault-finding lampoons.\(^{33}\) “There is sand, and then sand, and lastly sand,” lamented one author.\(^{34}\) “Tampa,” complained Outlook’s George Kennan, “is a huddled collection of generally insignificant buildings standing in an arid desert of sand, and to me it suggests the city of Semipalatinsk—a wretched, verdureless town in southern Siberia. . . . Thriving and prosperous Tampa may be, but attractive and pleasing it certainly is not.”\(^{35}\)

Soldiers gleefully joined reporters in a crescendo of enmities directed towards what one veteran described as a “city chiefly composed of derelict wooden houses drifting on an ocean of

\(^{31}\) Minutes of the Tampa Board of Trade, March 8, 1887, Ledger I, 41.
\(^{35}\) George Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba (New York, 1899), 2-3.
By August 1898, Tampa had provided quarters for 66,478 soldiers, thousands of animals, and tons of supplies. The streets are jammed with army teams,” Baltimore Mayor Joseph Pangborn exclaimed during a visit, “and the sidewalks are thronged with soldiers, civilians, contractors and the like. . . . Tampa has been completely transformed since my first arrival here, the middle of March. . . . Now everything is booming. There is not an empty structure in town and any number of temporary ones have gone up.38

Feisty soldiers occasionally brought the battle to Ybor City where many of the Spanish residents and institutions were suspected of disloyalty. “Some of the regular soldiers are giving the people of Ybor City considerable trouble,” reported the Tribune. “They demolish saloons, theatres and restaurants and other places of amusement with avidity and as regular as the click of a Waterbury watch. They shoot out the electric lights, climb on top of street cars, and are in all kinds of diabolical mischief that hoodlums can possible conceive.”39

The presence of the military generally helped Tampa’s economy, although there were some groups which were hurt during the period. This was particularly true of the black population. Rural southern blacks had begun moving to Tampa in large numbers after the Reconstruction era. In 1890, 1,632 blacks lived in the city, and the number increased to 2,926 a decade later. Blacks composed nearly twenty per cent of the population in 1900.40

Friction between Tampa whites and blacks had existed for many years. The execution of Harry Singlton, a black man

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38. Tampa Morning Tribune, May 29, 1898. Mayor Pangborn had visited Tampa during March 1898.
39. Ibid., June 8, 1898. During the war, American troops closed the Spanish clubhouse, Centro Español. “Ybor City, Historical Data,” Federal Writers’ Project, 401; Tampa Morning Tribune, April 19, 1899, reported the exodus from Tampa of 150 Spaniards.
convicted of killing a white policeman, touched off a series of protests in "the Scrub," the city's black ward. His hanging in 1898, the first public execution in the city since the Civil War, attracted a crowd of 5,000.\footnote{41. Tampa Morning Tribune, September 27, 1895, January 7, 8, August 7, 1898.}

The Spanish-American War intensified the strained relations between whites and blacks. Bickering between white soldiers and Tampa blacks increased during the summer of 1898. There was little criticism when white soldiers wrecked saloons or caused other disturbances, but when black military men, part of a contingent of 4,000 such troops in Tampa, created problems, there was immediate and serious reaction. A race riot occurred when black troopers of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Regiments objected to intoxicated white volunteers from Ohio shooting at a young black boy.\footnote{42. Willard Gatewood, "Negro Troops in Florida, 1898," Florida Historical Quarterly, XLIX (July 1970), 2-5; Tampa Morning Tribune, June 8, 1898; May 18, 1898; May 5, 1898.}

"It is indeed very humiliating to the American citizens and especially to the people of Tampa . . . ." argued the Tribune, "to be compelled to submit to the insults and mendacity perpetrated by the colored troops that are now camped in this city on the account of the inadequacy of the police force."\footnote{43. Tampa Morning Tribune, May 12, 1898.}

Blacks continued to challenge segregation and discrimination after the Spanish-American War. A direct challenge to Tampa's economic-social establishment appeared in the spring of 1899, when James Christopher, a black newspaper editor from Brunswick, Georgia, arrived. He immediately launched The Union Labor Recorder, a journal which scathed Tampa businessmen and politicians. His attack on the police department precipitated a fight between him and a policeman, and Christopher was shot and killed.\footnote{44. Ibid., June 25, 26, 1899.} Over 5,000 blacks marched in protest at his funeral. According to the Tribune, "The laboring negro left to themselves, are the last people in the world to form mobs and provoke riots. . . . Under such dangerous leadership, they fall into the ludicrous error that the white man is his sworn and lasting enemy, that he is being treated like a dog, denied his rights, assaulted for amusement, and slaughtered for pastime."\footnote{45. Ibid., June 27, 1899.}
Tribune added an ominous note: “Other agitators of his stamp who are deceiving the negroes of the South, should read the turbulent story of Christopher and mark the lesson well.”

The frustration and anxiety of the 1890s, exemplified in national terms by depression, war, and rebellion, saw local Tampans turn to their latest problem—new alien immigrants arriving in their midst. Several thousand Sicilians had settled in Tampa by the mid-1890s, many ironically seeking refuge to escape the nativist persecution suffered in New Orleans where eleven Italians had been murdered by vigilantes in 1891.

Sicilians, according to Tampans, carried with them the deadly germ of organized crime. After an alleged rape of a Spanish girl by an Italian immigrant, an 1897 letter to the editor suggested that “the brute who committed the heinous crime belongs to the Mighty Mafia. . . . Is it any wonder that such a flagrant case of this should awaken in fathers and brothers a desire for lynching?”

Lynch law was barely averted in 1899. Giuseppe Licata, an Italian immigrant, was accused of killing a rural farmer in a quarrel over a cow. A group of Pasco County farmers marched on the Tampa jail, demanding that he be released for justice. Licata was later found innocent of the charges, but the Tribune felt it was necessary to warn the city’s newest Latin group: “We want no Mafia in Tampa.”

The scare revealed a community troubled over the changing values that progress had brought. Rural Floridians and WASPish Tampans chaffed at the presence of this mass of Catholic foreigners in their midst. Latin customs offended many citizens. “The Cuban population seems to have very little decency in their composition,” the Tribune sneered in 1896, “You can at any time of the day if you promenade along the streets of West Tampa or Ybor City see children from all ages . . . playing around in the garb which nature gave them with a little additional covering of dust or cheesecloth . . . while the smiling parents watch them without a word of reproof.”

Latin and black neighborhoods were perceived as spawning grounds for crime and violence. “Tampa is establishing a reputa-

46. Ibid.
48. Tampa Morning Tribune, November 6, 1897.
49. Ibid., November 9, 10, 1899.
50. Ibid., August 4, 1896.
tion for being a very wicked city,” the Ocala Mail and Express noted. “She has surpassed all records of brutal fights, desperate deeds, ugly murders, and factionalism. With all her show of prosperity, people will not be inclined to reside in a place where sensitive nerves are shocked and lives endangered every day."51 Occasionally, Anglos clashed with Latins. “The Americans felt a racial hatred toward us,” remembered Dr. Manuel Santos. “Our mutual aid societies formed entertainment here, and many times se formaba bulla [literally, ‘noise was made’], because these Americans entered the picnics and would get drunk. When they would get drunk, se netian [they put themselves on] our women in order to start a quarrel."52 Other Latins vividly recall an historic poster at the Sulphur Springs swimming pool: “NO DOGS, NIGGERS OR LATINS ALLOWED.”53

By the 1890s in some quarters, the Latin flavor of Tampa’s cigar industry was under attack. The resentment stemmed from an obvious demographic imbalance: virtually no Anglos were employed in any of the nearly 4,000 jobs. James Wood, labor organizer for the Cigarmakers’ Union, criticized the manufacturers as being “un-American,” charging that “an American citizen in Tampa has as much chance of being hired in a cigar factory as being elected Senator.” Wood, dissatisfied over failures to unionize the Ybor City work force, and disillusioned over the Latin predominance in the industry, suggested restricting immigration during periods of widespread domestic unemployment—as during the 1890s depression. “The very men who have devoted their life’s labor to the upbuilding and beautifying of this country,” maintained Wood, “are forced to walk the streets in idleness, be called tramps and other such scurrilous epithets.”54

If native Americans began changing their perceptions of Latins in the 1890s, so too did Cubans reconsider their relationship to the Tampa community. Throughout the decade, the rallying cry had been “Cuba Libre!” The insurrections and conflicts, culminating in the 1898 spectacle, had achieved victory but not peace.

51. Ocala Mail Express editorial, reprinted in Tampa Morning Tribune, August 10, 1897.
52. “Personal History of Dr. M. Santos,” Federal Writers’ Project, 595.
53. Interviews with Philip Spoto, June 30, 1979, Tampa, and Nelson Palermo, October 18, 1979, Tampa.
Many of Tampa’s Cubans, exhilarated by independence, repatriated to the homeland only to find economic chaos and political embitterment.\textsuperscript{55} Many returned to Tampa—one-way passage by steamer was only ten dollars—and stories such as the following appeared frequently in 1898 and 1899: “The return of about 140 Cubans to this city from Havana yesterday speaks volumes in favor of Tampa. Most of these men left here after the war with hope of bettering their condition in their native land. They have been there long enough to give it a fair trial. . . . They were glad to get back to Tampa, their new found home. . . . After seeing so many starving people in Havana . . . hundreds . . . would gladly return to Tampa if they had money.”\textsuperscript{56} Some returned prepared to fight for what one Tampa historian has called “long deferred class issues.” He writes: “For three years, the cigar workers had labored under a patriotic injunction against strikes. As the moratorium on labor activity lapsed, increasing attention was given to working conditions.”\textsuperscript{57}

Cigarmakers, the majority of whom were still unorganized in 1899, met stiffening resistance to their growing independence. The rules were no longer the same. The introduction of weight scales in the Martinez Ybor factory symbolized a new day in the industry. Ostensibly, the scales were designed to weigh an allotted amount of tobacco for the cigarmaker, but in reality, far greater principles were at stake: power and custom. It had been a tradition in the industry that the cigar filler was never weighed; to question a Latin’s integrity challenged his dignity. The new weight scales demanded precision, which left no room for pre-industrial fringes such as “smokes” and scraps carried home in the evening. A worker was now expected to roll a precise number of cigars from his measured filler. Workers must have asked, “What would Ybor or Sanchez have said?” But by May 1899, most of the first generation patrones were dead. A new era had arrived in Ybor City, personified by Yankee efficiency and corporate rationality. The Latin pioneers—Joseph Seidenberg, Jose Morales, Serafin Sanchez, Don Vicente Martinez Ybor—had

\textsuperscript{55} Joan Marie Steffy, “The Cuban Immigrants of Tampa, Florida, 1886-1898” (master’s thesis, University of South Florida, 1975), 129.
\textsuperscript{56} Tampa Morning Tribune, January 31, 1899.
\textsuperscript{57} Louis A. Perez, “Cubans in Tampa: From Exiles to Immigrants, 1892-1901,” Florida Historical Quarterly, LVII (October 1978), 135.
all died in the years preceding 1899. At Ybor's funeral, ten Latin mutual aid societies marched in the cortege; by June 1, 1899, they would be marching in support of the "Huelga de Pesa," the weight strike.

To the new manufacturers, the weight system reflected efficiency; to workers the scales represented a breach of faith. The cigarmakers insisted the scales shortchanged the product. To reinforce their message, they went out on strike—the first major labor disturbance in a decade in Tampa. Management, seeing an opportunity to reform an antiquated system, enforced a lockout at their plants. By July of 1899, the "Huelga de Pesa" was well under way.

The lockout galvanized the unorganized Ybor City work force into a united front. "We will never give in," an impassioned strike leader told a crowd. "We are making a stand now for our rights and we'll starve before our surrender." A committee was organized to negotiate demands. Strikers gathered at the Labor Temple to hear fiery speeches and to lunch at soup kitchens. There were usually ten meetings a day at which the strikers "declared loudly and gesticulated wildly. They laughed and chatted and frequented places of amusement; only the deserted factories looked gloomy." Cigar-makers effectively boycotted unsympathetic merchants in a demonstration of their solidarity.

Mayor Frank C. Bowyer promised manufacturers police protection. To demonstrate the gravity of the situation, warrants for twelve strike leaders were issued on July 13, 1899. The leaders were duly arrested, and bond was set at $300 each. Peter Oliphant Knight, who prosecuted the case, was a political ringmaker and economic force in Tampa, and he had long battled the Latins. "We [Tampans]," he stated in 1897, "have always had great difficulty to properly handle the foreign element that is in this city."

Manufacturers showed great resolve and unity during the early stages of the strike. The lockout had thrown 4,000 workers

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58. Tampa Morning Tribune, November 17, December 16, 1896, November 11, 1899.
59. Ibid., July 7, 8, 9, 1899.
60. Ibid., July 11, 1899.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., July 9, 11, 1899.
63. Ibid., July 14, 15, 1899.
64. Ibid., October 13, 1897; July 15, 1899.
out of jobs, and some 1,400 Cubans left Tampa. More important, the manufacturers signed an “ironclad agreement,” pledging to break the strikers.65 Repercussions of the crisis were quickly in evidence. The shutdown meant $60,000-$70,000 in weekly wages lost. Businessmen on Franklin Street, the hub of Anglo-Saxon Tampa, reported the worst sales in several years. Strikers, aware of their financial clout, compiled lists of merchants known to be sympathetic to the lockout.66

What began over a set of scales soon evolved into a major battle for power and control. “A complaint so trivial as to be almost ludicrous has caused the wholesale paralysis of industry,” railed the Tribune. The powerful paper warned its readers: “If the blame must rest on one particular element, it should fall upon the anarchistic leaders who have urged the strikers into this defiance and its results. There can be little doubt that the Manrara strike was directly inspired by professional agitators.”67 The Tribune supported the manufacturers throughout the crisis. In editorial after editorial, the paper sounded familiar themes: “Tampa is afflicted with one of the most dangerous and obnoxious classes of people just now that ever has been tolerated by any civilized community. It is the professional agitator. . . . These people are regular anarchists, roaming the country, perpetrating their diabolical acts in towns.”68 The strike unleashed a torrent of nativistic insults: “Tampa can afford to lose cigarmakers. Tampa cannot afford to lose cigar factories. . . . Every influence, every sympathy of the people of Tampa should be with the factories.”69

A committee of strikers responded to the Tribune’s accusations. “The Tribune would be willing to fill our county jail with innocent men,” wrote Arturo Noviega, Joseph R. Torres, and Morris Cracowaner, strike committee members, “simply because the cigarmakers have the manhood to resist being crushed and annihilated by organized capital. . . . ‘What a contrast to Democracy at the present date.’”70 The Tribune quipped: “It would be a great picnic to turn a raft of hoodlums into a factory full of

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65. Ibid., July 9, 1899; July 11, 1899; August 17, 1899.
66. Ibid., July 11, 1899; July 16, 1899; July 18, 1899.
67. Ibid., July 9, 1899.
68. Ibid., July 11, 1899.
69. Ibid., July 30, 1899.
70. Ibid., July 18, 1899.
tobacco and tell them to make so many cigars every day, but it
would not be a bit funny for the manufacturers."

The end of the “Heulga de Pesa” came with surprising swift-
ness. On August 14, 1899, management conceded to the removal
of weight scales, in addition to a number of largely symbolic
issues. Workers had won every demand: abolition of the scales,
good material to be furnished, the committee of strikers to be
reinstated, wrappers to be furnished as late as 4:00 p.m., uni-
form wages for all grades of cigars, liberal supplies of ice water
to be available, coal to be used as fuel in winter, no sweeping
of the floors until after 6:00 p.m., and the factories were to be
thoroughly cleaned and scrubbed once a month. Most im-
portantly, workers won the right to act under the direction of
the General Committee. Cigarworkers had lost approximately
$600,000 in wages during the strike and some 1,400 workers
most of whom had moved to Havana. They had, however, gained
an organizational beachhead. Workers soon formed an immigrant
union, “La Sociedad de Torcedores de Tampa,” commonly
called La Resistencia. Jose Vega Diaz, perhaps the last veteran
of the 1899 strike, later reminisced about the affair: “Oh, Huelga
de Pesa ... What a strike! ... We make a union. That’s how
we started La Resistencia. That was our worker’s union, the first.
We won that strike.”

By the end of 1899, the Tribune reported, “the 120 Cigar
Factories ... are working on full time.” Cigarmakers, exultant
in victory, and manufacturers, sombre in defeat, resumed work.
Victory for the workers had been complete, or so the jubilant
Latinos thought. “Victory” had been largely symbolic, as it turned
out, the real test of power and control had just begun. The
“Heulga de Pesa” would soon be a relic of labor history; it
would be the last strike ever won by cigarmakers in Tampa.

The real victory of 1899 came not on the picket lines, but
rather at corporate headquarters on Wall Street and in Durham,
North Carolina. In September 1899, the creation of the Cigar
Trust was announced. Tampa would become the operational
base for this latest American conglomerate, the Havana-

71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., July 21, August 15, 1899.
73. Interview with Jose Vega Diaz, May 3, 1980, Tampa. Tape and tran-
script at the Florida State Museum.
74. Tampa Morning Tribune, December 3, 1899.
American Company.\textsuperscript{75} Two years later this company was aggrandized by the American Tobacco Company, a $25,000,000 operation headed by James Duke and popularly known as the Trust. By 1901, nearly ninety per cent of Cuba's tobacco exports and Tampa's clear Havanas were controlled by the Trust.\textsuperscript{76}

The decade of the 1890s had witnessed a revolution in financial control and corporate leadership in Tampa's cigar industry. Latin entrepreneurs such as Haya and Ybor had personally dominated the factories at the beginning of the decade, imparting their own personalities and lifestyles to their activities. By 1900, these patrones were either dead or no longer active. The new industrial leadership emerged not from the Vuelta Abajo, but from corporate boardrooms where decisions were made "scientifically and efficiently." The new corporate heroes were men such as Eli Buchanan Witt, who began his career in Tampa at about the time that the Ybors and Seidenbergs were retiring or dying. Born in Tennessee, Witt came to Florida where he launched his career in cigars by retailing them from a Tampa drugstore. He became associated with the Reynolds Tobacco Company, first as a salesman and later as executive.\textsuperscript{77}

Where Ybor needed only a handshake to finish a deal, Witt was credited with establishing the first cash-on-delivery, wholesale, trucking system in America. Where Ybor accompanied his countrymen to fiestas and knew the names of all of his workers' families, Witt used the new technological gadget—the telephone—to make business contacts. Where Ybor abhorred industrial technology because his customers demanded the perfection of a handmade cigar, Witt became president of Hava-Tampa, a company specializing in anti-unionism and machine-made cigars. Where Ybor prided himself on the artistic perfection of a handcrafted "El Principe de Gales," Witt perfected twentieth-century practices such as giving away free matches with purchases and pioneering the wooden tip and cellophane-wrapped cigar.

A new era dawned for the cigar industry, including new methods of dealing with labor problems. In 1900, the Tampa

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., September 17, 1899; Quien Sabe, "Early Days of Ybor City," 69.
\textsuperscript{76} Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia, 1933), 401; Stetson Kennedy, Palmetto Country (New York, 1942), 279.
\textsuperscript{77} Tampa Daily Times, January 31, 1947; Tampa Evening Tribune, February 1, 1947.
Cigar Manufacturer's Association was established, avowedly for the purpose of "group handling of labor relations." The following year, the American Tobacco Company instructed its Tampa representative to take a stern stand: "No union shop will be permitted in Tampa." During the first quarter of the twentieth century, Ybor City and West Tampa exploded in a series of protracted and violent struggles for power. In 1901, Tampa policemen, together with extralegal vigilante squads, tried to enforce the new corporate will. Immigrants were evicted by landlords, strikers were arrested for vagrancy and deported, and union strike funds were rendered unavailable when La Resistencia's president and treasurer were forcibly hijacked to Honduras. In 1910, workers and management battled for seven months—a strike highlighted by the hanging of two Italians, several shootings, and mass deprivation of workers and their families. Again, management won. The 1920 strike culminated in a crescendo of violence and destruction, leaving in its wake in Tampa the Ku Klux Klan and vigilante justice. "I been in many a strike," boasted Joe Maniscalco, a longtime cigar worker. "Cigarmaker strike in 1910, 1920, 1931. Cigarmaker lose every time." Added Paul Longo, another veteran of the cigar wars: "1920 was a big strike. 1910 was a bigger strike. We lose. But sometimes the best thing to say is nothing."

Viewed in perspective, the 1899 Weight Strike can be seen as a transitional affair between the new corporate organization and the old Latin factory system. The strike involved nineteenth-century issues: threats to pre-industrial Latin fringe benefits and control of the work process. The 1901 strike, however, involved

79. Tampa Morning Tribune, August 1, 1901.
82. Interview with Joseph Maniscalco, April 3, 1980, Tampa. Tape at the Florida State Museum.
83. Interview with Paul Longo, June 12, 1980, Tampa. Tape at the Florida State Museum.
new participants: immigrants had organized La Resistencia, a formal union, and capital had concentrated power into a Trust.

The 1899 affair served as a microcosm of Tampa society, symbolic of an evolution from the nineteenth-century industrial style to the more complex structures of the twentieth century. Regulation, rationalization, and corporate management replaced the values of an earlier society. The decade of the 1890s stands out as the critical watershed for Tampa. By the turn of the century, Tampa's future had been set by a series of dynamic yet disturbing events. War, racism, industrialization, finance capitalism, urbanization, and labor unrest had altered the city's future. By 1900 “the Queen of the Gulf” reigned as the urban-industrial center of Florida, but many residents must have questioned the price of such progress.
FLORIDA HISTORY RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

This list shows the amount and variety of Florida history research and writing currently underway, as reported to the Florida Historical Quarterly. Doctoral dissertations and masters' theses completed in 1980 are included. Research in Florida history, sociology, anthropology, political science, archeology, geography, and urban studies is included.

Auburn University

Robin F. A. Fabel (faculty)—"Economic Aspects of British West Florida" (continuing study).
Robert R. Rea (faculty) and John D. Ware—"George Gauld: Surveyor and Cartographer of the Gulf Coast (publication forthcoming).
Robert R. Rea and James A. Servies (faculty, University of West Florida)—"The Log of H.M.S. Mentor, 1780-1781: A New Account of the British Navy at Pensacola" (publication forthcoming).

Castillo de San Marcos National Monument, St. Augustine

Luis R. Arana—"Spanish Construction and Repair at Castillo de San Marcos, 1672-1763 and 1784-1821" (continuing study); "Notes on Fort Matanzas National Monument" (to be published in El Escribano).
Randall G. Copeland, C. Craig Frazier, and Terry Wong (National Park Service, Denver Service Center)—"Architectural Data, Castillo de San Marcos" (continuing study).
Kathleen A. Deagan (National Park Service, Southeast Archeological Center)—"Excavation at the Castillo de San Marcos" (continuing study).
John C. Paige (National Park Service, Denver Service Center) —"British Construction and Repair at the Castillo de San Marcos, 1763-1784"; "National Park Service Construction and Repair since 1933" (research completed).

Daytona Beach Community College

Peter D. Klingman (faculty)—"Black Politicians in Recon-
Flagler College

Thomas Graham (faculty)—“Charles H. Jones, 1848-1913: Editor and Progressive Democrat” (continuing study).

Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University

Theodore Hemmingway (faculty) and Robert Hall—“Black Florida in the New South,” in Blacks in the New South (published).

Florida Atlantic University

Donald W. Curl (faculty)—“Life and Architecture of Addison Cairns Mizner” (publication forthcoming).
Harry A. Kersey, Jr. (faculty)—My Work Among The Florida Seminoles, James Lafayette Glenn (publication forthcoming); “Seminole Indians of Florida” (continuing study).
Raymond A. Mohl (faculty)—“Metropolitan Growth and Political Change in Miami, 1940-1980,” in Sun Belt Cities (publication forthcoming).
Sandra M. Mohl (faculty)—“Migrant Farmworkers in America: A Florida Case Study” (master’s thesis completed, 1981).

Florida Southern College

J. Larry Durrence (faculty)—“Activities of the ‘Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching’ in
Florida State University


William R. Brueckheimer (faculty)—“Quail Plantations of the Tallahassee-Thomasville Region” (publication forthcoming); “Quail Plantations of North Florida and South Georgia” (research completed).

Juanita W. Crudele—“Chattahoochee, Florida: From Frontier to Twentieth Century” (Ph.D. dissertation in progress).

Kathleen A. Deagan (faculty)—“Adaptation and Change in Sixteenth-Century St. Augustine” (continuing study).


Frederick Gaske—“Archeological Patterns and Unwritten History of the Nineteenth-Century Hotel Period in St. Augustine” (master’s thesis in progress).

James P. Jones (faculty)—“History of Florida State College of Women” (continuing study).

Edward F. Keuchel (faculty) — A History of Columbia County, Florida (published).

Stanley E. Kinchen—“The Nineteenth Amendment and the Duval County Black Woman: A Perceived Threat to White Superiority” (continuing study).

Janet Snyder Matthews—“History of Sarasota and the Manatee River, 16th-19th Centuries” (continuing study).

David B. Mock, Robert G. Stakenas, and Kenneth Eaddy—“A History of Vocational Education in Florida”; “A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Policies of the Division of Vocational Education Since 1945” (continuing studies); “Reflections of Florida Vocational Educators and Administrators on the Development of Vocational Education in Florida” (oral history project).

Derald Pacetti—“Federal-State Jurisdictional Conflict over Florida” (continuing study).

Paige Parker (faculty) and Larry Jackson—“Block Representation on City Councils in Florida: Coalition Politics in At-Large Elections” (continuing study).
Fisheries Regulation in Florida During World War I”; “History of Florida Fisheries Regulation Enforcement, 1830-1920” (continuing studies).

Greg Padgett—“A History of the Black Churches in Florida as an Organ of Protest” (Ph.D. dissertation in progress).

William Warren Rogers (faculty)—“A History of Saint George Island” (continuing study).

William Warren Rogers and Jerrell H. Shofner (faculty, University of Central Florida)—“A Pictorial History of Florida During the Depression” (publication forthcoming).


Burke G. Vanderhill (faculty) and Frank A. Unger—“The Georgia Fractions: Florida’s Georgia Land Lots” (continuing study).

J. Leitch Wright, Jr. (faculty) — The Only Land They Knew: The Tragic Story of the Indians in the Old South (published); “Explosion of the Queen’s Redoubt in the Lives of William A. Bowles, John Miller, and William Panton”; “Creeks and Seminoles: The Final Years, 1775-1840”; “Black Seminoles” (continuing studies).

Historical Association of Southern Florida

Robert S. Carr and Margot Ammidown—“Archeological and Historical Investigations of Brickell Point, Miami”; “Archeological and Historical Investigations of Wagner House, Miami” (continuing studies).

Dorothy J. Fields—“Black Historic Archives and Oral History Collection of South Florida” (continuing study).

Arva M. Parks—“Coconut Grove”; “Mary Barr Munroe, Resident of Coconut Grove” (continuing studies); Miami: The Magic City (published).


Sandra Riley—“History of Abaco, the Bahamas, Including the Loyalists from Florida” (continuing study).

Jean C. Taylor—“South Dade County” (continuing study).

Patsy West—“Photographic History of the Seminoles and
Miccosukees”; “Seminoles in Tourist Attractions” (continuing studies).

Historic Key West Preservation Board

Sharon Wells—“Wooden Houses of Key West” (continuing study).

Historic Pensacola Preservation Board


Historic St. Augustine Preservation Board

Amy Bushnell — The King’s Coffer: The Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565-1702 (publication forthcoming); “Women in Parallel Polities Hispanic, Indian, and Spanish—During the Seventeenth Century” (continuing study).

Hong Kong Baptist College

Barton Starr (faculty)—“Loyalists in East Florida” (continuing study).

Jacksonville Historical Society

James R. Ward and Dena Snodgrass—“The King’s Road” (continuing study).

Jacksonville University

George E. Buker (faculty)—“Union Blockade of Florida During the Civil War”; “Involvement in the Wetlands Issue in Florida” (continuing studies).
Joan S. Carver (faculty)—“Women in Florida Politics” (continuing study).
George Hallam (faculty)—“History of Jacksonville University”; “History of Bolles School” (continuing studies).
Louisiana Collection Series, Birmingham, Alabama

Jack D. L. Holmes—“Thomas Nast Views Florida During the Civil War” (continuing study); “New Orleans Times-Democrat Expedition to Florida, 1882-1883” (research completed); “Gulf-Shore Islands in Colonial West Florida: An Historical Perspective” (research completed); Andrés de Pez and Pensacola’s Founding” (research completed); “Origin of Contraband Days, a Lake Charles Fiesta” (continuing study); “Gator Hunter” (to be published in Louisiana Life).

Jack D. L. Holmes and Eric Beerman (Madrid, Spain)—“Bernardo de Gálvez, 1746-1786” (publication forthcoming).

Louisiana State University


Paul E. Hoffman, Eugene Lyon, and Stanley South (faculty, University of South Carolina)—“The History of Spanish Santa Elena” (continuing study).

Mississippi College, Clinton, Mississippi

Edward N. Akin (faculty)—“Henry M. Flagler, A Biography” (continuing study).

McNeese State University, Lake Charles, Louisiana

Thomas D. Watson (faculty)—“United States-Creek Relations, 1783-1835” (continuing study).

Rollins College

Jack C. Lane (faculty)—“Centennial History of Rollins College”; “College Progressivism in Florida” (continuing studies).
Stetson University

Timothy Egnor—“Fernandina in the Civil War” (master’s thesis in progress).
Kevin J. O’Keefe (faculty)—“Florida and the Coming of War, 1898” (continuing study).

Tampa Historical Society

L. Glenn Westfall—“Cigar Label Lithography: A History of Florida’s Cigar Industry through Cigar Label Art”; “Cigar Factories and Manufacturers of Florida” (continuing studies).

Texas A. & M. University

Linda D. Vance (faculty)—“May Mann Jennings: Florida’s Genteel Activist” (publication forthcoming).

University of Central Florida

Richard C. Crepeau (faculty)—“A History of the Melbourne Village Project” (continuing study).
Thomas D. Greenhaw (faculty)—“Patrick Tonyn: Last Royal Governor of East Florida”; “Prisoners of War in Florida During World War II”; “Training of British Pilots in Florida During World War II” (continuing studies).
Edmund F. Kallina (faculty)—“Claude Kirk Administration” (continuing study).
Jerrell H. Shofner (faculty)—“Naval Stores Industry in the Southeastern United States”; “Black Laborers in the Forest Industry of the Southeast”; “History of Jackson County, Florida” (continuing studies); “The Town of Apopka City” (research completed); “The Black Press in Florida” (research completed).
Paul W. Wehr (faculty)—“History of Central Florida” (continuing study); “History of Slavia, Florida” (research completed); “Will Wallace Harney” (research completed).
Elizabeth Alexander, Bruce Chappell, and Paul Weaver—“Calendar of the Spanish Holdings of the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History” (continuing study).

Fred Blakey (faculty)—“A Biography of John Henry Winder”; “Alburtus Vogt” (continuing studies).

Donald Brandes—“Significance of Tropical Cyclone Rainfall in the Water Supply of South Florida” (Ph.D. dissertation completed, 1981).

James Button (faculty)—“Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Six Florida Communities, 1960-1976” (continuing study).

Bruce Chappell—“A History of the Diego Plains in the Second Spanish Period” (continuing study).

William C. Childers (faculty)—“Garth Wilkinson James and Robertson James: Abolitionists in Gainesville During Reconstruction” (continuing study).

Carl J. Clausen (faculty), Brenda Sigler-Lavelle (faculty), and Jerald T. Milanich (faculty)—“Archeology of Little Salt Spring and Environments, Paleo-Indian and Archaic Crisis and Community Adjustment” (publication forthcoming).

David R. Colburn (faculty)—“St. Augustine, 1964: Racial Crisis and Community Adjustment” (publication forthcoming).


Ann S. Cordell (Florida State Museum)—“Ceramic Technology at a Weeden Island Archeological Site in North Florida” (master’s thesis in progress).


Elizabeth Fisher—“Archeological Collections from the River Styx Site, Alachua County” (continuing study).

Michael V. Gannon (faculty)—“A Short History of Florida” (continuing study).

Patricia C. Griffin—“Tourism and Festivals: St. Augustine, Florida, and Bala, Wales” (Ph.D. dissertation in progress).
E. A. Hammond (faculty, emeritus)—“History of the Medical Profession in Florida, 1821-1875” (continuing study).
John Paul Jones (faculty)—“History of the Florida Press Association, 1879-1968” (continuing study).
Vernon J. Knight, Jr.—“Mississippian Ritual” (Ph.D. dissertation in progress).
Kevin M. McCarthy (faculty)—“A Cultural, Literary, and Historical Tour of Florida” (continuing study).
Jerald T. Milanich, Jefferson Chapman (faculty, University of Tennessee), Ann S. Cordell, Stephen Hale, and Rochelle Marrinan—“Toward an Understanding of the Prehistoric Development of Calusa Society in Southwest Florida—Excavations on Useppa Island, Lee County” (publication forthcoming).
Jerald T. Milanich, Ann S. Cordell, Tim A. Kohler (Washington State University), Vernon J. Knight, Jr., and Brenda Sigler-Lavelle—“McKeithen Weeden Island: A Pre-Mississippian Culture in North Florida” (publication forthcoming).
George Pozzetta (faculty)—“Ethnic Interaction in Tampa, Florida, 1885-1920: The Italian, Spanish, and Cuban Communities” (continuing study).
Samuel Proctor (faculty)—“Florida Slave Interviews”; “History of the University of Florida, 1853-present”; “Florida’s Civil War Governors” (continuing studies).
Peggy Jo Shaw—“Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings of Cross Creek” (master’s thesis in progress).
Marvin T. Smith—“Archeology of the DeSoto Entrada in Florida” (continuing study).
Richard Stauffer—“Third Seminole War” (Ph.D. dissertation in progress).
Paul Weaver—“The History of Preservation in St. Augustine” (master’s thesis in progress).
Arthur O. White (faculty)—“William N. Sheats: A Biography, 1851-1922” (continuing study).
Patricia R. Wickman—“St. Augustine’s Minorcans, 1777-1784” (master’s thesis in progress).
University of Miami

Frank Marotti—“English Translations of Félix Zubillaga’s La Florida, La Misión Jesuítica (1566-1572) y la Colonización Española and Monumenta Antique Floridae, 1566-1572” (continuing study).

University of North Florida

Daniel Schafer (faculty)—“Governor James Grant, Administrator of East Florida During the British Period”; “History of the Early Years of the University of North Florida”; “Biographical Studies of Eartha M. M. White and Zephaniah Kingsley” (continuing studies).

University of South Carolina

George C. Rogers, Jr. (faculty) and Lawrence S. Rowland (faculty, University of South Carolina at Beaufort)—“History of Beaufort County, South Carolina” (continuing study).

University of South Florida

Gary R. Mormino (faculty)—“History of Tampa” (continuing study).

University of Tampa

James W. Covington (faculty) — Under the Minarets: Fifty Years of Progress at the University of Tampa (published); “British Relations with the Creek-Seminole Indians in 1814-1815” (continuing study).

University of West Florida

William S. Coker (faculty)—“Papers of Panton, Leslie and Company” (continuing study); John Forbes’ Description of the Spanish Floridas (published).

Lucien A. Delson—"The Spanish Governors of Pensacola, 1757-1763" (continuing study).
Jane G. Dysart (faculty)—"Social Characteristics of Pensacola Before 1860" (continuing study).
Jane G. Dysart and Lucius F. Ellsworth (faculty)—"The Eastern Creek Indians" (continuing study).
Lucius F. Ellsworth—"Lumbering in Northwest Florida During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries" (continuing study).
James R. McGovern (faculty)—"Biography of General ‘Chappie’ James" (continuing study).
George F. Pearce — U. S. Navy in Pensacola From Sailing Ships to Naval Aviation (1825-1930) (published); "West Indies Squadron and American-Caribbean Diplomacy, 1823-1841"; "W. A. Blount and the Election of 1910"; "Henry Mustin: He Did Not Curry to Favor" (continuing studies).
Thomas V. O’Dea—"Biography of W. A. Blount" (master’s thesis in progress).
Merrily Y. Wells—"Father James Coleman, Parish Priest and Vicar-General of West Florida, 1774-1822" (master’s thesis in progress).

Valdosta State College

Lamar Pearson (faculty)—"Spanish-Indian Relations in the First Spanish Period" (continuing study).
Joseph Tomberlin (faculty)—"The Brown Case and Its Aftermath" (continuing study).

Consulting and/or Research Historians

Eugene Lyon—"The Conquest of Spanish Florida, 1568 through 1587" (continuing study).
Mildred L. Fryman—"Papers of the Florida Surveyor Generals to 1908" (continuing study).
Paul S. George—"Ku Klux Klan Activities in the 1930s"; "Miami’s Police During the ‘Roaring Twenties’"; "Evolu-
tion of a Penal System in Dade County”; “Early Black Communities in Miami”; “History of Miami, 1896-1930” (continuing studies).

James R. Ward with Dena Snodgrass—“Time, the River, and Old Hickory’s Town: A Pictorial History of Jacksonville, Florida” (publication forthcoming).
BOOK REVIEWS


Even the most casual student of recent southern history and politics is aware that the sub-title of V. O. Key’s chapter on Florida in Southern Politics (1949) is “Every Man for Himself.” Despite vast changes in the state over the past thirty years, it is surprising how well the caption still fits. The coauthors of Florida’s Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century, a felicitious combination of historian and political scientist, stress that characteristic at the outset of their near-exhaustive exploration of the gubernatorial office and its incumbents over the past eighty years: “Throughout the twentieth century Florida has had the most fragmented political structure in the South” (p. 2).

Since the authors’ conception of the primary function of the governor is as a problem solver (i.e., one who perceives the problems of the state and tries to develop programs to alleviate them), and since the formulation and implementation of public policy depends on working with an inchoate structure of politicians, parties, interest groups, and bureaucrats in all three levels of government, the extent to which a governor can persuade the public and its “representatives” to adopt and implement his proposals is the real measure of his leadership. The book is a tightly organized effort to evaluate the leadership exercised by those who have served as governor in this century in relation to the flux of external conditions and the personal resources various governors used to make the office more or less effective.

The methods used in this assessment are perhaps best characterized as clear and uncluttered, although the reader may sometimes feel that he is getting to know more about certain formal aspects of the office than he needs to know, on the one hand, and perhaps less than he would like to know about the anecdotal appraisal of the persona and the way they actually [369]
operated in certain circumstances, on the other. After a brief overview of the development of Florida since 1900 ("development" is the key word here because it suggests something of the changing demographic foundation and the emphasis on economic growth that has produced much of the political fragmentation as well as a pervasive attitude of business conservatism in the state), the authors provide a collective profile of the origins and backgrounds of the governors and the way each one campaigned his way to the office through the uncertainties of the Florida electoral process.

The second section deals with the structure, processes, and intergovernmental relations of the office, from constitutional characteristics through all of the formal and informal sources of power and influence, as well as the formidable constraints, that affect the capacity of the governor to identify problems, develop and implement policy, and be held accountable for his actions. This review of the resources and limits of the office is followed by a section entitled "Gubernatorial Initiatives." In it Colburn and Scher look briefly at the performance of each governor in four policy areas seen as essential responsibilities devolving on all governors: economic development, race relations, education, and criminal justice. The records here are interesting, and mixed indeed.

The brief concluding section pulls everything together in an "appraisal" of the twenty governors who served in Florida through 1978. Three categories are used: personal qualities, including personal appeal types (charismatic, gregarious, and reserved) and how this appeal related to style (demagogic, neopopulist, and reserved-businesslike) and character (using Barber's active-passive model); gubernatorial effectiveness in terms of administrative leadership and legislative relations to get programs approved and into operation; and gubernatorial initiatives in matters of economics, attitudes towards racial matters, and social programs. The range in each of these areas is considerable, and the permutations among the various categories is obviously extensive. One may disagree with the assignment of a governor to a particular category here and there (the ideal types admit of some crossovers), but on the whole the schema is helpful for comparative analysis. The authors do not hesitate to exercise moral judgment in an Aristotelian way (i.e., what positive moral
characteristics relative to leadership does the individual display most clearly, and did he serve pro bono publico or some narrower interest?). Furthermore, they are remarkably balanced in judging individuals in the perspective of their particular time and circumstance rather than against some absolute contemporaneous standard.

In sum, this is a book based on solid scholarship, and it is done in a way that should make it useful to academicians, aspiring political leaders, and interested political participants alike. Its subject and treatment—a major state institution carefully scrutinized over time—is a refreshing rarity these days.

Vanderbilt University

WILLIAM C. HAVARD


Soon after the American occupation of Florida, it became apparent that the United States needed additional naval bases on the Gulf coast. Up until this time the only facility of any significance in the entire area was New Orleans. Pensacola was obviously a good location for a base. It had one of the best harbors on the coast and the Spanish had left some fortifications from their earlier occupations. A naval base at Pensacola had, however, some drawbacks. It was not as accessible to the interior as either New Orleans or Mobile, and there were neither skilled workers nor readily available sources of material for construction. Good leadership and a high degree of persistence eventually overcame most of these disadvantages.

The beginnings of the yard were very modest, and for many years its facilities were used only for repairs. Competition with the better equipped Atlantic facilities also delayed the growth of the Pensacola station. However, when eventually a dry dock was built the yard's future seemed assured. During the Civil War the yard was occupied briefly by the Confederates, but after Union forces recaptured it, Pensacola became headquarters for the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron. Following the war,
the yard, as well as the navy itself, went through a long period of hard times. During the 1880s the yard’s activity declined, reaching a low point in 1892. The coming of the Spanish-American War led to some increased use of the yard. In fact, soon after the war the facility was expanded with the addition of a floating dry dock and other construction. This growth continued until 1906 when a hurricane nearly destroyed the place. Although repairs were made, the yard was closed in October 1911. In part as a result of the efforts of Pensacola citizens, the yard was reopened at the end of 1913, and in January 1914, the naval aviation unit was moved from Annapolis to Pensacola. World War I gave a tremendous expansion to naval aviation, and from that time on the naval station at Pensacola continued to grow and prosper as the main center of naval aviation training and development.

The author has told the story of the development of the naval base at Pensacola in a clear narrative style. Although Pearce covers some of the same material as did Ernest F. Dibble in Antebellum Pensacola and the Military Presence, his emphasis is greatly different. Dibble’s interest shows more concern for the town of Pensacola and its economic development, whereas Pearce has chosen to investigate the development of the yard itself. Each study has a rightful place of its own.

One weakness of this work was the author’s failure to develop the human side of the navy yard and its administration. Readers will want to know more about the people who built, maintained, and staffed the Pensacola station. This is by no means a major flaw. The book is a valuable contribution, especially to the naval historian. The bibliography and notes show this work to have been well researched. Pearce’s book will be of interest to the general reader, as well as to all who are interested in Florida’s history.

Auburn University

FRANK L. OWSLEY, JR.

(Tallahassee: Sentry Press, 1981. xii, 267 pp. Foreword, preface, appendices, bibliography, illustrations, index. $12.50.)

Professor Edward Keuchel’s History of Columbia County is
the story of one of the counties which constituted the ante-bellum middle Florida plantation belt. Situated along the Suwannee River on the eastern edge of that area, Columbia County was created in 1832. Like its neighbors to the west, it became a rural, agrarian community whose livelihood derived largely from cotton grown on plantations using slave labor. Keuchel's book places major emphasis on this early period of growth and development, the disruptions of civil war and reconstruction, and subsequent renewal in the late nineteenth century.

In a brief opening chapter, Keuchel describes the people who inhabited Columbia County before United States acquisition and then concentrates on the settlement of the region by the people whose descendants presently inhabit it. His handling of the devastating results of the Second Seminole War constitutes one of the strongest chapters of the book. A chapter on the county during the early years of statehood depicts a growing and developing community whose institutions were typically southern. The citizens of Columbia County supported Florida's secession and then fought in large numbers for the Confederacy. The Battle of Olustee, Florida's major military engagement during the war, is treated fully. An appendix to the book lists the numerous county residents who participated in the war.

A chapter on the Reconstruction era, with its turmoil, confusion, turbulence, violence, and resulting bitterness, shows how the county was affected by that chaotic episode. The chapter on the last quarter of the nineteenth century is concerned with the gradual emergence of Columbia County from the disruption of the Civil War and Reconstruction into an era of growth. Railroad construction and financing, the expansion of lumbering, and the introduction of such new economic activities as phosphate, oranges, vegetables, and wrapper-leaf tobacco are interlarded with descriptions of the various settlements of the county. Lake City and Fort White are the more important towns, but Benton, Mikesville, Leno, Mt. Tabor, Barrsville, Blounts Ferry, Suwannee Shoals, and Columbia City are also discussed.

The first thirty years of the twentieth century are covered in a single chapter. Highlights are the advent of the automobile, the loss of the Florida Agricultural College to Gainesville after the 1905 Buckman Act, and Aunt Aggie's Bone Yard. The De-
pression and World War II are condensed into a single chapter, and another covers the period "Since the Second World War." Fred Cone, Columbia County's contribution to the state's chief executive office, is included, but some of his colorful antics while in office have been omitted.

A History of Columbia County is a worthwhile addition to the growing number of county histories that have been published in recent years, in part spurred on by the Bicentennial. Dr. Keuchel has placed the county in the context of the state, region, and nation, but this reviewer would have welcomed a fuller treatment of the twentieth century. Three chapters covering sixty pages are simply inadequate for treating one of Florida's most colorful rural counties. Despite the book's many fine qualities, I must agree with Professor Keuchel's introductory comment that "This is not the full story" (ix).

University of Central Florida

JERRELL H. SHOFNER


Here for the price of a modest lunch the reader can acquire an introduction and broad perspective to one of the more colorful and least thoroughly developed aspects of Florida's rich history. Barbara Purdy has done yeoman's service in editing for publication the entire proceedings of an interdisciplinary conference held in 1980 devoted to Florida's maritime heritage.

Such a conference was conceived of by Dr. Purdy when the National Trust for Historic Preservation made resources available for maritime projects in the late 1970s. Florida's extensive coastline and many inland waterways, coupled with its rich history of aboriginal and European settlement, held the promise of an equally rich maritime heritage. With additional support from the University of Florida and Florida Sea Grant programs the conference was held on March 22-23, 1980. Ninety papers were presented by twenty-one authorities whose interests and
expertise covered a wide spectrum. The paper sessions were organized into three main divisions or parts.

Part one of the conference combined the efforts of archeologists and historians in the form of nine papers devoted to "The Maritime Heritage of Florida." Archeological aspects of this heritage were addressed by Purdy, Richard Daugherty, Rochelle Marrinan, Elizabeth Wing, Eugene Lyon, and Stephen Gluckman. Leading off, Purdy presented "An Evaluation of Wet Site Resources of Florida." Daugherty's paper, which followed, was a discussion of his experiences excavating a wet site in the state of Washington. Its inclusion in this Florida-centered symposium is somewhat difficult to understand beyond the fact that it described archeological field procedures at a wet site. Marrinan and Wing devoted their paper to a review of what archeological studies of some fifty sites across the length and breadth of Florida have revealed concerning prehistoric fishing activities. Eugene Lyon followed with an essay devoted to a review of the utilization of marine resources by Florida Indians during the pre-contact and contact periods. A wrap-up of things directly archeological was provided by Stephen Gluckman's presentation which outlined categories of underwater sites and existing underwater archeological programs underway in Florida.

The remaining four papers grouped in part one of the conference are clearly historical in nature. The best of these is George E. Buker's sketch of marine and joint military operations in south Florida and the Everglades during the Seminole conflicts. A colorfully illustrated essay detailing Florida's steamboat era was contributed by Edward Mueller. More general essays on Florida's maritime commerce and fishing industry up to the recent period were provided by Thomas O'Connor, James Cato, and Donald Sweat to round out this substantive portion of the conference.

Part two is shorter, with four papers devoted to the theme of preservation of Florida's maritime heritage. Neil Crenshaw, Florida's 4-H marine education specialist, described the way that active organization was working to keep maritime skills and interests alive among the state's youth enrolled in its programs. William Baker, a New England-based specialist in boat restoration and naval architecture, presented an overview of
past efforts devoted to building reproductions of historic vessels in America. Herschel Shepard, speaking from the perspective of city planning, addressed the problems of identifying and preserving those elements of the built environment and districts which are uniquely maritime in their character. The role of museums in maritime preservation efforts was treated by Peter Stanford in the final of these four papers.

The third and final portion of the conference was devoted to a keynote address and papers describing the various agencies and programs which support the preservation of Florida’s maritime heritage. In his keynote address, Jerry Rogers spoke from the vantage point of his position as deputy associate director of cultural programs of the federal government’s Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service. Harry Allendorfer’s talk on “Current Legislation” also drew participant attention to the Washington scene insofar as preservation efforts were concerned. The Florida Trust and Sea Grant programs which touched on maritime heritage were discussed by Joan Jennewein and William Seaman. The role of the Florida Division of Archives, History and Records Management and the status of state legislation bearing on historic preservation were detailed by L. Ross Morrell and George Percy to round out the final section of this information-rich conference.

Dr. Purdy added considerably to the value of this volume by including the remarks and questions of many of the participants who were attending the conference in roles other than that of paper presenters. Groups as diverse as treasure hunters and lighthouse preservationists were represented in the obviously lively discussion period which followed the formal presentations.

The publication of the proceedings of the Conference on Florida’s Maritime Heritage is a welcome addition to a growing literature which presents state and local history as a valuable base from which important public policy decisions concerned with the management of cultural and historical resources can be more intelligently formulated. Individuals and groups in all of our coastal and Great Lakes states, in addition to those interested in Florida’s maritime heritage, can find valuable insight here.

University of Georgia  LOUIS DE VORSEY, JR.
In The Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands, Professor Owsley treats the Creek War and the British operations in the Gulf of Mexico as a single campaign. Although a number of recent writers have also scouted this idea, none has made the case as persuasively as Owsley. Most older histories have considered operations in the Gulf as little more than footnotes or have relegated them to a self-standing chapter. The Creek hostilities, when treated at all, have been viewed as an aspect of the history of Indian relations separate from the second War for Independence. That historians largely ignored the operations in the Gulf littoral is scarcely surprising for few of the writers brought any appreciation of the history of the southeast to their studies.

Owsley argues that the Creek War stemmed from the hostility of the traditionalist, pro-Tecumseh Red Sticks to westernizing influences. He finds scant evidence of direct outside influence. On the other hand, he cogently points out that the Fort Mims massacre destroyed any hope of an accommodation of the traditionalists by their white neighbors for it made the pressures for removal unstoppable. It also brought onto the field Brigadier General Andrew Jackson. With a military competence rare for the time or place he smashed the hostiles and extorted a territorial settlement far beyond that desired in Washington.

Some of the Red Stick survivors fled into Florida where British agents, now awakened to the possibilities of the region, recruited them and the more numerous lower Creeks. Yet, from the British viewpoint the Indians had attacked prematurely for they had drawn sizable American forces into the region. Despite this the prospects for British success remained high since they possessed the mobility of water transport while the defenders faced major logistic difficulties, were short of trained manpower, and held a long exposed coast. The occupation of Pensacola and the abortive assault on Mobile destroyed much of the British strategic advantage by alerting Jackson to
the impending attack. Even so, Jackson misread British intentions and concentrated his forces at Mobile which leads Owsley to suggest that if Admiral Alexander Cochrane had moved rapidly to assail New Orleans it would have fallen before the defenders could arrive in sufficient numbers to offer serious opposition. He concludes that Cochrane did not decide to seize New Orleans until after it became clear that Jackson would fight for Mobile. By then it was too late.

Two chapters discuss the strategic options available to both sides during the New Orleans attack, the reasons for the choices, and the actual clash of arms. They are models of good operational history—clear, concise, and well written. The short concluding chapter on the significance of the war on the Gulf coast is more than a simple exposition of Owsley's thesis. He reminds his readers of the diplomatic importance of the twin American victories at Mobile and New Orleans. They occurred in areas which the British, who did not recognize the Louisiana Purchase, considered outside that covered by the Treaty of Ghent. Moreover, that treaty contained a provision which, if narrowly interpreted, required the restoration of the lands surrendered by the Creeks in the Treaty of Fort Jackson. Owsley points out that following their defeats the British abandoned their support of the Creeks while the pressures set loose by Jackson's insistence on removal prevented implementation by American authorities.

The Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands is an account of one portion of the War of 1812 from a regional perspective. It is nevertheless a highly useful corrective to traditional accounts of the war, and it makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of the conflict and its results.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

K. Jack Bauer


In nine clearly written, densely documented chapters Anne Loveland has made a significant contribution to our under-
standing of the social thought of southern evangelical clergymen. Concentrating on Southern Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian ministers in the south Atlantic states between 1800 and 1860, Loveland examined manuscript sources in eleven different collections as well as over two dozen religious and secular newspapers and magazines and an impressive array of printed primary and secondary sources.

While not totally rejecting the view of some historians that southern evangelicalism was shaped by, and subservient to, the ideology of the Old South, Loveland does find evidence of autonomy in the views of southern evangelical ministers and popular ideology. The largely middle-class clergymen she studied deviated from and criticized popular opinion on temperance, Sabbath observances, and dueling. Their views on slavery were “more in line with the dominant ideology, yet they never went so far as to defend slavery as a ‘positive good’ and their demands for religious instruction of the Negroes often contained an implicit criticism of the Old South’s ‘peculiar institution’.” Loveland’s main hope is to demonstrate the heretofore unrecognized complexity of the social ideas of southern evangelicals.

The study begins with detailed, often moving, accounts of the experience of being converted, joining a church, being called to preach, and being ordained. The pathways to preaching of Daniel Baker, Jeremiah Jeter, William Capers, and others are carefully traced. At the beginning of the nineteenth century southern evangelicals faced several cultural factors which were differentially prevalent in the South: the “destitute” (unchurched) status of most Southerners, the paucity of ministers, and the wide dispersal of population and inadequate transportation. Against this cultural backdrop the ministers performed their four main duties of teaching, pastoral work, discipline, and preaching. The most important of these duties was to preach the gospel because evangelicals believed that God used preaching to convert sinners. The imperative to preach to the unconverted necessitated a number of devices to overcome the dispersal of population and the scarcity of ministers: systems of itinerancy, once-a-month preaching, and the frontier-style revival. The camp meeting, the principle vehicle of revivalism, was not without its problems, abuses, and critics. The meetings were susceptible to worldly concerns—strong drink; fist fights,
excessive emotionalism, and just plain old secular fun—if not properly controlled, but even into the 1850s such meetings remained probably the best means of converting large numbers of people. Professor Loveland noted differences among the denominations in the preferred revival method, with Presbyterians and Baptists moving earlier and more completely toward the indoor protracted meeting, while Methodists were slower to abandon the outdoor camp meeting. Most southern evangelicals, says Loveland, stood “somewhere between outright hostility and unqualified approval” of revivalism. They seemed to accept a certain amount of excitement as necessary to make the unconverted listen to the gospel.

Later chapters in this fine work deal explicitly with such specific social issues as temperence, benevolence and reform, slavery, religious instruction of blacks, and the sectional controversy. While the treatment of the clergymen’s social views soundly demonstrates their complexity, it probably will not seriously shake the earlier view that southern evangelicalism was shaped by the prevailing ideology of the Old South. Perhaps this merely highlights the heaviness of the dominant slave-holding ideology. Social and religious appeals aimed at the dominant class were often couched in terms which would help members of this group perceive material secular interest in doing morally right things like providing religious instruction for slaves and advocating temperence. Loveland notes, for example, the striking similarity between the evangelicals’ appeal to slaveholders for religious instruction of the slaves and appeals to the same group on temperence. The temperence appeals focused on the hackneyed theme of slave control, arguing that the difficulties of “managing” slaves were multiplied by intemperence. Despite the existence of genuine, but usually only implicit, criticism of the Old South’s peculiar institution, the approach of southern evangelicals did not seriously challenge the dominant ideology on that centrally important matter. Readers interested in exploring the intricacies of antebellum southern evangelical social thought will find themselves turning repeatedly to Loveland’s well-organized and thorough account.

Florida State University

ROBERT L. HALL

It is a pleasure to read a book whose author presents his thesis clearly, develops it convincingly, states it succinctly, synthesizes his primary and secondary source materials skillfully, and accomplishes all this without benefit of the Pythagorean numerology of the cliometricians or the Freudian babblings of the psychohistorians. Instead, he has done it the hard way—by grubbing through thousands of pages of South Carolina newspapers and manuscripts.

In so doing, Professor Lander may well have driven the last nail in the coffin of the “aggressive slavocracy” hypothesis—or at least into its South Carolina slat. For he shows that leading South Carolina apologists for slavery and its expansion, John C. Calhoun principally among them, were not only “Reluctant Imperialists” in May 1846, but by January 1848, they had become aggressively disenchanted anti-imperialists insofar as Polk’s politically disruptive Mexican War policies and goals were concerned.

During this nineteen-month period they resisted the president’s diplomatic pressure on “Poor Mexico,” castigated his territorial appetites once the fighting had begun, criticized his dangerously inconclusive war strategy, and deplored the sectional animosity inherent in his unnecessary pursuit of “Manifest Destiny” in the desert wastes of the Southwest. Lander also demonstrates that public opinion in South Carolina, particularly as revealed in the state’s newspapers, came to support the anti-expansionist views of the Calhounian coterie, especially as the state’s combat casualties mounted, and as the literate citizenry of the state came to appreciate the anti-slavery dangers of the Wilmot Proviso, All-Mexico Movement, and popular sovereignty questions.

But to this review, Lander’s most important interpretive contribution turns on his treatment of the tragic history of South Carolina’s volunteer Palmetto Regiment. This sad story he
relates to the overall military strategy of the war, and to the steady shift of public opinion in South Carolina from superficial torch-light-parade patriotism in mid-1846 to bitter anti-imperialism in late 1847.

The ill-fated Palmetto Regiment was raised only with the greatest difficulty. South Carolinians did not rally ‘round the flag with much genuine enthusiasm when Congress declared war, mainly because the enlistment term was for twelve, long months and the inhospitable seat of war was far away. Further, the regiment’s officer corps was filled with dashing young Carolina blue-bloods and glory-hungry Gamecock politicians whose collective military skills ranged from the tactically incompetent to the strategically ignorant. Nor were Generals James Shields, Robert Patterson, and John A. Quitman, the brigade and divisional commanders under whom the Palmetto Regiment fought in Mexico, much better. It was often the blind leading the brash.

The history of the Palmettos was one of logistical confusion, poor leadership, low morale, unnecessary privation, untreated disease, pointless marching and counter-marching, mutiny, and desertion. These experiences, however, were punctuated by acts of exceptional personal bravery as well as by exceptionally heavy casualties—the heaviest by far (forty-three per cent) of any American unit to serve in the war. Even the ill-trained and ineptly-commanded Mexicans, for whom the racially arrogant South Carolinians had such contempt, could hit a prideful Palmetto chest at fifty feet, and frequently did.

Small wonder, then, that what there was of South Carolina’s support for the war in 1846 melted away as accounts of the Army’s mishandling of the Palmettos in the field reached the columns of the state’s newspapers and the ears of its politicians in 1847. This unsettling information helped solidify Calhoun’s political base at home, a development which revived briefly his presidential ambitions and encouraged him to escalate his attacks on Polk, Wilmot, the All-Mexico land grabbers, and the popular sovereignty heretics. The apogee of this process came in his brilliant speech in the Senate on January 4, 1848, which utterly destroyed the All-Mexico Movement. Whatever factors or motives influenced Calhoun’s stances on these war-related political issues, Lander demonstrates that the destruction of the
Palmetto Regiment in distant Mexico was important among them.

Two minor cavils: the book is far too brief (176 pages); so brief, that the author can say little about Calhoun’s personal responsibility in bringing on the war in his capacity as Tyler’s aggressive secretary of state during the matter of Texas annexation in 1844-1845. Surely there is irony in this. Nor does Professor Lander take the space to consider the possibility that the Mexicans themselves did much to provoke the war. Indeed, it is high time that the enduring notion of a weak, innocent, pacifistic Mexico being pounced upon by a screaming American eagle be returned to the bosom of the Whig folk, tradition from whence politically it sprang in 1846. But whether or not that reunion will ever occur, and it probably won’t, the fact remains, quibbles aside, that Reluctant Imperialists is an excellent monograph.

University of Kentucky

Robert Seager II


The Nashville Convention has not gone unnoticed by historians, but Professor Jennings is the first to offer a book-length account of its background, its action, and its importance. Particularly significant is her identification and analysis of the delegates to the two sessions. They are revealed, for the most part, as thoughtful, well-educated leaders. Moderates and conservatives far outnumbered the radicals.

In a brief introductory chapter the author conveniently furnishes the reader an overview of the movement. She concludes: "Instead of disrupting the Union, the convention may have saved it for another decade" (p. 12). She believes the first session, June 1850, influenced the congressional compromise, and that the Unionist victories in Georgia and Mississippi sealed the fate of the secessionists. Even South Carolina would not go it alone.

As do others, Professor Jennings credits Calhoun with the authorship of the movement which both South Carolinians and
Mississippians for purposes of strategy concealed from the general public. As the story moves along, the author gives state by state analysis of the response to the call, the choosing of the delegates, and the reaction to the convention’s actions. This detailed information about 175 delegates and dozens of newspaper reports becomes tedious and difficult to digest at times.

In general, support for the convention was strongest among Democrats in the heart of the black belt, the region most supportive of secession in 1861. The Whigs did not wish to embarrass the Taylor administration, but many were willing to attend the convention in an effort to restrain the hotheads. Also, the Whigs were under pressure to join the Democrats in supporting southern rights.

The convention’s moderate resolutions called for 36°30’ to be extended to the Pacific, but many Whigs and border state Southerners preferred to accept the compromise. Throughout her narrative the author weaves in the story of the battle in Congress over the compromise. She finds that Webster’s famous seventh of March speech did much to dampen southern sentiment for a convention. Interestingly, she notes that the Texans were more ready to fight over their boundary than to challenge federal authority over slavery in the territories.

In her conclusion, the author claims that while moderation at Nashville strengthened the forces in Congress favoring compromise, at the same time most Southerners retained the belief that secession was a legal right of the states. Thus, “the Nashville Convention paved the way for a Southern Confederacy in 1861. Southern nationalists had realized the difficulty of securing the cooperation of all the southern states in the defense of southern rights, and southern fire-eaters had learned their lesson well at Nashville. From 1850 on they eschewed cooperation and advocated single state action” (p. 210).

This is a well-written monograph based upon the widest possible use of manuscript sources. While there are no startling revelations, the author tells her story well. This should be the definitive study of the Nashville Convention.

Clemson University

ERNEST M. LANDER, JR.
Moments alone, looking across an empty stage:

It is quiet now. The stillness hangs heavy even as the melodies of birds, innocent of all the history lingering here, mingle their lovely sounds with the history that only old men who survived remembered. They are all gone now, those who were active on this stage. It is quiet here, too silent to think of raging horses and roaring guns, of swords and epaulettes, of pain and dying men. Too quiet now. One feels the presence of long ago, shadows of fateful days linger still among the sounds of singing birds, beside the sluggish stream, in yellowed notes that hide in files and family vaults, in pictures that fill the barren walls of an old museum.

This is hallowed ground, but not too sacred to write of death or of a peace that never came, except to the victors' disposition. The field is silent as its graves that hide the deeds that were once this place. The battle is long over, the heights all scaled, the heroes lie together beneath the marble and the sighing of the wind. Old men's tales now clutter history books. Rosecrans had his finest hour. Bragg slipped off to Chattanooga to mend his pain. Never again will these silent trees hear the battle cry, nor will those Tennessee birds I love to hear know this evil thing... at least not here, not here where guns are old and lined with rust and summer birds, to fire no more at random men as glory they pursue or courage they proclaim. No more will this river flow in blood, no more the horses in the fields nearby scream with battle pain, nor will they carry the swift and the brave to parapets stark and grim, there: the kiss of death! No more the rebel yell of men not ripe for life, nor men too old to feel the sun and rain but know the pain of viewing death as though a pageant on a stage.

Stones River, so quiet now, nature abounding in grace. But there are other fields, other men, history still to be made, epaulettes to shine with blood and space for heroes' graves. The horses now are tanks and planes, but the cries of Johnny Reb and Billy Yank will blend in other fields, in the fury of modern games.
Beyond the battle lines, the files await the newer notes, the picture frames cry out for newer faces wracked in pain. Stones River’s day is past, the sun shines on a quiet field. But somewhere darkness lingers yet, new men await the sounds to charge, to fire at modern random men, then speak of peace again amidst the newer mounds, and pinning medals on other widows’ sons.

On Good Friday, the last day of Abraham Lincoln’s life, General Ulysses S. Grant, in an informal statement to the president and some of his assembled cabinet, remarked that Stones River had been no military victory for the North. In fact, Grant concluded, many such engagements would probably have ruined the country. In Stones River—Bloody Winter in Tennessee, historian James Lee McDonough has recreated the saga of this battle in sharpest tones, illuminating many of its darkest secrets. Deep in the “heartland” of the Confederacy, far from the more publicized Eastern Theater of Lincoln, Jefferson Davis, and Robert E. Lee, another Yankee general with the “slows” finally made his move, striking General Braxton Bragg’s defending Army of Tennessee’s long defensive line stretched out just north of sleepy little Murfreesboro, Tennessee. McDonough’s work covers the preliminaries, the battle itself, and the immediate aftermath of this battle, the strategies and intrigues of Bragg and his opponent Federal General William S. Rosecrans, the heroism and the death among the enlisted men, and the frustrations of “best laid plans.”

Detailing a battle, just as fighting one, is an intricate process. The writer immediately involves himself in selecting and interpreting conflicting reports, feeling the pain and remaining detached, knowing the results but trying not to anticipate them in the writing. Like Wiley Sword in his fine book Shiloh: Bloody April (New York, 1974), McDonough selects material to highlight the human factor in war, gives intimate details of action through the eyes and words of the participants, comments sharply upon the decisions of commanders. Few writers have so captured the fury of war and remained so faithful to the details of the fighting. The reader can hardly restrain from getting personally caught up in the action as bravery and cowardice blend in the assaults of men against equally determined and inexperienced men in different uniforms.

While many historians have tended to give more emphasis to
the Virginia campaigns, McDonough follows more the patterns set by Stanley Horn, Thomas Connolly, and Archer Jones by searching for meaning in the actions beyond the Appalachians. He sees Stones River as an important engagement, but a strange battle where two commanding generals, reluctant to engage, finally attack each other in tactical operations memorized from the same military manual. On the last day of December 1862, their two armies struck against each other with great violence, and after a hard day fighting, the Confederates appeared to control the field, yea, even to win the day. But then came a day of stagnation, the New Year, a day of confusion, a time to lick wounds and reassemble the “iron filings” that the magnets of war had so haphazardly scattered through the vast countryside. Then, another day of battle with the Confederate lines finally breaking before Rosecrans’s superior firepower and larger units if not imaginative generalship. Again the results were indecisive, still not the clear-cut victory for which Lincoln prayed. Rosecrans, with heavy losses himself, allowed Bragg to escape from another “terrible affair.” Still, though not pivotal at this half-way point of the war in determining its final outcome, this battle did enable Rosecrans to move the Confederates south to the Tennessee River and begin the long march to Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Sherman’s march to the sea. And it was, writes its narrator, “one of the spectacular, breathtaking moments of the entire war.”

McDonough’s attempt to follow two armies with their many scattered units is generally well written and properly detailed. But sometimes the reader is lost in the maze of confusing action, even with the very descriptive maps which bless this work. Sometimes the writing is labored, even confusing, as the author attempts to reconcile conflicting interpretations and record simultaneous actions. There is the occasional cliché for immediate identification of his generals, and sometimes there is minutia in his detailing of events that detracts from the central action, as with his description of the abolitionists in the midst of battle plans, and a little song about Rosecrans as we get acquainted with his battle strategy. He probably dismisses too lightly the English decision not to intervene in the Civil War, and there is sometimes difficulty in separating the generals.
from their immediate actions and those that yet lie ahead of them.

But this is a good book. The writing is fair, always lively, always engaged in search for new answers to old questions and new ones. His descriptions are sometimes classic, as with Braxton Bragg, his less than winning personality, “wedded to the tactics of the Mexican War . . . a puzzling mixture of competence and ineptness.” This book will not enhance the reputations of either Bragg or Rosecrans, nor some of the other officers serving under them. The mistakes they made cost the Confederacy and the Union armies too many of their best soldiers. And it was indeed a poorly fought battle, just as Grant later insisted, but it was an important moment in history and McDonough so memorializes it. His picture of the three days at Stones River is a picture of permanent duration.

Wittenberg University

ROBERT HARTJE


This study of civil religion in the South from 1865 to 1920 fills a cavity in the history of the area. The Confederate experience provided the Southerners with a base for self-examination. They realized that their history was distinct; the Redeemer Nation had died, but remained as “a holy ghost haunting the spirits and actions of post-Civil War Southerners.”

Mr. Wilson develops his perspective of a civil religion that “centers on the religious implications of a nation.” His organization of the book is good. Early he outlines the scope, saying it is not a study of southern Protestantism, but of the religion of the Lost Cause, a defeated, humiliated, and distressed heritage. From that base “the cultural dream replaced the political dream.”

Baptized in Blood is a well-chosen title; it was a term often used by preachers who declared that war had brought “redemption from past sins, an atonement, and a sanctification for
the future.” After Appomattox Southerners tried to reconcile their universal notion of a chosen people now defeated. Members of Baptist and Methodist congregations dominated the movement, but were supported by Presbyterians and Episcopalians. For many Southerners defeat was a divine testing that would eventually result in renewed virtue and strength. This concept flourished in lay organizations and several loose groups, such as United Confederate Veterans, Ku Klux Klan, private schools, historical societies, United Daughters of the Confederacy, and United Sons of Confederate Veterans. Women were sought since they added respectability.

Where facts failed to support fantasy, avid minds nurtured a righteous cause with rituals and myths. From nonexistent precedents, memorial days were created, fasting and thanksgiving observances were specified, funeral sermons became eulogies, reunions magnified in importance, secular subjects were placed in stained windows of churches, and hymns such as “How Firm a Foundation” were part of a litany. Every town square found an appropriate place for a statue of a southern hero. Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee, and Jefferson Davis became monumental in importance and size on either boulevard or mountain face. Lee was regarded as the Christian knight in white armor, Davis was raised to sainthood, and Jackson was idolized in name and symbols. To this trio was added Sam Davis, a Tennessee private soldier hanged as a spy, whose scaffold was likened to the cross of the crucified Christ, and Leonidas Polk, general and bishop, became the defender of the church and its altars.

With the passage of time, ministers, having shelved the term Lost Cause, emphasized southern identity with the two-fold appeal of religion and regional history. Segregation replaced the caste of slavery, a process which relegated the Negro to inferiority and reemphasized white supremacy. This philosophical approach to an old problem was strongly supported by the Ku Klux Klan, whose members were generally on the church rolls.

J. William Jones of Lexington, Virginia, a close friend to Lee, became the most ubiquitous evangelist in the Lost Cause cult. Involved in almost every phase of southern life, as a soldier, cleric, historian, publisher, organizer, volunteer in all appeals, Jones “provided the crucial link between the Southern civil religion and Christianity.” Unreconstructed, but not em-
bittered by defeat, he believed that a focus on virtue and moral exemplification could firmly establish a “separate culture with religion at its heart.”

Southern heritage became the fulcrum for establishment of elementary and secondary schools linking the Confederacy with Christianity. Many teachers, especially in private academies, had been Confederate officers or were women who had rarely left the home turf. Books and materials written by Northerners were generally rejected, and those with a Dixie flavor were substituted. Steeped in the Lost Cause tradition, the University of the South was reorganized. Its teaching staff was heavy with former officers, and the town of Sewanee became a congenial haven for Southerners. Washington College (later Washington and Lee University) had a similar history and growth experience. Lexington and Sewanee rivaled Richmond as headquarters of the southern Confederacy.

Despite the fact that as late as 1920 southern churches were “the South’s most distinctly sectional institutions,” a new unity between North and South became evident. The barrier was broken by industrialism, northern investment in the South, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and Woodrow Wilson in the White House. Southern clergymen insisted that the Lost Cause really was a crusade for liberty quite similar to Wilson’s right of self-government.

Without question this is a good book, well conceived, the product of extensive research and careful writing. Forty-odd pages of references attest to the immensity of the undertaking. A lengthy bibliography seems to omit little of consequence with the exception of the excellent life of Bishop Polk by Joseph H. Parks and the incomparable four volumes on General Lee by Douglas S. Freeman. The University of Georgia Press also deserves commendation for this publication.

Atlanta, Georgia

WALTER B. POSEY
Yankee Missionaries in the South: The Penn School Experiment. By Elizabeth Jacoway. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980. xvi, 301 pp. Preface, photos, appendices, bibliography, index. $25.00.)

The “Port Royal Experiment” was dramatic, revealing, poignant, and, by some standards, unsuccessful. Commodore Samuel F. DuPont’s capture of the Sea Islands in 1861 aroused enthusiasm and activity in the North. Salmon P. Chase, secretary of the treasury, aware of the value of Sea Island long-staple cotton and, like most abolitionists, certain that the slaves, when freed and educated, would be patriotic, productive, and dependable citizens, sent Edward L. Pierce of Massachusetts to Port Royal to supervise the contrabands and direct their progress.

As the Federal forces moved into the Confederate states they were followed by hundreds of teachers and clergymen who organized schools and churches throughout the area. Many of them were abolitionists to the core and highly idealistic, but few understood the problems which they encountered. Some, overcome by disillusionment and despair, withdrew; others, brave and determined, devoted their lives to work among the freedmen. No accurate measure of their success is possible, of course, but certainly they influenced education and race relations in the South. Prominent among these stalwart souls were Laura M. Towne and Ellen Murray who worked in the Sea Islands for forty years. They established the Penn School, truly an “experiment,” in the words of the author. They were followed by Rossa Belle Cooley, Frances Butler (who died soon after beginning her work), and Grace House. Under their direction Penn School became a showcase for industrial education and community service.

The Port Royal experiment has been described in some detail, but Jacoway’s work is the first study of its most impressive and successful aspect, the Penn School. The author understands the philosophy which underlay Hampton, Tuskegee, and Penn; she also shows that the teachers in these institutions and the philanthropists who supported them firmly believed that they were agents of progressivism. Their goal was the development of character. Training in industrial and agricultural skills
was important, but not primary; the school was an instrument of progress, an institution through which Americans, including the Negro, would develop sound character and reliable citizenship. Penn was "an outpost of progressive education"; the "genteel" Northerners who supported it believed that it would develop in the Negro the traditional virtues of industry, thrift, and self-reliance which they considered essentials in citizens of a democracy. The aim of education was the development of "character," as they defined it: "Self-discipline, hard work, and orderliness were essential in that growth," the author correctly says. The pioneers at the Penn School saw it as a unique opportunity to show what could be done in an agricultural community in which the residents were ethnically and sociologically homogeneous. It could be the center of social and economic life, a tool by which sound character could be developed.

Jacoway has used a mass of documents and many interviews to trace the history of the Penn School. The selfless sacrifice of Laura M. Towne, Rossa B. Cooley, and their associates demands respect, and their determination and skill in following their ideal is impressive. They failed, however, to understand the changes which rapidly were thrust upon the nation, the region, and their wards. The author's assessment is correct; the people at Penn were unrealistically optimistic and naive; they were imbued with the confident arrogance of many Progressives and of the patrician reformers who supported them. They believed that the plight of the Negro could be solved; only patient application of the principles of progressive education was necessary.

The poignancy lies in the indisputable fact that the Penn School foundered on "the rough shoals of economic distress" fostered by the appearance of the boll weevil, depression, and repeated storms. Miss Cooley and her colleagues could not understand that "the goals and assumptions" of the missionaries were "woefully inadequate" to deal with the problem of racial relations, the author says, or, as she might have said, to cope with the social and economic developments of the twentieth century. Despite the undeniable impact of the school on the blacks who lived on the Islands in the period while the institution was at its height, it was based on "fallacious assumptions," the author concludes. The teachers could not make blacks white,
and the Penn School “became an irrelevant reminder of a promise unfilled.”

Vanderbilt University  
HENRY L. SWINT

The American Negro Academy: Voice of the Talented Tenth.  
By Alfred A. Moss, Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. 327 pp. Introduction, photos, complete bibliography, index. $30.00; $12.95 paper.)


Professor Richardson traces the history of Fisk University from its precarious beginnings in 1866 as a school for black children founded by three Christian missionaries from the North. Despite a considerable and racist opposition, Fisk survived and expanded to become a university with strong emphasis on academic achievement. Fisk succeeded so well that it was able to inspire one of its undergraduates, W. E. B. DuBois, with a lifelong quest for excellence. In the early twentieth century Fisk’s intellectual atmosphere attracted two of America’s leading black scholars, James Weldon Johnson and Charles S. Johnson, to teach on the campus.

This book is primarily a chronological summary of the careers of the successive white presidents of Fisk and of the struggles and achievements during each of their tenures. There is abundant information on the evolving curriculum, the changing racial composition of the faculty, and the continuing fiscal crisis with which Fisk administrators struggled. It was fiscal crisis that inspired the Freedom Singers, whose tours are recounted here. There are brief and interesting mentions of the social science courses and the community outreach emphasis at Fisk. The chapter, “Student Revolt,” looks into the complex mix of external and internal racial tensions and the puritanical and petty student conduct rules that led to protests and disturbances in the 1930s.
Readers will not, however, find a sustained analysis of the external and internal problems that Fisk encountered, nor will they find Fisk compared to other black schools of the South. More disturbing is the decision to end the book in 1946, the climactic year, when Charles S. Johnson was named the first black president and the exciting years of black liberation were just around the corner. The book also lacks a student perspective that would give insight into what it meant in the lives of the graduates to have been Fiskites.

That prejudice continued to hinder the advancement of black Americans after they earned college degrees is part of the dilemma examined by Alfred A. Moss in *The American Negro Academy*. Impetus for founding the ANA in 1897 came from the ascendancy of Booker T. Washington as the predominate black leader in America. To Alexander Crummel and W. E. B. DuBois this raised the fear that industrial education would soon eclipse classical education in the black colleges. Equally disturbing was Washington’s apparent approval of compromise and acquiescence to the onrush of segregation coming from the state legislatures of the South. Believers in militant protest against injustice, the founders of the ANA pledged to promote publication by black scholars, to assist black youth to attain classical educations, and in general to refute racism through scholarship.

DuBois and Crummell were joined by men like John Cromwell, Francis J. Grimke, Carter G. Woodson, Alaine L. Locke, James Weldon Johnson, and Arthur W. Schomburg. They attended meetings where they presented and discussed scholarly papers, published twenty-two occasional papers, and articulated the viewpoint that only black America’s educated elites, trained at universities and active in the professions, could lead the black masses and break down racist barriers. Hampered by sparse membership and a limited budget, the ANA was unable to influence in a major way either the black masses or white opinion. Its meetings were poorly attended and its publications of uneven quality. With new opportunities opening for membership in alternate organizations, interest in the ANA declined until it disbanded in 1928.

Alfred Moss has assembled an amazing array of primary and secondary materials on the ANA, and he tells his story well, with
clear prose and unusual analytic skill. This is especially true in the epilogue where he dissects the ANA’s internal tensions and the changing fashions in scholarship that minimized its influence. Unfortunately, there are many sections of the book that are tedious. Moss rehashes overly long selections from minutes of meetings, who made and seconded motions, why meeting places were changed, papers presented and/or published, and assorted reactions to the papers. There is transmitted by this accurate and objective method a strong flavor of the original sources, but eventually there is a surfeit of flavor. Selectivity was needed. This book is too long, yet it has sections of superlative analytic history.

University of North Florida

DANIEL SCHAFER


Professors Magdol and Wakelyn have focused their book on the social life and labor experiences of the great mass of whites in the South, the “common people.” What the editors mean by “common people” is middle class, not poor, whites, and they are dealing with small farmers, herdsment, and urban merchants and laborers. “Thus in defining the common people we have largely been guided by occupational and personal social relations” (xi).

The work is divided into two sections, one describing the life of the common people in the Old South, and the other depicting both the transition and departures they took in the New South. Each section contains an introductory essay and an annotated “suggested readings” section.

Part I has nine essays by well-known historians that range broadly in scope and geographical approach. Education, military commitment, religion, education, law and order, social and caste arrangements, and so on. An example is the essay by Forrest McDonald and Grady McWhiney, “The Antebellum
Southern Herdsman: A Reinterpretation.” They contend that the herdsman is a neglected figure among historians and deserves recognition for his large role in the Old South.

Part II has some solid, pioneering articles on what, in sum, amounts almost to a “new history,” or, at least, a different estimate of what is important in history. As one might expect, there is material on Populists and organized labor (very good material in the form of articles by Leon Fink who discusses the Knights of Labor in Richmond, Virginia, and Lawrence C. Goodwyn who writes about the Populists and Negro rights in East Texas). Beyond that, Edward Magdol writes with insight in his “Against the Gentry: An Inquiry into a Southern Lower-Class Community and Culture, 1865-1870.” Equally well done is Julie Roy Jeffrey’s discussion of women in the Southern Farmers’ Alliance.

In a brief but perceptive afterword, Professor Ira Berlin praises the work of Wakelyn and Magdol for what it does and for demonstrating how much remains to be done. This reviewer believes that the “common people” defy absolute definition and classification. Yet they can be studied, as these excellent articles demonstrate, as “parts,” with close attention to time; and to chronology.

Florida State University

William Warren Rogers


Green Fields: Two Hundred Years of Louisiana Sugar. By the Center for Louisiana Studies. (Lafayette, Louisiana: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1980. xiv, 139 pp. Introduction, photos, illustrations, maps. $6.95.)

The last two decades have witnessed a veritable revolution in labor and working class historiography. Under the influence of social historians, anthropologists, and labor economists, there
has been an outpouring of literature on not only traditional subjects of labor history (unions and unionization) but also on non-traditional subjects such as preindustrial laborers, agricultural workers, and women workers. The results are impressive. Thomas Becnel's *Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, Louisiana, 1887-1976* both reflects and retreats from these important historiographical directions. In nine chapters, a prologue, and an epilogue, Becnel traces the development of the sugar industry and outlines several decades of controversy between the industry and the agricultural work force. The focal point of the story is the sugar strike of 1953. Becnel narrates the role of the National Agricultural Workers Union of H. L. Mitchell, the Catholic church, and the opposition of the American Cane Growers Association. A particular strength of the book is Becnel's presentation of the dynamics of the Catholic church's social action program. Final chapters discuss the development of right to work legislation in the aftermath of the 1953 strike. Becnel has searched a range of manuscript sources including the Mitchell papers and the Ellender papers, and he has gained access to otherwise closed resources of the Catholic church. Interviews are used to reconstruct important parts of the story, and he has read a number of state and local newspapers that covered the events. The research is impressive but, the book lacks the fresh conceptualization that the current trends in labor history permit. The discussions of the industry, the labor unions' organizing efforts, the role of Senator Ellender as friend of the industry, the participation of the church and of the strike itself are written almost as a number of one-act plays that happen to occur on the same stage. There is little attempt to weave the important descriptions into an entire play. Perhaps more notably, important actors in the development of this drama are left out. While Becnel has an obvious, and understandable sympathy for the sugar cane workers, we know very little about those workers, their daily lives, or their involvement in either the work process or the strike activity. They appear only as objects rather than as subjects. Given the importance of his subject for an understanding of the twentieth-century agricultural work patterns, such omissions are most disconcerting. Becnel's treatment of these matters would have benefited from a reading and use of the suggestive work of James Green on
southwestern socialism or in a more general way the seminal work of E. P. Thompson or his historiographical followers.

Becnel’s work appears as part of a growing public interest in agricultural and labor history topics. The Center for Louisiana Studies has developed a travelling exhibit illustrating the historical development of Louisiana’s sugar industry. The exhibit will include twenty-five panels depicting the technological transformation of the industry as well as the architectural story of the sugar plantation before and after the Civil War. Green Fields: Two Hundred Years of Louisiana Sugar is the catalog of that exhibit. The pictures are superb; a viewer of the pictures gains a vivid impression of the history of Louisiana sugar from its intricate production processes to its frequent pests. It is to be hoped that the display will have a wide audience both within and outside of the state of Louisiana. This catalog also includes eight brief interpretive essays which accompany the pictures. The essays relate historical developments, technical changes, architectural heritage, and marketing changes for the industry. From the standpoint of the historian the essays are best left unread; the panels and their accompanying captions tell a much better and far more appropriate story. By way of comparison, the editors of Green Fields acknowledge that, “quite early the decision was reached to limit the exhibit to history, technology and architecture” (viii). Thus, like Becnel in Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, the workers are left out of the discussions. It is perhaps fitting commentary that in more than half of the display pictures, however, workers are present. Labor history, social history, and public interest in the pictorial past are all making important strides. Both of the works under review have much to offer in those directions; both, in quite different ways and for quite different reasons, have major omissions which limit their respective contributions.

Georgia College

THOMAS F. ARMSTRONG
Blood Relations: The Rise and Fall of the du Ponts of Delaware.
By Leonard Mosley. (New York: Atheneum, 1980. xii, 426 pp. Acknowledgments, genealogical tables, prologue, illustrations, source notes, index. $17.50.)

In Blood Relations Mosely has produced a family study which is both interesting and well written. He chronicles the du Ponts from the arrival on American soil of Pierre Samuel in January 1800, until the appointment of attorney Irving S. Shapiro, a non-du Pont, as chairman of the board of the Du Pont corporation in 1974. The traditional stories of the role of Du Pont gunpowder in the Civil, Spanish-American, and First World wars are retold, but with an emphasis upon the actions of the various members of the family who were involved.

Some of the time-honored but more lurid stories of the family are retold together with some new ones; few skeletons have been left hidden in family closets. Coleman du Pont is described as possessing an “unquenchable lust after good food, good drink, and bad women.” The chapter “Coup de Grace for Uncle Fred,” describes his demise as a result of actions by the madam of a Louisville brothel. Alfred’s adulterous affairs are covered in detail, and his brother-in-law, the late Ed Ball of Jacksonville, is referred to as a confirmed bachelor “who cold-bloodedly regarded women as useful only for recreational and therapeutic purposes.” The author’s preoccupation with sins of the flesh detracts from his study; they seem more appropriate to a television soap opera.

In spite of its shortcomings Florida readers will find interest in the sections devoted to Alfred I., the “Florida du Pont.” The stories of Alfred’s squabbles with family members and his marital problems have been related in earlier works such as Marquis James’s Alfred I. du Pont, the Family Rebel, and more recently in John D. Gates’s The du Post Family. Mosely does offer insights, however, not found in the earlier works. In some areas Mosely arouses more curiosity than he satisfies. We are told that much of Florida’s road building program of the 1930s was the result of the desire of Alfred I. du Pont to get his north Florida timber holdings to market. Alfred is described as “the strong man of Florida” and Ed Ball as the “fixer behind the scenes.” Ball, who headed a lobby group called the “Gulf Coast Highway
Association,” allegedly obtained legislative support for road construction by entertaining political leaders with “bourbon and nubile college cheerleaders.” Titillating and provocative though such charges may be, Mosely does not offer sufficient documentation to back them up, and the reader is left with many more questions than answers. His accuracy in reporting such matters is certainly suspect when we read that Ball helped to get a road constructed from Suwannee County to the state capital “three hundred miles away.” Mosely is somewhat remiss on his geography.

All in all, the reader is left with the realization that the final word on the Florida du Pont is yet to be written. What we see in this book is a mosaic of a complex man who had difficulties in keeping his personal and family life in order, but who showed considerable sensitivity toward company employees and the less-advantaged. Alfred I. du Pont lobbied actively in Delaware for pension plans for the aged, and he included the provision in his will that a large part of his estate would go to orphans in Delaware. At the same time he did not seem to be as concerned for the less-fortunate in his adopted state, Florida. Mrs. Du Pont’s will and that of her brother, Ed Ball, did bequeath a large amount of money for handicapped children of Florida.
Florida’s Fabled Inns is by Louise K. Frisbie, the author of Peace River Pioneers and Yesterday’s Polk County. Mrs. Frisbie notes in her lavishly illustrated book that the earliest travelers to Florida could find accommodations in the primitive inns in Pensacola and St. Augustine, but if they were fortunate they might be entertained in private homes. The oldest inn in Florida is the Ximenez-Fatio House in St. Augustine. It is now owned by the National Society of the Colonial Dames of America of the State of Florida. Two Georgians, William G. Dawson and Stephen E. Buckles, were among the earliest settlers in Jacksonville. They operated a store and erected a small frame house near the St. Johns River crossing where travelers could spend the night. The Florida census of 1850 lists some thirty innkeepers. Most of their hotels operated on the American plan with meals included in the daily or weekly rates. The dining rooms also received local guests; the independent restaurant was not much in evidence in Florida until the end of the nineteenth century. The era of the great resort hotels in Florida began after the Civil War. The first was the St. James Hotel in Jacksonville. It became nationally known, and many celebrities were guests there. Jacksonville was then the tourist center of Florida. From there visitors could travel by boat up the St. Johns and Oklawaha rivers. There were small resort hotels along the rivers to accommodate the travelers. Henry M. Flagler and Henry B. Plant were the great railroad and hotel builders of nineteenth-century Florida. The Plant System developed in the central part of the state and along the west coast; Flagler’s system ran south from Jacksonville to Miami, and later to Key West. These two entrepreneurs also built lavish hotels. The most famous of Plant’s operations was the Tampa Bay Hotel, now the University of Tampa. With its great Moorish towers, it was considered one of America’s most beautiful buildings. The Ponce de Leon in St. Augustine was the most famous of Flagler’s hotels. It cost $2,500,000 to build, and is today Flagler College. The Alcazar and Cordova in St. Augustine were also Flagler hotels. His chain included the Continental at Atlantic Beach, the
Ormond Beach Hotel, Royal Poinciana and Breakers at Palm Beach, and the Royal Palm in Miami. Included in Mrs. Frisbie's account of hotels and hotel builders, is the history of some of the famous brothels which operated in earlier years in Florida. In Ybor City there was the Melville Club, and Hilda Raymond's house. Gertie Walsh operated in a Victorian mansion on Flagler Street and later moved to a place on the Miami River which included a berth alongside for yachts. In Jacksonville, Cora Taylor, who married the writer Stephen Crane, operated two elegant bordelloos: the Hotel de Dream and the Court. Published by Imperial Publishing Company, Box 120, Bartow, Florida 33830, Florida's Fabled Inns sells for $12.95.

To celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the University of Tampa, James W. Covington of the history faculty of that institution wrote the history of the institution. His book, Under the Minarets: The University of Tampa Celebrates Fifty Years of Progress: 1931-1981, was published by the University of Tampa. Moorish minarets graced the lavish Tampa Bay Hotel constructed by Henry B. Plant; the old hotel is now the main university building. Mrs. Plant sold it and adjacent properties in 1905 to the city of Tampa for $125,000. It was operated as a hotel until 1929. In the meantime, a committee was formed in Tampa in July 1931 to develop a junior college until a four-year institution could be established. There was no money for faculty salaries; there was only the promise that if a surplus was accumulated it would be divided equally among the teachers. Courses were sparse that first year: rhetoric, composition, Latin, French, German, and Spanish, European history, and a handful of offerings in the mathematics and sciences. Many students found it difficult to meet tuition payments, but the college accepted notes, insurance policies, and deeds on homes in lieu of money. The profits from the first year, $700, were divided proportionately among the faculty according to class hours taught. One teacher reported that he was paid $52.00 for nine-months work. The college used the Hillsborough High School the first year, but when the city of Tampa offered the Tampa Bay Hotel for one dollar per year the college decided to move to that location. It opened there in the fall of 1933. Dr. Covington utilized college records, newspapers, and oral history interviews to secure the information that
he needed for his history. He shows how the University of Tampa has developed over half a century into an institution with a large physical plant, a good library, excellent facilities, an athletic program, and a quality faculty. It also plays an active role in providing community services to the Tampa Bay area. Under the Minarets is available from the University of Tampa, Tampa, Florida 33606; the price is $12.50.

Florida historians, particularly those interested in the early history of the southern part of the state, will refer to Miami, Florida: Early Families and Records compiled by Oby J. Bonawit. It is also useful for genealogical research. In 1821 when Florida became an American territory there were three families living on Biscayne Bay near the Miami River. One was John Egan who had migrated from St. Augustine in 1806. Two years later he received a Spanish land grant. Mr. Bonawit provides information on many early Dade County families, including the Adam C. Richards, Michael Oxar, the Frows, Robert H. Thompson, Julia Tuttle, Charles Peacock, Ralph M. Munroe, the Newbolds, and others. Land records, cemetery records, telephone directories, correspondence, legal records, and deeds are some of the primary sources which Bonawit utilized. A list of early Miami pioneers was published in the Miami Herald in 1935, and is reproduced in this volume. There is also a name index. The volume may be purchased from the author, 12030 S.W. 68th Street, Miami, Florida 33156. It sells for $16.50 to individuals, and $12.00 to libraries.

St. Petersburg's Architectural and Historic Resources is a report on the survey of St. Petersburg properties dating prior to December 31, 1939, which have potential historic and/or architectural significance. Published by the Planning Division, Community Development Department, City of St. Petersburg, this document also provides guidelines for governmental agencies, professionals, and citizens interested in the identification, evaluation, and preservation of potential significant sites and districts in the area. In addition to a brief history of St. Petersburg and a listing of the architectural styles of the various buildings (the majority of which are Mediterranean Revival), it provides a number of policy recommendations. The appendices list all of the build-
ings surveyed, showing site name, location, year built, style, present use, significance, and a notation showing its architectural and/or historical importance. Historic Resources can be obtained from the St. Petersburg Planning Division, Box 2842, St. Petersburg, Florida 33731, at a cost of $5.00.

"Gate City" Route, South Florida Railroad, is the most recent facsimile published by the Saint Johns-Oklawaha Rivers Trading Company in its Historic Byways of Florida series. It is a reproduction of the 1887 edition, and includes an introduction by V. O. Coshow, who briefly describes the development of the Plant System into central Florida. In 1883, the Plant Investment Company purchased a three-fifths interest in the South Florida Railroad. Construction of this line had begun in 1880 when former President Ulysses S. Grant, touring Florida at that time, threw out the first ceremonial spadeful of dirt. The Boston Herald owned the railroad. The road from Sanford reached Orlando in October 1880. When Henry Plant acquired the property he developed it on into Tampa. Later his company purchased the Jacksonville, Tampa, and Key West Railway. After his death in 1899, the Plant System merged with the Atlantic Coast Line. "Gate City" Route provides information about the area of Florida through which the railroad traveled, together with interesting vintage pictures showing early hotels and tourist sites. It may be ordered from the Saint Johns-Oklawaha Rivers Trading Company, Box 3503, DeLand, Florida 32720, and the price is $6.95.

E. W. Carswell of Milton, Florida, has been collecting folklore and stories about Florida for many years, and for the past decade he has been publishing this material in a series of bi-weekly articles in the Pensacola Journal. Two recent books include some of these columns. The first is Commotion in the Magnolia Tree, and the second is He Sold No 'Shine Before Its Time. Both were compiled and edited by Ray Reynolds. The illustrations are by Harley Hall. The emphasis is on west Florida. The stories mainly involve people and places, but there are also valuable comments about the wildlife, insects, and flora of the region. Judge Carswell recounts some of his famous hunting and fishing stories. The publications sell for $2.95 each, and
are being distributed by Taylor Publications, Route 3, Dogwood Lakes, Bonifay, Florida 32425. A third recent publication of Judge Carswell is his Possum Cookbook. It is a humorous look at the animal inspired by the annual Possum Auction that is part of the Wausau Funday festivities. It includes many recipes for preparing possum and accompanying dishes. The price is $2.95, and it is also distributed by Taylor Publications.

The History of Jupiter Lighthouse, by Bessie Wilson Du Bois, is a reprint from Tequesta: The Journal of the Historical Association of Southern Florida (XX, 1960). For more than 120 years, the lighthouse has warned approaching ships of the treacherous reefs located near the shipping lanes in the Gulf Stream. During the Civil War, the lighthouse was darkened when Confederates removed and hid the lenses. It was relighted in June 1866, and it has continued in operation ever since. Mrs. Du Bois, a native of Jupiter, has written a fascinating account of the lighthouse and the men who supervised its operation. One of the first was James A. Armour, and his daughter, born in 1868, was the first white child born in the area. She in time became the wife of the next keeper of Jupiter Lighthouse. The pamphlet may be purchased from Mrs. Du Bois, 18045 DuBois Road, Jupiter, Florida 33458, or from Florida Classics Library, Box 777, Port Salerno, Florida 33492. It sells for $2.50, plus postage of 39¢.

The Catlin Genealogy was compiled by Louise Catlin Cleaver Roloson who, before her death in 1974 at the age of ninety-three, lived in the Melbourne area. Joanne Galbroner Kirchman has edited the manuscript for publication. It shows that John Catlin was probably the first of his family to arrive in America from England. He settled in Connecticut, and from this line descended many distinguished Americans, including George Catlin the well-known artist and author. The Catlin Genealogy was published under the auspices of the Kellersberger Fund of the South Brevard Historical Society. It may be ordered from that organization in Melbourne, Florida. The price is $12.95.

Daphne M. Brownell in three previously published monographs reported on the results of her examination of inscriptions
and records from twenty-seven cemeteries in the western part of Volusia County. Volume Four, Cemetery Inscriptions lists inscriptions and records from six cemeteries in east Volusia County. Mrs. Brownell provides an index which makes this a very useful document for historical and genealogical research. The Kellersberger Fund, South Brevard Historical Society, published this volume which sells for $6.95.

Melbourne, Florida, Postal History, 1880-1980, was compiled by Fred A. Hopwood and was also published by the Kellersberger Fund, South Brevard Historical Society. This is a larger edition of an earlier study published privately by the author in June 1980 as his gift to the community in honor of its centennial. Melbourne's first post office was established in 1880 in a trading post run by Cornthwaite John Hector, a native of Melbourne, Australia. Hector's store was at the mouth of Crane Creek. Mail in those days came from New Smyrna to Titusville and then was transferred by boat to Melbourne. When the Florida East Coast Railroad reached the Melbourne area in 1893, mail service became more regular. Before Civil Service the position of postmaster was a Federal political appointment, and replacements occurred as new administrations were elected to office in Washington. As a result there was a long and frequently changing list of postmasters in Melbourne. Mr. Hopwood brings his Melbourne postal history up to 1977, when Maxwell E. Scott was appointed postmaster. The book sells for $6.95.

The Charm of the Bear Claw Necklace: A Story of Stone Age Southeastern Indians, by Margaret Z. Searcy, tells of two Indians, brother and sister. It describes their activities and the problems and dangers which they and their family encountered. They lived during the time which anthropologists describe as the Archaic Period. Mrs. Searcy's previous book, Ikwa of the Temple Mounds, was awarded the Charlton W. Tebeau Prize by the Florida Historical Society. The Charm of the Bear Claw Necklace, a children's book, was published by the University of Alabama Press, Box 2877, University, Alabama 35486; the price $9.50.

Behind The Big Top, by David Lewis Hammarstrom, is the
story of many of the most celebrated circus people and their organizations. It describes the Ringling brothers, particularly Charles and John Ringling, who played an important role in the history of Florida. They owned extensive properties on the Gulf coast and built lavish homes in Sarasota. The Sarasota area also became winter headquarters for their circus. Published by A. S. Barnes and Company, Cranbury, New Jersey, Behind The Big Top sells for $19.95.

American Indian Leaders, Studies in Diversity is a collection of essays edited by R. David Edmunds. Several relate to the southeast, including “Alexander McGillivray,” written by Michael D. Green. Educated in Charleston, McGillivray became a Creek Indian chief and served as an important protector of his people’s interest in the years following the American Revolution. He maneuvered American and Spanish officials to his own advantage, and it was because of his cooperation that the Panton, Leslie Company became such a major force in the economic life of Florida at the end of the eighteenth century. The essays on John Ross by Gary Moulton and on Dennis Bushyhead by Craig Miner describe the lives of two Indian leaders who played major roles in the history of the Cherokee Indians. Ross fought to keep his people from being removed from their homes in Georgia and Tennessee to Oklahoma. Bushyhead also struggled to strengthen the position of the Cherokees, believing that their only chance for survival lay in developing a partnership with the business community, mainly the railroad and mining companies. This paperback history was published by the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588, and it sells for $5.95.

The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1980, by Harvard Sitkoff, includes information about civil rights activities in Florida. In February 1960, Florida A & M students supported demonstrators in Greensboro, North Carolina, by staging their own non-violent sit-in at the Woolworth store in Tallahassee. Later they were joined by white supporters from Florida State University. A second demonstration a week later brought in the police. The pace of sit-ins and arrests in Tallahassee quickened, culminating in a protest march of nearly 1,000
students, both white and black. Other Florida incidents are also noted, including the pistol-whipping of a young demonstrator in Jacksonville, the jailing of Freedom Riders during the summer of 1961, and the voter-registration campaign and statewide demonstrations against segregation in 1963. Hill and Wang, New York, published this study; the paperback edition sells for $6.95.

Announcements and Activities

Joan and Allen Morris of Tallahassee received the 1981 D. B. McKay awards from the Tampa Historical Society in recognition of their “extraordinary contributions to the cause of Florida history.” The Morrises were the first couple to be so honored in the Society’s eleven years of recognizing historians. Joan Morris was honored for the development of the State Photographic Archives at the Stozier Library, Florida State University. Allen Morris was singled out for the biennial series, The Florida Handbook, and for his historical writing. The medals and a plaque were presented to Mr. and Mrs. Morris at the annual meeting of the Tampa Historical Society on Wednesday evening, November 18, 1981.

The Florida Anthropological Society will hold its annual meeting April 24, 1982, at Stone’s Travelodge in Tampa. The tentative deadline for submission of paper abstracts is January. Individuals or chapters interested in presenting papers and/or organizing a workshop should contact Joan Deming, 1839 Pine Cone Circle, Clearwater, Florida 33520.

West Florida’s Forgotten People: The Creek Indians is the title of a videotape program produced by Dr. Lucius Ellsworth of the University of West Florida. The program covers the story of the Creek Indians in northwest Florida, starting with the Creek Confederacy around 1820. For information on showing the videotape, write or phone Dr. Ellsworth, College of Arts and Sciences, University of West Florida, Pensacola, Florida 32504.

The Florida Trust for Historic Preservation has opened an office in Tampa in the Spartan Arms Building (originally Lafayette Arcade Building), on West Kennedy Boulevard, across from the University of Tampa. Tampa Preservation, Inc., and the Community Design Center are also part of this complex called the Preservation/Revitalization Center. The building, constructed in 1925, was from a design by M. Leo Elliott, a Tampa architect.
A survey is underway in Fort Myers to develop plans and programs for structures and/or lands that have historical, architectural, scenic, or similar interest. There will be a listing of all pre-1940 structures. The Atlantic Coastline Railroad depot in Fort Myers is undergoing adaptive use restoration. Purchased by the city in 1975, it is being renovated for use as a historical museum.

"In Celebration: Jacksonville Jewry, 1850-1982" will highlight the centennial anniversary celebration of Congregation Ahavath Chesed of Jacksonville. As part of a weekend of activities there will be a seminar and workshop at the Jacksonville Museum of Arts and Sciences on February 7, 1982. It will include papers and discussion on the history of the Jews in Duval County and Florida. There will also be an exhibition of photographs. A history of the congregation, the second oldest in Florida, is in press.

The Tampa Historical Society dedicated two historical plaques on November 7, 1981, in Marti Park, Ybor City. The first, the Paulina Pedroso plaque, was originally made in Cuba in 1952. The second plaque honors José Marti, the Cuban nationalist patriot who visited and talked in Tampa, Key West, and Jacksonville on behalf of the Cuban Revolution in 1895.

The Florida News Series, a subject reference guide to newspaper articles relating to Florida, is being published by the American Newspaper Service, 3990 Westerly Place, Suite 100, Newport Beach, California 92660. The Series, published quarterly, provides comprehensive coverage of events by reprinting and indexing articles from a number of Florida newspapers, including the Jacksonville Journal, Miami Herald, and Tampa Tribune. It is being published in five-year subscription periods; the first volume covers the period 1976-1980. Volume two will cover the years 1981-1985.

The South Florida Regional Planning Council of Miami has published an environmental sensitivity atlas and report entitled Oil Spill Shoreline Priority Protection Response Strategy for South Florida. It covers the coastline of Broward and Dade
counties and the Florida keys including the Dry Tortugas. The atlas provides twenty-three color map plates. The cost is $40.00 for the atlas and the technical report. It may be ordered from the Planning Council, 1515 N.W. 167th Street, Suite 429, Miami, Florida 33169.

The Historical Association of Southern Florida has purchased John James Audubon’s *Birds of America*, valued at $1,000,000. The double elephant folio contains 435 prints set in four volumes. For many years *Birds of America* has been on display in the Audubon House in Key West, but humidity has caused some of the prints to discolor. The volume will be displayed in the Association’s new historical museum when it opens in 1982. The purchase of the folio was made possible through the support of Mitchell Wolfson, Jr.

The *Journal*, published by the Florida Genealogical Society, provides pertinent data to individuals involved in Florida history and genealogical research. The most recent issue of the magazine includes information on the Henson and Chason families, a short history of the Hyde Park United Methodist Church of Tampa, and excerpts from the minutes of the Hillsborough County Commission meetings in the period 1863-1871. For information about subscriptions to the *Journal* and/or the Society, write Box 18624, Tampa, Florida 33679. South Florida Pioneers also provides important historical and genealogical data. It is published twice a year, and its editor is Richard Livingston, Box 166, Fort Ogden, Florida 33842.

Phillip A. Werndli, former director of the Florida Folklife Program, has been named director of the Division of Cultural Affairs. Mr. Werndli, a graduate of the University of Florida, began his professional career as a historic sites specialist in the Florida Division of Archives, History and Records Management. Later he served as the director of the Tampa/Hillsborough County Preservation Board. Succeeding him as director of the Florida Folklife Program will be Dr. David Closson, Department of English, University of Florida.

The Georgia Department of Archives and History is
accepting applications for its three-week Institute. Sponsored in conjunction with the Emory University Division of Librarianship, the annual training seminar for beginning archive professionals will be held in Atlanta, July 26 through August 13, 1982. The Institute offers general instruction in basic concepts and practices of archival administration and management of traditional and modern documentary materials. The program focuses on an integrated archives/records management approach to records keeping and features lectures, field trips, and supervised laboratory work. Topics to be included in this year’s program are records appraisal, arrangement and description of official and private papers, control systems, micrographics, conservation, and reference service. Application deadline is April 21. For information write: Lorraine Lee, Institute Coordinator, Georgia Archives, 330 Capitol Avenue, S.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30334.
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<td>Feb. 3-9</td>
<td>Smithsonian National Associates Program</td>
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<td>Feb. 7</td>
<td>“In Celebration: Jacksonville Jewry, 1850-1982” Seminar-Workshop</td>
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<td>Organization of American Historians</td>
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<td>Florida Anthropological Society</td>
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<td>May 6-7</td>
<td>Florida Historical Confederation</td>
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<td>FLORIDA HISTORICAL SOCIETY—81st MEETING</td>
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<td>Oct. 7-10</td>
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<td>Society of American Archivists</td>
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<td>American Historian Association</td>
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THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, successor, 1902
THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, incorporated, 1905

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