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ESSAYS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
- Date Issued:
- 2010
- Abstract/Description:
- This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S&P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S&P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to proxy for internal labor market competition.
Title: | ESSAYS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. |
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15 downloads |
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Name(s): |
Tan, Tih Koon, Author Frye, Melissa, Committee Chair University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor |
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Type of Resource: | text | |
Date Issued: | 2010 | |
Publisher: | University of Central Florida | |
Language(s): | English | |
Abstract/Description: | This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S&P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S&P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to proxy for internal labor market competition. | |
Identifier: | CFE0003258 (IID), ucf:48549 (fedora) | |
Note(s): |
2010-08-01 Ph.D. Business Administration, Department of Finance Masters This record was generated from author submitted information. |
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Subject(s): |
Governance Executive Compensation CEO Turnover Internal Labor Market |
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Persistent Link to This Record: | http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0003258 | |
Restrictions on Access: | public | |
Host Institution: | UCF |