FREEDOM ASSEMBLY

HOW FREE MEN CAN PREVAIL

Edited by
Jerry Korn *and*
Gerald L. Steibel

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Introduction

On October 6th and 7th, 1961, Freedom House sponsored a Freedom Assembly for the purpose of exploring major problems of U. S. foreign policy. Following the presentation of the organization's annual Freedom Award to Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, a number of the nation's most distinguished experts and opinion leaders in the field of international affairs joined in discussing various aspects of foreign policy. Their task was to determine priorities and directions for strategy in the struggle between the free world and Communism. This is a report on what they said, condensed and edited from their prepared speeches and extemporaneous remarks.

Among the participants were:

The Hon. JAMES J. WADSWORTH, former U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who delivered the keynote address.

The Hon. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., former Assistant Secretary of State, who led the discussion group on Ideology.

Dr. HENRY A. KISSINGER, of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, who led the discussion group on Political Goals.

Dr. WILLIAM R. KINTNER, deputy director of the University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Research Institute, who led the discussion group on Military Factors.

LEO CHERNE, executive director of the Research Institute of America, who led the discussion group on Economics.

The Hon. GEORGE V. ALLEN, former director of the United States Information Agency, who led the discussion group on Psychological Approaches.

Dr. HARRY D. GIDEONSE, president of Brooklyn College and president of Freedom House, who delivered the summation address.

WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, past president of the American Bar Association, who presided at the closing session.

ROSCOE DRUMMOND, Washington correspondent and columnist, Chairman of the Board, Freedom House.

The Hon. ROGER TUBBY, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

Dr. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University.

PAUL M. DEAC, vice president of the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups.

AMROM H. KATZ, Electronics Department of the RAND Corporation.

HERBERT HARRIS, director of Public Affairs, Institute of Aerospace Sciences.

Dr. PHILIP E. MOSELY, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.

EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER, columnist and writer on foreign affairs.

STACY MAY, economist and author.

Mrs. BONARO OVERSTREET, author and lecturer.

JOHN RICHARDSON, JR., president of the Free Europe Committee.

CHRISTOPHER EMMET, chairman, American Friends of the Captive Nations.

Dr. HUGH WOLF, director, Office of Publications, American Institute of Physics.

(Other members and guests of the Board of Directors of Freedom House.)

THE KEYNOTE:
Yardsticks for the Free World

AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH: An assembly like this does not make decisions for the nation; only the chosen leaders can do that. But perhaps the first article in our freedom's charter is that those leaders must know what the citizenry thinks.

We are conscious of the weaknesses in our posture and aware that the free world has yet to find how to mobilize and capitalize on its real strengths.

What are these weaknesses and vulnerabilities? First, we have not been adequately aware that rising revulsion at the thought of global atomic war has been turned to good account by an opponent who apparently does not suffer equal revulsion. Some of our reactions have been born of naivete, like our earlier assumption that the opponent is fundamentally a reasonable creature. And some have come out of inertia, as we turned from each crisis we survived with little or no planning for the next.

In total impact, these shortcomings could be disastrous. When the opponent turns each act of reasonableness on our part into an invitation to increase his pressure on us, and uses each act of firmness as an excuse for countermeasures, it is obvious that we need something more than a lament over his intransigence or an anxious questioning of whether he really means what he threatens.

It serves no purpose to protest that many things are beyond our control. If we are becoming less secure, less effective, it is not enough simply to complain. We must explore revisions in what we do and how we do it.

We are doing much. But much of what we do is simply "for its own sake," and with little consideration for the relationship to other things we are doing. Moreover, many societies including ours are only partially mobilized, and parts of them are still dreaming in terms that have been obsolete for some time. The primary need, therefore, is for a tying-together and a balancing and for a more unified sense of direction—in a sense, orchestration. Formal organization is only part of the problem. We cannot look to someone in our government to come up with the magic device which will blend everything into one "mix" painlessly and with no loose ends. Organization will come only when we as a people have decided on the character of the business at hand and what the priorities ought to be if freedom is to prevail tomorrow and fifty years from now.

To make a contribution to that decision is our purpose. Part of our problem has been clarified for us by

the opponent himself. By throwing down the gage to us in Berlin, by making clear that he is challenging not merely the rights of Germans, as he did thirteen years ago, but our own rights, our own solemn word and sacred honor, he has made it unnecessary for us to "run against peace," as the saying used to go. Berlin, we must remind ourselves, is neither remote nor only fitfully in the public attention. A defeat there cannot be hidden behind the jargon of compromise; its effects will not be delayed but immediate. Let us remind ourselves that it is late, that justifiably or not the Communists are running with great self-confidence, that their assessment of us and our will to respond is still dangerously low.

They are mistaken, of course. We are not going to crumble before them in Berlin or anywhere else, and we are going to come through this crisis with honor. But in addition to Berlin, it is what lies beyond that concerns us. This must be the last crisis we enter unprepared.

Our theme is "How Free Men Can Prevail." It is not how they can muddle through this year or how they can escape with their skins or how soon they can settle back into the more comfortable ways of living. "To prevail" means "to win," and that means to have a plan, a flexible strategy and a structure of priorities upon which the strategy is applied.

We here probably will not write a strategy, and certainly not a full policy, but we may suggest emphasis and priorities. We may thus emerge from our discussions with some yardsticks against which we can measure the success of our policies in the days to come. If we succeed, we may help make it a little easier to translate lofty purposes into effective action.

The Problems We Face

Mr. TUBBY: In considering topics that fall within the discussion areas of our five working groups we find no lack of foreign relations problems. Here are some of them:

How to avoid either war or surrender.

How to achieve disarmament or a ban on nuclear testing with effective controls.

How to strengthen the United Nations.

How to check Communist aggression or subversion in Southeast Asia or anywhere else.

How to broaden the economic or social base in many countries still in an early stage of economic development.

How to reach their intellectuals and win their respect and understanding.

How to deal with satellite countries.

What to do about U. S. economic aid to so-called neutrals which appear to support Moscow.

How to reserve outer space for peaceful use.

How to end colonialism—under the Russians or Red Chinese or anyone else.

How to make the new Alliance for Progress for Latin America a success.

IDEOLOGY:
The Myth of World Opinion

Mr. BERLE: In dealing with the Cold War, we must begin by discarding a lot of sanctified myths.

First, there is the myth of world opinion. What is called "world opinion" often turns out to be mostly propaganda bought and paid for. Americans for some reason are supposed to take speeches of foreign politicians and press accounts of "popular" demonstrations as showing world opinion on issues in the Cold War. When you go to the countries involved you discover that the much-touted politician represents no opinion but his own, or that of a small noisy group around him.

"Demonstrations" usually are equally fictitious. In most countries they can be cooked up by a couple of organizers with a little money and a few trained assistants. The Communist powers have even got out "how to do it" handbooks of instructions. In the demonstrations at the time of Lumumba's death, inquiry developed that some demonstrators did not know who Lumumba was or anything else about him. They were merely being paid a trifle to yell and break windows and were earning their money. The "crowds" were the sidewalk superintendents who gather anywhere. It was all in the instruction book.

Leaders Versus the People

There is, of course, a true body of opinion in literate countries—and even to a lesser degree in non-literate countries. It generally has little to do with what comes out of the noise-machine. The Belgrade conference of so-called neutral nations was a star illustration of the difference between the two. The elements in these countries—indeed, in all countries—which know anything about testing of nuclear bombs knew it brought the world closer to atomic destruction, and practically all knew that the Soviet Union had announced such tests and had begun exploding the bombs. They violently disapproved. Yet their representatives at Belgrade soft-pedalled or ran away from the problem. In blunt fact, these politicians did not dare to represent the opinion of their people.

A related myth is the assumption that personalities able to make headlines are powerful voices of the opinion of their countries. When you visit their countries, you often discover they are not even regarded as very important. Lumumba, for example, was never the voice of the Congo. His death there produced about the same result as did the death of Al Capone in Chicago. In the same way, I doubt whether anyone now speaks for the people in Laos, or Haiti.

So our problem is to distinguish real from fake ideology. There are, I am sure, certain currents of motion and thought widely followed throughout the world. Essentially they deal with objectives and hopes, and they have little to do with the temporary emotional outbreaks of occasional mob operations.

It is true, I believe, that most peoples want to better their lot. This simple fact is often blown up into an assumed social revolution sweeping the world. The fact is that although most populations want their lot improved, few want the waste and cruelty that go with bloody revolution. Where revolutions of that kind occur, you find later most of the participants have been forced into it by the most ferocious intimidation. The humble people usually have quite rational solutions for their problems, and these rarely involve killing.

Are Nations Friendly?

So, I suggest, Americans should be careful in accepting claimed ideological commitment as serious political fact. In dealing with foreign nations, whatever their ideology, our first question must be whether the nation is fundamentally friendly to the United States, and whether its regime is viable enough to make friendship desirable.

We can work—and have worked—quite comfortably with socialist countries. Possibly we could work quite comfortably with a Communist country—if it was friendly to us, was not a pumping station for hatred and disorder toward its neighbors or a colony of some power hostile to the United States, and had a decent respect for human rights. We have not yet had that opportunity.

My proposal accordingly is this: In studying ideological conflict, let us first draw a sharp distinction between the ends which the ideology purports to serve and the means proposed or used to achieve these ends. The great principle behind President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" in Latin America was to concentrate on the ends sought. These ends, agreed on by all independent Latin American countries, include lifting the standard of living of the entire region. Because methods of social organization

differ, each country was asked to work out its method of achieving those ends. Recently President Kennedy indicated that in foreign aid programs we also had a right to consider whether the country proposed to be a friend or an enemy of the United States. Obviously the United States can be of little help to a country whose methods involve reckless violation of human rights, or whose government asserts that it proposes to be hostile to us whenever expedient.

Some Ideological Criteria

The United States has the right if not the duty to propose its own ideological approach. But where its methods are not adopted, it has three criteria to apply to ideologies put forward by other countries:

First: Do the ends sought by the nation conform to standards we can accept? For example, we could not accept the ends proposed by the Nazi-Fascist regimes twenty years ago, nor could we work with that ideology now.

Second: Do the means proposed offer a reasonable basis for assuming that the acceptable ends will be reached? We cannot, for example, accept ideology motivated primarily by currents of hatred which Communist dogma presently assumes as necessary to keep Communism alive.

Third: Are the ends and means consistent with the reasonable national interests of a United States which does not wish to conquer the world, which does not have colonies, which does desire a rising measure of human welfare abroad as well as at home, and does desire to remain at peace if the aggressor powers will abandon Hitlerian ideas of world conquest?

These, I suggest, are the questions to be answered as increasingly we move into a world of nations seeking solutions for their social and political problems.

Mrs. OVERSTREET: I wonder whether we don't have in our American tradition a proper way of addressing ourselves to world opinion—even if it doesn't exist, so to speak, and even if it hasn't been formulated everywhere. It has been said here that a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that we declare the causes that impel us. Is it not our obligation then to make the clearest, most precise statement of why we do what we do, rather than to look to some hypothetical opinion as a determinant of what we should do? It does not seem reasonable, as Mr. Berle has pointed out, that every time someone somewhere, says "This is world opinion," we stop in our tracks and wonder whether we shouldn't reformulate our policy in accordance with it. Our obligation is rather to respect the minds of men enough to help them get the facts, as best we can, and to speak up with our reasons for doing what we intend to do.

Mr. DRUMMOND: How does one determine what American opinion is? Inevitably, there is a divergence in our appraisals of how we should deal with Soviet objectives, on the part of the political and intellectual leadership of this country—a difference of opinion between, say, Walter Lippmann on the one hand and David Lawrence on the other.

In my opinion, today, as in many crises of the nation in the past, American public opinion has been ahead of American political leadership. That was true in 1939, prior to World War II; I think it was often true during the Eisenhower Administration; and I think it is true today. The President of the United States is rightly feeling the pressure of a national consensus to stand firmer than he has been with respect to Soviet threats in different parts of the world. The problem, therefore, is not primarily to create a consensus of public opinion, but to bring the influence of public opinion to bear upon our national leadership.

Mr. CHERNE: I agree that the great bulk of the people is far ahead of the government. It is precisely for this reason that I am concerned with another group—an articulate, effective segment of the community that does *not* fit under the umbrella Mr. Drummond has provided. To me, one of the most disturbing illustrations of our dilemma in this respect can be found in a photograph that recently appeared in the newspapers. It showed the faces of happy, smiling, adoring young American girls who had enjoyed the marvelous opportunity to meet with Mrs. Khrushchev—and to be assured by her that in fact the Soviet Union does not contemplate war, as is evidenced by the fact that they are not building bomb shelters. The faces of those girls crystallizes an important aspect of our dilemma. We have been vulnerable to Soviet propaganda and many of our people get bamboozled by the Russians without being aware of it.

Dr. MOSELY: I too have a different impression from Mr. Drummond's.

In some respects our public opinion is extremely confused. In many parts of the country where I speak I find that a great many people still assume we have a unilateral deterrent which we can use in any way we want—that, somehow, this is the decisive factor. They seem ignorant of our movement into a period of *bilateral* deterrents, or *mutual* deterrents, and seem to assume we have an exclusive power that we somehow should use at any time, for any question, just to have it come out the way we want. This represents a very large body of opinion.

Then there is another body of opinion which is more concerned with finding enemies at home than it is

with facing up to our dangers abroad, because this looks a lot easier to handle and it is closer at hand. There is a real movement in many parts of the country toward a kind of new isolationism, based on the belief that we can't do anything abroad until we settle our problems at home.

There is in addition a very small—but in time of crisis possibly influential—body of thought pressing for unilateral disarmament, apparently on the ground that no one could want to destroy us because we are good people, and we wouldn't want to destroy anyone else.

The Meaning of Words

Mr. MOWRER: I would like to suggest that we are losing another part of the ideological battle, involving the uses and meanings of words. Some of the confusion has been cleared up in the last year or so by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, but to a great extent it still prevails. It seems to me that we have been remiss in accepting the use of certain words as they were given out either by Communists, or by African anti-colonialists or other groups. For instance, we are told that all the peoples on earth want to be "free." But that obviously isn't so if by freedom you mean personal freedom, for in many of the new countries they have far less personal freedom than they had as colonies.

It seems to me that our authorities should explain—both abroad and to Americans—that *national independence* and *personal freedom* are two quite different things. We Americans happen to confuse them because in 1776 you *could* equate independence from the British with personal freedom. But in many of the newly independent countries, notably Guinea and Mali, the drop in personal freedom from what they had under the French is fantastic. They may prefer national independence under native tyrants to more freedom under foreigners. That is perhaps understandable—but we Americans must recognize that there is a great difference.

A second phrase which is being thrown at us by Marxists and their disciples all over the world (even when they claim not to be Marxists) is "economic exploitation." As they use it, the phrase is largely buncombe. There is no question, for example, that the people of Katanga had the highest living standard of any black people in Africa. That may be "exploitation" by the Belgians or the copper companies, but if so you have got to redefine "exploitation." If they mean that the Katangese were not as rich as they would have been if the Belgians had not taken any money and instead had divided it all, that is true; but I doubt if you would have gotten the Belgians and

other people to develop the region on that basis.

In the same way, we were told Cuba was cruelly exploited by Batista. Batista was an unpleasant tyrant. The fact remains that Cuba had the second highest living standard in all of Latin America.

A Long Range Objective

Dr. BRZEZINSKI: One of our difficulties is a tendency to think in non-ideological terms. Against the kind of opponent we face, such thinking can have disastrous political consequences. For example, it seems to me we are in considerable danger right now of being faced, in the foreseeable future, with a situation whereby we remain in West Berlin but lose West Germany. The reason for this is we do tend to think in non-ideological terms, unaware of the ultimate significance of our actions. This forces us into a position of being essentially a reactive power, unlike the U.S.S.R. which has some notion of the pattern of change in world politics and has some sense of priorities in relationships to that pattern.

For instance, by insisting primarily on the defense of our rights in Berlin, we misconstrue the very long-range notion that the Soviets have. By forcing us gradually, step by step, to accept the *status quo* in Central Europe—particularly by forcing us to deal with East Germany only on a *de facto* basis—they hope to set in motion a chain of events in *West* Germany which could begin to undermine the Western Alliance, NATO, the Common Market, and all of the Western unity that has been fashioned with so much effort and dedication in the last fifteen years.

We have come to recognize the Soviet Union as our opponent. On this, there is national agreement and a sense of national will. But there is no sense of national understanding of our own position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet bloc. There has not been a sense of national identification in terms of what we ought to be accomplishing.

Much of our action, both in the Eisenhower Administration and the Kennedy Administration, is rooted in the ambivalence between our feeling on the one hand that we ought to be opponents of the Soviet Union and on the other that we ought to be civilizing the Soviet Union and adjusting the Russians to our pattern of behavior in the international community. This ambivalence paralyzes us and prevents us from taking the initiative. If we had a long-range image of the world and a sense of priorities, if we were thinking ideologically, we might take the initiative.

The Berlin crisis has opened up a variety of opportunities for us to act forthrightly in an area of the world in which the Soviet Union *a priori* has been objectively handicapped. We could have done this by

initiating proposals between East Germany and European Germany on political and economic relations in those areas. Instead, we maintain a position of rigidity—thereby rigidifying the Soviet position and creating ambiguity in our own camp.

This is primarily a result of the fact that we do not have any long-range programmatic sense of dedication in international politics. We are dealing with an opponent who has some sort of ideology. Perhaps it is a myth, as Mr. Berle said, but in many respects it is extremely relevant to the international politics of the age, to the economic development of nations. And the orientation of the so-called Western democracies is built on a bourgeois, non-ideological middle-class, used to the principles of compromise and adjustment.

In that sense we are yielding to the other side, starting with a handicap which we will not overcome if we insist on labeling all ideology a myth and insist instead on a dogmatically undogmatic stand.

POLITICAL GOALS:
Reality in the New Nations

Dr. KISSINGER: We hear today, regarding the Berlin issue and a number of others, a great deal about the need for realism and the need to adjust to facts which we are powerless to change. Nothing in the world would ever have been changed if this notion were to prevail. It reflects the views of a society which is satisfied with the *status quo* and to which any basic change is reasonably uncomfortable; and it explains in its deepest sense why our attitude can appear both peaceful and irrelevant to the new nations.

To us, in a middle-class society in the United States, the reality that is most significant is the reality we see around us. To us, realism consists in adjustment. Our eminent people are people who have known how to operate in an existing system. The worst penalty they learn in their lives is transfer to another department if they don't do well in the one they are in.

To the Communists and to many people in new nations, the most significant reality is the future. What they see around them is ephemeral. If you had asked, in 1913, who are these ridiculous people in Geneva, translating German texts, going to congresses, splitting hairs about abstruse points of Leninist doctrine, any Western businessman would have said, "These are ridiculous fanatics." Yet, three years later they changed history because they had a conviction; they had a sense of the future. Their reality was not where they were, but where they were going.

In Defense of the Neutrals

I would like to say a word about the stand taken by the neutral nations at the Belgrade meeting in September 1961. There have been a few comments here that the behavior of these nations at Belgrade was morally wrong. I would like to come somewhat to their defense. We had no right to expect them to behave very much differently from the way they did. We had no right to act as if international relations were a debate in the Oxford Union, with the uncommitted sitting in the referee's chair and awarding a prize after they had heard all the arguments. It was against all reason to expect that nations barely come into independence could suddenly play a global role and make wise judgments on the whole range of international problems. Our sentimentality and our illusion has projected them into a role that they cannot fulfill, and that must wreck their domestic stability if they try to fulfill it.

If anyone asks himself why the new nations behaved this way, he should look back a short twenty-two years ago. Was it conceivable that the United States would have supported Great Britain in 1939? Did there exist any British policy that would have induced us to enter the war on the British side on the issue of Danzig? Where would the world have been in 1939 if Great Britain had said that it would fight against Nazism only if the United States supported the fight? No abstract arguments could possibly have achieved American support for Great Britain in 1939 on the issues which were of most consequence to the world in that day. And no American policy can get the kind of support many people were expecting out of the Belgrade powers. By the nature of their society, by the nature of their preoccupation, they cannot play a global role. They cannot provide a substitute for our foreign policy.

Consider their dilemma regarding disarmament. We have been criticized for not studying this problem carefully. Well, we have a statutory agency and over 100 full-time professionals at work on the problem. I don't believe a single one of the emergent nations has one full-time person studying disarmament on a regular basis. Under the circumstances we cannot expect them to come up with a formula, and we cannot expect them to be the arbiters of all disputes.

The Man Who Leads a Revolution

I think the new nations are not psychologically in tune with our concern with stability. For this reason, we have enormous difficulty conveying what we stand for to these people. If Castro had wanted stability, if Castro had wanted security, he could have been a bank president in Havana today. In the social circles

he comes from this choice was open to him. The kind of man that goes into the mountains, the kind of man who leads a revolution is not a pleasant, middle-class intellectual disputing abstruse or abstract points of political doctrine. Very few revolutionaries make a revolution in order to bring into power a form of government which will make them dispensable. Most of them undergo the suffering which is inseparable from revolution in order to be able to exercise power.

I don't agree with those who say that the exclusive motivation of the new countries is to raise their standard of living. I think this is only one of their preoccupations. They are involved with the problem of political legitimacy, with their notions of social justice and their conception of the future they will have. It is these preoccupations that have made it so very hard for us to understand either the revolution in the new countries or the nature of the Communist challenge.

Mr. MOWRER: We must remember that our position as a major power brings with it certain unavoidable risks. I submit that at the moment we are in an impossible situation. We are struggling between two admirable, but perhaps incompatible, ideals. In the first place, we are passionately pursuing the cause of peace. In this pursuit we are prepared to envisage partial retreats, partial surrenders. We have been making invisible—and not so invisible—retreats ever since 1944. It has gotten us nowhere but backwards.

On the other hand, we stand committed to the defense and the extension of world freedom. If we are going to seek the extension of freedom against an adversary whose chief weapon is brinkmanship based on bigger and bigger nuclear devices, we will have to call his bluff and go to the edge of war, not once, but many times.

If we are to extend freedom, we will have to begin applying to the adversary the kind of treatment that he applies to us. I do not mean, of course, that we should have burned Germans in this country in World War II simply because we were at war with Hitler. However, we took war measures which shocked many people because our military authorities were convinced we had to do so to survive. My point is that today we will not be able to prevail and extend freedom if we merely try to dig in.

"Call the Game Off"

Every time the adversary lines up to try to break through somewhere or to make a pass over us, we say "Let's call the game off," and go home to Thanksgiving dinner.

I think we are coming to the place where we, as a people, have to decide on the character of the business at hand and what the priorities ought to be. Winning the cold war does not exclude preventing nuclear war; but it means taking the risk of it. On the other hand, too passionate a pursuit of peace leads inevitably to piecemeal surrenders, if the past is any guide.

Mr. CHERNE: When we talk of political goals as they affect the two Germanies let us understand what we are talking about. We are talking of a Communist Germany and one that is not Communist. To accept these as "realities" means that we are accepting (and I am perfectly ready to debate whether perhaps we should) a Communist Germany. More important, we are accepting permanent Soviet sovereignty over the entire bloc of Central European nations. That is what is at issue.

But what is it that Russia wants? It has been suggested that the Soviet Union wishes a reduction of tension in that area of the world, and I agree. If you are sitting as a jailer of 100 million people, you are in daily dread there may be prison riots. Of course, they want a reduction of tension.

What the Soviet Union is after, then, is a division of Germany—half Communist, half not—and permanent Western acceptance of Soviet sovereignty over the Central European states. In the present situation it would be prudent for us to pay heed to a statement made recently by a Soviet diplomat at the United Nations in a private conversation. He said, "Americans are very odd people. They desperately try to find out what it is we want and then they hand it to us as an ultimatum."

MILITARY FACTORS:

The High Price of Protection

Dr. KINTNER: The mobilization potential of this nation—not only military, but political, moral and psychological—is not being fully utilized. Unless it is, we may face ultimate disaster.

Somehow the possibility of American use of nuclear weapons has, in some circles, been made to appear like a morally reprehensible act. This is the equivalent of deciding that there is no issue worth fighting for, under any circumstances. In that case, the values of our society are meaningless. First you decide that this issue is not that important, then that some other issue is not that important—and eventually that nothing is that important. Under such circumstances the whole moral and spiritual structure of our society adds up to zero.

There are several respects in which U. S. policy has been remiss:

1. Although we have said we are shifting our main reliance from nuclear weapons back to conventional arms, neither our allies nor our opponents are prepared to believe it. They realize that despite the verbal change in policy it would take three or four years to make this fundamental adjustment in U. S. military posture.

2. In the effort to rule out the accidental triggering of nuclear war we have placed so many restrictions on the nuclear arsenal that we may wind up by convincing the enemy that we do not intend to use this power at all, under any circumstances.

3. There has been some increase in our capability for waging guerrilla warfare, at the bottom of the conflict spectrum. But the great middle ground—bulk, visible, conventional power which you are willing to use—is still the fundamental military weakness of the Western world. The Soviets and the Chinese Communists are exploiting their advantage in this sector politically, in Berlin and in Southeast Asia.

4. Although some good work is being done on defense against fallout, particularly in utilizing existing structures for community shelters, the confusion regarding backyard shelters could have been avoided.

5. In the anti-missile field our pace has been far too slow and too cautious. We insist that each step in the development of our principal defensive missile, the Nike-Zeus, be checked out before going on to the next—a process we have abandoned with offensive missiles.

Advantages on Both Sides

Those are specifics. In assessing U. S. military policy generally, it is necessary to consider the fundamental differences between the Soviet system and ours and to weigh the advantages of each.

In favor of the U.S.S.R. there is first the fact that the Soviets make central allocation of their resources primarily to improve and pursue their power advantage. As of now, this country and the Soviet Union are spending approximately the same amount of money in the military field. But the Soviet leaders can allocate this money as they see fit. In the United States roughly 20 per cent of the gross national product belongs to the federal government for its use; half of federal income is used for other purposes. So the relative amount of resources allocated for power actually is lower on our side.

Also favoring the Soviets is the centralization of strategy decisions. U. S. strategy is worked up

separately by various departments with general coordination at the White House. But since everyone tries to get in on the act, we tend toward compromises which mean all things to all people. In conflict, strategy by committee generally is not effective. The conflict managers of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, sit in the Presidium with Mr. Khrushchev and his immediate cabal. They work out their plans, and then they use the entire resources of the Soviet State to implement their strategy. This has given them a major advantage.

The U. S., for its part, has three main advantages of its own. First, as long as we occupy or have access to areas in the Eurasian land mass, geography is decidedly with us. Even in the space and missile age, geography is meaningful from the point of view of communications, tracking, warning, and other factors. Our geographical access also permits us to retain an effective alliance with the Japanese in the Far East and the NATO nations in Western Europe. If this advantage were to be turned against us, if we were ever euchred out of the Eurasian land mass, then the balance would go decisively the other way. This is why the Soviets are trying to eliminate our access to Eurasia by their variety of plays in the cold war—the elimination of the base system, and so forth—and why, also, these engagements in strange and faraway places, such as Laos or the Congo, have an important security meaning to us regardless of any of the political considerations involved.

The second advantage we have is our tremendous economic resource. Our economy is operating at around 80 or 85 per cent of capacity. We have untapped reserves, human and material, which, if we wanted to use them, could give us the means to work our way out of the insecure position we find ourselves in at present.

A third factor working for us is our system of values. Our society, with its traditions and its spiritual and political concepts, comes far closer to striking a responsive chord among people everywhere than anything the dialectic materialists have to offer on the other side of the fence. Yet we have been extremely reluctant to advance our values or even engage in ideological discussions. Because of the threat of thermonuclear war, we have even come to believe that perhaps values are not important; that maybe our skin is more important than what we believe in.

Strategic Imagination

If used fully, our advantages give us, I believe, a commanding position in the Cold War. But beyond these advantages is another element which might be decisive. That is the factor of "strategic imagination"

—the ability of one side to make better technological choices than the other. This means the ability to select from the bewildering array of weapons and weapons designs those that would prevail.

Two additional factors are also crucial:

The first is our no-first-blow policy. One problem with this policy is that it tends to mislead us into attributing to the enemy a similar reluctance to initiate a first strike. The no-first-blow policy also exacts a high price. You may require a defensive establishment one and one-half times as great as now in order to prevail after absorbing a devastating thermonuclear attack. We have been unwilling to accept that logic. I have nothing against the no-first-blow policy—provided we are willing to pay the price.

A final factor of great importance is timing. New threats must be foreseen, and prudent steps taken in advance to meet them. In the case of the Soviet missile threat, U. S. defensive reactions were too slow.

The price of proper military preparation comes high, and I doubt that the present administration is any more ready than the last to pay it. The announcement that there will be military cutbacks after the current Berlin crisis has passed, for example, hardly squared with earlier announcements that we can expect continual crises and will be prepared for them.

Mr. KATZ: I agree with almost everything said by Dr. Kintner, but I derive small comfort from mere deterrence. The more deterrence we build, the more danger we seem to be in. The difficulty with deterrence is our overwhelming preoccupation with it, to the exclusion of alternative policies which we should and could have been implementing with the time we were buying.

The military advantage which we once held over the Soviets has disappeared. While we held it we merely waited for them to catch up and did little beyond that. There have been desultory efforts at reconciliation, at disarmament, at stabilization, but they have come to nought, either because they were poor ideas or because they were poorly implemented or because the Soviets would have none of it. But to discuss our security from a military standpoint alone is sheer folly. We must somehow use the time bought by the current military stand-off in order to work out something else, either unilaterally or multilaterally.

Secrecy—A Danger to Russia

In dealing with the Soviets on matters of arms control and stability, we are confronted with a certain inordinate and so far intractable problem: their passion for secrecy. They don't understand—and we

haven't chosen to explain it to them, partly because we hardly understand it ourselves—the disadvantages of secrecy. They are forcing us to spend more and more money to buy protection against weapons that are never revealed to us. Perhaps we are spending too much, but we can't be sure. We are like men who are on one side of a large wall behind which are hiding three tigers. We must protect ourselves from the tigers. Three guns would be ample—but, not knowing how many tigers there are, we may order 17 guns. From the standpoint of the tigers and the men alike, this is a poor policy. We would both be better off if we put in a transparent glass.

It is up to us to demonstrate forcibly to them that secrecy is not as valuable to them as they think it is. They are relying upon this secrecy for protection, but it does not really protect them. The commanding officer of a missile station outside Moscow *believes* his missile is protected, but he can never be sure. Secrecy can evaporate overnight and he may not know it. He would be much better off if his missile were protected by 27½ feet of concrete. And so might we.

Missile Bookkeeping

Suppose we did know the location of their missiles and their number. It is usually assumed that such information would furnish target data for counter-force, but this is questionable. Even if we know where their missiles are, it is far from certain that they would be our primary targets. For one thing, we may be "going second"—responding to an attack —and the Soviet missiles may already have been fired. And even if the missile is still there, it may not be a good target. If it costs us three missiles to get one missile, this is poor bookkeeping.

We must persuade them that secrecy forces the arms race into higher and ever-increasing spirals; and that there is absolutely no chance for any form of arms-control agreement as long as secrecy goes on to its present extent.

Secrecy works against the Russians in one other way. In this country there is a continuous open debate in the halls of Congress and elsewhere. So much information is made public that it is hard for any one man to read all the reports that come out. This continuous debate has served to jack up our own thinking. Those of us who work in classified material know very well that, by and large, continuous unclassified, open debate has served to advance the classified discussion proceeding behind closed doors.

The Russians haven't got anything that resembles this. I would argue—admittedly without much proof —that their thinking must lag behind ours as a result.

I have deliberately exaggerated this position, trying to simplify it. But if I am correct, we should think seriously about educating the Russians to the undesirability of secrecy.

Perhaps we might draw up a list of things we are persuaded they ought to be more worried about than they are. These would be things of mutual worry so perhaps something could be done about the situation. The danger of accidental war might be a prime candidate for this list.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI: The Soviets have had great success at convincing us that there is an imbalance in favor of the camp of socialism. This alleged imbalance permits the Soviet Union to adopt aggressive policies which the West accepts because it feels that the balance is against it. But what will happen when the Soviets feel that the objective balance actually *has* turned in their favor? There are strong indications that this will occur within the next five years. When it happens, the Soviets can be expected to adopt policies even more extreme than those followed in the past.

What we need to do is cut down on the Soviet unilateral risk-taking capacity that results from our conceding to them an increment of strength which does not exist. We know the Soviet population is immensely fearful of a war—more fearful perhaps than even the American population. This is partly because of the ignorance of the American population as to what a war might mean, and partly because the American population now feels the time has come for the United States to get tough—to adopt a policy more commensurate with its own proclaimed objectives.

Persuading the Russians of War's Danger

But we have not responded to Soviet military threats by conveying to the Soviet population the dangers of war. A great deal more could be done by our media of mass communications aimed at people behind the Iron Curtain—notably the Voice of America—to convince the Soviet population there is indeed a very serious danger of total destruction. For although the Soviet people fear war, they have no sense of the dimension of the disaster which a nuclear war would bring to them. This ignorance is a major advantage for the Soviet government.

There is a related point I would like to make. The Russians are able to operate with a sense of security because of what I consider to be our excessive predictability. In this country there is a political elite which is pacifist and aims at adjustment, compromise, stability, the *status quo*. This gives the Soviets a

sense of understanding our rationality, and allows them to plan every move with full knowledge of how we are likely to react.

To counter this, we must create a certain enigma of the West, just as there is an enigma of the Soviet Union. Perhaps someone around the President could give the impression that this country, if pushed too far, might respond—as the Soviet Union does—irrationally, unpredictably. This too would diminish the Russians' capacity for risk-taking.

Finally we have to be conscious of political factors already to the enemy's advantage, and take care that we do not turn them further to that advantage.

Could Czechs and Poles Be Neutralized?

Here, particularly, the problem of Czechoslovakia and Poland is relevant. The armed forces of both these nations would be engaged in any war, if only to provide security behind the front-line zone in Germany. It would be of the utmost importance if we could prevent this stability from being achieved. Here, again, the political factor enters into the situation. It has been said that if we try to recognize the Oder-Neisse line in any way, we would let loose ten million new Nazis in West Germany. I do not believe this; I think democracy is in West Germany to stay. And I think it is extremely important to us, if we wish to create dissension within the opponent's military camp, that we do not mobilize factors which create homogeneity and stability in his camp. Talk of resurgent Nazism in Germany is unfortunate. We do not want the Poles and Czechs to fight on the Soviet side. But they will fight if they feel their national interests are engaged.

Dr. WOLF: In view of this fear in Eastern Europe of a German military resurgence, I would like to propose a return to the Kennan proposals for military disengagement in Central Europe, including Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. There might be a system of inspection and control of disarmament in these areas. Perhaps the Soviet Union would be willing to negotiate on this basis.

Dr. KINTNER: My own feeling is strongly against disengagement. Not only are German arms necessary to the NATO alliance, but to seduce Western Germany out of the alliance would be a signal to the other European allies not to play ball with the United States. Western Germany has to be an integral part of the alliance. We must embrace Germany so strongly that it will remain wedded to the West.

As for the Soviets giving up their weapons, it is visionary to hope for that in the near future, however much they talk about it. I believe they are

capable of living with instability—in fact, they thrive on it.

Perhaps in the long term, if we in the free world show the ability to check their onrush, and they can see we are not digestible, then, perhaps there may be an accord. But it cannot happen until they see their humanity and our humanity as deserving to live on the same globe.

ECONOMICS:

Trading with the Enemy

Mr. CHERNE: Secretary of Commerce Hodges predicted recently that the industrial output of the Soviet Union will for a long time lag behind our own. I find no comfort in this, but rather some cause for anxiety.

First, the smaller Soviet economy does not devote its gross national product to the luxuries of consumer choice, the vagaries of style and conspicuous consumption. Yet this smaller economy will soon exceed the United States in the attributes of power.

A second reason for anxiety is the ability of the smaller Soviet economy radically to expand its trade with the developing countries. This trade increased almost four-fold in the last five years. Among the nations dependent on the Soviet Union for more than 10 per cent of their total commerce are the United Arab Republic, Iceland, Guinea, Iran, Greece, Turkey, Finland, Iraq, Jordan, the Sudan, Cambodia and Uruguay.

Finally, an important study by Johns Hopkins University a year ago came to the following ominous conclusions: The Soviet Union will be spending more than the United States for cold war purposes before 1965, and the annual increment of Soviet growth will be larger than ours, in absolute terms. The Soviet Union assigns a large proportion of that annual increment to military power. Until this year, we have provided none of it to power.

The Vast Soviet Plan

Worse is ahead. In the draft of the recent ambitious Soviet Party Program the Kremlin set certain goals which are impressive indeed. Their anticipated steel output in 1980, 250 million metric tons, is almost three times our output last year. Their expected growth in electric power is more than three times as much as we produced last year. Such goals cannot be dismissed, whether or not they are precisely met.

It is not only the sheer addition to economic strength that is ominous. There is also the psychological consequence. This consequence Walter Rostow has stated with great effectiveness. "Soviet momentum," he said,

"set against our sluggishness, tends to make persuasive the psychological image of an ardent competitor closing fast on a front runner who has lost the capacity to deal with his problems and prefers to go down in the style to which he has become accustomed rather than to make the effort required to maintain his status." This dilemma is aggravated by the inability of the free nations to grasp acute Soviet weaknesses which, by Western will, could be substantially enlarged.

The central area of weakness in the Soviet world is its persistent failures in agriculture. What have the free nations done about this? In 1953 and 1954, immediately after Stalin's death, at a moment of life-or-death crisis for the Kremlin, the food-producing nations of the Western world were not at all reluctant to sell food that helped pacify the peoples under Communist rule.

In this present year of threatening nuclear war, the entire Communist world is caught in acute agricultural collapse—the worst disaster that has afflicted the Communist leaders in more than a generation.

What have we done? We have assisted them to meet the human problem they face.

What is Western policy toward the Soviet world? What, in fact, is Western policy even closer to home? Is there adequate reason for the 25 millions which are spent for goods exported by Castro's Cuba? Would the United States really suffer desperately if our cigars were not enshrouded in Havana wrappers? Lenin was reputed to have said, "When the time comes for us to hang the capitalists, they will rush to sell us the rope."

The Difficult Role of West Germany

If I were to advance one reason for a Western policy, it would be the pressure which our own lack of policy imposes upon one of our most important allies, West Germany. The growing recognition of two Germanies, the permanent division of Berlin, the increasing clamor for nuclear sterilization of Germany—all these serve to strengthen those who might well be eager to see the most sharply enlarged commercial relationships between Germany and the U.S.S.R.

In this year of intensified Berlin crisis, the value of West German trade with the Soviet bloc countries increased by 24 per cent. Trade directly with the Soviet Union increased 43 per cent. Let me make clear, I am pointing no finger of accusation. During this identical interval, the United States has participated in a somewhat similar increased trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. If a trade is somehow detached from war and peace, then by what logic

would we expect that German industry would be less eager to satisfy the Soviets' need for sophisticated industrial output than Canada, which is quite ready to reduce the agricultural stress suffered by Red China?

What is an appropriate economic policy that will enable freedom to prevail? It is urgent, in my judgment, to recognize that when we trade with the Soviet Union and mainland China we advance strength which has as its primary purpose our defeat. We need a government apparatus capable of conducting economic warfare. We need among the free nations an apparatus to prevent our competition with each other from hastening the day of our decline.

Strange Workings of Western Trade

The one existing organization designed to coordinate Western trade—COCOM, the 21-nation Coordinating Committee in Paris—works in strange ways, indeed. Take the recent example of ball-bearing machinery to be sold to the U.S.S.R. The United States came prepared to vote negatively, which should have done the trick, since only the United States has the technological ability to build such machines. Yet, the other COCOM nations voted to allow the deal—and the United States, as a loyal member, went along. Many of the COCOM countries have two policies on trade—COCOM policy and their own government's policy. When these two are at variance, they choose whichever they think is best at the moment. The result can be seen in Hong Kong, through which Canada recently air-freighted a big shipment of goods for Cuba.

What I am advocating is a tougher attitude toward economic warfare. I suggest that it is time we fight fire with fire. We need a growing understanding within our community that our economic assistance must have a purpose beyond the genuine need of the countries which require our assistance. We cannot assist equally those whose future is with freedom and those whose understanding of the value of freedom is far less clear.

The economic price of freedom is escalating. It will cost us all more to increase the rate of growth of the American economy. It will cost more to increase the annual increment of our growth applied to military strength and cold war expenditures.

The normal impulses of a peacetime private-enterprise system cannot be the guiding impulses of a nation facing the possibility of defeat. We cannot as separate-though-allied nations separately hang ourselves or each other. There is reason, in fact, to question whether we can long remain separate—alto-

gether separate—political and economic entities. We are approaching a moment of test so severe that the Atlantic Community may well, in fact, face the choice of indeed becoming a community—or a figure of speech in a historian's reference to a group of nations that died.

Mr. MAY: I agree with Mr. Cherne that the problem is how to meet the Soviet economic challenge effectively. But I disagree with his prescription for conducting economic warfare. Rather than simply ruling out trade with the Communist world, we should be seeking ways to trade with them on our terms rather than theirs.

The two trading systems are completely different. Theirs is monolithic, completely responsive to their political and foreign strategy purposes. The Western world's is much more difficult to manage. But it is ridiculous for us to trade on their terms, as a great part of the Western World is doing—through bilateral agreements, through a series of barter swaps in many cases—and particularly ridiculous to allow a set of terms to apply to that trade that we don't apply to most of our own trade.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Under GATT, we have simple rules for our Western trade. We say that dumping is not allowable and we define dumping very specifically: offering articles at a lower price than prevails in the domestic market; offering articles to one country at a price lower than to another country; offering them at a price that is lower than the cost of production plus the reasonable cost of conducting the trade.

The bookkeeping on some of these rules is hard to apply to Communist trade. But on others it is surprisingly easy to apply. When applied, it shows that virtually all of their trade falls outside the rules we enforce among ourselves. Unfortunately, the GATT principles that define what you can do about it—which is to have offsetting tariffs of a punitive or a protective nature—are permissive rather than compulsory. Nevertheless, we have machinery and we are building more. We have the NATO and SEATO groups, and it would be very logical for them to agree severally to apply this. We are building up the OECD to control most of the word's trade and to provide a forum for discussing this kind of question.

By taking strong steps we can rob trade between the East and the West of its very insidious character—that is, as an instrument to promote Communist political ends by disrupting the world-trade system in which we are engaged.

Dr. MOSELY: I question whether it is to our interest

to adopt a position of all-out hostility toward the Soviet Union in the economic field. Will this be effective in what we want? Will it possibly be inconsistent with our desire to move toward a strengthening of international organizations and a really effective system of arms control, which they now reject but which they may find to their advantage to accept at a later time?

Agreement in these areas would, of course, only move the struggle from the nuclear-missile field into other fields. But I feel that in these fields the West, with its resources and its goals of national and individual freedom, has a tremendous advantage over the Soviet Union. Many of the countries now dealing closely with the U.S.S.R. will become less enthusiastic about it. Egypt, for example, has learned many lessons by dealing with the Soviet Union. If we had succeeded in preventing them from dealing with the Soviet Union, they wouldn't have learned these lessons. The same is true of India.

Mr. CHERNE: The comments of Mr. May and Professor Mosely are directed essentially to our capacity to resist and to remain uninjured by Soviet economic warfare upon us. But the problem is still this: what are we doing with our very substantial strength, unequalled by the Soviets, that serves to weaken them significantly? Time is on their side, not ours.

Mr. HARRIS: I would like to urge a stepped-up program of economic collaboration among the free nations. We should think more seriously about the advantages to be derived from the establishment of a NATO economic general staff, a high command to develop a common economic strategy for the nations of the Atlantic community. This offers many obvious advantages; not the least would be the tying-together of economic, military and diplomatic considerations.

But there are also three less obvious advantages:

First, by moving in this direction we could at least begin to overcome our present state of stumbling somnambulism which is called a foreign-economic policy. Under this policy, with all of its contradictions in trade, in tariff, and in customs procedures, we keep preaching the virtues of political internationalism while retreating into the practices of economic isolationism.

Second, it seems to me that such an approach could bring a new measure of economic vitality and a sense of purpose to our free economies, which are, after all, mixed economies. If limited only to the NATO powers in terms of the market, it would apply to 550 million people, with their combined resources in manpower, machinery, materials, management know-how, scientific and technological talent. Once that were made

an operational and effective unit, we could start to work in concert and in a coherent fashion to extend aid and trade in a new pattern to the underdeveloped areas.

There is a third perhaps startling effect which a move in this direction could achieve. As the economic power of the West expanded under such a plan, extending the frontiers not only of economic freedom but also of political freedom, the Communist bloc might find itself being worsted in economic competition. It might, therefore, be compelled to divert to consumer goods those resources which now go into its gigantic armaments build-up, in order to hold its place in the new world-trading pattern. If it did that, and perhaps only if it did that, then it would listen realistically to some first proposals toward an effective arms-control agreement.

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES:

Propaganda and the Truth

Mr. ALLEN: In sending information abroad our aims should be to present the news honestly and believably. But these criteria of objectivity and credibility raise certain problems.

Should we send out unfavorable news along with the favorable? Should the Voice of America tell the world about Little Rock?

Of course we should. Yet an honest difference arises over the context in which we show the Little Rock story. Should we admit to our listeners, for example, that the duly elected Governor of Arkansas had called on the citizens of his state to refuse to allow Negroes to attend schools with white children, but follow this closely with a reminder that more Negroes obtain university degrees in the United States each year than in the rest of the world combined?

This is a much harder question to decide. I was in New Delhi during the distressing events in Little Rock. Several Indian newspapers, served by the United Press, asked to have two columns of American news a day—solely on the Little Rock story, although various matters of real concern to India were being decided in Washington and New York.

Sensationalism or Whitewash?

I had an opportunity to discuss the Little Rock story at about this time with a high official of the UP. He pointed out that the insertion of background could be misleading unless done with propriety. If, for example, background were injected in a way so as to minimize the actual situation in Little Rock, it would not be good reporting, in his view. I accused him of

sensationalism to sell his news service. He accused me of wanting to whitewash the ugly facts of Little Rock. Perhaps there was an element of truth in both accusations. What kind of propaganda we should send out is easy to state—we should send straight news—but difficult to decide in specific cases.

This brings us to a further question. Who should decide what the Voice of America says? How much press comment should be carried, and from what newspapers?

In my view, the Voice of America should have a clear-cut charter from the President and Congress, authorizing it to broadcast the news in as straightforward and honest a manner as humanly possible, including a balanced cross-section of political and editorial comment. The Voice of America should be free from day-to-day supervision by either the legislative or executive branches of the government.

To achieve this, the Voice of America should be detached from the USIA and put under the direction of a non-partisan board of 12 or 15 outstanding citizens of the United States, recognized for their devotion to straight news reporting. Congress would still have an opportunity to review the agency's operations annually in connection with the appropriations. But it would be a non-partisan review, since Voice of America would be non-partisan.

There have been many reports that the BBC enjoys greater credibility than the Voice of America. This may be true, at least in part. BBC has several advantages over us. First, it is primarily a domestic operation, to which its overseas broadcasts are an important but secondary adjunct. All political parties in Britain watch BBC scripts with the closest scrutiny, quick to complain against any evidence of bias. BBC's overseas broadcasts, again, are intended primarily for English-speaking listeners; its foreign language programs are secondary. This adds to its credibility, as the following example will illustrate.

BBC Broadcasts to Greece

In 1956, the Greeks were quarreling bitterly with Great Britain over the Cyprus situation. BBC was broadcasting to Greece every day in the Greek language, but very few Greeks would bother to listen since they felt certain that any broadcast meant only for Greek listeners would be one-sided, hence propaganda. Yet the Greek Foreign Minister told me that he never left his home in the morning until after the 8 o'clock BBC news *in English*. He knew that such broadcasts, intended for the English-speaking world, were more likely to contain straightforward, unbiased news.

Winston Churchill's grumble during the last war that the BBC was "too damned neutral" goes far to explain the BBC's credibility.

The Voice of America has had the advantage over the BBC on more than one occasion but day in and day out I must give grudging and envied recognition to BBC's high reputation. I do not believe the Voice of America will or can achieve this status until it is controlled by a non-partisan board under a well understood and stubbornly supported charter defining its terms of reference.

If our broadcasts are not believed, we will waste our time and money. Our programs, to be credible, must contain as little propaganda as is humanly possible.

Mr. RICHARDSON: I think it is proper that the USIA should disseminate both straight information and United States positions as exemplified by the statements of its leaders. But I would also assume, in the context of the cold war, that we are interested in affecting attitudes and actions of other peoples in the world. In this regard I would think that through one agency or another we should first decide what attitudes and actions we seek, and second, provide techniques to produce them.

This may mean one thing in one area, something else in another. Radio Free Europe, to a very limited extent, in broadcasting to a few countries of East Central Europe, does endeavor consciously to affect attitudes, though scarcely actions. But it can be effective only insofar as over-all policy makes it effective.

In view of the political and psychological struggle in which we are engaged, it might be useful for us here to consider ways of affecting the attitudes and actions of other peoples—behind the Iron Curtain and this side of it, as well as in the uncommitted areas—in directions which are positive in terms of United States policy.

Dr. KINTNER: I was about to make the same point. We do have a problem in distinguishing between the proper role of information and the proper way of somehow getting people to move in a direction which we think is favorable.

There are instrumentalities that can be used to influence people. For example, some of us are pretty well identified with the United States Government, even though we may officially disclaim any such connection, and our statements bear corresponding weight. There are also the great influences of our motion pictures, our newspapers, and our other information media. But the Communists use outright propaganda. Whether it is true or false makes little difference; eventually it enables them to mobilize actions on their behalf.

I would like Mr. Allen to give his views as to how—whether through private mechanisms or public mechanisms—we can get across the things we stand for, and deflate the lies told by the opposition. How do you aid the truth?

Mr. ALLEN. Basically, I think the same problem is posed for the government as for any loyal American running a private news association or a great newspaper. If you had the editorial board of *The New York Times* here discussing this question, they would approach it from the point of view that nobody wants to give our country a black eye, or to change the things that make it possible for *The Times* to be published in an atmosphere of freedom. Yet *The Times'* basic principle is "All the News that's Fit to Print."

That is the great dilemma. We are all fallible and there is just so much a human being can do. You have to keep in mind when you speak of being an advocate for any viewpoint, that the fellows on the receiving end are not Americans. They are usually predisposed to be rather skeptical toward what they are going to hear. In order to be effective, in order to be credible, in order to persuade anybody, we are not going to get far pushing our own point of view.

Mr. STEIBEL: Mr. Allen, I think you were associated with the drive within USIA to get more participation in the policy-making phases of government. Once you achieve this, how can you ask to be free of supervision and simply allowed to follow the dictates of truth? You say we should take the Voice of America out of government and set it up under a board. But this still leaves you with two problems. One, as a policy-maker, for whom do you speak in the minds of your listeners; of whom are you the voice? And, second, suppose you have the problem, as you do now, of convincing audiences that our position on Berlin is credible. Suppose the chairman of your non-partisan committee doesn't happen to like this as a policy? He may be a pacifist, or something else. Doesn't this still leave you with the original problem, which is that somebody has to speak officially in the name of the United States Government, and that he cannot, therefore, be disassociated from all of its decisions?

Mr. ALLEN: I think the answer is simple. I said I thought the radio program, the Voice of America, ought to be put under a non-partisan board. The rest of the activity of the United States Information Agency would certainly remain as it is, and the efforts of the head of the agency to be an important official in government could even be redoubled. He would have his influence in the councils of government. But the pronouncements about our foreign policy would be made primarily by the President, the

Secretary of State, and so forth. The Voice of America would be able to voice those. The announcer doesn't have to be the originator of statements of policy.

Mr. DEAC: I would like to say something on behalf of the foreign-born groups in the United States. These groups have been very disappointed ever since 1945. We Americans have let the world down; we have let ourselves down; we have let our principles down; and we have let our guard down as well. It was heartwarming to hear Mr. Drummond say that there is a large segment of our opinion that knows what it wants and is way ahead of our political leadership. That is true.

Speaking for the ethnic groups, I can say that they are way ahead of our political leadership in both parties. We would suggest one thing to our government leaders: don't get soft, because there has been too much softness already. Get tough. That is the only language the Communists understand. Don't be afraid of public opinion. Public opinion is asking you to show the way.

In propaganda, we believe our ethnic groups are more knowledgeable than most Americans. But these groups, which have excellent relations around the world and which are better placed than other Americans to make friends around the world, have been systematically excluded from our propaganda effort.

Mr. EMMET: I would like to take exception to Ambassador Allen's basic thesis. The idea of having a committee of newsmen run the Voice is fantastic. We have two problems.

One is that in the captive nations people are risking their lives to listen to us. They are not interested in spot news, in airplane accidents or earthquakes. They want to know whether we are going to win, what hope they have that we will act on one policy. They don't want to know whether we are of two minds.

Two, when it comes to our allies, they want to know what we are talking about. Instead of doing what Mr. Allen suggested, I would say the opposite. Put the libraries in the hands of newsmen, but put the Voice, the fighting element of our operation, in the hands of people who can combine the functions of teachers and advertisers.

I was in England in 1954 when Senator McCarthy was at his height. Why wasn't the United States Information Agency telling the British how a McCarthy could exist in our country? Why didn't they tell the history of American Congressional Committees? There was no way of quoting the President; the President didn't dare talk about McCarthy.

Mr. ALLEN: Thank you for giving me the best illustration I could possibly have thought of for my own case. You asked why the Voice of America wasn't telling the British about McCarthy. Because the Voice of America was part of the Administration. There were a few bold souls brave enough to speak out about McCarthyism, but they didn't last long. The Voice of America was under the domination of Senator McCarthy.

Mrs. OVERSTREET: In what additional ways besides the Voice of America can the U. S. communicate with other peoples?

Mr. ALLEN: We use every means humanly possible. In many areas of the world, motion pictures and documentary films are more effective than anything else. In Belgrade, the United States Information Library is on the main drag. At one time, when relations between the United States and Yugoslavia were tense, word went around that it was dangerous for a man's reputation to be seen inside our library. We had windows on the street and put up pictures every week of what was going on; the place was jammed every night. It stopped traffic.

In Russia we have a hard time reaching the people, but we did reach three million through our exhibit in Moscow in 1958.

We work with American travelers, with tourists. Mrs. Overstreet, I know how effective you and your husband have been on the platform in foreign countries. Whatever can be done by human ingenuity, we do.

Dr. MOSELY: In this respect I would like to say just a word about the cultural revolution which has taken place in perhaps 60 countries around the world, and to urge that, in addition to strategic and economic and political programs, we need to do a great deal more in the field of education, communications, and cultural development. Let me give you just one or two examples.

In India we were handicapped for more than ten years by the fact that Soviet books, in English, were being sold for a very small price—10, 15, 25 cents, and textbooks for the equivalent of 50 cents. For many years, we couldn't sell American books. But now the American Book Council has a program, with the aid of the United States Government, to have American books reprinted in India and sold at Indian prices. They are still higher than Soviet books, but our experience so far is that the Indian intellectuals, by and large, would rather pay the equivalent of 75 cents or one dollar for a book they want to read, than 15 or 25 cents for a book that is not only dull

but full of dogmatism. We ought to multiply these examples around the world.

There is room for a whole revolution in techniques of book production and sales. Many of you are familiar with the program of the Franklin Publications which is working toward this end. They don't tell the people what books they should print, but offer them a choice, help them identify their needs. In several countries the revolution has already occurred—in book publishing, bookselling, libraries, including mobile libraries in Iran.

But we need to do much more than we are doing to train people for journalism, for responsible work in analysis of world affairs, as educators, as businessmen, as entrepreneurs.

If the world strategic situation, which these countries can affect very much, ever comes into a kind of balance, perhaps the final decisions ultimately will be made by people that we will (or will not) have aided to make their own choices. I think that answers, in part, the question about what we have to offer. We offer something the Soviets cannot offer—though they pretend to offer it—and that is a real choice of things, the techniques, the knowledge that the ambitious people of these countries want.

SUMMATION:

Renewing Our Intellectual Armament

Dr. GIDEONSE: The key idea in Ambassador Wadsworth's address seemed to me to be that "this must be the last crisis to which we come unprepared." But what *is* preparation? First of all, it is awareness of the larger strategy as against the last emerging, immediate issue in the headlines. As far as the last fifteen years is concerned, determining the larger strategy has not been a great source of difficulty.

We had our eye on the larger strategy when we inaugurated the Marshall Plan, despite the difficulties posed by traditional ways of thinking in the United States. We bridged those difficulties primarily through a link between the Democratic Party and Republican Senator Vandenberg in the Senate. We did a magnificent job with the Marshall Plan, a better job of its kind than I think has ever before been done in economic and political history. In fact, we did so well that the nations of Western Europe now talk back to us—so vigorously that we might almost wish for some of the docility of pre-Marshall Plan days.

The organization of the North Atlantic military alliance—NATO—was another superior job of carrying forward the larger strategy.

A third example was the substitution of United States responsibility for British in the Communist-threatened Near and Middle East. This move, usually described, as "The Truman Doctrine," began in Greece and Turkey and led to Lebanon and other episodes.

A Larger Strategy

The question now is whether we still have that grasp of the larger strategy in what President Kennedy has called this crucial decade of the Sixties. A good example of the dilemma was presented by Dr. Brzezinski when he reminded us that the formula that saves us Berlin could lose us West Germany—and ultimately NATO and Western Europe.

I found Mr. Berle's remarks very refreshing because a liberal who re-thinks his basic presuppositions is even scarcer and more surprising than a conservative who does it. This was a beautiful example of a first-class mind offering a re-orientation of our thinking about what he termed "the myth of world opinion."

The thing that emerges in almost all these discussions is the need for yardsticks, standards by which we can judge the immediate issues before us in terms of strategic policy. We need something to help us make up our mind which really is the most important use of scarce resources—economic, military, whatever it may be. Dr. Kissinger used the phrase that we need a concept of the free world that "informs our action." It also has been said here that if the Common Market is considered as a concept that should be enlarged to include the whole Atlantic Community, it could give an additional dynamic to our ideological position. This is the one thing that is badly needed in—to name one instance—Western Europe. The students there, misled though they may be in our judgment, still see a dynamic in the Soviet philosophy; they miss it in our position.

The Predictable Consequences

There is also another idea that emerged again and again in these discussions, and that is the way in which we tend to analyze our opponents. We want to know what they are really thinking, as compared with what they say and what the traditional positions of Lenin, Stalin and the past positions of Khrushchev have been. At the same time I think there was a very healthy realization—pragmatic and therefore truly American — that the really basic question is not what our opponents believe, but what are the predictable consequences of what they are doing. This is something we lose sight of in our day-by-day search for a negotiating formula on Berlin. What are the predictable consequences in West Germany

of what they are doing? If there is some form of neutralization of West Germany, and if there is then some form of recognition of the repression in Central Europe, with the demoralization that would ensue for all the peoples in that strategically crucial area, you have a picture of what I mean by predictable consequences. We thereby would completely lose the cutting edge of our traditional appeal to the minds of free men. If we lose that, we are reduced to practically nothing but the military and material factors. I dare say that would be just about the least advantageous position we could put ourselves in.

Kissinger pointed out that we must on the one hand restore that cutting edge by some form of widening and integration of the idea by which we live, and must on the other concern ourselves more imaginatively with the question of what are the legitimate security factors in Russia's thinking as contrasted to the ones that are called security but are really aggressive imperialist intentions.

This is hard to do because, as many people have said, there is a great deal of hypocrisy in Russian talk about their security.

On the one hand, therefore, you have the need to widen the economic and military and political base of an Atlantic Community; on the other, there is the need for greater awareness of the legitimacy of Russia's concern for her security.

The Meaning of Freedom

I come back to what is, to me, perhaps the greatest weakness in our armament. It is not technical and not economic, important as those factors are. It is that we lack clarity in spelling out for our time the meaning of the word "freedom." No thought emerged more frequently than that one in these discussions.

This is an old theme, but it has been refreshed by our discussions here. Too often we simply take freedom for granted. Our specialists are all concerned with little splinters of the log. They don't concern themselves with the larger questions. "That," they say, "is somebody else's specialty." But that "somebody else" doesn't exist; we must all carry part of the load.

There is an abiding need for high-quality concern with the nature of our intellectual armament. For one thing, we keep talking about tension or insecurity as if it were something regrettable that has to be removed. Sure enough, some kinds of tension and insecurity should be removed, if we can do so. But let me remind you, a free society that will inform our action and be true to our historic experience cannot be developed without promoting insecurity. Wherever there is freedom of choice, there is insecurity for

those whose ideas are not chosen. Freedom and insecurity are inherently interwoven; they belong together.

Freedom is not an abstraction to be defined by philosophers. Freedom is defined by the historic experience of free men. It is always characterized by the presence of choice, the right to pursue human values and purposes, and the guaranty of human and civil rights. It calls for the limited state, that is to say a constitution which places the government as well as the governed under law.

All these historic achievements are rooted in a certain image of man—not just man as a producer and as a consumer who is expected to contribute to production, but the whole man with all his esthetic, moral, and religious aspirations. This image of man sees him as a potential angel as well as a potential devil. It reminds us that the danger of the potential devil submerging the potential angel is enlarged in direct proportion to the extent that man is entrusted with unlimited power.

The progress of science and technology demonstrates that whatever enhances man's power over his physical environment without strengthening his capacity for self-control is pernicious. The free society depends upon refreshing the sources of responsibility—the opportunity for self-control.

The Will to Win

Mr. MOWRER: I came here thinking that free men could prevail, and I go back certain that they can. Unhappily, I am not sure that they will. The mere choice of the title of this assembly—"How Free Men Can Prevail"—gives away the game, for it assumes that they are not yet prevailing.

Everybody now sees that we have the means of winning. And yet we are not winning. Certainly it is not for lack of trying. But it is for lack of trying to do the right thing. It seems to me we have been trying, not to prevail, but to survive. Our problem is not to put off crises and gain a little time. It is to win the cold war.

What is needed was once expressed by Goethe who, in figuring out why God created Germany, said, "In the beginning was the deed; and that deed on the part of the Lord I feel sure was an act of will." Only when we have demonstrated this "act of will" will things fall into shape.

Once we have faced the inexorable fact that we need to win if we are to survive, then surely we will find that a prolongation of peace by concessions is only bringing war nearer. Each time it merely seems to provoke a desire for more concessions, and so we

come closer to that horrible day when we shall really be asked to engage in major war or surrender.

On the other hand, by deciding to win, we reduce the chances of war. By mobilizing all of our superior energies, our superior resources, our superior philosophy, we have what it takes to win. By creating a permanent preponderance over our adversary and his underworld philosophy, we will develop such a barrier to further trouble that we will find that we may not have to win. Once we have decided that nothing short of prevalence will do the job, we have a chance of convincing the adversary. Only when we convince the adversary that he will never win will we have a chance of bringing about within the Soviet Union, Red China, and the other Communist nations those transformations which would enable the conflict to subside.

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