You are here
Essays on Marketing Strategies in the Context of Interdependent Consumption
- Date Issued:
- 2015
- Abstract/Description:
- This dissertation consists of two essays in which I study the impact of two interdependent consumerbehaviors, fairness concerns and exclusivity seeking, on a companys marketing strategiesand profits specifically in a context where it tries to expand its clientele with the objective of generatingrepeat purchases, for example by running deals on daily deal platforms. In the first essay,I examine the impact of customers fairness concerns on the profitability of a company runningpromotions on daily deal platforms. With the prevalence of social media and the internet, informationabout such targeted promotions can become available to all consumers including those whodid not have access to the platform and paid a full-price. Conducting a laboratory experiment,I demonstrate that knowledge about targeted promotions often leads to post-promotional fairnessconcerns among these consumers resulting in an increased tendency to switch providers. Incorporatingthe results of the experiment in a two-period game-theoretic model I analyze the impactof customers post-promotional fairness concerns on the profits of quality differentiated companieswho compete by running targeted promotions. I find that the low quality provider always suffersfrom consumers sensitivity to unfairness. Contrary, I show that the high quality provider can counterintuitivelybenefit from consumers fairness concerns as long as its quality advantage is not toolarge. Furthermore, I analyze how profits are impacted when information about the targeted dealsleaks to non-targeted customers who would have bought at the regular price. I find that, counterintuitively,competing firms profits increase with leakage. In the second essay of this dissertation, Istart with the observation that many platform members are new customers and are uncertain aboutthe quality of the companys product or service until they consume it. In such a context, I examinea high quality sellers optimal signaling strategy in a market where consumers prefer to purchase ascarce product due to desire for exclusivity or to receive a service in a non-crowded environmentdue to better experience and service delivery. Utilizing a repeat purchase signaling model I show that, consistent with prior literature, the high quality firm signals its quality by making its productscarce as well as charging a high price when consumers desire for exclusivity is high and cost ofquality is great. Contrary, I also find conditions under which the high quality firm counterintuitivelymakes its product widely available and prices it low to signal its quality. The model may inpart explain how high quality sellers market their products or services on daily deal websites.
Title: | Essays on Marketing Strategies in the Context of Interdependent Consumption. |
40 views
11 downloads |
---|---|---|
Name(s): |
Talebi Ashoori, Minoo, Author Stock, Axel, Committee Chair Liu, Lin, Committee Member Mao, Huifang, Committee Member Caputo, Michael, Committee Member University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor |
|
Type of Resource: | text | |
Date Issued: | 2015 | |
Publisher: | University of Central Florida | |
Language(s): | English | |
Abstract/Description: | This dissertation consists of two essays in which I study the impact of two interdependent consumerbehaviors, fairness concerns and exclusivity seeking, on a companys marketing strategiesand profits specifically in a context where it tries to expand its clientele with the objective of generatingrepeat purchases, for example by running deals on daily deal platforms. In the first essay,I examine the impact of customers fairness concerns on the profitability of a company runningpromotions on daily deal platforms. With the prevalence of social media and the internet, informationabout such targeted promotions can become available to all consumers including those whodid not have access to the platform and paid a full-price. Conducting a laboratory experiment,I demonstrate that knowledge about targeted promotions often leads to post-promotional fairnessconcerns among these consumers resulting in an increased tendency to switch providers. Incorporatingthe results of the experiment in a two-period game-theoretic model I analyze the impactof customers post-promotional fairness concerns on the profits of quality differentiated companieswho compete by running targeted promotions. I find that the low quality provider always suffersfrom consumers sensitivity to unfairness. Contrary, I show that the high quality provider can counterintuitivelybenefit from consumers fairness concerns as long as its quality advantage is not toolarge. Furthermore, I analyze how profits are impacted when information about the targeted dealsleaks to non-targeted customers who would have bought at the regular price. I find that, counterintuitively,competing firms profits increase with leakage. In the second essay of this dissertation, Istart with the observation that many platform members are new customers and are uncertain aboutthe quality of the companys product or service until they consume it. In such a context, I examinea high quality sellers optimal signaling strategy in a market where consumers prefer to purchase ascarce product due to desire for exclusivity or to receive a service in a non-crowded environmentdue to better experience and service delivery. Utilizing a repeat purchase signaling model I show that, consistent with prior literature, the high quality firm signals its quality by making its productscarce as well as charging a high price when consumers desire for exclusivity is high and cost ofquality is great. Contrary, I also find conditions under which the high quality firm counterintuitivelymakes its product widely available and prices it low to signal its quality. The model may inpart explain how high quality sellers market their products or services on daily deal websites. | |
Identifier: | CFE0005890 (IID), ucf:50855 (fedora) | |
Note(s): |
2015-08-01 Ph.D. Business Administration, Dean's Office CBA Doctoral This record was generated from author submitted information. |
|
Subject(s): | Marketing Strategy -- Game Theory -- Fairness Concerns -- Exclusivity Seeking -- Signalling Quality | |
Persistent Link to This Record: | http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0005890 | |
Restrictions on Access: | campus 2018-08-15 | |
Host Institution: | UCF |