

BASIC PAMPHLETS — 4

**Effects of
American
Foreign
Policy**

by

Corliss Lamont

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EFFECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

1

In his speech of November, 1945, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, referring to American-Russian relations, said: "For nearly a century and a half we have gotten along well—remarkably well when you consider that our forms of government, our economic systems and our special habits have never been similar. . . . Never, in the past, has there been any place on the globe where the vital interests of the American and Russian people have clashed or even been antagonistic—and there is no objective reason to suppose that there should, now or in the future, ever be such a place. There is an obvious reason for this. We are both continental peoples with adequate living space—interested in developing and enjoying the living

space we have. Our ambition is to achieve the highest possible standards of living among our own peoples, and we have the wherewithal to achieve high standards of living without conquest, through peaceful development and trade. We have that opportunity, moreover, only to the extent that we can create conditions of peace and prevent war. Thus the paramount interest, the only conceivable hope of both nations, lies in the cooperative enterprise of peace."

Mr. Acheson's words are as applicable today as in 1945. But Mr. Acheson as Secretary of State has, I submit, followed policies inconsistent with his earlier opinions. As the member of President Truman's Cabinet primarily responsible for the foreign policy of the United States, he has taken the lead in curtly turning down the repeated proposals of the Soviet Government over the past few years for a top-level conference between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of coming to an over-all settlement. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Truman have fallen into the bad habit of stigmatizing all such offers as mere propaganda on the part of the Soviet Union. The trouble is, of course, that the American Government cannot admit the sincerity of Soviet peace campaigns

without undermining its favorite thesis that Soviet aggression is the great menace facing the United States and the world at large. The underlying premise of the Truman Doctrine, the cold war, the North Atlantic Pact and the stupendous American armaments program is that Soviet armies will invade and overrun Western Europe if they have the opportunity.

Undoubtedly many high-ranking officials of the U. S. Government, as well as members of Congress and party leaders in the country at large, do not themselves really take stock in the fearful Soviet military threat which they keep talking about. But the originators of our bi-partisan foreign policy have succeeded in creating a situation in the United States in which loud cries about Soviet aggression and Communist conspiracy have become fundamental to orthodox political ritual both during and between elections. The high priests of the Democratic and Republican Parties have become the prisoners of their own myth-making and must maintain the pretense of absolute Soviet wickedness lest the foundations of their ideology melt away in the light of the simple truth.

A lamentable consequence of all this is that a

powerful public opinion has grown up in America which regards as appeasement any attempts to work out a peaceful accord with the Soviets. So it is that in various quarters the whole notion of peace has become suspect; and peace committees, peace meetings, peace addresses, peace articles are all regarded as most likely originating in a Soviet plot to undermine the strength of the United States and its allies. In 1950 a Hollywood studio went so far as to suppress a movie on the story of Hiawatha, because it was felt that the Indian chief's constant smoking of the Peace-Pipe and general opposition to war might be interpreted as un-American. The continuing Red hunt on the part of such agencies as the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Committee on Internal Security, and by such demagogues as Senators Joseph McCarthy and Pat McCarran, has made most members of Congress and most citizens afraid to agree publicly with any part of the Soviet peace program, lest they then be smeared as Communists.

Today most Americans tend to reject almost automatically any idea, in the controversial realms of economics, politics and international relations, which originated in Soviet Russia or is generally

approved there. In fact, this trend has gone so far that the relatively few dissenters who do express agreement with some Soviet doctrines may be indicted or jailed as foreign agents on the grounds of "parallelism" between their views and those of the Soviet Government. Yet if Americans for one reason or another feel unable ever to agree with Soviet opinions, then the Soviets are actually controlling them in reverse by forcing them always to support contrary conclusions. The truly independent mind cannot permit itself to be placed in such a senseless position.

2

I wonder how many millions of Americans, during the steady deterioration of American-Soviet relations since the end of World War II, have asked themselves the question I have so often put to myself: Would the present American-Soviet impasse have developed if President Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived out his last term of office through 1948? My answer has always been that while these post-war years would have been difficult in any case, President Roosevelt, with his wide experience in foreign affairs, his political

sagacity, his liberalism and wisdom, would have been able to lay the basis for continuing American-Soviet cooperation. Assuredly he would have had the moral strength and the basic statesmanship to resist Winston Churchill's suggestion in his famous Fulton, Missouri, speech of March, 1946, for an Anglo-American military alliance against the Soviet Union.

President Truman, however, never noted for his forcefulness of personality or independence of mind, fell in readily with Churchill's anti-Soviet rhetoric and apologia for a cold war. Moreover, being unsure of himself on international issues, Mr. Truman has consistently leaned on others in the formulation of American foreign policy rather than assuming leadership himself. And he has often taken very bad advice, as in accepting the "containment" thesis put forward in the magazine *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 by Mr. X, now universally recognized as Mr. George Kennan, present Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Also President Truman, despite his dismissal of General MacArthur for sabotaging American policy in Korea, has on the whole relied heavily upon the military mind.

Writing in the *New York Herald Tribune* about

the powers of the National Security Council, composed chiefly of military men and defense secretaries, Mr. Sumner Welles, former Under Secretary of State, asserts: "No President since General Grant has had such childlike faith in the omniscience of the high brass as the present occupant of the White House. It is no surprise to learn that President Truman invariably approves every decision of the Council. . . . The Council passes on all important questions in this country's international relations and decides the policy to be adopted. It has now been given authority by the President to determine our political objectives in every part of the world. . . . But no emergency can justify the control of this country's foreign policy by a Council which reaches its decisions from a military standpoint."

Generals and admirals, secretaries of war and navy and air, have traditionally been in favor of continued expansion of the services in which they function. Such expansion increases their power, prestige and sense of mission. Furthermore, they tend to look for the solution of international tensions in terms of war rather than of diplomacy. These are some of the reasons why civilian control over the U. S. defense departments is of such

great importance. But there are many indications that the White House in general bows to the Pentagon. And one unhappy sign of this is President Truman's willingness to spur on a dangerous armaments race, to foist Universal Military Training on America and to encourage wild war scares as the occasion demands. Even an anti-Soviet stalwart like Congressman Joseph W. Martin, Jr., leader of the Republican minority in the House of Representatives, has stated: "Down through the years the high officials of this Government uttered time and again the direst warnings of bloodshed when a particular piece of legislation they wanted was before Congress."

In September, 1951, as reported in *The New York Times*, President Truman signed a "measure authorizing a \$5,864,301,178 global military construction program, including a ring of secret overseas bases close enough to the Soviet Union so that the Air Force could retaliate against attack and neutralize the enemy's war potential. It was the largest amount ever voted for military construction during peacetime." Although the stated reason for this vast appropriation was that it was essential for defense, it is obvious that the air bases alluded to could also be used for a sudden

A-bomb onslaught against the U.S.S.R. The acknowledged U.S. policy of building a round-the-world network of air bases, now several hundreds in number, as near as possible to the frontiers of Soviet Russia and its allies, makes the Soviets understandably nervous.

There are grounds for believing that Harry Truman hopes to go down in history as one of America's greatest Presidents because of his militant crusade against communism. Be that as it may, he will certainly be remembered as the Chief Executive who engineered through Congress the largest peacetime budgets on record up till his second term of office. For the fiscal year of 1952 he obtained Congressional approval for a budget of almost 71 billion dollars, with 49.7 billions earmarked for military purposes, exclusive of payments to veterans. For the fiscal year of 1953, running from July 1, 1952 to July 1, 1953, the President demanded, shortly after new Soviet peace overtures, a budget of over 85 billions.

Of this budget, which the *Wall Street Journal* terms "so monstrous as to defy reasoned comment," approximately 76 percent or 65.1 billions are for national security, including 52.4 billions for the armed forces and 10.5 billions for inter-

national security (aid to U.S. allies). This does not include 4.2 billions for veterans and 6.2 billions for interest, chiefly on loans which financed past wars. Fourteen billions of the new budget are to go to the building of airplanes, while 1.7 billions are for speeding up the stockpiling of atom bombs as part of a 5- to 6-billion dollar program over the next few years for mass production of America's "fantastic new weapons." The 1952 Soviet budget allocates to defense 24 percent or 113.8 billion rubles, equal to 28.4 billion dollars at the official exchange rate. (The Soviet budget, however, covers a much larger proportion of the national economy than the American.)

The astronomical U.S. totals mean that President Truman is asking the United States to spend approximately 180 million dollars a day on defense, which is about 3.7 times the entire 48-million budget of the United Nations for 1952. Let that sink in: in a single day the U.S. is to expend for military purposes over three and a half times what the U.N. can devote to international peace during a full year. Or, to make another comparison, the U.S. is to pour into defense every day more than twice as much as the total endowment of Columbia University,

America's fourth largest educational institution. These colossal armament figures seem alarming not only to the Russians, but also to some of America's own allies.

The skyrocketing U.S. armaments outlays of the past few years have kept the American economy booming and headed off the depression that many competent economists think would have otherwise taken place. A brink-of-war economy, with government spending on a huge scale stimulating business and bringing enormous profits, is one way of temporarily overcoming fundamental economic difficulties in a capitalist economy. Government expenditure on weapons of war is the favorite form of public works for capitalist businessmen, since it results in very profitable contracts and since the end product is something that does not compete, like public hydroelectric developments or public housing, with private capitalist enterprise.

As a larger and larger proportion of American business becomes geared to the manufacture of arms and the servicing of armies, it grows harder and harder to turn back from a brink-of-war economy to a peace economy. It is for the time being more expedient, especially from a political

viewpoint, to accelerate the armaments boom than to put the brakes on it. And the terrible Communist blunder in Korea played directly into the hands of those powerful groups in America which had been agitating for an expanded armaments program.

That program has become so prodigiously enlarged over the past few years, and so interwoven with the basic fabric of the economy, that government officials, private businessmen and even trade union leaders are anxious lest the general cold war and the little hot war be concluded too quickly and peace break out. Typical was the reaction to talk of peace in Korea as reported in the *Wall Street Journal* of May 16, 1951: "Stock prices experienced the sharpest decline since March 13. Brokers ascribed the break to widespread peace rumors. . . . Traders are fearful that the end of hostilities might also halt rearmament and catch leading companies with swollen inventories unbalanced for peacetime production."

As Mr. Norman Thomas, an outspoken anti-Soviet crusader, has said: "Millions of Americans, despite their best hopes, have acquired a vested interest in the economic waste of the arms race. Its sudden end would be greeted with an out-

pouring of joy, but it would be followed by economic panic—unless we were ready with constructive plans for a cooperative war on hunger, illiteracy and disease.” Such plans the powers-that-be do not have, although vastly extended government spending for great economic projects at home and Point 4 abroad, assigned only \$600,000,000 in the 85-billion Truman budget, could obviously be just as much of a business stimulus as shoveling unending billions of dollars into the maw of Mars.

Resilient as it is, even the American economy will not be able to stand indefinitely the strain of such enormous arms budgets and staggering government deficits as those imposed by the Truman Administration. And if the people as a whole finally start to offer serious objection to the armaments burden, reckless political leaders may be tempted to overcome popular opposition by actually plunging America into a world war. When war preparations seem to the rulers of a country the easiest way to maintain prosperity and full employment, the danger is that they will choose the path of international conflict in preference to facing an immediate economic crisis and running the risk of becoming discredited.

The disturbing distension of armaments has already inflicted on the American people a spiral of inflation, with rising prices and rising taxes cutting drastically into the consumer's income. As ex-President Herbert Hoover stated in his address of January 27, 1952: "The outstanding phenomenon in the United States is the dangerous overstraining of our economy by our gigantic expenditures. The American people have not yet felt the full impact of the gigantic increase in government spending and taxes. Yet we already suffer from the blight of inflation and confiscatory taxes. We are actually in a war economy except for world-wide shooting. We are diverting more and more civilian production to war materials. . . .

"Since the end of the Second World War the purchasing power of our money, measured in wholesale price indexes, has decreased 40 percent. . . . It is the average family who pays the bulk of taxes, both income and hidden. Among them are corporation taxes. These are ultimately passed on to their customers or the corporation would quickly go bankrupt. . . . These huge taxes are also overstraining our economy." In addition, President Truman's reckless program is using up America's limited natural resources, such as iron

ore and oil, at such a furious rate that coming generations, under whatever form of economy, will be seriously handicapped. The Washington spendthrifts are robbing future Americans of their birthright for a wasteful mess of bombs and battleships, guns, tanks and warplanes.

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The burgeoning American armaments economy has brought the United States to a condition, as described by Walter Lippmann, "of gigantic, almost explosive, industrial expansion which draws tremendously and competitively on the available supplies." America's accelerating need for raw materials, scrap metal and finished goods to meet the insatiable demands of a defense policy run wild has made it increasingly difficult for Britain, France, Italy and the Benelux countries to find the necessary imports for their own needs; to pay the inflated prices asked, most frequently by American manufacturers; and to put across their vast rearmament programs, in conformance with American foreign policy, without more and more depressing their own standards of living through

domestic inflation, crushing taxation and a sheer lack of consumers' goods.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan commented most persuasively on the situation in his speech of April 23, 1951, when he resigned in protest as Minister of Labor in the British Labor Government: "It is now perfectly clear to anyone who examines the matter objectively—the lurchings of the American economy, the extravagance and unpredictable behavior of the production machine, the failure of the American Government to inject the arms program into the economy slowly enough has already caused a vast inflation of prices all over the world. It has disturbed the economy of the Western World to such an extent that if it goes on more damage will be done by this unrestrained behavior than by the behavior of the nation the arms are intended to restrain. . . .

"I say, therefore, with full solemnity of the seriousness of what I am saying, that the £4,700,000,000 arms program is already dead. It cannot be achieved without irreparable damage to the economy of Great Britain and the world. . . . The fact is that the Western World has embarked upon a campaign of arms production and upon a scale of arms production so

quickly and of such extent that the foundations of political liberty and parliamentary democracy will not be able to sustain the shock." (In his challenging book, *In Place of Fear*, published in the spring of 1952, Mr. Bevan expands this thesis in detail.)

In December, 1951, Winston Churchill, soon after he became Prime Minister for the second time, declared frankly in the House of Commons that Britain would be unable to complete on schedule its three-year \$13-billion rearmament program. He said that he was giving Aneurin Bevan "honorable mention" for having, "it appears by accident—perhaps not from the best of motives—happened to be right." Early in 1952 Churchill's Conservative Government launched a new *austerity* program "to avert national bankruptcy." Measures included a drastic curtailment of the social services, cuts in the civil service staff, a sharp reduction in manufactured goods for the home market and a record low European travel allowance of approximately \$70 per year for each Englishman.

The remarks of Bevan and Churchill raise the portentous question of whether the long-range effect of American policy will not be to force

Western Europe farther and farther to the left instead of rescuing it from the Communists. A most significant report issued in March, 1952, by the ultra-conservative U. S. Chamber of Commerce puts the issue squarely: "There is little surplus fat in Western Europe to permit the luxury of large armies. It will take decades fully to repair the destruction of the recent war. . . . Further sacrifices would inevitably drive many into the already large Communist and Socialist Parties. It would seem the part of wisdom, given these trends, not to overlook the political and economic problems of Europe. Heavy emphasis upon the military may well backfire."

The only sound way, of course, to prevent the spread of Communist regimes is to institute far-reaching social and economic reforms which will do away with poverty, unemployment, depression, currency crises and the other ills which have afflicted Europe over the past few decades. But the heavy-handed Truman Administration, insisting everywhere on the *warfare* state in place of the *welfare* state, has offered no effective plan for permanent economic well-being and is, on the contrary, depressing living standards in the nations it purports to be aiding.

The careening American economic juggernaut has affected for the worse not only England, France and Western Europe in general, but the entire world. Wholesale price increases since the start of the Korean war amounted, as of July, 1951, to more than 30 percent in Mexico, more than 33 percent in Brazil, more than 42 percent in Finland and more than 51 percent in Japan. If President Truman would study his own reports more carefully, he would be more conscious of the unhappy consequences of his policies. For example, his Mid-Year Economic Report of 1951 stated: "The enormous price increases which have occurred constitute in some countries a danger to political and social stability, and to the security program of the free world. . . . Because the economies of these countries have been under great strain and because in some of them the political and social situation is tense, inflation raises not only the question of equitable distribution of the economic burden of defense; it also raises the grave question of the ability of their governments to carry through the needed defense programs and maintain economic stability."

With the economic situation steadily deteriorating in the very nations the American Government

proclaims it is saving from the Soviet menace, the Truman Administration has all along insisted that its allies follow its own policy of curtailing trade with members of the Soviet-led bloc for the purpose of weakening Communist military potential. This has meant a severe decline in commerce between Western and Eastern Europe and the cutting off of Japan from China, which has traditionally been both its best customer and its main source of raw materials. The lack of normal trade relations with Western Europe has indeed been some handicap to the Soviet Union and the smaller Eastern European countries in their post-war economic reconstruction; but it has been considerably more of a handicap to the Western European economies.

This is because Soviet Russia and its allies, with their far-reaching economic planning, have been better able to adjust to the falling off of trade than the West. Furthermore, the American-imposed barriers against economic relations with the East have forced the North Atlantic Pact countries to attempt to fill the vacuum through trade with the U.S. This endeavor is impossible of fulfilment because European exports run into the barrier of America's high tariffs and because

European imports must be paid for in dollars. These difficulties have combined to create a critical and continuing dollar deficit. The U.S. "get-tough" policy towards the U.S.S.R. is toughest of all on the peoples of Western Europe.

In July, 1951, the American Government took the extreme step of breaking off its formal trade and commercial agreements with Soviet Russia and its allies in Eastern Europe, despite the fact that these nations have been most desirous of maintaining trade relations with the West. American business of course loses out economically from this short-sighted policy. The total value of exports from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. fell from \$149,504,000 (including \$50,540,000 in aid and relief) in 1947 to \$27,879,000 in 1948, to \$6,617,000 in 1949, to a trickle of \$621,407 in 1950 and an estimated \$70,000 in 1951.

Walter Lippmann makes some pertinent and penetrating remarks about the all too successful American campaign to cripple international trade. "A dominating part of Congress," he writes, "which Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson have felt it necessary to appease, is demanding a virtual embargo and blockade of the whole Communist orbit. The reasoning of these Congressmen is that

an embargo and blockade of this kind would hurt the Communists more than it hurts the United States. That, considering our immense self-sufficiency and enormous financial power, is no doubt true. But from this truth they have jumped to the quite unwarranted conclusion that the embargo hurts the Communists more than it hurts our weak and stricken allies. That is not true, and we shall be learning more and more, but in the hard way, how untrue it is.”

Mr. Lippmann analyzes the situation further: “The great problem looming on the horizon is how to keep the large, congested, industrial populations of Britain, West Germany and Japan at work and at a standard of living which they will accept as reasonable for themselves. To deal with this problem we are compelled—as things stand now—to replace the markets and sources of supply which they have lost by finding markets and sources of supply within the world which is dependably in the Western political orbit. This is perhaps the most radical reconstruction and re-routing of the trade of the world which men have ever dreamed of trying to bring about.” Although Mr. Lippmann does not say it, the chances are slim that this drastic and unnatural alteration in

long-established trade patterns will succeed.

The reference by Mr. Lippmann to appeasement on the part of the Truman Administration brings out the extent to which American foreign policy is being formulated, not for the benefit of the American people or the world, but to enable the Democratic Party to stay in power by outdoing the Republican Party in anti-Soviet and anti-Communist declarations and deeds. President Truman's announced determination to "contain" communism has been far more successful in containing the Republicans than in its original goal. And the Russians cannot help wondering whether this perpetual merry-go-round of American political maneuvering might not lead one party or the other to precipitate a world war as the culmination of the great contest in denouncing, hating and combating the alleged Communist menace.

Furthermore, current in Administration and congressional circles is a strong feeling that an armed conflict with the Soviet Union is inevitable. Mr. Demaree Bess corroborates this fact in *The Saturday Evening Post*: "A fatalistic feeling has pervaded both major political parties that we can solve our own and the world's problems only by overthrowing the expanding Soviet Em-

pire by force of arms. This fatalism has spread so widely that we no longer pay much attention to the most belligerent statements by our representatives in Washington.”

One of the most disturbing—and threatening—features of American foreign policy is that the U.S. has lined up as allies an incredible assortment of fascist or semi-fascist governments dedicated to violence, terror and tyranny. The so-called “free world,” supposedly banded together to extend the blessings of intellectual liberty and political democracy, includes sixteen Latin American dictatorships or quasi-dictatorships (I exclude here Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay); the royal fascist regime of Greece; the cruel police state of Turkey; the Formosan remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s bloody and primitive fascism; the Union of South Africa with its horrible racist laws; Franco’s Falangist Spain, established with the help of Hitler and Mussolini and perpetuated in their image; the Nazi-tending republic of Western Germany; and still semi-feudal Japan with its thin veneer of democracy. This roll call obviously shows that “the free world” is a propaganda myth.

Mrs. Vera M. Dean of the moderate Foreign

Policy Association makes clear in the weekly *Bulletin* of that organization the strange double standard characteristic of American policy: "In Eastern Europe Washington has urged free and unfettered elections and has denounced the establishment of dictatorial governments dominated by Communists. Yet at the Bogotá conference of 1948 the United States proposed recognition of governments in Latin America without inquiry into their character and without the requirement of prior elections. In the opinion of many observers, this doctrine has encouraged seizure of power by military juntas in Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador at the expense of the kind of middle-of-the-road regimes we have urged for Eastern Europe and the Balkans."

The efficient manner in which the United States Government has enlisted in its coalition well-nigh every reactionary force and gangster government throughout the world indicates the possible use of such elements in the unscrupulous rough-and-tumble of aggressive warfare. Certainly the make-up of the American-led bloc must in itself awaken grave apprehensions in the Soviet mind. And when in addition the Truman Administration insists on the provocative rearmament of

Western Germany and Japan, both the Russians and all other peace-loving peoples have a right to be anxious. Let us remember that already coming to the fore in post-war Western Germany and Japan are the same sort of economic and political groupings which so ruthlessly unleashed the Second World War.

The Japanese Peace Treaty, forced upon the world by the United States at San Francisco in September, 1951, summarily violated the 1943 Cairo Agreement, which promised the return of Formosa to China; and also the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which guaranteed that there should be no revival of Japanese militarism. The Treaty provided for continuing American military occupation of Japan and for numerous U.S. bases for land, sea and air forces. With India and Burma refusing to attend the San Francisco conference because of their opposition to the Treaty and with the Chinese Republic deliberately excluded, representatives of two-thirds of the people of Asia took no part in this settlement directly affecting that half of the earth's population living in the Orient.

Closely related to the Truman Administration's collaboration with and support of reactionary

regimes is its reversal of America's traditional attitude of sympathy towards the aspirations of colonial peoples for self-determination and independence. Americans are themselves a proud and freedom-loving people who threw off the yoke of empire through revolution. But today the United States has become the great champion of Western imperialism, resorting to dollar diplomacy, political intimidation and military violence in taking over the suppressive functions of faltering empires.

4

The effects of American foreign policy, then, since Mr. Truman took over the White House, have been such as to cause deepest misgivings throughout the globe. The apparent readiness of leaders in the United States Government to risk blowing civilization to smithereens for the sake of political advantage, the bellicose attitude of many American journalists, radio commentators and other prominent citizens, the stratospheric sums spent on atom bombs and other weapons, the expanding global ring of U.S. air and military

bases, America's alliance with outright fascist or old-fashioned military dictatorships, the rearming of Western Germany and Japan—all these things raise the question whether American policy is not directed towards war rather than peace through preparedness. Even the conservative *London Economist* states: "In large measure the present American program is designed for fighting Russia, not for staying at peace by deterring a Russian aggression." And some of the missteps that Soviet Russia and other members of the Communist bloc have taken in foreign policy are attributable in no small degree to fear of American intentions and a sharp defensive reaction to them.

Most of these deplorable developments flow from a policy that has been worked out and put through as the answer to the danger of "Soviet aggression." Returning to this theme for a moment, let us cite a man who, in the American community, is as respectable as the Washington Monument and who was denouncing the Soviet Union and all its works for years before Harry Truman even became a Senator. I refer to Mr. Herbert Hoover, who, in his speech of January, 1952, noted that Western Europe, in its judg-

ment as to the risk of a Communist invasion, takes a view "profoundly different from the attitude of Washington."

"There is in Europe today," asserted Mr. Hoover, "no such public alarm as has been fanned up in the United States. None of those nations has declared emergencies or taken measures comparable with ours. They do not propagandize war fears or war psychosis such as we get out of Washington. Not one European country conducts such exercises in protection from bombs as we have had in New York." Mr. Hoover then cited eight major reasons why public opinion in Western Europe estimates the "risk of invasion as so much less than does Washington." "I cannot say," he added, "whether these eight assumptions are correct or not. But they do contribute to Western Europe's lack of hysteria and their calculation of low risk and, therefore, their lack of hurry to arm. In any event this whole European situation requires that the United States recalculate our own risks and reconsider the possible alternatives."

I have quoted ex-President Hoover at some length, not only because of the intrinsic soundness of the statements cited, but also in order to show

that conservative defenders of the capitalist system, opponents of socialism and enemies of the Soviet Union are also critical of American foreign policy and agree on important international issues with liberals and radicals. The point is that the U.S. drift toward war and a garrison state is likely to prove catastrophic for the well-being of all Americans, regardless of their political and economic viewpoints.

Another conservative gravely troubled by the international situation is Pope Pius XII. In a Christmas message broadcast to the world on December 23, 1950, the Supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church appealed to Soviet Russia and the Western Powers to enter into direct negotiations before their deepening cleavage degenerated into war. "How earnestly," he pleaded, "the Church desires to smooth the way for these friendly relations between peoples! For her, East and West do not represent opposite ideals, but share a common heritage to which both have generously contributed and to which both are called to contribute in the future also."

Now it is precisely "direct negotiations," especially with the United States, that the Soviet Government has been suggesting over the past few

years and to which the Truman Administration has turned a cold—very cold—shoulder. The U.S. Government argues that diplomatic negotiations for the settlement of the cold war and the easing of American-Soviet tensions should take place within the framework of the United Nations. Yet the United States has itself by-passed the U.N. whenever it seemed convenient, as in the drawing up and effectuation of the Truman Doctrine regarding Greece and Turkey, the institution of the North Atlantic Treaty and the N.A.T.O., and the rearming of Western Germany and Japan.

Certainly the founders of the United Nations never intended that its establishment was to rule out special conversations and confidential negotiations between two or more of its members. Indeed, the first Article in the U.N. Charter's Chapter on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes reads: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, *or*

other peaceful means of their own choice." [Italics mine—C. L.]

The negative American attitude towards Soviet overtures has brought forth from the conservative David Lawrence, writing in the conservative *New York Herald Tribune*, the following comment: "The biggest barrier to world peace today has been erected by persons inside and outside Washington who have closed their minds to any further discussion with the Russians. This school of thought says conferences are no good, that Russians can't be trusted, that sooner or later there will be war and that America must stay on a war footing every day and night, borrow unearned billions from tomorrow's generations and even perhaps fight a 'preventive war,' striking before the enemy can. The exponents of that doctrine have nothing to offer but physical force and threats."

Soviet foreign policy does not and cannot function within a vacuum; to be realistic it must take into consideration the fundamental forces operating in international affairs, including the actions and policies of the United States, world capitalism's acknowledged leader. Hence the Soviet Government shapes and re-shapes its own policies

with the particular attitude of America always in mind. As we have seen, you do not have to be a Soviet diplomat to feel that the effects of current American policy are not conducive to world peace and economic stability. If I am correct in my analysis, then the economic, trade, armament and cold war policies of the Truman Administration, while certainly not helpful to the Soviet-led coalition, will not in the long run be helpful, either, to U.S. capitalism and democracy. And these policies may well prove fatal for Western Europe.

The all-out anti-Soviet atmosphere in the United States so stifles objective thinking that there is a tendency here among many leaders in government, business and public opinion to discard summarily as bad any move that would be good for the Soviet Union or the other Communist countries. Now indubitably international peace, disarmament and a normal exchange of goods on the world market would be beneficial for the Communist nations. But to reject these aims on this account is to negate the processes of reason. For plainly the fulfilment of such goals would also be immensely beneficial to America and the rest of the non-Communist world. *Mu-*

tual self-interest is the key to ending the present American-Soviet impasse.

There is much in Soviet international proposals that is valid not only for the U.S.S.R., but also for the U.S.A. A sound American peace policy is bound to have a number of basic points in common with Soviet policies. During the war against the Axis Soviet Russia and the United States drew up and faithfully carried out many joint military agreements which were to the obvious interest of both countries. In those years high officials in the Roosevelt or Truman Administrations did not turn down suggestions merely because they were initiated or advocated by the Soviets. It is not sensible to do so today.

War and violence have always been the worst ways to deal with problems between countries. There is a far, far better method for the solution of current dilemmas—for nations, for peoples, for governments, for capitalists, for Communists, for conservatives, for radicals, for politicians, for businessmen, for this alliance and that bloc, for East and West. That is the method of reason, understanding, negotiation and compromise. I believe that this method now demands that the American Government give more serious and rea-

sonable consideration to Soviet proposals for disarmament, international control of atomic energy, the re-establishment of East-West trade, the unification of Germany and a Five-Power Peace Pact.

Above all, it is time for Washington to accept the invitation of the Soviet Government to have highest ranking officials from each side sit down and talk things over calmly, with the aim in mind of coming to a general agreement on peaceful co-existence and settling the chief issues in dispute on terms advantageous to both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

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