

**The  
United States  
and  
China:**

**PEACE OR WAR?**

*By* **HERBERT APTHEKER**

**A POLITICAL AFFAIRS PAMPHLET**

## About the Author

This pamphlet is reprinted, with some additions by the author, from the October, 1958 issue of the monthly magazine *Political Affairs*, because of the wide demand for additional copies. Herbert Aptheker, the editor of *Political Affairs*, is the author of many major works including *American Negro Slave Revolts*, *Essays in the History of the American Negro*, *History and Reality*, *The Truth About Hungary*, and *A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States*. He is also the author of scores of pamphlets, the latest of which is *Freedom in History*, issued last month.

Dr. Aptheker served in the Field Artillery for over four years in the Second World War, rising through the ranks from private to major. He was awarded a prize in history from the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History in 1939, and was a Guggenheim Fellow, 1946-47. He is presently director of the Faculty of Social Science, in New York.

# The United States and China: Peace or War?

NEVER BEFORE IN THE history of the United States has its foreign policy provoked such widespread and intense opposition as at the present moment, and particularly as it relates to China. We shall have occasion, further on, to summarize some of the expressions of this world-wide response; at the moment consider the severity of the language occurring in American publications:

*The Christian Century*, a Protestant publication, "abysmal quality of our diplomacy" (Sept. 24, 1958); *The Commonwealth*, a Catholic publication, "confusion, misrepresentation and irresponsibility" (Sept. 19); Roscoe Drummond, a leading Republican columnist, sees the United States placed in "intolerably disadvantageous circumstances," and therefore, the "lonely defender of a very unpopular cause . . . [with] the hostility of the whole uncommitted world" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Sept. 15); Max Lerner, a leading Democratic-Liberal columnist, who apologized for the rape of Guatemala and gloried in the military intervention in Lebanon, gags at this latest exploit in Asia: "the worst place, for the worst cause, with the worst ally . . . forlorn of promise, of hope, of meaning" (*N. Y. Post*, Sept. 5); *The New Republic*: "Disastrous diplomacy . . . impossible situation . . . appalling chasm" (Sept. 22); *The Nation* entitles an editorial on this question: "Deaf, Dumb, Blind" (Sept. 13).

A policy which evokes this kind of language from such varied observers naturally moves them and others to attempt an explanation for its existence. But while the characterizations are apt, the explications fail to satisfy; and without accurate diagnosis, we may be left only with the capacity to label symptoms rather than to effect a cure.

What explanations are being offered? One is to ascribe insanity to the policy's authors. This is done not in the largely figurative sense conveyed in: "Those whom the gods would destroy . . ." etc., but in a more literal sense, reflective of the malady and fate that overtook the first U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Max Lerner, for example, in the aforementioned column, felt able to ascribe the source of the unholy mess only to "insanity"; similarly *The Nation*, in its cited editorial, concludes that "one searches in vain for some rationale"; it can do no better than ascribe "the utter folly of our China policy" to an "obsession" suffered by Mr. Dulles.

Mental illness may indeed often afflict those responsible for pursuing a disaster-ridden policy; but the illnesses of individuals do not create the foreign policies of nations. Here, too, there is inter-relation, and in these days of the possibility of the accidental launching of catastrophic war this is no insignificant point. Yet the fact remains that explaining the sources of United States foreign policy on the basis of the "obsessions" or "compulsions" of individuals is altogether inadequate and misleading.

Vera Micheles Dean, in advocating some time ago a relatively salutary *Foreign Policy Without Fear* (McGraw-Hill, N. Y., 1953), found the operative foreign policy of the United States to be some kind of inexplicable paradox, also stemming from strange, if not psychopathic, obsessions. At one point (pp. 84-85) she commented:

The paradoxical result is that the United States, while leading a crusade for democracy against dictatorship, has come to the conclusion that the maintenance in power of General Franco in Spain or Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, of Emperor Bao Dai in Indo-China or Dr. Syngman Rhee in South Korea, is essential to the security of the United States.

Of course, the tenure of these "necessary" props to U.S. security is somewhat precarious and since Miss Dean wrote the above words, Emperor Bao Dai has faded away; but then one can easily substitute others (in power as these words are written) allegedly essential to American security—like Batista of Cuba and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic—and retain the "paradox." If, however, one rejects the premise that the United States is leading a democratic crusade, then he has eliminated the apparent paradox; and if one replaces Miss Dean's premise with another—that the United States is the leading imperialist power seeking therefore to restrain social progress and curb national liberation—then what appears paradoxical in the admitted facts becomes logical. Is not a purpose of science to place all the observable facts within the framework of causative explanation, rather than inexplicable paradox?

Louis J. Halle, formerly a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and now a professor at the University of Virginia, in declaring faulty "Our China Policy" (*New Republic*, Sept. 15) finds "the mood of the country" to be responsible for it; the country was in "one of those periods of psychological disturbance." The bad policy, having sprung from this somewhat ill-defined source, was then persisted in "simply by force of inertia." Apparently one must wait for a change in mood that presumably must come about as unaccountably as did the original condition, which would then, I suppose, produce a period without psychological disturbance. Then one might hope that the inertia would be overcome—and a wise foreign policy would appear!

Behind Professor Halle's numerous verbal entrenchments, the only really operative cause explaining the admittedly disastrous foreign policy appears to be "public opinion." This comes close to the idea that the trouble with American foreign policy is that it is too democratic, too dependent upon "the man in the street." Others have not left this to be inferred from their writings. Marguerite Higgins, for instance, who has managed to stick with Dulles from brink to brink and still holds on to his coat-tails, is incensed at the widespread popular opposition to the Quemoy-Matsu junket, and wants to know "just when the canonization of the 'man in the street' in the Western democracies occurred"; she thinks, too, that he "was wrong about nearly all the milestones that led to both World War I and World War II" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Sept. 15). It is Miss Higgins who is wrong; the milestones that led to both World Wars, while marched over through blood by the "man in the street," were laid out for him by responsible statesmen, by the elite, for imperial and exploitative considerations. And, of course, any consideration of "public opinion" which ignores the class ownership of the means of communication is superficial and demagogic.

We have spent some time on this idea because it forms an important feature of developing reactionary ideology. Faulty public opinion is blamed for political failures in many recent works—as Raymond Aron's *The Century of Total War*, Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy*, Will Herberg's *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, and Herbert Butterfield's *Christianity and History*. It forms a rationalization for the increasingly arbitrary and secretive manner in which public affairs in general are being administered in our own country; and for the outrageously bureaucratic and altogether unconstitutional manner in which Mr. Dulles has seen fit to conduct the foreign policy of the United States. An element helping to explain the abysmal failure of Dulles diplomacy is, in fact, its complete separation from any kind of democratic control, even the notoriously inadequate provisions for such control provided by our Constitution.

The most extensive attack upon current U.S. foreign policy to come from a significant national political leader, was that offered by the second ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas. It is reproduced, with some revisions, in *The Progressive*, for September, 1958. Senator Fulbright expresses complete disapproval of that policy; hence he calls for a thorough "reconsideration and reorientation." This is all to the good and is an important example of the growing popular revulsion against the Dulles line.

Yet, again, it is necessary to suggest—if we are to achieve that thorough reconsideration and reorientation that Senator Fulbright demands—that the Senator offers no explanation for what he himself calls an "incomprehensible" policy. He says we are too often aligned with reactionary governments abroad, but he does not even ask why; he says the United States spends too lavishly abroad for military purposes and too little for creative purposes, but again he does not ask why. He finds the government of the United States suspected or disliked in Latin America, Asia and Europe (the Senator forgets Africa, not

to speak of Arkansas) because it is the defender of a despised status quo, but why it is, he does not inquire.

The nearest the Senator comes to an explanation is to blame a poorly informed public opinion (again) for failing to exercise sufficient supervision over Congress! And he has one other suggestion as to cause:

If there is a single factor which more than any other explains the predicament in which we now find ourselves, it is our readiness to use the spectre of Soviet communism as a cloak for the failure of our own leadership.

And, he adds: "In the fear of the devilry of communism, we have cast ourselves indiscriminately in the role of the defender of the status quo throughout the world." Extremely important is the Senator's hint (it is no more than that, of course), that the whole anti-Communist ballyhoo has been a racket and a fraud. But again, the failure to ask why, makes exceedingly limited the illuminating quality of the remarks. Actually, it is not because of the fear of Communism that "we" have cast "ourselves" in the role of twentieth-century Metternichs; it is rather because of the Administration's devotion to reaction that its foreign policy has gone from one catastrophe to another. And it is because a reactionary line is catastrophic for our national interests that the Administration, and the whole ruling-class apparatus, has made anti-Communism its trump card. Standing Senator Fulbright's analysis on its head, improves it and brings it very near the real operating cause of why, as he says: "Our foreign policy is inadequate, outmoded, and misdirected."

An attempt at explanation having racist and Malthusian overtones is becoming more and more common, again as a component of developing reactionary ideology. A very recent example was the comment by Philip Wylie in *The Saturday Review* (June 6) that American and European setbacks in Asia and Africa reflected the "Decline of the West," and the impending conquest of the world by its colored inhabitants—forming as they do a majority of the human race. Mr. Wylie's remarks not only reverted to Spengler but to the "rising tide of color" of Lothrop Stoddard and the "Yellow Peril" of William Randolph Hearst.

We are witness in this age to the decline of capitalism, not of the West. It is true that this decline brings with it degenerative phenomena, but just as the decline applies basically to a ruling class, so the degenerative aspects mark in particular that class' ethics, reasoning, and leadership. And we see in our time not the rising tide of color, but the rising dawn of socialism and national liberation. It is true that this dawn carries with it the elimination of the special oppression of people of color; but this means the achievement of human brotherhood.

Such worldwide equality may offend those who have assumed that Washington and London would be the centers of "civilization" and the arbiters of mankind's fate forever; that era is already over as everyone, except the Eisenhower Administration, understands. Its termination will mark the enhancement of the well-being of all mankind, including those who are white.

Ralph Matthews, the militant Negro journalist, falls into an opposite, though related, kind of error in a column in the *Afro-American* (Sept. 20). Denouncing the course of the State Department in its current China provocations, Mr. Matthews ascribes it entirely to the existence of white chauvinism in that Department, and makes the conflict one of white versus colored. It is certainly true that a large ingredient in the arrogance and blindness displayed by the State Department toward China stems from racism; but the arrogance and blindness are forms within which the policy is conducted; they are not the policy itself. Similarly, racism is a result of the system producing that policy; it is not the system itself. Capitalism breeds racism and imperialism intensifies it, and racism displays itself in an arrogance towards the "inferiors"; all these are inter-related. But the root is imperialism, and the stake is continued exploitation and oppression and power.

The distinction is vital, not academic, and it explains facts which the hypothesis of Mr. Matthews will not explain. It explains Dulles' colored "allies" (to the extent that he has any); above all, it explains why a predominantly non-colored state like the Soviet Union stands four-square as the immovable and mighty bulwark of the colonial and national liberation movements; why the white socialist states of central and eastern Europe similarly align themselves; and why radical and progressive whites elsewhere in the world, including in the United States, oppose American imperialism. It is on the basis of this unity that the national liberation movements have achieved the successes they have; the continuance and strengthening of that unity is a prerequisite for the great achievements that the future certainly holds.

### THE EISENHOWER-DULLES LINE

Let us now turn to aspects of the argumentation and justification put forth by the Eisenhower Administration for its Chinese policy.

First of all, the Eisenhower Administration seeks to forget the Chinese civil war; it seeks to transform that civil war into some kind of an international conflict, either by constructing the myth of "Two Chinas," or by the myth of a Formosan nation.\* At the moment it concentrates on the "Two Chinas" idea because this is the commitment of Chiang, because it fosters the "legality" of Chiang's usurping China's seat in the United Nations (and in the Security Council), and of Dulles' refusal to recognize China, and it tends to "justify" Chiang's (read: Dulles') refusal to relinquish the coastal islands. It sticks to this position very stubbornly, too, in the hope that if and when it is forced to move to the other position (as appears increasingly likely) it can pose as having yielded a great point quite sacrificially, and can the better insist upon the permanent severance of Taiwan from the Chinese People's Republic in return for its "sacrifice."

\* It was interesting to see, in connection with this American propaganda effort, that a severe critic of the Administration line, Walter Lippmann, writes of the "Formosa people": "The American national interest in Formosa is not that it should masquerade as China, but that the Formosa people should have autonomy and that in a military sense the island should be strategically neutralized"—*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Sept. 11, 1958.

The fact is that Taiwan is as much a part of China as the Balearic Islands are of Spain, or Sicily is of Italy, or Gotland is of Sweden, or the Isle of Wight is of England, or Staten Island is of the United States. Says the *Columbia Encyclopedia* (2nd edition, 1950): "Formosa, Chinese *Taiwan*, province of China."

The island's settlement by the Chinese goes back to antiquity; its universal acknowledgement as a part of the Chinese nation goes back to the 17th century. Certainly it was seized through war by a rising Japanese imperialism in 1895. But it is relevant to know that the Chinese on Taiwan bitterly and seriously resisted, with arms in hand, the actual taking over of the island, and that from 1895 until the end of World War II, there was never a moment when the Chinese on Taiwan left the Japanese occupiers in doubt as to their desires and their nationality.

Of course the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Treaty (1945) found the Allies pledging the return of Taiwan to China with the defeat of Japan; this pledge was made good, and the return to *China* was acknowledged by Japan in its peace treaty. And the people who now live in Taiwan are in their overwhelming majority Chinese; descendants of the original inhabitants of the island going back to the middle ages constitute a very small fraction of the population, and Japanese, left over from the occupation, also constitute an insignificant fraction. Going back to 1924, the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (14th edition, 1930) reports that of four millions then on Taiwan, the Chinese were "much the most predominant element," with two groups of aborigines totalling 140,000 people and with the Japanese totalling 180,000.

Taiwan is Chinese; it is Chinese legally, historically, ethnically. It belongs to China and until it is in fact returned to the effective and actual Chinese government, that government will not rest, the people on Taiwan will not be satisfied, justice will not have been done, and tranquillity cannot return to Asia.

The point is made that Taiwan in the hands of the actual Chinese government would threaten world peace, for it would serve as a base for "further" advances, just as in the hands of the Japanese it served that function. But, Taiwan was stolen from China as the first step in the expansion of Japanese imperialism; it was used by Japan to expedite the seizure of Korea, which in turn served as the base for the rape of Manchuria, and this served as the base from which to launch full-scale war upon China, and limited war (in the 1930's) against the Soviet Union. And today, the fact is that Taiwan is a major air and naval base for the United States, which simultaneously holds the Ryūku islands as spoils of war, has bases throughout Japan and dominates half of Korea. This is the physical fact, and this is true of the United States which is five thousand miles away from China. For the United States in this condition to charge China with aggression in seeking to regain possession of its own province Taiwan, ninety miles from its coast—remembering the past history of Taiwan—is manifestly absurd. Its very absurdity and the persistence in that absurdity make more suspect a policy dependent upon it.

The islands of Quemoy and Matsu are within the territorial waters of



China; they have been in the possession of the Chinese mainland government throughout the thousands of years of recorded Chinese history. They are held today by the United States Navy and Air Force, in conjunction with troops of the Chiang regime—a regime whose finances, foreign policy, armaments, and physical existence are absolutely and wholly dependent upon the support of the United States government. Those islands are held not because they are vital to the defense of Taiwan—Eisenhower, Chiang and Secretary of Defense Wilson have all testified to the contrary—but because they have made possible the blockading of Amoy and Foochow, the launching of harassing and spying expeditions onto the mainland, and because their possession symbolizes Chiang's announced intention to forcibly return to the Chinese mainland.

For China to remain indifferent to this would be as though the United States paid no attention to the blockading of its Atlantic coast from Norfolk to Philadelphia. For China to remain indifferent to this would be for it to permit the remnants of a reactionary civil war foe to continue physical attacks and avowed preparations for the renewal of full-scale warfare, with no counteraction on its part. Again the absurdity of the U.S. position which denounces the Chinese People's Republic as "aggressors" because it seeks to terminate this impermissible situation is clear to the entire world. It is clear, too, that the Eisenhower-Dulles persistence in this absurd posture in which the partners pretend to abjure violence while pursuing a policy of naked force, hides their own sinister aims, which at its present maximum seeks the destruction of the Chinese People's Republic and the return of China to the plundering, corrupt, sadistic, and utterly reactionary mercies of the Kuomintang, leashed (to use the significantly canine-like language commonly employed in this connection) to the Pentagon, or, as its apparent minimum, the achievement of some kind of Two-China deal.

## TIBET AND KOREA

We wish to deal very briefly with two other components of the Dulles charge of "aggression" against the Chinese People's Republic. These are grouped around the names of Tibet and Korea. Dulles persists in repeating the lie that China forcibly swallowed up an independent country on its western borders named Tibet.

Tibet is and has been for centuries part of the sovereign nation of China. As for the recent period, one need do no more than examine the map of China appearing in the book published by the U.S. State Department itself, in 1949, entitled *United States Relations With China*. There, following page 409, one will clearly see Tibet designated as a constituent part of China. The nation, other than China, having naturally the greatest interest in Tibet is India, for Tibet borders it. India, in recognizing the Chinese People's Republic has acknowledged its sovereignty over Tibet. The Indian Ambassador to China who negotiated the recognition of the New China writes, in his recently published memoirs:

The only area where our interests overlapped was in Tibet, and knowing the importance that every Chinese Government, including the Kuo-mintang, had attached to exclusive Chinese authority over that area I had, even before I started for Peking, come to the conclusion that the British policy (which we were supposed to have inherited) of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interests could not be maintained. (K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, London, 1955, p. 103.)

Mr. Pannikar, one of India's leading historians as well as a distinguished public figure, also refers (p. 113) to the "blood-curdling stories issued from Hong Kong by Taipeh agents" about the alleged Chinese military conquest of "poor little Tibet." It is impossible that Mr. Dulles does not know these facts; his persistence in charging the Chinese People's Republic with "aggression" on the basis of Tibet reflects his notorious disdain for the truth\* while furthering aggressive aims of his own.

Another instance of alleged Chinese aggressiveness often cited by the Eisenhower-Dulles duo is Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The facts here again actually prove the opposite of Dulles' conclusions. Quite regardless of one's views on the origins of the fighting in the Korean civil war,\*\* the fact is that China did not intervene until the UN (*i.e.*, the U.S.) forces, commanded by General MacArthur, crossed the 38th parallel and drove well up towards the Chinese border. This was done despite President Truman's earlier pledge that it would not be done; it was done despite advice against it by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; it was done despite, as Walter Lippmann noted at the time, "the critical importance of Korea in the foreign policy of any Chinese government, no matter what its ideology"; he had added that "in its geography Korea is to China what Florida is to the United States."

The attack north of the 38th parallel was undertaken although the Chinese Premier had told the Indian Ambassador that China would not tolerate having American troops in force so near its own border. He had added that this warning did not apply to South Korean troops since China acknowledged the existence of civil war in Korea, but it did apply to American troops. This was conveyed through diplomatic channels to all the parties involved. Nevertheless MacArthur crossed the parallel; *afterwards*, under U.S. pressure, on October 8, 1950, the UN authorized such crossing. The Indian Ambassador in China wrote that day in his diary:

So, America has knowingly elected for war, with Britain following. It is indeed a tragic decision, for the Americans and the British are well aware that a military settlement of the Korean issue will be re-

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\* For other examples of his "laxity with the truth" see "The Lord and John Foster Dulles," by Charles F. Edmundson, in *The Nation*, Sept. 13, 1958.

\*\* My own views were expressed at length at the time in *Masses and Mainstream*, July, 1950; additional evidence available since then has confirmed, I think, the opinions then expressed.

sisted by the Chinese and that the armies now concentrated on the Yalu border will intervene decisively in the fight. (K. M. Pannikar, cited work, p. 110.)\*

## “APPEASEMENT” AND “MUNICH” AGAIN

The Administration and its supporters insist that to yield on the question of Quemoy and Matsu—not to speak of Taiwan—would repeat the tragic policy of appeasement and would represent the Munich of our time. Since this September is the twentieth anniversary of Munich and since its image is pointed to as the basic justification for the Dulles foreign policy, it will be well to look into this matter.

It may appear remarkable to find the most conservative quarters, as personified by the U.S. Secretary of State, so vehemently opposed to a policy of appeasement and to another Munich, for both were associated originally with arch-reaction. The matter is not remarkable, however; it is altogether logical and proper. For today reactionary elements are raising demagogically the hated symbol of Munich in order, under present conditions, to accomplish what Munich accomplished for them twenty years ago.

Those pursuing an anti-Soviet and anti-progressive line; those fearful of colonial liberation movements; those sympathetic to ultra-reaction and fascism; those who despised socialism and desired the destruction of Communism—they were the appeasers and the Munichers. And they are today the same class (often the same people, notably Mr. Dulles, himself), who, in the name of resisting appeasement, seek the same ends.

Moreover, the essence of Munich was not yielding to the threats of fascist aggressors; the essence of Munich was the policy of *building up and encouraging* the fascist aggressors. The essence of Munich was the effort to use fascism to break the backs of labor and radical movements at home, and as a spearhead for what was hoped would eventually be a worldwide and irresistible military onslaught upon the Soviet Union.

Thus, specifically in terms of the Asian area, consider the fact that while Japan conquered Manchuria and Jehol and moved further into China in the 1930's, the United States was Japan's main foreign source of arms, supplies, and money. Thus, for example, the United States bought 85% of the raw silk exported by Japan in 1935; she bought one-fourth of all Japan's exports in 1936 and sold her one-third of all imports. From 1937 to 1938 the United States sold Japan over \$325,000,000 worth of war materials, including 75% of Japan's gasoline and over 30% of her steel.

Comparable activities were conducted by the United States and France and Great Britain in connection with Italy's rape of Ethiopia, with fascism's inva-

\* Additional evidence of the provocative nature of the crossing of the 38th parallel and refuting the charge of "aggression" against the Chinese in the Korean case will be found in Kenneth Ingram, *History of the Cold War* (N. Y. Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 224; and in U. S. *Foreign Policy, 1945-55*, by W. Reitzel, M. Kaplan, C. Coblentz (Brookings Institution, Washington, 1956), pp. 272-73.

sion of Spain, with Hitler's advances into Austria and Czechoslovakia. *Munich was the climax of a whole program of encouraging reaction and fascism, not of grudgingly yielding to it.* And it was a climax which had the inevitable conclusion of world war—as the Soviet Union and the forces of the Left throughout the world had warned without letup for a decade.

John Foster Dulles as attorney for the international cartels responsible for this policy, was then a leading apologist for it, just as today, holding the same class position, he functions as the leading executor of an analogous policy. No book is more relevant to a comprehension of the present and especially the Dulles foreign policy than his own work, *War, Peace and Change*, published by Harpers in 1939. Its whole argument is an apologia for the expansionism of Japan, Italy and Germany. Indeed, this was so marked, that Dulles himself wrote in the foreword: "The reasoning of this study may be repellent to some, as suggesting a defense of those powers which are in rebellion against the present scheme of things."

In this work, the words fascism, imperialism, nazism, socialism, the Soviet Union are not present; but it is an elaborate defense of the policy of appeasement and of Munich itself (indeed, the preface is dated November, 1938, *i.e.*, two months after Munich).

John Foster Dulles was personally a major architect of the Munich policy; his current cries of alarm lest we repeat the tragedy of Munich, are acts of demagoguery and deceitfulness in pursuit now, as then, of a policy dedicated to the destruction of the Soviet Union and of socialism, the thwarting of all national liberation efforts and the imposition on mankind of a fascistic inferno.

## THE THREAT OF ATOMIC WAR

The seriousness of the danger of war between the United States and China with all the implications that holds for further expansion of the conflict is admitted by everyone. None denies that this is the closest we have yet come to going over one of Mr. Dulles' brinks.

In this mid-twentieth century, with what full-scale war means to all humanity, such dangers are simply impermissible. It is imperative to understand that the United States Government moves more and more certainly not only in the direction of war-making, but also in the direction of committing itself to the employment of atomic weapons in war.

Since 1954, the United States has adopted the position of considering so-called tactical atomic weapons as being in the "conventional" arms category. In the past several years it has moved—together with Great Britain—in the direction of revamping its military tactics and strategy, and therefore its tables of equipment and organization, in the direction of atomic warfare. Once the huge military machine is committed, it develops a power and an inertia to change that are vast. The fact is that the reorganization of the American armed forces from the high-explosive base of World War II to the atomic and nuclear energy base for its projected World War III is so well advanced that it now plays a significant part in predisposing the Government towards atomic warfare

and opposing a ban on atomic-weapon development, let alone atomic-weapon disarmament.

On March 27, 1955, James Reston wrote from Washington, in the *N. Y. Times* (remember, this is 1955):

The situation is disturbing in the extreme. The U.S. is isolated from its Western Allies over Quemoy and Matsu. It is risking war for islands that are not vital to its own security or even—if we are to take the word of Secretary of Defense Wilson—to the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

*Moreover, officials in Washington are now talking about tactical weapons as if they were instruments of mercy that could knock out military targets more neatly and quickly than 'conventional' weapons.*

Ever since then a campaign has been conducted to accustom the American public to expect the use of atomic weapons by its forces in any serious fighting. That is why one now finds the military expert for the *N. Y. Times*, Hanson Baldwin, writing (Sept. 7): "Attacks against Chinese mainland airfields—if made—might well have to be made with nuclear weapons." Mr. Baldwin explains that this "necessity" follows from the fact that such weapons would require only seven flights, rather than the seven thousand needed if old-fashioned high-explosive bombs are used. And Joseph Alsop, writing from Washington, (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Sept. 10), reports: "The highest Pentagon authorities in fact maintain that the U.S. armed services will be almost compelled to use tactical nuclear weapons." Two days later, the same person, writing from Taiwan, declared:

No one should forget for an instant that the American armed services intended to use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy and Matsu. That is the present intention . . . certain key figures in the armed services . . . are not averse to having a nuclear showdown now.

A correspondent for the *U. S. News & World Report* (Sept. 26) writes from Taiwan that in various places on the island, "spotted at strategically located sites" are guided missiles, "their noses aimed at predetermined targets on the mainland." He adds: "Atomic warheads probably are here." The Seventh Fleet, patrolling the waters of Taiwan, and moving to within five or six miles of the Chinese mainland, has six aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, thirty-six destroyers, twenty service ships and four submarines—several of these vessels are equipped for nuclear warfare. This fleet is manned by 60,000 men and carries 500 planes. All this is in addition to the enormous buildup of airpower in the Pacific (especially South Korea and the Philippines) and about 2,000 U.S. troops now on Taiwan as instructors of the 500,000 combat-ready men under Chiang.

Most recently: "U.S. Air Secretary James H. Douglas said at Dallas the U.S. forces were in a state of readiness to use nuclear weapons in the China crisis" (*N. Y. Times*, Sept. 28). And Madame Chiang, visiting our country, openly

advocated, via radio and television, the use of nuclear weapons upon China, "to get the war over with quicker."

The American public has been reassured many times that the decision to use atomic weapons could come only from the President. While this assurance is far from satisfactory, it has indicated some sense of responsibility about this most grave question. Lately, however, there has been a tendency to remain silent on this matter, and the only recent reference to it that I have seen tends to throw serious doubt as to the validity of the assurance any longer. Thus, in the President's news conference of August 27, 1958, the President was again asked: "If the U.S. does get involved in war, will military commanders at the front make the decision whether or not to use tactical atomic weapons?"

First, the President replied: "I think not." He then amended that to indicate that there was no doubt and that the use of such weapons did require "the specific authority of the President." When, however, he was pressed further, as to whether "in the case of an immediate threat to American troops," such weapons could not be employed "at the discretion of the local commander," the President then replied:

It has been a long time that I have gone through these, all these directives, and many of them go into tremendous detail.

I am not going any further than that, and, if it is possible, I will take a look again, because there is one exception, but I don't believe it mentions atomic weapons: that, if the United States itself or any of its armed forces are under attack, that they can use any measures necessary for their defense, but I would have to make certain. My memory is not quite that good this morning.

If the President did refresh his memory on this "detail", and if so, what he found, has not been announced, so far as I know. But from what the President did say, there appears now to be the gravest doubt as to whether or not atomic weapons may be used at the discretion of local commanders, or—as the American people had been repeatedly assured—only at the discretion of and with the authority of the President.

There was another significant statement made by the President at this press conference. The President was asked if it was expected or if it was policy for the United States not to open attack, not to deliver the first blow, and specifically the first nuclear blow. The President replied: "Now, *I don't see any reason, therefore, for saying we necessarily have to take the first blow. . . .*"

Given the catastrophic quality of nuclear weapons, and the fact that only the United States has used atomic weapons in warfare, thus slaughtering scores of thousands of civilians, it is likely that neither of these statements by the President won us many friends abroad.

#### DULLES' TREATY WITH CHIANG

The Secretary of State, in his best church-going manner, cites the "solemn obligation" imposed upon the "honor" of the United States to support Chiang

Kai-shek because of treaty commitments, notably the alliance of 1955, and the consequent Senate Resolution authorizing the President to use American military force to protect Chiang's hold on Taiwan and the Pescadores. He appears horrified if one suggests that the existence of the treaty and the Resolution do not put at rest all arguments opposed to his China policy.

We would first remind Mr. Dulles that in his 1939 book, already mentioned, he devoted several pages to explaining to his readers why treaties were not sacred, and were subject to change or even to repudiation. And he concluded his discussion, then, with these words:

There are doubtless many treaties which under any international system would be accorded the sanction of authority. There are others which would not. In the absence of any central authority to pass judgment, one cannot consider treaties, as such, to be sacred, nor can we identify treaty observance, in the abstract, with 'law and order.' (p. 47)

Of course, here Mr. Dulles' purpose was to apologize for the violations and repudiations of treaties which regularly marked the conduct of the fascist powers; then, in those circumstances, he found treaties far from sacred. Now, having signed a treaty of mutual military assistance with a bankrupt and repudiated counter-revolutionary—whom he owns body and soul—whose whole purpose in life is to destroy the Chinese People's Republic and who knows he cannot even attempt that seriously without the large-scale involvement of the United States in an attack upon China—now, under these circumstances and with these commitments, Dulles assures the American people of the sacredness and inviolability of treaties, and that treaty in particular.

Dulles' treaty with Chiang has no more moral and legal force than did the treaties Hitler made with the "Protector" of Moravia and Bohemia. Moreover, concerning that treaty, and particularly its invocation to justify the Quemoy-Matsu line, there is more than the suspicion of fraud and deception. Senator Wayne Morse (D., Oregon), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, writing in *The Nation* (Sept. 20, 1958), in an article entitled, "How Dulles Tricked Congress," proves that the treaty ratification and the Senate Resolution of 1955, resulted in large part from "the deception and intellectual dishonesty of Dulles toward Congress and the American people." He proves that it was thoroughly understood at the time that the commitment specifically did not include the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and that any effort to include those islands would require a formal amendment of both the treaty and the Resolution. He proves, further, that it was understood, and stated in writing as part of the Resolution and treaty, that any major movement of troops by Chiang out of the immediate Taiwan vicinity would only be undertaken with the express knowledge and approval of the U.S. authorities. Yet, as Senator Morse writes, though one-third of Chiang's forces were moved almost ninety miles from Taiwan to Quemoy and Matsu, "neither the Senate Foreign Relations Committee nor the Senate Armed Services Committee has ever been officially apprised of the move, either before or afterward." These facts lead the

Senator to conclude, in measured words, which, from such a source, have very few precedents in American history:

As Dulles proudly treads the brink of war, he also treads the brink of unconstitutionality, for his commitment to Quemoy in the Far East, as in Lebanon, is his own and not that of Congress.

Nor is that all: When Dulles was questioned about the movement of 90,000 Chiang troops to Quemoy, he replied that it was done with neither the approval nor the disapproval of the United States, falling back upon his transparent myth of Chiang as an independent and fully sovereign "power." The first point to note is that the treaty with Chiang and the Senate Resolution specifically required prior approval for any such major military move of the "independent" ally; and the second point to note is that, in this instance specifically, once again, Dulles is not telling the truth. This follows from the fact that Chiang does not have the capacity to move 900 men, let alone 90,000, without the financial and logistical support of the U.S. Furthermore, Joseph Alsop, an ultra-reactionary columnist fittingly sympathetic with Dulles, wrote (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Sept. 7):

Even after the famous 'unleashing' [in 1953], Chiang himself saw that his regular troops and his political prestige ought not to be committed on the offshore islands, which he was then treating as entirely expendable. *He made the commitment on the islands under severe American pressure, which was applied to give substance to the unleashing.*

The Dulles-Chiang treaty is a moral monstrosity and a legal fraud and needs to be discarded together with its author; the Senate Resolution was obtained through deception and has been stretched to cover measures either never envisioned or specifically barred by that Resolution itself.

#### DULLES' ALLY AND THE NEW CHINA

To what has Dulles committed the United States, in the name of protecting freedom? And against what nation has Dulles joined in a war-making pact?

A decade ago, American Ambassador Stuart writing to President Truman characterized the Chiang government as "an unpopular regime which does not have the interests of the country at heart." This was the reason for revolution and this was the reason for the success of the Communists in China, despite the tremendous aid given to Chiang by the United States. The evidence documenting this is overwhelming; its truth is admitted today by everyone except Dulles and Chiang. We will offer one very recent reiteration of this truth. Our source is Y. Chu Wang, professor of Far Eastern History at Pennsylvania State Teachers College. Professor Wang wrote in *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1958):

When V-J Day came, all the evil symptoms [of the Chiang govern-



ment] reappeared with double vigor. Corruption in the government reached an all-time high. . . . When the regime was faced by a large peasant army, led by the Communists, with nothing to lose but a world to gain, it crumbled like a house of cards.

And what are the facts in Taiwan itself? The censorship there is exceedingly tight and very little gets through. Yet some things are available. Thus, the State Department itself, in its previously cited volume, *United States Relations with China*, wrote as follows (p. 308):

During the Japanese occupation the principal hope of the people had been reunion with the mainland. Instead of utilizing this highly favorable situation to its own advantage the Nationalist Government appointed to the governorship General Chen Yi, a long-time associate of the Generalissimo. . . . The new Governor arrived with an imposing retinue who proceeded with great efficiency to exploit Formosa. In addition the local population was ruthlessly excluded from any important role in public life and was made to feel that it was again under the rule of a conqueror.

The economic deterioration of the island and the administration of the mainland officials became so bad that on February 28, 1947, popular resentment erupted into a major rebellion. In the ensuing days the Government put down the revolt in a series of military actions which cost thousands of lives. Order was restored but the hatred of the mainland Chinese was increased.

Seven months after the repression of this uprising, General Wedemeyer, on an official mission to China, reported to the President, August 17, 1947, that in Taiwan the Nationalists were behaving "ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously" and that its Army "conducted themselves as conquerors."

Somewhat later a civilian governor replaced the military, and for a year and a half, American officials reported some improvement in government, and stated: "Although it cannot be said that economic conditions improved, it can be said that the situation did not become measurably worse." But in January, 1949, the civilian governor was removed and replaced by General Chen Cheng, "who proceeded to restore military rule." Thereafter conditions deteriorated; "in summary," said the State Department late in 1949, "the island is badly and inefficiently run." This General Chen Cheng is today Prime Minister of Chiang's "government." Intermittent outbreaks have since occurred; Chiang's regime on Taiwan is comparable to Batista's in Cuba. Among the more delightful efforts of the free and democratic American press to demonstrate the amenities of life under Chiang, there was this paragraph in the *Saturday Evening Post*, Sept. 6, 1958:

There is little sign of dry rot or deteriorating morale among the tough soldiers. . . . There is a permanent 'Paradise House' run, curiously, by the Officers Moral Endeavor Assn., where officers and men alike find surcease from their loneliness. The establishment is supervised by a medical staff,

the girls are under contract to the government at the equivalent of 50 American dollars a month, and an atmosphere of strict propriety prevails.

But the New China—the China that threatens “us,” and against which “we” are ready to hurl nuclear weapons—has other kinds of Moral Endeavor, which trouble the pious Mr. Dulles. Its enormous achievements are astounding the world; they are a magnificent tribute to the creative capacities of the masses, and a thrilling confirmation of the liberating potential of Marxism-Leninism.

Professor L. C. Walmsley of Canada, for 27 years a missionary in the old China, returned to the new China for several weeks late in 1957. Remembering the poverty, filth, oppression of the old, he found the New “amazing” and almost incredible. He found a new pride, a new dignity; he found the working man and—what is more—the working woman, emancipated and working enthusiastically for themselves, collectively. He concludes: “I can be glad for the measure of progress they have made, and I rejoice to see hope replacing despair, and pride in achievement replacing fatalistic apathy.” (*The United Church Observer*, Toronto, March 15, 1958) That is Dulles’ enemy, whom he would treat to nuclear bombs.

The President of the Royal Bank of Canada, James Muir, visited the new China in the spring of 1958. He reports:

The growth in industry, the change in living standards, the modernization of everything and anything, the feats of human effort and the colossal impact of human labor are not within our power to describe and still give a worthwhile picture of the scene. All I can say is that it must be seen to be believed. It’s truly stupendous. . . . We think the vast majority of the people of China have a government they want, a government which is improving their lot, a government in which they have confidence, a government which stands no chance whatever of being supplanted. (*National Guardian*, Sept. 15, reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, July 15, 1958)

That is Dulles’ enemy.

A former official of the old Chinese government, who resigned after the Communist victory and now lives in San Francisco, Ping-Chia Kuo, in his book, *China: New Age and New Outlook* (Knopf, N. Y., 1956), commends the “remarkable progress” made by the New China. He says it is necessary “to recognize first of all that the new China led by the Communist government in Peking is here to stay”; that it has unified China as never before in her history; that “it has aroused new hope in the Chinese people”; and that it “represents an irresistible force, which cannot be stopped or checked.” Wherefore, says this non-Communist Chinese: “It is the responsibility of the statesmen of all nations to devise means within the given circumstances to find a way of living together, of minimizing the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace.”

That is Dulles’ enemy.

The opposition to the Asian policy of the United States as expressed in Dulles' antics is well-nigh unanimous. George Herald, surveying the European press "from Oslo to Rome and from London to Vienna" found "a rare unanimity" on several major points in direct conflict with the Dulles policy (*N. Y. Post*, Sept. 11). Drew Middleton, the *New York Times* correspondent in London, reported (Sept. 14) the most widespread hostility to Dulles' policy throughout Great Britain, and stated that similar findings had been reported by the same paper's correspondents in Paris, Bonn and Rome.

Eisenhower and Dulles have made much of their so-called "dominoes" theory, in which they put forth the idea that "giving up" Quemoy and Matsu would lead to the collapse of all the "free" or non-committed nations in Asia—such as Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, etc. This concept—first put forward, by the way, to buttress support of France's "dirty war" in Vietnam—is faulty not only because it is applied to nations and peoples who are not quite the same as dominoes; it is also faulty on its face because public opinion within the very countries Dulles seeks to "protect" is opposed to his protection.

The Dulles line is rejected in Australia and New Zealand. It is anathema in Malaya—the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Malaya said that the "dominoes" concept "has been received here with a mixture of amazement, hilarity and anger" (Sept. 15). The Prime Minister of Thailand has announced his country's "non-intervention" beforehand in any war Mr. Dulles may precipitate; Defense Minister Vargas of the Philippines also questioned Mr. Dulles' wisdom in connection with Quemoy and Matsu; and even the Deputy Secretary General, William Worth, of Dulles' own concoction, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) made a point of declaring that the commitment of that organization did not cover the Taiwan Strait nor the coast of China. In the UN itself the governments of Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia opposed Dulles, and a leading newspaper in Pakistan (a member of Dulles' Baghdad Pact), the *Karachi Times* (Aug. 30, 1958), found Dulles' "maneuvers highly provocative" and said that "U.S. armed intervention in the area would constitute an act of aggressive war." So even among the "dominoes," it appears that Dulles has only two certain pieces—Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek.

As for the hostility of public opinion in Latin America on this matter, nothing need be said; the same holds for the people (and the independent governments) of Africa; it applies to the Mid-East; and it has been vigorously expressed by the Government and the peoples of India.

That the peoples of the socialist world, and in the first place of the Soviet Union, stand foursquare with the Chinese people and nation is crystal-clear. The partisanship of the USSR is unequivocal, and history shows that its commitments in such matters are not to be taken lightly. The Premier of the USSR wrote President Eisenhower:

I have already told you, and I believe it necessary to re-emphasize it,

that an attack on the People's Republic of China is an attack on the Soviet Union. With People's China, our great friend, ally and neighbor, we have a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, meeting the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples and the interests of peace. Let no one have any doubts about it; we shall fully perform all the assumed obligations.

The evidence leads to this conclusion: if it is the duty of the Secretary of State to achieve the utter isolation of the United States, in the face of serious international difficulties, then John Foster Dulles has performed so admirably that he is, as President Eisenhower insists, the greatest Secretary of State in American history.

### AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

As we have commented in *Political Affairs* for months, there is a rising uneasiness among the American people with the Dulles foreign policy. This has reached a crescendo during August and September; it pervades the land. The myth of bipartisanship on foreign policy has been smashed (in part due to Dulles' terrible arrogance) and Senators Fulbright, Cooper, Green, Morse, Mansfield, Kennedy, Humphrey, and Kefauver have spoken out, with varied vigor, against the Dulles line. The denunciations of the policy coming from Mrs. Roosevelt, former Secretary of State Acheson and former Senator Lehman are well known. An increasing section of the press, including the Republican press, is casting critical glances at the current foreign policy. The public, in the form of letters to the newspapers, to Congressmen and to the State Department, have been overwhelmingly—about 8 to 1—in opposition to the Asian adventures. Some old-line Republican figures, like Henry B. Cabot of Massachusetts and Hamilton Fish of New York, have spoken out in a similar sense.

Dana Adams Schmidt, writing from Washington in the *N. Y. Times* (Sept. 14), stated: "The only force likely to deflect the Administration from its course would be mushrooming domestic political opposition." I believe the other forces indicated above have also played a part in this deflection; but certainly a basic force is American public opinion and it has been speaking out in unprecedented numbers and vigor. No doubt it has helped to deflect the Administration from actually launching a full-scale "hot" war, at least to the moment of writing. Its continuance and acceleration will guarantee the permanent "deflection" of that Administration.

### THE REALITY OF THE WAR DANGER

Dulles has led the country to so many brinks, that a mood is developing to the effect that it is all a game and that neither he nor anyone else really intends to produce war. People are becoming bored with the cries of "wolf"; but real wolves do exist. Added to this is the feeling that nuclear weapons have made war so catastrophic that it is inconceivable that any leaders would permit

a major conflict in which such weapons probably would be used, to ever break out.

Such feelings and moods are not in accord with reality and are most dangerous. They can contribute to a lessening of vigilance in opposition to war, and by that to the unleashing of the dogs of war. The Chiang lobby is powerful, and there are extreme Right-wing elements here and elsewhere quite capable of launching nuclear war.

One has from Mr. Dulles himself a statement like this:

I think we would win a hot war, and I do not know if we will win this 'cold war' or not. It depends on whether we have an adequate program. . . . But as far as the defense of the principles and ideals for which this country has stood from the beginning and to which it is dedicated, those are, I think, in greater jeopardy from a cold war than from a hot war. (*N. Y. Times*, June 27, 1958).

No, peace will not come of itself and it will not come because of the horrors of implements of war; it will come in our time only because the will for peace among the masses of mankind is made sufficiently articulate and organized so that it can muzzle imperialism's organic war-making drive.

## CONCLUSION

We began our commentary by pointing to inadequacies in analyses of causation among those critical of the Administration's brink-of-war policy. We wish to conclude by underlining another, and a related, failing among these critics. True, from all of them, Walter Lippmann, Dean Acheson, Herbert Lehman, *The Nation*, etc., has come the proposal that the off-shore islands be relinquished, and that China be recognized and seated in the United Nations. These proposals are necessary ones and that they are brought forward is as welcome as is the criticism of policy which accompanies them.

However, in every case, it is simultaneously advocated that Taiwan be torn from the Chinese People's Republic, and either be "neutralized" in some way, or else established as some sort of "independent" nation, under UN auspices. *The Nation*, for example, urges (Sept. 20) that "The way out is to hark back to the declaration embodied in President Truman's executive order of June 27, 1950, when the 7th Fleet was 'interposed' between Formosa and the mainland." Or, Lewis Mumford wants "to establish Formosa as a self-governing nation" (*N. Y. Times*, Sept. 28, 1958).

But the fact is that the tearing of Taiwan from China and its so-called "neutralization" in an ocean dominated by the U.S. 7th Fleet is precisely the basic line of the United States Government, both under Truman (after June, 1950) and under Eisenhower.

One wonders why *The Nation* wants to go back only to June, 1950. Why not go back to January 5, 1950, when President Truman declared that the United States accepted the fact of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, that the

United States had no designs on that island, that it would not give military aid or advice to Chiang on the island, and that it would follow a policy of strict non-involvement in the Chinese civil war. Or why not go back to President Truman's statement of December 15, 1945:

The U.S. government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of sovereign nations. . . . U.S. support will not be extended to U.S. military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife. . . . The U.S. government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate.

Taiwan is Chinese. There would be more reason to neutralize and internationalize Hawaii than there is to so deal with Taiwan. At least Hawaii—not appropriated until 1898—is over 1500 miles from California. Or perhaps, one should internationalize Newfoundland, only recently a province of Canada, and as far from the coast of Canada as Taiwan is from China.

Furthermore, the history of the imperialist rape of China has been a history of the carving up of that nation, with pieces taken by Japan and Czarist Russia and England and France, etc. The New China is the most stable and most firm central government in Chinese history; a fundamental drive of the Chinese Revolution has been a national one, one seeking the attainment of the full integrity and sovereignty of China over all China. Hence the Chinese People's Government could never agree to the permanent relinquishment of Taiwan, a province of China with ten million people.

Therefore, any solution of the Asian crisis which consists of tearing away part of the flesh of China is no solution. It cannot last: it can only be a source of international friction and a potential war danger. The Chinese people must settle their own problems in their own way and they must conclude their civil war without any interference from any Power, let alone one that is five thousand miles away from its borders.

In the name of the real national interests of the United States, in the name of its own good-fame, and in the name of the securing of peace in the world, it is necessary that:

*The United States recognize the Chinese People's Republic*

*The Chinese People's Republic be seated in the United Nations and on the Security Council of that body*

*There be no outside interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese nation, including its civil war*

*The United States withdraw its land, sea, and air forces from the territory of China*

We need a policy of friendship with the 650,000,000 Chinese people, not one of hostility, which in turn isolates us from world public opinion. Such friendship would serve the best interests of our country and would enhance the welfare of the peoples of the world.

## Postscript

Since writing the above, certain additional information has become available throwing light on Dulles' allegations that the reinforcements sent to Quemoy went without his approval. A *New York Times* reporter, Greg MacGregor, interviewed General Bork, Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Group in Taiwan, on October 8. General Bork was quoted as stating that the troops then on Quemoy needed an average of 307 tons of supplies a day, an estimate which included sufficient ammunition for counter-battery fire. In addition, said the General, the civilians there required 13 tons a day, *i.e.*, a total for the island, as of October, 1958, of 320 tons of supplies per day. But, wrote MacGregor:

*The general disclosed that a daily average of 697 tons of supplies had been poured into the island from Taiwan for nearly two years before the Communists started their heavy artillery attacks last August 23.*

That is to say, the United States was pouring into Quemoy, for almost two years prior to August, 1958, over two times more supplies a day than the garrison and the civilians there needed for purposes of existence and defense. Can there be any explanation for this other than that of meeting the avowed ends of Dulles' ally, Chiang—namely the mounting of a major assault upon the Chinese mainland?

## Appendix

Reference has been made above to the benefits our country stands to gain by pursuing a policy of friendship with the 650,000,000 people of China. Translating those benefits just in terms of the possibilities of trade, with all that an increase in trade means in combatting economic recession and unemployment, it may be of some interest to offer the reader latest figures on this question.

The foreign trade of the Chinese People's Republic in 1957 amounted to about 4.2 billion dollars; in 1958 it is estimated that the total will amount to about 4.8 billions. Of this, today fully one-quarter consists of trade carried on by China with capitalist countries. Furthermore, not only has the overall trade of China been rising, but the trade of China with capitalist countries also has been rising. It is officially estimated that the value of the Chinese trade with Western Europe alone, in 1958, will amount to at least five hundred million dollars. One final fact: the exports of Great Britain to China in the first half of 1958 were 60% greater than they had been in the first six months of 1957. Is it not in the interest of the economy of our country, and in the interest of our working class—still with some 5 millions out of work altogether—to participate actively in this enormous and growing market in China?

## DAMNED . . . AND BANNED . . . BUT GROWING! WHY?

Marxism has been damned incessantly and banned repeatedly—but *it has not been refuted*. Eighty years ago the butcher of the Paris Commune announced: "*Now we are finished with Communism!*" He was wrong. Twenty-five years ago, Hitler, taking power, shouted: "*We have destroyed Communism; we shall rule for a thousand years!*" In his first assertion, Hitler, too, was wrong; in his second assertion, he missed by 988 years.

While all this has been going on, disillusionment with and renegacy from Marxism have also proceeded. The disillusionment and the renegacy were always proclaimed as decisive evidences of the obsolescence or fallacy of Marxism. Yet, somehow, Marxism persists; and today has more numerous adherents than any other philosophy in the world.

In the United States there is one monthly magazine which is a partisan of that philosophy, which seeks, with the light it affords, to illuminate the domestic and the world-wide scenes. That magazine is *Political Affairs*; there, and only there in the United States, will one find the viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism conveyed every month. There, and only there, each month, will the reader be able to find what the Communists think—not what George Sokolsky or Walter Lippmann or Max Lerner say the Communists think, but what they think in fact and as expressed by themselves.

We believe these thoughts are more profound, more revealing, and more truthful than any others. Be that as it may, they are significant and must be weighed by any person who wants to understand the world in which he lives. To get those thoughts first-hand, quickly and regularly, you must read *Political Affairs*.

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