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THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM

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Date Issued:
2014
Abstract/Description:
Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
Title: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM.
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Name(s): Gonzalez, Ariel, Author
Rodgers, Travis, Committee Chair
University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor
Type of Resource: text
Date Issued: 2014
Publisher: University of Central Florida
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
Identifier: CFH0004628 (IID), ucf:45292 (fedora)
Note(s): 2014-05-01
B.A.
Arts and Humanities, Dept. of Philosophy
Bachelors
This record was generated from author submitted information.
Subject(s): Philosophy
analytic philosophy
metaphysics
free will
consciousness
Leibniz
freedom of the will
freedom of choice
free action
physicalism
anthropological physicalism
naturalist
naturalism
naturalistic
agency
free agency
materialist
materialism
Timothy O'Connor
John Searle
Libertarian
Agent
Agent-Causal
Agent-Cause
Libertarian free will
Event-Cause
Event-Causal
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophical
Emergence
Emergent
Properties
Substance
Substances
Structural
Structural Properties
Creatio
Creatio ex Nihilo
Nihilo
Panpsychism
Protopanpsychism
Chalmers
Nagasawa
Disposition
Powers
Power
Explanatory
Explanation
Reasons
Reason
Alternative Possibilities
Alternate Possibilities
Sourcehood
Moral Responsibility
Responsible
Compatibilism
Determinist
Determinism
Deterministic
Indeterminist
Indeterminism
Indeterministic
Moral Agency
Moral
Control
Intention
Reasoning
Categorical Ability
Hypothetical Ability
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFH0004628
Restrictions on Access: campus 2015-04-01
Host Institution: UCF

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