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THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM
| Title: | THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM. |
 30 views 16 downloads |
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| Name(s): |
Gonzalez, Ariel, Author Rodgers, Travis, Committee Chair University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor |
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| Type of Resource: | text | |
| Date Issued: | 2014 | |
| Publisher: | University of Central Florida | |
| Language(s): | English | |
| Abstract/Description: | Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian. | |
| Identifier: | CFH0004628 (IID), ucf:45292 (fedora) | |
| Note(s): |
2014-05-01 B.A. Arts and Humanities, Dept. of Philosophy Bachelors This record was generated from author submitted information. |
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| Subject(s): |
Philosophy analytic philosophy metaphysics free will consciousness Leibniz freedom of the will freedom of choice free action physicalism anthropological physicalism naturalist naturalism naturalistic agency free agency materialist materialism Timothy O'Connor John Searle Libertarian Agent Agent-Causal Agent-Cause Libertarian free will Event-Cause Event-Causal Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion Philosophical Emergence Emergent Properties Substance Substances Structural Structural Properties Creatio Creatio ex Nihilo Nihilo Panpsychism Protopanpsychism Chalmers Nagasawa Disposition Powers Power Explanatory Explanation Reasons Reason Alternative Possibilities Alternate Possibilities Sourcehood Moral Responsibility Responsible Compatibilism Determinist Determinism Deterministic Indeterminist Indeterminism Indeterministic Moral Agency Moral Control Intention Reasoning Categorical Ability Hypothetical Ability |
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| Persistent Link to This Record: | http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFH0004628 | |
| Restrictions on Access: | campus 2015-04-01 | |
| Host Institution: | UCF |
