

# The Transformation and Demise of Terrorist Organizations: Causes and Categories

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THE TRANSFORMATION AND DEMISE OF TERRORIST  
ORGANIZATIONS: CAUSES AND CATEGORIES

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program  
in International and Global Studies in the College of Sciences and in The Burnett Honors  
College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida

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## **ABSTRACT**

In the recent years, the world has experienced devastating losses due to terrorist attacks. Research in the fields of causes of terrorism is abundant, but the amount of research on the end of terrorism does not equally measure up. This paper aims to add to the research focused on analyzing the causes and factors which cause terrorist groups to transition away from violence.

This paper introduces an original categorization of the factors which generate this transition. Factors belong to two categories: internal --decisions made by the terrorist organization, and external--actions or features pertaining to organization outside of non-terrorist organizations. These factors will be illustrated through examples of terrorist organizations and their activity. The purpose of this paper is to provide an original, comparative overview of those factors that may best illustrate the study of counterterrorism.

## **DEDICATION**

For those who have suffered through the violent hands of terrorism.

For my professors, who have shared their wisdom and generated my thirst for knowledge.

For my family and friends, thank you for patiently taking care of me through this process.

And my sidekick/sister, Maahi Mehta, for always cheering me up and loving me unconditionally.

And especially for my parents, Jyoti Mehta and Millind Mehta, who have given me the world

and more, and been there for me every single step to offer love, support, and a boost of confidence whenever I'm down. You have made me the student, the woman, and the person I am today, I'm proud to call myself your daughter.

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## INTRODUCTION

Since the 9/11 attacks, the world of security studies has been focused on studying why and how terrorist organizations emerge and operate. Most existing research on terrorist groups has been focused on the terrorist groups' origin, but not on their transitions away from violence.

The aim of this paper is to explore under which circumstances terrorist groups or organizations abandon violence, dismantle, or transform into mainstream organizations. These are instances when groups abandon their past, fringe behavior. Most of the times, this also means abandoning violence and accepting negotiation and compromise as the main way to reach the group's goals, or giving up those goals altogether. Describing the circumstances of such transitions will in part also reveal what some likely solutions to terrorism may be.

A comparative analysis will contrast the transformation of different terrorist groups taking in account the factors which make this transformation most likely. This paper acknowledges that there are many different political and strategic instruments that determine the transformation or termination of a terrorist organization. In spite of possible multiple causality, often times, case studies in the literature identify one major factor that likely contributed the most to such transformations. Six such factors, which are prevalent in the "end of terrorism" literature, will be organized in two original categories and will be the focus of this study. After defining and describing factors and categories, the paper proceeds to illustrate each factor with a discussion of examples drawn from various historical time frames and geographical contexts. A comparative overview and analysis of the examples will provide the reader with an original typology and categorization of examples in the "end of terrorism" literature. These factors will

be presented in a systematic way and illustrated through concrete examples, thus making an original contribution to the “end of terrorism” literature.

## **DEFINITIONS, CATEGORIES, AND FACTORS**

This paper takes into consideration the difficulty of adopting a definition for terrorism which is globally accepted. Because there is no common definition for terrorism this paper will be adopting a definition from the research of Seth Jones and Martin Libicki in *How Terrorist Groups End* (2008). “Terrorism involves the use of politically motivated violence against noncombatants to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience” (pg. 3) by non-state actors.

A terrorist group or organization will be defined in this paper as an assembly of individuals who operate outside the state entity and use terrorism to achieve their objectives. Due to the collective ideology and agenda of the group, the organizational cluster of terrorists are controlled to follow a strategic direction (Jones and Libicki, 2008). The control and strategic leadership provided in terrorist groups is an important factor in creating the large scale attacks that an individual would not be able to create (Shapiro, 2013). The transformation of a terrorist group is defined in this paper as the termination of the use of terrorism. The factors which are categorized into this paper show how decisions made by the terrorist organization, or an entity outside of the organization can generate the groups’ movement away from violence.

The two original categories in this paper take into account the origin of intent in a terrorist group’s transition away from violence. Such intent can be internal or external to the terrorist group itself. Internal intent means that the group itself, through one of its actions or decisions brings about its transformation. External intent means that a factor/entity external to the terrorist group brought about such change.

### **Category I: Internal Factors**

The first category consists of internal factors which can attenuate terrorist groups' violent behavior. Internal factors are ones which deal with initiatives or decisions taken within the terrorist group that lead it to transition away from violence. This category involves terrorist organizations splintering and merging with other terrorist groups. It also analyzes groups merging into mainstream politics, while transitioning away from terroristic strategies and violence, once their goals are fulfilled. Terrorist organizations all around the world have better access to each other due to advancing globalization, terrorists have the opportunity to take advantage of this and gain help and support from other terrorist groups, the decision regarding participation in terrorist group networks has an effect on the groups' transition away from violence.

#### ***Splinter Away From Main Group***

The first category deals with how the internal decision made within the group can, directly or indirectly, be fatal to the existence of the group. Members wanting to splinter away from one terrorist group, to merge into another terrorist group can be dangerous to the survival of the first terrorist organization. Many terrorist groups are tied together through similarities in ideologies and alignment of political goals, so the movement of members from one group to another is highly possible. The opposite of this convergence is competition between terrorist groups. Terrorist groups fight for the same resources, recruitment, safe houses and fund generation. The study of How Terrorist Groups End (Jones and Libicki, 2008) lists a number of terrorist groups within the Palestinian territory who follow this idea, groups such as "Palestinian

Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, and a variety of Fatah organizations, such as al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades” (p.13).

The movement of members from one group, the center, to another group is labeled as splintering by Jones and Libicki (2008). Individual members engage in a cost-benefit analysis and reach the conclusion that they will be better equip in reaching their goals if they joined another group and disaffiliate away from their first terrorist organization. Studies have shown how splintering occurs in the presence of uncertainty and insecurity of one’s terrorist organization (Mesquita, p.406). A historic example of splintering takes place within the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as a section of this republican militia, the Provisional Irish Republican Army split from the main group in the late 1960s. A further divide in the organization took place when a radical group, the Real IRA, broke from the Provisionals, during the 1990s, when the peace process leading to Good Friday Agreement was taking place (Mesquita, pg.400).

Terrorist organizations are rational decision makers, in that they use all of their resources to “maximize their utility” (Gaibulloev & Sandler, pg. 4). Having multiple bases can be a positive for groups trying to not be defeated by external forces, as the government, military or local police would have to band together to terminate the organizations many bases; a collaboration which does not usually occur. Having multiple bases, and greater populations, within a terrorist group is also a hindrance to getting the people into mainstream politics as the government is less likely to please multiple viewpoints within the organization. Splintering also causes the central terrorist organization, the one which members are splintering from, to weaken, as the organization loses its members, usually the ones which are more radical in their thinking. This shift can cause the central organization to transition away from violence as the more violent

members splinter away, as seen in the splits of the IRA. The change of membership and their move away from the terrorist organization can generate the loss of power and control from the central organization as it loses members, causing it to shift away from violence.

### ***Shift Towards Mainstream Politics***

Another factor within the category of internal intent is a terrorist group's shift towards mainstream politics, after the group has achieved its set goals. Some terrorist groups have converted to mainstream politics by announcing they would adopt peaceful tactics. The Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), which used to be an armed Basque separatist group, has used the tools of technology and media to convey their messages to the world, instead of resorting to violent terrorism. This has generated their movement to mainstream politics as the ETA announced its intentions to speak with the Spanish and French government in hopes of reaching a peaceful resolution (Tremlett, 2011).

Terrorist groups can also be attracted to mainstream politics and transition into nonviolent groups through active participation in their country's electoral process. Majority of the members from ETA decided to join the mainstream politics in Spain once the country moved into a democracy (Alonso, 2011). This allowed for the terrorist organization of the ETA to politically legitimize and participate in political change without the use of terrorism. Another example of this can be found in the former terrorist organization that has taken on peaceful methods of political change is the Muslim Brotherhood. The best example of the Muslim Brotherhood using non-violent means to political change was their participation in the 2013 Egyptian coup of President Hosni Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood, along with other Egyptian citizens, were given the opportunity to create change in their country and they were successful in

bring down President Mubarak and electing President Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood member.

A terrorist group is more likely to shift towards mainstream politics if they have previously attained their political goals within the country. The study done by Jones and Libicki also lists success in achieving political goals as an end to terrorist organizations (2008). The same study also discusses how 10% of analyzed cases ended due to the group meeting their goals. Although this is a small percentage, the study cites Irgun Zvai Leumi in Israel as a historic example of this factor. Although the Irgun is a terrorist organization, it met its political goals through a mix of terrorist strategies as well as nonviolent means. Majority of the group's members transferred to a political party which spoke about the issues they cared for. The terrorist group's members legitimized the process of fighting for political change by participating in an official electoral process and transitioning away from violence.

Although terrorist groups may transition away from violence after attaining victory, it is not always just the terrorist activities which allowed them to meet their agenda (Crenshaw, pg.260). Some terrorist groups may have also met their goals without using violence, or because of the willing or unwilling contribution or input of other groups or factors. Jones and Libicki list the Armenian Resistance Group as one of these organizations (2008). The group advocated for an independent Armenian state through the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union collapsed, without the efforts of the Armenian Resistance Group, and independence was achieved, but not to the group's actions (Jones and Libicki, pg.15). Terrorist groups which have attained their goals, directly or indirectly, slowly transition away from violence, making their shift to mainstream politics more likely to occur.

The fulfillment of a goal can really decide whether or not a terrorist organization will make their transition to mainstream politics. Terrorist organizations which have goals such as regime change, or revolutions are unlikely to join the legal political path (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2014). Terrorist organizations can also make the cost benefit analysis of how their goals can be realistically achieved, and the group will change their goals and the ways of obtaining them in order to fulfill their agenda. This change occurred in the terrorist group of Hamas. Hamas originated in the boycott of elections as dictated by a memorandum from July 1992 (Brathwaite, pg.66). The group was set in their ways until 1993, which is when they realized their electoral boycott was keeping them from achieving their goals, and produced the shift to electoral participation in 1996 rose. Hamas was not achieving the political goals it had set forth previously and believed that participating in elections would help gain an advantage over its rival, the Fatah (Brathwaite, pg.67). Groups which have goals that are concrete and demand major changes are unlikely to achieve their agenda. In changing the groups' goals and political aims, the terrorist organization takes a more nonviolent and mainstream route of political change by participating in the electoral process, as seen in the case of Hamas.

### ***Terrorist Group Networking***

Another factor which deals with internal intent and decision making is the how terrorist groups interact with each other in the global network. Although terrorist groups do not frequently interact and collaborate with each other, but when they do, there are significant systematic consequences. Terrorist groups can help each other as they share information, resources, weapons and other tools to be effective, generating a longer existence for the terrorist groups involved. Terrorist longevity has a direct result on policy making as the activation and



establishment of a terrorist group and its life cycle can cause direct harm to citizens. Eliminating one terrorist organization can effect another group's survival as terrorist groups use support of other groups, who they may not always declare an alliance with (Phillips, 2014).

This factor has several negatives to a terrorist organization, as building up skill, resources and attacks attracts more attention from the government. A grass roots operation can become a full organization and this can be dangerous to the existence of an organization as governments would use efforts to eliminate them. Some terrorist groups have refused to create this network of aid with other groups as to avoid the attention it garners. Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is suspected to being one of the organizations which follows that train of thought when it comes to collaboration with other terrorist groups. (Phillips, pg.337). The literature shows that networking and sharing of resources can determine a terrorist group's longevity and success, conversely, the lack of shared resources or networks, voluntary or involuntary, can bring the demise or end of the group. The paradoxical case of the Shining Path, where they made a voluntary decision not to networking with other groups, weakened the group over time and ceased terrorist activity (Brown, 2010; Phillips, 2014). The decision a terrorist group makes internally, whether to have relations with other terrorist group, can be a contributing factor in the longevity and the generation of violent attacks though the organization.

#### Category II: External Factors

The second original category of this paper deals with actions and initiatives taken from the outside of the terrorist group, through exterior entities, that lead the terrorist group away from violence. The factors which this category will discuss involves the government type of the host country, as certain regimes are more susceptible to compromises and treaties with terrorist

organizations. This category also analyzes the views on policing and military intervention to terminate terrorist groups. Following the thought of exterior attacks like military and police intervention, terrorists groups can also start to transition away from violence after the elimination of their leader.

### *Regime Type*

The first factor within their category deaths with the regime type of the host country of a specific terrorist group, as it is an important factor in attenuating violence or eventually ending terrorism. In democracies, a violent and harsh response to terrorism causes the public to retreat their support away from its governments and creates a larger pool of recruitment for terrorist groups (Daxecker and Hess, 2013). The article “Repression hurts: Coercive government responses and the demise of terrorist campaigns”, talks about how the regime type of a country has an effect on the terrorist activity in the region, as the policy decisions will either feed the membership of the terrorist group or eradicate it. Repression is a negative in democracies and will lengthen the duration of a terrorist organization (Eubank, 1994). For non-democratic regimes, coercive techniques will deter people’s engagement in terrorist groups. Terrorists and legitimate governments fight for the popular support of the people (Daxecker and Hess, 2013).

The type of regime a country has is in direct correlation to the longevity of a terrorist group, as the government’s policies will either feed the terrorist recruitment or terminate it. Because democracies have the social and political standards of civil rights and liberties, oppression, even to a terrorist organization, is not socially accepted. This can actually generate sympathy for the terrorist group, feeding the group with civilian support. In trying to create policy goals which will rid the country of terrorism, the government makes people question its

own legitimacy as they use harsh and excessive force to terminate terrorism (Daxecker & Hess, pg.7).

There is also an issue of generating the perfect policy to counteract terrorism in a democracy, as leaders of democratic nations will be influenced by fear in making counter terrorist decisions that are too harsh, since the public may rebel against this and ask for a change in leadership. This is not an issue non-democratic regimes deal with, as their government leaders are not as accountable to their citizens. Repression is usually their social standard, so putting more pressure on repressive policies can decrease the terrorist group recruitment. Leaders of non-democratic regimes can be more coercive and forceful towards counterterrorism policies as they are not as replaceable as democratic leaders, and don't need the approval of the general public. This study's conclusions are clear for democracies. Oppressive policies towards terrorism can result in a negative outcome for the country's government, so selective measures need to be used in battling terrorism in democracies (Daxecker & Hess, 2013).

The policy making in non-democratic nations is far more complex than the counterterrorism decisions made in democratic nations. Although repression will work to combat terrorism, this will not be the long term solution. The long term result of oppression can produce widespread rebellion as popular discontent will spread. In some cases this long-run issue can also impact the short term solution of oppression (Daxecker & Hess, 2013).

### ***Willingness to Compromise***

Another external factor which can lead a terrorist organization away from violence is the willingness of the host country to compromise and meet the demands of a terrorist organization. The possibility of peaceful transition from violence for the terrorist organization, can be achieved

through a settlement between the country and the organization (Bull, pg. 74). Jones and Libicki talk about the breath of terrorist goals and how some can be easily achieved through alliances and treaties with a legitimate government. Governments have a great role in determining the fate of terrorist organizations as shown by the measurement of terrorist groups from 1968 to 2006, as 43% of terrorist groups were terminated through political negotiations (Wood, pg.64).

Terrorist groups generally look for political recognition, so in order to compromise or understand the main aims of a terrorist organization, some countries separate the violent terroristic tactics from the root agendas of an organization (Rapoport, 2006). This in theory has sound logic, but there are risks involved with dealing with the root causes. The issue in this policy is the contradiction to the democratic process, as a compromise with a terrorist organization, to create political change, may conflict with the nation's social and political standards. Democratic citizens organize their social and political lives with the trust that their government will uphold certain laws and regulations, compromising with a terrorist organization can be the antithesis of the values and political morals set forth by the people and the government of a given democratic nation. Another problem in this factor is government's indirectly reinforcing terrorism as a means of obtaining political goals. This can increase the productivity and strength of existing terrorist groups and can turn the citizens against its government (Rapoport, pg.258). This factor could create a greater breeding ground for the terrorist organization as people learn to turn to terrorism any time they want to obtain political change.

### ***Military/Policing***

External entities can also determine the transition of terrorist groups away from violence, by executing attacks against the group. According to Jones and Libicki the best option for ending terrorism within a given area would be to use the option of policing (pg.27). Some scholars (Clutterbuck, 2004; Ross and Gurr, pg.409-410; Nacos, pg.195) agree with this assessment and also conclude the best way to eradicate such groups is to use police methods. Police forces within a given country know more about the local area and its citizens, compared to federal/statewide forces or military wings, since it is the police that locally patrols and deal with local crime.

The domestic police force has a home turf advantage over the military in dealing with terrorist groups. The military on the other hand has a lot more resources and the skill set to diminish a terrorist group altogether through armed fighting. The military would use a more invasive and violent means of strategy when dealing with these organizations as their task would be to kill and destroy the group physically, whereas the police would treat terrorism as a crime. Democracies have well established legal systems and other process to deal with crime.

Terrorist engage themselves in many criminal activities and the easiest way to track them and catch them would be by placing the criminal justice system at the heart of counterterrorism policies (Nacos p.195). A study which measures the end of terrorist groups around the world from 1968 to 2006 lists that 7% of the groups were terminated due to military force, while 40% ended due to policing (Nacos, p.195). The study of Jones and Libicki cites the invasion of the Turkish government into the Kurdistan Workers party, where a physical attack from the states military force was called to kill and destroy the terrorist group (pg.12).

Although military attacks or policing can terminate terrorist groups, there is another minimalistic approach to terminate terrorist organizations. There is evidence which shows how targeting the leader of a terrorist group can cause the scattering of member's and the terrorist groups' eventual transition away from violence (Perliger and Weinberg, pg.17). Looking at this factor from the point of view of counterterrorism, arresting the leader of an organization, rather than killing him, is a more effective defeat for the terrorist group (Brown, pg. 392).

An example of this factor is the capture and eventual death of Che Guevara by the Bolivian Army in October 1967, Guevara became an influential figure for leftist and separatist movements, encouraging further violence (Brown, 2010). The elimination of a terrorist organization's leader can also be advantageous to the group. Eliminating the leadership in a group may create splintering of members into smaller groups. This can mean the groups still have the same agenda and ideologies but they become much more agile and efficient in their tasks. This also increases the connections between the groups as they adapt and react to situations much faster as the structure of the group allows for quick change (Keller and Desouza, 2010).

On the other side of this factor, the positives of eliminating terrorist group leaders can raise questions to their authority and credibility, as the leaders control will be undermined, severing their connection to the terrorist organization (Brown, pg.392). This counterterrorism technique threatens the effectiveness of a terrorist group as it puts a target on their leader. Exterior intent to attack forces the terrorist to use much of its security measures, resources, and time to protect its leader, leaving them vulnerable to attack (Price, 2012). The idea of an external entity focusing on a singular target, which in turn will cause internal issues to arise in a terrorist

organization has been used to take down organizations previously. The terrorist group of the Kurdistan People's Party started to transition away from violence after the arrest of its leader.

Through his study, Bryan Prince, evaluates this factor and speaks about how targeting the leader of a terrorist group is an effective way to damage the organization. He puts an importance on six specific variables, the internal organization of the terrorist group, the value of its leader, when the leader is targeted, group size, leadership turnover, method of execution and ideology of the terrorist groups (pg. 43). These are the variables he uses to validate this factor of a terrorist group being drawn away from violence to eventually meet its end because of the counterterrorism policy of leadership targeting. This paper will use the categories and factors to focus on answering the main research questions of how, when and why terrorist organization transition away from violence.

## ILLUSTRATIONS/EXAMPLES OF CATEGORIES AND FACTORS

### Category I: Internal Factors

#### *Splinter Away From Main Group*

The category of internal intent and decision making transitioning a terrorist group away from violence depends on several factors. The first factor is the splintering of members from one terrorist group to another. When members of one terrorist group leave the group to join another group, the original terrorist organization is weakened. Depending on the amount of people migrating out of the group, a large outflow from the organization can risk its existence and ability to inflict harm. A historic example of a splinter that caused weakness to spread in the original terrorist organization occurred in the IRA.

The roots of the IRA's conquest for national independence from Great Britain lead back to the creation of the United Kingdom. In the year 1801, the English Protestant (Anglican) United Kingdom of Great Britain united with Roman Catholic Ireland. These Protestant Irish were also known as Unionists, as they supported the union of Great Britain and Ireland. For several hundred years the Catholic Irish nationalists opposed the Unionists.

It was from 1919 to 1921, that the first IRA fought with the British in the Irish War of Independence. At the end of the war, Ireland was divided into two parts, the Catholic Irish Free State and the Protestant Northern Ireland, which was still united with the British, and became the Ulster province.

This negotiation between the two parties was not satisfactory with some members of the IRA and resulted into a split in the group. This split caused two factions in the terrorist organization, the first still being led by Collins, who supported the treaty, and the second being



led by Eamon De Valera, who disagreed with the negotiations. The group led by Collins became Irish Free State Army (English, 2005).

This first split shows how different attitudes and beliefs in a terrorist organization can be dangerous to the group existence. The disagreement about the first negotiations caused a civil war in the group and weakened the organization due to the original group losing members.

The IRA lost a portion of its members to this failed splinter group, but some still refused to give up arms to accept defeat. IRA continued to recruit and carried on illegal activities. The government became even more oppressive towards the organization after the violent use of terrorism. They introduced regulations like provision for internment without trial (English, 2005).

In the 1960s the Catholics in Northern Ireland started a campaign, which brought up the discrimination against voting, housing and employment by the protestant government. The dominant Protestant police force did not stop extremists from using violence against the Catholic protestors, escalating the anger and friction between the two parties (English, 2005).

This escalation of violence caused another split in the IRA in 1969. This time they divided into two more groups, making the “provisional” wing the group that wanted violent terroristic tactics in order to have a government that didn’t include the British. The start of 1970 saw a reign of terror from the provisional wing, with bombings, ambushes, and assassinations. They wanted to use this terror to destabilize mainland Britain and then spread to Central Europe (Sharma, 2005).

The IRA began using terrorist attacks to fight against the British army and police force in Northern Ireland. The free Irish state only included Southern Ireland. After violent attacks

against the British and Irish Unionist targets, talks between Sinn Fein and the British government started taking place in 1994.

The Sinn Fein leaders wanted to end the armed struggle between the IRA and the Irish and British governments. In August of 1994 the IRA announced a cease-fire. IRA's political representatives were included in the multiparty talks starting in September 1997. And just a year after the representatives approved the Good Friday Agreement between the parties of the British government, Irish government, and the IRA (English, 2005).

The issue in splinter groups is that the central group that all members started out from can never again have the amount of power it originally had. The main group weakens as the members branch out due to differences within the terrorist organization. These disagreements cause a change in ideology and tactics, and transform the terrorist organization into different groups. The splintering of members from one group can weaken a terrorist organization and lead them away from violence. The main organization loses most of its violent tactics, as the more violent members form splinter groups that use focus mostly on terroristic violence to attain goals, as seen by the example of the provisional IRA splitting from the main IRA (Jones and Libicki, 2008).

### ***Shift Towards Mainstream Politics***

A terrorist groups transition towards mainstream politics is another internal factor which leads the group away from terrorism. The organization of some terrorist groups allows for an easy transition to a political party that will engage in legitimate politics to bring about change. One of these groups is the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). It is especially easy for some terrorist

organization, like the ETA, to converge into mainstream politics as they may have previously decided to pursue relations with the government through peace agreements.

The ETA was founded in 1959 as a call for Basque freedom. This terrorist organization was born during the oppressive state of Dictator General Francisco Franco. The group was started by a group of youths from the Basque region, due to their dissatisfaction with the civil war of Basque nationalists and Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Bourne pg. 3).

The ETA wanted to establish a socialist state, this state also included areas of Spain and France. The ETA is a violent terrorist organization and is responsible for the death of 829 people, with countless victims of injuries, and many kidnappings. The group is identified as a terrorist organization in the United States as well as many of its allies around the world. The ETA used to provoke state repression, which would eventually gather popular insurrection against the government of Spain. This formed the tactic of using violence in order to get states to negotiate and meet the demands of the terrorist group (Bourne, 2013).

They wanted to convey the idea that the Spanish government is completely anti-Basque and the democracy it presents its citizens with is the same as Francoism. The ETA represented the struggle of the Basque nation and wanted the powers of a legitimate government. In order to participate in the mainstream political process, the ETA announced a cease-fire on September 5, 2010. They later, on October 20, 2011, declared a final and full cessation of its violent armed attacks (“Basque group ETA says armed campaign is over”).

The political party of Batasuna also has the same political goals as the terrorist group of ETA. They have also never condemned the act and use of violence from the ETA. This party was also known as Euskal herritarrok and Herri Batasuna. Investigations on the linkages between the

two groups have been made as the two parties, ETA and Batasuna, share a lot of the same members. Although the party refuses to be labeled as a simple political wing of the ETA, in order to avoid citizen discontent towards the political party, they have a membership overlap with the ETA as their participants have similar political agendas. (Bourne, 2013).

Terrorist groups that have fulfilled their goals are more likely to make the decision to transition into mainstream politics. Once the group has fulfilled its political agenda by using violent tactics, the group transitions away from violence as they no longer have a goal to rationalize attacks for. Members may still want to be involved in the political process and the transition into mainstream politics is made.

The Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) was a terrorist organization that wanted to attain power for the Jewish people. The group was originally founded by 1931 under the leadership of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the group at this point did not engage in violent attacks. It was in 1939 when the group's leaders started to believe that violent attacks are needed to attain their goals. Jabotinsky's doctrine of Revisionist Zionism is what influenced this group, making it a secondary Zionist military group. The doctrine asked them to put pressure on Great Britain so that Jewish statehood could be established. They also wanted no further interference from the British and wanted to expel them from the region (Brenner, pg.4).

The event, which marked the Irgun's transition to violence, was the King David Hotel bombing on July 22, 1946. This attack resulted in the death of around a hundred people, this population included British, Jews, and Arabs (Fromkin, pg.688). Although the group claims that the death of these people was an accident, others refuse to believe this and caused the Irgun's popularity to dive down.

In 1948, after nine years of existence the Irgun attained its goal of having a Jewish state. Although this goal was not achieved directly by the methods and strategies of the Irgun, the organization was satisfied with the change and the terrorist group started its transition away from violence. The Irgun wanted power for the Jewish people and this goal was fulfilled, even if not entirely through their efforts. The declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel was called on by the United Nations General Assembly. The natural right of the Jewish people was attained by the creation of their own sovereign state (Ben-Gurion, 1948). The terrorist group, Irgun, is no longer engaged in terrorism, but has not left the political scene completely. The Irgun started a movement, led by its leaders, aiming to remain in the legitimate sphere of politics in Israel. The Irgun transitioned into a political party named Heurt, showcasing a successful transition away from violence and into mainstream politics.

### ***Terrorist Group Networking***

The last factor of internal decision making and intent is a terrorist group's involvement in the network of other terrorist groups. The willingness of a group to participate in having relations with another other organization can determine the transition of the group away from violence.

The Sendero Luminiso (Shining Path) of Peru claims to be influenced by Marxism and embodies Peruvian Marxism. The goal of this organization was to launch attacks against the Peruvian govern to replace the bourgeois democracy with New Democracy, a democracy which is not influenced by the liberal capitalism that western countries adopt. Abimael Guzman, a quiet and reserved man who had confidence in the conservative Andean intellectual, founded the terrorist group. Guzman was from a middle class family and transferred over to Huamanga in 1962, he took on the job of a university philosophy professor. He already knew the importance of

Marxists thought, as he belonged to the Communist Party of Peru-Red Flag till 1970. He left the organization at that time due to the group's unwillingness to take up arms against the Peruvian government. He then splintered away from the organization and formed the Shining Path. He started to give lectures and speeches on scientific socialism and gained the title "Dr. Shamu" garnered from his ability brainwash the listeners (Starn pg.404).

The Shining Path took on the identity of a peasant rebellion directed by Guzman. This organization had a fertile recruitment as there were many who were discontent with the government of Peru. These members were happy to fight back the corrupt authorities to form a new just order. Although the Peruvian government offered elections, for the first time, the Shining Path refused to participate, showcasing the need of violence in their political agenda. The group's first act of violence was on May 17, 1980 when they burned ballot boxes in the town of Chuschi. The group started to gather members in the Andean highlands and started filling in the political void and providing justice to local peasants. The government had never taken the insurgency seriously, Interior Minister Jose Maria de la Jara, said the group could be easily taken down by the government's police force (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación).

On December 29, 1981 the government finally called an emergency state, regarding the Andean regions. But the military abused the power the government gave them and arrested innocent people, raped women and tortured the suspected. This was also reflected on to Guzman's thinking of violence being the way to change and revolution, the Shining Path believed the Ashninka, indigenous Peruvians, had collaborated with the army and so they slaughtered sixty-five indigenous Peruvians, including spearing children as they promised the continuation of the "Peoples war" (Starn pg.411).

The Peruvian government started a reign of terror against the Shining path from 1983 to 1984 and in the process they left burned crops, murdered villagers and homeless citizens in their path. The response of the party was to become even more violent to protect and defend themselves against the government's armed forces. The terrorist group responded with the "mass executions of villages in Cochabamba, Uchuraccy, Humanaguilla, Chaca, Huayllo and Sivia" (Starn pg. 419). Although the Shining Path claimed to be fighting for the poor, more than fifteen thousand Andean peasants had died by 1994. Six hundred thousand more people migrated away from this violence to shantytowns in Lima and Ayacucho. The war between the government and the Shining Path became the dirty war and turned the south-central Andes into the time of fear (Starn pg. 419).

The Peruvian police captured Guzman, along with several other leaders, on September 12, 1992. The police captured the leaders above a dance studio in the district of Lima (Rochlin 2003). The Shining Path continued its attacks and the use of other terroristic violence. As time flew by the ground for recruitment was drying out and the terrorist group was suffering as their attacks were not as powerful as before. The terrorist group made a self-limiting choice to involve its self in the terrorist group network, by working with another organization. The Shining Path refused to attach itself with another organization if it meant that they would be put under unwanted attention from officials (Phillips, pg.337).

There are benefits to joining together with another terrorist group as terrorist groups have globalized in the modern era, and have members in more than one geographic area. Terrorist groups are also aware of the presence and threat of other terrorist groups. Groups may get-together and share resources, members and tactics but the more likely situation is how

competition fuels terrorist groups. Although cooperation could make terrorist groups stronger the expectation of them isolating is more likely.

Terrorist groups are aware of the fact that if they do aid another terrorist group or effort they would have to share resources, information, recruitment pool, and existing members with the other group. The terrorists rather focus their energy on targeting the governments they are fighting against (Phillips pg.1).

The previously mentioned terrorist group, the Shining Path, rejects the idea of a terrorist network being useful. This terrorist organization refuses to help or aid another organization and also does not work with them (McCormick, 2001). Terrorist organizations also understand that joining or helping another terrorist group can bring them unwanted attention from the government of their country. Terrorist groups can join together and have greater attacks, becoming a threat the government would prioritize to eliminate. The Shining Path refused to make the decision to join another group and continued its attacks with the dwindling membership it had, it lost out on the members and other resources it would have gained through a partnership. Eventually the movement lost the control it has previously to bid for power in the region (McCormick pg. 51).

#### Category II: External Factors

##### ***Regime Type***

The second category, which deals with external factors that affect the transition of a terrorist organization from violence, emphasizes the importance regime type, among other factors. There is a danger in democratic nations creating policies that will heavily oppress terrorist groups. This can be a mistake on the part of the government as this strategy can generate



sympathy for the terrorists, and create a breeding ground for recruitment. Non-democratic regimes do not have to be as cautious in creating oppressive counter terrorism policies, as they are not accountable to their citizens like democratic nations are. Non-democratic nations already have the factor of oppression in their society, so citizens have been more exposed to this treatment than democratic citizens.

Policies that are oppressive towards terrorists and require the government to intervene in citizens' daily lives may be opposed by the citizens of a given country, so governments taking smaller steps can yield a more successful result. Governments using series of laws and regulations, rather than quick and massive changes to fight terrorism will garner a more successful result. The Red Army Faction is an example of how a group can come to an end if this theory is practiced correctly.

The origin of the Red Army Faction (RAF) was in West Germany in 1970.. This group characterized itself as a far left militia group. The government of West Germany declared this organization to be a terrorist group when a member, Dümlein Christine, was punished for being a part of the RAF terrorist organization (Smith and Moncourt pg. 566).

The group targeted most of its protests against the so-called American imperialists. This meant the US military and the German political and business leaders. This group usually carried out protests in a non-violent manner until June of 1967 (Levy pg.11). At that time, deadly violent riots broke out against US involvement in Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict. One student was killed by police, leading to massive popular discontent.

The violence escalated from 1970 to 1979, as the RAF was responsible for the death of 31 people, injuring more than 100 people and had taken 163 hostages, while being responsible

for 25 bombings. The Attorney general of West Germany was also a victim of this group's terrorism, as was the head of national employer association, and other American soldiers who were stationed in West Germany (Levy pg. 11).

The response of the West Germany government varied across time. One of these counterterrorist measures included making citizens take loyalty oaths towards its German government. People found this strategy to be ineffective and intrusive. In 1976, Germany declared the formation of terrorist groups to be illegal. There were other changes made with the support of the law, to increase police powers. The police was allowed to search the homes and possessions of suspected parties with the approval of the court. The police also created checkpoints on roadways to search suspicious travelers (Levy pg.13). The threat of terrorism pushed West Germany to increase their intelligence-gathering agencies and they also created an anti-terrorist reaction unit. This unit was responsible for handling any terrorist attacks that occurred in the country, as they could assemble in 15 minutes and deploy within an hour with helicopters, high-tech weapons and special land vehicles.

But the government of West Germany also gave concessions to the RAF, especially when dealing with hostage situations. Instead of slowing the group down, the RAF now took more hostages and had greater demands, like releasing the group's members from prison. It was 1975, when the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reversed this policy of dealing with terrorists and refused to give into the RAFs demands when they had hostages in the West German embassy in Sweden. The terrorists then murdered two diplomats and also blew up the entire embassy. Once the embassy was blown up, two of the terrorists were killed instantly and the remaining four were sent to prison after being tried in West Germany (Levy pg.13).

It was in the early 1980s when the RAF membership was dwindling out, due to the unyielding counter terrorist policies the government created against this group, members were being arrested. The grounds for recruitment was getting smaller and smaller. In April 1998, a letter written by the RAF was given to the Reuters news agency declaring that the RAF has been dissolved and that they had failed to accomplish their objective (Pluchinsky pg.137).

The dissolution of the RAF show cases that the cases discussed in this study are used illustrate the biggest factor which led to its demise. There can be several causes to the end of these terrorist groups, but the factors mentioned in the paper are the leading causes of the demise of the listed terrorist organizations. The RAF transitioned away from violence due to the government's strict counterterrorist policies (Levy pg. 13), but the paper also acknowledges the existence of other unlisted factors which caused the group to end.

### ***Willingness to Compromise***

The second factor within the external intent and decision, is the willingness of the government to comply and make peace with the terrorist organization, effect the group's transition away from violence. Because terrorist groups are looking to generate political change, the acknowledgement of their political aims and reaching a compromise between the terrorist group and the government can be beneficial to both parties. An agreement or treaty between the two parties can be beneficial to the government, in political means, the riots and protests will decrease, economically, the government wouldn't have to spend money on security, and fixing the damaged infrastructure, and socially, citizens will live in a more peaceful and safe environment.

The Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) is a leftist terrorist organization that originated and spread terror in El Salvador (Jones and Libicki pg.23). The group was named after Farabundo Marti, a communist revolutionary Salvadorian who led an unsuccessful revolt in 1932, when the economic and social structure of El Salvador was suffering a depression. The goals of this terrorist group was to shift the Salvadorian government to a communist political system in order to end oppression, and to seek land reforms that would create better economic conditions for the oppressed (Jones and Libicki pg.64, 67).

Historically, the political system of El Salvador can be defined as elites resisting political change. The country's economy is based primarily on export agriculture, and a system of exploitation and abuse. Due to the abuse and mistreatment of workers, the politically and economically oppressed citizens began to protest. Looking at the protestors who challenged the status quo, the government started to implement oppressive policies towards the people. This in turn, further angered the people and generated violence within the protests. Several members of the FMLN have used these oppressive tactics, employed by the government and elites, as the excuse to why they joined this terrorist group in the first place. (Jones and Libicki pg.67).

The oppressive policies of the government gave rise to the FMLN attacks against the Salvadorian government and the civilians who supported it. The Salvadorian government was incentivized to make changes in the political, economic and social sectors of the country from the kidnappings, bombings, and arson the FMLN carried out (Call, 2002). Due to the great amount of people oppressed by the Salvadorian government, the recruiting ground in the country was very fertile. Eventually the FMLN included more than 12,000 combatants who took up more than one-thirds of the country (Jones and Libicki pg. 68).

The end of the cold war created an opportunity for the Salvadorian government to extend their hand out to the FMLN for peace. The Salvadorian government was under pressure from the US to not yield to the FMLN, but after the cold war, with the loss of Soviet Union against the US, and the new administration with George H. W. Bush, the government of El Salvador decided to form a peace settlement with the FMLN (Wood 2000).

The government started negotiation talks mid-1989 with the FMLN, and the Geneva Agreement of April 1990 paved the way for negotiations to progress between the El Salvadorian government and the FMLN, making the end of the armed conflict between the two parties. The five stages, which ended with the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords, declared a political compromise between the government and the FMLN. This agreement transitioned the government to a democratic political regime, with a capitalist economy. From then on the two groups decide to solve their differences through democratic political process (Jones and Libicki pg.73). The change in nature of the government to extend peace and compromise towards the FMLN allowed the terrorist group to transition away from violence.

### ***Military/Policing***

The last factor in the category of external intent and decision is the use of military or police intervention to attain the transition of terrorist groups away from violence (Cronin pg.30). An ongoing debate shows how the identity and type of terrorist organization is what will determine if a police intervention, or military attack will be useful. Although there are benefits to each option, it really is the terrorist group and the situation a government finds itself in that will decide whether military, or police force is required.

There have been many interventions and attacks over the world aiming to disband terrorism from a specific geographical region. One of these includes the Turkish military attacks was against the Kurdistan Workers Party also known as Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK).

The PKK occupies a spot on the terrorism black list for Turkey and its allies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a military alliance that Turkey has been a part of since 1952, declared PKK to be a terrorist group ("NATO chief declares PKK terrorist group"). Another organization, the European Union (EU), also labels the PKK to be a terrorist organization. Although the PKK was prescribed to be removed from the EU's terror list, the EU officials dismissed the ruling and stated that the PKK would remain on the list (Schomberg, 2008). The PKK is also on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list created by the US State Department.

The PKK is a terrorist organization based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. This terrorist organization began in 1974 by a group of Kurdish students with the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan at the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. In 1978 the PKK begin a communist revolution by the techniques of guerilla warfare, in the heart of Turkey, Ankara (Criss, 1995). Ocalan learned about the exploitation of Kurds in Southeast Turkey and thought that the Kurds should be able to determine their own fate and not be punished for wanting an independent and sovereign state (Poluton, 1997). The Kurds make up 18%-25% of the population in Turkey and have been oppressed in the country for decades, this is the motivation for the PKK to wage attacks against the Turkish state for political and social right to freedom (Kreyenbroken, 2005).

The group began with presenting itself as a worldwide communist revolution. While this organization was a Marxist-Leninist organization, they eventually mutated towards having goals of national autonomy and wanting Democratic Confederalism. Democratic Confederalism, according to Abdullah Ocalan, is a socialist political system with roots in libertarian beliefs. This system is open and free towards different political groups and it's multi-cultural and non-monopolistic in nature, making it consensus-oriented (Oclan, 2007).

The PKK, in the time frame of 1978 to 1984, ambushed, sabotaged, and created riots, protests and demonstrations against the Turkish government. The organization rationalized these attacks to be a defense of the Turkish population as they were being culturally oppressed. The Turkish government's 1983 Turkish Language Act Ban could support this explanation, along with the other cultural rights taken away from the Kurds by the government in the region. The language ban stopped the use of Kurdish language from offices, schools and any other official capacities (McDowall, 2001).

The second wave which lasted from 1984 to 1999, made attacks on the government's important institutions all over the country. The point and purpose of these attacks was to destabilize and weaken the government. The PKK also went through with suicide bombings in this time period, on government and police institutions and tourist sites (Matovic 2007). The Turkish government created several counter-insurgency operations against the PKK, announcing the state of emergency in the several PKK controlled territories (Robins, 1993).

The Kenyan government transferred Ocalan to Turkey in February of 1998, after Turkish police arrested him. He was charged at a State Security Court for treason in trying to separate part of the country from the government control and sentenced to death. This sentence was

upheld in November and this case is in front of the European Court of Human Rights (“Annual Report”).

Due to the PKK being integrated into the Turkish society, an international force of military or police would not be effective in harming the organization. The Turkish military was right for this job as they knew the domestic layout of the organization and had a home turf advantage. The Turkish government has carried out several air strikes and artillery strikes in the region, even with the warning of the United States and Iraq to back off (“Iraq warns Turkey over incursion”). The constant military attacks the PKK suffers at the hands of the Turkish government has exhausted the organization and the leader of the organization, Abdullah Ocalan, has announced the end of armed struggle and called for a cease fire through peace talks on March 21, 2013 (“PKK leader calls for ceasefire in Turkey”). These peace talks helped the PKK transition away from violence. There have been recent attacks in Turkey labeled to be the work of the TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks), an offshoot of the PKK. This group has been separated from the PKK as they did not agree with the cease-fire and formed another group in 2004 (“Ankara blast: Kurdish group TAK claims bombing”). Still, the PKK may be returning to violence, as it has claimed responsibility for bombings in Turkey as recently as March 2016. Thus, the PKK can be seen as an organization that has transitioned both from and back to violent acts.



**TABLE 1**

This table contains an overview of the categories and factors discussed in the sections above.

CATEGORY	FACTOR	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLE
Internal	Splinter away from main group	Splintering and dividing from a group to form, or merge into a new group can weaken the original organization and generate cracks in ideology and strength of the main organization. Makes the original group move towards nonviolent means.	The several splits in the IRA, weakened the central organization and led it away from violence (Mesquita, pg. 400).
Internal	Movement to mainstream politics	Some terrorist groups take on the legitimate political path, through participating in government with the use of legitimate non-violent group such as political parties.	The ETA transitioned to mainstream politics as it transitioned away from violent tactics (Tremlett, 2011).
Internal	Terrorist group network	Some group choose not to work with other terrorist groups, despite the benefits, this can have a dangerous	Peru's Shining Path refuses to collaborate with other terrorist groups. Collaboration

		effect on the power of a terrorist group.	can generate greater attention from governments, dangerous for terrorist groups (Phillips pg. 337)
External	Regime type	The type of government and the counterterrorism policies it generates has a direct effect on the terrorist groups transition away from violence.	Germany used a variety of different strategies to combat the terrorist group of RAF. RAF was defeated due to strict regulations of the government's anti-terrorism policies. (Levy, 2001).
External	Government's willingness to compromise	Depending on the country's willingness to compromise with the terrorist group, peaceful means of ending the group is possible through goal fulfillment.	FMLN disarmed after the Chapultepec Peace Accords, and transitioned away from violent attacks (Jones and Libicki, pg. 22-23).

External	Policing/Military	The police and military intervention and attack on a terrorist group physically stops the group from maintain its capabilities and resources and generates the groups move towards nonviolence.	Turkish government won the fight against the PKK, through several attacks from the police and military. (Jones and Libicki, pg.12)
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The success of these factors is measured through the end of the terrorist organizations used to illustrate them. The groups' transition away from violence, loss of membership, and/or its end, accounts for the success of the leading factor it is illustrating.

The factors listed above can be analyzed further by being assigning ranks to their successes. The rankings can be made in both categories, internal and external. The internal category, which deals with the decision and intent of terrorist organization from within include several different factors. The most successful factor in eliminating terrorist organizations is a terrorist organizations refusal to participate in a terrorist group network. This is the most successful in the category as it damages not only the terrorist organization, but the network as a whole. The second most successful factor in the category is the groups' movement from mainstream politics as the terrorist group no longer uses methods of terrorism to achieve its political objectives. The least successful factor in the internal category is the splintering of a terrorist group away from the central organization. This causes a weakness in the main organization but it still results in the newly parted terrorist group.

The external category deals with decisions and policies created by governments and other entities outside of the terrorist organization. The most successful factor in this category is the government's willingness to compromise with a terrorist organization. This is the most effective factor as a face to face peace settlement leaves little to no room for the terrorist organization to take up arms again, as they will be politically satisfied. The regime type of a country and the decisions it makes is the second most effective as the policies the govern makes to combat terrorism can get rid of the terrorist threat, it can also anger citizens and cause civil unrest in the general population. The least effective factor in this category is the policing or military attack at a terrorist organization. An attack can target and eliminate a terrorist group, but it can produce survivors who will locate somewhere else to continue terrorist activities. Although all of the factors threaten the security and existence of a terrorist organization this classification analyzes which factors would be most successful.

## ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

How and why do terrorist groups decide to abandon violent behavior and/ or transition away from violence, or into the mainstream? The paper answers these research questions by creating an original categorization of factors which allow or force terrorist groups to achieve this transition. Six such factors are organized in two categories. In Category One (Internal), a terrorist group's transition to non-violence or disintegration is the result of a decision or action of the terrorist group itself. Category Two (External), sees the transition to non-violence as a result of factors external to the terrorist group (government actions, police-military campaigns or regime type).

The factors which have been categorized in this paper are illustrated with real world examples. In Category One cases, the decisions made by the terrorist group itself determine its fate. The three factors discussed in this category: decision to split/ merge with another group, decision to merge into mainstream politics, decision to network with other terrorist groups, illustrate this point. The splintering of terrorist members from one group to form or join another group can cause systemic weakness in the main organization. As members and resources are being taken away from the main hub of the terrorist organization, the group will never be as powerful as it was before at its peak capacity. The IRA went through several splits and regroupings, and this caused so changes in the ideology and goals of the group, weakening the terrorist organization. Once splits start to take place the main organization its vulnerability increases and its transition or termination becomes more likely.

Under various circumstances, terrorist groups may consider moving to legitimate routes. Such routes may mean that terrorist groups seek to be recognized as official parties that can bring

about political change. This was the case with the ETA in Spain. The ETA has transitioned from using violent terrorism to focusing on generating support for the political parties its members are a part of.

The decision to network with other terrorist groups can be regarded as a double edged sword. On one hand, it can strengthen the group through the availability of more information and resources and cooperation. Still, networking makes a terrorist group more visible and may attract unwanted attention from the authorities. On the other hand, complete isolation of a group, and the conscientious decision not to collaborate or network with others may considerably weaken a group, as seen in the example of the Shining Path.

In Category Two cases, factors external to the terrorist group play a key role in its transition: government type/ regime type, government's decisions to initiate military or policing actions, and government willingness to work with or compromise with terrorist groups.

Depending on the given regime of a country, and their laws against terrorist groups, terrorist groups can thrive or decline. A government needs to find the balance between strict rules and regulations to combat terrorism, and respect for civil liberties. The combination of the two will make sure terrorist groups cannot recruit citizens. Thus, as regime typology goes, democracy is more conducive to the decline of terrorism. But, as seen by the case of the Red Army Faction in Germany, compromising with a terrorist group and giving into their demands all the time can be dangerous, as they may refuse to cooperate and continue to use violence to attain their goals. Still the literature shows that democratic regimes are more likely to see a decline in terrorism over the years than non-democratic regimes.

Attacking a terrorist group with police or military force is also a way in which governments bring about the decline of violent terrorist groups. Governments make case-by-case decisions in regard to using force against a terrorist group in a given region. This paper used the example of PKK, as they were defeated by the Turkish military force. The decision to use the Turkish military was successful in the situation as many PKK members were active within Turkey. Given these circumstances, the Turkish military, which was well acquainted with the organizational ins and outs of the PKK, was the best tactical enemy of the PKK. This expertise allowed the military to defeat and deter the PKK for many years, and even capture its leader in 1998.

The leader of a terrorist group is an integral part of the structure of that terrorist organization. Even if the person is simply a figure head, their capture or the loss of their life is likely to cause the demise of an organization. Besides the case of Ocalan and the PKK, this was also the case with the Shining Path and its leader. In the case of the Shining Path, once its leader, Guzman was targeted and killed by the government, the organization suffered a huge setback. Without the charisma and organizational skills of Guzman, the Shining Path started on a path of inevitable demise.

Most terrorist groups, at their very core, want political change. Governments can acknowledge this and extend a hand to compromise with the group by creating a treaty where both parties are satisfied with the results and an end to violence can be brought about. The case of the FMLN in El Salvador settling down after signing a treaty with the government showcases how it is possible to have a peaceful resolution thanks to the government's willingness to compromise.

This means that the political agendas of groups are met and they have no further incentive to extend the life of their organization. Such an accomplishment may or may not be the result of a government's direct response to the group's demands. This was the case with the Irgun in Israel. The group wanted a sovereign nation of Israel and an independent nation was created due to external efforts and circumstances, regardless of the Irgun's efforts. Still, the group transitioned to peaceful integration into mainstream politics due to these goals being met. This example shows that after their political agenda is met, groups usually disappear into mainstream politics of the country and they learn to use the legitimate ways to achieve political change.

This paper has researched factors and examples of terrorist groups which have ceased to exist or transitioned away from violence. This categorization does not include many of the Middle Eastern terrorist organizations that threaten the stability and security of the world today. The groups which have been influenced by Radical Islam have not experienced a demise. Due to the organizations being fairly current, it is hard to point out the concrete factors that will lead to their transition away from violence.



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