

The Florida 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment and Variance in County Support

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THE FLORIDA 2004 MINIMUM WAGE AMENDMENT AND VARIANCE IN
COUNTY SUPPORT

by

BRITTANY WILSON

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Honors in the Major program in Political Science
in the College of Sciences
and in The Burnett Honors College
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

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Thesis Chair: Dr. Aubrey Jewett

ABSTRACT

Several interest groups seek to put a \$15 per hour minimum wage amendment on the Florida ballot in 2020. Floridians voted successfully to increase the minimum wage back in 2004. While the measure passed by over 50% in every county, there were substantial differences. What explains variance in support for the 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment among Florida counties? Hypotheses were drawn from previous literature and theory and multiple regression models find several statistically significant results. The percentage of Hispanic residents and the percentage of residents with a high school education or less had a positive relationship with support for increasing the minimum wage, while the percentage of votes for President Bush had a negative relationship. Conclusions are drawn that suggest how these results may impact the expected upcoming vote to further increase the minimum wage in Florida.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

On November 2, 2004, 71.3% of Floridians voted to amend Florida's Constitution by adding a minimum wage provision: The Florida Minimum Wage Amendment (Florida Department of State 2018). The Amendment increased Florida's minimum wage \$1.00 above the federal rate to \$6.15 per hour, and included provisions for annual adjustments of the wage (Midulla 2005). According to data published by the Florida Division of Elections, *all* sixty-seven of Florida's counties voted in favor of the Amendment, but support came with a wider margin in some counties than in others. Figure 1.1 depicts percentages of approval among Florida's counties and presents a quick snapshot of the geographic variance in support. Southeast Florida provided the strongest support for the Amendment. Conversely, North Florida displayed somewhat lower levels of support, including Liberty County which was the only one to provide less than 60% approval in the state. Central Florida had more mixed support.

Figure 1.1: Percentage of votes in favor of Florida 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment



Note: Data obtained from *Florida Department of State, Division of Elections*

<https://results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/2/2004&DATAMODE=>

It is expected that counties with greater numbers of registered Democrats will support liberal initiatives such as raising the minimum wage but, in the case of this particular Amendment, counties with greater numbers of registered Republicans also unexpectedly supported the initiative. As of the date of this writing, no research has been published offering explanations for the variance between Florida's counties. Part of the reason for this lack of information is that polling firms did not conduct any exit polling, as the margin of support for the Amendment was so wide. The purpose of this study is to offer possible explanations to close the knowledge gap and further use that information to predict the outcome of any future minimum wage amendments that may be placed on the ballot today or in the near future.

To begin the research, data was obtained from the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau as well as the Florida Department of State's Division of Elections. Demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables were identified and examined through regression analysis in an effort to identify a pattern or patterns that may explain the variance in support. Findings were applied in an effort to attempt to predict the success of any future initiatives to increase Florida's minimum wage beyond the latest increase to \$8.46 that took place January 1, 2019 after the annual adjustment (U.S. Department of Labor 2019). Before summarizing research findings, an understanding of the Amendment itself, public policies and political aspects underlying minimum wages, a current initiative petition to further increase Florida's minimum wage, and popular readings in support of or against such increases must be examined.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Section 1: Amendment Background

The Florida Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO) provides a basic overview of the Amendment in a 2015 announcement entitled “Florida’s Minimum Wage Law”. The announcement serves to update Florida’s minimum wage rate as of the date of the writing and offers background information on the Amendment, including provisions for future increases. The DEO explains that Florida’s minimum wage rate applies to all employees in the state currently covered by the federal minimum wage. Employees not paid the minimum wage rate may bring civil actions against an employer or any person violating Florida’s minimum wage law (DEO 2015).

As to further rate increases, Robin Greiwe Midulla explains in her article entitled “Florida’s New Minimum Wage Provision: An Overview of the Amendment to the Florida Constitution” featured in *The Florida Bar Journal* in October 2005, that adjustments to the minimum wage rate are calculated each year on September 30th for the twelve month period prior to September 1st. The rate is based upon changes in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers as calculated by the United States Department of Labor, and takes effect January 1st of the following year (Midulla 2005). As of the date of this writing, Florida’s minimum wage has increased to \$8.46 per hour effective January 1, 2019 (U.S. Department of Labor 2019).

An understanding of the “what” of the Amendment then begs an understanding of the “why” behind it. The Amendment itself opens with a declaration of the Florida public policy surrounding the payment of a minimum wage. This declaration states that the intent behind the Amendment is to pay Florida workers “a minimum wage sufficient to provide a decent and healthy life, that protects employers from unfair, low wage competition; and does not force working Floridians to rely on taxpayer-funded public services” (Midulla 2005). According to a U.S. Census Report entitled “Poverty in Florida”, the overall percentage of Floridians living in poverty in the year 2000 (the most recent report published before passage of the Amendment) was 12.5%. Even though the rate declined slightly from the last census performed in 1990, the number of persons living in poverty in Florida actually increased by nearly 22% during the decade, and totaled just fewer than two million residents. If Florida’s stated mission was to “provide a decent and healthy life” and “not force working Floridians to rely on taxpayer-funded public services”, voters clearly believed it failed to reach that goal and sought to remedy the shortcoming through passage of the Amendment.

Section II: Public Policy & Political Aspects

To understand the significance of the Amendment, the public policy surrounding the establishment of a minimum wage was reviewed. As Belman and Wolfson explain in *What Does the Minimum Wage Do?* published in 2014, public policy surrounding the

minimum wage is premised on improving the lives of the most vulnerable workers in the labor market. Since a large proportion of the labor force works at or relatively close to the minimum wage, legislators must weigh the benefits of an increase against the cost of possible job losses. Who are the workers most vulnerable to the employment effects of an increase in the minimum wage? The most vulnerable cohorts are teens, those with less education and fewer skills, and single women; especially single women with children. Many studies also indicate that African Americans are more likely to remain at or close to the minimum wage as well (Belman and Wolfson 2014). A plethora of research findings with respect to the federal minimum wage are available for each of these groups but, for the purposes of this study, these groups (with the exception of teens) were considered at a county level in an effort to determine the extent of influence they may have had on votes in favor of the Amendment. The percentage of retirees in each county was also studied to determine whether or not this demographic had an impact on votes in favor of passage.

Another consideration legislators must take into account when determining appropriate minimum wage rates is its potential to affect decisions about schooling, training, and the provision of nonwage benefits. Teenagers may discontinue their educations to pursue the improved earnings afforded by increased minimum wages and employers may reduce training provided to employees in an effort to mitigate increased wages and salaries expense. This reduction in the development of skills could possibly

have negative consequences for individuals and society as a whole as future productivity and earnings are reduced, particularly for low-wage workers (Belman and Wolfson 2014).

As to the political aspects of the minimum wage, studies show that when Congress lags in raising the *federal* minimum wage, states become likely to fill the void by raising their own *state* minimums above the federal rate to compensate (Card and Krueger 2016). A number of state legislatures and voter referendums in recent years have resulted in minimum wage increases. In the year 2004, Florida wasn't the only state to support a ballot measure to increase its state wage: Nevada overwhelmingly supported a minimum wage ballot measure as well, with 68.36% of voters in favor of the increase (Nevada Division of State 2018). Spurred on by an unwillingness of Congress to raise the federal minimum wage above \$5.15 an hour (the rate in place since 1997), a loose coalition of organized labor, the Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now placed initiatives increasing the state minimum wages of six states (Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Ohio) on their respective ballots in 2006. All six measures passed with an average rate of 65% (Smith and Tolbert 2010).

In addition to these direct democracy initiatives, lawmakers themselves have also taken steps to increase state minimum wages. Lawmakers in Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and D.C. enacted increases during their 2014 sessions.

Oregon Governor Kate Brown signed a bill into law in 2016 that establishes a series of annual minimum wage increases from July 1, 2016 through July 1, 2022 indexed to inflation, with California's governor following suit with an increase on April 4th. Thanks to ballot initiatives and new legislation, a total of eighteen states began the year 2018 with higher minimum wages (National Conference of State Legislators 2018). But what of support from Congressional lawmakers as popularity of measures to raise the minimum wage increases?

It should come as no surprise that the federal minimum wage divides the leadership of the Democratic and Republican parties in Congress, according to David Card and Alan Krueger in *Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage* (2016). Even though this division exists, the minimum wage has widespread bipartisan appeal among the voters themselves. Evidence of this bipartisan appeal was documented in 2014 when four "red" states-Alaska, Arkansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota- all voted overwhelmingly in favor of raising their states' minimum wages as high as \$9.75 per hour (Card and Krueger 2016). In addition, out of the top twenty Florida counties with the largest margins of support for the 2004 Florida Minimum Wage Amendment, only seven of those twenty counties voted for the Democratic nominee, even though the initiative itself was progressive (CNN 2004). There is no question that Florida's 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment appealed to voters on both sides of the fence, but the question still remains as to what factors account for the variance between counties with respect to margin of support.

Due to the fact that the 2004 Amendment passed by such a large margin, polling and research firms were not compelled to conduct exit polls. However, Florida firm Mason-Dixon Polling & Strategy did conduct telephone polls before the election on October 4th and 5th of 2004 in an attempt to gauge voter reaction. Mason-Dixon's Managing Director, Brad Coker, verified in a personal telephone interview in May of 2018 that, out of 625 likely voters statewide, 59% were in favor of the Amendment, 26% were not, and 15% were undecided. These figures were further broken down as follows with a margin of error of +/- four percentage points: men voted 56% in favor, with 30% opposed and 14% undecided, women voted 62% in favor, with 22% opposed and 16% undecided, Democrats voted 76% in favor, with 11% opposed and 13% undecided, Republicans voted 42% in favor, with 43% opposed and 15% undecided, and Independents voted 58% in favor, with 23% opposed and 19% undecided.

These findings were compared to the results of a Colorado pre-election survey conducted by Magellan Strategies in 2016 to test the waters for the state's proposed Minimum Wage Amendment. The purpose of the comparison was to determine if there were any similarities between Florida's voters and voters from other states with similar ballot initiatives. Five-hundred likely 2016 General Election Colorado voters were polled via landline and cell phone surveys between August 29th and 31st and were asked the following question: "Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado constitution increasing the minimum wage to nine dollars and thirty cents per hour with annual

increases of ninety cents each January 1 until it reaches \$12.00 per hour effective January 2020, and annually adjusting it thereafter for cost-of-living increases?” Among all the responders, 55% intended to vote in favor of increasing the minimum wage, 42% opposed the measure, and 3% were undecided. 83% of Democrats were in favor versus 24% of Republicans and 60% of “unaffiliated” voters (Flaherty 2016).

An additional subgroup identified in the Magellan survey, but not in the Mason-Dixon survey was marital status. Marital status definitely played a factor as 64% of all single men and 72% of single women supported the measure, while 53% of married men and 48% of married women opposed the measure. Ultimately, these percentages resulted in 53% of men and 57% of women in favor overall (Flaherty 2016). These overall passage rates were consistent with the rates reported by Mason-Dixon with the exception of the percentage of Republicans approving the measure in Colorado. This percentage was significantly lower than in Florida, perhaps owing to the fact that there were significantly fewer numbers of registered Republicans in Colorado (1,118,597) than in Florida (3,942,040) in 2004 (Colorado Division of State; Florida Department of State 2018). Nevertheless, the results of both surveys provide a picture of where the “yes” votes are coming from and provide a starting point for further research of these demographics.

The relationship between proposed ballot initiatives and candidates on the ballot at the same time was explored, even though preliminary research conducted revealed that support for progressive ballot initiatives tends to occur separate from

partisan politics. A Republican president was elected at the same time Florida's 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment passed. In 2016, Republican President Donald Trump won the Sunshine State's vote at the same time that Floridians passed Amendment 2 to legalize medical marijuana by an even larger margin than the votes for the President: 71.3% versus 49% (Florida Department of State 2018). Even though at first glance these findings may not appear to support a relationship, they are statewide percentages and not necessarily representative of individual counties; thus, the relationship was examined further.

Section III: Proposed Initiative & Potential Arguments For & Against

As to future amendments, attorney John Morgan of the Orlando-based law firm Morgan & Morgan is proposing just that: a referendum to raise Florida's minimum wage to \$15.00 an hour by 2026. According to an article written by Steven Lemongello and featured on the *Orlando Sentinel's* website in May of the current year, Morgan is currently in the process of obtaining enough signatures to have his initiative placed on the ballot in 2020. If the initiative qualifies for placement and is approved by more than 60% of the voters, Florida's minimum wage would increase to \$10.00 per hour as of September 30, 2021 and would increase by \$1.00 per year until it reaches \$15.00 per hour by 2026. Morgan believes that Florida's current minimum wage of \$8.25 per hour is insufficient for families to make ends meet and may actually be contributing to a

government assistance mentality in which citizens quite capable of working would rather stay home and collect public assistance. He also argues for quality over quantity; jobs that pay people well are more important than a large number of low-paying jobs (Lemongello 2018). The results of this study will attempt to predict how Morgan's initiative will be received by Florida voters. However, before reliable conclusions can be drawn, literature containing arguments for and against further increases was examined to understand potential considerations voters may be faced with before making a decision.

Before passage of the 2004 Amendment, Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Florida Senator Mel Martinez voiced opposition and predicted job loss would be the end result. Both the Florida Retail Association and the Orlando Florida Chamber of Commerce made the same prediction, adding that the measure would "devastate" Florida's strong economy and that many of the Sunshine State's good jobs would be shipped overseas. Bruce Nissen, Director of Research at the Florida International University Center for Labor Research and Studies teamed up with H. Luke Shaefer of the University of Chicago to examine the actual impact of Florida's minimum wage one year after it took effect in an effort to either prove or disprove the aforementioned claims. Nissen and Shaefer were unable to prove any of the claims. Instead, they found that Florida actually *added* jobs at a faster pace than did the United States as a whole. Service sector jobs (especially those in retail, accommodations, and food service) grew rapidly. In addition, the number of private establishments also grew at a faster pace in the year following

passage of the new minimum wage than it had in years before (Nissen 2007).

Jeanne Mejeur, the National Conference of State Legislatures' expert on state labor and employment issues, lists additional arguments in favor of increases in a 2014 article in *State Legislators* magazine. First, increases put more money in the pockets of low-income workers. Mejeur cites a 2013 Congressional Research Service report as stating that a single parent with two children working full time would move up to earning 94% of the poverty line were wages increased to \$9.00 hourly. Second, minimum wage increases shrink the wage gap between higher-paid workers and low-wage workers, thus aiding in lessening income inequality. Third, since low-wage workers tend to spend more of their incomes than their higher-paid counterparts, more money would be injected into the economy. Lastly, higher minimum wages have been shown to decrease turnover among low-wage workers, resulting in a savings to the business in the form of decreased training costs and higher productivity. These findings would certainly add to arguments supporting further increases in the minimum wage (Mejeur 2014).

For arguments against further increases in the minimum wage, Mejeur cites four of the most common. First, mandatory increases in hourly wages may mean that businesses would be forced to eliminate jobs or reduce hours worked to maintain their bottom line, thus resulting in lower or no income at all for the very group the legislation aims to protect. Second, opponents believe there are better ways to address poverty, such as income tax credits for low-income workers or tax policies encouraging asset development and savings for these workers.

Third, increased labor costs will ultimately be passed on to consumers through higher prices. Fourth, an increase in labor costs will result in lower profits for businesses, leading to less job creation through business expansion. Mejeur is careful to point out that convincing studies both for and against increases can be found. However, consumers (and Florida's voters) will ultimately see that their pay doesn't stretch as far as it used to, making it obvious that the minimum wage has not kept up with inflation (Mejeur 2014). These arguments both for and against future increases reflect the many concerns voters will have going into the polls should John Morgan's initiative make it to the ballot.

As to the possibility of passage should Morgan succeed in ballot placement, the economic climate at the time may also be a consideration. Since the year 2008, Gallup has conducted weekly surveys via telephone interviews to gauge what they refer to as the "U.S. Economic Confidence Index". This index is the average of two components: how Americans view the economic conditions at the time the survey is conducted and their perceptions of whether the economy is getting better or worse. Examination of the monthly averages reveals a trend: voters or legislators in a large number of states approve increases in their states' minimum wages following a decrease in the confidence index for the year prior. Both 2013 and 2015 experienced declines and ended the year in a slump but, after significant numbers of states passed measures to increase their minimum wages the following years in 2014 and 2016, the index levels (and thus, consumer confidence) steadily increased thereafter for the remainder of the

year (Dugan 2017). The Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR) also conducts Florida-specific surveys similar to Gallup's nationwide survey to determine Consumer Sentiment Index. Approximately five-hundred adult Florida residents are surveyed by telephone monthly via random digit dialing of cell phone numbers and asked two questions about current financial conditions and three questions about future expectations. Results are tallied and assigned a value between two and one-hundred fifty, with the year 1966 as a base; numbers over one-hundred mean more optimism than 1966. The mean index is the final figure published. The year 2004 ended with an index value of 90.8 but began 2005 with an index value of 93.4 after the Amendment was passed (BEBR 2018).

CHAPTER 3: THEORY & HYPOTHESES

The overarching theory that seems to best explain support for increasing the minimum wage is economic self-interest. People or groups who believe that increasing the minimum wage would help them directly are more likely to support the increase. In contrast, people or groups who believe they will receive no direct benefit, or even harm, are more likely to oppose an increase. These groups were divided into three types (demographic, socio-economic, and political) and hypotheses were formulated based upon these groupings as follows:

Demographic Groups:

H1: There is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of working women in a county. Women on average make less money than men and thus are more likely to be economically insecure. In addition, some previous surveys have found that women were more likely to support the minimum wage increases than men.

H2: There is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of African American residents in a county. Previous studies have shown that African Americans are more likely to remain at or close to the minimum wage. If these studies are accurate, it reasons that this demographic will benefit greatly from an increase in the minimum wage and will be more likely to vote in favor of any amendments to accomplish this goal.

H3: There is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the

percentage of Hispanics in a county. Florida's Hispanic population is largely comprised of Cuban Americans and Puerto Ricans. Younger Cuban Americans of working age are far more likely to be Democrats than their elders and would favor any amendment to increase the minimum wage. Puerto Ricans also lean Democratic and are more likely to support liberal policies.

H4: There is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of younger working (and voting) age residents in a county (ages 20-34). Younger workers are more likely to be earning salaries close to the minimum wage. If they do earn salaries above the minimum wage, they are likely to receive a pay increase to maintain the gap between their salaries and the salaries of those in the organization currently earning minimum wage. Therefore, it reasons that this demographic would support minimum wage increases.

H5: There is a negative relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of residents over sixty-five years of age in a given county. Since most individuals within this demographic have exited the workforce, it reasons that these voters will not be motivated by an increase in the minimum wage and may even fear inflation will result; inflated prices are more difficult to adjust to when working with a fixed income.

Socioeconomic Groups:

H6: There is a negative relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of married couples in a county. A Magellan Strategies survey showed married men and women were less likely to support minimum wage increases than were single men and women. This could be due to the additional financial security enjoyed by households in which there are two earners, versus households in which there is only one individual responsible for carrying the load.

H7: There is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of people living in poverty in a county. Due to inflation, workers earning at or near the minimum wage are either under or very close to the federal poverty line. Any increases in the minimum wage would be welcome for these workers.

H8: There is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of adults with a high school education or less in a county. Adults at this education level are more likely to be earning wages at or near the minimum wage, and would thus have much to benefit from an increase.

Political Groups

H9: There is a negative relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of Republicans registered in a county. Republicans tend to be more fiscally-conservative than their Democratic counterparts and will be less likely to support the Amendment.

H10: There is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of Democrats registered in a county. Democrats are more likely to support liberal economic policies; therefore, this is a large support base for minimum wage increases. Voters in “blue” counties are more likely to show support for the Amendment by greater margins than will “red” counties.

H11: There is a negative relationship on the county level between support for the Amendment and the percentage of votes in favor of George W. Bush during the 2004 Election. It is possible that voters who favor Republican candidates will also be loath to support progressive amendments.

CHAPTER 4: DATA & METHODOLOGY

As previously stated, the purpose of this research is to attempt to explain the variance between Florida's sixty-seven counties with respect to support for the 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment, and use the findings to draw reasonable conclusions regarding the viability of future minimum wage increases. The unit of analysis for this study is the county, and the following variables were measured:

Dependent Variable:

Support for the Amendment- the percentage of votes in favor of Florida's 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment as reported by the Florida Division of Elections (Table A, Appendix). Votes both in favor and against were reported individually for all sixty-seven of Florida's counties. These totals were converted to percentages and compiled in spreadsheet format.

Independent Variables:

Working Women- the percentage of women working in the civilian labor force in a county as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census. The 2000 U.S. Census reports the percentage of women in the civilian labor force over sixteen years of age for each of Florida's sixty-seven counties. Even though the legal voting age is eighteen, percentages were not reported for this specific age bracket. However, it is doubtful that the percentage of women sixteen and seventeen years of age included within the

figures is high enough to have a significant impact on the reported percentage.

African American Residents- the percentage of African Americans living in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census.

Hispanic Residents- the percentage of Hispanic/Latino residents living in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census.

Younger Working-Age Residents- the percentage of residents aged twenty to thirty-four living in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census. Percentages for this age group were reported by the Census in two separate rows: twenty to twenty-four years of age and twenty-five to thirty-four years of age. Percentages for both rows were added together to come up with a single percentage for each county.

Retirees- the percentage of residents aged sixty-five years or older living in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census.

Married Couples- the percentage of married couple families living in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census. The Census reports married couples with and without their own children, but the presence of children in a family does not negate the fact that married couples enjoy greater financial security than single individuals as a general rule. Therefore, figures representing "Married-couple family" were chosen for the analysis.

Poverty Rate- the official poverty rate for each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census. The Census Bureau reports 1999 poverty rates for

numerous familial arrangements, but the category this study is concerned with is the percentage of individual residents below the federal poverty level. The poverty threshold for individual residents under sixty-five years of age in 1999 was an annual amount of \$8,667. The percentages compiled list the percent of Florida residents by county that are below this threshold.

Low Education- the percentage of residents with a high school education or less for each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census. Figure reported was for residents aged twenty-five years or older.

Democrats- the percentage of registered Democrats in each of Florida's counties as reported by the Florida Division of Elections YTD Voter Registration Report for 2004. The total number of residents registered as Democrats in each county was given, along with the total number of registered voters for each county as a whole. The number was converted to a percentage, and all are listed in Table B of the Appendix.

Republicans- the percentage of registered Republicans in each of Florida's counties as reported by the Florida Division of Elections YTD Voter Registration Report for 2004. The total number of residents registered as Republicans in each county was given, along with the total number of registered voters for each county as a whole. The number was converted to a percentage, and all are listed in Table B of the Appendix.

Presidential Votes- the percentage of votes for George W. Bush in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the Florida Division of Elections for the 2004 election. Total votes cast for all presidential and vice-presidential candidates

were given for each of Florida's counties in table format in the Division of Elections' archives. Total votes for each county were tallied, and then divided by votes for Bush/Cheney to convert total votes to percentages. These percentages are listed in Table B in the Appendix.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH ANALYSIS

The counties with the lowest and highest values and the mean and statewide averages for each variable were identified; all are summarized in Table 5.1 on page 26. The lowest percentage of support (58.79%) came from Lafayette County in the Big Bend area of the state and the greatest percentage of support (80.87%) was found in Broward County. A couple of additional points worth noting from the table are, first, while studies show that African Americans are more likely to remain at or close to the minimum wage, the county with the lowest percentage of African Americans (Pasco, 2.10%) still showed support for the Amendment at a rate over 70% as Table A in the Appendix shows.

Second, out of all sixty-seven counties in Florida, seven appeared in the table more than once: Charlotte, Alachua, Clay, Gadsden, Liberty, Leon, and Okaloosa. It should come as no surprise that the county with the lowest percentage of residents aged twenty to thirty-four, Charlotte County, would also have the highest percentage of residents over age sixty-five, or that the county with the lowest poverty rate, Clay County, would also have the highest percentage of married couples (dual-income households). Partisanship is evident in Gadsden, Liberty, and Okaloosa Counties, with Gadsden County showing the lowest percentage of votes for Bush. Liberty County had the lowest percentage of registered Republicans and, thus, the highest percentage

of registered Democrats. Okaloosa County had the highest percentage of registered Republicans.

TABLE 5.1: County & Statewide Variable Summary

| VARIABLES (DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT *): | LOWEST VALUE: | HIGHEST VALUE: | MEAN VALUE: | STANDARD DEVIATION: | STATEWIDE VALUE: |
|---|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------|
| SUPPORT FOR AMENDMENT (DEPENDENT) | 58.79% (Lafayette) | 80.87% (Broward) | 69.32% | 4.54% | 71.30% |
| WORKING WOMEN IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE* | 34.60% (Sumter) | 63.90% (Leon) | 50.36% | 6.33% | 52.60% |
| AFRICAN AMERICAN RESIDENTS* | 2.10% (Pasco) | 57.10% (Gadsden) | 13.93% | 9.85% | 14.60% |
| HISPANIC RESIDENTS* | 1.50% (Nassau & Taylor) | 57.30% (Miami-Dade) | 8.53% | 9.97% | 16.80% |
| RESIDENTS AGED 20-34* | 10.60% (Charlotte) | 30.90% (Alachua) | 18.50% | 4.21% | 18.80% |
| RESIDENTS AGED 65+* | 7.50% (Union) | 34.70% (Charlotte) | 17.51% | 7.00% | 17.60% |
| MARRIED COUPLES* | 38.80% (Alachua) | 63.80% (Clay) | 54.00% | 5.17% | 50.40% |
| POVERTY RATE* | 6.80% (Clay) | 24.60% (Hardee) | 14.35% | 4.83% | 12.50% |
| RESIDENTS WITH HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR LESS* | 29.80% (Leon) | 74.90% (Liberty) | 56.51% | 8.96% | 28.70%** |
| REGISTERED DEMOCRATS* | 24.30% (Collier) | 87.90% (Liberty) | 50.68% | 17.86% | 41.31% |
| REGISTERED REPUBLICANS* | 8.20% (Liberty) | 57.20% (Okaloosa) | 34.02% | 12.56% | 37.73% |
| PRESIDENTIAL VOTES-BUSH* | 29.80% (Gadsden) | 77.73% (Baker) | 59.52% | 10.66% | 52.10% |

**Figure based on residents aged 25 or older.

(Sources: U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Summary Files 1 & 3: <https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk> & https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_00_SF#_DP2&prodType=table & Florida Department of State, Voter Registration YTD Report 2004: <http://dos.myflorida.com/elections/data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/voter-registration-monthly-reports/>)

After data collection was completed, regression analysis was performed on each of the variables to determine the exact nature of the relationship (if any) between the independent and dependent variables, controlling for multicollinearity.

Section 1: Univariate Analysis

In this study, the dependent variable was the percentage of support for the Amendment in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties. Table A in the Appendix shows that the highest percentage of support came from Broward County (80.87%), followed by St. Lucie, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Okeechobee Counties. The county with the lowest percentage of support was Lafayette County at 58.79%. The mean percentage was 69.32% and a total of twenty-eight counties exceeded this average. Twenty-one of the twenty-eight counties exceeding the average were located in Central and South Florida, with only five in the Panhandle and two in the Big Bend exceeding the mean. Statewide, the percentage of approval for the Amendment was 71.30%.

The first independent variable analyzed was the percentage of working women over sixteen years of age in the civilian labor force as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census. According to Table 5.1, the county with the highest percentage was Leon County at 63.90% and the county with the lowest percentage, 34.60%, was Sumter. The mean percentage for all of Florida's sixty-seven counties was 50.36%, and the statewide value was 52.60%. Out of the thirty-three counties with percentages of working women exceeding the mean, the vast majority are concentrated in the

Northeastern part of the state as well as in the Panhandle.

The second independent variable analyzed was the percentage of African American residents in each county as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau. As Table 5.1 reports, Gadsden County had the highest percentage of African American residents (57.10%) and Pasco County had the lowest percentage (2.10%). The mean percentage for all of Florida's sixty-seven counties was 13.93%, and the statewide value was 14.60%. Over three-quarters of the counties with populations exceeding the mean were found in the northern part of the state.

The third independent variable analyzed was the percentage of Hispanic residents in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau. As illustrated in Table 5.1, the county with the highest percentage of Hispanic residents was Miami-Dade at 57.30%. Two counties, Nassau and Taylor, had the lowest percentage at 1.50%. The mean percentage for all of Florida's sixty-seven counties was 8.53%, and the statewide percentage was 16.80%. Of the nineteen counties with populations exceeding the mean, the vast majority were located in counties that approved the Amendment with over 70% of the vote.

Another independent variable analyzed was the percentage of residents aged twenty to thirty-four in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties. As reported by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau and summarized in Table 5.1, Alachua County had the highest percentage (30.90%) and Charlotte County had the lowest percentage (10.60%). The

mean percentage for all sixty-seven counties was 18.50%, and the statewide percentage was 18.80%. No discernable pattern could be detected.

The fifth independent variable analyzed was the percentage of residents aged sixty-five years or older as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau. As Table 5.1 illustrates, the county with the highest percentage was Charlotte, with 34.70% of its residents falling within this age bracket and the lowest percentage was Union County at 7.50%. The mean percentage of Florida residents aged sixty-five years or older was 17.51%, and twenty-five counties (all located in Central and South Florida) exceeded this percentage.

The sixth independent variable analyzed was the percentage of married couples in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties. As reported by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau and summarized in Table 5.1, the county with the highest percentage of married couples was Clay County at 63.80%. The county with the lowest percentage was Alachua County at 38.80%, which came in much lower than the mean percentage of 54% for all counties. Thirty-eight counties exceeded the mean, and the statewide percentage was reported as 50.40%. No discernable pattern could be detected.

The next independent variable analyzed was the percentage of residents below the poverty rate for each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau. Table 5.1 shows that Hardee County had the highest percentage of

residents living below the poverty rate (24.60%), and Clay County had the lowest percentage (6.80%). The mean value was 14.35%, just slightly higher than the statewide value of 12.50%.

The eighth independent variable analyzed was the percentage of residents aged twenty-five years or older with a high school education or less as reported by the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau. As shown in Table 5.1, the county with the highest percentage of residents at this level was Liberty County, with 74.90% of its residents only attaining a high school education at most. The county with the smallest percentage of its residents with a high school education or less was Leon County at 29.80%. The mean value for all sixty-seven counties was 56.51%, much higher than the statewide value of 28.70%.

Another independent variable analyzed was the percentage of registered Democrats for each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2004 Florida Division of Elections YTD Voter Registration Report. As Table 5.1 summarizes, the county with the highest percentage of registered Democrats was Liberty County (87.90%) and the lowest percentage of registered Democrats was reported in Collier County (24.30%). The mean value for all sixty-seven counties was 50.68%, and the statewide value was 41.31%. Values for the remaining sixty-five counties can be found in Table B in the Appendix.

The tenth independent variable to be analyzed was the percentage of registered Republicans in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties as reported by the 2004 Florida Division of Elections YTD Voter Registration Report. As shown in Table 5.1, the county

with the highest percentage of registered Republicans was Okaloosa County (57.20%) and the county with the lowest percentage was Liberty County at 8.20%. The mean value for all sixty-seven counties was 34.02%, not much lower than the statewide value of 37.73%. While some counties with more registered Republicans than Democrats did vote in favor of the Amendment with percentages over 70%, the vast majority had lower percentages of approval. Values for all sixty-seven counties can be found in Table B in the Appendix.

The final independent variable to be analyzed was the percentage of votes for George W. Bush in the 2004 General Election as reported by the Florida Division of Elections and summarized in Table 5.1. The county showing the highest percentage of votes for Bush was Baker County (77.73%) and the county with the lowest percentage was Gadsden at 29.80%. The mean value for all sixty-seven counties was 59.52% and the statewide value was 52.10%. Table B in the Appendix lists the percentages for the remaining sixty-five counties.

TABLE 5.2: Explaining Variance in County Support: Bivariate Linear Regression Analysis

| INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: | B: | T: | STD. ERROR: | SIG. : | ADJ. R SQ.: |
|--|-------|--------|-------------|---------|-------------|
| WORKING WOMEN IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE | -.139 | -1.597 | .087 | .115 | .023 |
| AFRICAN AMERICAN RESIDENTS | .069 | 1.221 | .057 | .227 | .007 |
| HISPANIC RESIDENTS | .153 | 2.880 | .053 | .005*** | .100 |
| RESIDENTS AGED 20-34 | -.169 | -1.285 | .132 | .204 | .010 |
| RESIDENTS AGED 65+ | .150 | 1.918 | .078 | .060* | .039 |
| MARRIED COUPLES | -.269 | -2.598 | .104 | .012** | .080 |
| POVERTY RATE | .028 | .238 | .116 | .813 | -.015 |
| RESIDENTS WITH HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR LESS | .008 | .127 | .063 | .900 | -.015 |
| REGISTERED DEMOCRATS | .011 | .345 | .031 | .731 | -.014 |
| REGISTERED REPUBLICANS | -.071 | -1.613 | .044 | .112 | .024 |
| PRESIDENTIAL VOTES-BUSH | -.287 | -7.355 | .039 | .000*** | .446 |

Significance levels: ***<.01, **<.05, *<.10

Section 2: Bivariate Analysis

After data for each independent variable was collected and analyzed, bivariate regression was run for each variable to test its relationship to the dependent variable. Table 5.2 on the previous page displays the results of each separate regression analysis. Due to a small sample size of only sixty-seven counties, a relationship was deemed statistically significant at .10 or less. Four variables were statistically significant including Hispanic residents, senior citizens, married couples, and the vote for Bush. Variables that did not achieve statistical significance include working women, African Americans, residents aged twenty to thirty-four, poverty rate, lower- educated residents, registered Republicans, and registered Democrats.

As Table 5.2 shows, the percentage of Hispanic residents in a county has a positive, statistically significant relationship with the percentage of votes in favor of the Amendment. This supports the hypothesis that counties with larger percentages of Hispanic residents will show stronger support for increasing the minimum wage. For every 1% increase in the Hispanic population of a county, percentage of approval for the Amendment increases by .153 %.

The model also tested the relationship between the percentage of residents aged sixty-five or older in a county and votes in favor of the Amendment. It was hypothesized that residents falling within this age bracket would be less likely to support an increase in the minimum wage for fear that inflation will result, thus presenting a hardship for residents on a fixed income. According to Table 5.2, there was a positive, statistically

significant relationship between these two variables. This finding contradicted the hypothesis that a negative relationship would exist; instead, for every 1% increase in the number of residents aged sixty-five or older, the percentage of approval increased .150 percent.

The next independent variable tested was the percentage of married couples living in each county. Since dual income households tend to be more financially-secure and less concerned with minimum wage increases, it was expected that a larger percentage of married couples would result in fewer votes in favor of the Amendment. As expected, the variables demonstrated a negative statistically significant relationship and the results in Table 5.2 support the hypothesis: for every 1% increase in the number of married couples living in a county, the percentage of approval for the Amendment decreased by .269%.

The model also looked at the percentage of votes for President Bush during the 2004 General Election. According to the results, the percentage of votes for President Bush had a negative, statistically significant relationship with approval for the Amendment. A 1% increase in the vote for President Bush was associated with a .287% decrease in approval for the Amendment. This supports the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between support for the more progressive Amendment and the percentage of votes in favor of George W. Bush.

The first independent variable tested that did not show statistical significance was the percentage of working women over sixteen years of age in the civilian labor force. As Table 5.2 shows, the level of significance was only slightly above the threshold established, and there is a negative relationship between the number of working women in a county and votes in favor of the Amendment. This result can be interpreted to mean that, contrary to what was hypothesized that more working women in a county would translate to more votes in favor of raising the minimum wage, the opposite was true. For every 1% increase in the number of working women reported in a county, approval for the Amendment decreased by .139%.

The second independent variable tested was the percentage of African Americans in a county. Unexpectedly, this variable had no statistically significant relationship with votes in favor of the Amendment as demonstrated in Table 5.2. This does not meet the expectation hypothesized that, the more African Americans there are residing in a county, the higher the percentage of approval will be for the Amendment.

An additional independent variable tested by the model was the percentage of residents in a county aged twenty to thirty-four. As demonstrated by Table 5.2, there was no statistically significant relationship between the variables, contradicting the hypothesis offered that a larger percentage of county residents falling within this age demographic will translate to stronger support for the Amendment.

Another independent variable tested that did not show statistical significance was the percentage of residents in a county living below the federal poverty rate. This result was unexpected, as it was hypothesized that residents living in poverty were more likely to be employed at or beneath the minimum wage. Since poverty and lack of education tend to go hand-in-hand, results were expected to be the same for the next variable: educational attainment. As Table 5.2 shows, there was no statistically significant relationship between the percentage of residents in a county aged twenty-five years or older with a high school diploma or less and the percentage of approval for the Amendment as a result of bivariate analysis.

The next independent variable measured in this analysis was the percentage of registered Democrats in a county. Surprisingly, the results of the analysis did not reveal a statistically significant relationship, and contradicted the hypothesis that the greater the number of registered Democrats in a county, the higher the percentage of approval would be. Results for the analysis of the final independent variable were similar to the results obtained in the analysis of the independent variable above: no statistically significant relationship existed between the percentage of registered Republicans in a county and support for the Amendment. Since support for the Amendment crossed party lines, this result could be interpreted to mean that Florida has less of a partisan divide than other states. In addition, party registration and party affiliation may not be one and the same for all voters; registration alone may not accurately reflect voter behavior at the polls (Pew Research Center 2012).

Section 3: Multivariate Analysis

After performing bivariate regression for each variable separately, a multivariate linear regression was run removing two of the independent variables: the percentage of registered Democrats in a county and the percentage of registered Republicans in a county. The initial full model (see Appendix II, Table A) excluded these variables in order to get a more accurate picture of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable with only one variable representing partisanship. Since neither voter registration variable was significant in the bivariate model, they were excluded. As shown in Table A in Appendix II, R Square for this particular full model was .719, indicating the model explained almost seventy-two percent of the variance in county votes for the Amendment and the adjusted R Square was reported as .675.

Unfortunately, this model showed signs of multicollinearity, with several variance inflation factors (VIF) above the typical threshold level of five. As shown in Table A of Appendix II, three variables displayed high VIF: working women in the civilian labor force, residents aged twenty to thirty-four, and residents aged sixty-five or older. To remedy multicollinearity, the first two listed variables were removed from the model. The variable representing working woman was removed first, as the associated VIF was 11.582 and it was highly correlated with the percentage of residents over the age of 65. Table B of Appendix II displays the full model after this adjustment was made. As the results show, R Square showed a value of .644, which indicated the model now explained just over 64% of the variance in county votes for the Amendment.

After the new model was run, the variable representing residents aged sixty-five or older reported a VIF of 4.775, putting the variable below the tolerance level of five. However, the model still exhibited signs of multicollinearity as residents aged twenty to thirty-four had a VIF of 5.619 and was highly correlated with senior citizens. Thus, the variable for these younger residents was excluded from the full model.

Table 5.3 below displays the results from the resulting full model. VIF for all variables was within range (all below four), demonstrating an effective control for 63% of the variance in county vote for the Amendment. Votes for President Bush seems to be the most important explanatory variable. It was statistically significant and had the highest standardized coefficient (Beta) at $-.804$, thus indicating that this variable had the largest impact on votes in favor of the Amendment. This particular impact is negative and results can be interpreted to mean that, for every 1% increase in votes cast for President Bush, support for the Amendment fell by .342%.

Table 5.3: Multivariate Regression-Final Full Model-Votes for Bush

| | B: | STD. ERROR: | BETA: | SIG.: | VIF: |
|--|-----------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| (CONSTANT) | 86.363 | 5.370 | | P <.001*** | |
| AFRICAN AMERICAN RESIDENTS | -.098 | .061 | -.213 | .115 | 2.802 |
| HISPANIC RESIDENTS | .112 | .046 | .246 | .019** | 1.652 |
| RESIDENTS AGED 65+ | -.014 | .073 | -.022 | .848 | 2.016 |
| MARRIED COUPLES | -.110 | .131 | -.125 | .403 | 3.507 |
| POVERTY RATE | -.201 | .128 | -.214 | .123 | 2.956 |
| RESIDENTS WITH HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR LESS | .263 | .063 | .518 | P <.001*** | 2.429 |
| PRESIDENTIAL VOTES-BUSH | -.342 | .064 | -.804 | P <.001*** | 3.612 |

P-VALUE: ***=.01 **=.05 *=.10

R SQUARE: .628 ADJ.R SQUARE: .584 F: 14.23 SIG: .000

The percentage of Hispanics in a county and the percentage of residents with a high school diploma or less were also statistically significant and show a positive relationship with votes for the Amendment (.112 and .263 respectively). The results can be interpreted to mean that, for every 1% increase in the percentage of Hispanics in a county, support for the Amendment increased .112%. In addition, for every 1% increase in the number of residents in a county with a high school diploma or less, support for the Amendment increased .263%.

The finding for Hispanics supports the hypothesis that percentage of approval for the Amendment increases as Hispanic populations increase. Southeast Florida showed the largest support for the Amendment, and the counties within that region also had the largest percentage of Hispanic residents. The percentage of support in the counties with the top five largest percentages of Hispanics (DeSoto, Hardee, Hendry, Miami-Dade, and Osceola) was no less than 65%.

The finding for educational attainment as it relates to support for the Amendment supports the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of adults with a high school education or less in a county. Adults at this education level or more likely to be earning wages at or near the minimum wage, and would thus have much to benefit from an increase.

The variables that were not statistically significant were the percentage of African American residents in a county, residents aged sixty-five or older, married couples, and

residents below the federal poverty rate. A large percentage of residents falling within certain demographics in a county may not necessarily translate into large percentages of votes at the polls. For example, out of the twenty-seven counties that passed the Amendment with margins over 70%, only fourteen had percentages of African American residents over 10%. In addition, out of the twenty-one counties with over 17% of residents living at or below the federal poverty line, only ten had an approval percentage over 70%.

As to residents over sixty-five years of age, it was hypothesized that the majority of voters in this demographic were not active participants in the workforce and would not have much to gain by an increase in the minimum wage. Further, these voters may actually have believed they would lose out due to inflation caused by more disposable income being injected into the economy. As a result, this demographic would be less likely to vote for the Amendment. However, it is possible that some voters in this age bracket considered themselves secure and were thinking of the well-being of future generations (possibly grandchildren) when casting votes for the Amendment. Results were not statistically significant.

Even though the Magellan Strategies survey showed that married couples were less likely to support the Amendment, thus resulting in a negative statistically significant relationship, no such relationship existed. It is probable that, while results of the survey seemed to support this hypothesis, the survey was conducted on an

individual basis while this analysis was concerned with results on a county-wide basis.

The estimated 2004 vote for each county was then calculated using the full regression model and compared to the actual vote (see Table 5.4 following). The difference in predicted vote and actual vote by county seems close. Only four counties had a predicted vote more than 4% higher than the actual vote and only five counties had a predicted vote more than 4% lower than the actual vote. Or, put another way, the estimate for 58 out of 67 counties (almost 87%) was within plus/minus 4% from their actual vote. The estimates fell within plus/minus 2% for over half of the counties.

The model estimated too high for the large contiguous counties of Hillsborough and Manatee, where actual support was less than predicted. Polk and Pasco Counties were also in the top seven counties in terms of having a lower actual vote than predicted. Clearly, the model did not work quite as well for the Tampa region; there may be some unknown underlying variable that would reduce predicted support and help improve the model fit for this area. Tampa is a closely divided swing region with voters often displaying an independent streak, so perhaps this county-level model is just not precise enough to capture subtle differences between individual Tampa voters.

Conversely, the actual vote was higher than the predicted vote in the three adjoining western-most Panhandle counties: Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, and Escambia. It may be that a measure of conservative ideology separate from party voting would help improve the fit of the model, since the Pensacola media market is known as one of the more conservative areas in the state. However, paradoxically, conservative ideology is

normally associated with opposition to increases in the minimum wage and so inclusion of that variable might make the discrepancy between predicted and actual values worse. This region is also home to many active and retired military and it is possible that many enlisted personnel and retirees on fixed incomes would support an increase in the minimum wage despite having conservative views on other social issues.

The actual county vote was higher than predicted in Dixie and Hamilton but lower than predicted in Lafayette and Gilchrist. This suggests that there is no underlying North-central Florida regional factor affecting the model. Predictions were not quite as close for these neighboring counties, but the error was spread in both directions.

Table 5.4: Estimated County Vote for 2004 Florida Minimum Wage Amendment from the Regression Model and Difference from Actual Vote

| COUNTY: | ACTUAL VOTE 2004 AMENDMENT: | ESTIMATED VOTE 2004 AMENDMENT: | DIFFERENCE ESTIMATED MINUS ACTUAL: |
|----------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| Hillsborough | 63.87 | 71.25 | 7.38 |
| Lafayette | 58.79 | 66.04 | 7.25 |
| Manatee | 65.10 | 70.82 | 5.73 |
| Gilchrist | 62.08 | 67.09 | 5.01 |
| Highlands | 65.59 | 69.19 | 3.60 |
| Pasco | 70.36 | 73.77 | 3.41 |
| Polk | 67.19 | 70.57 | 3.38 |
| Suwannee | 63.29 | 66.38 | 3.10 |
| Nassau | 62.39 | 64.72 | 2.33 |
| Leon | 67.61 | 69.82 | 2.21 |
| Collier | 64.49 | 66.64 | 2.15 |
| Levy | 67.32 | 69.47 | 2.15 |
| Clay | 60.59 | 62.67 | 2.08 |
| Madison | 68.23 | 70.15 | 1.92 |
| Hardee | 65.17 | 67.01 | 1.85 |
| Orange | 70.28 | 72.08 | 1.80 |
| Alachua | 67.17 | 68.94 | 1.77 |
| Brevard | 66.87 | 68.61 | 1.74 |
| Baker | 63.16 | 64.83 | 1.67 |
| Putnam | 68.78 | 70.08 | 1.30 |
| Wakulla | 69.12 | 70.23 | 1.11 |
| Jefferson | 70.18 | 71.29 | 1.10 |
| Lee | 68.77 | 69.75 | 0.98 |
| Bradford | 66.01 | 66.99 | 0.97 |
| Union | 64.95 | 65.90 | 0.95 |

| | | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Lake | 68.76 | 69.68 | 0.92 |
| Seminole | 65.88 | 66.78 | 0.90 |
| Sarasota | 68.08 | 68.94 | 0.86 |
| Gadsden | 75.55 | 76.39 | 0.84 |
| Hernando | 72.62 | 73.43 | 0.81 |
| Taylor | 68.74 | 69.54 | 0.80 |
| Pinellas | 72.08 | 72.77 | 0.69 |
| St. Johns | 63.18 | 63.86 | 0.68 |
| Columbia | 66.53 | 66.95 | 0.43 |
| Marion | 70.72 | 70.46 | -0.25 |
| Volusia | 73.52 | 73.23 | -0.28 |
| Sumter | 69.47 | 69.16 | -0.31 |
| Palm Beach | 75.56 | 75.07 | -0.49 |
| Indian River | 68.82 | 68.28 | -0.53 |
| Liberty | 71.17 | 70.48 | -0.69 |
| Calhoun | 69.23 | 68.45 | -0.79 |
| Osceola | 75.94 | 75.11 | -0.82 |
| Holmes | 66.26 | 65.30 | -0.97 |
| Hendry | 72.24 | 71.26 | -0.98 |
| Duval | 68.75 | 67.71 | -1.04 |
| Martin | 70.31 | 69.08 | -1.24 |
| Citrus | 73.51 | 72.03 | -1.48 |
| Glades | 73.89 | 72.39 | -1.49 |
| Miami-Dade | 77.79 | 76.23 | -1.56 |
| Gulf | 69.01 | 67.34 | -1.68 |
| Walton | 66.57 | 64.80 | -1.77 |
| DeSoto | 72.90 | 70.66 | -2.24 |
| Charlotte | 74.18 | 71.65 | -2.53 |
| Jackson | 70.27 | 67.58 | -2.68 |
| Franklin | 74.13 | 71.22 | -2.91 |
| Washington | 68.26 | 65.30 | -2.96 |
| St. Lucie | 78.50 | 75.22 | -3.29 |

| | | | |
|------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Broward | 80.87 | 77.55 | -3.32 |
| Monroe | 77.10 | 73.77 | -3.34 |
| Bay | 68.05 | 64.44 | -3.61 |
| Flagler | 74.56 | 70.83 | -3.73 |
| Okeechobee | 76.65 | 72.75 | -3.90 |
| Dixie | 72.46 | 68.36 | -4.10 |
| Hamilton | 74.06 | 69.87 | -4.19 |
| Okaloosa | 64.78 | 60.56 | -4.21 |
| Escambia | 68.84 | 64.51 | -4.33 |
| Santa Rosa | 67.56 | 61.42 | -6.14 |

Table 5.5: Multivariate Regression-Best Model

| | B: | STD. ERROR: | BETA: | SIG.: | VIF: |
|--|-----------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| (CONSTANT) | 79.405 | 2.777 | | P <.001*** | |
| HISPANIC RESIDENTS | 0.93 | .039 | .205 | .021** | 1.084 |
| RESIDENTS WITH HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR LESS | .154 | .045 | .304 | .001*** | 1.148 |
| PRESIDENTIAL VOTES-BUSH | -.309 | .039 | -.726 | P <.001*** | 1.189 |

P-VALUE: ***=.01 **=.05 *=.10

R SQUARE: .563 ADJ.R SQUARE: .542 F: 27.047 SIG: .000

Table 5.6: Predicted Votes-Proposed 2020 Amendment & Difference from Actual

Votes-2004 Amendment

| COUNTY: | % OF APPROVAL- 2004 AMENDMENT: | PREDICTED VALUE OF 2020 MIN. WAGE AMENDMENT: | DIFFERENCE: |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------|
| Alachua | 67.17% | 73.63% | 6.46% |
| Baker | 63.16% | 63.29% | 0.13% |
| Bay | 68.05% | 64.42% | -3.63% |
| Bradford | 66.01% | 66.22% | 0.21% |
| Brevard | 66.87% | 68.12% | 1.25% |
| Broward | 80.87% | 78.30% | -2.57% |
| Calhoun | 69.23% | 65.99% | -3.24% |
| Charlotte | 74.18% | 67.55% | -6.63% |
| Citrus | 73.51% | 66.55% | -6.96% |
| Clay | 60.59% | 64.69% | 4.10% |
| Collier | 64.49% | 69.00% | 4.51% |
| Columbia | 66.53% | 65.58% | -0.95% |
| DeSoto | 72.90% | 73.65% | 0.75% |
| Dixie | 72.46% | 64.76% | -7.70% |
| Duval | 68.75% | 71.06% | 2.31% |
| Escambia | 68.84% | 67.57% | -1.27% |
| Flagler | 74.56% | 68.54% | -6.02% |
| Franklin | 74.13% | 67.23% | -6.90% |
| Gadsden | 75.55% | 79.65% | 4.10% |
| Gilchrist | 62.08% | 63.72% | 1.64% |
| Glades | 73.89% | 70.22% | -3.67% |
| Gulf | 69.01% | 65.32% | -3.69% |
| Hamilton | 74.06% | 70.89% | -3.17% |
| Hardee | 65.17% | 64.83% | -0.34% |
| Hendry | 72.24% | 77.46% | 5.22% |

| | | | |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Hernando | 72.62% | 68.66% | -3.96% |
| Highlands | 65.59% | 69.29% | 3.70% |
| Hillsborough | 63.87% | 74.17% | 10.30% |
| Holmes | 66.26% | 62.19% | -4.07% |
| Indian River | 68.82% | 68.28% | -0.54% |
| Jackson | 70.27% | 67.52% | -2.75% |
| Jefferson | 70.18% | 71.90% | 1.72% |
| Lafayette | 58.79% | 65.09% | 6.30% |
| Lake | 68.76% | 69.09% | 0.33% |
| Lee | 68.77% | 69.86% | 1.09% |
| Leon | 67.61% | 72.96% | 5.35% |
| Levy | 67.32% | 67.11% | -0.21% |
| Liberty | 71.17% | 66.65% | -4.52% |
| Madison | 68.23% | 70.92% | 2.69% |
| Manatee | 65.10% | 69.70% | 4.60% |
| Marion | 70.72% | 69.21% | -1.51% |
| Martin | 70.31% | 66.98% | -3.33% |
| Miami-Dade | 77.79% | 82.42% | 4.63% |
| Monroe | 77.10% | 71.29% | -5.81% |
| Nassau | 62.39% | 63.45% | 1.06% |
| Okaloosa | 64.78% | 63.37% | -1.41% |
| Okeechobee | 76.65% | 70.48% | -6.17% |
| Orange | 70.28% | 76.85% | 6.57% |
| Osceola | 75.94% | 80.23% | 4.29% |
| Palm Beach | 75.56% | 74.36% | -1.20% |
| Pasco | 70.36% | 69.33% | -1.02% |
| Pinellas | 72.08% | 71.07% | -1.01% |
| Polk | 67.19% | 72.10% | 4.91% |
| Putnam | 68.78% | 68.99% | 0.21% |

| | | | |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Santa Rosa | 67.56% | 62.50% | -5.06% |
| Sarasota | 68.08% | 69.14% | 1.06% |
| Seminole | 65.88% | 70.51% | 4.63% |
| St. Johns | 63.18% | 64.06% | 0.88% |
| St. Lucie | 78.50% | 73.03% | -5.47% |
| Sumter | 69.47% | 64.61% | -4.86% |
| Suwannee | 63.29% | 65.77% | 2.48% |
| Taylor | 68.74% | 66.44% | -2.29% |
| Union | 64.95% | 64.63% | -0.32% |
| Volusia | 73.52% | 70.35% | -3.17% |
| Wakulla | 69.12% | 66.07% | -3.05% |
| Walton | 66.57% | 62.56% | -4.01% |
| Washington | 68.26% | 65.14% | -3.12% |

After the multivariate linear regression was performed and the final full model obtained, a best model was run only including the three independent variables that were statistically significant in the full model along with the dependent variable. The best model, displayed in Table 5.5 preceding, was also statistically significant and explained just over 53% of the variance. As was the case in the final full model, VIF was well within range for all the variables (all below two), and votes for President Bush was again the most explanatory variable, followed by residents with a high school education or less and the percentage of Hispanics in a county.

Values from the best model were then used in an attempt to arrive at updated figures for each county for the 2020 General Election should John Morgan's initiative make it to the ballot. First, data was compiled to include the votes for the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, in the 2016 election as reported by the Florida Division of Elections and the percentage of Hispanics and residents with a high school diploma or less for all sixty-seven counties as per the 2013-2017 American Community 5-Year Survey published by the U.S. Census Bureau. The figures were compiled in table format and totals for each variable were multiplied by the b values from the best model. These totals were then plugged into a regression equation using the y-intercept from the 2004 final full model to arrive at the predicted votes for each county.

As shown in Table 5.6 preceding, every county is again predicted to support the 2020 Amendment by percentages of approval over 60%. Miami-Dade County led the

way with an approval percentage of 82.42%, and the lowest percentage of support came from Holmes County at 62.19%. Miami-Dade County experienced an increase of its Hispanic population by over 10% since 2004 and also showed a 7.5% increase in the percentage of its population over twenty-five with a high school diploma or less in the same time period. In contrast, Holmes County did not experience a significant increase in either demographic from 2004 to 2017; the percentage of Hispanics increased less than 1% and the percentage of residents not having continued their education beyond high school only increased by 2.21%. Holmes County also had the highest percentage of support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Election: 87.89%.

The three counties with the next highest percentages of predicted votes for the 2020 Amendment were Osceola (80.23%), Gadsden County (79.65%), and Broward County (78.30%). Both Osceola and Broward Counties experienced significant increases in their Hispanic populations (22.20% and 11.65%, respectively), but Gadsden County's Hispanic population only increased by 3.84%. Gadsden County did, however, report the lowest percentage of votes cast for the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, at 30.43%. Gadsden County showed a nominal increase (2.57%) in the number of residents with a high school education or less but, interestingly, Osceola and Broward Counties both saw decreases of just slightly over 2% in this demographic. Both counties did, however, report a decrease in votes for the Republican candidate.

The greatest increases in the percentage of approval since the 2004 Amendment came from Hillsborough County (10.31%), Orange County (6.57%), and Alachua

County (6.46%). Both Hillsborough and Orange Counties experienced significant increases in the percentage of Hispanics residing in both counties since 2004: 9.45% and 11.35%, respectively. Even though Alachua County's Hispanic population only increased by 3.56%, its support for the Republican candidate decreased from 42.90% to 36.43%. The level of education for each county remained fairly consistent.

The greatest decreases in approval percentages came from Dixie County (-7.70%), Citrus County (-6.96%), and Franklin County (-6.90). In all three counties, support for the Republican presidential candidate increased by over 10% from 2004. In addition, two of the three counties (Citrus & Franklin) experienced a decrease in the number of residents over the age of twenty-five with a high school diploma or less. Dixie County did have an increase in the number of residents within this demographic, but the increase was very nominal; only 2.56%.

Results derived in obtaining the predicted votes continue to support the hypotheses that an increase in the Hispanic population and the number of residents with a high school diploma or less will result in greater percentages of approval for minimum wage amendments. Conversely, votes for the Republican candidate are more likely to result in decreased percentages of approval. Even though these results speak well to these hypotheses, two caveats must be pointed out. First, Morgan's proposed increase is significantly higher than the increase proposed by the 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment. Second, with President Trump having upset many traditional political

calculations, votes for the Republican presidential candidate may not be a good indicator of approval. There is simply not enough pre-election polling data available as of yet to speak to whether or not Trump supporters will remain as such during the next Election.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this study was to attempt to explain variance between Florida's counties with respect to support for the 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment. Eleven independent variables were tested using bivariate regression, and four exhibited a statistically significant relationship to the dependent variable: the percentage of Hispanics in a county, the percentage of residents aged sixty-five or older in a county, the percentage of married couples in a county, and votes for Bush. Two of these variables, the percentage of married couples and votes for Bush, had negative relationships to the dependent variable as was expected; the remaining two exhibited a positive relationship.

A multivariate model was run controlling for multicollinearity among the independent variables. Since neither voter registration variable was significant in the bivariate model, they were excluded when running the multivariate models. Ultimately eight variables were tested, and the votes for the presidential candidate had the most statistically significant impact of all the variables, followed by the percentage of residents with a high school education or less and the percentage of Hispanics in a county. These results are consistent with the hypotheses proposed for each of these variables: there is a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of Hispanics in a county, a positive relationship between support for the Amendment and the percentage of adults with a high school education or less in a

county, and a negative relationship between support for the Amendment and votes for Bush. The model as a whole was statistically significant and explained nearly 63% of the variance between counties. The remaining 37% of the variance not explained by the model may be tied to factors such as the percentage of blue collar versus white collar jobs in a county or the percentage of available jobs in a county.

Estimated votes for each county were calculated using the full regression model and compared to the actual vote, with differences between the two figures very slight. Out of 67 counties, 58 were within plus/minus 4% of their actual vote, and estimates fell within plus/minus 2% for over half of the counties. Model estimates for Hillsborough, Manatee, Lafayette, Gilchrist, Polk, and Pasco Counties were too high; actual support was less than predicted. Conversely, the actual vote was higher than the predicted vote in Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, Escambia, Dixie, and Hamilton Counties.

A best model was run only including the dependent variable and the three statistically significant variables from the full model: votes for President Bush, percentage of Hispanics in a county, and the percentage of adults with a high school education or less in a county. The model was statistically significant and explained over 56% of the variance. Like the final full model, the remaining 44% of the variance not explained by the best model may be tied to the percentage of blue collar versus white collar jobs in a county or the percentage of available jobs in a county. VIF was within range for all three variables; all were below a level of two.

Values from the best model were then used in an attempt to arrive at updated figures for each county for the 2020 General Election should John Morgan's initiative make it to the ballot. Results showed that percentages of approval for all sixty-seven counties was again above 60%, with significant increases in the Hispanic population of some South and Central Florida counties as well as varying support for the Republican presidential candidate explaining some of the increases and decreases. Educational attainment remained fairly unchanged, with only DeSoto County showing a significant increase (17.61%) in the number of residents with a high school diploma or less.

Clearly, partisanship and ideology matters when it comes to explaining variance between the counties. While the Amendment was approved by voters in all sixty-seven counties within the state, the margin of support differed and seemed to speak to the ideological values held by voters in the individual counties. A few of the highest margins of approval were found in Broward, St. Lucie, and Miami-Dade Counties, all counties with a strong Democratic base that supported John Kerry in the 2004 General Election.

On the campaign trail, Kerry spoke repeatedly about strengthening the middle class through tax breaks and job creation. He spoke of giving everyone a chance to build a better life; not just the wealthy. Kerry proposed to roll back tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans and pledged to put an end to "corporate welfare" (Stanford University 2018). Since Democratic voters tend to be more liberal than their Republican counterparts, this rhetoric would have had strong appeal to this voter base. Voters in counties such as Broward, St. Lucie, and Miami-Dade more than likely would have

recognized that the choices open to individuals are sometimes limited by their economic circumstances. They would have believed in a liberal ideology encouraging government involvement to shape these circumstances either through lowering or raising taxes and would have supported not only a liberal candidate, but a constitutional Amendment that promised to raise the minimum wage (Ball et al. 2017).

Voters in more liberal counties may have held hope that, by raising the minimum wage, more disposable income would be put into the pockets of lower-wage workers. These workers would have then spent the money, giving the economy a jump-start and increasing employment. Since the economy was viewed as stagnant at the time of the 2004 General Election, this would have been just the catalyst needed to result in approval of the Amendment by liberal voters residing in the more Democratic counties.

On the other hand, counties with more conservative voters would have been more hesitant with respect to approval of a liberal amendment to raise the minimum wage. Three counties with strong Republican bases that supported George W. Bush during the 2004 General Election and also had lower margins of approval for the Amendment were Gilchrist, Clay, and Lafayette Counties. Votes for Bush in all three of these counties came in at over seventy percent, and they also exhibited the lowest margins of approval for the Amendment in the entire state.

These counties may have had large numbers of voters holding more fiscally-conservative values. These voters may have believed that raising the minimum wage

would cause job loss for lower-skilled workers. To these more conservative voters, forcing businesses to pay higher wages results in these businesses having to charge more for their products or services than a competitive market will allow, possibly resulting in closure. In addition, workers' hours would be reduced and lay-offs would be the end result of increased wage and salary expenses. It is likely that voters within these counties viewed the Amendment as exacerbating an already stagnant economy and would not have been excited to see it pass.

Any hesitation felt by more conservative counties was more than made up for by counties with large numbers of voters with a high school education or less. All but one of the forty-five counties in Florida (Lafayette) with a majority of residents only having obtained a high school education or less voted in favor of the Amendment by over 60%. Nineteen of the forty-five aforementioned counties boasted approval percentages over 70%. In contrast, out of the twenty-two counties with a majority of residents having continued their education beyond high school, only seven approved the Amendment by over 70%. Since workers with only a high school education are more likely to earn wages at or below the minimum wage, support for an Amendment proposing to raise wages would have been met with very little resistance.

It should be noted that, out of fifteen of Florida's counties with a percentage of Hispanic residents over 10%, nine of those counties also reported over 54% of residents with only a high school education or less. This would not be surprising to authors Carole Green and Marianne Ferber. Green and Ferber stated in a 2005 article

published in the *Review of Social Economy* that blacks and Hispanics “have significantly fewer years of education than do whites,” and are also more likely to be high school dropouts (Green and Ferber 2005: 58). It is probable that support for the Amendment appealed to workers within this demographic, hence the final statistically significant variable: the percentage of Hispanics in a county.

It is no coincidence that counties with the highest percentages of Hispanics also had some of the highest percentages of approval for the Amendment. Both Kerry and Bush knew the Hispanic vote would play a crucial role in the outcome of the election and dedicated a significant amount of resources to reaching the Hispanic community, even speaking a few Spanish phrases at the beginning of their speeches (Wharton 2004). Statistics show that about 60% of Hispanics are Democrats and, out of the fifteen counties with Hispanic populations greater than 10%, ten of those counties voted in favor of the Amendment by percentage rates over 70%.

What do these findings mean for future initiatives, such as attorney John Morgan’s, to further raise Florida’s minimum wage? According to an article published in August of 2018 by the Gainesville Sun, Florida’s unemployment rate is nearing an all-time low. However, research by Florida International University shows that almost half of the new jobs are paying \$10.00 an hour or less. Findings showed that the percentage of Floridians in low-wage jobs has actually climbed since the recession, to where the figure now represents one in every five people in the workforce. United Way also conducted a similar study and found that two-thirds of jobs in Florida pay less than \$20.00 an hour,

with an overwhelming number drawing less than \$15.00. This, coupled with an increase in the cost of living is putting a strain on Florida's families. For a family of four to reach what United Way analysts refer to as an "average survival budget", they would need an annual income of \$53,856, which equates to an hourly wage of \$27.00 per hour.

Unfortunately, low-wage jobs are projected to grow faster than higher paying jobs over the next decade, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that 82% of new jobs in Florida through the year 2023 will pay less than \$15.00 per hour (Kennedy 2018). Most of the workers filling these positions will more than likely have no greater than a high school education. If the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' predictions through 2023 are accurate, these workers would have much to gain from a ballot initiative to raise Florida's minimum wage.

Orlando attorney John Morgan's initiative proposes to raise Florida's minimum wage to \$15.00 an hour by the year 2026. If the issue makes the ballot in 2020 and is approved by more than 60% of voters, it would raise the state's minimum wage to \$10.00 per hour as of September 30, 2021, then raise it a dollar each year thereafter until it reaches \$15.00 an hour on September 30, 2026 (Lemongello 2018). If voter trends exhibited at the time of passage of the 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment continue and predictions for the 2020 county votes come to fruition, Morgan can count on support from counties with voters leaning Democratic, counties with large percentages of residents having attained no more than a high school education, and counties home to high numbers of Florida's growing Hispanic community.

According to the Florida Division of Elections' October 9, 2018 Book Closing Report, registered Democrats outnumbered registered Republicans by over 263,000, even though registration for both parties increased since 2004 (Florida Department of State 2018). The biggest increase, however, came from voters registered under the category of "No Party Affiliation". Kevin Wagner, a political scientist with Florida Atlantic University, said that more and more people are registering with no party affiliation in recent years, and these voters tend to be young, new to voting, and more likely to support Democrats (Daugherty and Tavel 2018). Any new ballot initiatives to increase Florida's minimum wage will more than likely appeal to these voters.

As explained previously, half of Florida's new jobs are paying less than \$10.00 per hour. Morgan's initiative is proposing an increase in the minimum wage to \$10.00 per hour initially, but will increase wages \$1.00 each year thereafter until reaching \$15.00 per hour. Counties with large number of workers holding these positions, typically those with a high school education or less, will be more apt to support an increase in the minimum wage. According to the U.S.Census Bureau, only 28.5% of Floridians over the age of 25 had obtained a Bachelor's degree or higher between the years 2013 and 2017 (U.S. Census 2019). Campaign strategies aimed at this demographic can only benefit Morgan's initiative.

Lastly, if Hispanic support for any new initiatives to increase Florida's minimum wage mirrors that of the 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment, recent increases in the

State's Hispanic population may mean more support for Morgan's initiative should it make it to the ballot. In the year 2016, one out of every four Floridians was Latino and the Sunshine State was home to the third largest Hispanic population in the country. This demographic also lead other demographic groups in the percentage of population in the workforce, with 63.9% of Latinos in the workforce compared to 60.6% for the overall state population (Sesin 2016). According to the Pew Research Center, more than 29,000,000 Hispanics nationwide are eligible to vote, and these voters tend to affiliate more with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party by a more than two-to-one margin. In addition, about half of Latino registered voters say the Democratic Party has more concern for Latinos (Gonzalez-Barrera and Krogstad 2018). As per a U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts report, there were 5,452,627 Hispanics in Florida as of July 1, 2018, and it is likely that counties home to these voters will show strong support for liberal ballot initiatives such as Morgan's (US Census 2019).

While this study offers strong explanations for the variance between counties with respect to support for the 2004 Amendment, it does have limitations that should be noted. First, this study utilized data collected for individual *counties* instead of individual *voters*. In order to accurately predict voter reaction to future initiatives to increase the minimum wage, it is highly recommended that studies be conducted on an individual level and the results compared to the findings of this study. Second, the results of this study reflect counties within the State of Florida at one point in time and may not

accurately reflect voter behavior within counties of other states. While useful for Florida, it may not be reliable for use in attempting to predict the passage of similar initiatives in other states. Lastly, the 2004 Amendment proposed only a small increase (\$1.00 above the federal minimum wage) with an inflation adjustment for the future, while the initiative Morgan is proposing nearly doubles the minimum wage. Voters may be more reluctant to vote in favor of such a large increase for fear of business closure/loss of employment, increased prices, and loss of benefits. Further research, such as a study of the expected upcoming vote in Florida or perhaps public opinion surveys, may be useful to gain a true picture of voter behavior with respect to such initiatives. If the same variables that were statistically significant in this study remain so in future studies, further predictions of Florida voters' behavior may be made with a certain measure of confidence.

APPENDIX I: Univariate Variable Listing

Table A: Official Results: Nov. 2, 2004 General Election-Constitutional Amendment No. 5-

Florida Counties

| COUNTY: | TOTAL # IN FAVOR: | TOTAL # NOT IN FAVOR: | TOTAL VOTES: | % OF TOTAL VOTING IN FAVOR: |
|----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| Alachua | 72,121 | 35,248 | 107,369 | 67.17% |
| Baker | 5,917 | 3,452 | 9,369 | 63.16% |
| Bay | 48,853 | 22,936 | 71,789 | 68.05% |
| Bradford | 6,901 | 3,553 | 10,454 | 66.01% |
| Brevard | 172,069 | 85,264 | 257,333 | 66.87% |
| Broward | 549,611 | 129,993 | 679,604 | 80.87% |
| Calhoun | 3,837 | 1,705 | 5,542 | 69.23% |
| Charlotte | 57,364 | 19,962 | 77,326 | 74.18% |
| Citrus | 49,467 | 17,826 | 67,293 | 73.51% |
| Clay | 47,686 | 31,021 | 78,707 | 60.59% |
| Collier | 79,510 | 43,787 | 123,297 | 64.49% |
| Columbia | 15,889 | 7,995 | 23,884 | 66.53% |
| DeSoto | 6,467 | 2,404 | 8,871 | 72.90% |
| Dixie | 4,213 | 1,601 | 5,814 | 72.46% |
| Duval | 253,386 | 115,187 | 368,573 | 68.75% |
| Escambia | 92,722 | 41,963 | 134,685 | 68.84% |
| Flagler | 27,565 | 9,407 | 36,972 | 74.56% |
| Franklin | 4,068 | 1,420 | 5,488 | 74.13% |
| Gadsden | 15,132 | 4,897 | 20,029 | 75.55% |
| Gilchrist | 4,184 | 2,556 | 6,740 | 62.08% |
| Glades | 2,934 | 1,037 | 3,971 | 73.89% |
| Gulf | 4,733 | 2,125 | 6,858 | 69.01% |
| Hamilton | 3,341 | 1,170 | 4,511 | 74.06% |
| Hardee | 4,550 | 2,432 | 6,982 | 65.17% |
| Hendry | 6,429 | 2,470 | 8,899 | 72.24% |
| Hernando | 56,441 | 21,280 | 77,721 | 72.62% |
| Highlands | 26,111 | 13,698 | 39,809 | 65.59% |

| | | | | |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| Hillsborough | 286,540 | 162,117 | 448,657 | 63.87% |
| Holmes | 4,894 | 2,492 | 7,386 | 66.26% |
| Indian River | 40,328 | 18,274 | 58,602 | 68.82% |
| Jackson | 13,081 | 5,535 | 18,616 | 70.27% |
| Jefferson | 5,016 | 2,131 | 7,147 | 70.18% |
| Lafayette | 1,782 | 1,249 | 3,031 | 58.79% |
| Lake | 82,972 | 37,694 | 120,666 | 68.76% |
| Lee | 158,824 | 72,126 | 230,950 | 68.77% |
| Leon | 89,127 | 42,705 | 131,832 | 67.61% |
| Levy | 10,316 | 5,008 | 15,324 | 67.32% |
| Liberty | 1,982 | 803 | 2,785 | 71.17% |
| Madison | 5,397 | 2,513 | 7,910 | 68.23% |
| Manatee | 90,879 | 48,729 | 139,608 | 65.10% |
| Marion | 94,604 | 39,171 | 133,775 | 70.72% |
| Martin | 49,563 | 20,925 | 70,488 | 70.31% |
| Miami-Dade | 555,325 | 158,573 | 713,898 | 77.79% |
| Monroe | 29,214 | 8,675 | 37,889 | 77.10% |
| Nassau | 19,697 | 11,875 | 31,572 | 62.39% |
| Okaloosa | 55,203 | 30,014 | 85,217 | 64.78% |
| Okeechobee | 8,834 | 2,691 | 11,525 | 76.65% |
| Orange | 261,132 | 110,415 | 371,547 | 70.28% |
| Osceola | 59,865 | 18,969 | 78,834 | 75.94% |
| Palm Beach | 397,184 | 128,468 | 525,652 | 75.56% |
| Pasco | 131,266 | 55,304 | 186,570 | 70.36% |
| Pinellas | 317,835 | 123,122 | 440,957 | 72.08% |
| Polk | 135,811 | 66,327 | 202,138 | 67.19% |
| Putnam | 20,582 | 9,344 | 29,926 | 68.78% |
| Santa Rosa | 43,632 | 20,948 | 64,580 | 67.56% |
| Sarasota | 128,481 | 60,238 | 188,719 | 68.08% |

| | | | | |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|---------|--------|
| Seminole | 118,896 | 61,585 | 180,481 | 65.88% |
| St. Johns | 52,079 | 30,351 | 82,430 | 63.18% |
| St. Lucie | 74,285 | 20,340 | 94,625 | 78.50% |
| Sumter | 21,619 | 9,501 | 31,120 | 69.47% |
| Suwannee | 9,560 | 5,546 | 15,106 | 63.29% |
| Taylor | 5,582 | 2,538 | 8,120 | 68.74% |
| Union | 2,859 | 1,543 | 4,402 | 64.95% |
| Volusia | 163,442 | 58,877 | 222,319 | 73.52% |
| Wakulla | 7,855 | 3,509 | 11,364 | 69.12% |
| Walton | 14,936 | 7,499 | 22,435 | 66.57% |
| Washington | 6,534 | 3,038 | 9,572 | 68.26% |
| Total | 5,198,514 | 2,097,151 | | |
| % Votes | 71.30% | 28.70% | | |

Table B: Registered Democrats, Registered Republicans, Presidential Votes-2004-Florida**Counties**

| COUNTY: | REGISTERED DEMOCRATS: | REGISTERED REPUBLICANS: | VOTES FOR BUSH: |
|----------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| Alachua | 50.50% | 27.90% | 42.90% |
| Baker | 68.90% | 24.60% | 77.73% |
| Bay | 38.90% | 44.20% | 71.18% |
| Bradford | 60.90% | 28.80% | 69.62% |
| Brevard | 36.50% | 44.80% | 57.66% |
| Broward | 50.40% | 26.70% | 34.61% |
| Calhoun | 82.10% | 12.10% | 63.42% |
| Charlotte | 31.80% | 44.80% | 55.56% |
| Citrus | 38.80% | 41.50% | 56.86% |
| Clay | 25.60% | 56.50% | 76.17% |
| Collier | 24.30% | 53.00% | 64.99% |
| Columbia | 56.00% | 31.60% | 67.10% |
| DeSoto | 59.20% | 25.40% | 58.10% |
| Dixie | 77.30% | 15.10% | 68.83% |
| Duval | 46.20% | 36.90% | 57.78% |
| Escambia | 40.60% | 43.90% | 65.30% |
| Flagler | 38.10% | 40.70% | 51.02% |
| Franklin | 77.00% | 16.20% | 58.54% |
| Gadsden | 82.70% | 11.20% | 29.80% |
| Gilchrist | 58.20% | 30.70% | 70.36% |
| Glades | 63.90% | 24.60% | 58.33% |
| Gulf | 66.70% | 26.90% | 66.03% |
| Hamilton | 78.60% | 15.10% | 54.97% |
| Hardee | 63.60% | 26.80% | 69.65% |
| Hendry | 56.50% | 30.80% | 58.90% |
| Hernando | 38.70% | 41.30% | 52.93% |
| Highlands | 39.70% | 44.40% | 62.36% |
| Hillsborough | 41.60% | 35.00% | 53.01% |
| Holmes | 72.40% | 21.60% | 77.25% |
| Indian River | 30.00% | 51.20% | 60.15% |
| Jackson | 71.80% | 21.90% | 61.20% |

| | | | |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Jefferson | 72.20% | 20.80% | 44.10% |
| Lafayette | 82.50% | 13.50% | 73.98% |
| Lake | 34.20% | 47.30% | 60.02% |
| Lee | 29.70% | 47.30% | 59.91% |
| Leon | 57.10% | 26.70% | 37.85% |
| Levy | 59.50% | 27.70% | 62.52% |
| Liberty | 87.90% | 8.20% | 63.79% |
| Madison | 79.30% | 15.00% | 50.47% |
| Manatee | 33.10% | 44.20% | 56.62% |
| Marion | 39.70% | 43.20% | 58.19% |
| Martin | 27.60% | 52.40% | 57.09% |
| Miami-Dade | 42.80% | 34.70% | 46.61% |
| Monroe | 36.00% | 38.60% | 49.24% |
| Nassau | 36.60% | 49.30% | 72.64% |
| Okaloosa | 24.70% | 57.20% | 77.65% |
| Okeechobee | 58.30% | 29.70% | 57.24% |
| Orange | 40.20% | 35.00% | 49.62% |
| Osceola | 40.20% | 32.80% | 52.45% |
| Palm Beach | 44.90% | 31.20% | 39.05% |
| Pasco | 37.30% | 40.10% | 54.07% |
| Pinellas | 37.90% | 39.10% | 49.56% |
| Polk | 42.50% | 38.80% | 58.61% |
| Putnam | 57.50% | 28.30% | 59.12% |
| Santa Rosa | 28.10% | 55.90% | 77.35% |
| Sarasota | 31.10% | 47.80% | 53.51% |
| Seminole | 32.30% | 44.50% | 58.10% |
| St. Johns | 28.20% | 53.30% | 68.60% |
| St. Lucie | 41.40% | 36.50% | 47.56% |
| Sumter | 40.70% | 43.50% | 62.18% |

| | | | |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Suwannee | 63.20% | 27.00% | 70.58% |
| Taylor | 75.50% | 19.00% | 63.71% |
| Union | 75.20% | 18.60% | 72.64% |
| Volusia | 40.80% | 35.90% | 48.89% |
| Wakulla | 66.50% | 24.50% | 57.61% |
| Walton | 36.60% | 50.10% | 73.22% |
| Washington | 66.80% | 25.60% | 71.10% |

APPENDIX II: Multivariate Regression Models

Table A: Multivariate Regression-Initial Full Model-Votes for Bush

| | B: | STD. ERROR: | BETA: | SIG.: | VIF: |
|--|-----------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| (CONSTANT) | 159.474 | 17.755 | | P <.001*** | |
| WORKING WOMEN IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE | -0.669 | 0.171 | -0.933 | P <.001*** | 11.582 |
| AFRICAN AMERICAN RESIDENTS | -0.142 | 0.055 | -0.308 | 0.013** | 2.907 |
| HISPANIC RESIDENTS | 0.097 | 0.041 | 0.212 | 0.023** | 1.685 |
| RESIDENTS AGED 20-34 | -0.335 | 0.179 | -0.311 | 0.067* | 5.621 |
| RESIDENTS AGED 65+ | -0.727 | 0.178 | -1.122 | P <.001*** | 15.372 |
| MARRIED COUPLES | -0.260 | 0.121 | -0.296 | 0.03** | 3.844 |
| POVERTY RATE | -0.370 | 0.143 | -0.394 | 0.012** | 4.699 |
| RESIDENTS WITH HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR LESS | 0.143 | 0.062 | 0.283 | 0.025** | 3.041 |
| PRESIDENTIAL VOTES-BUSH | -0.404 | 0.059 | -0.949 | P <.001*** | 3.884 |

P-VALUE: ***=.01 **=.05 *=.10
R SQUARE: .719 ADJ.R SQUARE: .675 F: 16.199 SIG: .000

Table B: Multivariate Regression-Initial Full Model-Votes for Bush-Working Women Variable Removed

| | B: | STD. ERROR: | BETA: | SIG.: | VIF: |
|--|-----------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| (CONSTANT) | 96.429 | 8.230 | | P <.001*** | |
| AFRICAN AMERICAN RESIDENTS | -.109 | .061 | -.237 | .078* | 2.839 |
| HISPANIC RESIDENTS | .117 | .046 | .257 | .014** | 1.659 |
| RESIDENTS AGED 20-34 | -.320 | .200 | -.297 | .115 | 5.619 |
| RESIDENTS AGED 65+ | -.149 | .111 | -.230 | .185 | 4.775 |
| MARRIED COUPLES | -.148 | .131 | -.169 | .262 | 3.629 |
| POVERTY RATE | -.104 | .140 | -.111 | .461 | 3.632 |
| RESIDENTS WITH HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR LESS | .243 | .063 | .480 | P <.001*** | 2.521 |
| PRESIDENTIAL VOTES-BUSH | -.343 | .063 | -.806 | P <.001*** | 3.613 |

P-VALUE: ***=.01 **=.05 *=.10

R SQUARE: .644 ADJ.R SQUARE: .595 F: 13.103 SIG.: .000

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