You are here

CONFLICT RECURRENCE IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

Download pdf | Full Screen View

Date Issued:
2017
Abstract/Description:
This thesis argues that the different reactions of the population and rival elites to executive attempts to extend term limits in Rwanda and Burundi reflect the different ways civil wars ended in these two countries. In Rwanda, a military victory resulted in institutions that placed less constraint on the ruling party, while in Burundi, a negotiated settlement placed comparatively greater constraints on the ruling party. As a result, the major party in Rwanda was more powerful than the major power in Burundi, and thus more capable to co-opt or coerce the opposition. This paper uses a most-similar case design to test the hypothesis that civil wars that end in negotiated settlements are more likely to become unstable than a civil war that ends in a military victory when executives attempt to extend their term limits and finds that the civil war outcome was instrumental in explaining the divergent reactions in both countries. This paper has important implications for those interested in post-conflict situations and executive term-limit extensions.
Title: CONFLICT RECURRENCE IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI.
0 views
0 downloads
Name(s): Ritter, Kellan H, Author
Powell, Jonathan, Committee Chair
University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor
Type of Resource: text
Date Issued: 2017
Publisher: University of Central Florida
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: This thesis argues that the different reactions of the population and rival elites to executive attempts to extend term limits in Rwanda and Burundi reflect the different ways civil wars ended in these two countries. In Rwanda, a military victory resulted in institutions that placed less constraint on the ruling party, while in Burundi, a negotiated settlement placed comparatively greater constraints on the ruling party. As a result, the major party in Rwanda was more powerful than the major power in Burundi, and thus more capable to co-opt or coerce the opposition. This paper uses a most-similar case design to test the hypothesis that civil wars that end in negotiated settlements are more likely to become unstable than a civil war that ends in a military victory when executives attempt to extend their term limits and finds that the civil war outcome was instrumental in explaining the divergent reactions in both countries. This paper has important implications for those interested in post-conflict situations and executive term-limit extensions.
Identifier: CFH2000247 (IID), ucf:46051 (fedora)
Note(s): 2017-12-01
B.A.
College of Sciences, Political Science
Bachelors
This record was generated from author submitted information.
Subject(s): Conflict
Africa
Civil War
Rwanda
Burundi
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFH2000247
Restrictions on Access: campus 2018-12-01
Host Institution: UCF

In Collections