

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR AND
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

by

MICHAEL FREDRICK ERNST

B. S. Fairfield University, 1988
M. A. Wesleyan University, 1992
Ed. S. University of Central Florida, 2003

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Major Professor: Barbara A. Murray

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ABSTRACT

Citizenship – commitment to and participation in a political community - is the heart of constitutional democracy and a free society. Knowledge of the rights, responsibilities, and privileges are the electrical impulses that keep a steady beat. Without the participation of educated citizens, a democratic republic can not and does not function. This study analyzed the relationship between adolescent behavior and civic engagement. This task was accomplished by examining the amount of civic knowledge possessed by two groups within a population. The population examined, a high school in Flagler County, was composed of “at risk” students (those who had an Individualized Education Plan) and “regular” students (those that did not).

The study uncovered the message that the amount of civic knowledge possessed by American youth was not as important as it was for them to be engaged in extracurricular activities. During the course of time, educators appear to have restricted their own ability to plan for and provide learning experiences that take in to consideration the physical characteristics; physical needs; patterns of growth and maturation; physiological changes; intellectual development; intellectual characteristics; learning preferences and styles; emotional development; personality development; and social development of each and every young adolescent attending school. When interesting, affordable activities are not made available, students become bored and get in to trouble during after school hours. Adolescent behaviors such as moral judgment and risk taking (or lack thereof) affect their decision to become civically involved.

To my parents, Roger W. Ernst and Audrey S. Ernst:

You supported me in countless ways throughout my entire education. You have been there through some of my happiest moments and suffered with me through some significant all time lows. I want you to know that you have been especially wonderful through the very recent, dark years that ended in the tragic death of my wife - Jean E. Ernst. Without you, I would not have maintained my sanity nor been able to rebuild my life from the rubble left behind. There are simply no words that can express how grateful I am to you. I love you both very much.

To my children, Ethan Zachary Ernst and Isabelle Marie Ernst:

A good teacher reflects upon the lesson he has taught for the day to determine whether or not he made the right decisions to help the student learn what there was to learn. Many times I have wondered if I truly made the right decisions in my life. Some of my decisions have brought me sadness that I could not anticipate and some of those decisions affected both of your lives. Know this – that if I didn't make some of those decisions, neither one of you would be in my life now. You both bring me great joy - despite some of those sad times and monumental losses. I now know that I would make those same choices over again.

At a very young age you both lost your mother. During the rebuilding phase, I was not around as much as I was when you were in your infancy. This saddens me because, for awhile, you lost your father too. Understand that some of the psychological

research I conducted in this dissertation helped me clarify events that led to the tragic death of your mother. Other parts of it taught me what I needed to know and do to help you achieve a better life. This dissertation is dedicated to the two of you. Now that it is finished, I look forward to spending quality time with you both and watch you grow in to the fantastic children I know I was blessed with. In light of the circumstances in our lives, you have both come a long way; yet, your journey is not finished. I can't wait to see where it takes you. Know that I love you more than life itself, that I would do anything to help make you happy and that I am very proud of both of you.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since ancient Greek times, democracy was a shared vision in which all citizens understood, appreciated and actively engaged in civic and political life. Civic education had deep roots in America. In fact, the main reason for the creation of the first public school system was to prepare each generation to be active participants in our democratic society (The Center for Civic Education, 2004).

In 2003, there was a trend of disengagement from civic and political institutions (Boyte, 2003). Based upon a public opinion survey, many young people did not understand the ideals of citizenship. As a result, they did not get involved in the political process because they lacked the knowledge necessary for self-government (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2003). Consequently, there was enormous concern that many young Americans were ill-prepared to participate fully in our society.

Democracy in America and the Emergence of Civics Education

In the New World, the emphasis on life, liberty and equality were highlighted in the great documents of the Revolutionary Period: the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the Northwest Ordinances. Many leaders began to link free public schooling with the ideas of popular government and political freedom. Thomas Jefferson believed the state had the responsibility to cultivate an educated and liberated citizenry to ensure a democratic society. In *A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge*, introduced in the Virginia legislature in 1779, Jefferson advocated a plan that provided

educational opportunities for both common people and landed gentry at everyone's expense (Gants, 1993).

Thomas Jefferson's plan, however, was not enacted even though the classical curriculum and religious influence of the times were in decline. In the late 1800s, the United States population had grown tremendously and the federal government decided that it was time to control immigration. Early immigration laws aimed to preserve the racial, religious, and ethnic composition of the United States, which was then largely European. In the last two decades of the 19th century, blacks in the South were disenfranchised and stripped of civil rights through discriminatory legislation and unlawful violence. Separate facilities for whites and blacks became a basic rule. In *Plessy v. Ferguson*, an 1896 case involving the segregation of railroad passengers, the Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" public facilities did not violate the Constitution and refused to acknowledge that the separate facilities in use were not in fact equal (Cozzens, 1999).

During the first half of the 20th century, racial exclusion, either overt or covert, was practiced in most areas of American life. The people who suffered most from inequalities – the poor blacks, working class immigrants, the disabled, and women – had little influence over educational policy. A system of governance and finance rooted in local school boards and state legislatures (and professionally guided by the administrative progressives) placed most power in the hands of prosperous, white, male leaders born in the United States who tended to assume the correctness of their own culture and policies (Counts, 1927). In the South, school systems were part of a caste system that legally assigned blacks to a separate and distinctly unequal education; relatively few white

educators challenged these inequities. Most educational policymakers did not notice, much less seek to correct, gender inequalities. Educators did try to create special, usually segregated, niches in the system for children with special needs (Tyack, Lowe, & Hansot, 1984).

In the 1950s, civil rights for blacks became a major national political movement. The Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education* represented a turning point. The 1896 “separate but equal” ruling was reversed and the Court held that compulsory segregation in public schools denied black children equal protection under the law (Rains, 1997). However, school desegregation was resisted in the South. Federal determination to enforce the court decision was demonstrated in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, when President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched troops to secure admission of black students into a predominantly white high school (Rains).

As the 1950s came to an end, Sputnik shocked the United States because it brought to our attention the incredible knowledge gap between our universities and what was being taught in our schools. As a result, Congress passed first the National Defense Education Act and later the Education Professions Development Act. Both acts supported training programs at universities for pre-collegiate teachers, the development of improved curricular materials, and research and evaluation (Quigley, 1999).

Controversies about the decisions of the Warren Court drew attention to the low level of public understanding of the Constitution and the role of the courts. In the early 1960s, Justice Brennan and other concerned members of the legal profession met near Washington, D.C. Key participants at that meeting returned to their states and took leadership roles in initiating many civic education programs that continue to exist today.

They include the American Bar Association Division for Public Education; the Center for Civic Education affiliated with the State Bar of California; the Constitutional Rights Foundations of Los Angeles and Chicago, both affiliated with bar associations; the Close Up Foundation; and the Street Law program which originated at Georgetown Law School (Quigley, 1999).

In 1964 a more sweeping civil rights bill outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations and by employers, unions, and voting registrars. Deciding that normal judicial procedures were too slow in assuring minority registration and voting, Congress passed a voting rights bill in 1965. The law suspended use of literacy or other voter-qualification tests that had sometimes served to keep blacks off voting lists, authorized appointment of federal voting examiners in areas not meeting certain voter-participation requirements, and provided for federal court suits to bar discriminatory poll taxes, which were ended by a Supreme Court decision and the 24th Amendment (MSN Encarta, 2005).

Through Title I of the *Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965* reformers targeted funds to students from low income families to prevent poverty from restricting school opportunities and academic achievement. President Lyndon Johnson declared that proper schooling could prevent poverty, not merely ameliorate the lives of the poor, echoing a claim made by Horace Mann more than a century before (Tyack & Cuban, 2001).

Demonstrations by opponents of racial discrimination and the Vietnam War (and government attempts to restrict these demonstrations) led the Supreme Court to specify where, when, and how cities and states may limit the use of streets, parks, and other public places for purposes of protest (MSN Encarta, 2005). In the late 1970s, for example, members of the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA) attempted to

march through Skokie, Illinois. Because of the large Jewish community, it was believed that the march would be disruptive, and the city refused to allow it. The American Civil Liberties Union interceded on the behalf of the National Socialist Party of America, and the march was permitted to proceed under court order (Wikipedia, 2005).

During the 1980s, the most influential school reform report was *A Nation at Risk*. In the report, a litany of dismal statistics suggested for the first time in the history of our country, that the educational skills of one generation will not surpass, will not equal, will not even approach, those of their parents (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). But, still, the belief that better schools make a better society is alive and well. During the Reagan and Bush Administration many policymakers narrowed the currency of educational success to one main measure – test scores – and reduced schooling to a means of economic competitiveness, both personal and national (Koretz, 1988).

In light of the trend of disengagement from civic and political institutions, there was a call for new strategies that rose to the occasion and provided the average citizen with a solid foundation with which to work. The federal government became more involved in creating civics initiatives. For example, during the Reagan Administration, Take Pride in America successfully engaged individuals nationwide in efforts to preserve and protect our natural resources and open spaces, generating more than 12 million hours among individuals and groups in volunteer service (USA Freedom Corps, n.d.). The Bush administration supported the development of the National Standards for Civics and Government (Quigley, 1999). The Clinton administration supported the development of the National Assessment of Educational Progress in Civics and Government which was

based upon the National Standards (Quigley, 1999). In 2003, current President George W. Bush expanded his call to service and announced “Volunteers for Prosperity,” a new volunteer-based initiative designed to support major U.S. development initiatives overseas using the talents of highly skilled Americans who will work with U.S. organizations helping to promote health and generate prosperity in countries around the world (Volunteers for Prosperity, 2003).

The struggle for civil rights was not confined to just blacks. Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, women, children and homosexuals suffered too. In 1966, the Supreme Court in *Kent v. United States* observed that “the child received the worst of both worlds: he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children” (Feld, 1999, p.109). In 1970, the Supreme Court in *In re Winship* decided that the prosecution must establish delinquency by the criminal standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” (Feld, 1999, p.103). Many other reforms were enacted in an attempt to strengthen the nation’s response to juvenile offenders, but the reforms did not curtail the public view that juvenile justice was something less than real justice. In the 1980s, juvenile courts began to adopt the values and orientation of criminal courts (Butts & Mitchell, 2000).

Supposedly, the United States Constitution guaranteed equal treatment under the law. That is to say, juveniles who committed the same types of crimes and had similar delinquency histories deserved equal treatment by the police, the prosecutors and the courts, regardless of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender (American Civil Liberties Union, 2003). However, according to national research, this was found untrue. Across the nation, Hispanic and African-American youth were over-represented in the

U.S. justice system and they received harsher treatment than Caucasian youth for the same types of offenses (Poe-Yamagata & Jones, 2000; Villarruel & Walker, 2002).

The unequal treatment of minorities in our criminal justice system had manifested itself in an exploding prison population that was overwhelmingly African-American and Hispanic; in the decay of minority communities that had given up a generation of young men to prison; and in a widely-held belief among black and Hispanic Americans that democracy deserved neither trust nor of support (Weich & Angulo, 2000). These people were trapped in a vicious cycle that affected the general population. It was a cycle that evolved into a self-fulfilling prophecy: “more minority arrests and convictions perpetuate the belief that minorities commit more crimes, which in turn leads to racial profiling and more minority arrests” (Weich & Angulo, p.2).

Besides unequal treatment, juveniles experienced many events throughout the early years of their lives that influenced their individual thoughts and actions. Liao, Barriga, & Gibbs (1998) defined cognitive distortions as inaccurate or rationalizing attitudes, thoughts, or beliefs concerning one's own or others' social behavior. Youth, especially delinquent youth, used cognitive distortions to justify socially unacceptable actions as acceptable. As a result of cognitive distortion usage, those juveniles were more likely to engage in illegal activities (Elliott & Ageton, 1980).

Literature was replete with research attempting to understand the behavior of young children. Adolescence was defined as a period of learning by doing, when competence in decision making could be achieved only by making decisions and making mistakes (Zimring, 1998). Cognitive distortion usage coupled with poor adolescent decision making, therefore, seemed to explain the emergence of what Boyte (2003) called

a “culture of radical individualism”. Consequently, the understanding of such behavior was of major significance because it seemed to help educators help juveniles make better decisions, perhaps even redirected them toward more productive citizenry.

Civics in Modern America

Typically, when one received education in the area of civics, he or she studied the structures of governance, patterns of power and civic negotiations over public purposes that give shape to a civilization (Boyte, 2003). In the United States, school systems used two different methods to teach civics education. Liberal theory, as found in civics courses, described departments of government and processes of legislation; and, communitarian political theory which was service-oriented and concerned about teaching values, such as responsibility and care for others (Boyte). At one time, communitarian political theory was fairly popular. Forty-six percent of high schools incorporated service learning into their curricula. In 1984, only 9% had such courses (Galston, 2001).

Literature was replete with statistics concerning changing attitudes toward civic education. The nation's oldest and most comprehensive assessment of the attitudes of freshmen was conducted by the Higher Education Research Institute at the University of California Los Angeles (Sax, Astin, Korn & Mahoney, 1995). In 1995, the Institute found that college students exhibited higher levels of disengagement both academically and politically than any previous entering class. The study revealed that only 27% of students believed that keeping up to date with political affairs was a very important or an essential life goal (compared to 58% in 1966); and, that only 14% of students said that they frequently discussed politics (compared to 30% in 1968). The Institute also found

that student disinterest in politics was paralleled by an increasing disinterest in activism. For example, the percentage of students who voted in elections dramatically declined from 77% in 1968 to 21% in 1997; the percentage of students working on a local, state, or national campaigns dropped from a record high of 16% in 1969 to 7% in 1996; and, the percentage of students who considered it very important or essential to participate in a community action program fell from a high of 30% in 1975 to a low of 23% in 1996.

Despite the fact that some of these interesting statistics were acquired during the Vietnam Era for comparison (a period in which young activists protested the 21-year-old age voting limit because 18-20 year olds were being drafted into the army and dying for their country), one should not be led to believe that these were “false highs”. In 1971, the 26th Amendment was passed giving all U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older the right to vote (Applebaum, 2000).

Boyte (2003) attributed civic disengagement of young Americans to the role of money; the unraveling of public morality; the pervasiveness of television; and the rise of a culture of radical individualism. The Civic Mission of Schools (2003) contended that fear of litigation; high stakes testing; and, budget cutbacks were alternative reasons.

Schools could make a difference in people’s interest in public affairs and knowledge about politics, especially through regular classroom discussion of current events (Neimi & Junn, 1998). However, several sources argued that schools generally failed to accomplish this task. For example, the National Alliance for Civic Education (NACE) found that only 6% of eighth-graders could describe two ways that societies benefit from having a constitution; and, that only 9% of high school seniors could list two

ways that democratic societies benefit from citizen participation (National Alliance for Civic Education, 2002).

During the course of time, changing political climate and world order were important reasons why so many civics initiatives came forward (Tyack & Cuban, 2001). In the past, beliefs in progress or regress always conveyed a political message. Opinions about advance or decline in education reflected general confidence in American institutions. Faith in the nation and its institutions were far higher in the aftermath of World War II than in the skeptical era of the Vietnam War and Watergate. Expectations about education changed, as did media representations of what was happening in schools. And the broader goals that education served – the visions of possibility that animate the society – also shifted in different periods, making it necessary to ask how people have judged progress, from what points of view, and over what spans of time (Tyack & Cuban).

Statement of the Problem

The United States, more than any other country in the world, had a population that was completely heterogeneous. Like any country, its future was dependent on the education of its youth. However, with such a diverse population, its culture was to say the least quite unique. Unfortunately, there happened to be a trend of disengagement from politics and public affairs, as well as growing divisions along class and racial lines. As an explanation, Boyte (2003) suggested the unraveling of public morality and rise of a culture of radical individualism. America's youth were most likely to be susceptible to these changes. In light of his suggestion, there were many questions that remained unanswered. However, one purpose (or main theme) of this study was to determine

whether or not a relationship existed between adolescent behavior and civic engagement. Another was to examine adolescent decision making and determine whether or not it related to civic preparedness.

Research Questions

1. What relationships exist amongst civic knowledge, moral judgment, peer pressure, cognitive distortion, and risk taking?
2. Is there a gender difference with regard to civic knowledge?
3. Is there a gender difference with regard to adolescent behavior?
4. Can civic knowledge be predicted by gender?
5. Can civic knowledge be predicted by race?
6. Can civic knowledge be predicted by age?
7. Can adolescent behavior be predicted by gender?
8. Can adolescent behavior be predicted by race?
9. Can adolescent behavior be predicted by age?
10. Is there a knowledge difference between at risk and non-at risk youth?
11. Is there a behavior difference between at risk and non-at risk youth?
12. Is there a knowledge difference between engaged and non-engaged youth?
13. Is there a behavior difference between engaged and non-engaged youth?
14. Based upon the Kohlberg dilemma, do at risk and non-at risk youth have different stages of moral development?
15. Based upon the Gilligan dilemma, do at risk and non-at risk youth have different stages of moral development?

16. Based upon the Kohlberg dilemma, do males and females have different stages of moral development?
17. Based upon the Gilligan dilemma, do males and females have different stages of moral development?
18. Based upon the Kohlberg dilemma, do different races have different stages of moral development?
19. Based upon the Gilligan dilemma, do different races have different stages of moral development?
20. Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, do engaged and non-engaged youth have different stages of moral development?
21. Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, do engaged and non-engaged youth have different stages of moral development?

Null Hypotheses

1. There is no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and different adolescent behaviors. Also, there is no statistically significant relationship between different adolescent behaviors.
2. There is no statistically significant difference between gender and civic knowledge.
3. There is no statistically significant difference between gender and adolescent behavior.
4. There is no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and gender.

5. There is no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and race.
6. There is no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and age.
7. There is no statistically significant relationship between adolescent behaviors and gender.
8. There is no statistically significant relationship between adolescent behaviors and race.
9. There is no statistically significant relationship between adolescent behaviors and age.
10. There is no statistically significant difference between at risk and non-at risk youth with regard to civic knowledge.
11. There is no statistically significant difference between at risk and non-at risk youth with regard to adolescent behavior.
12. There is no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to civic knowledge.
13. There is no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to adolescent behavior.
14. Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, there is no relationship between type of youth and stage of moral development.
15. Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, there is no relationship between type of youth and stage of moral development.

16. Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, there is no relationship between gender and stage of moral development.

17. Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, there is no relationship between gender and stage of moral development.

18. Based upon the Kohlberg dilemma, there is no relationship between race and stage of moral development.

19. Based upon the Gilligan dilemma, there is no relationship between race and stage of moral development.

20. Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, there is no relationship between engagement in extracurricular activities and stage of moral development.

21. Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, there is no relationship between engagement in extracurricular activities and stage of moral development.

Definition of Terms

Adolescent – a person who has undergone puberty but who has not reached full maturity; a teenager. Age was used to determine that the respondent met this criterion.

Adolescent Behavior – refers to one of the behavioral constructs used in this study. The constructs used were moral judgment, peer pressure, risk taking, and cognitive distortion.

At Risk – a student with a self-reported Individualized Education Plan.

Civics - the branch of political science that deals with civic affairs and the rights and duties of citizens.

Civic Engagement - working to make a difference in the civic life of our communities and developing the combination of knowledge, skills, values and motivation to make that difference. It means promoting the quality of life in a community, through both political and non-political processes (Ehrlich, 2000).

Civic Knowledge – a construct that was measured in this study. It refers to the amount of understanding possessed by an individual in the area of civics. Eighteen multiple choice questions, many of which were selected from the 1998 National Assessment of Educational Progress Civics Exam, were administered to participants in the study.

Civic Preparedness – the state of being prepared for civic engagement.

Cognitive Distortion – a behavioral construct that was measured in this study. It is a faulty way of seeing the world due to severe internalized emotional harm (Namka, 1997). Found in the Profile of American Youth, Likert scale response items were used to assess respondents' desire to use cognitive distortions.

Engaged – the student participates in an after school activity.

Non-At Risk – a student that does not have an Individualized Education Plan.

Non-Engaged – the student does not participate in an after school activity.

Moral Dilemma - when two or more moral obligations, duties, rights, or ideals come into conflict with one another. The Kohlberg and Gilligan Dilemmas are specific/famous moral dilemmas presented to adolescents in this study. More detail will be presented in the literature review.

Moral Judgment – a behavioral construct that was measured in this study. Moral Dilemmas were used to assess an adolescent's moral reasoning ability or moral judgment.

These terms are used interchangeably. Found in the Profile of American Youth, participants responded to a short selection of moral dilemmas designed to assess moral reasoning ability.

Moral Reasoning – judgments about right and wrong (Woolfolk, 2001).

Narcissism - behavior that focuses primarily on negative ways of getting the needs of the self met without regard to others (Namka, 1997).

Peer Pressure – a behavioral construct that was measured in this study. It is when people your age pressure you to think a certain way, act a certain way, or do a certain thing (Young Ladies Christian Fellowship, 2004). Found in the Profile of American Youth, respondents were asked to quantitatively indicate how much peer pressure they experienced.

Profile of American Youth – another name for the Behavioral Questionnaire. This was the instrument used to measure each of the behavioral constructs.

Risk Taking – a behavioral construct that was measured in this study. It is behavior that is characterized by deviations from a set of socially accepted norms (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1995). Found in the Profile of American Youth, respondents were asked to quantitatively indicate the frequency with which they made risky decisions.

Theoretical Framework

Lawrence Kohlberg's ideas of moral development were based on the premise that at birth, all humans are void of morals, ethics, and honesty. He identified the family as the first source of values and moral development for an individual. He believed that as

one's intelligence and ability to interact with others matures, so did one's patterns of moral behavior (Woolfolk, 2001). Kohlberg followed the development of moral judgment beyond the ages studied by Piaget, and determined that the process of attaining moral maturity took longer and was more gradual than Piaget had proposed. Kohlberg defined moral reasoning as judgments about right and wrong. His studies of moral reasoning were based on the use of moral dilemmas, or hypothetical situations in which people must make a difficult decision. Kohlberg defined a subject's level of moral reasoning from the reasoning used to defend his or her position when faced with a moral dilemma. He thought this was more important than the actual choice made, since the choices people make in such a dilemma aren't always clearly and indisputably right. He determined that the highest level of moral reasoning was not reached by all of his subjects. Kohlberg's levels of moral development (Duska & Whelan, 1975; Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989) were broken down in to these specific stages:

1. Pre-Conventional Level

- a. Stage 0 – Egocentric Judgment
- b. Stage 1 – Punishment & Obedience
- c. Stage 2 – Individual Instrumental Purpose & Exchange

2. Conventional Level

- a. Stage 3 – Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships & Conformity
- b. Stage 4 – Social System & Conscience Maintenance

3. Post-Conventional Level

- a. Stage 5 – Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility
- b. Stage 6 – Universal Ethical Principles

At the pre-conventional level, the child was responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but he interpreted the labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or the physical power of those who enunciated the rules and labels. Children in the stage of Egocentric Judgment made judgments of good on the basis of what he liked and wanted or what helped him, and bad on the basis of what he did not like or what hurt him. Only when he had concept of rules or of obligations to obey or conform independent of his wishes was he moved in to the next stage which was called Punishment and Obedience. Reciprocity was the final stage in pre-conventional thinking, it was a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch your back". Reciprocity described the stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange.

At the conventional level, the individual perceived the maintenance of the expectations of his family, group, or nation as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude was not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and identifying with the persons or group involved. The Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Conformity was more commonly referred to as the "good boy-nice girl" orientation. The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance suggested that right behavior consisted of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

At the post-conventional level, right action tended to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards that were critically examined and agreed upon by

the whole society. This described the stage called Prior Rights and Social Contract. The highest level, Universal Ethical Principles, applied to all of humanity. When laws violated what should be the highest principles, one acted in accordance with the principle rather than the law.

Significance of the Study

The need to understand why so many Americans became disengaged from politics and public affairs can best be understood if we truly understand the importance and necessity of civics education in the first place. The National Assessment Governing Board (1998) expressed this sentiment as follows:

The goal of education in civics and government is informed, responsible participation in political life by competent citizens committed to the fundamental values and principles of American constitutional democracy. Their effective and responsible participation requires the acquisition of a body of knowledge and of intellectual and participatory skills. Effective and responsible participation also is furthered by development of certain dispositions or traits of character that enhance the individual's capacity to participate in the political process and contribute to the healthy functioning of the political system and improvement of society (p.7)

Many of America's institutions helped develop the knowledge and skills; however, schools had a special and historic responsibility for the development of civic competence and responsibility. Despite a national consensus on the need for civics education in schools, this vital part of students' education was seldom given sustained and systematic attention in the K-12 curriculum (Quigley, 1999). Consequently, schools were not to blame for this problem in its entirety. A lot had to do with changes that occurred in the 1960s with the widespread elimination of civics education from the curriculum and changes that occurred in the 1980s with widespread dissatisfaction with the juvenile courts (Quigley).

Equality and equity were always an issue in the field of education. The unequal treatment of minorities in our criminal justice system undermined the progress we made over the past five decades in ensuring equal treatment under the law (Weich & Angulo, 2000). This notion opened up a huge gap across class and racial lines and caused specific attitudes among certain youth groups (Boyte, 2003). This study differs from previous studies because it does not traditionally look at the problems associated with a social studies curriculum (particularly, as it attempted to address acquisition of civics knowledge). Instead, it focused on the human qualities of the audience receiving that instruction. Consequently, the new contribution to civics research is in the fact that this will be the first time any researcher examines adolescent decision making as it relates to civic preparedness.

Assumptions

The researcher assumed all of the surveyed high school students offered honest responses to the items presented in the questionnaire.

Delimitations

This study was delimited to students located at one Flagler County public high school. Each respondent was expected to be currently enrolled in or have already completed a course in U.S. History. High school students from alternative education, vocational education and private educational settings were not included.

Limitations

In order to obtain a significant sample size, assistant superintendents from five Central Florida counties were contacted requesting permission to use their high school

students in the study. Only the Flagler County school system granted permission. The generalizability of the results was, therefore, limited to schools that have demographic data similar to Flagler County.

Also, given the relatively low response rate, the results must be interpreted with caution. It seemed likely that bias in the sample favored participation by students who had strong opinions about the issues involved.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter provides a review of literature and establishes a foundation for this study. The review is divided into two main areas. The first area covers literature that addressed what was known about civics and how it came to be applied to American youth. This section was divided into the following subsections: (1) civic knowledge and engagement; (2) the history of American democracy, civil rights and education; (3) the dismantling of American citizenry by the juvenile justice system and (4) disengagement from productive citizenry. The second area covers literature that addressed what was known about adolescent behavior. This section was divided into the following subsections: (5) the social construction of childhood, 1860 to present day; (6) moral development; (7) adolescent risk taking behavior; (8) deviant peer association and (9) narcissism and cognitive distortions.

Civic Knowledge and Engagement

Since Plato and Aristotle first discussed the matter, it was clear that civic education was related to the type of government already in place. A democracy, for example, required democratic citizens whose specific knowledge, competencies, and character would not as well be suited to other non-democratic politics (Galston, 2001). What made this concept highly complex was the specific conception of democracy we embraced (March & Olsen, 2000). Consequently, the question - what degree of civic and political knowledge is required to be a competent democratic citizen? – was a matter of

considerable debate – especially since the discovery, early in the twentieth century, that most Americans had low levels of public knowledge. This discovery created shock waves among social scientists and sparked a wide range of revisionist responses (Galston). Ultimately, during the 1990s, further discussion resulted in substantial agreement on the content of this knowledge, which in turn served as the basis for the construction of the Civics Assessment of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (Center for Civic Education, 2004; National Assessment Governing Board, 1998).

Renewed attention to civic education reflected broader concerns about U.S. civic culture, especially among the young. Anxiety about the civic engagement of young adults was nothing new, and its persistence was easily explained – young adults tended to be less attached to civic life than their parents and grandparents because civic attachment was linked to factors such as professional interest (and self-interests), stable residential location, home ownership, marriage, and parenthood, all of which are statistically less characteristic of young adults (Galston, 2001). However, there were also other disturbing trends over time. For example, when comparing generations rather than cohorts, there was evidence of diminished civic attachment. Further investigations revealed that, in the early 1970s, about half of the 18-29 year olds voted in presidential elections. By 1996, less than one third did. The same pattern held for congressional elections – about one third voting in the 1970s, compared to less than one fifth in 1998. Less familiar were the trends charted by the annual UCLA survey, conducted since the mid-1960s and involving roughly 250,000 matriculating college freshman each year. Over the more than three decades since the initiation of this survey, every significant indicator of political

engagement fell by at least half. Only 26% of freshman thought that keeping up with politics was important, down from 58% in 1966. Only 14% said they frequently discussed politics, down from 30%. Acquisition of political knowledge from traditional news sources was way down, and relatively few younger people were using the new media to replace newspapers and network TV news as a source of political information (Bennett, 1997; Hahn, 1999; National Association of Secretaries of State, 1999; Sax, Astin, Korn & Mahoney, 1995)

There were signs that these trends have continued unabated throughout the 1990s. For example, a Pew Research Center poll of voters in their late teens and twenties found that less than half were thinking “a great deal” about the 2000 election, versus two thirds at the comparable point in 1992. Four in ten said it did not matter who was elected president, twice as high a percentage as in 1992 (Galston, 2001).

The most comprehensive study of U.S. citizens’ attainment of civic knowledge, to date, was entitled *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters* (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). These authors assembled more than 50 years of survey data drawn principally from the Roper Center, National Election Studies, and their own surveys. In the work, they suggested that “all things being equal, the more informed people are, the better able they are to perform as citizens” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, p. 219). But how much is enough? What are reasonable expectations for the majority of citizens? The NAEP Civics Assessment helped clarify this issue.

Each National Assessment for Educational Progress subject-matter assessment was divided into four achievement levels: “below basic” (which meant little if any demonstrated knowledge of the subject); “basic,” (which indicated partial mastery);

“proficient” (which represented a standard of adequate knowledge); and “advanced”.

Within this framework, the results of the 1998 Civics Assessment were not encouraging because 74% of high school seniors tested below the proficient level (Lutkus, et al, 1999).

As early as 1996, Delli Carpini & Keeter reported that overall levels of political knowledge have not budged over the past half century. This was a remarkable finding in light of the fact that political knowledge was highly correlated with levels of formal education. Delli Carpini & Keeter explained this fact by stating that civic instruction was less effective than it once was and that formative processes outside of school have weakened.

So, why does it matter whether or not young people possess civic knowledge?

Major research findings, according to Galston (2001), suggested the following reasons:

1. Civic knowledge helps citizens understand their interests as individuals and as members of groups. The more knowledge they have, the better they can understand the impact of public policies on their interests, and the more effectively they can promote their interests in the political process.

2. Civic knowledge increases the consistency of views across the issues and across time.

3. Unless citizens possess a basic level of civic knowledge – especially concerning political institutions and processes – it is difficult for them to understand political events or to integrate new information into an existing framework.

4. Civic knowledge can alter our views on specific public issues.

5. The more knowledge citizens have of civic affairs; the less likely they are to experience a generalized mistrust of, or alienation from, public life.

6. Civic knowledge promotes support for democratic values.

7. Civic knowledge promotes political participation.

So then, the question remains – what affects civic knowledge? Well, for over three decades, the scholarly consensus was that formal classroom-based civic education had little or no effect on civic knowledge (Langton & Jennings, 1968). Recent findings challenged this consensus.

History of American Democracy, Civil Rights and Civics Education

The notion that human beings have inalienable rights and liberties that cannot justly be violated was first expressed by the philosophers of ancient Greece (MSN Encarta, 2005). Centuries later, libertarian ideals were embodied in the structure of national governments. England, during its Glorious Revolution of 1688, led the way. In 1689, the Declaration of Rights was implemented and guaranteed constitutional government (Burchill, Hughes, Gale, Price & Woodall, 2004). Eventually, British colonists brought this concept to the New World.

In the New World, the emphasis on life, liberty and equality were highlighted in the great documents of the Revolutionary Period: the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the Northwest Ordinances. Many leaders began to link free public schooling with the ideas of popular government and political freedom. Thomas Jefferson believed the state had the responsibility to cultivate an educated and liberated citizenry to ensure a democratic society. In “A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge,”

introduced in the Virginia legislature in 1779, Jefferson advocated a plan that provided educational opportunities for both common people and landed gentry at everyone's expense (Gants, 1993).

Thomas Jefferson's plan, however, was not enacted even though the classical curriculum and religious influence of the times were in decline. In the 1830s, William Holmes McGuffey combined the virtues of the Protestant faith with those of the rural American – patriotism, heroism, hard work, diligence and virtuous living. He published the McGuffey Eclectic Readers, books which eventually evolved into a series of six volumes with a spelling book and a high school reader. The Readers went through many editions and were adopted by thirty-seven of the then existing states (Jones & Kelly, 2004). The tone of the collection was moral, religious, capitalistic, and pro-American. The selections of American literature included orations by George Washington, Patrick Henry, Benjamin Franklin and Daniel Webster. From 1836 to 1920, an estimated 120 million copies were sold (Westerhoff, 1978).

In the late 1800s, the United States population had grown tremendously and the federal government decided that it was time to control immigration. Early immigration laws aimed to preserve the racial, religious, and ethnic composition of the United States, which was then largely European. The first immigration laws were aimed at nonwhites. In 1882, for example, the Chinese Exclusion Act suspended immigration from China for sixty years (Close Up Foundation, 1998).

Even after the Civil War, black people continued to have their share of problems. In the last two decades of the 19th century, blacks in the South were disfranchised and stripped of civil rights through discriminatory legislation and unlawful violence.

Separate facilities for whites and blacks became a basic rule. In *Plessy v. Ferguson*, an 1896 case involving the segregation of railroad passengers, the Supreme Court held that “separate but equal” public facilities did not violate the Constitution and refused to acknowledge that the separate facilities in use were not, in fact, equal (Cozzens, 1995).

Gradually, demands were made for various changes to be made in the schools to meet the needs of a changing society. The pace of immigration and industrial development led a growing number of educators to question the classical curriculum and the constant emphasis on mental discipline and incessant drill. For example, in 1883, Lester Ward published a book entitled *Dynamic Sociology*. In his book, Ward stated that classical education, which stressed knowledge of literary abstractions rather than knowledge of objective realities, was a “perverted system which, at best, only leaves the world where it finds it (p. 70).” According to Tanner and Tanner (1980), Ward’s book provided the theoretical underpinnings for American Progressivism and affected a revolution in the secondary curriculum. People naturally concluded that in order to produce good citizenship, the schools themselves would have to become laboratories for citizenship where school problems were solved.

In 1894, Francis Parker shared Ward’s concern about having a more modern curriculum and wrote a book entitled *Talks on Pedagogics*. In her book, she stated that the most important factor in learning is the social factor – which children from all social classes and backgrounds learn from each other (Tanner & Tanner, 1980). In 1916, John Dewey carried this idea a step further. In his book, *Democracy and Education*, Dewey showed the relationship between education and democracy and set forth the notion that democracy itself was a social process that could be enhanced through the school.

However, he also warned that unless our ideal society was clear, the definition of education as a social function would fit as appropriately in a dictatorship as in a democracy (Tanner & Tanner).

One educational theorist, Abraham Flexner, claimed that progressive schools were altogether too timid in their elimination of useless subjects from the curriculum. In a famous essay called *A Modern School*, Flexner (1923) wrote that the purpose of education was to develop in children “the power to handle themselves in our own world (p. 98)”. In the paper he proposed a modern curriculum that consisted of science, industry, civics and aesthetics.

During the first half of the 20th century, racial exclusion, either overt or covert, was practiced in most areas of American life. The people who suffered most from inequalities – the poor blacks, working class immigrants, the disabled, and women – had little influence over educational policy. A system of governance and finance rooted in local school boards and state legislatures and professionally guided by the administrative progressives placed most power in the hands of prosperous, white, male leaders born in the United States who tended to assume the correctness of their own culture and policies (Counts, 1927). In the South, school systems were part of a caste system that legally assigned blacks to a separate and distinctly unequal education; relatively few white educators challenged these inequities. Most educational policymakers did not notice, much less seek to correct, gender inequalities. Educators did try to create special, usually segregated, niches in the system for children with special needs (Tyack, Lowe, & Hansot, 1984).

In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated an informal “gentlemen’s agreement” with Japan, under which the United States promised to desegregate California schools—which had separated Japanese students from others—and in return, the Japanese government promised to stop the emigration of its citizens (Close Up Foundation, 1998). Soon, however, Americans were complaining about European immigrants too. For example, a law passed by Congress in 1921 encouraged immigration from western European countries such as Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, and Scandinavia because natives of these lands seemed more likely to assimilate. Meanwhile, the law discouraged immigration from eastern and southern Europe (Close Up Foundation). This was because, after World War I, there was fear of the newly established Communist government in the Soviet Union. Evidence for this comes from the fact that the U.S. Department of Justice harassed suspected subversives (MSN Encarta, 2005). In 1929, Congress passed the National Origins Act, which set an annual quota of 150,000 immigrants, only 30 percent of which could come from Southern and Eastern Europe (Close Up Foundation).

The rise of National Socialism in Germany, the spread of Communism, and the Great Depression all aroused concern for the internal security of the United States. The federal legislative and executive power to deal with disloyal acts was enlarged (MSN Encarta, 2005). In 1940, Congress passed the Smith Act, which outlawed the advocacy of force and violence as a means of bringing about changes in government (Tedford & Herbeck, 2005). During World War II, black leaders such as A. Philip Randolph protested segregation in military service. In 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed an executive order integrating the armed forces (A. Phillip Randolph Institute, 2005).

In 1950, Congress adopted the Internal Security Act, which established a new federal agency for identifying and suppressing so-called subversive persons and organizations (Barson, 1992). In 1952, President Harry Truman signed the *McCarran-Walter Act*, which revised the *National Origins Act*. People of all races would now be eligible for immigration into the United States. However, under this law, ideology became a criterion for admission. Both immigrants' and citizens' political beliefs were questioned during the *Red Scare* of the 1950s, as the government sought to weed out people with even a marginally communist background. Among the legislators prominently identified with these investigations were Senators Patrick McCarran of Nevada and Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. In 1954, Congress virtually outlawed the Communist Party (Campi, 2004).

Civil rights for blacks became a major national political issue in the 1950s. The 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* represented a turning point; reversing the 1896 "separate but equal" ruling, the Court held that compulsory segregation in public schools denied black children equal protection under the law (Rains, 1997). However, school desegregation was resisted in the South. Federal determination to enforce the court decision was demonstrated in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, when President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched troops to secure admission of black students into a predominantly white high school (Rains).

As the 1950s came to an end, Sputnik shocked the United States because it brought to the nation's attention the incredible knowledge gap between our universities and what was being taught in our schools. As a result, Congress passed first the *National Defense Education Act* and later the *Education Professions Development Act*. Both acts

supported training programs at universities for pre-collegiate teachers, the development of improved curricular materials, and research and evaluation (Quigley, 1999).

Controversies about the decisions of the Warren Court drew attention to the low level of public understanding of the Constitution and the role of the courts. In the early 1960s, Justice Brennan and other concerned members of the legal profession met near Washington, D.C. Key participants at that meeting returned to their states and took leadership roles in initiating many civic education programs that continue to exist today. They include the American Bar Association Division for Public Education; the Center for Civic Education affiliated with the State Bar of California; the Constitutional Rights Foundations of Los Angeles and Chicago, both affiliated with bar associations; the Close Up Foundation; and the Street Law program which originated at Georgetown Law School (Quigley, 1999).

In 1964, a more sweeping civil rights bill outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations and by employers, unions, and voting registrars. Deciding that normal judicial procedures were too slow in assuring minority registration and voting, Congress passed a voting rights bill in 1965. The law suspended use of literacy or other voter-qualification tests that had sometimes served to keep blacks off voting lists, authorized appointment of federal voting examiners in areas not meeting certain voter-participation requirements, and provided for federal court suits to bar discriminatory poll taxes, which were ended by a Supreme Court decision and the 24th Amendment (MSN Encarta, 2005).

Through Title I of the *Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965* reformers targeted funds to students from low income families to prevent poverty from restricting school opportunities and academic achievement. President Lyndon Johnson declared that proper

schooling could prevent poverty, not merely ameliorate the lives of the poor, echoing a claim made by Horace Mann more than a century before (Tyack & Cuban, 2001).

Historically, American women were denied their civil rights - they were unable to vote until a 1920 constitutional amendment (ClassBrain, 2004). In the 1960s women organized to demand legal equality with men and, after passage of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964*, made many gains, especially in employment. During the 1970s, efforts continued to change not only unfair practices but also outmoded attitudes toward the role of women in society. In 1972 Congress passed the *Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)* to the Constitution and submitted it to the states for ratification. The ERA, however, which was designed to eliminate legal discrimination against women, failed to win the approval of a sufficient number of states (Wikipedia, 2005).

The struggle for civil rights was not confined to just blacks, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and women. Native Americans, for decades, were forcibly deprived of their lands and denied civil rights. In 1968, Congress enacted the *Indian Civil Rights Act*, and the federal courts have heard a number of suits designed to restore to Native American tribes rights to their ancestral lands (MSN Encarta, 2005).

Other test cases of rights of privacy during this period concerned wiretapping and eavesdropping on private conversations, widespread dissemination of personal information through computers, access to information in government files, and the use without consent of pictures and names of celebrities. Although the courts provided some measure of protection to privacy, the limitations have been relatively minor. Additional protection resulted from legislative enactments such as the federal *Privacy Act of 1974* (Bushkin & Schaen, 1975).

Demonstrations by opponents of racial discrimination and the Vietnam War (and government attempts to restrict these demonstrations) led the Supreme Court to specify where, when, and how cities and states may limit the use of streets, parks, and other public places for purposes of protest (MSN Encarta, 2005). In the late 1970s, for example, members of the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA) attempted to march through Skokie, Illinois. Because of the large Jewish community, it was believed that the march would be disruptive, and the city refused to allow it. The American Civil Liberties Union interceded on the behalf of the NSPA, and the march was permitted to proceed under court order (Wikipedia, 2005).

Homosexuals, historically, have not had full civil rights because of social and sexual taboos. The number of judicial decisions and laws enacted at the local level to protect gay men and women from discrimination increased; but, the degree of prejudice heightened in the 1980s by the concern about Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In 1986 the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not bar criminal prosecution for private homosexual relations between consenting adults (MSN Encarta, 2005).

During the 1980s, the most influential school reform report was *A Nation at Risk*. In the report, a litany of dismal statistics suggests for the first time in the history of our country, that the educational skills of one generation will not surpass, will not equal, will not even approach, those of their parents (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). But, still, the belief that better schools make a better society is alive and well. During the Reagan and Bush Administration many policymakers narrowed the currency of educational success to one main measure – test scores – and reduced

schooling to a means of economic competitiveness, both personal and national (Koretz, 1988).

By the early 1990s, both women and the gay community had organized more effectively than ever before in the effort to assert their rights. The *Civil Rights Act of 1991* extended to women victims of job bias the right to sue their employers for monetary damages. The act also established a commission to probe the “glass ceiling” that prevented women and other minorities from advancing to top management (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1997). In *United States v. Virginia* (1996), the Court held that sex discrimination was unconstitutional unless the state can advance an “exceedingly persuasive justification” (MSN Encarta, 2005).

Also, in 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that state and local governments cannot make it more difficult for homosexuals than other groups to seek protection through antidiscrimination legislation. Furthermore, in a 2003 landmark decision, the Supreme Court overturned its 1986 ruling and nullified laws in 13 states that criminalized gay sexual practices. The Court asserted that gays are “entitled to respect for their private lives” and that “the state cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime” (MSN Encarta, 2005).

Terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 caused Americans to display an unusually high degree of patriotism as flags were mounted everywhere (Smith & Stackel, 2003). In contrast, during the Vietnam Era, we saw protest after protest and even the burning of the American flag (Luckey, 2003). In the address made on November 8, 2001, President Bush said that we were “...a nation awakened to service and citizenship ... American civilization itself is at war with a ruthless enemy. We value life. The

terrorists ruthlessly destroy it” (White House, 2001, p.1). Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by international terrorists on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the *PATRIOT Act of 2001*. This law expanded the federal government’s power to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorists (American Civil Liberties Union, nd). Among other provisions, the law allowed the government to detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism for months or longer without filing charges and to hold court hearings about them in secrecy. Also, the U.S. military detained as “enemy combatants” hundreds of foreign nationals who were captured during hostilities in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The government held them indefinitely at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, without bringing criminal charges or allowing them legal counsel (MSN Encarta, 2005).

On July 31, 2003, Senators Murkowski (R-AK) and Wyden (D-OR), introduced the *Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act*. This bill revised several provisions of the *PATRIOT Act of 2001* to increase judicial review. However, the *Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act* did not address Section 216 of the *PATRIOT Act of 2001* which allowed unnamed persons to be subject to a warrant based on law enforcement certifying that those individuals should have been named (Federation of American Scientists, 2003).

On September 24, 2003, Congressman Kucinich (D-OH) introduced legislation to repeal more than ten sections of the Patriot Act. The bill, entitled the *Benjamin Franklin True Patriot Act*, reviewed certain sections of the *PATRIOT Act of 2001*, including those that authorized sneak and peek searches, library, medical, and financial record searches, and the detention and deportation of non-citizens without meaningful judicial review.

The bill languished without action taken before the end of the 108th United States Congress (Wikipedia, 2005).

On January 23, 2004, U.S. District Judge Audrey Collins ruled that Section 805 (which classifies "expert advice or assistance" as material support to terrorism) was vague and in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, marking the first legal decision to set a part of the Act aside (*Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft*, 2003). Collins granted the plaintiff's motion that "expert advice or assistance" was impermissibly vague, but denied a nationwide injunction against the provision.

Antiterrorism legislation significantly expanded the federal government's surveillance powers. Federal agents were given greater authority to wiretap telephones, to monitor e-mail and Internet use, and to secretly search a suspect's home or office. These powers were further widened by the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* (MSN Encarta, 2005).

Sanders (I-VT) with Representatives Nadler (D-NY), Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.), Otter (R-Idaho), and Paul (R-Texas) proposed an amendment to the *Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Bill of 2005* that would cut off funding to the Department of Justice for searches conducted under Section 215. The amendment initially failed to pass the House with a tie vote (Morgan & Babington, 2004). However, on June 15, 2005, a second attempt to limit Section 215 was successful in the House of Representatives. The House voted in favor of the Sanders amendment to an appropriations bill. The Sanders amendment prevented funds provided by the bill from being used by the FBI and the Justice Department to search library and book store records as authorized by Section 215

of FISA. This vote was misreported in many media outlets as a vote against Section 215 (Wikipedia, 2005).

In April, 2004 the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit challenging the national security letter provisions of the *Electronic Communications Privacy Act*, which allowed the Director of the FBI to obtain customer records from phone and Internet companies in terrorism investigations. Months later, U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero struck down Section 505—which allowed the government to issue "National Security Letters" to obtain sensitive customer records from Internet Service Providers and other businesses without judicial oversight—was in violation of the First and Fourth Amendment. The court also found the broad gag provision in the law to be an "unconstitutional prior restraint" on free speech (*Doe and ACLU v. Ashcroft*, 2004).

Changing political climate and world order are important reasons why so many civics initiatives have recently come forward. Beliefs in progress or regress always convey a political message. Opinions about advance or decline in education reflect general confidence in American institutions. Faith in the nation and its institutions was far higher in the aftermath of World War II than in the skeptical era of the Vietnam War and Watergate. Expectations about education changed, as did media representations of what was happening in schools. And the broader goals that education served – the visions of possibility that animate the society – also shifted in different periods, making it necessary to ask how people have judged progress, from what points of view, and over what spans of time (Tyack & Cuban, 2001).

The Dismantling of American Citizenry by the Juvenile Justice System

The original juvenile justice system, which stems from English common law, practiced the legal doctrine of *parens patriae* – the right and responsibility of the state to substitute its own control over children for that of the natural parents when the latter appeared unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities or when the child posed a problem for the community – which provided the formal justification to intervene (Cogan, 1970; Curtis, 1976; Pisciotta, 1982). This was done to protect the Crown’s interests in feudal succession and to ensure the orderly transfer of property interests and feudal duties from one generation to the next and established royal authority to administer the estates of orphaned minors with property (Cogan; Rendelman, 1971). In the American colonies, however, local poor laws authorized the state to act in *loco parentis* to separate children from their destitute or neglectful parents (Katz, 1986, Rendelman). In 1838, *parens patriae* formally entered American jurisprudence to justify the commitment of a juvenile to a house of refuge (Feld, 1999). Houses of refuge removed offenders from the community, isolated them from contaminating influences and imposed a strict discipline to inculcate obedience and respect for authority (Mennel, 1973; Pickett, 1969; Rothman, 1971).

In 1899, ideological changes in the cultural conception of children and in strategies of social control at the end of the nineteenth century culminated in the creation of a separate juvenile court beginning in Cook County, Illinois (Feld, 1999). Considering that children are less developed mentally, morally and emotionally, it was generally believed that they should be held to a lower standard of criminal responsibility. During this time frame, the primary mission of the juvenile court was to investigate the factors

that caused each youth to go astray and then devise sanctions and services that would cause rehabilitation.

The primary mission of the criminal court, on the other hand, was to express the community's disapproval of the illegal behavior and provide an appropriate amount of punishment for every conviction. The distinction between these two systems barely survived seventy years since its inception in 1899. Systematic and critical reexamination of juvenile courts' cultural and legal premises emerged in the 1960s and culminated in the court case *Kent v. United States* (383 U.S. 541, 1966). In 1966, the Supreme Court observed that "the child receives the worst of both worlds: he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children" (Feld, 1999, p. 109).

Many other reforms were enacted in an attempt to strengthen the nation's response to juvenile offenders, but the reforms did not curtail the public view that juvenile justice was something less than real justice. In the 1980s, juvenile courts began to adopt the values and orientation of criminal courts (Butts & Mitchell, 2000).

The United States Constitution guaranteed equal treatment under the law. That is to say, juveniles who commit the same types of crimes and have similar delinquency histories deserve equal treatment by the police, the prosecutors and the courts, regardless of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender (American Civil Liberties Union, 2003). According to national research, this was found untrue. Across the nation, Hispanic and African-American youth are over-represented in the U.S. justice system and they receive harsher treatment than Caucasian youth for the same types of offenses (Poe-Yamagata & Jones, 2000, Villarruel & Walker, 2002).

In 2000, juveniles were charged with 150,747 crimes. Of these, 104,176 juveniles were referred to juvenile court and 12,028 juveniles were sentenced to long-term delinquency programs. In 2004, Florida's population of 10 to 17-year olds was approximately 1.5 million. Roughly, 7% of these children were engaged in crime (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 2004).

In Florida, juveniles were responsible for 1 out of 4 violent crimes; and 1 out of 4 offenders were female. For example, of the 104,176 offenders, 54% committed felony offenses (3% were by girls). There were 118 referred for murder; 11,342 for aggravated assault; 16,941 for burglary, and 4,447 for auto theft. Juvenile crime, including violent offenses, peaked at 3 p.m., right after school lets out. This past decade, there was a 229% increase in juvenile offenders referred for drug use (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 2004).

In the Florida schools, there were 14,153 assaults; 3,942 incidents of weapons possession and 21,808 incidents involving alcohol, tobacco or illegal drugs. According to the Florida Youth Survey of 2000, students reported that within the past 12 months, 15% had attacked someone with intent to harm; 15% were suspended from school; 12% were drunk or high at school; 6% were arrested; 6% sold illegal drugs; 4% carried a handgun; 3% stole or attempted to steal a vehicle and 1% took a handgun to school (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 2004). Fourteen percent of juvenile offenders can be classified as chronic offenders, responsible overall for 42% of delinquency referrals and 67% of repeat referrals. Chronic offenders had six or more delinquency referrals over a two year period (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice).

For comparison, California had roughly twice the population of Florida. In 2002, the state of California had 229,634 juvenile arrests. Statistically, 27% were felonies, 58% were misdemeanors, and 15% were status offenses. Racially, 43% were Hispanic, 33% were Caucasian, and 17% were African American. Sadly, 8% were age 12 or younger and 26% were female. Of the 229,634 arrests, 94,000 were incidents that occurred in public schools. Eighty-five percent of these incidents were divided equally among battery, property crime and drug or alcohol offenses. The rest were possession of a deadly weapon (8%), assault with a deadly weapon (2%), sex offenses (2%), robbery and extortion. There were two homicides (Administrative Office of the Courts, Center for Families, Children & the Courts, 2003).

Over the past twenty years, the United States experienced a massive increase in imprisonment (Blumstein & Beck, 1999; Gilliard & Beck, 1996; Lynch & Sabol, 1997, 2000). Since 1980, the total incarcerated population increased from 497,362 to 1,696,958 (Lynch & Sabol, 2000). Incarceration has been greatest for young black males, first in central cities and more recently in smaller urban areas (Lynch & Sabol, 1997, 2000; Lynch, Sabol, & Shelley, 1998). Blacks are about seven times more likely than whites to be incarcerated (Lynch & Sabol, 2000). Bonczar & Beck (1997) estimated that nearly 30% of the black male population 20 years of age and older will be incarcerated at least once in their lifetime.

Between 1980 and 1995, the number of state prisoners locked up for drug crimes increased by more than 1000%. Whereas only one out of every 16 state inmates was a drug offender in 1980, one out of every four in 1995 was a drug offender. By the middle of the 1990s, 60% of federal prison inmates were convicted of a drug offense, as opposed

to 25% in 1980. If local and county jail inmate populations were included in the calculation, there would be some 400,000 federal and state prison inmates serving time or awaiting trial for drug offenses. Drug offenders accounted for more than 80% of the total growth in the federal inmate population – and 50% of the growth of the state prison population – from 1985 to 1995 (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

The chances of receiving a prison sentence after being arrested for a drug offense increased by 447% between 1980 and 1992. The number of state prison drug sentences between 1985 and 1995 increased 331% and represented more than half of the overall increase in state sentences meted out during that period. The effect of drug sentences on the federal system was even more pronounced. The number of federal drug sentences imposed between 1985 and 1995 increased 478%, and accounted for 74% of the total increase in federal sentences during that period. Similarly, the length of sentences for drug offenses dramatically increased: drug offenders entering federal prison in 1986 served an average term of almost 30 months; drug offenders entering federal prison in 1997 were expected to serve an average term of more than twice that length, 66.2 months (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

Hispanics represented the fastest growing category of prisoners, having grown 219% between 1985 and 1995. The percentage of Asian-Americans in prison also grew; their percentage of the federal prison population increased by a factor of four from 1980 to 1999 (Weich & Angulo, 2000). According to the Austin, Johnson & Gregoriou (2000), approximately 107,000 youth (younger than 18) were incarcerated on any given day. Of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 44 have juveniles in adult jails and prisons. The vast majorities of these youths were age 17 (79%) or were age 16 (18%).

The first execution of a juvenile, Thomas Granger of Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts, occurred in 1642 (Streib, 2005). Since then 366 juvenile offenders have been executed. The most recent execution of a juvenile offender occurred in Oklahoma on April 3, 2003 (Streib). As of December 31, 2004, 72 juveniles were on death row. All of the offenders were male and had been convicted and sentenced to death for murder. Over three-quarters of these cases involved 17 year old offenders and two-thirds of them were offenders of color (45% black and 19% Hispanic). These 72 juveniles constituted about 2 % of the total death row population which was approximately 3,487 (Streib).

Even though Texas had the largest death row for offenders in the country, the United States was the only nation in the world refusing to abandon its laws permitting the juvenile death penalty (Streib, 2005). Court cases such as *Thompson v. Oklahoma* (1988) and *Stanford v. Kentucky* (1989) have examined the constitutionality of this issue and held that for crimes committed at the age of 16 or older that the juvenile death penalty is, in fact, constitutional. Today, in *Roper v. Simmons* the issue is before the United States Supreme Court (2004) awaiting further decision.

A steep rise in juvenile crime occurred between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. The increase in crime reached a plateau in 1994. In response to a fear that juvenile crime would continue to rise, legislatures enacted measures designed to “get tough on crime.” The *Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974* was amended to include provisions that allowed states to try juveniles as adults. Minimum detention standards were also created. In the late 1990s, Americans faced growing concern over highly publicized, violent juvenile crime. A series of school shootings (Columbine High School, for example) caused the public to fear a new breed of "juvenile superpredators" defined

by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as "juveniles for whom violence was a way of life – new delinquents unlike youth of past generations" (Juvenile Justice FYI, n.d, p.1).

The disparate treatment of minorities begins with law enforcement. Routinely, police patrol the streets looking for activity they think is suspicious. They stop cars for traffic violations in the hope of discovering more serious criminality and they engage in undercover operations in an effort to reduce crimes like drug trafficking and prostitution. These tactics require discretion – they decide who is suspicious, which cars to tail, what conduct warrants further investigation, and even which neighborhoods to scour (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

Statistical evidence indicated that black motorists were stopped for minor traffic violations because the police assumed the potential existed for more serious criminal activity. This “driving while black” syndrome had two effects. It caused a large number of innocent black drivers to be subjected to the hassle and humiliation of police questioning, and it resulted in a skewed number of blacks being arrested for non-violent drug crimes that would not normally be discovered (Cockburn & St. Clair, 1999).

Racial profiling was widespread. For example, in Florida, a highway interdiction program, called “Operation Pipeline”, was part of a network of drug interdiction programs established and funded by federal authorities. The Task Force examined the racial makeup of arrested drivers who had been initially stopped for weaving, following too closely or making an unsafe lane change. Out of 156 such drivers, 121 of them (78%) were Latino, 24 of them (15%) were white, and 10 were African American (6%).

These percentages meant that either minorities have special difficulties driving safely at interstate speeds or that they are being racially profiled (Villaragos, 1999).

Racial profiling was also carried out in the enforcement of controlled substances. As part of its "Operation Pipeline," New Jersey DEAs trained local and state law enforcement personnel around the country to explicitly use race as a basis for highway stops. In order to find drugs, police adopt highly intrusive tactics - stop and frisks, vehicle searches, no knock warrants, etc. - and in order to decide where and when to intrude, they've adopted the use of profiles, racial and other. In the war against drugs, many police officers believe that "anything goes," and set aside ethical or even legal concerns in order to fight the war and catch drugs at any cost (Drug Reform Coordination Network, 2000).

Immigration laws furnished further evidence of widespread racial profiling. Overall, nearly three-quarters of all of those deported by the INS are of Mexican origin. According to INS statistics, even though Mexicans constitute less than half of all undocumented persons in the United States, Hispanics constitute approximately 60% of all undocumented persons, but well over 90% of those subjected to INS enforcement actions were Hispanic (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 7-4 decision held that U.S. Border Patrol agents may not stop individuals for questioning based solely on their Hispanic appearance. The court stated, "stops based on race or ethnic appearance send the underlying message to all our citizens that those who are not white are judged by the color of their skin alone" (U.S. Visa News, 2000, p.1).

Racial profiling was inconsistent with dominant law enforcement philosophy: community policing. At its best, community policing refers to a more diverse police

force working with community institutions to prevent crime before it occurs. In many jurisdictions, community policing means little more than giving street level officers wide discretion to “clean up” the communities they patrol by whatever means seem expedient. In Denver, the Biased Policing Task Force was created in 2000 to address the national issue of racial profiling and make certain that it did not occur (Denver Police Department, 2003).

The disparate treatment of minorities did not end with law enforcement, in fact, it continued with prosecutorial decision making. Displays of prosecutorial mercy were shown to disproportionately benefit white people. For example, a study of 1,017 homicide defendants in Florida compared the police assessment of the severity of the initial offense with the prosecutorial assessment of the severity. The study found that crimes involving white victims and African American offenders were much more likely to be upgraded in severity by the prosecutor, while crimes involving African American victims and white offenders were more likely to be downgraded (World Order Against Torture, n.d).

Related to the decision to decline prosecution is the decision to charge the defendant in state or federal court. The decision of whether to prosecute a drug case in federal court had important consequences for the defendant because federal sentences are notoriously harsher than state sentences. That the prosecutorial decision to bring charges in federal, rather than state, court was often exercised to the detriment of minorities was best demonstrated by statistics on crack cocaine prosecutions (Weich & Angulo, 2000). For example, Stephen Green, a black man, was arrested with 70 grams of crack and sentenced in federal court to 10 years in prison – the mandatory minimum federal

sentence for selling more than 50 grams of crack. On the other hand, Daniel Siemanowski, a white man, was arrested with 67 grams of crack and sentenced in state court to prison for less than a year (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

Once a prosecutor decides to bring charges against an individual, plea negotiation presented the next opportunity for a prosecutor to grant some degree of leniency to a defendant, or to insist on maximum punishment. Prosecutors have virtually unlimited discretion to enter into an agreement by which the defendant will plead guilty in exchange for the dismissal of certain charges or a reduced sentence, and once again the exercise of discretion is characterized by racially disparate results. For example, the San Jose Mercury News carried out a comprehensive study of racial bias in plea bargaining in California in 1991. A computer analysis of almost 700,000 criminal cases in California from 1981 to 1990 demonstrated that at virtually every stage of pre-trial plea bargaining whites received more favorable treatment than similarly situated minorities. All else being equal, whites did better than African Americans and Hispanics at getting charges dropped, getting cases dismissed, avoiding harsher punishment, avoiding extra charges, and having their criminal records wiped clean (World Order Against Torture, n.d).

Another turning point in the criminal justice process, one that can mean the difference between freedom and incarceration for criminal defendants, is bail determination. While the decision to set bail is ultimately a judicial function, prosecutors play an important role in determining whether a criminal defendant will be released on bail or detained in jail prior to trial by recommending detention or release. A study by the Hartford Courant of 150,000 criminal cases in Connecticut found that an African American or Hispanic man receives on average double the bail of a white man for the

same offense. In drug cases, the study found that the average bond for African American and Hispanics in several areas of the state was four times higher than the bond for whites. For Hispanic women with no prior record, the average bond was 197% higher than the average for white women (World Order Against Torture, n.d).

Thirty-eight states and the federal government authorize capital punishment. In each of those jurisdictions it was the prosecutor who made the critical decision of whether or not to seek the death penalty. That decision was guided somewhat by statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, but many of these factors, such as the heinousness of the crime, are subjective. Judges and juries may eventually reject a prosecutor's request that the death penalty be imposed, but prosecutors alone decide whether death is an option (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

The importance of race as a factor in the imposition of capital punishment was well documented. Individuals charged with killing white victims are significantly more likely to receive the death penalty than individuals charged with killing non-white victims. Race of the victim yielded significant disparity in the application of the death penalty (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

The Baldus study (1990), for example, concluded that blacks who killed whites were sentenced to death 22 times more frequently than blacks who killed blacks, and seven times more frequently than whites who killed blacks (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

Although they comprise less than a quarter of the U.S. population, black and Hispanic Americans make up approximately two-thirds of the total U.S. prison population. The percentage of prisoners who are black is four times that of the percentage of blacks in the U.S. population (49% to 12%); the percentage of prisoners

who are Hispanic is almost twice that of the percentage of Hispanics in the U.S. population (17% to 10%). In order to grasp the enormity of these facts, consider that: (1) almost one in three black males aged 20-29 is on any given day under some form of criminal supervision – either in prison or jail, or on probation or parole; (2) a black male born in 1991 has a one in three chance of spending time in prison at some point in his life; (3) a Hispanic male born in 1991 has a one in six chance of spending time in prison; (4) there are more young black men under criminal supervision than there are in college; and, (5) for every one black male who graduates from college, 100 black males are arrested (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

The rate at which young minorities are relegated to lives of incarceration and its consequences served to negate many of the hard-fought gains of the civil rights movement. During the last half of the 20th century, black Americans and other minorities struggled to win the right to equal opportunity in employment, housing, education and public accommodations. These rights are now meaningless to hundreds of thousand of minority prisoners and are largely unavailable to hundreds of thousands of minority ex-convicts. The ability of minorities to enjoy the fruits of the civil rights struggle was compromised by the racial disparities of the criminal justice system (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

Perhaps the most precious of the civil rights victories was the right to vote. Yet, in 46 states, convicted adults in prison are stripped of their right to vote. Thirty-two states disenfranchise felons on parole, while 29 states disenfranchise felons on probation. And 14 states even disenfranchise for life ex-felons who have fully served their prison terms. Many of those who lose the right to vote were convicted of relatively minor, non-violent

crimes. In some states, an offender who received probation for a single sale of marijuana, or for shoplifting, may be permanently disenfranchised. This means that an estimated 3.9 million Americans, or one in fifty adults, have currently or permanently lost the ability to vote because of a felony conviction. More than one-third (36%) of the total disenfranchised population are black men (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Black women were incarcerated at a rate seven times greater than white women. The 417 percent increase in their incarceration rates between 1980 and 1995 was greater even than the increase for black men. Three fourths of the women in prison in 1991 were mothers, and two-thirds had children under 18. More women in prison therefore mean fewer mothers caring for their children, a trend that further exacerbates the deterioration of minority communities and family structures (Weich & Angulo, 2000).

The juvenile justice system was conceived as a way to intervene constructively in the lives of children in order to steer them away from the adult criminal justice system. Juvenile courts were established throughout the United States in the early 1900's based on the recognition that children are different than adults; while children may violate the law, they remain uniquely suited to rehabilitation. *In re Gault* (1967) precipitated a procedural revolution that unintentionally but inevitably transformed the juvenile court. Although *McKeiver v. Pennsylvania* (1971) declined to extend a constitutional right to a jury trial to juveniles, *In re Gault* (387 U.S. 1, 1967) and *In re Winship* (1970) endorsed the adversarial model, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the primacy of factual and legal guilt as a constitutional prerequisite of state intervention. As a consequence, the

Court redefined delinquents as a subgroup of criminal defendants, rather than as a category of dependent children in need of services (Feld, 1999).

Disengagement from Productive Citizenry

Since ancient Greek times, democracy has been a shared vision in which all citizens understand, appreciate and actively engage in civic and political life. “Civic education” has deep roots in America. In fact, the main reason for the creation of the first public school system was to prepare each generation to be active participants in our democratic society (The Center for Civic Education, 2004).

Increasing numbers of Americans have disengaged from civic and political institutions at alarming rates. For example, in 2003, a public opinion survey showed that young people did not understand the ideals of citizenship; that they were disengaged from the political process; that they lacked the knowledge needed for self-government; and, that they had a limited appreciation for American democracy (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2003). Put simply, many young Americans may be ill-prepared to participate fully in our society.

When one received education in the area of civics, he or she studied the structures of governance, patterns of power and civic negotiations over public purposes that give shape to a civilization (Boyte, 2003). Recently, there was a call for new strategies that provided the average citizen with a solid foundation with which to work. The most promising approach, however, was based in school. Unfortunately, there was also a growing trend of disengagement from politics and public affairs in the United States, as well as growing divisions along class and racial lines. Two out of three of the poorest

Americans were not able to describe political parties' attitudes toward government spending priorities, whereas most of the wealthiest Americans knew how Democrats differed from Republicans (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).

Statistically, from the early 1970s to 1996, the percentage of young adults, 18 to 29, voting in presidential elections decreased from 50% to less than 33%. In 1966, 58% of freshman college students expressed the belief that keeping up with politics was important. Only 26% agreed in the year 2000 (Boyte, 2003).

Boyte (2003) expressed the opinion that the role of money; the unraveling of public morality and the rise of a culture of radical individualism; and the pervasiveness of television explained the civic and political disengagement of young people. However, according to the Civic Mission of Schools (2003), fear of criticism and litigation; high stakes testing; and, budget cutbacks should also be included.

Schools can make a difference in people's interest in public affairs and knowledge about politics, especially through regular classroom discussion of current events (Neimi & Junn, 1998). However, several sources argued that schools generally fail to accomplish this task. For example, a study found that one-third of high school seniors' lack basic understanding of the fundamental principles, institutions and processes of American democracy (McCullough, 2003). The National Alliance for Civic Education (2002) found that only 6% of eighth-graders could describe two ways that societies benefit from having a constitution; and, that only 9% of high school seniors could list two ways that democratic societies benefit from citizen participation.

Until the mid-1900s, immigration officials decided who spoke English well enough to gain U.S. citizenship. Often, the only requirement for citizenship was proof of

U.S. residency for five years. In 1906, a statute was enacted that required all citizenship applicants to demonstrate their ability in spoken English (Nixon & Keenan, 1997). This was during a period in U.S. history when there was immense immigration. In 1950, a federal law mandated reading and writing skill levels. This made it more difficult for immigrants to become citizens (Becker, 1997).

In the late 1980s, adult ESL programs responded to the requirements of the *Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)* of 1986. The IRCA granted limited amnesty and permanent residency to undocumented immigrants (many of whom were displaced by unrest in Central America) who followed a specific application process and received at least 40 hours of instruction. Service providers indicated that the number of low-literate learners was rising in citizenship classes (Becker, 1997). Many of these low-literate learners became residents in the early 1990s as part of the IRCA (Terdy & Spener, 1990). Older and disabled immigrants, those who faced a cutoff of social services, also attended classes in greater numbers (Rimer, 1996).

In 1996, changes in federal law limited some rights that immigrants had previously held, such as access to food stamps and other government services (*Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996*, PL #104-193). These changes have renewed interest among immigrants in seeking citizenship, as they can protect their interests more fully by becoming citizens (Mitchell, 1998). Although some of the 1996 measures have been eliminated or amended (National Immigration Law Center, 1998), obtaining citizenship remains a goal for many adult ESL learners. In 2000, the U.S. Department of Education's English Literacy/Civics education initiative allocated money to 32 states and 12 demonstration grant recipients to help adults learn

English while also learning about civil rights, civic participation and responsibility, and obtaining citizenship (United States Department of Education, 2000).

In the United States, there were two main approaches to civics education.

Traditional citizenship education, as found in civics courses, was characterized by liberal theory. Typically, two aspects of liberal theory were examined. The first described departments of government and processes of legislation. The second focused on the individual, who possessed constitutional rights. The role of government was to secure these rights, ensure a just distribution of resources, and uphold the law (Boyte, 2003).

Neo-liberalism or communitarian political theory was service-oriented and concerned about teaching values, such as responsibility and care for others. This side argued that America suffers from excessive individualism and an increasingly litigious culture where citizens sought restitution through courts. Neo-liberalism grew over the last two decades. Statistically, 46% of high schools incorporated service learning into their curricula. In 1984, only 9% had such courses (Galston, 2001).

The G.W. Bush administration, since its inception, has been noted for its pro-citizenship orientation. For example, beginning with his Inaugural Address on January 20, 2001, President G.W. Bush asked the public to "...seek a common good beyond your comfort. To serve your nation, beginning with your neighborhood. I ask you to be citizens. Citizens, not spectators. Citizens, not subjects. Responsible citizens, building communities of service and a nation of character" (White House, 2001, p.1). Subsequent terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 caused Americans to display their patriotism. In the address made on November 8, 2001, President Bush said that we were "...a nation awakened to service and citizenship ... American civilization itself is at war with a

ruthless enemy. We value life. The terrorists ruthlessly destroy it” (White House, 2001, p.1). His pro-citizenship orientation, even after crushing Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, continues this very moment. Our military troops are currently stationed in Iraq and they been asked to rebuild a society reeling from oppression into a prospering democracy (Martin & Richardson, 2003).

While in office, President George W. Bush acknowledged the need to redefine civic education in America, he, therefore, announced the creation of two initiatives designed to improve students’ knowledge of U.S. history and civics. The first initiative, called “We the People”, encouraged the teaching of American history and civic education. The program has provided grants to develop good curricula; held training seminars for school teachers and university faculty; sponsored lecture series in which acclaimed scholars told the story of great figures from American history; and enlisted high school students in a national essay contest about the principles and ideals of America. The second initiative, called Our Documents, used the Internet to bring one hundred of America's most important documents from the National Archives to classrooms and communities across the country, provided lesson plans, and fostered competitions and discussions about defining moments in our history (White House, 2002).

Through the U.S. Department of Education, he also saw to it that an online booklet entitled “Helping Your Child Become a Responsible Citizen” was available to the public at large. The Introduction contained a rather inspiring and appropriate lead in to the booklet (United States Department of Education, Introduction, 2003). In it, President George W. Bush said,

Our Founding Fathers understood that our country would survive and flourish if our nation was committed to good character and an unyielding dedication to liberty and justice for all. Throughout our history, our most honorable heroes practiced the values of hard work and honesty, commitment to excellence and courage, and self-discipline and perseverance. Today, as we work to preserve peace and freedom throughout world, we are guided by a national character that respects human dignity and values every life (p.1).

Helping children become responsible citizens meant developing the strong character that our Founding Fathers cherished most. The word character described an individual's pattern of behavior or personality. People with strong character, according to the U.S. Department of Education (2003) showed compassion; were honest and fair; displayed self-discipline in setting and meeting goals; made good judgments; showed respect to others; showed courage in standing up for beliefs; had a strong sense of responsibility; were good citizens who were concerned for their community; and, maintained self-respect.

Children acquired strong character when adults in their daily lives: set good examples; had high standards and clear expectations; coached them on how to be responsible; and, told stories that reinforced the values of strong character. In short, children need to be shown and taught the elements of character through activities in school and at home. The importance of parent involvement can not be over-emphasized (United States Department of Education, 2003).

Social Construction of Childhood, 1860 to the Present Day

Until the last third of the nineteenth century, most people lived within walking distance of the places where they worked, and social, economic, and ethnic residential segregation did not separate the well-to-do people from the poor ones (Clement, 1985;

Massey & Denton, 1993). In a short period of time, industrial growth spurred population increases and altered the urban landscape. The immigrant poor crowded into the urban center surrounding the industrial core, the middle class and wealthier dispersed to the suburban periphery, and cities became segregated by socioeconomic class and ethnicity (Warner, 1978). Crowded ethnic ghettos, poverty, disease, disorder, and crime became conspicuous and threatening features of modern urban industrial life. For Anglo-Protestant Americans, “raised in respectable quietude and the high-toned moral imperatives of evangelical Protestantism, the city seemed not merely a new social form or way of life, but a strange threat to civilization itself” (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 176). Anti-urban sentiments mingled with nativists’ ethnic prejudices against foreign immigrants whom they regarded as sources of crime, juvenile delinquency, moral decline, and political corruption (Wiebe, 1967).

The shift from an agrarian family economy to corporate industrial production separated work from the home, contracted domestic arrangements from an extended kinship group into a more isolated nuclear family, and altered child-rearing practices. Spanning most of the nineteenth century and extending into the twentieth, families erected a shield of privacy against the outside world, relegated women to the “domestic sphere,” and prolonged the dependent status of children (Lasch, 1977; Rothman, 1978). Especially within the upper and middle classes of merchants, entrepreneurs, and professionals, women assumed a larger role to maintain a proper moral environment and to supervise their children’s development (Feld, 1999).

The structural transition from an agricultural to an urban industrial society dramatically altered young people’s economic roles and their social and legal status

(Feld, 1999). The separation between life in the home and work in the marketplace affected both children and their mothers who became primary caretakers. The prolongation of childhood consigned women to a life of greater domesticity as work environments no longer tolerated the presence of children. The “doctrine of separate spheres” – men as workers in the marketplace and women as wives, mothers, and caretakers in the home – provided cultural and ideological support for Victorian-era gender segregation (Rothman, 1978).

The rise of domesticity sealed off the family from penetration by the surrounding world. The nuclear family erected barriers between the family and larger society and created a “new conception of the family as a refuge from the highly competitive and often brutal world of commerce and industry” (Lasch, 1977, p. 5). Within the increasingly privatized nuclear family, parents devoted greater energy to raising their children. Demographic changes in the numbers and spacing of children facilitated greater attention to each child. Especially among the urban middle classes, parents had somewhat fewer children and spaced them more closely together (Demos & Boocock, 1978; Kett, 1977). These demographic changes enabled middle-class women more systematically to nurture their children and to supervise their moral and social development.

Child-rearing literature used images of plasticity, softness, and malleability and described children as objects for adults to manipulate (Boylan, 1985). Belief in children’s plasticity led to greater stress on and attention to structuring the child’s physical, social, and moral environment. Deferral of adult responsibilities rather than early assumption of adult roles became the child-rearing norm. Parents supervised their

children closely to inculcate moral character, economic diligence, appropriate manners, sexual modesty, obedience and respect for adult authority, and self-control. By the turn of the century, the idealized conception of childhood provided a benchmark by which to measure parental success and a standard against which to evaluate children's deviance (Feld, 1999).

Women's responsibilities as custodians of their children's moral development also provided an impetus to make the world in which their children lived a better place. Concern for social and moral welfare allowed women to participate in certain public causes and thereby to expand the domestic sphere into other arenas of social policy (Degler, 1980). However, all social classes and ethnic and religious groups did not subscribe equally to this new conception of childhood. The newly arrived immigrants, for example, still adhered to a more traditional, pre-modern view of young people. Many legislative reforms during the past century reflect cultural conflicts over the construction of childhood, appropriate ways to socialize children, and the balance between private and public responsibilities for youth. The privatization of parental child-rearing responsibilities limited public authority to meddle in domestic arrangements and defined public intervention in the family as an abnormal intrusion. As a result, *parens patriae* intercession acquired negative connotations and occurred only in instances of indisputable parental failure (Grubb & Lazerson, 1982).

Progressive reformers enacted laws and created institutions to structure child development, to control and mold children, to protect them from exploitation, and to oversee their parents (Rothman, 1980). As formal education increasingly became a prerequisite of future success, compulsory school attendance laws provided adults "with

unprecedented control over the symbolic environment of the young” and enabled them to define the “conditions by which a child was to become an adult” (Postman, 1994, p. 45). Progressives created specialized agencies to enforce child labor, school attendance, and child welfare laws. Juvenile courts provided a means by which to define and control youthful deviance and to buttress other child-saving endeavors (Feld, 1999).

Progressive reformers reconfigured schools as the salience of education for success in the corporate economy increased. The quest for bureaucratic rationality and administrative efficiency that pervaded American society altered schools’ organization and expanded their role as agencies of social change and social control. School administrators replicated the bureaucratic structure of corporations and instituted hierarchical centralized controls (Tyack, 1974). Schools borrowed the concept of efficiency from factories and applied “scientific management” theory to education and school administration (Button & Provenzo, 1981). Further bureaucratic rationalization of education led to standardized curricula, norms for evaluating student performance, and tracking students on the basis of ability (Button & Provenzo).

As the corporate economy expanded at the turn of the century, formal education became a functional prerequisite of entry into many white-collar, middle-class careers and occupations. Virtually, for the first time, formal education correlated with attractive job opportunities and membership in the middle class (Kett, 1977).

The primacy and prolongation of school attendance affected families and children. For example, child labor laws prevented children’s economic exploitation, removed them from the workplace, returned them to their homes and schools, and reinforced a moratorium for adolescence during which they could prepare for success

later in life (Stern, Smith & Doolittle, 1975). As young people remained at home longer, their families sacrificed their economic contributions and young people imposed a drain on family resources. As a result, extended education and social mobility correlated with class and ethnic differences. Affluent parents absorbed the costs of prolonged education, and their children attended school well into their teen years, whereas the children of urban working-class families seldom remained in school beyond the 6th grade. By the end of the century, mass schooling provided a means to acculturate normal children while juvenile courts provided a means to control those who deviated (Feld, 1999).

One approach was clearly outlined in a book produced by the U.S. Department of Justice (1964), called *Re-educating Confined Delinquents*. Re-education was not necessarily accomplished by the influx of more head knowledge, but instead by training the child, or in some cases, re-training the child to confront and solve the problems of everyday life. Many children did not do well in this type of environment; therefore, they found themselves getting into trouble because they were isolated, controlled or simply bored. Statistics revealed a rising trend of violent acts being committed. In 1998, some 2,100 United States juvenile courts processed an estimated 1,757,400 delinquency cases in which the juvenile had been charged with a criminal law violation (Stahl, 2001).

Moral Development

Moral education has always been a popular topic in the fields of psychology and education. Media reports of increased violent juvenile crime, teen pregnancy, and suicide caused many to proclaim that our nation was in moral crisis (Nucci, 2005). While not all of these social concerns were moral in nature, there was a growing trend toward linking

the solutions to these and related social problems to the teaching of moral and social values in our public schools. What role the school can and should play in the moral development of youth remained controversial (Nucci).

Piaget was among the first psychologists whose work remains directly relevant to contemporary theories of moral development. In his early writing, he focused specifically on the moral lives of children, studying the way children played games in order to learn more about children's beliefs about right and wrong. According to Piaget (1965), all development emerges from action; that is to say, individuals construct and reconstruct their knowledge of the world as a result of interactions with the environment.

Piaget (1965) also interviewed children regarding acts such as stealing and lying. From his observations, he concluded that children begin in a "heteronomous" stage of moral reasoning, characterized by a strict adherence to rules and duties, and obedience to authority. According to Piaget, heteronomy resulted from two factors. The first factor was related to the young child's cognitive structure – which he described as egocentric. Piaget believed that egocentrism caused children to project their own thoughts and wishes onto others. He also believed that egocentrism was associated with the unidirectional view of rules and power associated with heteronomous moral thought; consequently, he concluded that heteronomous moral thought was associated with "objective responsibility" and explained why young children were more concerned about outcomes than they were the intentions of the person doing the act. The second major contributor was social relationship with adults. In the natural authority relationship between adults and children, the adult has all the power. Eventually, through interactions with other children, egocentrism faded away and young children were observed to develop an

"autonomous" stage of moral thinking characterized by the ability to consider rules critically and selectively apply them based on mutual respect and cooperation.

Lawrence Kohlberg's ideas of moral development were based on the premise that at birth, all humans were void of morals, ethics, and honesty. He identified the family as the first source of values and moral development for an individual. He also believed that as one's intelligence and ability to interact with others matured, so did one's patterns of moral behavior (Woolfolk, 2001).

Kohlberg followed the development of moral judgment beyond the ages studied by Piaget. During those studies he defined moral reasoning as judgments about right and wrong and determined that the process of attaining moral maturity took longer and was more gradual than Piaget had proposed. His studies were based on the use of moral dilemmas (hypothetical situations in which people must make a difficult decision).

Kohlberg later defined a subject's level of moral reasoning based upon the reasoning used to defend his or her position when faced with a moral dilemma. He thought this was more important than the actual choice made, since the choices people made were not always clearly and indisputably right. He also observed that the highest level of moral reasoning was not reached by all of his subjects.

Kohlberg's levels of moral development (Duska & Whelan, 1975; Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989) are broken down into these specific stages:

1. Pre-Conventional Level

- a. Stage 0 – Egocentric Judgment

- b. Stage 1 – Punishment & Obedience

- c. Stage 2 – Individual Instrumental Purpose & Exchange

2. Conventional Level

a. Stage 3 – Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships & Conformity

b. Stage 4 – Social System & Conscience Maintenance

3. Post-Conventional Level

a. Stage 5 – Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility

b. Stage 6 – Universal Ethical Principles

At the pre-conventional level, the child was responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but he interpreted the labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or the physical power of those who enunciated the rules and labels. Children in the stage of Egocentric Judgment made judgments of good on the basis of what he liked and wanted or what helped him, and bad on the basis of what he did not like or what hurt him. Only when the concept of rules or of obligations to obey or conform independent of his wishes was he moved to the next stage which was called Punishment and Obedience. Reciprocity was the final stage in pre-conventional thinking, it was a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch your back". Reciprocity described the stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange (Duska & Whelan, 1975).

At the conventional level, the individual perceived the maintenance of the expectations of his family, group, or nation as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude was not only one of conforming to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and identifying with the persons or group involved. The stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Conformity were

more commonly referred to as the “good boy-nice girl” orientation. The stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance suggested that right behavior consisted of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order (Duska & Whelan, 1975).

At the post-conventional level, right action tended to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards that were critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. This described the stage called Prior Rights and Social Contract. The highest level, Universal Ethical Principles, applied to all of humanity. When laws violated what should be the highest principles, one should act in accordance with the principle rather than the law (Duska & Whelan, 1975).

In the early 1970s, longitudinal studies conducted by the Kohlberg research group began to reveal anomalies in the stage sequence. In a short period of time, Elliot Turiel proposed what he called “domain theory”. According to domain theory (Turiel, 1983), the child's concepts of morality and social convention emerged out of the child's attempts to account for qualitatively differing forms of social experience associated with these two classes of social events. Actions within the moral domain, such as unprovoked hitting of someone, have intrinsic effects on the welfare of another person. Such intrinsic effects occurred irregardless of the nature of social rules that may or may not be in place regarding the action. Because of this, the core features of moral cognition were centered on considerations of the effects which actions have upon the well-being of persons. Morality was, therefore, structured by concepts of harm, welfare, and fairness. In contrast, actions that were matters of social convention had no intrinsic interpersonal consequences. They merely provided a way for members of the group to coordinate their

social exchanges through a set of agreed upon and predictable modes of conduct. Consequently, concepts of convention were structured by the child's understandings of social organization.

According to Turiel (1983), morality and convention, were distinct, parallel developmental frameworks, rather than a single system as thought by Kohlberg. However, because all social events, including moral ones, took place within the context of the larger society, a person's reasoning about the right course of action in any given social situation required the person to access and coordinate their understandings from more than one of these two social cognitive frameworks.

Carol Gilligan, a former research assistant for Lawrence Kohlberg, found that men and women had fundamentally different approaches to morality. Historically, men dominated discussions about morality and at the same time women's perspectives were not taken seriously at all. Consequently, the literature often provides a heated comparison of Gilligan's theory with that of Lawrence Kohlberg's.

Kohlberg's theory entailed the famous man "Heinz" who was portrayed to have a wife that was terminally ill. He devised his theory by asking college aged students whether or not they would break into a drug store to steal the medicine to save his wife and why or why not (Wark & Krebs, 1996). Kohlberg's moral development theory was a stage theory that did not take into account gender. Based upon Kohlberg's theory, Gilligan found that girls develop moral orientations differently than boys. Over the years, she came to believe that male morality had a "justice orientation" and that female morality had a "responsibility orientation" (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). In her book, entitled *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Gilligan

(1983) communicated that she used a famous Aesop Fable, commonly referred to as the Porcupine Dilemma, to create her own stage theory of moral development for women. Like Kohlberg's, it had three major divisions: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. But for Gilligan, the transitions between the stages were fueled by changes in the sense of self rather than in changes in cognitive capability (Belknap, 2000).

At level one of Gilligan's theoretical framework a woman's orientation was toward individual survival (Belknap, 2000); the self was the sole object of concern. The first transition that took place was from being selfish to being responsible. At level two the main concern was that goodness was equated with self-sacrifice (Belknap). This level was where a woman adopted societal values and social membership. Gilligan referred to the second transition from level two to level three as the transition from goodness to truth (Belknap). Here, the needs of the self must be deliberately uncovered; as they are uncovered the woman began to consider the consequences of the self and others (Belknap).

In *Everybody's Normal Till You Get to Know Them*, John Ortberg (2003) analyzed the Porcupine Dilemma further. From him, we learned that this dilemma was about social interaction and relationships – that each one of us is like the porcupine with many quills; and, that our quills happen to have names like rejection, condemnation, resentment, arrogance, selfishness, envy, and contempt. Some people hide them better than others. Eventually, we learn to survive through a combination of withdrawal and attack. We find ourselves hurting (and being hurt) by those we long to be closest to. The dilemma is the fact that we are all someone's porcupine.

In *Rebuilding the Nest*, Urie Bronfenbrenner (1990) laid out five propositions that described the processes that fostered the development of human competence and

character. At the core of these principles was a child's emotional, physical, intellectual and social need for ongoing, mutual interaction with a caring adult--and preferably with many adults. According to Bronfenbrenner (1990), the propositions were as follows:

Proposition 1: In order to develop--intellectually, emotionally, socially, and morally--a child requires participation in progressively more complex reciprocal activity, on a regular basis over an extended period in the child's life, with one or more persons with whom the child develops a strong, mutual, irrational, emotional attachment and who is committed to the child's well-being and development, preferably for life.

Proposition 2: The establishment of patterns of progressive interpersonal interaction under conditions of strong mutual attachment enhances the young child's responsiveness to other features of the immediate physical, social, and--in due course--symbolic environment that invite exploration, manipulation, elaboration and imagination. Such activities, in turn, also accelerate the child's psychological growth.

Proposition 3: The establishment and maintenance of patterns of progressively more complex interaction and emotional attachment between caregiver and child depend in substantial degree on the availability and involvement of another adult, a third party who assists, encourages, spells off, gives status to, and expresses admiration and affection for the person caring for and engaging in joint activity with the child.

Proposition 4: The effective functioning of child-rearing processes in the family and other child settings requires establishing ongoing patterns of exchange of information, two-way communication, mutual accommodation, and mutual trust between the principal settings in which children and their parents live their lives. These settings are the home, child-care programs, the school, and the parents' place of work.

Proposition 5: The effective functioning of child-rearing processes in the family and other child settings requires public policies and practices that provide place, time, stability, status, recognition, belief systems, customs, and actions in support of child-rearing activities not only on the part of parents, caregivers, teachers, and other professional personnel, but also relatives, friends, neighbors, co-workers, communities, and the major economic, social, and political institutions of the entire society.

Robert Havighurst (1972) proposed that stages in human development can best be thought of in terms of the developmental tasks that are part of the normal transition. In his book, entitled *Developmental Tasks and Education*, he identified eleven specific developmental tasks. According to Carr-Gregg (2003), these included: adjustment to a new physical sense of self; adjustment to new intellectual abilities; adjustment to increased cognitive demands at school; development of expanded verbal skills; development of a personal sense of identity; establishment of adult vocational goals; establishment of emotional and psychological independence from his or her parents; development of stable and productive peer relationships; management of his or her sexuality; adoption of a personal value system; and, development of increased impulse control and behavioral maturity.

Adolescents do not progress through these developmental tasks separately. At any given time, adolescents may be dealing with several tasks at once. Early adolescence is marked by rapid physical growth, maturation and intense conformity with peers (Carr-Gregg, 2003). Middle adolescence is marked by the emergence of new thinking skills. Although peers still play an important role, they are increasingly self-directed or toward their opposite sexed peers. Despite some delinquent behavior, middle adolescence is a

period during which young people are oriented toward what is right and proper (Carr-Gregg). Late adolescence is marked by the final preparations for adult roles. Late adolescents attempt to crystallize their vocational goals and to establish a sense of personal identity. Their needs for peer approval are highly diminished and they are psychologically independent from their parents (Carr-Gregg).

Adolescent Risk Taking Behavior

The period of adolescence is often synonymous with risk taking. For some, risk taking is a set of volitional behaviors initiated during the teenage years that have major negative health and social consequences (Donovan, Jessor & Costa, 1991; Irwin & Millstein, 1986; Jessor, 1992; Jessor & Jessor, 1977). For others, risk taking is a way in which individuals meet their needs for stimulation (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). Risk taking has also been viewed as normative and adaptive for identity and social competence (Baumrind, 1991). For individuals who live in adverse social environments, risk taking is a way of dealing with the loss of personal control (Lyng, 1993). Irregardless of whatever perspective one prescribes to, behaviors like engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse, substance use, and committing acts of delinquency are considered risk taking since they can be linked to rates of morbidity and mortality (Irwin, 1993).

Recently, the literature has grown rapidly with regard to child abuse, family violence, and delinquent behavior. Violence has been found to be a function of age, race, and gender. Homicides of teenagers, according to Finkelhor & Ormod (2001), overwhelmingly involve a male victim (81%) killed by a male offender (95%) using a firearm (86%) or a knife or other object (10%). In the United States, homicide claimed

the lives of more teenagers than any cause other than accidents (U.S. Census Bureau, 1998). Among developed countries, the United States ranked first in homicides of juveniles (Krug, Dahlberg & Powell, 1996).

FBI data indicated that 1,789 persons under 18 were victims of homicide in 1999 (Fox & Zawitz, 2001). Minority children and youth are disproportionately affected. For example, fifty-two percent of juvenile victims of homicide are non-white (Snyder & Finnegan, 1998). Even after a decline, the overall rate of victimization for black juveniles (9.1 per 100,000) in 1997 exceeded the rate for Hispanic juveniles (5.0 per 100,000) and for white juveniles (1.8 per 100,000). Even worse was the rate at which these murders were committed – 123.6 per 100,000 by black male juveniles and 11.8 per 100,000 by white male juveniles (U.S. Department of Justice, 1992). These rates are fifteen times lower for females (Zimring, 1998).

Violence as a learned behavior is a recurring theme in the literature. Widom (1989) observed that the more offenders were victimized by routine family violence, the more violent crimes they committed. Hernandez, Lodico & DiClemente (1993) claimed that histories of abuse are 2 to 3 times more prevalent for blacks than they were for whites. Moral development may affect whether or not an individual believes a certain behavior to be appropriate. Age normative understanding of human social life, according to Kohlberg (1978), is acquired through role-taking opportunities. Role-taking is a way for youth to restructure their own moral schemata and incorporate those of others. In doing so, this may play a role in stimulating an individual to construct more mature moral judgments (Mason & Gibbs, 1993). Earlier, Gibbs argued that antisocial youth often solidify their sociomoral development by employing cognitive distortions (Gibbs, 1991).

Binge drinking is related to increased risk of violence. Valois, Vincent, McKeown, Garrison & Kirby (1993) observed that those who engaged in binge drinking were three times more likely to be involved in violence than those who did not. The co-occurrence of violence and substance abuse was examined by Kingery, Pruitt & Hurley (1992). They found, among adolescents, that taking risks such as going to a dangerous place, walking in unsafe neighborhoods, and hitchhiking were associated with drug use. In a sample of urban youth, Huizinga, Loeber & Thornberry (1993), found a relationship between delinquency and substance abuse – drug users fight more than nonusers.

Youths may use or abuse a variety of substances. Alcohol is the most prevalent substance abused; followed by nicotine and marijuana. Other substances include: inhalants, hallucinogens, cocaine, crack, heroin, stimulants, tranquilizers and barbiturates (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1995). Johnston, O'Malley & Bachman (1994), reported that males were more likely to use illicit drugs than same-aged females, especially at levels of heavy use.

Research indicates that a combination of cognitive, developmental, personality, social, and environmental factors are important in determining which youths are at risk for substance abuse; however, no one characteristic has been found to be uniquely predictive of substance use involvement. Towberman & McDonald (1993) examined attitudes of adolescents toward substance use. Six factors – perceived attitude among peers towards alcohol and drug use; personal attitude towards alcohol use; personal attitude towards drug use; belief that alcohol will negatively impact school performance; belief that the use of substances will portray a negative image; and, perceptions of parents' attitude towards the use of drugs – were found to relate drug use and

experimentation with drugs among youths. Among these factors, adolescents holding negative attitudes towards drugs were, in fact, less likely to become involved with them.

Although deviant behavior and tolerance of deviance has been associated with adolescent substance use, all youths characterized as deviant may not be equally at risk. Chassin, Presson & Sherman (1989) examined the relationship between adolescent deviance and the risk of substance use. They found that adolescents high in destructive deviance were more likely to smoke cigarettes and be strongly influenced by peer opinions.

In a Special Report on Alcohol and Health, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1993) discussed research relating to the role of genetics in alcoholism. Twin studies suggested that genetics may influence the frequency and quantity of alcohol use. Adoption studies also suggested that children with an alcoholic biological parent may have as much as 2.5 times the risk of alcoholism than children without alcoholic parents. It was also estimated that as many as 80% of the people who received inpatient treatment for alcoholism have close biological relatives with a history of alcohol-related problems. Additionally, individuals with close relatives suffering from alcoholism have a risk factor four to five times higher than those who do not.

Stern, Northman & Van Slyck (1984) examined the effect of father's absence from the home on adolescent drinking and marijuana use. Absence was found to increase the likelihood of male adolescents being categorized as heavy alcohol and marijuana users. Females were most likely to be categorized in the moderate alcohol use group.

In the school setting, Gibbons, Wylie, Echterling & French (1986) found that students who were less conscientious and less involved in extracurricular activities

tended to consume more alcohol. Ellickson & Hays (1992) found that adolescents with poor grades and weak links to the school were at an increased risk for exposure to drug influences. Farrell, Danish & Howard (1992) determined that frequency of substance use was related to frequency of sexual intercourse and delinquent behavior.

Early initiation of intercourse, lack of contraceptive use, frequent sex or sex with a high number of partners, intercourse with risky partners, and the incidence of pregnancy and fathering a child were among the most risky sexual behaviors examined in the literature. Dryfoos (1998) reported that males tend to exaggerate their rates of sexual activity, while females tend to report less sexual activity than they actually experience.

The Alan Guttmacher Institute (1994) indicated that there has been a rise in the incidence of adolescent sexual activity since the mid 1950s with only one-quarter of females reported being sexually active by the age of 18. In 2002, the Institute reported that 6 out of 10 teenage women and 7 out of 10 teenage men reported being sexually active by the age of 18. A disturbing trend was the fact that 74% of females having sex before the age of 14 (and 60% before the age of 15) reported that the sex was involuntary.

The Alan Guttmacher Institute (1994) also reported that blacks had a higher incidence of sexual activity than whites and Hispanics, with 50% of males stating that by age 15 they were already sexually active and 50% of females stating the same by age 17. White and Hispanic males did not report this much activity until the age of 17 or 18. Income was also related to rates of sexual activity, with those from poor or low income backgrounds having a higher frequency. Higher income homes were more likely to have unplanned pregnancies aborted. Hogan & Kitagawa (1985) reported that for black females aged 13-19, timing of initial intercourse and the likelihood of pregnancy was

affected by factors such as neighborhood, family structure, number of siblings, whether a sister had a pregnancy without being married, and the laxness of parents' control of their daughters' dating habits.

Nearly one million teenagers become pregnant each year – 85% are considered unplanned. Statistically, 19% of black females, 13% of Hispanic females, and 8% of white females became pregnant between the ages of 15 and 19. In 2001, the United States had one of the highest teenage pregnancy rates in the developed world - twice as high as those in England, Wales or Canada and nine times as high as rates in the Netherlands and Japan (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 2001).

Handler (1990) determined that lower levels of maternal education, being the daughter of a teen-aged mother, and type of public school attended by the adolescent were all correlated to the early onset of sexual intercourse by young, urban black females. In general, research indicates that although adolescents may know and understand the risks associated with unprotected sex, they do not necessarily take proper precautions. DiClemente, Brown, Beausoleil & Lodico (1993) found that although a sample of rural adolescents knew more about AIDS than their urban peers, and knew how to protect themselves against disease, they still engaged in riskier sexual behavior. Education about pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases was found to have little effect on adolescent sexual behavior (Hanson, Myers & Ginsberg 1987; Marsiglio & Mott, 1986).

Kegeles, Adler & Irwin (1989) found that among female adolescents, increased intentions to use condoms correlated most highly with the belief that using condoms was popular with one's peers, that condoms enable one to have sex on the spur of the moment, that they are clean and easy to use, and that they require one's partner to have

self-control. MacDonald, et al (1990) found that among male adolescents, the factors most associated with irregular or no condom use included embarrassment about buying condoms and the belief that condoms interfere with sexual pleasure.

DuRant, Jay & Seymore (1990) examined the relationship between coital frequency and risk taking. Higher frequency among youths was found to be related to physical development, longer heterosexual relationships, and for females, having more partners. Female adolescents who reported greater coital frequency generally reported high levels of worry over the perceived risk of pregnancy. Additionally, female adolescents who perceived that their parents would react negatively toward them becoming pregnant reported decreased coital frequency. Perceptions of parental approval or disapproval of engagement in sexual activity were not related to lower levels of coital frequency (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1995).

MacDonald, et al (1990) found no relationship between numbers of sexual partners and grade point average, mental health score, self-esteem, quality of relationship with parents, fear of AIDS, worry about STD or pregnancy, church attendance, and STD knowledge. They did find that greater numbers of sexual partners were associated with substance abuse, a casual attitude towards sex, oral contraceptive use, and having a good relationship with peers. Arnett (1990) discovered that sensation seeking and adolescent egocentrism contributed to reckless behavior – that is to say, some of these girls consented to sex without the use of contraception.

Educational aspirations impact adolescent sexuality. Hanson, Myers & Ginsberg (1987) found that white females were less likely to become pregnant if they held high educational expectations for themselves. Pleck, Sonenstein & Leighton (1990) found that

among males, intentions to use a condom occurred more often with higher educational aspirations. Communication between parents and teens had little influence on risky sexual behavior, probably because the level of communication between parents and teens on sexual matters was typically very low (Casper, 1990).

Deviant Peer Association

Despite the large number of studies that have examined the effects of delinquent peers, the issue of the nature and quality of peer relationships and the linkage to delinquency is largely unresolved (Logan, 1998). Social theories, like Sutherland's Principle of Differential Association argued that persons exposed to delinquent associates are likely to acquire the same traits and that the importance of peers; the amount of time spent with them; and, loyalty to peers are substantial enough to exert a strong effect on the behavior of adolescents (Sutherland, Cressey & Luckenbill, 1992). On the other hand, Social Learning Theory hypothesized that social behavior (including deviant behavior) was acquired through both direct conditioning and imitation or modeling of another's behavior. In this theory, peer attachment was an important conditioning variable because we are likely to imitate those we respect (Logan). Hirschi's Social Control Theory espoused the ideas that members of delinquent peer groups are socially disabled persons who associate with each other because of threats from rival gangs or the lack of an alternative (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 2002). Finally, the Social Interaction Model was based upon social learning principles with emphasis on the socialization process played by parental reinforcement and punishment of delinquent behavior.

One particular study presented delinquent behavior as the outcome of an extended process characterized by two stages. The first stage, beginning in childhood, was the result of a breakdown in family management. This turmoil produced an increase in antisocial behavior and exposed the child to rejection. The second stage, which occurred during adolescence, was characterized by continuous disruption in parental monitoring, academic failure and association with deviant peers. These factors contributed to the likelihood of engagement in delinquent acts (Patterson & Dishion, 1985).

Pursuit of stages between early disruptive behavior and later antisocial delinquent behavior resulted in a vast amount of research (Fergusson & Horwood, 1996; Keenan, Loeber, Quanwu, Stouthamer-Loeber & Van Kammen 1995; Pabon, Rodriguez & Gurin 1992; Patterson & Dishion, 1985). The results of these research studies indicated a consensus that chronic antisocial behavior generally started early in life and that there was a continuity between early behavior and later adjustment. There was also strong emphasis on the impact of repeated failures by parents to react supportively to the social behaviors of the child. Examples included - failure to discipline when antisocial behavior occurred and failure to monitor association with delinquent peers (Patterson & Dishion).

Within families engaged in high rates of conflict, sibling collusion (a process by which siblings in a family form coalitions of deviance that potentially undermine parents' socialization efforts) provided another setting in which children learned to use aggression and other forms of aversion (Bullock & Dishion, 2002). Patterson, Reid & Dishion (1992) previously stated that escape conditioning occurred during such conflict and that aggressive and antisocial behavior tended to develop as a consequence. Parents who did

not attend to or manage sibling play inadvertently allowed conflicts to be solved by coercion (Bullock & Dishion).

Research has also indicated that when parental attachment was high, adolescents were less attached to delinquent friends, spent less time with them and received fewer rewards from them (Agnew, 1991). Apparently, a strong conscience was built up when parents exercised close supervision over their children and if they punished socially disapproved behavior using love-oriented discipline. Children exposed to poor parental child interaction were likely to offend because they did not build up internal controls over antisocial behavior (Farmington, 1993).

Antisocial tendency can also be inhibited by empathy which develops from parental warmth and loving relationships. Parents of children who are difficult to manage are often lacking in psychological and physical resources to cope constructively (Snyder & Patterson, 1987). This suggested that parents of children whose angry outbursts and hyperactivity, which might be curbed by discipline, will often be inconsistent disciplinarians. Vulnerable children were often subject to adverse homes and neighborhoods as their parents were vulnerable to problems. Consequently, one can see that there are a number of psychological, social and environmental combinations that would produce a chain of failed parent child encounters.

Much of the recent literature on adjustment to adolescence and adulthood has centered on peer rejection and aggression. There exists a growing body of research linking childhood peer rejection to poor school adjustment as well as internalizing and externalizing problems (Burks, Dodge & Price 1995; Coie, Terry, Lenox, Lochman & Hyman, 1995). There are also two perspectives on the relationship between early

rejection and later disorder. The first viewed rejection as a negative social stressor that limits socialization experiences and, therefore, leads to negative outcomes. The second asserted that rejection was an indicator of an underlying process. In a study at the Oregon Youth Center, two factors remained as significant predictors of early adolescent involvement with antisocial peers: academic failure and peer rejection (Dishion, Patterson, Stoolmiller & Skinner, 1991). This group of researchers suggested that aggressive and rejected children seek delinquent peer groups - citing a progression from negative parent-child interaction leading to behavioral problems which place the child at risk for peer rejection and this peer rejection then increased the likelihood of deviant peer association.

Burks, et al, (1995) found that the stressful effects of rejection for boys resulted in both short and long-term internalizing problems. Girls, however, showed no significant difference regardless of exposure to rejection. In a study of boys in elementary school from the third to tenth grade, childhood peer rejection was the only predictor of stable disorder (Coie, et al, 1995).

Children with low intelligence were more likely to offend because of failure in school and inability to achieve goals legally (Farmington, 1989). Impulsive children were more likely to offend because they did not consider long-term consequences of their actions (Farmington). Disruptive elementary school children were shown to be the greatest risk of becoming delinquent adolescents and criminal adults (Huesmann, Eron, Lefkowitz & Walder, 1984; Tremblay, Masse, Vitaro & Dobkin, 1995). Moreover, there appeared to be a path toward delinquency beginning with disruptive behavior in kindergarten, to aggression between ages 10 and 12, and to the onset of delinquency

between the ages of 11 and 13 (Tremblay, et al). In a report on childhood behavior, gathered during a 16 year longitudinal study of New Zealand children, the findings suggested that children who were prone to conduct problems showed clear tendencies to associate with delinquent peers in adolescence (Fergusson & Horwood, 1996).

A step on the pathway linking early behavioral adjustment to later offending involved adolescent peer association. There was substantial evidence suggesting that adolescents associate with like-minded peer groups (Fergusson & Horwood, 1996; Keenan, Loeber, Quanwu, Stouthamer-Loeber, & VanKammen, 1995; Pabon, Rodriguez & Gurin, 1992; Patterson & Dishion, 1985; Tremblay, et al, 1995). Furthermore, differential association with deviant peers acted to reinforce current behavior and sustain the continuity toward delinquent behavior. The reciprocal nature of peer association and offending behavior was often noted in that, on one hand, a predisposition to offending influenced peer association while at the same time peer affiliation influenced predisposition to offending (Elliot & Menard, 1994; Fergusson & Horwood; 1996; Keenan, et al, 1995; Warr, 1993).

Perhaps the most consistent finding in the literature on the cause of delinquency was that adolescents with delinquent peers were themselves more likely to be delinquent. Agnew (1991) stated three reasons why delinquent peers cause adolescents to engage in delinquency: attachment, contact and modeling. According to Agnew, when attachment and contact were high, deviant peers had a greater effect by: (a) having more sanctioning power over the adolescent; (b) being more attractive as a role model; and (c) being more effective as a socializing agent.

Narcissism and Cognitive Distortions

Behavior that focuses primarily on negative ways of getting the needs of the self met without regard to others is called narcissism. A child with narcissism never had his basic needs met when he was young. His mother, for example, quite probably did not have the capacity to support the ego-emerging aspects of her child or may not have been available emotionally or physically during this critical developmental period (Namka, 1997). Deprivation of need often causes ego fixation and arrested development. The child at risk for narcissism has typically witnessed one of his parents displaying a pattern of domination and selfishness while the other parent often gave in to demand. What has happened along the way is that he has learned to expect others to meet his needs as modeled by the dominant parent whom he perceived as very powerful (Namka).

Children at risk for narcissism include those who have experienced early physical and sexual trauma; spoiled and overindulged children; and, children who are required to live up to high parental expectation of being charming, talented, intelligent, or beautiful so that the parent's self esteem can be enhanced (Namka, 1997).

Narcissistic behavior is a defense against internal negative feelings. Masterson (1988) described the narcissistic wound as being so great that the individual cannot even consider the balm to provide the healing. This type of child continually seeks self gratification to pursue relief from shame. The depth of their defenses reflects the depth of their trauma. These types of faulty thinking patterns are called cognitive distortions (Liau, Barriga & Gibbs, 1998).

According to social information processing theory, cognitive distortions may not be only due to environmental factors but due to the result of physiological processes. An

individual's behavior may be altered due to cognitive distortions interrupting the transfer of incoming information before the information activates a particular behavior. The interruption may affect traditional schemas and/or the ability for the incoming information to continue to lead to an action (Liau, et al, 1998).

Gibbs (1991) argued that antisocial youth often solidify their sociomoral development by employing cognitive distortions. Cognitive distortions are often self-serving and untrue. According to Gibbs, there are two types of cognitive distortions: primary and secondary. Primary distortions are self-centered cognitive distortions stemming from egocentric bias. Secondary distortions are rationalizations. Namka (1997) stated that some of the following errors in thinking may be present in the child who feels needy because of an inner sense of shame:

1. Reality Distortion and Inability to See and Hear – a type of distortion reflecting the fact that the child sees situations through his own sense of being wounded and needy. The child cannot always hear what you say because he is constantly in a state of neediness and fear of being vulnerable. He cannot risk trying new situations that might offer the opportunities to learn new skills. His internal shame and fears of being found cause a selective lens of which to look through.

2. Entitlement and Self-Involvement: a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child has his antenna out looking for life's injustices that he then must whine and complain about. This intense need to look out for himself and complain loudly takes up a great deal of energy and he misses learning basic social skills of getting along with others.

3. Inability to Take Criticism: a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child is thin skinned and must defend himself from hearing both constructive criticism and reprimands.

4. Externalization of Blame – a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child cannot allow the bad feelings of being at fault for anything. He avoids feeling vulnerable by blaming others. The fragile self esteem cannot be punctured by taking responsibility for behavior.

5. Mood Switching – a type of distortion reflecting the fact that the child's fractured self is caught in mood swings. Anger becomes a way of trying to avoid abandonment and depression. There is a paramount fear of being hurt and rejected coupled with denial of need and clinging to the adult.

6. Poor Impulse Control and Frustration Tolerance – a type of distortion reflecting the fact that the child is highly reactive to outside stimuli that seem to threaten his sense of self and cannot delay gratification.

7. Poor Ego Boundaries and Need for Control – a type of distortion reflecting the fact that the child cannot view things from any other perspective other than his own. He is so caught in his own neediness that he cannot feel empathy for others. He does not have the ability to put himself in someone else's shoes. He views others as objects to be used for personal gratification.

8. Denial of Uncomfortable Feelings – a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child keeps the focus on what he wants not how he feels. His constant demanding keeps him from feeling the pain inside. Denial of feelings is a major defense

against keeping the hurt and shame away. He turns the tables around by trying to make others wrong for not giving him what he feels entitled to.

9. Frequent Anger and Rage – a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child substitutes anger and tantrums as a way of keeping his uncomfortable feelings from being experienced. He becomes a master of rationalization and justification of his explosive actions. Suicidal threats can be an extension of the distorted thinking.

10. Need for Admiration – a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child erroneously believes that he is special and should be given special privileges. This need to be seen as special is so great that he cannot take in other information.

11. Grandiosity and Fantasy – a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child spins grandiose fantasies to cover up the internal wounds of his fractured self. He sets up elaborate fantasy schemes of winning, becoming powerful or gaining revenge for injustice. Daydreams of becoming rich and famous without talent or hard work are common.

12. Idealization and Devaluation of Teachers or Therapists – a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child will make you feel that you are wonderful and special as long as you humor him. There is generally a honeymoon period until you ask him to be responsible for his own actions. Then you, like everyone else, will fall from grace.

13. Bullying Others: a type of distortion that reflects the fact that the child who has been hurt internalizes the aggressive behaviors of the ones that were cruel to him and begins to bully others. The narcissistic wound caused by the trauma is then played out on others with teasing, taunting and physically hurting others.

Juvenile delinquents find it acceptable to use cognitive distortions and, therefore, use them frequently. These at risk youth tend to come from hostile and dysfunctional families in which very little emphasis is placed on structure and discipline. Their environments tend to be high in criticism, physical and emotional abuse, unnecessarily harsh punishments, and lack of positive parental influence (Cronk, 1999). Researchers have found children that have been raised in a negative type of environment are more aggressive, more often diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit disorder, conduct disorder, and antisocial personality disorder, and exhibit more frequent use of cognitive distortions (Giancola, Mezzich, Clark & Tarter, 1999).

Summary Statements

After conducting an extensive review of the literature, there were several important messages that provided guidance for this study. A thorough review of the literature revealed that civic attachment was linked to factors such as professional interest (and self-interests), stable residential location, home ownership, marriage, and parenthood. It also revealed the idea that unless citizens possessed a basic level of civic knowledge they would not understand world political events.

During the civil rights movement the nation was being hard-pressed to address social control. The rights of every kind of citizen were defined and established during this time frame. The 1960s was characterized by the constitutional domestication of the juvenile court. This meant that the Court redefined delinquents as a subgroup of criminal defendants, rather than as a category of dependent children in need of services. As a consequence of this action, the United States witnessed increasing numbers of Americans

becoming disengaged from civic and political institutions at alarming rates. Therefore, with concern over the fact that many young Americans may be ill-prepared to participate fully in a democratic society, it became apparent that changing political climate was a key reason why so many civic initiatives were created.

The social construction of childhood revealed that children were being educated in a bureaucracy rather than a social organization. Many of our children did not do well in this type of environment and found themselves getting into trouble because they were isolated, controlled or simply bored. Juvenile delinquency rates, therefore, steadily climbed. To address this concern, the literature was replete with information about moral development, peer pressure, cognitive distortions and risk taking behaviors. These were the elements that set the tone for this study which was entitled “The Relationship between Adolescent Behavior and Civic Engagement.”

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The research design of this study is both correlational and causal-comparative in nature. The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not a relationship exists between civic knowledge and adolescent behavior. The study measured civic knowledge possessed by two independent groups of students – those categorized as at risk for becoming potential problems in the community and those categorized as a non-at risk. Adolescent behavior, a conglomerate of moral judgment, risk taking behavior, deviant peer association, and cognitive distortion, were also measured.

The study will also attempt to determine whether or not any relationships exist between these two variables and gender, race, age, or engagement in extracurricular activities.

Participants

For this study, the target population, which was in Flagler County, Florida, was all high school students currently enrolled in or who had completed a course in United States History. At the high school in Bunnell, Florida there were 1,846 students who fit this description. In that population 150 students were categorized as at risk youth. The target population was 76% Caucasian, 12% African American and 7% Hispanic. Through convenience sampling 87 at risk youth and 471 non-at risk youth volunteered to participate in the study. The overall response rate was 30%. The response rate for at risk youth was 58%. The response rate for non-at risk youth was 28%.

Table 1 summarizes the demographic data. A high percentage of students indicated that they were enrolled in advanced classes (54.3%). Fifty five percent of the respondents were female.

Instruments

All data on students were derived from a questionnaire returned by the respondents. The questionnaire for each respondent contained demographic items, a series of items designed to assess respondents' knowledge about civics and a series of items designed to measure specific adolescent behaviors.

The Civic Knowledge Questionnaire

In this study, a civics test was created using questions from the 1998 Civics Assessment of the National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP). The National Assessment of Educational Progress - also known as "The Nation's Report Card" is the only national standardized continuing assessment administered periodically by the U.S. Department of Education in reading, math, science, writing, US history, civics, geography, and the arts to random schools in each state to evaluate national performance of students ages 7, 12, 14, and 17 (NCES, 2005). The test contained 18 multiple choice questions and was designed to measure individual student performance in civics at the high school level. These 18 multiple choice questions, which were selected by the researcher, were publicly available and previously reviewed by a panel of experts. Face validity was addressed by a highly qualified social studies professor, from the University of Central Florida, with expertise in the area of civics prior to administration of the questionnaire in April 2005.

The Civic Knowledge Questionnaire drew heavily on the 1994 National Standards for Civics and Government developed by the Center for Civic Education and covered a broad range of content that forms the basis of civic understanding. It was organized into five main categories, expressed as questions. These included:

- What are civic life, politics and government?
- What are the foundations of the American political system?
- How does the government established by the Constitution embody the purpose, values, and principles of American democracy?
- What are the roles of the United States with regard to world affairs?
- What are the roles of citizens in American democracy?

The breakdown of these individual items was as follows: questions 6, 9, and 14 corresponded to civic life, politics and government; questions 1, 10, 13 and 15 corresponded to foundations of the American political system; questions 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 16 corresponded to the purpose, values and principles of American democracy; questions 11 and 12 corresponded to world affairs; and, questions 7, 17 and 18 corresponded to roles of citizens in American democracy. Possible total scores for the scale ranged from 0 to 100. These were based upon the percent of questions answered correctly. Internal consistency was measured by Cronbach's Alpha. Alpha for this instrument, 0.64, was really quite good considering there were five different categories from which questions were asked. This result was obtained by running fourteen of the eighteen items together. Questions 1, 4, 10 and 16 were eliminated from the analysis to achieve this result. For each of the categories run separately there were too few questions to run the reliability analysis.

The Adolescent Behavior Questionnaire

The Adolescent Behavior Questionnaire (also called the Profile of American Youth) addressed four types of adolescent behaviors. These included moral judgment, peer pressure, cognitive distortion and risk taking. This questionnaire contained 50 questions.

Moral Judgment

The moral judgment section asked respondents to indicate their response to a moral dilemma. The researcher developed this 4 item scale on the basis of moral development literature cited earlier. The scale was limited to 4 items because moral dilemmas tend to require time to read and think about the situation. The literature was replete with information concerning different theories of moral development and was used as the basis for this measure because interest in this study focused on at risk youth. Kohlberg and Gilligan both use stage theories, therefore, responses corresponded to a specific stage of development for each respondent. A score of zero on each question indicated pre-conventional thinking. A score of one on each question indicated conventional thinking. And, a score of two indicated post-conventional thinking. The construct included the famous Heinz and Porcupine Dilemmas described earlier. Possible scores for the scale ranged from 0 to 8.

Peer Pressure

The peer pressure section asked respondents to quantify how much peer pressure they experienced for each item they were asked. The researcher developed this 16 item scale on the basis of deviant peer association literature cited earlier. The literature was

replete with information concerning peer pressure and was used as the basis for this measure because interest in this study focused on at risk youth. With so many different possibilities to choose from only the most common items were chosen. This was decided based upon classic peer pressure studies. Specific items included pressure to have sex, drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, smoke marijuana and join a gang. These were the same items the literature indicated that adolescents were at risk for trying. Items were scored on a scale ranging from no pressure to low, medium, high and very high. Possible scores for the scale ranged from 0 to 32. For each question, a score of zero indicated either no pressure or low pressure; a score of one indicated medium pressure; and, a score of two indicated high or very high pressure. Internal consistency was measured by Cronbach's Alpha (0.90).

Cognitive Distortion

The cognitive distortion section contained Likert-scale response items intended to assess respondents' desire to use cognitive distortions. The researcher developed this 15 item scale on the basis of the narcissistic and cognitive distortion literature cited earlier. Although efforts to develop an assessment of cognitive distortions have been reported for juvenile delinquents (Cronk, 1999), the literature was used as the basis for this measure because interest in this study focused on at risk youth. The scale included such items as "I manipulate other people to obtain what I want or need" and "I dream of being rich and famous without doing hard work". Items were scored on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Possible scores for the scale ranged from 0 to 30. For each question, zero indicated disagreement or little desire to use cognitive

distortions; one indicated neutrality; and, two indicated agreement or desire to use cognitive distortions. Internal consistency was measured by Cronbach's Alpha (0.82).

Risk Taking

The risk taking section asked respondents to quantify how much they gave in to many of the peer pressure items. The researcher developed this 15 item scale on the basis of risk taking literature cited earlier. The literature was replete with information concerning risk taking and was used as the basis for this measure because interest in this study focused on at risk youth. With so many different possibilities to choose from only the most common items were chosen. The scale included such items as having sex without protection, having sex on school grounds, drinking alcohol, using or selling illegal drugs, and assault or battery. Items were scored on a scale ranging from never to more than 3 times. Possible scores for the scale ranged from 0 to 30. For each question, zero represented low risk (never tried or tried only once), one represented medium risk (tried twice); and, two represented high risk (tried three or more times). Internal consistency was measured by Cronbach's Alpha (0.86).

Pilot Studies

A pilot study was conducted (in the spring of 2004) on the cognitive distortion section of the behavioral questionnaire. Convenience sampling was used to obtain thirty adult participants. The response rate was 100%. Preliminary reliability results were obtained. Specific written comments by participants indicated that several of the cognitive distortion statements needed careful rewording and simplification in order to

avoid misinterpretation by teenage respondents. Based upon these suggestions, corrections were made.

A pilot study of the entire questionnaire was conducted prior to its administration to the main population used. Initially, time was thought to be of importance. The amount of time required administering the questionnaire ending up being of little or no consequence since researcher discovered that the school was using block scheduling. Therefore, no problems were encountered by the randomly selected teacher who administered the survey instrument. As a result, no additional changes were made to any of the constructs used in the study.

Informed Consent

In mid-March, 2005, 2,000 copies of the parental letter of informed consent were personally delivered to one of the high schools in Flagler County. The letter, printed on school stationery and endorsed by the principal, was distributed by teachers to potential participants. The letter stated the purpose of the study, its potential to improve educators understanding of adolescent behavior, the process of informed consent, and that return of the letter with a signature from a parent/guardian would indicated willingness to let the child participate in the study. The letter also indicated that the researcher would maintain confidentiality by not asking for names of the participant and that data would be analyzed in aggregate form to ensure anonymity. Students returned the letters of consent to the history teachers who distributed them. Teachers subsequently returned the letters of consent to the main office at the school. In total, 339 letters of consent were returned (the overall response rate was 30%).

Administration of the Questionnaire

Copies of the questionnaire were delivered to the principal's secretary who took charge of the distribution of the questionnaire to all United States history teachers who would be participating in administration of the study. Each history teacher had an ample supply of questionnaires. The questionnaire was administered in the classroom by the history teacher shortly after spring break. No pressure was placed upon any of the history teachers to hurry up and administer the questionnaire. And, no time limit or pressure was imposed upon the student. All questionnaires were completed within a two week time frame. Copies of the questionnaire were returned to the researcher by the principal's secretary for data analysis.

Procedure for Data Analysis

Research Question 1 – What relationships exist amongst civic knowledge, moral judgment, peer pressure, cognitive distortion, and risk taking?

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were determined.

Research Question 2 – Is there a gender difference with regard to civic knowledge?

The independent t-test was used to make this determination.

Research Question 3 – Is there a gender difference with regard to adolescent behavior?

The independent t-test was used to make this determination.

Research Question 4 – Can civic knowledge be predicted by gender?

Simple linear regression was used to make this determination.

Research Question 5 – Can civic knowledge be predicted by race?

Simple linear regression was used to make this determination.

Research Question 6 – Can civic knowledge be predicted by age?

Simple linear regression was used to make this determination.

Research Question 7 – Can adolescent behavior be predicted by gender?

Simple linear regression was used to make this determination.

Research Question 8 – Can adolescent behavior be predicted by race?

Simple linear regression was used to make this determination.

Research Question 9 – Can adolescent behavior be predicted by age?

Simple linear regression was used to make this determination.

Research Question 10 - Is there a knowledge difference between at risk and non-at risk youth?

The independent t-test was used to make this determination.

Research Question 11 – Is there a behavior difference between at risk and non-at risk youth?

The independent t-test was used to make this determination.

Research Question 12 – Is there a knowledge difference between engaged and non-engaged youth?

The independent t-test was used to make this determination.

Research Question 13 - Is there a behavior difference between engaged and non-engaged youth?

The independent t-test was used to make this determination.

Research Question 14 - Based upon the Kohlberg dilemma, do at risk and non-at risk youth have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

Research Question 15 - Based upon the Gilligan dilemma, do at risk and non-at risk youth have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

Research Question 16 - Based upon the Kohlberg dilemma, do males and females have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

Research Question 17 - Based upon the Gilligan dilemma, do males and females have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

Research Question 18 - Based upon the Kohlberg dilemma, do different races have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

Research Question 19 - Based upon the Gilligan dilemma, do different races have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

Research Question 20 - Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, do engaged and non-engaged youth have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

Research Question 21 - Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, do engaged and non-engaged youth have different stages of moral development?

The Chi square test for independence was used to make this determination.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not a relationship exists between adolescent behavior and civic engagement. A survey was designed and administered to 558 Florida high school students. Eighty-seven of these respondents constituted the at risk group. Four hundred and seventy-one of these respondents constituted the non-at risk group. In the study, specific adolescent behaviors (moral judgment, peer pressure, cognitive distortion, and risk taking) were independent variables. Civic knowledge was the dependent variable. The study also determined whether or not adolescent behavior was related to civic preparedness. This was accomplished by examining the relationships between civic knowledge and engagement in extracurricular activities.

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics was used to summarize the data. Throughout the study, the entire group, the at risk group and the non-at risk group were examined. Measures of central tendency (mean, median and mode) and measures of variability (range, variance and standard deviation) can be found in Tables 2 – 16 (Appendix F).

Results from the civic knowledge exam are summarized in Table 17 (Appendix F). This table illustrates how current respondents performed in civic knowledge using a small number of publicly available NAEP items as compared to respondents who completed the full NAEP in 1998. Questions selected from the NAEP that were

designated 4th and 8th grade level were considered standard fare while those at the 12th grade level were intended to be challenging questions for the entire group. In all but 3 of the 18 questions, students performed equal or better than respondents did back in 1998.

Correlations – Research Question 1

What relationships exist amongst civic knowledge, moral judgment, peer pressure, cognitive distortion, and risk taking?

For at risk and non-at risk respondents, there were statistically significant relationships between civic knowledge and certain adolescent behaviors. For both groups these occurred between civic knowledge and peer pressure; and, between civic knowledge and risk taking. These relationships were negatively correlated. So, when scores for peer pressure or risk taking increase we can expect civic knowledge scores to decrease. Additionally, for non-at risk respondents, there was also a positive relationship between civic knowledge and moral judgment. When moral judgment scores increase, civic knowledge scores also increase.

Further examination of these two groups revealed that there were also statistically significant relationships between certain behaviors. These occurred between peer pressure and cognitive distortion; peer pressure and risk taking; and, cognitive distortion and risk taking. Most of these were positively correlated. For the non-at risk group, however, peer pressure and risk taking were negatively correlated. This suggests that when members of the non-at risk group felt peer pressure they were not willing to act on it and take risk. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, r , for these two groups are summarized in Table 18 and 19.

Table 18

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (At Risk Group)

Source	<u>At Risk</u> ($n = 87$)			
	Moral Judgment	Peer Pressure	Cognitive Distortion	Risk Taking
Civic Knowledge	0.158	-0.246*	-0.154	-0.256**
Moral Judgment		0.124	0.002	0.000
Peer Pressure			0.557**	0.625**
Cognitive Distortions				0.479**

Note. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 19

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (Non-At Risk Group)

Source	<u>Non-At Risk</u> ($n = 471$)			
	Moral Judgment	Peer Pressure	Cognitive Distortion	Risk Taking
Civic Knowledge	0.173**	-0.174**	-0.015	-0.124**
Moral Judgment		-0.047	0.008	-0.092
Peer Pressure			0.367**	-0.310*
Cognitive Distortions				0.343**

Note. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

For engaged and non-engaged respondents, there were statistically significant relationships between civic knowledge and certain adolescent behaviors. For the engaged group, these occurred between civic knowledge and moral judgment; between civic knowledge and peer pressure; and, between civic knowledge and risk taking. Civic knowledge relationships between peer pressure and risk taking were both negatively correlated. The relationship between civic knowledge and moral judgment was positively correlated for both groups.

Further examination of these two groups revealed that there were also statistically significant relationships between certain behaviors. These occurred between peer pressure and cognitive distortion; peer pressure and risk taking; and, cognitive distortion and risk taking. All of these were positively correlated. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, r , for these two groups are summarized in Table 20 and 21.

Table 20
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (Engaged Group)

Source	<u>Engaged</u> ($n = 371$)			
	Moral Judgment	Peer Pressure	Cognitive Distortion	Risk Taking
Civic Knowledge	0.142**	-0.244**	-0.024	-0.164**
Moral Judgment		-0.047	-0.023	-0.091
Peer Pressure			0.414**	0.400**
Cognitive Distortions				0.386**

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 21

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (Non-Engaged Group)

Source	<u>Non-Engaged</u> ($n = 183$)			
	Moral Judgment	Peer Pressure	Cognitive Distortion	Risk Taking
Civic Knowledge	0.163*	-0.090	-0.068	-0.079
Moral Judgment		0.066	0.088	0.008
Peer Pressure			0.394**	0.348**
Cognitive Distortions				0.338**

Note. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

Factor Analysis

The purpose of factor analysis was to explore the factor structure underlying the behavioral item responses in the Profile of American Youth. Factor analysis was performed for peer pressure, cognitive distortion and risk taking behaviors.

When factor analysis was performed for peer pressure, the maximum likelihood estimation procedure was used to extract the factors from the variable data. Kaiser's rule was used to determine which factors were most eligible for interpretation. The peer pressure construct originally contained 16 items. All 16 items were included in factor analysis. Using Kaiser's rule, three factors were extracted (Table 22, Appendix F). Together they are capable of explaining 56.7% of all variable variances. A review of the initial factor loadings suggested that a proper solution was attainable through maximum likelihood, as it was capable of converging in 5 iterations. In this study, the

communalities were fine, providing further evidence that the results were appropriate for interpretation. Promax with Kaiser Normalization was the rotational method used to obtain a linear transformation of the data. Interpretation of the factor correlation matrix ensued (Table 23, Appendix F). Correlations were large enough to justify retention of the Promax results (Table 24, Appendix F). A review of the structure coefficient matrix suggested that the three factors group the items in a theoretically understandable way. The coefficients suggested that the way in which teenagers responded to the behavioral items was very consistent. Names for the factors are as follows: Factor 1, Experimentation; Factor 2, Self-Expression; Factor 3, Popularity. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 1 include: the amount of pressure to smoke marijuana; to use illegal drugs; to smoke cigarettes; to drink alcohol; and, to have sex. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 2 include: the amount of pressure to wear black make-up; wear a wild hair style; get a tattoo; and, pierce your body. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 3 include: the amount of pressure to drink alcohol; to have sex; to skip class; and, to dress “cool”.

When factor analysis was performed for cognitive distortion, the maximum likelihood estimation procedure was used to extract the factors from the variable data. Kaiser’s rule was used to determine which factors were most eligible for interpretation. The cognitive distortion construct originally contained 15 items. Twelve items were included in factor analysis. Using Kaiser’s rule, three factors were extracted (Table 25, Appendix F). Together they are capable of explaining 53.4% of all variable variances. A review of the initial factor loadings suggested that a proper solution was attainable through maximum likelihood, as it was capable of converging in 6 iterations. In this

study, the communalities were fine, providing further evidence that the results were appropriate for interpretation. Promax with Kaiser Normalization was the rotational method used to obtain a linear transformation of the data. Interpretation of the factor correlation matrix ensued (Table 26, Appendix F). Correlations were large enough to justify retention of the Promax results (Table 25, Appendix F). A review of the structure coefficient matrix suggested that the three factors group the items in a theoretically understandable way. The coefficients suggested that the way in which teenagers responded to the behavioral items was very consistent. Names for the factors are as follows: Factor 1, Need for Control; Factor 2, Mood Switching; Factor 3, Inability to be Criticized. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 1 include: “I manipulate other people to obtain what I want or need”; “I like to blame someone else for something I did wrong”; “I get angry when threatened with not getting my own way”; and, “I have played one parent against another to get what I want”. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 2 include: “I hurt other people’s feelings when my feelings are hurt”; “I get angry when threatened with not getting my own way”; and, “When my needs are denied, I feel hurt and rejected”. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 3 include: “When my needs are denied, I feel hurt and rejected”; “I desire respect and admiration from others”; “I get angry when threatened with not getting my own way”; and, “I hurt other people’s feelings when my feelings are hurt”.

When factor analysis was performed for risk taking, the maximum likelihood estimation procedure was used to extract the factors from the variable data. Kaiser’s rule was used to determine which factors were most eligible for interpretation. The risk taking construct originally contained 15 items. All 15 items were included in factor

analysis. Using Kaiser's rule, four factors were extracted (Table 28, Appendix F). Together they are capable of explaining 68.3% of all variable variances. A review of the initial factor loadings suggested that a proper solution was attainable through maximum likelihood, as it was capable of converging in 5 iterations. In this study, the communalities were fine, providing further evidence that the results were appropriate for interpretation. Promax with Kaiser Normalization was the rotational method used to obtain a linear transformation of the data. Interpretation of the factor correlation matrix ensued (Table 29, Appendix F). Correlations were large enough to justify retention of the Promax results (Table 30, Appendix F). A review of the structure coefficient matrix suggested that the three factors group the items in a theoretically understandable way. The coefficients suggested that the way in which teenagers responded to the behavioral items was very consistent. Names for the factors are as follows: Factor 1, Illegal Drugs; Factor 2, Alcohol and Smoking; Factor 3, Sex; and Factor 4, Gang Violence. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 1 include: risk to try heroine; sex with an i.v. drug user; ecstasy; and cocaine (or "crack"). Survey items that fit the description for Factor 2 include: risk to try marijuana; cigarettes; and, alcohol. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 3 include: risk to try sexual intercourse; sex without protection; sex with the same sex partner; and, sex on school grounds. Survey items that fit the description for Factor 4 include: risk to try becoming a gang member; threatening someone with a weapon; and, physically hurting someone in a fight.

Inferential Statistics

Inferential statistics was used to analyze the data. Initially, some data screening took place. There were no significant problems with any of the returned surveys; consequently, they were all used in the analysis. Entry errors were looked for and corrected when found. However, outliers were neither looked for nor removed.

The independent t-test was used to determine if there were any differences in the way in which at risk and non-at risk respondents answered any of the questions. Of the 68 questions asked, only questions 23 and 53 indicated statistically significant differences. Cohen's *d* was used to determine effect sizes – 0.26 and 0.28, respectively. A summary of this data is provided in Tables 31 through 35 (Appendix F).

Research Question 2

Is there a gender difference with regard to civic knowledge?

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the civics knowledge questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and civic knowledge. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 36 provides a summary of the results.

Table 36

Civic Knowledge, Entire Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1.321	0.251	0.165	251	52.36	21.716	302	52.06	21.013

Note. $p = 0.869$

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the civics knowledge questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and civic knowledge. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 37 provides a summary of the results.

Table 37

Civic Knowledge, At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
2.402	0.125	-0.959	39	47.70	24.562	48	52.44	21.478

Note. $p = 0.340$

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the civics knowledge questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no

statistically significant difference between gender and civic knowledge. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 38 provides a summary of the results.

Table 38
Civic Knowledge, Non-At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene’s Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.405	0.525	0.628	212	53.22	21.103	254	51.99	20.966

Note. $p = 0.530$

Research Question 3

Is there a gender difference with regard to adolescent behavior?

Moral Judgment

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and moral judgment. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 39 provides a summary of the results.

Table 39

Moral Judgment, Entire Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.111	0.739	-0.543	251	5.1673	1.5479	302	5.2384	1.5215

Note. $p = 0.588$.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and moral judgment. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 40 provides a summary of the results.

Table 40

Moral Judgment, At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1.392	0.241	0.211	39	5.2821	1.7313	48	5.2083	1.5293

Note. $p = 0.824$.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the

moral judgment construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and moral judgment. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 41 provides a summary of the results.

Table 41
Moral Judgment, Non-At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.047	0.828	-0.692	212	5.1462	1.5153	254	5.2441	1.5230

Note. $p = 0.489$

Peer Pressure

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the peer pressure construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and peer pressure. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 42 provides a summary of the results.

Table 42

Peer Pressure, Entire Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.017	0.896	0.729	251	6.9920	5.8304	302	6.6308	5.7760

Note. $p = 0.466$

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the peer pressure construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and peer pressure. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 43 provides a summary of the results.

Table 43

Peer Pressure, At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.114	0.737	0.817	39	8.4359	7.3870	48	7.1875	6.8352

Note. $p = 0.416$.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the peer pressure construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated

that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and peer pressure. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 44 provides a summary of the results.

Table 44
Peer Pressure, Non-At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene’s Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.201	0.654	0.391	212	6.7264	5.4766	254	6.5256	5.5621

Note. $p = 0.696$.

Cognitive Distortion

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the cognitive distortion construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and cognitive distortion. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 45 provides a summary of the results.

Table 45

Cognitive Distortion, Entire Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.132	0.716	0.532	251	14.0120	5.2881	302	13.7715	5.2932

Note. $p = 0.595$.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the cognitive distortion construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and cognitive distortion. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 46 provides a summary of the results.

Table 46

Cognitive Distortion, At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
2.101	0.151	1.842	39	15.5897	5.0872	48	13.3542	6.0336

Note. $p = 0.069$.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the

cognitive distortion construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and cognitive distortion. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 47 provides a summary of the results.

Table 47
Cognitive Distortion, Non-At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.035	0.853	-0.265	212	13.7217	5.2846	254	13.8504	5.1508

Note. $p = 0.791$.

Risk Taking

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the risk taking construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and risk taking. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not met and equal variances were not assumed. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 48 provides a summary of these results.

Table 48

Risk Taking, Entire Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
4.338	0.038	0.745	251	6.4243	6.1575	302	6.0596	5.1649

Note. $p = 0.449$.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the risk taking construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and risk taking. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not met and equal variances were not assumed. The test was statistically significant (see Table 49); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.

Table 49

Risk Taking, At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
6.145	0.015	2.103*	39	8.1282	8.1642	48	4.9954	5.6674

Note. * $p < 0.05$.

On average, male students in the at risk group ($n = 39$, $M = 8.1282$, $SD = 8.1642$) scored higher than female students in the at risk group ($n = 48$, $M = 4.9954$, $SD = 5.6674$). The 95% confidence interval for the difference between means was $-0.287 -$

6.199. The effect size was calculated by Cohen’s *d* and found to be 0.45 indicating that that there was nearly ½ of one standard deviation between the means of the two groups. The results provide evidence to support the conclusion that males scored higher on the risk taking construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire than females.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if male students score differently than female students on the risk taking construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between gender and risk taking. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 50 provides a summary of these results.

Table 50
Risk Taking, Non-At Risk Group (Male vs. Female)

<u>Levene’s Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Male</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Female</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1.332	0.249	-0.343	212	6.1108	5.6818	254	6.2815	5.0457

Note. *p* = 0.732.

Research Question 4

Can civic knowledge be predicted by gender?

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic

knowledge and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 51 and 52 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 53 and 54 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 55 and 56 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Research Question 5

Can civic knowledge be predicted by race?

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and race. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Race can be used to predict civic knowledge, $F(3, 552) = 3.673, p = 0.012$.

Parameter estimates can be found in Tables 57 and 58 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting civic knowledge score as a result of race was:

$$\text{Civic Knowledge Score} = 53.805 - 8.496 (\text{Black}) - 5.218 (\text{Hispanic}) - 5.049 (\text{Other})$$

The model predicted that changes in race from white to black resulted in a civic knowledge score 8.496 points lower; changes in race from white to Hispanic resulted in a civic knowledge score 5.218 points lower; and, changes in race from white to other resulted in a civic knowledge score 5.049 points lower. Accuracy in predicting civic knowledge score was weak with a correlation of 0.14. Only 2% ($R^2 = 0.020$) of the variation in frequency of civics knowledge score was accounted for by its linear relationship with race.

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and race. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Race can be used to predict civic knowledge, $F(3, 83) = 5.971, p = 0.001$. Parameter estimates can be found in Tables 59 and 60 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting civic knowledge score as a result of race was:

$$\text{Civic Knowledge Score} = 56.628 - 22.882 (\text{Black}) - 20.005 (\text{Hispanic}) - 4.776 (\text{Other})$$

The model predicted that changes in race from white to black resulted in a civic knowledge score 22.882 points lower; changes in race from white to Hispanic resulted in a civic knowledge score 20.005 points lower; and, changes in race from white to other resulted in a civic knowledge score 4.776 points lower. Accuracy in predicting civic knowledge score was moderate with a correlation of 0.42. Some 14.8% ($R^2 = 0.148$) of

the variation in frequency of civics knowledge score was accounted for by its linear relationship with race.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 61 and 62 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Research Question 6

Can civic knowledge be predicted by age?

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and age. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Age can be used to predict civic knowledge, $F(1, 531) = 42.764$, $p = 0.000$. Parameter estimates can be found in Tables 63 and 64 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting civic knowledge score as a result of age was:

$$\text{Civic Knowledge Score} = 42.665 + 5.831 (\text{Age})$$

The model predicted that, on average, 15 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 42.665; that 16 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 48.496; that 17 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 54.327; and, that 18 year olds had a civic knowledge score of 60.158. Accuracy in predicting civic knowledge score was weak

with a correlation of 0.27. Only 7.5% ($R^2 = 0.075$) of the variation in frequency of civics knowledge score was accounted for by its linear relationship with age.

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and age. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Age can be used to predict civic knowledge, $F(1, 82) = 4.222$, $p = 0.043$. Parameter estimates can be found in Tables 64 and 65 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting civic knowledge score as a result of age was:

$$\text{Civic Knowledge Score} = 43.699 + 4.959 (\text{Age})$$

The model predicted that, on average, 15 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 43.699; that 16 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 48.658; that 17 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 53.617; and, that 18 year olds had a civic knowledge score of 58.576. Accuracy in predicting civic knowledge score was weak with a correlation of 0.22. Only 4.9% ($R^2 = 0.049$) of the variation in frequency of civics knowledge score was accounted for by its linear relationship with age.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between civic knowledge and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between civic knowledge and age. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Age can be used to predict civic knowledge, $F(1, 447) = 38.482$, $p = 0.000$. Parameter estimates can be found in Tables 67 and 68 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting civic knowledge score as a result of age was:

$$\text{Civic Knowledge Score} = 42.436 + 5.989 (\text{Age})$$

The model predicted that, on average, 15 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 42.436; that 16 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 48.425; that 17 year old students had a civic knowledge score of 54.414; and, that 18 year olds had a civic knowledge score of 60.403. Accuracy in predicting civic knowledge score was weak with a correlation of 0.28. Only 7.9% ($R^2 = 0.079$) of the variation in frequency of civics knowledge score was accounted for by its linear relationship with age.

Research Question 7

Can adolescent behavior be predicted by gender?

Moral Judgment

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 69 and 70 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 71 and 72 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 73 and 74 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Peer Pressure

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 75 and 76 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer pressure and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 77 and 78 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer

pressure and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 79 and 80 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Cognitive Distortion

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 81 and 82 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 83 and 84 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 85 and 86 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Risk Taking

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 87 and 88 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and gender. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Gender can be used to predict risk taking behavior, $F(1, 85) = 4.758$, $p = 0.032$. Parameter estimates can be found in Tables 89 and 90 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting risk taking score as a result of gender was:

$$\text{Risk Taking Score} = 8.128 - 3.243 (\text{Gender})$$

The model predicted, on average, that male students had a risk taking score of 8.128 and that female students had a risk taking score of 4.885. Accuracy in predicting civic knowledge score was weak with a correlation of 0.23. Only 5.3% ($R^2 = 0.053$) of the variation in frequency of risk taking score was accounted for by its linear relationship with gender.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and gender. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk

taking and gender. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 91 and 92 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Research Question 8

Can adolescent behavior be predicted by race?

Moral Judgment

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 93 and 94 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 95 and 96 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null

hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 97 and 98 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Peer Pressure

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer pressure and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 99 and 100 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer pressure and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 101 and 102 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer pressure and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 103 and 104 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Cognitive Distortion

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive

distortion and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 105 and 106 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 107 and 108 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 109 and 110 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Risk Taking

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 111 and 112 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 113 and 114 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and race. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 115 and 116 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Research Question 9

Can adolescent behavior be predicted by age?

Moral Judgment

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 117 and 118 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral

judgment and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 119 and 120 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between moral judgment and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between moral judgment and race. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 121 and 122 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Peer Pressure

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer pressure and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 123 and 124 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer pressure and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 125 and 126 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between peer pressure and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between peer

pressure and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 127 and 128 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Cognitive Distortion

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, we failed to reject the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 129 and 130 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 131 and 132 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between cognitive distortion and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between cognitive distortion and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 133 and 134 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

Risk Taking

For the entire group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and age. The null hypothesis

stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and age. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Age can be used to predict risk taking behavior, $F(1, 531) = 6.228, p = 0.013$. Parameter estimates can be found in Tables 135 and 136 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting risk taking score as a result of age was:

$$\text{Risk Taking Score} = 5.157 + 0.604 (\text{Age})$$

The model predicted that, on average, 15 year old students had a risk taking score of 5.157; that 16 year old students had a risk taking score of 5.761; that 17 year old students had a risk taking score of 6.365; and, that 18 year old students had a risk taking score of 6.969. Accuracy in predicting risk taking score was weak with a correlation of 0.108. Only 1.2% ($R^2 = 0.012$) of the variation in frequency of risk taking score was accounted for by its linear relationship with age.

For the at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and age. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Tables 137 and 138 provide a summary of these results (Appendix F).

For the non-at risk group of respondents, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between risk taking and age. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between risk taking and age. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Age can be used to predict risk taking behavior, $F(1, 447) = 3.950, p = 0.047$. Parameter

estimates can be found in Tables 139 and 140 (Appendix F). The regression equation for predicting risk taking score as a result of age was:

$$\text{Risk Taking Score} = 5.319 + 0.508 (\text{Age})$$

The model predicted that, on average, 15 year old students had a risk taking score of 5.319; that 16 year old students had a risk taking score of 5.827; that 17 year old students had a risk taking score of 6.335; and, that 18 year old students had a risk taking score of 6.843. Accuracy in predicting risk taking score was weak with a correlation of 0.094. Only 0.9% ($R^2 = 0.009$) of the variation in frequency of risk taking score was accounted for by its linear relationship with age.

Research Question 10

Is there a knowledge difference between at risk and non-at risk youth?

An *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if at risk youth score differently than non-at risk youth on the civics knowledge questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in civic knowledge between at risk and non-at risk youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 141 provides a summary of these results.

Table 141
Civic Knowledge (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>At Risk</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-At Risk</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.892	0.345	-0.810	87	50.32	22.898	471	52.34	21.096

Note. $p = 0.418$.

Research Question 11

Is there a behavior difference between at risk and non-at risk youth?

Moral Judgment

An independent samples *t*-test was conducted to determine if at risk youth score differently than non-at risk youth on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in moral judgment between at risk and non-at risk youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 142 provides a summary of these results.

Table 142
Moral Judgment (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>At Risk</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-At Risk</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.174	0.676	0.222	87	5.2414	1.6136	471	5.2017	1.5186

Note. $p = 0.825$.

Peer Pressure

An independent samples *t*-test was conducted to determine if at risk youth score differently than non-at risk youth on the peer pressure construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in peer pressure between at risk and non-at risk youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not met and equal variances were not assumed. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 143 provides a summary of these results.

Table 143
Peer Pressure (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>At Risk</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-At Risk</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
7.639	0.006	1.398	87	7.7471	7.0735	471	6.6285	5.5400

Note. *p* = 0.099.

Cognitive Distortion

An independent samples *t*-test was conducted to determine if at risk youth score differently than non-at risk youth on the cognitive distortion construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in cognitive distortion between at risk and non-at risk youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of

homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 144 provides a summary of these results.

Table 144
Cognitive Distortion (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>At Risk</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-At Risk</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.182	0.670	0.989	87	14.3563	5.7080	471	13.7431	5.2390

Note. $p = 0.323$.

Risk Taking

An independent samples *t*-test was conducted to determine if at risk youth score differently than non-at risk youth on the risk taking construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in moral judgment between at risk and non-at risk youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not met and equal variances were not assumed. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 145 provides a summary of these results.

Table 145

Risk Taking (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>At Risk</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-At Risk</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
7.576	0.006	0.932	87	6.3391	7.0453	471	6.1847	5.3573

Note. $p = 0.815$.

Research Question 12

Is there a knowledge difference between engaged and non-engaged youth?

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged youth score differently than non-engaged youth on the civics knowledge questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in civic knowledge between engaged and non-engaged youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 146 provides a summary of these results.

Table 146

Civic Knowledge, Entire Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1.819	0.178	4.028**	371	54.63	21.119	183	46.99	20.790

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

On average, students in the engaged group (N = 337, M = 54.63, SD = 21.119) scored higher than students in the non-engaged group (N = 183, M = 46.99, SD = 20.790). The 95% confidence interval for the difference between means was 3.918 – 11.374. The effect size was calculated by Cohen’s *d* and found to be 0.36 indicating that there was a little more than 1/3 of one standard deviation between the means of the two groups. The results provide evidence to support the conclusion that individuals who are engaged in extracurricular activities score higher on the civic knowledge questionnaire than do individuals who are not engaged.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged youth score differently than non-engaged youth on the civics knowledge questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in civic knowledge between engaged and non-engaged youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 147 provides a summary of these results.

Table 147
Civic Knowledge, At Risk (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene’s Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1.532	0.219	1.652	65	52.65	23.325	22	43.41	20.547

Note. *p* = 0.102

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged youth score differently than non-engaged youth on the civics knowledge questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in civic knowledge between engaged and non-engaged youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 148 provides a summary of these results.

Table 148
Civic Knowledge, Non-At Risk (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene’s Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.861	0.354	3.759**	306	55.05	20.637	161	44.47	20.839

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

On average, students in the engaged group ($n = 306$, $M = 55.05$, $SD = 20.637$) scored higher than students in the non-engaged group ($n = 161$, $M = 44.47$, $SD = 20.839$). The 95% confidence interval for the difference between means was 3.617 – 11.540. The effect size was calculated by Cohen’s *d* and found to be 0.51 indicating that there was a little more than ½ of one standard deviation between the means of the two groups. The results provide evidence to support the conclusion that individuals who are engaged in extracurricular activities score higher on the civic knowledge questionnaire than do individuals who are not engaged.

Research Question 13

Is there a behavior difference between engaged and non-engaged youth?

Moral Judgment

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged youth score differently than non-engaged youth on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in moral judgment between engaged and non-engaged youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 149 provides a summary of the results.

Table 149

Moral Judgment, Entire Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
2.268	0.133	-2.808**	371	5.3315	1.4688	183	4.9454	1.6265

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

On average, students in the engaged group ($N = 371$, $M = 5.3315$, $SD = 1.4688$) scored higher than students in the non-engaged group ($N = 183$, $M = 4.9454$, $SD = 1.6265$). The 95% confidence interval for the difference between means was 0.116 – 0.656. The effect size was calculated by Cohen's d and found to be 0.25 indicating that there was $\frac{1}{4}$ of one standard deviation between the means of the two groups. The results

provide evidence to support the conclusion that individuals who are engaged in extracurricular activities score higher on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent questionnaire than do individuals who are not engaged.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to moral judgment. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 150 provides a summary of the results.

Table 150
Moral Judgment, At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene’s Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1.172	0.282	0.810	65	5.3231	1.5218	22	5.0000	1.8772

Note. $p = 0.420$.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged youth score differently than non-engaged youth on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in moral judgment between engaged and non-engaged youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test

indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 151 provides a summary of the results.

Table 151

Moral Judgment, Non-At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1.469	0.226	2.693**	306	5.3333	1.4599	161	4.9379	1.5957

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

On average, students in the engaged group ($n = 306$, $M = 5.3333$, $SD = 1.4599$) scored higher than students in the non-engaged group ($n = 161$, $M = 4.9379$, $SD = 1.5957$). The 95% confidence interval for the difference between means was 0.107 – 0.684. The effect size was calculated by Cohen's d and found to be 0.26 indicating that there was a little more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of one standard deviation between the means of the two groups. The results provide evidence to support the conclusion that individuals who are engaged in extracurricular activities score higher on the moral judgment construct of the adolescent questionnaire than do individuals who are not engaged.

Peer Pressure

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the peer pressure construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-

engaged students with regard to peer pressure. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 152 provides a summary of the results.

Table 152
Peer Pressure, Entire Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.026	0.871	-0.906	371	6.6658	5.7791	183	7.1421	5.9095

Note. $p = 0.366$.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the peer pressure construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to peer pressure. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 153 provides a summary of the results.

Table 153

Peer Pressure, At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.015	0.904	-1.155	65	7.2385	6.9682	22	9.2500	7.3319

Note. $p = 0.251$.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the peer pressure construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to peer pressure. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 154 provides a summary of the results.

Table 154

Peer Pressure, Non-At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.000	0.987	-0.573	306	6.5441	5.4992	161	6.8540	5.6545

Note. $p = 0.567$.

Cognitive Distortion

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the cognitive distortion construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to cognitive distortion. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 155 provides a summary of the results.

Table 155

Cognitive Distortion, Entire Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene’s Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.538	0.464	-0.286	371	13.8302	5.3480	183	13.9672	5.2329

Note. $p = 0.775$.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the cognitive distortion construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to cognitive distortion. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of

homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 156 provides a summary of the results.

Table 156

Cognitive Distortion, At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<u>Non-Engaged</u>		
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.015	0.902	-0.222	65	14.2769	5.4787	22	14.5909	6.4709

Note. $p = 0.825$.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the cognitive distortion construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to cognitive distortion. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 157 provides a summary of the results.

Table 157

Cognitive Distortion, Non-At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<u>Non-Engaged</u>		
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.693	0.406	-0.288	306	13.7353	5.3241	161	13.8820	5.058

Note. $p = 0.774$.

Risk Taking

For the entire group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged youth score differently than non-engaged youth on the risk taking construct of the adolescent questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference in risk taking between engaged and non-engaged youth. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 158 provides a summary of the results.

Table 158

Risk Taking, Entire Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>N</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>N</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
3.270	0.071	-3.727**	371	5.6294	5.4251	183	7.5082	5.8850

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

On average, students in the non-engaged group ($N = 183$, $M = 7.5082$, $SD = 5.8850$) scored higher than students in the engaged group ($N = 371$, $M = 5.6294$, $SD = 5.4251$). The 95% confidence interval for the difference between means was $-2.869 - -0.889$. The effect size was calculated by Cohen's d and found to be 0.33 indicating that there was 1/3 of one standard deviation between the means of the two groups. The results provide evidence to support the conclusion that individuals who were not engaged in extracurricular activities score higher on the risk taking construct of the adolescent questionnaire than do individuals who were engaged.

For the at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the risk taking construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to risk taking. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Table 159 provides a summary of the results.

Table 159
Risk Taking, At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<i>n</i>	<u>Non-Engaged</u>	
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
0.000	0.986	-1.320	65	5.7615	7.0262	22	8.0455	6.9811

Note. $p = 0.190$.

For the non-at risk group of respondents, an *independent samples t-test* was conducted to determine if engaged students score differently than non-engaged students on the risk taking construct of the adolescent behavior questionnaire. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no statistically significant difference between engaged and non-engaged students with regard to risk taking. The test was conducted using an alpha of 0.05. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not met and equal variances were not assumed. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 160 provides a summary of the results.

Table 160

Risk Taking, Non-At Risk Group (Engaged vs. Non-Engaged)

<u>Levene's Test</u>		<i>t</i>	<i>n</i>	<u>Engaged</u>		<u>Non-Engaged</u>		
<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
5.183	0.023	-3.419**	306	5.6013	5.03394	161	7.4348	5.7405

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

On average, students in the non-engaged group ($n = 161$, $M = 7.4348$, $SD = 5.7405$) scored higher than students in the engaged group ($n = 306$, $M = 5.6013$, $SD = 5.03394$). The 95% confidence interval for the difference between means was $-2.845 - -0.822$. The effect size was calculated by Cohen's d and found to be 0.32 indicating that there was nearly 1/3 of one standard deviation between the means of the two groups. The results provide evidence to support the conclusion that individuals who were not engaged in extracurricular activities score higher on the risk taking construct of the adolescent questionnaire than do individuals who were engaged.

Research Question 14

Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, do at risk and non-at risk youth have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if at risk youth had statistically significant differences in stage of moral development than non-at risk youth. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no relationship between type of youth and stage of moral development. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null

hypothesis was not rejected. The results should be interpreted with caution given than an assumption of an expected count of five per cell was violated (see Table 161).

Table 161
Moral Judgment, Kohlberg Dilemma, N = 546 (At Risk v. Non-At Risk)

Stage of Development		At Risk	Non-At Risk	Total
Pre-Conventional, Stage 1	Count	17	86	103
	Exp. Count	15.5	87.5	103
	S. Residual	0.4	-0.2	
Pre-Conventional, Stage 2	Count	7	34	41
	Exp. Count	6.2	34.8	41
	S. Residual	0.3	-0.1	
Conventional, Stage 3	Count	1	20	21
	Exp. Count	3.2	17.8	21
	S. Residual	-1.2	0.5	
Conventional, Stage 4	Count	26	109	135
	Exp. Count	20.3	114.7	135
	S. Residual	1.3	-0.5	
Post-Conventional, Stage 5	Count	7	72	79
	Exp. Count	11.9	67.1	79
	S. Residual	-1.4	0.6	
Post-Conventional, Stage 6	Count	24	143	167
	Exp. Count	25.1	141.9	167
	S. Residual	-0.2	0.1	
Total	Count	82	464	546
	Exp. Count	82	464	546

Note. $\chi_5^2 = 6.349, p = 0.274$

Research Question 15

Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, do at risk and non-at risk youth have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if at risk youth had statistically significant differences in stage of moral development than non-at risk youth. The null hypothesis stated that there would be no relationship between type of youth and stage of moral development. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected (see Table 162).

Table 162
Moral Judgment, Gilligan Dilemma, N = 526 (At Risk v. Non-At Risk)

Stage of Development		At Risk	Non-At Risk	Total
Pre-Conventional	Count	9	70	79
	Exp. Count	11.9	67.1	79
	S. Residual	-0.8	0.3	
Conventional	Count	27	163	190
	Exp. Count	28.5	161.5	190
	S. Residual	-0.3	0.1	
Post-Conventional	Count	43	214	257
	Exp. Count	38.6	218.4	257
	S. Residual	0.7	-0.3	
Total	Count	79	447	526
	Exp. Count	79	447	526

Note. $\chi^2 = 1.502, p = 0.472$

Research Question 16

Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, do males and females have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if males possess statistically significant differences in stage of moral development than females. The null hypothesis stated that, based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, there would be no relationship between gender and stage of moral development. The test was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 15.352, p < 0.01$); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 163 provides a summary of the results.

Four cells contributed significantly to this relationship. For males, significantly fewer respondents were observed in the pre-conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.9, 34 observed, 46.9 expected). For females, significantly more respondents were observed in the pre-conventional stage of moral development (SR = 1.7, 69 observed, 56.1 expected). On the other hand, significantly more male respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = 2.0, 93 observed, 75.6 expected) and significantly fewer female respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.8, 73 observed, 90.4 expected). For this specific dilemma and population, this evidence supports the conclusion that males are making better moral judgment decisions.

Table 163
Moral Judgment, Kohlberg Dilemma, N = 542 (Males v. Females)

Stage of Development		Males	Females	Total
Pre-Conventional, Stage 1	Count	34	69	103
	Exp. Count	46.9	56.1	103
	S. Residual	-1.9	1.7	
Pre-Conventional, Stage 2	Count	20	20	40
	Exp. Count	18.2	21.8	40
	S. Residual	0.4	-0.4	
Conventional, Stage 3	Count	8	12	20
	Exp. Count	9.1	10.9	20
	S. Residual	-0.4	0.3	
Conventional, Stage 4	Count	56	79	135
	Exp. Count	61.5	73.5	135
	S. Residual	-0.7	0.6	
Post-Conventional, Stage 5	Count	36	42	78
	Exp. Count	35.5	42.5	78
	S. Residual	0.1	-0.1	
Post-Conventional, Stage 6	Count	93	73	166
	Exp. Count	75.6	90.4	166
	S. Residual	2.0	-1.8	
Total	Count	247	295	542
	Exp. Count	247	295	542

Note. $\chi_5^2 = 15.352, p = 0.009$

Research Question 17

Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, do males and females have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if males possess statistically significant differences in stage of moral development than females. The null hypothesis stated that, based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, there would be no relationship between gender and stage of moral development. The test was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 11.945$, $p < 0.01$); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Table 164 provides a summary of the results.

Four cells contributed significantly to this relationship. For males, significantly more respondents were observed in the conventional stage of moral development (SR = -2.0, 103 observed, 84.7 expected). For females, significantly fewer respondents were observed in the conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.8, 86 observed, 104.3 expected). On the other hand, significantly fewer male respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.6, 97 observed, 114.3 expected) and significantly more female respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = 1.5, 158 observed, 140.7 expected). For this specific dilemma and population, this evidence supports the conclusion that females are making better moral judgment decisions.

Table 164
Moral Judgment, Gilligan Dilemma, N = 522 (Male v. Female)

Stage of Development		Males	Females	Total
Pre-Conventional	Count	34	44	78
	Exp. Count	35.0	43.0	78
	S. Residual	-0.2	0.1	
Conventional	Count	103	86	189
	Exp. Count	84.7	104.3	189
	S. Residual	2.0	-1.8	
Post-Conventional	Count	97	158	255
	Exp. Count	114.3	140.7	255
	S. Residual	-1.6	1.5	
Total	Count	234	288	522
	Exp. Count	234	288	522

Note. $\chi^2 = 11.945, p = 0.003$

Research Question 18

Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, do different races have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if different races possess statistically significant differences in stage of moral development. The null hypothesis stated that, based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, there would be no relationship between race and stage of moral development. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. The results should be interpreted with caution given that an assumption of an expected count of five per cell was violated.

Table 165 provides a summary of the results.

Table 165
Moral Judgment, Kohlberg Dilemma, N = 545 (Race)

Stage of Development		White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Total
Pre-Conventional, Stage 1	Count	77	11	10	5	103
	Exp. Count	76.7	10.4	8.5	7.4	103
	S. Residual	0.0	0.2	0.5	-0.9	
Pre-Conventional, Stage 2	Count	29	2	1	7	41
	Exp. Count	30.5	4.1	1.7	2.9	41
	S. Residual	-0.3	-1.1	-0.6	2.4	
Conventional, Stage 3	Count	13	4	13	9	21
	Exp. Count	15.6	2.1	11.1	9.7	21
	S. Residual	-0.7	1.3	0.6	-0.2	
Conventional, Stage 4	Count	97	16	13	9	135
	Exp. Count	100.6	13.6	11.1	9.7	135
	S. Residual	-0.4	0.6	0.6	-0.2	
Post-Conventional, Stage 5	Count	65	6	4	3	78
	Exp. Count	58.1	7.9	6.4	5.6	78
	S. Residual	0.9	-0.7	-1.0	-1.1	
Post-Conventional, Stage 6	Count	125	16	14	12	167
	Exp. Count	124.4	16.9	13.8	12.0	167
	S. Residual	0.1	-0.2	0.1	0.0	
Total	Count	406	55	45	39	545
	Exp. Count	406	55	45	39	545

Note. $\chi_{15}^2 = 16.167, p = 0.371$

Research Question 19

Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, do different races have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if different races possess statistically significant differences in stage of moral development. The null hypothesis stated that, based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, there would be no relationship between race and stage of moral development. The test was not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. The results should be interpreted with caution given that an assumption of an expected count of five per cell was violated.

Table 166 provides a summary of the results.

Table 166
Moral Judgment, Gilligan Dilemma, N = 525 (Race)

Stage of Development		White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Total
Pre-Conventional	Count	60	7	9	3	79
	Exp. Count	59.9	7.2	6.5	5.4	79
	S. Residual	0.0	-0.1	1.0	-1.0	
Conventional	Count	138	18	17	16	189
	Exp. Count	143.3	17.3	15.5	13.0	189
	S. Residual	-0.4	0.2	0.4	0.8	
Post-Conventional	Count	200	23	17	17	257
	Exp. Count	194.8	23.5	21.0	17.6	257
	S. Residual	0.4	-0.1	-0.9	-0.1	
Total	Count	398	48	43	36	525
	Exp. Count	398	48	43	36	525

Note. $X^2_6 = 4.110, p = 0.662$

Research Question 20

Based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, do engaged and non-engaged youth have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if engaged youth possess statistically significant differences in stage of moral development than non-engaged youth. The null hypothesis stated that, based upon the Kohlberg Dilemma, there would be no relationship between engagement in extracurricular activities and stage of moral development. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Four cells contributed significantly to this relationship. For engaged youth, significantly fewer respondents were observed in the pre-conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.6, 19 observed, 27.3 expected). For engaged youth, significantly more respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = 1.0, 122 observed, 111.3 expected). On the other hand, for non-engaged youth, significantly more respondents were observed in the pre-conventional stage of moral development (SR = 2.3, 22 observed, 13.7 expected) and significantly fewer respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.4, 45 observed, 55.7 expected). For this specific dilemma and population, this evidence supports the conclusion that engaged youth are making better moral judgment decisions. Table 167 provides a summary of the results.

Table 167
Moral Judgment, Kohlberg Dilemma, N = 543 (Engaged v. Non-Engaged)

Stage of Development		Engaged	Non-Engaged	Total
Pre-Conventional, Stage 1	Count	65	38	103
	Exp. Count	68.7	34.3	103
	S. Residual	-0.4	0.6	
Pre-Conventional, Stage 2	Count	19	22	41
	Exp. Count	27.3	13.7	41
	S. Residual	-1.6	2.3	
Conventional, Stage 3	Count	13	7	20
	Exp. Count	13.3	6.9	20
	S. Residual	-0.1	0.1	
Conventional, Stage 4	Count	95	40	135
	Exp. Count	90.0	45.0	135
	S. Residual	0.5	-0.7	
Post-Conventional, Stage 5	Count	48	29	77
	Exp. Count	51.3	25.7	77
	S. Residual	-0.5	0.7	
Post-Conventional, Stage 6	Count	122	45	167
	Exp. Count	111.3	55.7	167
	S. Residual	1.0	-1.4	
Total	Count	362	181	543
	Exp. Count	362	181	543

Note. $\chi^2_5 = 12.783, p = 0.026$

Research Question 21

Based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, do engaged and non-engaged youth have different stages of moral development?

A Chi square test of independence was conducted to determine if engaged youth possess statistically significant differences in stage of moral development than non-engaged youth. The null hypothesis stated that, based upon the Gilligan Dilemma, there would be no relationship between engagement in extracurricular activities and stage of moral development. The test was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Four cells contributed significantly to this relationship. For engaged youth, significantly fewer respondents were observed in the pre-conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.1, 45 observed, 52.7 expected). For engaged youth, significantly more respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = 0.9, 182 observed, 170.2 expected). On the other hand, for non-engaged youth, significantly more respondents were observed in the pre-conventional stage of moral development (SR = 1.5, 34 observed, 26.3 expected) and significantly fewer respondents were observed in the post-conventional stage of moral development (SR = -1.3, 73 observed, 84.8 expected). For this specific dilemma and population, this evidence supports the conclusion that engaged youth are making better moral judgment decisions. Table 168 provides a summary of the results.

Table 168
Moral Judgment, Gilligan Dilemma, N = 523 (Engaged v. Non-Engaged)

Stage of Development		Engaged	Non-Engaged	Total
Pre-Conventional	Count	45	34	79
	Exp. Count	52.7	26.3	79
	S. Residual	-1.1	1.5	
Conventional	Count	122	67	189
	Exp. Count	126.1	62.9	189
	S. Residual	-0.4	0.5	
Post-Conventional	Count	182	73	255
	Exp. Count	170.2	84.8	255
	S. Residual	0.9	-1.3	
Total	Count	349	174	523
	Exp. Count	349	174	523

Note. $\chi^2 = 6.275, p = 0.043$

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

This study was designed to determine whether or not there would be a relationship between adolescent behavior and civic engagement. To accomplish this task, two different types of populations were examined – at risk and non-at risk high school students. The original premise for the study was based upon the notion that an underlying cause for juvenile delinquency was poor decision making reinforced by cognitive distortions; and, that this thinking process would also be indicative of reduced interest in civic affairs - or what Boyte (2003) called radical individualism. So, this meant that the at risk group of respondents was originally defined as juvenile delinquents. However, when the researcher was unable to obtain permission from the state of Florida's Department of Juvenile Justice allowing juvenile delinquents to participate in the study, an alternative population was selected. Ultimately, high school students who identified themselves as having an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) defined the at risk group used in this study. Further difficulty recruiting school districts, however, ensued. Several school districts refused participation. Success was achieved when the Flagler County, Florida School System chose to participate.

At the high school in Flagler County, Florida, the study measured the amount of civic knowledge possessed by its students and ascertained that civic knowledge was not related to civic preparedness or even civic engagement. The study did, however,

determine that involvement in extracurricular activities enhanced students' moral reasoning ability. This was reflected by higher scores on the civic knowledge instrument created by the researcher.

Discussion and Conclusions

Results from the civic knowledge exam indicated that students did not perform well on the Civic Knowledge Questionnaire (see Table 17, Appendix F). Quigley (1999), Executive Director at the Center for Civic Education, stated that the main reason why students did not do well on the full 1998 NAEP exam was because the vast majority of students either were not taught civics and government at all or were taught too little, too late. Therefore, the fact that respondents did just a poorly on the Civic Knowledge Questionnaire was not surprising. Quigley further explained that this problem was due to a number of reasons scattered throughout the nation. A study commissioned by the Center for Civic Education (and performed by the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin) determined that:

- Thirteen states' constitutions explicitly affirmed that an informed citizenry was a worthwhile goal. However, no constitutional provisions specifically required instruction in citizenship, government, rights, or liberties (Quigley, 1999).
- Twenty-six states enacted state laws specifically related to civic education. These were statutes that may have required instruction in civics but did not require specific courses, standards, or assessments, leaving the details to regulatory authorities, school districts, or schools; may have required some form of civics assessment or the specification of civics content in state standards; may have

required specific courses in civics, government, constitutions, or related topics; or may have funded civic education curricula, authorized community service in schools, or required a state clearinghouse for information on character and citizenship education programs (Quigley).

- States address civics topics in their state academic standards by adopting separate civics standards; by including civics topics as an explicit section in social studies standards; or by integrating civics content in social studies standards (Quigley).
- Twenty-nine states reported requiring that students complete one or more high school courses in civics/government. Only five of these states required a 12th grade "capstone" course (Quigley).
- Thirty-one states reported testing civics topics, with 11 more states expecting to institute new tests soon. Only 3 of the 31 states reported having a separate, stand-alone civics test, however; in the other 28 states, the civics topics were included in other state assessments. In 15 of the 31 states, student failure on these tests prevented high school graduation; in 2 of the 15 states, failure also prevented promotion (Quigley).
- Thirteen states reported offering certification in civics or government (or both) for high school teachers, with 10 states offering certification in civics or government for middle school or junior high school teachers. The most common state certification for teachers of civics topics was a broad history and social studies certification, although 3 states reported requiring only a general teaching certification. Twenty-three (23) states reported requiring teachers to pass some

kind of standardized test of their civics knowledge before being certified to teach civics content (Quigley).

- Twenty-one states reported requiring professional development for teachers of civics topics. State-level in-service programs and conferences, university courses to refresh and update knowledge of civics topics, and training through community organizations (e.g., law-related education associations or offices) were among the professional development opportunities offered in 18 or more states (Quigley).
- Three (3) states reported having a community service program requirement for all students; 8 other states reported having statewide voluntary programs (Quigley).

The study also revealed that there were also relationships between civic knowledge and certain adolescent behaviors. For example, for at risk respondents, a relationship occurred between civic knowledge and peer pressure and between civic knowledge and risk taking. And, for non-at risk respondents, a relationship occurred between civic knowledge and moral judgment. Correlations of this type were not found in the literature. There were also relationships between certain behaviors. These occurred between peer pressure and cognitive distortion; peer pressure and risk taking; and, cognitive distortion and risk taking. Correlations of this type were mentioned in the literature. For example, Lochman (1984) and Dodge (1986) reported that cognitive distortions among aggressive children were seen to contribute to high anger arousal. In particular, aggressive children misperceived the neutral or benign intentions of others as hostile. These attribution errors became self-reinforcing as the child's angry reactions created counter-aggressive responses from peers, resulting in increased aggression and

further peer rejection (Lochman, Lampron, Gemmer, & Harris, 1986). Also, a study by Lewis and Lewis (1984) indicated that peer pressures to engage in risk-taking behaviors increased as children entered adolescence.

In this study, there were no differences between male and female respondents with regard to civic knowledge. This result was not expected because it was known that female students had higher average scale scores than their male peers on the 1998 NAEP Civics Assessment (National Center for Educational Statistics, 1998). For the at risk group of respondents, there was a gender difference with regard to risk taking behavior. Male respondents indicated that they were more willing to take risk ($p < 0.05$). This finding was not surprising because it was reported that aggressive behavior for males showed continuity from childhood to adulthood (Farrington, 1991; Olweus, 1979). Incarceration statistics added credibility to this finding since males tended populate prisons than more than females (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 2004; Weich & Angulo, 2000).

Civic knowledge was predicted by race. For the entire group of respondents ($p < 0.01$) and the at risk group ($p < 0.01$) of respondents, blacks possessed the least amount of civic knowledge followed by Hispanics. This finding was not surprising because it had been previously reported that a greater percentage of white and Asian/Pacific Islander students performed at or above the proficient level than did black, Hispanic or American Indian students (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998).

For all behaviors tested, adolescent behavior was not predicted by race. This finding was not expected. With the literature indicating that across the nation, blacks and Hispanics were over-represented in the U.S. justice system (Poe-Yamagata & Jones,

2000; Villarruel & Walker, 2002) it appeared as though these two racial groups were willing to take more risk than others. This study did not support this hypothesis.

Civic knowledge was predicted by age. For the entire group and non-at risk group of respondents ($p < 0.01$); and, for the at risk group of respondents ($p < 0.05$) it was determined that older respondents possessed more civic knowledge. This finding was not surprising because it was previously reported that amount of schooling was positively correlated with civic engagement and attitudes (Dee, 2003). For the entire group and the non-at risk group of respondents, only risk taking was predicted by age. With increasing age, males were more willing to take risk. This finding was not surprising. Male aggressive behavior supported this finding.

There were no knowledge or behavior differences between at risk and non-at risk youth. This finding was not surprising because this question may have been inadequately addressed. The reader is reminded that the at risk group was changed from juvenile delinquents to those with a self-reported Individualized Education Plan.

There were, however, knowledge and behavior differences between engaged and non-engaged youth ($p < 0.01$). In the literature, psychological research supported the notion that engagement in after school activities kept young adolescents from experimenting with sex, drugs and other risky behaviors, and helped produce happier, healthier, more productive adults (Larner, Zippiroli & Behrman, 1999). In the past, time outside of school was spent doing homework or chores; gathered at the dinner table or television set; or spent with friends in the neighborhood. In 1999, widespread shifts in family and community life have changed the lives of American youth. Fewer familiar adults were home when children were dismissed from school because more parents were

working. Consequently, Americans were becoming increasingly concerned about what the nation's youngsters were doing and not doing after school let out (Larner, et al).

The vast majority of after school programs were made up of a heterogeneous mix of offerings that sprouted from different roots and exhibited different strengths and weaknesses. To a large extent, the habits and expectations that surrounded out-of-school time were shaped by patterns of family life that existed in earlier eras (West, 1997). Some programs were modern versions of child care centers that opened during World War II to allow mothers to work in wartime factories and shipyards without worrying that their children were safe when the school day ended. For instance, after school activities that grew in popularity during the prosperous, family-oriented 1950s and 1960s such as YMCA, Scouts, urban settlement houses, and rural Grange or 4H associations (Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, 1992; Miller, 1995) found few parents available to provide transportation or to serve as volunteer leaders and coaches because most held jobs. Other programs emerged in response to new demands. These included private tutoring programs in wealthy suburbs and urban neighborhoods operated by for profit companies (Pekow, 1997); and comprehensive efforts like the Beacon Schools which brought community groups, health professionals, youth programs, and social service organizations into a school that remained open 12 hours a day (USDOJ, 1996). As varied as after school opportunities were, an important issue was that they were unevenly distributed (Ianni, 1990; Littell & Wynn, 1989). Low income neighborhoods offered few after school options and the programs that did exist tended to address risks and problems rather than cultivate children's skills and talents (Littell & Wynn). By contrast,

enrichment activities typically charged participant fees, and so were more prevalent in affluent communities (Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development).

Violence as a learned behavior was a recurring theme in the literature. When there were unevenly distributed or cost prohibitive programs for American youth, one was able to argue that juvenile delinquency was a product of boredom because risk taking was a way in which individuals met their needs for stimulation (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). This would explain why risk taking behavior had statistical significance. Law enforcement officials were in agreement - the hours after school were when school children stirred up trouble on the streets, in the malls, or in schoolyards. Widely reported FBI statistics indicated that 47% of violent juvenile crimes take place on weekdays between the hours of 2:00 P.M. and 8:00 P.M. (Snyder & Sickmund, 1997). Such statistics have turned local police into vocal advocates for after-school programs (Fox & Newman, 1998). For instance, the Police Athletic League in some cities provided recreational programs to keep children off the streets, away from gangs, and out of trouble (Healy, 1998). At the national level, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention funded mentoring and after-school programs that provided safe havens, adult guidance, and help in resolving conflicts peacefully (Dryfoos, 1998).

In this study, moral judgment had statistical significance. In 1978, Kohlberg reasoned that moral development affected whether or not an individual believed certain behavior to be appropriate. In 1993, Mason and Gibbs determined that role-taking was a way for youth to restructure their own moral schemata and incorporate those of others and that this played a role in stimulating an individual to construct more mature moral judgments. In lieu of these findings, this study examined specific dilemmas used by both

Kohlberg and Gilligan to determine whether or not there was any connection to civic engagement. Both dilemmas supported the idea that males and females had different stages of moral development ($p < 0.01$); but, with opposite results. Responses to the Kohlberg Dilemma indicated that males were making better moral judgment decisions while responses to the Gilligan Dilemma supported the conclusion that females were making better moral judgment decisions.

Neither dilemma supported the idea that at risk and non-at risk youth had different stages of moral development. However, both dilemmas did support the idea that engaged and non-engaged youth had different stages of moral development. They both indicated that engaged youth had more respondents in the post-conventional stage of moral development and fewer in the pre-conventional stage; and, non-engaged youth had fewer respondents in the post-conventional stage of moral development and more in the pre-conventional stage. Racially, no differences were observed.

To children, out-of-school time was when they were most free to be with friends, explore their surroundings, pursue their own interests, and retreat with their private thoughts. The activities that promoted this self-definition may seem trivial to adults, but they were critical during the early school years when children move outside the family to define a place for themselves in the broader social world. It was during the school-age years that adults hoped children would discover and develop their individual talents, learn to recognize and overcome their limitations, and choose activities that would prepare them for satisfying adult lives. They also had to learn how to juggle a volatile mix of emotions, hormones, and social pressures while creating positive relationships with the peers and adults with whom they interacted (Larner, et al, 1999). When young

adolescents cope simultaneously with physical, cognitive and emotional changes, the process of identity formation can be complex (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984).

During middle school, the balance of power between parents and children begins to shift from adult control that is appropriate during preschool years, to a period when adults remain vigilant but give their school-age children more room to make decisions (Collins, 1984). Not surprisingly, decision making, autonomy, and social relationships were high priorities for teenagers. Extracurricular activities provided this opportunity for American youth.

The primary question that policymakers and voters were likely to ask about out-of-school time was not whether it was important in the lives of children and families but whether it was the rightful concern of government. For more than a century, the main public commitment to children ages 6 to 18 in the United States was the promise of a free public education. Fulfilling that promise consumed about \$265 billion per year, or \$6,000 per school child, in local, state, and federal tax dollars (Terman, 1997). Public opinion polls revealed that Americans endorse the use of government funds to support school-age children and their families, especially to provide structure and moral guidance to children (Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 1998).

Ironically, some of that moral guidance that was discussed earlier was lost when, on June 25, 1962, 39 million students were forbidden to do what they and their predecessors had been doing since the founding of our nation – having public prayer at the beginning of each school day (*Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421, 1962). This loss of moral guidance was compounded by the middle school movement which became popular in the 1960s and 1970s. Most middle schools did not engage in the high school practices

of offering extracurricular activities. Instead, middle schools tried to meet the needs of young adolescents through such practices as smaller learning teams, advisory classes that helped create a bond between each student and at least one teacher, and interdisciplinary teaching and learning (Manning, 2000). As time went on, The "Father" of the middle school movement, Dr. William M. Alexander, Professor Emeritus of Education at the University of Florida, was leading a group of thinkers, scholars, and school people in developing a new school for children. Dr. Alexander defined the middle school as..."a school providing a program planned for a range of older children, preadolescents, and early adolescents that builds upon the elementary school program for earlier childhood and in turn is built upon by the high school's program for adolescence" (Alexander, 1969, p. 5). He provided the basic framework for the design of the new, dynamic, synergistic middle school in America.

In the end, the impact of these issues curbed the school systems ability to allow students to reach their maximum potential. Youth crime increased dramatically in the 1960s as the children of the baby boom reached adolescence and, by their sheer numbers, overwhelmed many agencies of social control (Feld, 1999). The number of young males aged fifteen to seventeen years – peak ages for many forms of criminality – doubled during this period (Allen, 1981). Despite such well designed plans, court cases like *In re Gault* (1967) marked the constitutional domestication of the juvenile court and the recognition of young people's legal rights (Feld). Lawsuits and the fear of them caused school policies to change.

In the end, educators appear to have restricted their own ability to plan for and provide learning experiences that take in to consideration the physical characteristics;

physical needs; patterns of growth and maturation; physiological changes; intellectual development; intellectual characteristics; learning preferences and styles; emotional development; personality development; and social development of each and every young adolescent attending school. This study uncovered the message that young people need to live and experience things in order to accept responsibility. When interesting, affordable activities are not available students become bored and get in to trouble. The only logical conclusion that can come from all this must be that engagement in extracurricular activities is essential to being civically prepared in the future.

Recommendations

1. Nationally, continue advocacy and public education efforts to strengthen the willingness of voters to support the use of government resources to aid after school activities for all children.

2. Locally, undertake community planning efforts to identify needs, establish priorities, mobilize resources, and guide investments to create a community in which children can thrive. Revisit a number of extracurricular models, such as the YMCA, Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc. or Boy (Girl) Scouts of America, that worked in the past.

3. Develop and implement new models for financing after-school programs that incorporate affordable parent fees, private-sector support and donations, and expanded government funding. A new approach to combining and balancing these funding sources would be useful to ensure that programs can be sustained and made accessible to low-income children and families.

4. Invest in efforts that aid the professional development of educators who work with school-age children; create tailored training courses and degree programs; and, design a career ladder that links increasing compensation to increased qualifications.

5. Establish strategic partnerships between public and private institutions (such as school districts partnering with the Park and Recreation Department) to maximize the benefit derived from resources and facilities that are suited for use by school-age children. There needs to be more cooperation in the community.

6. Create coalitions, councils, or coordinating bodies to serve as network hubs, intermediaries, advocates, and support systems for after-school programs, families, and youths throughout the community.

7. Launch a limited number of program evaluations. Such evaluations should be designed to estimate effects on a broad array of outcome measures that matter to planners and policymakers, so that positive results can reinforce public confidence that government has a role to play in providing after-school solutions.

Implications for Further Research

1. Conduct research to document the supply of, and the demand for, after-school programs by type, hours, location, and cost of care for children of different ages, to guide the deliberations of community planners, program developers, and policymakers as they allocate new funds and design new programs.

2. Conduct research that will examine the history and thematic content of the social studies curriculum. Then, carry out an action research plan (both locally and nationally) that investigates service learning - academic study closely tied to community

service through structured reflection. This is a particularly important pedagogy for promoting civic responsibility, especially when used with collaborative learning and problem-based learning. Service learning connects thought and feeling in a deliberate way, creating a context in which students can explore how they feel about what they are thinking and what they think about how they feel; through guided reflection, it offers students opportunities to explore the relationship between their academic learning and their civic values and commitments.

3. This study used a volunteer sample from just one high school. More data should be collected from a larger population (i.e. more high schools throughout the United States).

4. George W. Bush (2002) has issued a call to all American citizens to provide two years of service or 4,000 hours of service over a lifetime to create a nation of active and engaged citizens. Youth Courts, also known as Teen Courts, are the fastest growing crime intervention programs in the nation and appear to play a critical role in supporting that call. Apparently, Youth Courts offer ways to engage the community in a partnership with the juvenile justice system to respond to juvenile crimes by increasing the awareness of delinquency issues on a local level and by mobilizing community members and youth to take an active role in addressing the problem. The effectiveness of these programs needs to be investigated further.

APPENDIX A
RESPONSE FROM FLDJJ



STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

June 4, 2004

Michael Ernst
701 Dolphin Head Lane
Ormond Beach, Florida 32174

Dear Mr. Ernst:

Regarding: Relationship between adolescent behavior and disengagement from American Citizenry.

The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice is pleased to work with researchers whose studies benefit delinquent youth in our state. I have been asked to respond to your research protocol, which you submitted to the Department Institutional Review Board. I am sorry to inform you that your proposal has been rejected. It was felt that the study results would not contribute sufficiently to knowledge about delinquent youth.

Best Wishes,

Dominique E. Roe-Sepowitz
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice
Institutional Review Board
cc. Noah Power
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice Assistant Secretary of Administration.

APPENDIX B
IRB APPROVAL LETTER

University of Central Florida
Office of Research

March 14, 2005

Michael Ernst
701 Dolphin Head Lane
Ormond Beach, FL 32174

Dear Mr. Ernst:

With reference to your protocol #05-2106 entitled, "Relationship between Adolescent Behavior and Disengagement from American Citizenry" I am enclosing for your records the approved, expedited document of the UCFIRB Form you had submitted to our office. The expiration date for this study will be 3/6/06. Should there be a need to extend this study, a Continuing Review form must be submitted to the IRB Office for review by the Chairman or full IRB at least one month prior to the expiration date. This is the responsibility of the investigator.

Please be advised that this approval is given for one year. Should there be any addendums or administrative changes to the already approved protocol, they must also be submitted to the Board through use of the Addendum/Modification Request form. Changes should not be initiated until written IRB approval is received. Adverse events should be reported to the IRB as they occur.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at 407-823-2901.

Please accept our best wishes for the success of your endeavors.

Cordially,

.~::~

Barbara Ward, CIM
IRB Coordinator

Copy: IRB file

APPENDIX C
INITIAL COVER LETTER

Flagler Palm Coast High School
P.O. Box 488 Bunnell, Florida 32110-0488
Phone (386) 437-7540 Fax (386) 437-7546
Bill Delbrugge, Principal

March, 2005

Dear Parent/Guardian:

Flagler Palm Coast High School has been chosen to participate in a research study entitled “**The Relationship between Adolescent Behavior and Civic Disengagement**”. Our school was randomly selected from different counties across the state of Florida. Consequently, all students who are currently enrolled in or have already completed a course in U.S. History will be eligible to participate (which is nearly 2,000 students from our school alone) by filling out a simple survey instrument that will be administered during history class.

Results from the study will help educators understand that as a consequence of adolescent or immature behavior, American youth are more likely to engage in mischievous and even illegal activities thereby not becoming involved in their civic responsibilities. Enhanced understanding of such behavior can help educators reduce these type of transgressions and perhaps even redirect them toward more productive lives. Also, the civic knowledge section of the survey instrument used will also give the school some indication of how well we are preparing students for future civic involvement.

This study will take place beginning prior to “Spring Break” and end some time in April before students become involved in final exams. On the reverse side of this letter is a parental consent form for your child to participate in the study. The study will be conducted by Mr. Michael Ernst, a doctoral student at the University of Central Florida and an experienced educator currently teaching in the Volusia County School system. I have reviewed this research and feel that it is a very worthwhile endeavor for our students and school. While we hope that you would be willing to allow your child to participate, you should know that your child may withdraw from the study at any time and that no names will ever be solicited by the researcher.

Sincerely,

Bill DelBrugge
Principal

Michael F. Ernst
Principal Research Investigator

APPENDIX D
LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT

PARENTAL CONSENT FORM

The information provided on this form and the accompanying cover letter is presented to you in order to fulfill legal and ethical requirements for the University of Central Florida (institution sponsoring this doctoral dissertation study) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations for the Protection of Human Research Subjects as amended on March 26, 1989. The wording used in this form is utilized for all types of studies and should not be misinterpreted for this particular study.

The dissertation committee at the University of Central Florida and Flagler County Public Schools, have both given approval to conduct a study entitled, **“The Relationship between Adolescent Behavior and Civic Engagement”**. The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not a relationship exists between adolescent behavior and civic engagement. Your child will be involved in this study for approximately 45 minutes and will answer questions from a student questionnaire. Initially, questions will assess student knowledge regarding American citizenship. However, other questions may be sensitive because they address student risk taking behavior and exposure to peer pressure (i.e. towards drugs and sexual activity, things common to “American” youth).

The study is an important one that will help educators understand why some American youth are more likely to engage in mischievous and even illegal activities. Hence, the notion that this type of behavior is causing American youth to become less concerned about or even involved in civic related activities (such as voting) once they graduate. Early recognition and correction of such behavior by educators may help reduce this negative behavior and perhaps redirect some of them toward more productive lives.

There are no foreseeable risks to the students involved in the study. In addition, the parent or researcher may remove the student from the study at any time with just cause. Specific information about individual students will be kept strictly confidential. The results that are published publicly will not reference any individual students since the study will only analyze relationships among groups of data. A copy of study results will be on file at the school.

The purpose of this form is to allow your child to participate in the study, and to allow the researcher to use the information already available at the school or information obtained from the actual study to analyze the outcomes of the study. Parental consent for this research study is strictly voluntary without undue influence or penalty. The parent signature below also assumes that the child understands and agrees to participate cooperatively.


If you have any additional questions, please contact me at (386) 437-2178 or my faculty supervisor, Dr. Barbara A. Murray, at (407) 823-1474. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCFIRB office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 207, Orlando, FL 32826. The hours of operation are 8:00 am until 5:00 pm, Monday through Friday except on University of Central Florida official holidays. The phone number is (407) 823-2901.

Student's Name

Signature of Parent/Guardian

Date

APPENDIX E
SURVEY INSTRUMENT



Relationship Between Adolescent Behavior and Civic Engagement

"Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country."

- *John F. Kennedy*

CIVIC KNOWLEDGE

START HERE.

INSTRUCTIONS: For each of the following questions, circle the answer you believe is correct.

1. What was the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights?

- A. The Bill of Right limited the spread of slavery.
- B. The Bill of Rights limited the power of federal government.
- C. The Bill of Rights established judicial review.
- D. The Bill of Rights allotted specific powers to the states.

2. What document describes the powers of the President of the United States?

- A. The document was the Declaration of Independence.
- B. The document was the Mayflower Compact.
- C. The document was the United States Constitution.
- D. The document was the Articles of the Confederation.

3. Why can Congress pass a bill when the President disagrees with it?

- A. Congress must make sure that the needs of all citizens are met.
- B. Congress can make laws more quickly when it does not have to involve the President.
- C. Congress usually knows more about what the laws mean than the President does.
- D. Congress is the primary legislative power of government.

4. For each state, how is the number of electoral votes allotted?

- A. Electoral votes are allotted based upon the size of each state.
- B. Electoral votes are allotted based upon each state's representation in Congress.
- C. Electoral votes are allotted based upon average income.
- D. Electoral votes are allotted based upon number of years the state has existed.

5. Who was the main writer of the Declaration of Independence?

- A. John Hancock
- B. Benjamin Franklin
- C. Thomas Jefferson
- D. James Monroe

6. Which activity is an example of civil society rather than an example of government?

- A. The sanitation department picking up garbage.
- B. The School Board deciding its yearly budget.
- C. A builder asking the planning board to approve his plans.
- D. Churches joining together to provide food for the homeless.

7. What response to an unjust law is most consistent with the ideas of Martin Luther King, Jr.?

- A. Leaving the country rather than obey the law.
- B. Engaging the police in open battle.
- C. Urging people to carry guns for protection.
- D. Taking part in peaceful demonstrations.

Continue Here.

8. What happens to most of the bills introduced in the House of Representatives?

- A. They become laws.
- B. They are passed but then vetoed by the President.
- C. They are passed by the House but not by the Senate.
- D. They are never sent by committees to the full House.

9. Which would most likely be true in a totalitarian system?

- A. Citizens enjoy great personal freedom.
- B. Political parties compete actively in national elections.
- C. There are a few checks on the powers of the ruler.
- D. Private organizations have great influence on government.

10. Which of the following is true because of the Fourth Amendment?

- A. There are legal limits on the power of police to enter your home.
- B. You have the right to speak to a lawyer before answering police questions.
- C. Police must be certain a crime has been committed before getting a search warrant.
- D. You may never be tried for the same crime twice.

11. Which statement about the making of United States foreign policy is accurate?

- A. State governments have preeminent authority in making foreign policy.
- B. The Senate has more power in setting foreign policy than does the President of the United States.
- C. The Supreme Court dominates foreign policy.
- D. The President and the State Department have the greatest authority.

12. What is the primary purpose of the United Nations?

- A. To give money to governments to explore outer space.
- B. To help countries to develop nuclear weapons.
- C. To promote international peace and security.
- D. To sponsor international events like the Olympic games.

13. Which amendment can you cite to prevent being sentenced to 50 years in prison for stealing?

- A. The First Amendment.
- B. The Fifth Amendment.
- C. The Eighth Amendment.
- D. The Ninth Amendment.

14. Who was the most recent person to serve as Secretary of State?

- A. William Rehnquist.
- B. Gale Norton.
- C. Colin Powell.
- D. Donald Rumsfeld.

15. The Connecticut Compromise settled a major debate between large states and small states about representation in Congress. What was the nature of the compromise?

- A. Population would determine how many seats a state had in Congress.

- B. Congress will have 2 houses and population would determine the number of seats in each house.
- C. Congress will have 2 houses, one in which state representation was based upon population and another in which all states had equal representation.
- D. Congress will have 2 houses in which all states had an equal number of representatives.

Continue Here.

16. In the U.S., who has power to declare war?

- A. Congress.
- B. The President.
- C. The Secretary of Defense.
- D. The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Questions 17-18 refer to the quotation below.

I often wondered whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lives in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it.

- Judge Learned Hand, 1941

17. Which statement best summarizes Judge Hand's argument about constitutional democracy?

- A. Constitutions are a serious obstacle to individual liberties.
- B. Constitutions allow governments to disregard individual liberties.
- C. Individual liberties depend on citizens committed to the protection of those liberties.
- D. Individual liberties are safeguarded by written constitution and an independent judiciary.

18. Based upon the quotation above, what did Judge Hand believe was most important for citizens?

- A. He believed that citizens should vote for candidates who support their views.
- B. He believed that citizens should rely on the courts to safeguard their rights.
- C. He believed that citizens should amend the Constitution whenever necessary.
- D. He believed that citizens should protect their freedoms through political participation.

GO TO PROFILE OF AMERICAN YOUTH.

PROFILE OF AMERICAN YOUTH

Instructions: For each of the following situations, circle the answer you think best.

19. On September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center Buildings were destroyed killing many people. President Bush immediately declared a War on Terrorism. Iraq was attacked and Saddam Hussein was overthrown. Today, the search for Osama Bin Laden continues and there is U.S. involvement in government affairs. Do you support or oppose continued U.S. involvement in Iraq?

Please choose one position or the other, not both.

I support U.S. involvement because:

- A. the U.S. can gain control and security over the oil supply
- B. the U.S. doesn't want the world to see us as weak.
- C. the U.N. has laid down written resolutions which should be upheld.
- D. the situation is extreme enough that society's rights need to be defended.
- E. evil is on the march, and it would be morally wrong to allow it to continue.

I oppose U.S. involvement because:

- A. we'll have more money for domestic issues.
- B. we don't want to appear too militaristic.
- C. war is killing and killing is against the law
- D. war is damaging to people and property and society agrees that is bad.
- E. although atrocities have been committed, it is an even greater atrocity to continue to wage war.

20. A woman is dying from a rare disease. The attending physician tells her husband, Mr. Heinz, that there is a drug that might save her life; however, the drug is expensive and sells for \$5,000. Disappointed, the husband explained to the pharmacist that his wife was dying, and asked him if he could sell it cheaper or let him pay the balance later. Sadly, the pharmacist refused. Desperate, the husband considers stealing the drug. What should Mr. Heinz do?

- A. Heinz should not steal the drug because he might be caught and sent to jail.
- B. It is right for Heinz to steal the drug because it can cure his wife.
- C. Heinz should steal the drug. In doing so, his in-laws will think he is a good husband.
- D. Heinz should steal the drug and be prepared to accept the penalty for breaking the law.
- E. Heinz should steal the drug because everyone has the right to life regardless of the law.
- F. Heinz should steal the drug to save his wife because preserving human life is a higher moral obligation than preserving property.

21. Joe is a 16 year old boy who wants to go to camp. His father promised him he could go if he saved his money. So, Joe did exactly that; however, just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a fishing trip. Joe's father was short of the money he needed. So, he told his son Joe to give him the money he had saved. If you are Joe, what do you do?

- A. I would give Dad the money to avoid both an argument and punishment.
- B. I get mad and call Dad a hypocrite – he should pay his own way, he expects me to pay mine.
- C. I have Mom convince Dad to let me go on the trip – after all, he already agreed.

Continue Here.

22. A group of industrious moles have spent the summer digging a burrow where they will spend the winter. A lazy porcupine who has not prepared a winter shelter approaches the moles and pleads to share their burrow. The moles take pity on the porcupine and agree to let him in. Once the porcupine has moved in, however, the moles find themselves being constantly stabbed by the porcupine's quills. The moles endured this discomfort for as long as they could. Then at last they gathered enough courage to approach their visitor. "Pray leave," they said, "and let us have our cave to ourselves once again." "Oh no!" said the porcupine. "This place suits me very well." What should the moles do?

- A. The porcupine is justified in his response (the moles agreed) and should be allowed to stay.
- B. The moles should throw the porcupine out because it's their cave.
- C. The moles should throw a blanket over the porcupine so the quills don't poke them any more.

Instructions: Place an X in the box to indicate the amount of peer pressure you have experienced to:

	None	Low	Medium	High	Very High
23. Pierce your body					
24. Dress "Cool"					
25. Use Illegal Drugs					
26. Get lower grades					
27. Steal					
28. Get a Tattoo					
29. Wear a Wild Hair Style					
30. Wear Black Make-Up					
31. Skip Class					
32. Have Sex					
33. Drink Alcohol					
34. Listen to Rap or Gangster Music					
35. Smoke Cigarettes					
36. Smoke Marijuana					
37. Join a Gang					
38. Remain Unemployed					

Instructions: Place an X in the box to indicate the frequency with which you would respond to the following statements: **1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree**

	1	2	3	4	5
39. I have to have the best of every product produced					
40. I have played one parent against another to get what I want					
41. I manipulate other people to obtain what I want or need					
42. Illegal drugs help keep me from feeling depressed					
43. I hurt other people's feelings when my feelings are hurt					
44. I get angry when threatened with not getting my own way					
45. When my needs are denied, I feel hurt and rejected					
46. I desire respect and admiration from others					
47. I dream of being rich and famous without doing hard work					
48. I do not enjoy games unless I win at them					
49. I have intentionally blamed others to get them in trouble					

Continue Here.	1	2	3	4	5
50. I like to blame someone else for something I did wrong					
51. When I know who is to blame, I will not be a “squealer”					
52. To protect a friend, I will take the blame					
53. To protect a family member, I will take the blame					
Instructions: Place an X in the box to indicate the frequency you have tried the following:					
	Never	Once	2 Times	3 Times	More Than 3
54. Alcohol					
55. Cigarettes					
56. Marijuana					
57. Ecstasy					
58. Cocaine / “Crack”					
59. Heroin					
60. Selling or distributing illegal drugs					
61. Sexual Intercourse					
62. Sex without protection					
63. Sex with a same sex partner					
64. Sex on school grounds					
65. Sex with an IV drug user					
66. Physically hurting someone in a fight					
67. Threatening someone with a weapon					
68. Becoming a gang member					

GO TO DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Instructions: Please circle the appropriate response

69. Age	15	16	17	18
70. Race	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
71. Gender	Male	Female		
72. I live with one parent or a Guardian	Yes	No		
73. The person with custody is	Mom	Dad	Guardian	Both
74. I have completed or am currently enrolled in U.S. History	Yes	No		
75. I am an appointed/elected member of student government	Yes	No		
76. I play for a school sponsored team sport (e.g. football, etc.)	Yes	No		
77. I am involved in other extracurricular activities (e.g. school clubs, band, Boy/Girl Scouts, etc.)	Yes	No		
78. I am enrolled in an Individualized Education Plan	Yes	No		
79. I take special classes (for example, Honors, AP or IB)	Yes	No		

**** Thank you for your time completing this questionnaire ****

References:

- 1). Civics Knowledge questions were taken from the 1998 NAEP Civics Exam.
- 2). Morality question #19 is based upon an example created by J. K. Shapiro (1995) in *Dr. Kohlberg goes to Washington: Using Congressional debates to teach moral development*. *Teaching of Psychology*, 22(4): 245-247.
- 3). Morality question #20 and #21 are dilemmas created by Lawrence Kohlberg in *Collected Papers on Moral Development and Moral Education*. Cambridge: Moral Education and Research Foundation, Harvard University Education Foundation, 1973.
- 4). Morality question #22 was originally an *Aesop Fable* and was discussed by Carol Gilligan (1982) *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*. Cambridge: Harvard UP.

APPENDIX F
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Summary of Demographic Data

Source	<u>Percent of Respondents Fitting Source Description</u>		
	Entire Group	At Risk Group	Non-At Risk Group
Age, 15	14.4	19.0	13.6
Age, 16	29.6	39.3	27.8
Age, 17	32.3	22.6	34.1
Age, 18	23.6	19.0	24.5
Race, Caucasian	73.7	65.5	75.3
Race, Black	10.6	16.1	9.6
Race, Hispanic	8.5	11.5	7.9
Race, Other	7.2	6.9	7.2
Gender, Male	45.4	44.8	45.5
Gender, Female	54.6	55.2	54.5
1-Parent/Guardian	47.3	50.6	46.7
Had U.S. History	82.4	81.4	82.6
Student Government	9.8	20.7	7.8
Team Sports	37.4	42.5	36.4
Extracurricular	51.9	59.8	50.4
Individualized Education Program	15.6	100.0	0.0
Advanced Classes	54.3	57.5	53.7

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – Civic Knowledge Exam (Entire Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 1	552	1.31	1	1	0.825	0.680	3	0.999
Question 2	552	1.95	2	2	0.801	0.642	3	-1.165
Question 3	546	2.27	3	3	1.196	1.430	3	-1.164
Question 4	547	0.66	1	0	0.744	0.554	3	1.119
Question 5	551	1.57	2	2	0.787	0.620	3	-0.951
Question 6	549	2.38	3	3	0.990	0.980	3	-1.292
Question 7	549	2.71	3	3	0.735	0.540	3	-2.471
Question 8	549	1.72	2	2	1.062	1.128	3	-0.361
Question 9	542	1.69	2	2	0.963	0.928	3	-0.405
Question 10	546	1.16	1	0	1.129	1.276	3	0.439
Question 11	543	1.94	2	3	1.063	1.129	3	-0.419
Question 12	549	1.83	2	2	0.599	0.359	3	-1.502
Question 13	546	1.59	2	2	0.876	0.767	3	-0.065
Question 14	548	2.01	2	2	0.657	0.431	3	-0.940
Question 15	543	1.63	2	2	0.914	0.836	3	-0.457
Question 16	547	0.76	1	1	0.715	0.511	3	0.821
Question 17	540	1.59	2	2	0.862	0.743	3	-0.547
Question 18	546	2.13	3	3	1.152	1.328	4	-0.848

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics – Civic Knowledge Exam (At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 1	86	1.22	1	1	0.803	0.645	3	0.971
Question 2	86	1.95	1	2	0.825	0.680	3	-1.072
Question 3	85	2.28	2	3	1.171	1.372	3	-1.211
Question 4	84	0.57	3	0	0.699	0.489	3	1.473
Question 5	86	1.50	1	2	0.763	0.582	3	-0.813
Question 6	85	2.48	3	3	0.881	0.776	3	-1.549
Question 7	85	2.64	3	3	0.898	0.806	3	-2.238
Question 8	85	1.72	2	2	1.019	1.038	3	-0.302
Question 9	85	1.66	2	2	1.018	1.037	3	-0.306
Question 10	85	1.25	1	0	1.174	1.379	3	0.451
Question 11	84	2.08	2	3	0.996	0.993	3	-0.619
Question 12	85	1.73	2	2	0.746	0.557	3	-1.272
Question 13	85	1.68	2	2	0.876	0.767	3	-0.089
Question 14	84	1.93	2	2	0.708	0.501	3	-0.942
Question 15	84	1.60	2	2	0.880	0.774	3	-0.515
Question 16	85	0.72	1	1	0.648	0.419	3	0.617
Question 17	84	1.64	2	2	0.887	0.787	3	-0.499
Question 18	84	2.10	3	3	1.199	1.437	3	-0.875

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics – Civic Knowledge Exam (Non-At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 1	466	1.33	1	1	0.828	0.686	3	1.006
Question 2	466	1.95	2	2	0.798	0.636	3	-1.188
Question 3	461	2.27	3	3	1.202	1.444	3	-1.160
Question 4	463	0.68	1	0	0.752	0.565	3	1.067
Question 5	465	1.59	2	2	0.792	0.627	3	-0.983
Question 6	464	2.36	3	3	1.008	1.017	3	-1.250
Question 7	464	2.72	3	3	0.701	0.492	3	-2.496
Question 8	464	1.72	2	2	1.071	1.147	3	-0.371
Question 9	457	1.70	2	2	0.954	0.909	3	-0.426
Question 10	461	1.15	1	0	1.122	1.258	3	0.436
Question 11	459	1.92	2	3	1.073	1.152	3	-0.383
Question 12	464	1.84	2	2	0.567	0.321	3	-1.511
Question 13	461	1.57	2	2	0.876	0.767	3	-0.061
Question 14	464	2.02	2	2	0.647	0.419	3	-0.934
Question 15	459	1.63	2	2	0.921	0.849	3	-0.450
Question 16	462	0.76	1	1	0.727	0.529	3	0.841
Question 17	456	1.58	2	2	0.858	0.737	3	-0.561
Question 18	462	2.14	3	3	1.145	1.311	4	-0.844

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics – Moral Judgment (Entire Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 19	540	2.80	3	3	1.281	1.640	5	-0.988
Question 20	546	3.00	3	5	1.847	3.411	5	-0.504
Question 21	528	1.15	1	1	0.683	0.467	4	0.050
Question 22	526	1.34	1	2	0.734	0.539	3	-0.553

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics – Moral Judgment (At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 19	83	2.86	3	3	1.170	1.369	4	-1.116
Question 20	82	2.87	3	3	1.871	3.500	5	-0.392
Question 21	77	1.19	1	1	0.708	0.501	2	-0.298
Question 22	79	1.43	1	2	0.692	0.479	2	-0.815

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics – Moral Judgment (Non-At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 19	457	2.79	3	4	1.301	1.691	5	-0.967
Question 20	464	3.03	3	5	1.844	3.399	5	-0.526
Question 21	451	1.14	1	1	0.679	0.461	4	0.113
Question 22	447	1.33	1	2	0.741	0.549	3	-0.511

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics – Peer Pressure (Entire Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 23	556	0.59	0	0	0.985	0.970	4	1.901
Question 24	555	1.48	1	0	1.326	1.759	4	0.432
Question 25	553	1.09	1	0	1.265	1.600	4	0.917
Question 26	554	0.43	0	0	0.852	0.726	4	2.259
Question 27	554	0.77	0	0	1.104	1.220	4	1.396
Question 28	556	0.69	0	0	1.121	1.257	4	1.679
Question 29	556	0.44	0	0	0.867	0.751	4	2.322
Question 30	553	0.24	0	0	0.758	0.574	4	3.654
Question 31	554	1.35	1	0	1.309	1.713	4	0.704
Question 32	553	1.39	0	0	1.472	1.472	4	0.592
Question 33	555	1.48	0	0	1.409	1.409	4	0.514
Question 34	553	0.97	0	0	1.362	1.362	4	1.180
Question 35	554	0.91	0	0	1.271	1.271	4	1.244
Question 36	554	1.16	0	0	1.417	1.417	4	0.885
Question 37	554	0.30	0	0	0.873	0.873	4	3.189
Question 38	555	0.40	0	0	0.965	0.965	4	2.642

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics – Peer Pressure (At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 23	86	0.80	0	0	1.125	1.266	4	1.568
Question 24	86	1.56	1.5	0	1.394	1.944	4	0.384
Question 25	85	1.20	1	0	1.429	2.043	4	0.891
Question 26	86	0.60	0	0	1.044	1.089	4	1.750
Question 27	86	0.86	0	0	1.276	1.627	4	1.382
Question 28	86	0.76	0	0	1.168	1.363	4	1.583
Question 29	86	0.52	0	0	1.060	1.123	4	2.215
Question 30	85	0.40	0	0	1.049	1.110	4	2.681
Question 31	86	1.45	1	0	1.420	2.015	4	0.639
Question 32	84	1.57	1	0	1.523	2.320	4	0.448
Question 33	86	1.57	1	0	1.499	2.248	4	0.388
Question 34	85	1.25	0	0	1.495	2.236	4	0.768
Question 35	86	0.97	0	0	1.359	1.846	4	1.275
Question 36	86	1.22	0	0	1.590	2.527	4	0.869
Question 37	86	0.40	0	0	1.077	1.160	4	2.796
Question 38	86	0.62	0	0	1.330	1.769	4	2.002

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics – Peer Pressure (Non-At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 23	470	0.55	0	0	0.953	0.909	4	1.976
Question 24	469	1.47	1	0	1.315	1.728	4	0.441
Question 25	468	1.07	1	0	1.233	1.521	4	0.909
Question 26	468	0.40	0	0	0.809	0.655	4	2.375
Question 27	468	0.75	0	0	1.071	1.146	4	1.380
Question 28	470	0.67	0	0	1.113	1.239	4	1.702
Question 29	470	0.42	0	0	0.827	0.684	4	2.302
Question 30	468	0.21	0	0	0.690	0.475	4	3.907
Question 31	468	1.33	1	0	1.288	1.659	4	0.713
Question 32	469	1.36	1	0	1.462	2.137	4	0.620
Question 33	469	1.46	1	0	1.393	1.941	4	0.538
Question 34	468	0.92	0	0	1.332	1.773	5	1.271
Question 35	468	0.90	0	0	1.255	1.575	4	1.237
Question 36	468	1.15	0	0	1.385	1.918	4	0.882
Question 37	468	0.29	0	0	0.830	0.689	4	3.261
Question 38	468	0.36	0	0	0.878	0.771	4	2.740

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics – Cognitive Distortion (Entire Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 39	555	2.57	3	3	1.191	1.419	5	0.303
Question 40	555	2.40	2	1	1.354	1.833	4	0.500
Question 41	553	2.08	2	1	1.200	1.441	4	0.940
Question 42	555	1.60	1	1	1.081	1.167	4	1.760
Question 43	554	2.01	2	1	1.214	1.474	4	0.956
Question 44	556	2.16	2	1	1.245	1.550	4	0.766
Question 45	551	2.74	3	3	1.254	1.573	4	0.139
Question 46	551	3.49	4	4	1.260	1.589	4	-0.587
Question 47	549	2.73	3	1	1.413	1.996	4	0.291
Question 48	553	2.00	2	1	1.133	1.284	5	1.008
Question 49	552	1.82	1	1	1.140	1.300	5	1.240
Question 50	553	1.68	1	1	1.053	1.108	5	1.567
Question 51	553	3.24	3	3	1.299	1.688	5	-0.253
Question 52	554	3.25	3	3	1.187	1.408	4	-0.323
Question 53	555	3.68	4	5	1.238	1.534	4	-0.710

Table 12: Descriptive Statistics – Cognitive Distortion (At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 39	86	2.77	3	3	1.224	1.498	4	0.223
Question 40	86	2.37	2	1	1.464	2.142	4	0.501
Question 41	86	2.19	2	1	1.342	1.800	4	0.788
Question 42	86	1.58	1	1	1.122	1.258	4	2.122
Question 43	85	1.96	1	1	1.219	1.487	4	1.118
Question 44	86	2.17	2	1	1.285	1.652	4	0.789
Question 45	84	2.77	3	1	1.320	1.743	4	0.108
Question 46	86	3.58	4	4	1.222	1.493	4	-0.570
Question 47	84	2.85	3	2	1.435	2.060	4	0.303
Question 48	86	2.20	2	1	1.273	1.619	5	0.635
Question 49	84	1.77	1	1	1.302	1.695	5	1.205
Question 50	86	1.59	1	1	1.078	1.162	5	1.283
Question 51	86	3.29	3	3	1.354	1.832	5	-0.432
Question 52	86	3.43	4	4	1.315	1.730	4	-0.528
Question 53	86	3.97	4	5	1.241	1.540	4	-0.954

Table 13: Descriptive Statistics – Cognitive Distortion (Non-At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 39	469	2.54	3	3	1.183	1.399	5	0.316
Question 40	469	2.41	2	1	1.334	1.780	4	0.503
Question 41	467	2.06	2	1	1.173	1.376	4	0.969
Question 42	469	1.61	1	1	1.074	1.153	4	1.694
Question 43	469	2.02	2	1	1.214	1.474	4	0.930
Question 44	470	2.16	2	1	1.239	1.534	4	0.764
Question 45	467	2.73	3	3	1.243	1.546	4	0.144
Question 46	465	3.48	4	4	1.268	1.608	4	-0.589
Question 47	465	2.71	3	1	1.409	1.986	4	0.289
Question 48	467	1.97	2	1	1.103	1.218	5	1.088
Question 49	468	1.82	1	1	1.110	1.233	4	1.256
Question 50	467	1.70	1	1	1.048	1.099	4	1.634
Question 51	467	3.23	3	3	1.290	1.664	4	-0.219
Question 52	468	3.22	3	3	1.160	1.345	4	-0.296
Question 53	469	3.62	4	5	1.232	1.518	4	-0.684

Table 14: Descriptive Statistics – Risk Taking (Entire Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 54	555	2.70	4	4	1.650	2.721	5	-0.666
Question 55	554	1.61	1	0	1.809	3.272	4	0.427
Question 56	554	1.52	0	0	1.801	3.245	5	0.530
Question 57	554	0.19	0	0	0.744	0.553	4	4.398
Question 58	554	0.25	0	0	0.884	0.781	4	3.681
Question 59	553	0.09	0	0	0.551	0.303	4	6.377
Question 60	555	0.53	0	0	1.243	1.546	4	2.207
Question 61	551	1.58	0	0	1.837	3.375	4	0.456
Question 62	554	0.98	0	0	1.610	2.593	4	1.208
Question 63	551	0.81	0	0	1.519	2.308	4	1.499
Question 64	553	0.30	0	0	0.959	0.920	4	3.342
Question 65	552	0.11	0	0	0.608	0.370	4	5.768
Question 66	552	1.08	0	0	1.424	2.028	4	1.116
Question 67	554	0.55	0	0	1.175	1.380	4	2.180
Question 68	553	0.22	0	0	0.814	0.663	4	4.069

Table 15: Descriptive Statistics – Risk Taking (At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 54	86	2.48	4	4	1.767	3.123	4	-0.445
Question 55	86	1.56	0	0	1.819	3.308	4	0.469
Question 56	86	1.58	0	0	1.888	3.564	4	0.456
Question 57	86	0.24	0	0	0.945	0.893	4	3.773
Question 58	86	0.37	0	0	1.128	1.272	4	2.847
Question 59	86	0.17	0	0	0.800	0.640	4	4.474
Question 60	86	0.51	0	0	1.263	1.594	4	2.325
Question 61	85	1.48	0	0	1.817	3.300	4	0.554
Question 62	86	0.91	0	0	1.562	2.438	4	1.373
Question 63	86	0.76	0	0	1.447	2.093	4	1.610
Question 64	86	0.42	0	0	1.132	1.282	4	2.697
Question 65	86	0.23	0	0	0.903	0.816	4	3.833
Question 66	85	1.38	1	0	1.558	2.428	4	0.816
Question 67	86	0.47	0	0	1.081	1.169	4	2.578
Question 68	85	0.31	0	0	0.976	0.953	4	3.357

Table 16: Descriptive Statistics – Risk Taking (Non-At Risk Group)

Source	N	M	Mdn	Mode	SD	Variance	Range	Skewness
Question 54	469	2.75	4	4	1.626	2.643	5	-0.709
Question 55	468	1.62	1	0	1.809	3.272	4	0.421
Question 56	468	1.51	0	0	1.787	3.193	5	0.546
Question 57	468	0.18	0	0	0.701	0.492	4	4.533
Question 58	468	0.23	0	0	0.831	0.691	4	3.912
Question 59	467	0.07	0	0	0.491	0.241	4	7.053
Question 60	469	0.53	0	0	1.241	1.540	4	2.192
Question 61	466	1.60	0	0	1.842	3.394	4	0.440
Question 62	468	1.00	0	0	1.620	2.625	4	1.184
Question 63	465	0.82	0	0	1.534	2.352	4	1.483
Question 64	467	0.28	0	0	0.923	0.853	4	3.514
Question 65	466	0.09	0	0	0.535	0.286	4	6.518
Question 66	467	1.03	0	0	1.393	1.941	4	1.179
Question 67	468	0.56	0	0	1.192	1.420	4	2.124
Question 68	468	0.20	0	0	0.781	0.611	4	4.257

Table 17: Overview of Civic Knowledge Exam

Question Number	NAEP Question Grade Level	<u>Percent of Respondents Answering Questions Correctly</u>			
		Entire Group	On this Survey		On the 1998 NAEP Exam
			At Risk	Non-At Risk	
1	12	68	66	68	65
2	8	68	64	69	48
4	8	43	44	43	35
6	8	67	69	67	52
7	12	84	85	84	71
8	8	28	26	28	31
9	8	45	39	46	21
10	12	38	34	39	52
11	4	43	46	42	45
12	8	78	73	79	69
13	8	39	39	39	58
15	12	51	54	50	55
17	12	55	52	56	69
18	12	56	57	56	59

Table 22

Factor Analysis for Peer Pressure – Communalities and Eigenvalues

Source	Communalities		Factor	Total	Initial Eigenvalues	
	Initial	Extraction			% of Variance	Cumulative %
Question 23	0.370	0.377	1	6.334	39.586	39.586
Question 24	0.379	0.444	2	1.685	10.529	50.115
Question 25	0.614	0.660	3	1.060	6.623	56.738
Question 26	0.290	0.328	4	0.918	5.735	62.473
Question 27	0.422	0.402	5	0.768	4.800	67.273
Question 28	0.402	0.413	6	0.709	4.434	71.706
Question 29	0.323	0.367	7	0.675	4.220	75.926
Question 30	0.307	0.378	8	0.601	3.757	79.683
Question 31	0.451	0.454	9	0.550	3.437	83.120
Question 32	0.510	0.568	10	0.502	3.137	86.257
Question 33	0.627	0.691	11	0.482	3.010	89.267
Question 34	0.346	0.328	12	0.440	2.748	92.015
Question 35	0.605	0.640	13	0.425	2.655	94.670
Question 36	0.710	0.827	14	0.376	2.348	97.019
Question 37	0.338	0.328	15	0.275	1.720	98.739
Question 38	0.249	0.274	16	0.202	1.261	100.000

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood

Table 23

Factor Analysis for Peer Pressure – Factor and Structure Matrices

Source	<u>Factor Matrix</u>			<u>Structure Matrix</u>		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Question 23	0.483	0.379	0.008	0.369	0.560	0.552
Question 24	0.482	0.381	-0.258	0.353	0.454	0.654
Question 25	0.785	-0.201	0.059	0.813	0.388	0.548
Question 26	0.391	0.392	0.149	0.265	0.566	0.427
Question 27	0.628	0.051	0.076	0.597	0.462	0.513
Question 28	0.556	0.323	0.007	0.454	0.569	0.590
Question 29	0.431	0.381	0.189	0.329	0.601	0.441
Question 30	0.365	0.426	0.251	0.258	0.614	0.381
Question 31	0.644	0.127	-0.152	0.580	0.431	0.644
Question 32	0.703	0.122	-0.241	0.634	0.429	0.726
Question 33	0.796	-0.015	-0.241	0.758	0.397	0.747
Question 34	0.467	0.323	-0.082	0.363	0.476	0.550
Question 35	0.760	-0.238	0.074	0.799	0.353	0.506
Question 36	0.847	-0.318	0.093	0.904	0.363	0.539
Question 37	0.498	0.171	0.224	0.450	0.518	0.398
Question 38	0.304	0.347	0.248	0.218	0.522	0.299

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 3 factors extracted. 5 iterations required.
Rotation method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization

Table 24
 Factor Correlation and Covariance Matrices for Peer Pressure

Factor	<u>Factor Correlations</u>			<u>Factor Score Covariance</u>		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
1	1.000	0.464	0.675	1.867	1.564	2.316
2	0.464	1.000	0.642	1.564	1.456	1.717
3	0.675	0.642	1.000	2.316	1.717	2.833

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 25

Factor Analysis for Cognitive Distortion – Communalities and Eigenvalues

Source	<u>Communalities</u>		Factor	Total	<u>Initial Eigenvalues</u>	
	Initial	Extraction			% of Variance	Cumulative %
Question 39	0.219	0.272	1	4.098	34.153	34.153
Question 40	0.293	0.332	2	1.263	10.525	44.677
Question 41	0.432	0.581	3	1.044	8.703	53.381
Question 42	0.224	0.271	4	0.939	7.826	61.207
Question 43	0.469	0.701	5	0.900	7.500	68.707
Question 44	0.484	0.551	6	0.763	6.360	75.067
Question 45	0.468	0.674	7	0.707	5.894	80.962
Question 46	0.254	0.387	8	0.557	4.644	85.606
Question 47	0.210	0.212	9	0.488	4.065	89.670
Question 48	0.287	0.260	10	0.465	3.873	93.543
Question 50	0.355	0.418	11	0.391	3.256	96.799
Question 52	0.042	0.040	12	0.384	3.201	100.000

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood

Table 26

Factor Analysis for Cognitive Distortion – Factor and Structure Matrices

Source	<u>Factor Matrix</u>			<u>Structure Matrix</u>		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Question 39	0.415	0.211	0.236	0.510	0.290	0.267
Question 40	0.480	0.304	0.098	0.573	0.401	0.217
Question 41	0.641	0.410	0.048	0.746	0.567	0.259
Question 42	0.449	0.103	-0.242	0.367	0.506	0.196
Question 43	0.750	-0.175	-0.327	0.473	0.821	0.553
Question 44	0.740	-0.024	-0.061	0.602	0.707	0.547
Question 45	0.713	-0.361	0.189	0.488	0.591	0.803
Question 46	0.438	-0.302	0.323	0.316	0.285	0.608
Question 47	0.392	0.150	0.190	0.451	0.287	0.270
Question 48	0.461	0.177	0.126	0.506	0.375	0.285
Question 50	0.580	0.284	-0.027	0.617	0.542	0.261
Question 52	0.079	-0.182	0.024	-0.010	0.067	0.172

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 3 factors extracted. 6 iterations required.
Rotation method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization

Table 27

Factor Correlation and Covariance Matrices for Cognitive Distortion

Factor	<u>Factor Correlations</u>			<u>Factor Score Covariance</u>		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
1	1.000	0.679	0.456	1.703	1.777	2.089
2	0.679	1.000	0.572	1.777	1.791	1.914
3	0.456	0.572	1.000	2.089	1.914	2.609

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 28

Factor Analysis for Risk Taking – Communalities and Eigenvalues

Source	<u>Communalities</u>		Factor	Total	<u>Initial Eigenvalues</u>	
	Initial	Extraction			% of Variance	Cumulative %
Question 54	0.400	0.427	1	5.481	36.537	36.537
Question 55	0.543	0.673	2	2.305	15.367	51.904
Question 56	0.591	0.713	3	1.373	9.153	61.057
Question 57	0.526	0.566	4	1.085	7.236	68.292
Question 58	0.496	0.511	5	0.754	5.025	73.317
Question 59	0.694	0.842	6	0.685	4.565	77.882
Question 60	0.473	0.444	7	0.519	3.458	81.340
Question 61	0.596	0.762	8	0.488	3.253	84.593
Question 62	0.576	0.672	9	0.444	2.961	87.554
Question 63	0.399	0.461	10	0.402	2.679	90.233
Question 64	0.379	0.376	11	0.392	2.616	92.849
Question 65	0.620	0.641	12	0.294	1.960	94.810
Question 66	0.380	0.517	13	0.290	1.931	96.740
Question 67	0.406	0.518	14	0.276	1.843	98.584
Question 68	0.473	0.489	15	0.212	1.416	100.000

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood

Table 29

Factor Analysis for Risk Taking – Factor and Structure Matrices

Source	<u>Factor Matrix</u>				<u>Structure Matrix</u>			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Question 54	0.429	0.416	0.251	0.084	0.159	0.628	0.377	0.351
Question 55	0.494	0.478	0.426	-0.137	0.210	0.819	0.369	0.244
Question 56	0.567	0.513	0.352	-0.066	0.246	0.839	0.474	0.341
Question 57	0.666	-0.271	0.098	-0.199	0.729	0.311	0.310	0.346
Question 58	0.651	-0.189	0.186	-0.129	0.672	0.387	0.292	0.384
Question 59	0.734	-0.530	0.009	-0.147	0.911	0.144	0.282	0.441
Question 60	0.624	0.150	0.163	0.080	0.458	0.540	0.438	0.495
Question 61	0.579	0.512	-0.404	-0.043	0.231	0.471	0.864	0.340
Question 62	0.634	0.356	-0.378	0.019	0.352	0.415	0.817	0.431
Question 63	0.454	0.327	-0.355	-0.149	0.229	0.320	0.665	0.187
Question 64	0.535	-0.054	-0.219	0.198	0.462	0.160	0.469	0.513
Question 65	0.637	-0.464	-0.107	0.097	0.768	0.038	0.296	0.537
Question 66	0.487	0.126	0.139	0.495	0.313	0.380	0.330	0.692
Question 67	0.526	-0.140	0.130	0.453	0.484	0.242	0.240	0.702
Question 68	0.574	-0.355	-0.036	0.178	0.654	0.091	0.264	0.547

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 3 factors extracted. 5 iterations required.
Rotation method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization

Table 30

Summary of Factor Correlation and Covariance Matrices for Risk Taking

Factor	<u>Factor Correlations</u>				<u>Factor Score Covariance</u>			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1	1.000	0.240	0.373	0.566	1.627	1.145	2.323	1.508
2	0.240	1.000	0.481	0.328	1.145	1.312	1.316	1.155
3	0.373	0.481	1.000	0.455	2.323	1.316	3.087	2.162
4	0.566	0.328	0.455	1.000	1.508	1.155	2.162	1.641

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 31

Inferential Statistics – Civic Knowledge (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

Question	Levene's Test		t	At Risk			Non-At Risk			Effect Size
	F	p		N	M	SD	N	M	SD	
1	1.234	0.267	-1.132	86	1.22	0.803	466	1.33	0.828	0.13
2	0.249	0.618	0.030	86	1.95	0.825	466	1.95	0.798	0.00
3	0.324	0.569	0.110	85	2.28	1.171	461	2.27	1.202	0.01
4	0.748	0.388	-1.210	84	0.57	0.699	463	0.68	0.752	0.15
5	0.016	0.899	-0.943	86	1.50	0.763	465	1.59	0.792	0.11
6	5.073	0.025	1.115	85	2.48	0.881	464	2.36	1.008	0.12
7	5.302	0.022	-0.823	85	2.64	0.898	464	2.72	0.701	0.17
8	0.572	0.450	-0.035	85	1.72	1.019	464	1.72	1.071	0.00
9	1.481	0.224	-0.325	85	1.66	1.018	457	1.70	0.954	0.04
10	0.269	0.604	0.730	85	1.25	1.174	461	1.15	1.122	0.09
11	2.650	0.104	1.335	84	2.08	0.996	459	1.92	1.073	0.15
12	12.093	0.001	-1.356	85	1.73	0.746	464	1.84	0.567	0.19
13	0.057	0.811	1.082	85	1.68	0.876	461	1.57	0.876	0.13
14	1.468	0.226	-1.194	84	1.93	0.708	464	2.02	0.647	0.14
15	0.320	0.572	-0.337	84	1.60	0.880	459	1.63	0.921	0.03
16	0.763	0.383	-0.524	85	0.72	0.648	462	0.76	0.727	0.06
17	0.015	0.902	0.624	84	1.64	0.887	456	1.58	0.858	0.07
18	0.314	0.575	-0.301	84	2.10	1.199	462	2.14	1.145	0.03

Table 32

Inferential Statistics – Moral Judgment (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

Question	<u>Levene's Test</u>		t	<u>At Risk</u>			<u>Non-At Risk</u>			Effect Size
	F	p		N	M	SD	N	M	SD	
19	1.706	0.192	0.414	83	2.86	1.170	457	2.79	1.301	0.05
20	0.767	0.382	-0.723	82	2.87	1.871	464	3.03	1.844	0.09
21	2.761	0.097	0.601	77	1.19	0.708	451	1.14	0.679	0.07
22	0.736	0.391	1.134	79	1.43	0.692	447	1.33	0.741	0.13

Table 33

Inferential Statistics – Peer Pressure (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

Question	Levene's Test		t	At Risk			Non-At Risk			Effect Size
	F	p		N	M	SD	N	M	SD	
23	2.761	0.097	2.164*	86	0.80	1.125	470	0.55	0.953	0.26
24	0.736	0.391	0.586	86	1.56	1.394	469	1.47	1.315	0.07
25	5.019	0.025	0.758	85	1.20	1.429	468	1.07	1.233	0.11
26	12.632	0.000	1.765	86	0.60	1.044	468	0.40	0.809	0.25
27	2.893	0.090	0.836	86	0.86	1.276	468	0.75	1.071	0.08
28	0.259	0.611	0.618	86	0.76	1.168	470	0.67	1.113	0.08
29	4.780	0.029	0.829	86	0.52	1.060	470	0.42	0.827	0.12
30	16.314	0.000	1.595	85	0.40	1.049	468	0.21	0.690	0.28
31	2.504	0.114	0.824	86	1.45	1.420	468	1.33	1.288	0.09
32	0.311	0.577	1.211	84	1.57	1.523	469	1.36	1.462	0.14
33	2.080	0.150	0.673	86	1.57	1.499	469	1.46	1.393	0.08
34	6.633	0.010	1.880	85	1.25	1.495	468	0.92	1.332	0.25
35	0.416	0.519	0.425	86	0.97	1.359	468	0.90	1.255	0.06
36	5.903	0.015	0.390	86	1.22	1.590	468	1.15	1.385	0.05
37	4.861	0.028	0.892	86	0.40	1.077	468	0.29	0.830	0.13
38	20.787	0.000	1.689	86	0.62	1.330	469	0.36	0.878	0.30

Note. * $p < 0.05$.

Table 34

Inferential Statistics – Cognitive Distortion (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

Question	Levene's Test		t	At Risk			Non-At Risk			Effect Size
	F	p		N	M	SD	N	M	SD	
39	0.052	0.820	1.665	86	2.77	1.224	469	2.54	1.183	0.19
40	4.309	0.038	-0.207	86	2.37	1.464	469	2.41	1.334	0.03
41	6.799	0.009	0.802	86	2.19	1.342	467	2.06	1.173	0.11
42	0.151	0.697	-0.207	86	1.58	1.122	469	1.61	1.074	0.03
43	0.068	0.795	-0.395	85	1.96	1.219	469	2.02	1.214	0.05
44	0.319	0.573	0.131	86	2.17	1.285	470	2.16	1.239	0.01
45	0.801	0.371	0.308	84	2.77	1.320	467	2.73	1.243	0.03
46	0.265	0.607	0.702	86	3.58	1.222	465	3.48	1.268	0.08
47	0.008	0.927	0.796	84	2.85	1.435	465	2.71	1.409	0.13
48	4.805	0.029	1.584	86	2.20	1.273	467	1.97	1.103	0.21
49	3.049	0.081	-0.377	84	1.77	1.302	468	1.82	1.110	0.05
50	0.230	0.631	-0.868	86	1.59	1.078	467	1.70	1.048	0.11
51	0.211	0.646	0.376	86	3.29	1.354	467	3.23	1.290	0.05
52	4.992	0.026	1.386	86	3.43	1.315	468	3.22	1.160	0.18
53	0.000	0.998	2.368*	86	3.97	1.241	469	3.62	1.232	0.28

Note. * $p < 0.05$.

Table 35

Inferential Statistics – Risk Taking (At Risk vs. Non-At Risk)

Question	Levene's Test		t	At Risk			Non-At Risk			Effect Size
	F	p		N	M	SD	N	M	SD	
54	5.762	0.017	-1.316	86	2.48	1.767	469	2.75	1.626	0.17
55	0.009	0.924	-0.310	86	1.56	1.819	468	1.62	1.809	0.03
56	3.215	0.074	0.344	86	1.58	1.888	468	1.51	1.787	0.04
57	2.905	0.089	0.790	86	0.24	0.945	468	0.18	0.701	0.09
58	8.108	0.005	1.125	86	0.37	1.128	468	0.23	0.831	0.17
59	9.487	0.002	1.115	86	0.17	0.800	467	0.07	0.491	0.20
60	0.036	0.849	-0.132	86	0.51	1.263	469	0.53	1.241	0.02
61	0.520	0.471	-0.527	85	1.48	1.817	466	1.60	1.842	0.07
62	0.866	0.352	-0.469	86	0.91	1.562	468	1.00	1.620	0.06
63	0.676	0.411	-0.344	86	0.76	1.447	465	0.82	1.534	0.04
64	5.413	0.020	1.101	86	0.42	1.132	467	0.28	0.926	0.15
65	15.159	0.000	1.396	86	0.23	0.903	466	0.09	0.535	0.26
66	4.477	0.035	1.927	85	1.38	1.558	467	1.03	1.393	0.25
67	1.889	0.170	-0.702	86	0.47	1.081	468	0.56	1.192	0.08
68	4.212	0.041	0.939	85	0.31	0.976	468	0.20	0.781	0.14

Table 51

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	12.331	1	12.331	0.027	0.869
Residual	250793.63	551	455.161		
Total	250805.96	552			

Table 52

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	52.364	1.347	
Gender	-0.300	1.822	-0.007

Note. $R^2 = 0.000$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.002$ for the Entire Group.

Table 53

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	482.648	1	482.648	0.920	0.340
Residual	44606.773	85	524.786		
Total	45089.420	86			

Table 54

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	47.704	3.668	
Gender	4.736	4.939	0.103

Note. $R^2 = 0.011$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 55

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Gender, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 465$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	174.327	1	174.327	0.394	0.530
Residual	205175.84	464	442.189		
Total	205350.17	465			

Table 56

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Gender, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 465$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	53.222	1.444	
Gender	-1.228	1.956	-0.029

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 57

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	4940.075	3	1646.692	3.673	0.012
Residual	247483.59	552	448.340		
Total	252423.67	555			

Table 58

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	53.805	1.046	
Black	-8.496	2.948	-0.123**
Hispanic	-5.218	3.261	-0.068
Other	-5.049	3.507	-0.061

Note. $R^2 = 0.020$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.014$ for the Entire Group. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 59

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Race, At-Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	4940.075	3	1646.692	3.673	0.012
Residual	247483.59	552	448.340		
Total	252423.67	555			

Table 60

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	56.628	2.800	
Black	-22.882	6.305	-0.369**
Hispanic	-20.005	7.247	-0.280**
Other	-4.776	9.072	-0.053

Note. $R^2 = 0.178$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.148$ for the At Risk Group. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 61

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 468$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	1476.258	3	492.086	1.113	0.343
Residual	205530.47	465	442.001		
Total	207006.73	468			

Table 62

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($N = 468$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	53.349	1.119	
Black	-4.443	3.328	-0.062
Hispanic	-1.529	3.633	-0.020
Other	-5.140	3.775	-0.063

Note. $R^2 = 0.007$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.001$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 63

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	18152.220	3	6050.740	14.398	0.000
Residual	222313.60	529	420.253		
Total	240465.82	532			

Table 64

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	55.023	1.536	
Age 15	-11.748	2.811	-0.194**
Age 16	-7.352	2.259	-0.158**
Age 17	4.847	2.404	0.097*

Note. $R^2 = 0.075$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.070$ for the Entire Group. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 65

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	3420.614	3	1140.205	2.340	0.080
Residual	38979.077	80	487.238		
Total	42399.691	83			

Table 66

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	51.347	3.842	
Age 15	-8.638	6.724	-0.151
Age 16	-4.563	6.357	-0.085
Age 18	10.792	6.724	0.189

Note. $R^2 = 0.081$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.046$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 67

ANOVA: Civic Knowledge based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	16600.855	3	5533.618	13.588	0.000
Residual	181220.17	445	407.236		
Total	197821	448			

Table 68

Linear Regression: Civic Knowledge based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	56.046	1.631	
Age 15	-12.622	3.056	-0.206**
Age 16	-9.345	2.433	-0.200**
Age 18	3.494	2.523	0.072

Note. $R^2 = 0.084$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.078$ for the Non-At Risk Group. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 69

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	0.693	1	0.693	0.294	0.588
Residual	1295.807	551	2.352		
Total	1296.499	552			

Table 70

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	5.167	0.097	
Gender	0.071	0.131	0.023

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the Entire Group.

Table 71

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	0.117	1	0.117	0.044	0.834
Residual	223.814	85	2.633		
Total	223.931	86			

Table 72

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	5.282	0.260	
Gender	-0.074	0.350	-0.023

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.011$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 73

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Gender, Non-At Risk ($n = 465$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	1.107	1	1.107	0.479	0.489
Residual	1071.333	464	2.309		
Total	1072.440	465			

Table 74

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Gender, Non-At Risk ($n = 465$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	5.146	0.104	
Gender	0.098	0.141	0.032

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 75

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	17.887	1	17.887	0.532	0.466
Residual	18539.068	551	33.646		
Total	18556.995	552			

Table 76

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	6.992	0.366	
Gender	-0.361	0.495	-0.031

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the Entire Group.

Table 77

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	33.535	1	33.535	0.668	0.416
Residual	4269.402	85	50.228		
Total	4302.937	86			

Table 78

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	8.436	1.135	
Gender	-1.248	1.528	-0.088

Note. $R^2 = 0.008$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.004$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 79

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Gender, Non-At Risk ($n = 465$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	4.660	1	4.660	0.153	0.696
Residual	14155.716	464	30.508		
Total	14160.376	465			

Table 80

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Gender, Non-At Risk ($n = 465$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	6.726	0.379	
Gender	-0.201	0.514	-0.018

Note. $R^2 = 0.000$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.002$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 81

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	7.924	1	7.924	0.283	0.595
Residual	15424.199	551	27.993		
Total	15432.123	552			

Table 82

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	14.012	0.334	
Gender	-0.240	0.452	-0.023

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the Entire Group.

Table 83

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	107.539	1	107.539	3.393	0.069
Residual	2694.415	85	31.699		
Total	2801.954	86			

Table 84

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Gender, At-Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	15.590	0.902	
Gender	-2.236	1.214	-0.196

Note. $R^2 = 0.038$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.027$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 85

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Gender, Non-At Risk ($n = 465$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	1.914	1	1.914	0.070	0.791
Residual	12604.895	464	27.166		
Total	12606.809	465			

Table 86

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Gender, Non-At Risk ($n = 465$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	13.722	0.358	
Gender	0.129	0.485	0.012

Note. $R^2 = 0.000$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.002$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 87

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	18.232	1	18.232	0.574	0.449
Residual	17507.989	551	31.775		
Total	17526.221	552			

Table 88

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Gender, Entire Group ($N = 552$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	6.424	0.356	
Gender	-0.365	0.481	-0.032

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the Entire Group.

Table 89

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Gender, At Risk ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	226.268	1	226.268	4.758	0.032
Residual	4042.479	85	47.559		
Total	4268.747	86			

Table 90

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Gender, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	8.128	1.104	
Gender	-3.243	1.487	-0.230*

Note. $R^2 = 0.053$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.042$ for the At Risk Group. * $p < 0.05$.

Table 91

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Gender, Non-At Risk ($n = 465$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	3.365	1	3.365	0.118	0.732
Residual	13252.768	464	28.562		
Total	13256.133	465			

Table 92

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Gender, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 465$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	6.111	0.367	
Gender	0.171	0.497	0.016

Note. $R^2 = 0.000$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.002$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 93

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	7.464	3	2.488	1.057	0.367
Residual	1298.916	552	2.353		
Total	1306.379	555			

Table 94

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	5.249	0.076	
Black	-0.011	0.214	-0.002
Hispanic	-0.419	0.236	-0.076
Other	-0.024	0.254	-0.004

Note. $R^2 = 0.006$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.000$ for the Entire Group.

Table 95

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	9.746	3	3.249	1.259	0.294
Residual	214.185	83	2.581		
Total	223.931	86			

Table 96

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	5.421	0.213	
Black	-0.707	0.479	-0.162
Hispanic	-0.721	0.551	-0.143
Other	0.246	0.689	0.039

Note. $R^2 = 0.044$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.009$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 97

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 468$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	6.196	3	2.065	0.892	0.445
Residual	1076.154	465	2.314		
Total	1082.350	468			

Table 98

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 468$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	5.221	0.081	
Black	0.179	0.241	0.035
Hispanic	-0.356	0.263	-0.063
Other	-0.074	0.273	-0.013

Note. $R^2 = 0.006$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.001$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 99

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	113.581	3	37.860	1.120	0.340
Residual	18652.651	552	33.791		
Total	18766.232	555			

Table 100

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	6.552	0.287	
Black	1.295	0.809	0.069
Hispanic	0.799	0.895	0.038
Other	0.735	0.963	0.033

Note. $R^2 = 0.006$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.001$ for the Entire Group.

Table 101

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	168.985	3	56.328	1.131	0.341
Residual	4133.951	83	49.807		
Total	4302.937	86			

Table 102

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	6.904	0.935	
Black	3.382	2.105	0.177
Hispanic	0.596	2.420	0.027
Other	3.346	3.029	0.121

Note. $R^2 = 0.039$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.005$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 103

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 468$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	33.585	3	11.195	0.363	0.780
Residual	4339.181	465	30.837		
Total	14372.767	468			

Table 104

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Race, Non-At Risk ($n = 468$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	6.496	0.296	
Black	0.593	0.879	0.032
Hispanic	0.815	0.960	0.040
Other	0.269	0.997	0.013

Note. $R^2 = 0.002$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.004$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 105

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	31.167	3	10.389	0.366	0.777
Residual	15650.142	552	28.352		
Total	15681.309	555			

Table 106

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	13.717	0.263	
Black	0.537	0.741	0.031
Hispanic	0.283	0.820	0.015
Other	0.708	0.882	0.034

Note. $R^2 = 0.002$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.003$ for the Entire Group.

Table 107

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	149.548	3	49.849	1.560	0.205
Residual	2652.406	83	31.957		
Total	2801.954	86			

Table 108

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	13.684	0.749	
Black	3.102	1.686	0.201
Hispanic	-0.284	1.938	-0.016
Other	2.982	2.426	0.133

Note. $R^2 = 0.053$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.019$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 109

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 468$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	12.811	3	4.270	0.155	0.927
Residual	12839.991	465	27.613		
Total	12852.802	468			

Table 110

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 468$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	13.722	0.280	
Black	-0.256	0.832	-0.014
Hispanic	0.440	0.908	0.023
Other	0.307	0.944	0.015

Note. $R^2 = 0.001$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.005$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 111

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	107.329	3	35.776	1.124	0.339
Residual	17575.223	552	31.839		
Total	17682.552	555			

Table 112

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Race, Entire Group ($N = 555$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	6.005	0.279	
Black	1.241	0.786	0.068
Hispanic	0.963	0.869	0.048
Other	0.183	0.935	0.008

Note. $R^2 = 0.006$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.001$ for the Entire Group.

Table 113

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	156.014	3	52.005	1.050	0.375
Residual	4112.733	83	49.551		
Total	4268.747	86			

Table 114

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Race, At Risk Group ($n = 86$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	5.526	0.932	
Black	2.367	2.100	0.124
Hispanic	1.024	2.413	0.047
Other	4.557	3.021	0.165

Note. $R^2 = 0.037$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.002$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 115

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Race, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 468$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	82.317	3	27.439	0.957	0.413
Residual	13330.285	465	28.667		
Total	13412.602	468			

Table 116

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Race, Non-At Risk ($n = 468$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	6.082	0.285	
Black	0.962	0.848	0.053
Hispanic	0.999	0.925	0.050
Other	-0.582	0.961	-0.028

Note. $R^2 = 0.006$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.000$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 117

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	3.265	3	1.088	0.469	0.704
Residual	1227.027	529	2.320		
Total	1230.293	532			

Table 118

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	5.215	0.116	
Age 15	-0.124	0.209	0.552
Age 16	0.057	0.168	0.017
Age 18	0.126	0.179	0.035

Note. $R^2 = 0.003$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.003$ for the Entire Group.

Table 119

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	10.549	3	3.516	1.332	0.270
Residual	211.201	80	2.640		
Total	221.750	83			

Table 120

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	4.939	0.283	
Age 15	0.873	0.495	0.211
Age 17	0.113	0.468	0.029
Age 18	0.623	0.495	0.151

Note. $R^2 = 0.048$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.012$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 121

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	9.309	3	3.103	1.382	0.248
Residual	999.230	445	2.245		
Total	1008.539	448			

Table 122

Linear Regression: Moral Judgment based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	5.235	0.121	
Age 15	-0.334	0.227	-0.076
Age 17	0.125	0.181	0.037
Age 18	0.074	0.187	0.021

Note. $R^2 = 0.009$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.003$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 123

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	131.586	3	43.862	1.355	0.256
Residual	17128.318	529	32.379		
Total	17259.904	532			

Table 124

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	7.110	0.434	
Age 15	0.097	0.780	0.006
Age 16	-0.383	0.627	-0.031
Age 18	-1.222	0.667	-0.091

Note. $R^2 = 0.008$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.002$ for the Entire Group.

Table 125

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	26.920	3	8.973	0.199	0.897
Residual	3604.151	80	45.052		
Total	3631.071	83			

Table 126

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Age, At Risk Group ($N = 83$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	7.697	1.168	
Age 15	-1.416	2.045	-0.085
Age 17	-0.144	1.933	-0.009
Age 18	0.178	2.045	0.011

Note. $R^2 = 0.007$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.030$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 127

ANOVA: Peer Pressure based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	187.915	3	62.638	2.082	0.102
Residual	13391.182	445	30.093		
Total	13579.097	448			

Table 128

Linear Regression: Peer Pressure based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	7.056	0.443	
Age 15	0.395	0.831	0.025
Age 16	-0.584	0.661	-0.048
Age 18	-1.456	0.686	-0.114*

Note. $R^2 = 0.009$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.003$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 129

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	59.422	3	19.807	0.712	0.545
Residual	14714.049	529	27.815		
Total	14773.471	532			

Table 130

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Variable	B	$SE B$	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	14.017	0.402	
Age 15	-0.381	0.723	-0.025
Age 16	0.134	0.581	0.012
Age 18	-0.708	0.618	-0.057

Note. $R^2 = 0.004$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.002$ for the Entire Group.

Table 131

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	64.887	3	21.629	0.732	0.536
Residual	2362.351	80	29.529		
Total	2427.238	83			

Table 132

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	15.152	0.946	
Age 15	-2.277	1.655	-0.166
Age 17	-1.520	1.565	-0.118
Age 18	-0.714	1.655	-0.052

Note. $R^2 = 0.027$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.010$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 133

ANOVA: Cognitive Distortion based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	58.210	3	19.403	0.704	0.550
Residual	12271.812	445	27.577		
Total	12330.022	448			

Table 134

Linear Regression: Cognitive Distortion based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	14.065	0.425	
Age 15	-0.229	0.795	-0.015
Age 16	-0.177	0.633	-0.015
Age 18	-0.920	0.656	-0.075

Note. $R^2 = 0.005$; $\Delta R^2 = -0.002$ for the Non-At Risk Group.

Table 135

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	245.488	3	81.829	2.653	0.048
Residual	16315.896	529	30.843		
Total	16561.385	532			

Table 136

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Age, Entire Group ($N = 532$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Entire Group			
Intercept	6.773	0.423	
Age 15	-1.923	0.761	-0.121*
Age 16	-1.011	0.612	-0.083
Age 18	-0.178	0.651	-0.014

Note. $R^2 = 0.015$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.009$ for the Entire Group.

Table 137

ANOVA: Moral Judgment based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	165.569	3	55.190	1.262	0.293
Residual	3498.919	80	43.736		
Total	3664.488	83			

Table 138

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Age, At Risk Group ($n = 83$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
At Risk Group			
Intercept	5.197	1.151	
Age 15	-0.853	2.015	-0.051
Age 17	2.987	1.905	0.189
Age 18	1.584	2.015	0.094

Note. $R^2 = 0.045$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.009$ for the At Risk Group.

Table 139

ANOVA: Risk Taking based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Regression	139.604	3	46.535	1.623	0.183
Residual	12755.284	445	28.664		
Total	12894.888	448			

Table 140

Linear Regression: Risk Taking based upon Age, Non-At Risk Group ($n = 448$)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Non-At Risk Group			
Intercept	6.598	0.433	
Age 15	-1.614	0.811	-0.103*
Age 16	-0.686	0.645	-0.057
Age 18	-0.030	0.669	-0.002

Note. $R^2 = 0.011$; $\Delta R^2 = 0.004$ for the Non-At Risk Group. * $p < 0.05$.

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