

HOLY BOOKS OR POCKET BOOKS? CLASS  
AND VALUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

by

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## ABSTRACT

There has been much speculation recently as to the political effect that “moral values” have on Americans and much research has shown inconclusive results as far as the effect of class. This paper aims to study how class and values, including moral values and postmaterialist values, interact with politics in the United States. The analyses performed to determine these effects include crosstabulation and logistical regressions and will include data from the National Election Studies (NES). It is found that postmaterialist values have little effect on political behavior but in separate analyses, class and moral values have increasing influences on vote choice and partisan identification. It is also determined that moral values currently has more influence on presidential votes, but there is no clear indication that values are consistent indicators of House vote choice or partisan identification.

For Amanda, without whom none of my achievements would be possible.

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The presidential election of 2004 elicited many remarks from the media about a strong and growing political division among Americans: values. It was widely cited in the days following the election that a plurality of American voters, 22 percent, chose “moral values” as the most important issue in that particular election. Shortly after this statistic arose, the article would read something like “Among the 22 percent who cited it as their top issue, Mr. Bush won by 79 percent to 18 percent” (Mulligan 2004). The conclusion many reporters drew from these facts was that there was a new and growing constituency in the American electorate made up of individuals whose traditional Christian values compelled them to vote for a conservative Christian Republican president over a moderate Christian Democratic challenger (Feldmann 2004; Mooney and Mishra 2004).

The “values divide” has been studied by social scientists for years now, with an extensive body of literature being written after the historically narrow presidential victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 general election. Countless books, editorial articles, and blog entries have been penned on the divisive nature of moral values. Other scholars have suggested that values issues like abortion have an intense effect on political behavior and the effect may be growing (Abramowitz 1995). Coupled with the exit poll data from the past two presidential elections cited earlier, it would seem as though moral values are a strong motivator for political behavior at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

As the moral values issue was supposedly growing, social class was said to be declining as a relevant political cleavage (Clark and Lipset 2001). Although some vehemently claim that

there is an enduring relationship between class and political behavior, most insist that other cleavages render class nearly meaningless when voters decide for whom to vote or with whom to identify. One of the most ardent promoters of the latter view is Ronald Inglehart, whose hypothesis about postmaterialism has fundamentally changed the debate about the relationship between class and politics. Inglehart's postmaterialist hypothesis states that as economic and physical well-being increases, intangible cultural values gain importance at the expense of material economic issues. Thus, according to Inglehart, decades of recovery from two world wars and unprecedented economic growth should render the United States ripe for a transition from materialist to postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1990).

There is, however, a body of literature which reaffirms the significance of class in the minds of the electorate (see Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). For example, there is evidence that occupational realignments have been occurring so that upper class occupations and lower class occupations have been changing in political behavior while overall political behavior has not changed much at all. Others suggest that the political disparity between upper and lower income earners has been growing since the 1950s (Stonecash et al 2000). Also, some authors have felt compelled to write pieces dismissing the values hypothesis outright. Morris Fiorina (2005), for example, discusses how pundits and scholars have greatly exaggerated the values divide. He suggests that most Americans more or less agree with each other on major issues while the outer fringes of the left and right have become the most outspoken, raising specters of a new silent majority.

So which is more important to Americans: class or culture? This will be the main research question of my thesis. Much talk is heard from the media, books, and politicians in

general about a new “culture war” that is taking place in America’s ballot boxes. And, when politicians discuss increasing entitlement programs or another tax cut for the rich, there is much talk about “class warfare.” Which of these “wars” is attracting the attention of American voters? Do individuals vote their pocketbooks or their holy books? This discussion will attempt to empirically test hypotheses offered by myself and other scholars of political behavior as well as the pundits who continue the use of the culture war metaphor. Hopefully, a new understanding might be realized by taking some different approaches to the class and values discussion.

It is widely understood and accepted that the United States is not a monolithic bloc. Certain states and regions have distinctive traits independent of other states and regions, the most glaring example of which is probably the eleven states of the old confederacy. For nearly a century, the southern United States gave an overwhelming percentage of its electoral votes and House and Senate seats to the Democratic party. During the mid- to late-20<sup>th</sup> century, the south gradually shifted parties; presently it is Republican at all levels with few exceptions. As the South drifted toward the Republicans, the rest of the country, especially the Northeast and West, moved even more slowly toward the Democrats. Does this change reflect a shift from class politics to values politics and cut across class lines? Or have class issues been exacerbated in these regions? Is class becoming more important in some areas while cultural values make gains in others? Are the same cultural issues salient in all regions or do separate regions hold different cultural values?

The way minorities view these conflicts might have an effect on their political behavior that would divide them from the rest of the country. For example, African-American voters have historically voted for the Democratic party overwhelmingly, especially since the Democrats

pushed through the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s. Minority groups tend to act in unison politically, decreasing any class effect. What racial, ethnic, and gender-related differences are there in terms of class- or values-based political behavior?

When discussing how cultural differences are changing politics, one cannot overlook the undeniable influence of evangelical Christians. These individuals, mostly southerners and those with lower incomes, are now considered to be a formidable force in modern American politics due to both increasing numbers and political activity (see Appendix A). Where and how is this rise influencing class and values politics? Is the effect really that of evangelical Christians or do they simply have more conservative moral values than those with other religious preferences?

Answers to these questions are all essential contributions required to determine the course that American politics has taken, and may provide a forecast of where it is headed. A nationwide shift from class- to values-based preferences could indeed signal a new politics, the kind that was discussed by the media as if it was fact. A lack of such a shift would provide an interesting puzzle as to why Americans are electing such obtrusively religious and culturally conservative candidates. A decline in both values- and class-based cleavages would present the possibility of starting from scratch; if neither cultural issues nor class issues are relevant to understanding political behavior, what is? An increase in both could signal an increasingly divisive nation. From the results, it should be possible to conclude whether the political “culture wars” and “class wars” are real, who is winning, and why.

Following this brief introduction, Chapter 2 consists of a broad literature review which seeks to ascertain what researchers have uncovered to date as well as introduce more concepts that concern the questions raised here. Chapter 3 contains empirical tests as to the importance of

class in American politics, looking in-depth to discover trends in the nation as a whole and in specific regions. Chapter 4 is a similar exposition on values and politics. Chapter 5 is a discussion which seeks to relate the previous two chapters and answer more questions raised in this introduction along with a conclusion of this paper.

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The topic of this thesis is concerned with several important and well-researched themes in political science. Some of these themes form the basis of what political scientists believe to be true of American politics. The central question that this thesis seeks to answer is whether underlying shifts have occurred which have realigned the electorate from class-based to values-based political cleavages. One assumption on which this research lies is that realignments in the bases of partisan attachment and political behavior can and do occur. Another is that “class” and “values” are measurable and relatively exclusive concepts which can be tested against each other. Hence, this thesis relies on the invaluable research social scientists have previously performed on these topics. From this research, one can determine unanswered hypotheses concerning these issues and how to best analyze the available data. The previous literature on these topics is discussed at length below.

### Realignment

Any discussion of shifts in the cleavages of the American electorate must begin with the original realignment hypotheses offered by V. O. Key Jr. In the 1950s, Key authored three articles defining this term which would provide political scientists with decades of intense study (Key 1952, 1955, 1959). Realignment was introduced as “an orientation for an attempt to formulate a concept of one type of election – based on American experience – which might be built into a more general theory of elections” (Key 1955: 3). Thus, the original concept of realignment was one of shifting voter cleavages; that is, members of a particular voter cleavage may shift their partisan attachments en masse from one major political party to another. When

such realignments occurred, the “alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate” would “persist for several succeeding elections” (Key 1955: 4).

Key also wrote that there were two types of realignment which were known to take place in American politics. Critical realignment, the more familiar topic, was said to be a sharp and immediate change in the electorate (Key 1955). In one election cycle, individual cleavages within the electorate would shift determinedly from either nonalignment to alignment with another party or from one alignment to another. The most obvious example and perhaps the only one of its kind is the realignment of 1932 following the Great Depression. Following the stock market crash and the inability of Republicans to effectively control the situation, former Republicans and independents overwhelmingly supported the charismatic and optimistic Democratic candidate, Franklin Roosevelt. The mostly class-based cleavages which were created during that critical election are said by some to be in existence today, while most believe that they have long been demolished (see Clark and Lipset 2001). The other type of realignment noted by Key was secular realignment, during which elections “may mark only steps in a more or less continuous creation of new party loyalties and the decay of old” (1959: 198). Such realignments might be missed under the proverbial radar until the cleavages which were being created by the realignment became more powerful. These realignments could be based upon lines of religion, class, gender, ethnicity, race, or myriad other group characteristics and can be noticed only by looking at the behavior of such groups over time.

Not long after Key wrote this series, political scientists attempted to add to the original hypotheses. Consistent with Key’s original idea, *The American Voter* (1960) incorporated the concept of realignment into a more broad theory of electoral classification. In addition to

realigning elections, Converse et al. identified two additional types of elections: deviating and maintaining. Deviating elections were said to consist of voters electing a non-majority party president in spite of his minority status due to peculiar circumstances of that election such as the character of the candidate or salient issue. These are not realigning elections because the majority party rises to power once again after the issue loses salience or candidate becomes ineligible for reelection. Maintaining elections were said to be those which took place after realignments and kept the majority party in power. Realigning elections, then, were elections in which either the majority party lost or the majority party was revitalized due to substantial, durable shifts in the electorate.

Gerald Pomper revamped this classification system in the 1960s which left the maintaining and deviating elections to their former definitions but divided the Converse et al. definition of a realigning election into two types: realigning and converting (1967). The difference between a realigning and converting election was said to be that in a realigning election, the majority party changes, while a converting election maintains the status quo of the majority party but significantly alters the underlying cleavages which make up the electoral base for the parties. Under this classification system, the 1932 election remains a realigning one while the 1896 election, in which the electoral cleavages were significantly and durably changed, was a converting one, as the Republican Party remained the majority party. Significant evidence for such a classification of elections was offered through aggregate data; the percentage of the vote of each state that went to the Democratic party was analyzed using correlation statistics which revealed that several series of presidential elections resulted in changes in bases of state support. Some of these changes resulted in a majority party change while others did not. Those



that caused a change in the majority party were dubbed realigning elections while those which resulted in no change were called converting elections.

Some scholars attempted to expand the concept of realignment again in the 1970s by adding new elements. For example, Walter Dean Burnham's book on critical elections provided evidence that realigning elections took place every thirty years or so (1970). Such a periodic event was enticing for political scientists and caused many to expect that a realignment had recently occurred or that one soon would (Lawrence and Fleisher 1987). But no consensus emerged in the coming years concerning such a periodic realignment, which caused many to question the validity of the concept itself. Some have proposed the alternate hypothesis of "dealignment" which posited that since individuals were increasingly identifying as neither Democratic nor Republican and the national government was consistently divided, neither party could be considered the "majority party" in the United States (Norpoth and Rusk 1982). Others insisted that the idea of realignment was far too simplistic to support a real theory about partisan change. Picking up on the dealignment hypothesis, Ladd (1990) contested that electoral cycles picked up by realignment scholars were really changes in the political parties themselves rather than in the electorate. David Mayhew, treating realignment as a mature genre consisting of a literature canon developed by ten or so authors, argued that realignment is a poor theoretical construct through which political shifts might be generalized (2002). To evidence this claim, he arbitrarily determined fifteen points which he believes the canon implies are attributes of realignment. Since all of these points are not seen in the electoral pattern of national realignment, he says, the concept itself is largely bunk. Carmines and Stimson (1981) criticized critical realignment as "plausible" but "problematic both theoretically and empirically" (107).

Key's idea of secular realignment, however, was expanded to produce "issue evolution" through which "normal partisan change" causes cleavages to separate and new identities to arise, usually through additions to the electorate.

Despite these criticisms, realignment remains a relevant framework through which to study electoral shifts for at least two reasons. One is that despite the lack of consensus on which party is the "majority party" in American politics today and in previous years, the original concept of realignment does not rely on such a consensus. The idea is, in its most simplistic form, one through which we may study shifting electoral cleavages. Secondly, realignment does not necessarily rely *only* on shifts in the electorate but can also determine shifts in the party platforms. Whether or not the parties have changed their platforms to accommodate such shifts is hardly irrelevant, but contrary to Mayhew's suggestions it seems impractical as a device through which all electoral cleavage shifts might be measured. In short, neither the people nor the parties are static, but realignment measures shifts in the cleavages of the people, regardless of party movement. Realignment, then, is a relevant and useful tool with which we might understand how cleavages change in the American electorate when used within its proper context. In this paper, I attempt to examine how cleavages based on class and values have shifted individuals' support for candidates and for partisan identification through a realignment perspective.

### Class

Study of the relationship between class and politics goes back centuries. Economic conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, two dichotomous classes, was the basis of Marx's theories on society in general and politics in particular. These notions of class conflict

formed the basis for many revolutions, wars, political party platforms, and citizen movements. Ideological differentiation alone between Marxist nations and liberal capitalist democracies has led to international conflicts. Needless to say, then, the combination of class with politics has a long and often violent history. Within the United States, this combination has not been nearly as volatile. Perhaps as an example of American exceptionalism, or perhaps as a by-product of relatively stable two-party democracy, the United States has not succumbed to all-out class war in the literal sense. But this does not mean that there is no class conflict, nor does it mean that social scientists have not strived to understand the full relationship between class and politics in the United States. In order to achieve this, though, scholars need an understanding of precisely what class is and how it can best be measured.

### *Class Measurement*

Conceptualization and operationalization of social class has been a hotly debated topic in the social sciences for quite some time. In the 1950s, as the biannual National Election Studies (NES) began in earnest, political scientists were inspired to write volumes on the bases of political behavior. Some of the first quantitative studies of class and its relationship to political behavior gave the impression of a huge gap between working class and middle class individuals (Eulau 1955, 1955a). Most of these studies were based on the following NES question: “There’s quite a bit of talk these days about four different social classes. If you were asked to use one of these four names for your social class, which would you say you belonged in - the middle class, lower class, working class or upper class?” Soon after these studies, the authors of *The American Voter* identified both objective (i.e. an indicator such as income or occupation) and subjective (i.e. feelings of belonging to a specific social class as above) forms of measuring

social class, utilizing both in their studies which found links between “status polarization” and individual, political, and economic circumstances. Soon thereafter, the Alford index of class voting was created, which is a dichotomization of individuals computed by “subtract[ing] the percentage of persons in nonmanual occupations voting for ‘Left’ parties from the percentage of persons in manual occupations voting for ‘Left’ parties” (Alford 1962: 422). The 1990s saw a revitalization of the study of class politics after decades of study which suggested that, according to the Alford index, class politics had been declining in nearly every advanced industrial society in the world for decades (Clark and Lipset 1991). It was then that the validity of the Alford index was seriously questioned, and class politics was brought back under the microscope. The resumption of intense study on the subject led to two debates: one on how to best conceptualize social class and one on how to best operationalize it.

As many social scientists can no doubt attest, many diverse definitions of class have been realized, not all of which may be covered in this review. Pakulski (1993) noted that the concept of social class falls into Sartori’s definition of a “conceptually stretched” concept (Sartori 1970). That is, the concept of class has become so loaded and come to mean so many different things to different people that the very idea is almost unrecognizable in any objective sense. According to Sartori, the “net result of conceptual straining is that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision” (1035). This point seems self-evident by the simple fact that many scholars are seemingly talking past each other. Social theorists have taken advantage of the situation by debating the validity of Marxist (e.g. relationship to the means of production) and gender-related (e.g. women’s relationship to the workplace) themes (Pakulski

1993). Predictably, no consensus on the true definition of class has emerged from these discussions.

Difficulties in agreeing upon a proper conceptualization of class have mirrored a lack of consensus in operationalizing class. Further difficulties have arisen due to the limits of available survey data. While conceptualizations are constrained only by imagination, empirical operationalization requires survey data. When long-term trends are to be studied, the limits of the data are readily apparent. Hout, Brooks, and Manza first brought the Alford index under scrutiny in the 1990s. They wrote that “[b]y lumping together all persons employed in non-manual occupations in one 'class', and all persons working in manual occupations into the other 'class', the Alford Index creates artificially high levels of cross-class voting among both groups” (1993: 265). Through writing extensively on class voting and political behavior these authors decided that the best indicator for class analysis is occupation. Rather than Alford’s simple classification, however, occupation is divided into non-dichotomous categories such as managers, semi-skilled workers, and professionals. Defenders of the decline of class hypothesis continued to reluctantly incorporate the Alford index along with logistic regressions to further their point (Clark 2003, Clark and Lipset 1997). Stonecash et al. (2000) broke with the tradition set by previous scholars by invoking relative household income as the proper indicator of social class in America. This was done because the “relative income situation of voters [...] reflects the relative level of resources people have to live their lives” (731). Cited in this approach are studies that show that individuals in low-income families have fewer opportunities to attend good schools and colleges, have less access to health care, and have fewer prospects for retirement savings (738). Regardless of what collar these individuals wear to work, their income

appears to be a proper indicator of how many resources are available to the individual and therefore, their relative social class.

### *Trends in Class Politics*

Most scholars have concluded that American class politics has been declining since the 1950s (Inglehart 1971, 1977, Clark and Lipset 1991, Clark, Lipset, and Rempel 1993, Clark 1996, 2001, Nieuwbeerta 2001, Lipset 2001; see also Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Most such studies base their findings on the Alford index although some studies have derived similar conclusions with a different operationalization of social class. For example, subjective identification as part of a social class has been a part the National Election Studies (NES), for decades. Respondents to the survey usually are asked whether they identify as someone in the “working class” or in the “middle class.” Heinz Eulau (1955, 1955a) pointed out that individuals differed in their political behavior based on their self-identified class. Lipset argued that individuals in the working class were more likely to support an authoritarian government – be it right (Fascist) or left (Communist) – than were middle class individuals in a variety of countries (1959). This was said to be due to a variety of social and psychological reasons, including that working class individuals grew up in more authoritarian homes. Other studies using these data suggest that the middle and working class identifiers have become less stratified over the years in terms of political behavior (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1999, Nelson 2005).

Many studies that provide evidence of a decline in class politics since the 1950s rely on objective information which creates class stratification. As mentioned above, the Alford index has been remarkably adept at promoting the declining significance of class hypothesis. Using the Alford index, Clark and Lipset (1991) infamously declared the “death of class” as a

stratification system on which people based their political and social decisions. They provided evidence to the effect that some social groups, including and especially social class, are fragmenting as hierarchical social stratification in general becomes less and less commonplace (Clark and Lipset 1991). This is a recurring theme in the “decline of class” literature: to fill the void left by the declining significance of class, other social cleavages such as race or moral values have taken its place (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990: 260 Abramson 1978, Clark, Lipset, and Rempel 1993, Clark 2003).

Ronald Inglehart is widely praised as the originator of the hypothesis of postmaterialism, which suggests that “material” or economic interests decline as a nation gains economic and physical security (1990). This, he posits, is due to the fact that most people in such advanced societies in effect take living for granted and focus their attention less on bread-and-butter issues and more on abstract ones, such as environmentalism and the promotion of free speech. Thus, class interests ought to decline and “values” issues such as those mentioned above should become more salient as postmaterialism rises. Furthermore, as ideology change is rare in individual persons, generational change is considered to be the ultimate harbinger of postmaterialist change. Other researchers have found either no change in class politics or something termed “trendless fluctuation,” in which class voting moves very little and erratically from one election to the next (Goldthorpe 2001).

Fewer scholars have suggested that class politics has been on the rise since the 1950s (Stonecash et al. 2000, Brooks and Brady 1999, Hout, Brooks and Manza 1993, 1997, Weakliem 1991). The evidence for this view is also based on an objective view of social class, but rather than the Alford index, class is operationalized sometimes as an index based on income,

occupation, and education (Guterbock 1980), and other times as just one of those variables (Stonecash et al 2000, Brooks and Brady 1999, Brooks and Manza 1993, 1997). These studies argue that individuals behave differently in the political arena whether or not they identify with a predetermined class and should be studied based on more objective independent variables. From such an operationalization, strikingly different results come clear.

Weakliem (1991), for example, determined that despite an increase of importance attached to “values” in several Western democracies, social class is as salient a cleavage as ever. Pakulski (1993) suggested that the significance of class is not really declining, but the Marxist basis of class stratification that persists in studies of class politics is becoming outmoded, thereby giving false impressions of a lessening importance of class. Evans (1993) found that “among older people, class interests are rooted more in present class position and possessions” because “[i]f you are older, what you have now is of greater importance for your political interests than what you might obtain in the future” (272). Thus, older individuals engage in class politics more than younger people due to their limited prospects for upward mobility. Stonecash, et al. found an increase of the difference in percentage voting Democrat between the top third and bottom third income earners from the 1950s through the 1990s. All of this evidence directly opposed that of previous research, which held that class had been a declining factor in vote choice and partisan identification. Still others have performed in-depth case studies in specific areas that have led to differing conclusions. Guterbock (1980), for instance, seized an opportunity to investigate changes in class voting in “Middletown,” made famous by sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd. By replicating the methods used in the 1930s – including analysis of aggregate data – he determined that class voting persisted, at least in 1980, at nearly the same levels.



No consensus has emerged concerning the trends of class politics. The results of any analysis rest on how “class” is measured and how substantial an increase or decrease is required for the author to make a determination. One quality required by almost all social scientists concerning the measurement of social class is relative access to resources. The theory of class interests requires that those in higher social classes have access to resources that those in the lower classes do not. While occupation may have provided an approximation of access to resources in previous decades, both manual and non-manual occupations have similar tiers of income that provide stratified access. The rise of the service sector in America in the past twenty years and the substantial decline in manual occupations presents a conundrum of where to place rapidly shifting sections of the economy in time-series analyses. Furthermore, Marxist ideologies have never proven to be very popular in the United States, especially not in the slice of time this paper is concerned with (1952-2004). Therefore, neither occupation nor subjective identification with a particular class seem appropriate for this analysis.

A more apposite measure of social class considering the context of the time in American politics is relative family income. Relative income appears to me to be the most approximate and consistent indicator of individuals’ access to resources during this time in American history for several reasons. First, it is by nature consistent. An individual who was in the lower third of household income in 1952 has the same relative access to resources as a similar individual in the 1990s. A blue-collar worker in the 1950s had decidedly less access to resources than a white-collar worker, but by the 2000s, a mechanic might make as much as or more than an executive assistant, providing more, or at least more equal, access. Secondly, by separating individuals into tiers of income, one can virtually identify how likely that person is to have access to health

care, proper education, a sanitary environment, and even quality food or shelter or a working automobile or mass transit. Third, rather than an indicator which is presumed to be a means through which resources might be required or expected such as education, income is based solely on the resources the individual has at the time the political behavior was noted. It is not that one is objectively better or more important, but which one provides the most access to goods and services through a higher income.

### Values

As briefly discussed above, Ronald Inglehart's postmaterialism hypothesis points to "values" as the leading cause in the supposed decline in class politics. As part of his original work, Inglehart developed a series of survey questions that were designed to ascertain which goals respondents from many countries believed should be on the national agenda. Included were "maintain order in the nation," "give people more say in the decisions of the government," "fight rising prices," and "protect freedom of speech" (1990: 74). The first and third of these were deemed "materialist" goals; that is, they were concerned with economic and physical security. The second and fourth were "postmaterialist" goals in that they did not concern security but were more abstract goals which ought to be desired by those in a more secure economic and physical environment in their formative years. The interviewer would ask which of the four goals ought to be highest in priority and then which should be second. Identifying both materialist goals to both questions would identify the respondent as a materialist, both postmaterialist answers as a postmaterialist, and one of each as "mixed." Later, eight more questions were added to the four-item battery including materialist goals such as "strong defense

forces” and “fight against crime” as well as postmaterialist goals like “a friendlier, less impersonal society” and to “make our cities and countryside more beautiful” (75).

Inglehart’s decades-long analysis of his postmaterialism hypothesis has led to several conclusions. First, postmaterialism is on the rise. From the 1970s until the present day, postmaterialism has steadily increased in many countries while materialism has fallen (Inglehart 1990: Chapter 2, Inglehart and Abramson 1999). Secondly, the changes in these countries’ postmaterialist scores are due mainly to generational replacement (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and Inglehart 1992). Younger cohorts are more likely to be postmaterialist than their predecessors in almost every country, and period effects are visible and relatively equal in all cohorts. Third, the rise in salience of these values is directly related to the decline in significance of social class as a political cleavage. Inglehart’s long-ranging studies have influenced many social scientists and convinced many that postmaterialism is a valid and sensible framework through which we might understand recent political trends. Evidence from decades of work suggests that materialism is decreasing while postmaterialism is increasing in most Western democracies. Noticeably absent in most of these studies, however, is analysis of the United States and its voters’ adherence to postmaterialist values. Carmines and Layman (1997) identified this problem and noted that Americans have a peculiar relationship to postmaterialism: it is on the rise, but only influences voters indirectly, through more traditional issue orientations.

But there are problems with Inglehart’s analysis. For example, it relies on a decline in class politics as it is something that should happen if economic issues become less salient – an assumption at the heart of postmaterialism. The reality of this assumption, as noted above, has come under scrutiny. Brown and Carmines (1995) found that there was very little difference in

how materialists and postmaterialists voted in the presidential elections from 1976 to 1992. In essence, both economic and non-economic issues mattered to both materialists and postmaterialists in determining their presidential vote choice. The validity of the postmaterialist index itself has also come under fire. Davis and Davenport (1999) found that the American respondents answers to the goals in the index “approximate a random response in the aggregate” and that their “second choices [are] increasingly related only randomly to their first” (662). Furthermore, the individual responses to the postmaterialism index failed to properly predict other conceivably linked variables (656). Clarke et al. (1999) noted evidence suggesting that Inglehart’s index was actually a measurement artifact. By controlling for interactions with unemployment and inflation concerns, Clarke et al. determined that the supposed value shifts that had taken place in Germany and Canada were false: the relationship was spurious. Inglehart attempted to explain away Davis and Davenport’s critiques by simply saying that the postmaterialist index was not designed to predict responses to other questions (1999). While Inglehart admitted that there were period effects to the postmaterialist hypothesis, he provided evidence that postmaterialism was still a significant variable despite inflation and unemployment variation. Proponents of the persisting salience of class hypothesis have also assaulted Inglehart’s postmaterialism methods. Brooks and Manza (1994), for example, suggested that although it is quite probable that values have changed in Western democracies in recent decades, the postmaterialism scale is a poor indicator of such change. Furthermore, they suggest that dichotomizing individuals into materialism/postmaterialist terms is similar to the counterproductive nature of dichotomizing class into the working/middle class framework.

Despite these problems, Inglehart has led the way to the present discussion of values in politics. The fixation of the media on “values” responses to exit polls during the last two presidential elections has armed supporters of the values hypothesis with evidence that values are important in the minds of Americans – especially considering that Inglehart’s predictions have come true concerning the increase of postmaterialists and the decrease in materialists (Carmines and Layman 1997). But it seems as though not everything has worked out the way Inglehart imagined. Inglehart’s version of “values” issues were those concerning the environment or free speech; what is inferred from the “values” voters in the 2004 election is values such as anti-choice, anti-gay, pro-gun, and pro-war: the ironically named “culture of life” agenda. Thus, as Carmines and Layman (1997a) suggested, Inglehart’s measurement scale of postmaterialism is invalid in how it measures the United States’ version of “values.” Moral conservatism, they suggest, has a much greater significant influence on political choices – and the evidence they provide is very convincing. In fact, they determined that “[i]n 1992, [moral conservatism] had the strongest influence on the probability of voting for George Bush than any variable in the model except partisanship,” outstripping even race and family income (764). Abramowitz (1995) provides similar evidence concerning Americans’ attitudes toward abortion, suggesting in the title of the article that “It’s Abortion, Stupid.”

Moral values have been studied at length in the past few years. Kauffman (2002) offers an indication of a gender gap in the culture war: “[t]he defense of traditional lifestyles and the rejection of liberal moral values appear to play a more significant role in the political beliefs of men than of women” (303). Several authors have suggested that the culture wars began in the 1960s with the baby boomer generation and were exacerbated by the Clinton administration

(White 2002, Weisberg 2005, Knuckey 2005). Fiorina's (2005) new book disagrees with the values argument altogether, suggesting that the close recent presidential elections have less to do with polarized values and more to do with the outrage of those on the fringes toward the increased movement of the parties toward the middle.

Again, the academic community is split on the relationship between values and political behavior. Inglehart's postmaterialist hypothesis is compelling to social scientists because it explains how values can cross class lines and the supposed decrease in class politics. But it is less compelling in the American case because of both intuition and evidence that point to traditional moral values rather than enlightened liberal values as the cause of the value shift. Still, such an increase in values could theoretically cross class lines and decrease the salience of class or, as Inglehart predicted, temporarily reverse class cleavages. This thesis will proceed with the assumption that both the moral values and postmaterialism hypotheses are valid arguments for changes in voter cleavages. Therefore, both moral conservatism and postmaterialist values will be operationalized to determine the length and breadth of the values shift in American politics and its relationship to the decrease or increase in class political behavior.

## CHAPTER THREE: CLASS

As discussed in the literature review, the effects of social class on electoral decisions are well researched. Despite an exceptionally large volume of work dedicated to determining these effects, a consensus has not been reached among researchers and, so long as class is a divisive and salient concept, it is not likely that such a consensus will emerge. This chapter represents a humble exposition on the subject which attempts two things. The first is to add an element of clarity to the debate of whether or not class, as a concept, matters in the political decision-making process of American individuals. The second is to raise new questions as to which, if any, Americans allow their individual class status to have a bearing on their political decisions.

There are several ways in which these goals may be met. In this paper, quantitative analyses will be performed as information for the past half-century regarding the income, political behavior, and several other potentially meaningful variables are readily available from the National Election Studies (NES). This type of study will allow an empirical determination of whether or not individuals in different classes behave differently and the degree at which that level is apparent. A quantitative study is also desirable because it looks beyond the individual and can uncover biases that some individuals might prefer to hide.

### Data

The quantitative data in the chapter covering class, and the next chapter on values, will be derived from the NES. Since 1952, the NES has been performed biannually on a random sample of the American population. Respondents are asked scores of questions concerning their personal information such as income level, occupation, age, and religion as well as their

particular feelings toward parties, candidates, morality, politics in general, and other topics. These biannual surveys are available individually or as a cumulative data file which has data from all the years the studies were performed. Unfortunately, all questions were not asked every year, so time series analysis of the data is impossible in some instances.

### *Dependent Variables*

The dependent variables in this and the next chapter will be the same: the party of presidential vote choice, the party of House of Representatives vote choice, and the party with which the individual identifies. In an attempt to raise the number of cases available in spite of the controls necessary to perform these evaluations, the dependent variables (presidential and House elections and partisan identification) will be grouped by decades. For example, the presidential elections of 1972 and 1976 will be combined into elections that took place in the 1970s. The goal here is to ascertain trends in the electorate, not to study the characteristics of individual elections. Although some decades have three presidential elections and others only two, the numbers in each decade are similar (usually between 2500 and 3000), and the goal of studying trends can be most easily discussed in a generic framework of decades. For the presidential vote choice variable, those who voted Democratic are coded as Democratic while those who voted for any other candidate (Republicans and third-party candidates such as Perot or Wallace) are coded as “not Democratic.” In House elections, third party candidates are not included in the original data set and therefore cannot be used. Thus, individuals who did not vote Republican are Democratic voters. For the partisan identification variable, the seven-point



party ID scale was employed despite its supposed shortcomings<sup>1</sup>. Strong Democrats, weak Democrats, and independents leaning Democratic were all included as Democratic, as independents are often more partisan than weak supporters (Dennis 1992). “Pure” independents and all Republicans were coded as “not Democratic.” For the regions, I have deferred to Charles Bullock’s (1988) definition of six regions<sup>2</sup> rather than use the standard four NES regions, though the names of the regions have been slightly changed in order to be more precise. Since the elections are to be grouped into decades rather than individual elections, a closer look at more specific regions is both possible and warranted.

#### *Independent Variables*

Class has been an intriguing yet elusive variable for political scientists for some time. The NES contains many variables which are related to an individual’s social class. For example, since the inception of the NES, respondents’ occupation, level of education, and relative income level have all been reported. As was covered in the literature review, all of these variables have been used extensively to measure the social class of respondents. It was also noted in the

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<sup>1</sup> The NES Party ID scale is notorious for not capturing the essence of “independence.” In this instance though, independents are grouped in with Republicans as they are not Democratic identifiers. Thus, the scale is more useful for this purpose.

<sup>2</sup> The regions are defined as follows. Northeast: CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; North Central: IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI; Border South: DC, DE, KY, MD, OK, WV; Solid South: AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA; Pacific West: AK, CA, HI, OR, WA; Mountain West: AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY

literature review that in this paper, family income would be used to measure social class. This is done because it is a consistent indicator of relative access to resources. Those in the lowest income bracket have less access to resources than those in the middle, who have less access than those in the highest bracket.

In the NES, income is coded so that those whose family income is in the 0 to 16th percentile are in the lowest bracket, then those in the 17th to 33rd percentile, the 34th through 67th percentile, the 68th through the 95th percentile, and finally the 96th through 100th percentile. In this paper, the variable is recoded into thirds, so that the 0 through 33rd, 34th through 67th and 68th through 100th percentiles are represented along a scale from the lowest to highest third income level. Although the income brackets prescribed by the NES do trace income from the lowest to highest levels, the recode is necessary for comparison between income groups of the same relative size and access to resources. Other independent variables will act as controls in the regression analyses. These will consist of variables that are known to be influential on vote choice and partisan identification. The age and education of the respondent are ordinal variables while dummy variables will control for race (African-Americans are coded as 1), and for the sex of the respondent (females are coded as 1).

### Method

Class and behavior will be analyzed on a national scale first with crosstabulations along with statistics for the nominal variables included. Percentages of individuals in each income bracket that voted for or identified with the Democratic party are displayed. Also, the differences in the Democratic vote or identification between low- and high-income brackets and low-and middle-income brackets are calculated for comparative purposes. In dealing with

regions, rather than showing the actual percentages of individuals who voted for the Democratic party in each income bracket, election, and region, the data will be shown as a difference in Democratic affect between two sets of individuals in different income brackets. For example, Table 3.2 displays the percentage of low-income individuals voting for a Democratic president minus the percentage of high-income individuals voting for a Democratic president per decade. Later, logistic regression analyses will be performed to determine the effect that class has, if any, on presidential and congressional election choices, and partisan identification. The effects of class will be controlled for by dividing the nation into separate regions and by utilizing the independent variables listed above. In the case of logistic regressions, all variables have been recoded on a scale of 0 to 1, so all of the results are comparable.

### Hypotheses

The aim of this chapter is to determine how class affects individual voting behavior both nationwide and in separate regions of the United States. Several hypotheses are necessary in order to uncover such a relationship. First it is hypothesized that, in accordance with Stonecash et al (2000), those in the lowest income bracket will be more likely to vote and identify as Democratic than those in the highest income bracket, with the middle-income bracket falling somewhere in between. Likewise, as the income of individuals rises, individuals will be more likely to vote for and identify with Republicans. The purpose of this hypothesis is to determine whether or not the trend identified in Stonecash et al has continued into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Hypothesis 2 will utilize the time series function of this chapter; it states that the gap in political orientation toward the Democratic party between individuals in the highest income bracket and individuals in the lowest income bracket will increase over time.

The main point of this paper though is to determine variations in voting behavior across regions. Some areas of the United States have a history of class conflict while in others such traditional cleavages are notably absent. For example, the Northeast and North Central regions have traditionally been hotbeds of conflict between organized labor and business interests while others have remained rather silent on such issues. It is entirely possible that the conflicts that have taken place in the Northeast and North Central regions would continue on to the voting booth. Labor unions regularly support the Democratic party and its candidates, and Americans often view the Democratic party as “for the working class” and the Republicans are “for the rich.” Conversely, where organized labor and class struggles have been largely absent, namely the southern and western regions, such conflicts might not have entered the political arena. These regions have a much more pronounced agricultural and service sector and a much smaller industrial one. It seems plausible that such regions would be less likely to engage in political class conflicts. Thus, Hypothesis 3 states that the degree of separation between higher and lower income brackets will be greater in regions where there is a history of class conflict such as the Northeast and North Central regions than in areas where such conflicts did not traditionally erupt such as all the South and West regions.

Hypothesis 4 simply deals with the addition of the other independent variables. While the relationship between class and political behavior may be supported by the crosstabulations, it might also be spurious. For example, the difference may be that women are more Democratic than men and women make less money than men. Thus, the difference might show up in a crosstabulation, but it would have more to do with the sex of the individual than the income.

Hypothesis 4 states that even having controlled for these other variables, class will remain a statistically significant predictor of political behavior.

### Results And Discussion

Voting disparity between individuals in the highest and lowest income brackets grew substantially between the 1960s and 1990s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the difference in Democratic presidential voting between the highest and lowest income brackets was only about six percent. The 1970s saw an expansion of class voting, when that figure jumped to 15%, followed by another jump in the 1980s and 1990s to about 22%. A drop in low-income voters voting Democratic coupled with an increase in high-income voters voting Democratic caused the disparity to drop in the 2000s to slightly below the level of the 1970s: 13.9%.

The relationship between class and presidential voting appears to be factual, but slight, and increasing from the 1950s to the 1990s. The peak of class voting for the presidency in the 1990s was accompanied by a Chi-Square statistic of only 80.92 with 2 d.f. Cramer's V in the same decade was a mere 0.18, ranging from 0.06 to 0.17 in the other decades. Therefore, there is a statistically significant yet weak relationship between income and presidential voting in all decades. According to this initial data on presidential elections, Hypotheses 1 and 2 appear to have gained evidence in their favor.

Voting for the House of Representatives has followed a similar pattern. In the 1950s and 1960s, the difference between individuals in high- and low-income brackets voting Democratic varied by about eight percent. Just as in presidential voting patterns, the disparity between high- and low-income voters grew from the 1960s to the 1990s from 7.7% to 23.0%, which closed in the 2000s to just 14%. According to the statistics, the significance of the relationship is nearly

identical. Chi-Square statistics are higher in this section of the table, and Cramer's V depicts a relationship ranging from a very weak 0.06 in the 1950s and 1960s to a modest 0.18 in the 1990s. There is a weak statistically significant relationship between income and House voting in all decades.

Table 3.1: Presidential and House Elections and Party Identification By Income Level and Decade, 1952

President								
	Income			Differences		Statistics		
	Low	Middle	High	Lo – Hi	Lo - Mid	$\chi^2$	N	Cramer's V
1950s	43.4%	43.9%	37.9%	5.5%	-0.5%	7.91*	2384	0.06*
1960s	55.5%	55.4%	49.3%	6.2%	0.1%	10.67**	2982	0.06**
1970s	50.1%	42.8%	35.2%	14.9%	7.3%	41.81***	2829	0.12***
1980s	55.2%	43.3%	33.3%	21.9%	11.9%	98.11***	3256	0.17***
1990s	63.0%	50.3%	40.8%	22.2%	12.7%	80.92***	2590	0.18***
2000s	58.0%	49.8%	44.1%	13.9%	8.2%	22.92***	1720	0.12***

  

House								
	Income			Differences		Statistics		
	Low	Middle	High	Lo – Hi	Lo - Mid	$\chi^2$	N	Cramer's V
1950s	56.5%	58.2%	48.3%	8.2%	-1.7%	23.34***	2870	0.09***
1960s	61.1%	59.3%	53.4%	7.7%	1.8%	18.11***	3872	0.07***
1970s	65.8%	58.7%	51.3%	14.5%	7.1%	64.42***	4647	0.12***
1980s	68.1%	56.6%	50.7%	17.4%	11.5%	81.03***	4367	0.14***
1990s	67.1%	55.4%	44.1%	23.0%	11.7%	147.55***	4342	0.18***
2000s	60.5%	54.0%	46.5%	14.0%	6.5%	19.52**	1417	0.12***

  

Party Identification								
	Income			Differences		Statistics		
	Low	Middle	High	Lo – Hi	Lo - Mid	$\chi^2$	N	Cramer's V
1950s	59.3%	58.5%	52.8%	6.5%	0.8%	20.50***	5695	0.05***
1960s	59.9%	58.3%	52.4%	7.5%	1.6%	27.97***	6479	0.05***
1970s	59.4%	54.7%	46.6%	12.8%	4.7%	105.03***	9448	0.09***
1980s	59.4%	50.7%	43.1%	16.3%	8.7%	144.42***	8346	0.11***
1990s	59.5%	51.2%	42.5%	17.0%	8.3%	161.64***	8384	0.12***
2000s	56.4%	48.8%	45.9%	10.5%	7.6%	21.26***	2550	0.11***

Notes: All rows have 2 degrees of freedom. \*\*\*significant at the .001 level \*\*significant at the .01 level \*significant at the .05 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Partisan identification is said to be much more stable than voting patterns. Individuals that identify with one party often remain loyal to that party (as far as identification) for their entire lives, despite splitting their ticket for a candidate of another party, or even switching parties altogether. Thus it is not surprising to find that the gap seen in voting behavior is more muted when observing party identification. As can be seen in the bottom section of Table 3.1, there has been an income gap in party identification as far back as the 1950s. This gap, like presidential and House voting, was small: 6.5%. In the 1960s it was only 7.5%. Just as in the other two measures, the gap widened in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, but only to a peak of 17%. In the 2000s, the gap shrank to 10.5%. This muted growth is also notable in the statistical evidence. The relationship between income and partisan identification is even less strong than in the other two, with Cramer's V ranging from 0.05 to only 0.12.

Perhaps the most important fact to take from this analysis is that there is indeed a moderate, statistically significant relationship between class and voting and between class and partisan identification. This relationship has, contrary to popular belief, been gaining in strength in the previous half-century and apparently peaked in the 1990s. But despite the recent drop-off in class voting and identification in this decade, the relationship has not completely disintegrated. With Cramer's V statistics of .11 and .12, there remains a statistically significant relationship between income (i.e. access to resources) and political behavior. Thus Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by the data: there is a relationship and it has grown since the 1950s, although there is a lapse in recent elections.

Also of interest in Table 3.1 is a growth in the gap between middle- and low-income voters. By the 1970s, the gap between middle- and low-income voters approximated the gap

between high- and low-income voters of the 1960s. By the 1980s, the middle-low gap exceeded the 1960s high-low gap in all three variables. In the 2000s, the middle-low gap has subsided to a level just higher than that of the 1970s. This gap is crucial to understanding the peculiarities of American class politics. Previously, middle- and low-income voters acted as a bloc, resulting in an outcome which was more to the liking of the lower income earners. From the 1970s to the 1990s, however, middle-income earners split from lower income earners and more closely approximated the voting and identification patterns of the highest income earners. This has almost certainly played a role in the diminishing number of Democratic victories in the House and presidency.

Having provided initial evidence supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, Hypothesis 3 must now be addressed. Hypothesis 3 addresses the idea that class voting is more likely to occur in regions of the country in which there is a history of class conflict such as the Northeast and North Central regions while the South and West regions ought to exhibit less class voting. Table 3.2 displays the differences in class voting for president in the six regions mentioned in the Data and Methods section. Several patterns become apparent from these data. For example, every region except the Border South and the Mountain West has exhibited an increase in high- and low-income voting disparity between the 1950s and 2000s. In the Solid South, it nearly doubled from 12.8% to 24.8% while the North Central region saw an increase of over 14%. The Northeast and Pacific West saw much more modest increases at just 5.7% and 1.2% respectively.

The second pattern apparent in Table 3.2 is that all of the regions followed the national trend shown in Table 3.1, but at different degrees. For instance, the high-low income disparity for presidential elections rose in every region between the 1950s and 1990s and fell in every



region between the 1990s and 2000s. In every region the greatest increases were between the 1960s and 1980s and most regions (the most notable exception being the Border South) enjoyed a relative plateau between the 1980s and 1990s before falling in the 2000s.

Table 3.2: Low-High Difference in Democratic Presidential Vote By Region, Income Level, and Decade, 1952 – 2004

	<b>Northeast</b>	<b>North Central</b>	<b>Border South</b>
1950s	3.7%	1.2%	0.0%
1960s	8.7%	0.2%	0.0%
1970s	6.8%	16.2%	0.0%
1980s	14.1%	14.9%	10.9%
1990s	12.6%	18.5%	19.5%
2000s	9.4%	14.9%	0.0%
	<b>Solid South</b>	<b>Pacific West</b>	<b>Mountain West</b>
1950s	12.8%	10.6%	0.0%
1960s	14.6%	9.7%	5.4%
1970s	22.0%	14.4%	31.0%
1980s	37.1%	21.5%	18.5%
1990s	33.2%	16.3%	22.2%
2000s	24.8%	11.8%	0.0%

Note: If percentages are less than or equal to zero, they are identified as 0.0%.

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

But there are important differences between the regions. Different regions have exhibited peaks in class voting at different times. For example, the Mountain West region's measure rose at an extraordinary rate in the 1970s and fell rapidly in the next decade. The North Central region's number rose from 0.2% in the 1960s to 16.2% in the 1970s and has remained within a few percentage points since then. In the 1980s, it was the Solid South's turn to rapidly increase

the prevalence of class voting to a whopping 37.1%. The Border South displayed a propensity for class voting in the 1980s and 1990s when an enormous gap appeared and then vanished in the 2000s.

Table 3.3: Low-High Differences in Democratic House Vote and Party ID By Region, Income Level, and Decade, 1952 – 2004

	<b>Northeast</b>		<b>North Central</b>		<b>Border South</b>	
	<b>House</b>	<b>PID</b>	<b>House</b>	<b>PID</b>	<b>House</b>	<b>PID</b>
1950s	8.7%	7.6%	3.2%	3.5%	0.0%	0.0%
1960s	8.2%	5.9%	1.7%	2.7%	0.0%	0.0%
1970s	10.2%	11.2%	9.3%	8.0%	6.5%	1.2%
1980s	13.0%	18.1%	8.9%	14.4%	0.5%	4.6%
1990s	8.5%	10.0%	21.5%	13.0%	35.8%	13.3%
2000s	16.4%	3.8%	12.7%	14.7%	0.0%	0.0%
	<b>Solid South</b>		<b>Pacific West</b>		<b>Mountain West</b>	
	<b>House</b>	<b>PID</b>	<b>House</b>	<b>PID</b>	<b>House</b>	<b>PID</b>
1950s	0.0%	0.0%	16.5%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
1960s	6.7%	9.2%	5.4%	8.9%	18.7%	13.2%
1970s	13.9%	13.2%	15.9%	18.9%	10.7%	12.2%
1980s	26.2%	17.1%	19.8%	16.5%	20.3%	16.4%
1990s	34.5%	22.6%	20.9%	21.8%	21.6%	16.9%
2000s	23.6%	22.0%	15.7%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Note: If percentages are less than or equal to zero, they are identified as 0.0%.

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Another difference is in the strength of each region’s class voting. Here, Hypothesis 3 can be discussed. In the section above, I suggested that the Northeast and North Central regions would be most likely to exhibit signs of class voting. The data suggest that this is not the case. In every decade except the 1970s, the eleven states of the old Confederacy show the strongest tendency toward class voting. For the past thirty years, the presidential gap in the Solid South

has been at least 10% higher than in any other region. The Mountain West region showed more class voting than most other regions from the 1970s through the 1990s, and then the gap simply disappeared. Border South states had very little class voting through the years and the Pacific West region is hardly a hotbed of class-based presidential voting. However, it is true that the Northeast and North Central regions have some of the lowest rates of class voting. The highest class voting gap in the Northeast was just 14.1% in the 1980s and in the North Central it was just 18.5% in the 1990s compared to the Solid South's whopping 37.1% in the 1980s. The regions are also more diverse today in their class voting propensities than they were at mid-century. In the 1950s and 1960s, the regions with the highest and lowest class voting rates were only about 15% apart. So far in the 2000s, the regions range from the Border South and Mountain West at 0% to the Solid South at 25%.

Regional class voting for the House took on a similar pattern, though there are a few differences. The Solid South started at a much lower level in House voting and peaked in the 1990s rather than the 1980s. It did have the highest levels of class voting from the 1980s through the 2000s, just as in presidential voting. Also as in presidential voting, all regions displayed an increase in class voting at the House level between the 1950s and 1990s with the exception of the Northeast region, due to a drop between the 1980s and 1990s. The Northeast was also the exception in that it was the only region that did not see a decline in class voting at the House level in the 2000s. The same patterns generally hold true for partisan identification as well, although the increases and decreases are again at a more subdued level than in the other two measures. All regions saw an increase in class-based identification patterns between the 1950s and 1990s and they all decreased in the 2000s (except the North Central region which had

a slight increase). Also absent from this measure is the dwarfing of the class politics of other regions by the Solid South. That particular region was much closer to the other regions compared to presidential and House voting.

Three inferences can be gleaned from the preceding information. The first is that there is evidence that an increase in class voting on a national scale has occurred between the 1950s and the present. Although it is certainly not what one might call a “class war” taking place at the ballot box, there is certainly a difference in voting patterns based on the amount of income coming into the home. Whether the relationship is spurious, or is evident only in certain groups of people remains to be seen. Second, there is now a difference between low- and middle-income individuals that has hardly existed at all before the 1970s. This can help explain the Republican rise in recent decades. As middle-income individuals exit the Democratic party along with their upper-income counterparts, it is not surprising that the Republicans now control the two elected branches of national government. The third is that although some aspects of the pattern of class voting are similar between regions, there are indeed differences. Inconsistent with the third hypothesis, the Solid South appears to have a history of class politics that far surpasses any other region in terms of presidential elections and, in more recent years, House elections and partisan identification. Conversely, the Northeast, North Central, and Border South (except in 1990) have some of the lowest levels of class voting. With the exception of presidential elections in some decades, the Mountain West and Pacific West have generally followed the same patterns as the nation, usually falling in between the more extreme regions. In short, the presidential, House, and partisan identification data suggest that Hypothesis 3 is not supported.

Having discovered a significant link between class and political behavior, a more in-depth approach to understanding that relationship is appropriate. As discussed in the Data and Methods section, logistic regressions were performed on presidential and House voting and partisan identification both nationwide and in each region, in each decade. The results of these regressions are expressed in Table 3.4 below.

What is apparent in the regressions from the nationwide sample is that even when controlling for other factors such as race, gender, and education, income has become a greater predictor of political behavior since the 1950s, directly supporting Hypothesis 4. During the 1990s, individuals in the lowest income bracket were close to twice as likely to vote for a Democratic president and congressperson than those in the highest income bracket and individuals in the middle-income bracket were about 1.4 times as likely to vote Democratic than their more wealthy counterparts. These statistically significant results stand in contrast to the 1950s and 1960s in which there was no real difference between any of the three income groups. Even as the gender gap was growing in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, income remained a salient indicator of how individuals would act politically. In fact, from the 1970s through the 1990s, class had the greatest effect on individual political behavior except for race.

Another important factor to consider from Table 3.4 is that class as a predictor of political behavior dropped off steeply in the 2000s, just as in the crosstabulations. In no case was the middle-income group significantly different from the upper-income (constant) group in the 2000s. Lower-income individuals were much less different from upper- and middle-income individuals during the 2000s compared to the three earlier decades. In short, it appears as though

class has, in the span of the past fifty years, become a stronger and then weaker political cleavage.

Table 3.4: Class on Presidential Vote, House Vote, and Party ID by Decade, 1952-2004

<b>President</b>						
	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Lower Income	0.06	-0.04	0.47***	0.53***	0.60***	0.42**
Middle Income	0.07	0.05	0.23*	0.34***	0.32**	0.13
Age	-0.69***	-0.86***	-0.66***	0.05	0.15	0.30
Black	1.23***	2.57***	2.60***	2.49***	2.67***	2.39***
Female	-0.17*	-0.01	0.09	0.18*	0.33***	0.44***
Education	-0.88***	1.17***	-0.23	-0.27*	-0.18	0.39
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.047	0.117	0.137	0.159	0.160	0.150
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.035	0.087	0.101	0.118	0.120	0.112
<b>House</b>						
	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Lower Income	0.28**	0.10	0.49***	0.52***	0.70***	0.47**
Middle Income	0.27**	0.09	0.26***	0.15*	0.36***	0.21
Age	-0.73***	-0.61***	-0.44***	-0.24*	-0.15	-0.04
Black	1.56***	1.90***	2.12***	2.03***	1.65***	2.97***
Female	-0.19*	-0.19**	-0.13*	-0.06	0.11	0.28*
Education	-0.55***	-1.04***	-0.34**	-0.32**	-0.51***	0.32
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.080	0.074	0.096	0.104	0.158
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.035	0.059	0.055	0.071	0.078	0.118
<b>Party Identification</b>						
	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Lower Income	0.17*	0.04	0.22***	0.35***	0.41***	0.23*
Middle Income	0.11	0.08	0.21***	0.22***	0.28***	0.03
Age	-0.83***	-0.55***	-0.09	0.39***	0.32***	0.24
Black	0.51***	1.27***	1.43***	1.65***	1.49***	1.74***
Female	-0.62**	-0.05	0.05	0.18***	0.23***	0.33***
Education	-0.15***	-0.97***	-0.52***	-0.15	-0.22**	0.03
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.059	0.065	0.097	0.092	0.107
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.023	0.044	0.048	0.073	0.069	0.080

Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. \*\*\* significant at .001 level  
 \*\* significant at .01 level \* significant at .05 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Much of the literature to date has been written either explicitly or implicitly in the context of realignment. Proponents of class as an indicator of political behavior have suggested that class has remained as significant as in previous decades or has become more so. Advocates of postmaterialism and a new morality hypothesis suggest that class has become much less important as individuals are now more concerned with social issues such as homosexuality, abortion, or freedom of speech. The results of this chapter on class lead to conclusions that can be spun into either of these camps. While most were suggesting that class politics were declining, this analysis indicates the exact opposite. There was little or no class-based politics in the 1950s followed by a profound increase through the 1990s. Only recently has this increase been dampened. While some may still say that class politics is dead, the evidence suggests that class is still a statistically significant indicator of political behavior. What the results clearly show, though, is that a realignment has simply not occurred.

Referring back to the literature review, the basic components of a realignment are that there is a clear and durable shift amongst the electorate. While there was a shift between 1952 and 1996, the drop in class politics in the 2000s simply precludes any suggestion that a realignment has occurred. While the drop may be short and inconsequential in the long term, there is no evidence from these results of a durable realignment in the patterns of the voting public. Furthermore, a realignment suggests that individuals were once aligned in one way and then aligned in the opposite way. An example of this is the once persistently Democratic south which has become persistently Republican in recent years. From the data analysis presented here, there was no such previous alignment between income groups, leaving no evidence of a realignment.

Table 3.5: Class on Presidential Vote by Decade and Region, 1952-2004

		<b>Northeast</b>	<b>North Central</b>	<b>Border South</b>
1950s	Low Income	0.02	-0.23	0.78
	Middle Income	0.08	0.02	0.40
1960s	Low Income	0.16	-0.17	-0.78
	Middle Income	0.04	0.05	-0.53
1970s	Low Income	0.45	0.79***	-0.05
	Middle Income	-0.15	0.55**	-0.26
1980s	Low Income	0.10	0.25	0.45
	Middle Income	0.35	0.26	0.26
1990s	Low Income	0.39	0.49*	-0.30
	Middle Income	-0.01	0.46*	-0.10
2000s	Low Income	0.11	0.41	0.83
	Middle Income	-0.02	0.45	0.88
		<b>Solid South</b>	<b>Pacific West</b>	<b>Mountain West</b>
1950s	Low Income	0.35	0.26	-1.20
	Middle Income	0.07	0.45	-1.74*
1960s	Low Income	0.19	0.17	0.11
	Middle Income	0.29	0.43	-0.51
1970s	Low Income	0.26	0.53	1.57*
	Middle Income	0.17	0.57*	0.84
1980s	Low Income	1.05***	0.73**	0.75
	Middle Income	0.58**	0.36	0.10
1990s	Low Income	0.93***	0.48	1.00*
	Middle Income	0.47*	0.43	0.24
2000s	Low Income	0.89**	0.49	0.07
	Middle Income	0.21	-0.20	-0.44

Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. \*\*\* significant at .001 level  
 \*\* significant at .01 level \* significant at .05 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Regressions on regional presidential voting revealed that the Solid South region did indeed have a much greater proclivity to vote according to class lines than any other region, with the North Central falling far behind. In the 1980s, individuals in low-income southern families were nearly three times as likely to vote Democratic as individuals in high-income southern families, even after controlling for race, gender, and age. The trend has continued relatively



unabated into the twenty-first century. Members of low-income southern families are 2.4 times more likely to vote Democratic than their high-income counterparts. This is the exact opposite of what one would expect to find, given that poorer southerners are considered most likely to vote according to their evangelical values instead of their class status. What has changed is that people in middle-income families have shifted their support. From a statistically significant score of 0.58 to an insignificant 0.23, the middle class has gone from much more Democratic than the upper class to about the same level.

Contrasted with the Solid South region, the rest of the country is virtually free of class voting. As noted above, the North Central region had a much lower prevalence of presidential class voting. The 1970s and 1990s revealed differences between the upper, middle, and lower class families while in the rest of the time studied, presidential class voting was absent. Individuals in lower-income families in the Mountain West were more likely to vote Democratic than those in upper-income families in the 1970s and 1990s also, but the significance is not nearly as strong, and middle-income earners were not any different from upper-income earners. Neither the Northeast nor the Border South evidenced statistically significant results from the regression analyses while the Pacific West had barely significant results for low-income earners in the 1980s and middle-income earners in the 1970s. In short, the rest of the country has hardly any presidential class voting whatsoever compared to the Solid South region.

Results from the regressions on House voting suggest that the Solid South region does not hold a monopoly on class voting across the board. Low-income individuals in the Pacific West in the 1970s and 2000s and the Mountain West in the 1990s were more likely to vote for Democratic House members than were low-income individuals in the Solid South. The results

for the Party ID analysis are even more level. Individuals in the Pacific West and even the Northeast showed a greater propensity to identify with Democrats than did those in the Solid South during the 1980s while the Pacific and Mountain West regions showed a greater Party ID disparity in the 1990s.

Table 3.6: Class on House Vote and Party ID by Decade and Region, 1952-2004

		Northeast		North Central		Border South	
Income		House	Party ID	House	Party ID	House	Party ID
1950s	Low	0.22	0.07	-0.04	-0.06	-0.09	-0.56
	Middle	0.12	0.06	0.34*	-0.04	0.15	0.22
1960s	Low	0.27	0.03	-0.22	0.00	-0.29	-0.59*
	Middle	0.00	0.04	-0.03	-0.10	0.46	-0.07
1970s	Low	0.45*	0.32**	0.39*	0.09	0.14	-0.07
	Middle	0.16	0.17	0.24	0.11	0.03	0.13
1980s	Low	0.44*	0.56***	0.13	0.20	0.08	0.23
	Middle	-0.03	0.22	0.07	0.08	0.15	-0.25
1990s	Low	0.09	0.33*	0.67***	0.24*	0.64	-0.35
	Middle	0.02	0.20	0.38**	0.17	1.13*	-0.21
2000s	Low	0.55	0.07	0.46	0.42	1.18	0.36
	Middle	0.23	0.06	0.77***	0.46*	-0.18	0.58
		Solid South		Pacific West		Mountain West	
Income		House	Party ID	House	Party ID	House	Party ID
1950s	Low	-0.30	-0.18	0.75*	0.12	-0.34	-0.19
	Middle	0.60	0.25	0.39	-0.13	-1.28*	-0.58
1960s	Low	0.16	0.03	-0.08	0.04	0.65	-0.03
	Middle	0.15	0.27	0.28	0.25	0.11	-0.36
1970s	Low	0.38	0.09	0.61**	0.61***	0.35	0.20
	Middle	0.05	0.20	0.49*	0.38**	0.54	0.31
1980s	Low	0.89***	0.28*	0.82***	0.55***	0.81*	0.58*
	Middle	0.39*	0.35**	0.30	0.30*	-0.17	0.54*
1990s	Low	1.01***	0.61***	0.89***	0.76***	0.98**	0.85**
	Middle	0.47**	0.46***	0.61**	0.41**	0.20	0.58**
2000s	Low	0.72*	0.58**	0.80*	0.00	-0.28	-0.07
	Middle	0.10	0.18	-0.07	-0.60*	-1.20	-0.86

Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. \*\*\* significant at .001 level  
 \*\* significant at .01 level \* significant at .05 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

## Conclusions

The results for this chapter are clear, but unexpected. The twenty-first century has indeed brought about a change in the way Americans behave politically, but that change is a disruption of the previous pattern of increasing class disparity at the voting booth. Low-income Americans now differ with upper-income Americans at about the same rate as in the 1970s. But class conflicts do still exist and have the potential to reach greater proportions with little notice as is evidenced from the statistics from the 1980s and 1990s. Even more unexpected is that the Solid South, a region that is not known for its labor disputes and class conflicts exhibits the most class-based voting patterns as anywhere else in the country. This conflicts with the view that poorer southerners have become more values-conscious at the expense of class-consciousness. What remains to be seen is whether or not “values” – either postmaterialist or traditional – matter to Americans more than class.

## CHAPTER FOUR: VALUES

Perhaps the most talked-about division among Americans in this decade is the so-called values divide. Authors from religious, ethical, and academic backgrounds have all taken up the debate on the importance of individual values to the American voter. Radio talk shows, cable news roundtables, and blogs endlessly discuss the necessity for politicians to understand the values of American citizens. Televangelists chastise political elites on the air for their failure to accommodate fundamentalist ideals in crafting or enforcing laws, sometimes even calling for imprisonment or assassinations.

Such discussions cannot be employed as evidence that a values divide exists. Political elites and media pundits may argue about the values of the American people at the same time that those values have no measurable effect on individual political behavior. Do values really matter to Americans when they decide the political fate of the country? Over which values are we divided? If values have such an enormous effect, why do they seem so ambiguous? This chapter will discuss which values Americans seem to be divided over and whether or not those values have a significant effect on individual political behavior.

Ronald Inglehart's hypothesis of the materialist-postmaterialist continuum has led many scholars to declare the end of class as a component in understanding electoral behavior. It is said that as materialists leave the electoral arena, the younger postmaterialists take their place, making class an obsolete indicator of electoral choice. Much of the research that tests Inglehart's hypothesis has been cross-national and even then, most do not even include the United States. The discussion of postmaterialism in this chapter seeks to shed new light on how the materialist-

postmaterialist continuum relates to the American electorate and to determine whether or not it is more important than class as a predictor of electoral behavior.

In 2004, an overwhelming 77% of American adults said that religion was an important part of their lives. A full 59% said that religion provided “quite a bit” or “a great deal” of guidance in their day-to-day lives. Thirty-two percent even supported group or school-wide prayer in public schools. 24% of Americans attend religious services at least once a week while one in three skip out altogether and 80% of Americans describe themselves as Christians. Certainly, the values that religious leaders prescribe to individuals influence the values held by that individual. An overwhelming majority of American citizens are religious Christians whose beliefs help dictate how they live their lives every day. It is not difficult to imagine that the religious values that dictate personal behavior to these individuals might also dictate their political behavior as well.

It is also apparent that religious and moral values are a major influence on political action. Religious language emanating from political figures, especially those on the right, is intertwined with desired policy outcomes such as banning the right of women to choose how, when, and with whom to have children, or outlawing the marriage of two men or women. One can hardly engage in a conversation about such issues without delving into the morality of individuals who terminate their pregnancies or love someone of the same sex and how these are condemned by the Christian Bible. Of course, this is nothing new. Language used to argue for (and against) civil rights also employed loaded religious language. Political leaders from Thomas Jefferson to Abraham Lincoln to Franklin Roosevelt have referred to religious ideals and morals through the course of American history. The goal of this part of the chapter is not to

discuss the issue of religion in politics, but to determine whether or not religion and moral values affect the politics of the American public, what that effect is, whether or not it has grown or faded, and how it relates to class politics.

### Data

With less scholarly evidence and with far fewer data than class, values have the potential to explain many changes in American electoral decision-making in the past half-century. Submitted in this chapter are two ways to understand the effect values have on political behavior: postmaterialist and moral values.

### *Postmaterialism*

This chapter uses the same cumulative NES dataset as does the chapter on class, but the variables used are not nearly as available or intuitive. Whereas data on respondents' relative income levels are available from every NES survey, there are no such data available that match Inglehart's survey questions. In fact, the actual four-question battery developed by Inglehart was asked by the NES beginning in 1972 and ending in 1992. This leaves the most recent twelve years of NES surveys without a proper measure for materialism/postmaterialism. Therefore, in order to proceed with this analysis, an alternative battery of questions must be developed. These questions must deal with the theory behind the materialist/postmaterialist paradigm and approximate the level of materialism/postmaterialism exhibited by an individual respondent.

Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism centered on the idea of two dichotomous groups of individuals and a mixed group in between. On one side are the materialists, who are more concerned with the government's responsibility to keep the people safe from economic hardship

and physical harm. Thus, materialists believe that the first priorities of the government should be to “fight rising prices” and “maintain order in the nation.” Conversely, postmaterialists are said to have come of age in relative peace and prosperity and to be more concerned with “protect[ing] freedom of speech” and “giv[ing] people more say in the decisions of the government.” “Mixed” individuals (i.e. those who feel both materialist and postmaterialist goals should be sought) make up the bulk of the population.

Inglehart claims that materialism rises as economic and physical security declines. Therefore, a set of NES questions must tap both the relative economic and physical security that a respondent feels, and the political consequences of that security. One question the NES has routinely asked is whether or not the respondent has been laid off in the past 6 months. Respondents who are coded as having been laid off are included here, even if they have since obtained a job or been rehired. Even if the respondent has obtained a job since being laid off, the economic security of the respondent has recently been shaken. Such an individual would be less likely to take their job for granted, and would be more concerned about losing that job in the future or of not getting one quickly. Another question ties economic security directly to politics: a scale where the respondent indicates whether individuals or the government should have more responsibility in seeing to it that everyone has access to a job and a “good standard of living.” Yet another question is used to determine the respondents’ work status; that is, whether or not that person is working, and if not, whether that person is retired, a student, a homemaker, laid off, unemployed, or disabled. One might reasonably expect those in the “working” category to have more economic security than those in any other group. Thus this variable is dichotomized into groups of working and not working individuals. All of these variables are included in order

to ascertain the economic security of individual respondents. Unfortunately, there are far fewer variables concerning physical security. This chapter will utilize the defense spending scale, which asks respondents whether defense spending should be greatly increased, greatly decreased or at five points in between. Those who wish for an increase in defense spending can be assumed to feel less secure. Again, these are intended to ascertain the security that an individual feels. Inglehart's hypothesis predicts that each of these materialist values ought to influence individuals to vote for conservative parties.

Postmaterialism is a much more difficult concept to operationalize. A postmaterialist goal could be described as a non-materialist goal. That is, anything a respondent believes the government should do that is not security-based is a postmaterialist goal. A cleaner environment could be considered a postmaterialist goal, as could a desire for less corruption in government. Inglehart introduced several postmaterialist values that I have attempted to approximate here. The first is a "thermometer" type scale for environmentalists. A more appropriate measure would be a scale for spending on the environment, just like the one for defense spending. Unfortunately, this question was not asked at several points within the time frame being studied and could not be used. The second is a three-point scale asking whether school spending should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. Third is how strongly the respondent disagrees with the statement that "This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are." Although these are not perfect measures, if Inglehart's hypothesis is correct, they should be very much related to postmaterialism and Democratic affect.



### *Moral Values*

Moral values will be measured here using data from the same NES dataset as postmaterialism and class. Variables in this section suffer the same problem as materialism and postmaterialism in that they are asked less often than researchers might wish. The most relevant moral values variables were included in the 1980s, probably because no one thought such values mattered much in politics until that point. To determine what religion the individual belongs to, the major religious group of the respondent (e.g. evangelical or mainline Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish) will be employed. The NES stopped defining these types of groups, specifically evangelical Protestants, in 1998. Fortunately, other researchers have assembled a list of which particular religions are “evangelical” and which are “mainline” Protestant (see Bolce and De Maio 1999). This list was used to create a seamless variable which denotes evangelical and mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, other, and none up to the most recent survey year<sup>3</sup>. Religiosity will be measured by how often the individual attends religious services and whether or not religion has a significant influence in their daily lives. The assumption here is that if religion is a regular part of an individual’s life, it will be more likely to have an effect on that individual’s politics. The remaining variables reserved for this section have to do with the respondents’ attitudes toward general and specific moral issues.

A “moral values” index was created for this analysis by combining four moral and traditional values variables. The first of these questions asks whether more emphasis should be

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<sup>3</sup> Other religions and none are not included due to the fact that there were too few cases.

Mainline Protestantism is represented in the constant.

placed on traditional values. Another question asks whether it is appropriate to adjust one's view of morality in light of new situations, essentially measuring moral relativism. A third asks whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society." This question requires the respondent to agree to two propositions: 1) there is a breakdown in our society and 2) this breakdown is due to the "newer lifestyles" of others. Essentially this question measures both moral certitude and a feeling of moral superiority. The fourth question in the index asks whether "we should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are different from our own." What this index is intended to measure then, is moral conservatism. This index taps how strongly one feels about imposing one's morality on others and whether those morals ought to be conservative "traditional" morals or not. Each variable was recoded to give a higher score for more conservative answers and was then consolidated into an index measuring from 0 to 1. Finally, the abortion question – "when should abortions be allowed by law?" -- is also added due to the fact that abortion is perhaps the most salient and divisive cultural issue in modern times, and has had a significant influence on individual political behavior (Abramowitz 1995). All of the variables in this section have been recoded on a 0 to 1 scale in which 0 is the least conservative response and 1 is the most conservative response. For example, a 0 on the abortion variable implies that the respondent believes abortion should always be allowed and a 1 means that the respondent believes abortion should never be allowed.

## Method

As in the previous chapter, logistical regressions will be performed to determine the influence of each of these variables on Democratic presidential vote, House vote, and partisan identification. Also as in the chapter on class, all of the variables will be coded from 0 to 1 in order to standardize the results, making them comparable to each other. Included in all of the regressions will be controls for age, race, gender, and education – four variables known to be linked to vote choice and party identification. What is different in this chapter is the addition of ideology as an independent variable, which is used as control. Not only is the seven-point ideology scale from conservative to liberal asked at every point in this time series, but it is much more likely to influence how individuals will react to questions such as whether jobs ought to be guaranteed by the government or affect toward environmentalists. Using ideology as a control in this instance will allow for more accurate results.

## Hypotheses

I have set out to achieve three goals in this chapter. The first is to determine whether or not postmaterialism and/or moral values affect individual voting behavior in America. The second is to establish whether or not this influence has been growing or waning over the past twenty years. The third is to uncover how these relationships vary across the regions of the country. To achieve these goals, several hypotheses are necessary.

The first goal mentioned seeks to uncover whether or not there is a relationship at all between the postmaterialism and moral values and political behavior in the United States. The postmaterialist hypothesis claims that materialists are more conservative in nature, being

concerned with older bread-and-butter and security issues while postmaterialists lean toward the left (1990). Therefore, individuals exhibiting materialist tendencies ought to be less likely to vote for and identify with parties on the left than postmaterialists. Hypothesis 1, then, is that postmaterialist values will generate positive affect toward the Democratic party while materialist values will produce negative affect toward the Democratic party. Both intuition and previous research suggest that moral conservatism ought to be negatively correlated with Democratic affect. Hypothesis 2 states that individuals scoring higher on the moral values variables will be less likely to vote for and identify with the Democratic party than those scoring lower on the moral values variables.

The second goal deals with the degree of influence postmaterialism and moral values have had on American politics over the course of two decades. Inglehart's postmaterialism hypothesis requires that postmaterialism should be gaining influence on the political behavior of individuals at the expense of materialism. Hypothesis 3 tests this hypothesis, claiming that over time, postmaterialism will become a more significant indicator of Democratic affect while materialism becomes less significant. To determine whether moral values have an increasing influence on political behavior, Hypothesis 4 states that over time moral values will become a greater predictor of individual affect toward the Democratic party.

The third goal inquires whether there is a difference in the influence of postmaterialist and moral values across regions of the United States. Just as class relations have traditionally had special significance in certain regions of the United States, so too have attitudes toward values. Two regions stand out as the most probable to have incorporated postmaterialist values: the Northeast and Pacific West. It is plausible that those in the Pacific West and Northeast,

being more progressive on such postmaterialist goals such as the environment, will be more likely than those in other regions to incorporate postmaterialist values. Thus, Hypothesis 5 states that individuals in the Northeast and Pacific West will be more likely to be influenced by postmaterialist values than those in other regions. The Solid South and North Central regions are known for their conservative stances on cultural values issues such as abortion. It seems appropriate, then, that Hypothesis 6 state that in comparing individuals, those who reside in the South and North Central United States will be more likely to be influenced by moral values issues than will those who live in other regions.

#### Postmaterialism Results and Discussion

What is immediately striking about Model A in Table 4.1 is that the results are all over the map. The physical security variable, defense spending, is in the direction the postmaterialist hypothesis would anticipate, although there was a considerable lessening of the score in the 1990s. In all three decades, the measure was significant and negative, meaning that those wishing for an increase in defense spending were less likely to support a Democratic president. When the economic security variables are entered there is either no significant difference or, in the case the jobs variable, an overwhelming partiality toward the Democratic presidential candidates in all three decades. Those who agree that it is the government's responsibility to ensure employment are nearly 22 times as likely to vote for a Democratic presidential candidate than those who disagree. This is not consistent with Inglehart's postmaterialism hypothesis, which states that materialists lean more toward candidates on the right. So far as presidential contests are concerned, the materialism portion of Inglehart's hypothesis seems half-correct: the desire for physical security definitely affects the vote choice of American individuals toward the

right but economic security issues lead respondents toward the left. Even in the case of a recent job loss or of no job at all, respondents' lack of economic security does not compel them to vote for Republican candidates. Furthermore, the physical security portion of the materialist variables does not seem to be weakening, something postmaterialism suggests ought to happen.

Table 4.1: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on Presidential Vote Choice  
Nationwide, 1980s-2000s

	1980s	1990s	2000s
<b>Model A</b>			
Defense	-3.03***	-0.81*	-2.29***
Laid off	0.39	-0.15	0.12
Jobs	1.77***	1.21***	2.39***
Not Working	-0.20	-.632	0.61
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.352	0.362	0.437
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.476	0.484	0.583
<b>Model B</b>			
Environmentalists	0.76	1.27***	1.96***
Worry about equality?	0.65*	1.01***	0.36
School spending	1.21***	0.89***	0.85*
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.304	0.322	0.383
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.407	0.430	0.511
<b>Model C</b>			
Defense	-2.77***	-0.68*	-2.50***
Laid off	0.18	-0.15	0.18
Jobs	1.17**	0.84**	2.05***
Not Working	-0.26	-0.65	0.39
Environmentalists	1.74*	0.76	2.91***
Worry about equality?	0.40	0.82***	0.50
School spending	0.80	0.83**	1.09*
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.366	0.372	0.461
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.492	0.497	0.616

Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space

\* significant at the .05 level \*\* significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

Results for the postmaterialism measure in Model B are also unimpressive. The variables chosen here (affect toward environmentalists, worrying about equality, and the desire to spend more on schools) were all statistically significant indicators of likelihood to vote for Democratic presidential candidates in the 1990s and the affect toward environmentalists variable increased from insignificance in the 1980s to being a very strong indicator in the 2000s. But inconsistencies and negative trends are problems for postmaterialism. The equality measure gained in the 1990s, but dropped off in the 2000s. And, just as affect toward environmentalists has increased since the 1980s, the school spending variable has been decreasing since then.

Model C tests both materialism and postmaterialism in the same regression and the results are even less supportive of the hypothesis. Defense spending is still a significant predictor of less Democratic affect, but became much less important in the 1990s and has become weaker since the 1980s. Over that same time span, the jobs variable grew in importance and significance toward Democratic support. What is interesting to note is that what is supposed to be a materialist indicator is the second best predictor of Democratic presidential voting in this decade.

All things equal, those individuals who believe that the government has a responsibility to make sure that everyone has access to a decent job are much more likely to vote Democratic than those who do not. Clearly, the postmaterialism variables are inconsistent. The environmentalist variable is significant only in the 1980s and 2000s while the equality variable is significant in the 1990s alone. Surprisingly, school spending grows as a predictor for Democratic support, in contrast to Model B in which it is falling. In short the postmaterialism

hypothesis does not gather any support from this test due to the failure of these variables to register any change in Democratic affect.

Table 4.2: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on House Vote Choice Nationwide, 1980s-2000s

	House			Party ID		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
<b>Model A</b>						
Defense	-1.41***	-1.64***	-1.51*	-1.97***	-1.37***	-
Laid off	-0.14	0.33	0.11	0.28	0.06	-0.36
Jobs	0.99***	1.17***	0.95*	1.30***	1.20***	1.38**
Not Working	0.40	-0.36	-0.66	0.12	-0.30	-0.11
<b>Model B</b>						
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.163	0.259	0.375	0.242	0.312	0.430
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.218	0.346	0.499	0.323	0.417	0.574
<b>Model C</b>						
Environmentalists	0.66	1.37***	0.98	0.64	1.16***	1.51***
Worry about equality?	0.15	0.55***	0.89**	0.35	0.76***	0.71**
School spending	1.84***	0.40**	0.64	1.34***	0.95***	0.98**
<b>Model D</b>						
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.224	0.245	0.361	0.217	0.281	0.371
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.301	0.327	0.481	0.291	0.375	0.496
<b>Model E</b>						
Defense	-1.64**	-1.56***	-1.55*	-1.76***	-1.31***	-
Laid off	0.48	0.27	0.07	-0.24	0.11	-0.32
Jobs	0.59	1.02***	0.69	1.10**	1.05***	1.16**
Not Working	1.12	-0.35	-0.70	0.24	0.20	-0.37
<b>Model F</b>						
Environmentalists	1.11	0.72	1.00	1.07*	1.13***	1.64*
Worry about equality?	-0.11	0.36	0.90*	0.15	0.65***	0.45
School spending	1.94***	0.34	0.16	1.17***	0.89***	0.81
<b>Model G</b>						
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.257	0.267	0.389	0.241	0.346	0.436
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.345	0.356	0.519	0.324	0.462	0.583

Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space. \* significant at the .05 level \*\* significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Party identification may be the most promising predictor of postmaterialism from Models A and B. The defense variable is significant and has a higher score than the jobs variable in



every decade and all three postmaterialist variables are significant by the 2000s. Yet when all of the variables are entered in Model C, more problems become apparent. The equality and school spending variables drop off, leaving the environmentalist scale as the sole significant indicator of the influence of postmaterialism on party identification. Voting for House candidates appears even less tied to postmaterialism. In the full model, the defense variable is again a very strong negative indicator in all the decades, but the postmaterialist variables are inconsistent and there are never any more than two significant variables out of seven going the predicted direction.

In short, there is no evidence that the results described above are relegated simply to one aspect of Democratic affect or another. There is clear and persistent evidence that inconsistent but positive Democratic affect is achieved from both materialist (excluding physical security) and postmaterialist values. In terms of the hypotheses, there is no evidence to support either Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 3. Both postmaterialist and materialist variables showed increases over time while two of the materialist variables never changed at all. According to these data, there has been no nationwide realignment from materialist to postmaterialist values. It is possible, however, that a realignment has occurred across regions that is not apparent in the data shown thus far. To determine if there has been such a realignment, more analyses must be performed.

To show the results from the six different regions, the tables are truncated. Separating materialism and postmaterialism in the different regions does not yield any different results and have been omitted, so only Model C is shown for the regional analyses. As there are fewer cases in the presidential and House tests and there is no major difference between the three dependent variables, only the regression on partisan identification will be displayed in Table 4.3

Table 4.3: Materialist and Postmaterialist Values on Partisan Identification By Region 1980s – 2000s

	Northeast			North Central		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Defense	-2.64**	-0.87	-5.10**	-1.15	-0.49	-2.31
Laid off	-0.43	0.08	-0.21	-0.26	0.21	1.16
Jobs	1.68*	0.58	-0.76	2.49**	1.60***	1.19
Not Working	0.24	-0.57	1.30	1.87	0.28	1.08
Environmentalists	0.79	0.78	1.94	-0.32	1.64**	2.75*
Worry about equality?	0.02	0.66	2.09*	0.07	0.56	-0.59
School spending	0.70	1.24**	1.15	1.62*	0.59	0.48
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.236	0.296	0.508	0.282	0.348	0.386
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.318	0.395	0.679	0.389	0.466	0.521
	Border South			Solid South		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Defense	-2.63	-7.43**	-----	-2.44**	-1.58***	-1.24
Laid off	-----	-2.61	-----	0.34	0.09	0.06
Jobs	-1.23	1.10	-----	-0.12	0.99**	1.93*
Not Working	0.05	-----	-----	0.54	-1.38**	-1.29
Environmentalists	3.48	-0.79	-----	1.99	0.86	1.56
Worry about equality?	3.55*	2.16*	-----	0.72	0.78**	0.47
School spending	4.51	-0.84	-----	0.95	1.16**	1.62
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.386	0.523	-----	0.254	0.371	0.455
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.518	0.698	-----	0.339	0.497	0.609
	Pacific West			Mountain West		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Defense	-3.00*	-1.49*	-3.58	-4.52	-1.83**	-0.32
Laid off	-0.24	-0.21	0.34	-3.05*	0.41	1.28
Jobs	1.45	0.62	2.56	4.48*	2.24**	5.51**
Not Working	-0.03	0.56	-----	-----	0.43	-----
Environmentalists	2.71	1.71*	4.30	-2.69	2.04*	-1.02
Worry about equality?	0.01	0.44	-0.62	-1.86	1.01	0.15
School spending	1.63	1.71**	1.06	5.04	0.96	2.05
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.357	0.401	0.578	0.389	0.262	0.372
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.479	0.535	0.770	0.519	0.351	0.498

Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space \* significant at the .05 level \*\* significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

There are three possible types of regions<sup>4</sup> with regard to postmaterialism. The first would be a region where materialism is waning in importance and postmaterialism is gaining importance, just as Inglehart's hypothesis predicts. For this analysis, this type of region will be called a "postmaterialist region". The second region would be the exact opposite, in which materialism is gaining in importance while postmaterialism trails off called a "materialist region". The third type is a "trendless region", in which none of the regions show a great tendency toward one or another type of value system at any point in time, or the values lie along a flat line, never gaining nor losing value. Most of the regions fit best in this last "trendless" category.

Inglehart's postmaterialism hypothesis gets its greatest support in the North Central region. Here, defense spending is completely insignificant and the jobs variable has declined from positive and significant to insignificant. On the postmaterialism side, the environmentalist variable has been gaining since the 1980s and the other two have been insignificant with the

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<sup>4</sup> Regressions in this chapter were plagued with the problem of having too few cases in the Border South and the Mountain West. The obvious solution to this problem would be to group the regions together, but this was not done because the states in question did not seem to fit with any other regions. The Border South States were not a part of the Solid South which was so essential to the Democratic party in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Mostly agrarian states such as Kentucky and West Virginia have little in common with states like Massachusetts and New York where the majority of the population lives in urban centers. The Mountain West also has little in common with the perennially progressive west coast.

exception of the school spending variable in the 1980s. This region is the most like the “postmaterialist region” described above. The Northeast fits in between the “trendless” and “postmaterialist” type of region. The defense spending measure has grown in significance since the 1980s and the jobs measure has dropped off while the postmaterialist variables are mainly trendless except for the equality measure which has gained in significance over the course of the three decades.

There is nothing close to a positive trend in the postmaterialist variables in the other regions. In many cases, the variables became positive and significant in one decade only to lose significance or turn negative in the next. In the case of the Border and Solid South, and the Pacific and Mountain West regions, there is absolutely no evidence of a shift toward postmaterialist values. This is especially apparent in the Solid South and the Mountain West, where the jobs variable has become more indicative of Democratic partisan identification over the years. For this reason, these regions could be classified as “trendless” regions leaning more toward “materialist” regions. The Pacific West and Border South can safely be classified as completely “trendless” as there is virtually no trend whatsoever.

What is important to recognize is that despite the fact that some of these regions fit more with Inglehart’s postmaterialism hypothesis than others, postmaterialism fails to explain voting patterns in any of the regions. Two economic security variables never showed any signs of being significant and negative as postmaterialism suggests. Rather than seeing solid and reliable trends toward more positive and significant numbers in the postmaterialist variables, the vast majority of the postmaterialist values indicators are insignificant and any change is not durable, making the change “trendless.” It is also important to note that this is not intended to proclaim the

destruction of postmaterialism. I did not intend for these variables to duplicate the entirety of Inglehart's hypothesis. However, these are not the results one would expect to find if postmaterialist values were increasing in significance among Americans. What should be gained from this discussion is an understanding that postmaterialism does not explain very much with regard to American political behavior.

To conclude this section, the hypotheses will be revisited. Hypothesis 1 stated that postmaterialism would generate more affect toward Democrats. This is clearly not the case. Although some postmaterialist values are significant indicators of Democratic affect at some times, the findings are inconsistent and unimpressive. One would expect to see that all of the postmaterialist variables would be significant and positive and all of the materialist variables would be significant and negative at all points if postmaterialism were a correct hypothesis. Since this is hardly true, Hypothesis 1 is not supported by these data.

Hypothesis 3 stated that postmaterialist values would generate greater affect toward the Democratic party over time. This is also not supported by the data. Sometimes the variables would become more influential, sometimes less, and sometimes not at all. Inconsistencies in the outcomes of these analyses lead to the dismissal of Hypothesis 3 as well. Hypothesis 5 stated that individuals in the Northeast and Pacific West would most likely exhibit postmaterialism in their political behavior. To the contrary, the North Central region showed the greatest signs of postmaterialist behavior followed by the Northeast. The Pacific West was shown to be a "trendless region" in that hardly any of the variables in the model had any influence at all. As these two regions did not show signs of greater postmaterialism, Hypothesis 5 must also be discarded.

### Moral Values Results and Discussion

Table 4.4 shows results from the logistical regression of religiosity and moral values on presidential vote choice. Right away it is evident that both moral values and attitude toward abortion both have a significant and growing effect on presidential vote choice. As of this decade, all of the separate religion and religiosity variables are neutralized in light of these variables. In fact, attitudes toward moral values have an influence on presidential vote choice rivaled only by race. Not only are the coefficients for the values variables growing but so are the pseudo- $R^2$  measures, indicating that the predictive power of this model is growing. But it is possible that this is only true for presidential voting patterns. Table 4.5 reproduced this model for House voting and partisan identification.

It appears in Table 4.5 that the extraordinary growing effect of moral values may be just a presidential voting phenomenon. In House voting, moral values dropped to insignificance in the 2000s while only abortion showed signs of increasing influence. The opposite happened in the party identification table as the moral values index grew and the abortion variable dropped off. In both of these models, the pseudo- $R^2$  statistics grew as well, indicating that the variables included explained more of the variance in House voting and party identification. It is unclear at this time why this is so. Perhaps the media attention given to presidential candidates' values systems and positions on abortion give voters more cause to vote for or against presidential candidates concerning these issues than for congressional candidates. Another factor might be incumbency. Congressional incumbents enjoy much greater chances of victory in elections compared to challengers. Perhaps this edge helps insulate incumbents from voters' judgments of values. Initial evidence performed for this paper provided little evidence for this hypothesis and

will thus not be presented here. More exhaustive studies ought to be pursued in order to uncover this perplexing phenomenon. It will suffice to say here that values issues clearly have a growing effect on presidential vote choice, but a less clear and decisive effect on House vote choice and partisan identification.

Table 4.4: Moral Values on Presidential Vote Choice Nationwide, 1980s-2000s

	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	0.27	0.26	0.38
Jewish	1.25*	1.34*	1.15
Evangelical	-0.15	0.07	-0.10
Attendance	0.35	-0.08	0.11
Importance	0.26	0.03	0.16
Moral Values	-1.28*	-2.15***	-2.41***
Abortion	-0.28	-0.59**	-0.99**
Age	0.21	1.15***	0.69*
Black	2.77***	2.78***	2.69***
Female	0.02	0.16	0.08
Education	-0.71*	-0.93***	-0.37
Ideology	-4.34***	-3.92***	-5.71***
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.282	0.316	0.397
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.379	0.423	0.591

Notes: \* significant at the .05 level \*\*significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .01 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Also of interest in these tables is that religious preference and religiosity have hardly any influence on political behavior at all. Catholicism and Judaism have much more influence over individuals' votes than evangelical Christianity. Only once is the evangelical variable significant, but it is positive, signaling that evangelicals were more likely to identify as

Democratic in the 1990s than mainline Protestants. Similarly, neither frequency of attendance nor importance of religion to one's daily life have any lasting effect on political behavior. Only in the 1990s did either of these variables produce significant effects; attendance was negatively associated with Democratic House votes and the importance of religion was positively associated with Democratic partisan identification. These results lead to the conclusion that religious preference and religiosity have little to do with political behavior – it is the degree of moral conservatism that truly matters here.

Table 4.5: Moral Values on House Vote Choice and Partisan Identification Nationwide, 1980s-2000s

	House			Party ID		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	0.67***	0.38***	0.20	0.47**	0.58***	0.21
Jewish	0.62	1.13**	0.30	0.51	1.52***	1.70**
Evangelical	0.33	0.12	-0.42	0.26	0.40***	0.26
Attendance	0.15	-0.31*	-0.05	0.19	0.10	0.35
Importance	0.13	0.12	-0.21	-0.02	0.35**	0.23
Moral Values	-0.87*	-1.11***	-0.59	-0.77*	-1.72***	-2.07***
Abortion	-0.13	-0.20	-0.97**	-0.14	-0.35**	-0.38
Age	-0.03	0.40*	0.36	0.75***	0.77***	0.43
Black	1.63***	1.64***	3.40***	1.75***	1.68***	2.49***
Female	-0.09	-0.03	-0.09	0.15	0.20**	0.28
Education	-0.81**	-1.23***	-0.91*	-0.28	-1.06***	-0.68
Ideology	-2.97***	-3.42***	-5.17***	-3.44***	-4.21***	-5.39***
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.171	0.229	0.360	0.189	0.267	0.350
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.229	0.305	0.480	0.253	0.356	0.468

Notes: \* significant at the .05 level \*\*significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .01 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

For a regional analysis of the moral values issues, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are presented. In terms of presidential vote choice, the moral values index has a profound effect in every measurable region. In the Northeast, North Central, and Pacific West regions, the index grew from insignificance in the 1980s to an incredibly strong, significant indicator by the 2000s.



What is unexpected (and inconsistent with Hypothesis 6) is that the Solid South sustained the only reduction in influence of moral values of all the regions. By the 2000s, the Northeast and Pacific West displayed greater scores for moral values in presidential voting than the Solid South.

These results are important for many reasons. The first is that moral traditionalism is not confined to one specific region of the country. The situation displayed in Table 4.6 is far from one in which moral conservatism plays different roles in the different regions. Rather, moral conservatism has similar effects in all measurable regions. Although the measure is not significant in the Mountain West, this is most probably because there are not many cases from those states. The measure is still very high there, as it is in the other regions. The second important aspect of these results is the fact that the effect of what is considered an incredibly important cultural issue – abortion – is largely marginalized in light of moral conservatism in general. This signals that perhaps it is not actual issues that cause divisions between the two parties, but rather the more abstract idea of moral conservatism. That is, moral values issues might be less about abortion and other rights issues and more about feelings of moral certitude and the need to force one's morals on others. Another important facet of these results is that in all regions, moral conservatism increased in predictive strength between the 1990s and the 2000s. This is immediately in stark contrast to the results provided in the immediately preceding chapter. While class was declining as an indicator of Democratic affect in all regions, moral conservatism has increased. A more complete analysis of the implications of this finding will be discussed in the next chapter. It will suffice to say here that values have become increasingly salient while values have become less so, possibly indicating that a realignment is occurring.

Contrast between the presidential voting results and the House voting results is immense. Where all regions (excluding the Solid South and those with too few cases) in the Presidential voting table saw increases in the moral values indicator, almost none saw any significance whatsoever in terms of House voting. Clearly whatever is causing the difference in the effect of moral values between the two branches is not regional. Abortion rarely has any effect on House voting choice and when it does, a trend does not develop. Just as in presidential voting patterns, religious preference and religiosity have practically no effect.

In terms of the hypotheses, these data again show mixed results. Hypothesis 2 suggested that individuals scoring higher on the moral values variables would be less likely to vote and identify as Democratic than those scoring lower on the moral values variables. This has been shown to be the case for presidential voting, but not for House voting or partisan identification. Hypothesis 4 claimed that over time moral values would become more important to the decision-making of American voters. Again, in the presidential voting model, this appears to be the case while in the House voting and party identification models, there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. Hypothesis 6 suggested that the Solid South and North Central regions would be influenced more by moral values than other regions due to their conservative moral stances on cultural issues such as abortion. The Solid South was the only region in this analysis in which moral values actually declined as an indicator of presidential voting. Furthermore, in no region did moral values display a large effect on House voting. Hypothesis 6, which stated that moral values would be a more significant indicator in the Solid South and North Central regions, is rejected.

Table 4.6: Moral Values and Presidential Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s

	Northeast			North Central		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	0.04	0.41	0.44	0.90*	-0.03	0.12
Jewish	1.16	1.81	-0.53	0.94	-----	-1.91
Evangelical	1.17	-0.50	1.14	0.05	-0.18	-0.35
Attendance	0.21	0.59	-1.17	-0.51	-0.33	0.70
Importance	0.17	-0.52	1.29	0.21	0.33	-0.50
Moral Values	-2.29	-2.32**	-2.71*	-0.42	-1.87**	-2.11*
Abortion	0.89	-0.51	-0.94	0.18	-0.27	0.65
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.336	0.285	0.461	0.314	0.267	0.361
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.450	0.382	0.614	0.422	0.362	0.484
	Border South			Solid South		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	-----	2.69	-----	0.24	0.14	0.15
Jewish	-----	-----	-----	1.36	0.48	-----
Evangelical	-----	2.67	-----	-0.74	0.44	-0.14
Attendance	-----	-5.39	-----	0.73	0.40	0.15
Importance	-----	1.62	-----	1.09	-0.32	0.33
Moral Values	-----	-5.15	-----	-2.52*	-1.94**	-2.34*
Abortion	-----	3.14	-----	-0.80	-1.04*	-0.62
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	-----	0.600	-----	0.313	0.381	0.412
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	-----	0.805	-----	0.419	0.511	0.554
	Pacific West			Mountain West		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	0.10	-0.16	1.11	-----	0.74	1.89
Jewish	2.35	1.93	-----	-----	-----	-----
Evangelical	-0.30	-0.97	0.58	-----	0.18	-----
Attendance	1.43	-1.49*	-0.67	-----	-0.18	2.87
Importance	-0.35	0.48	1.35	-----	1.08	1.72
Moral Values	-0.78	-3.01**	-4.35*	-----	-2.57	-6.33
Abortion	-0.29	0.65	-2.86**	-----	-1.17	-1.26
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.337	0.393	0.531	-----	0.307	0.541
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.459	0.529	0.708	-----	0.409	0.739

Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space \* significant at the .05 level \*\* significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table 4.7: Moral Values and House Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s

	Northeast			North Central		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	1.62***	0.31	-0.02	0.54	0.26	0.05
Jewish	1.88*	2.06	-1.21	1.38	1.13	-----
Evangelical	-0.21	-0.12	0.37	-0.21	0.12	-0.15
Attendance	1.14	-0.05	0.29	-0.60	-0.40	0.71
Importance	-0.42	-0.42	-0.35	0.50	-0.09	0.43
Moral Values	-0.03	-0.30	-0.95	-1.03	-1.44**	-1.67
Abortion	-0.22	-0.43	-1.06	0.16	-0.21	-1.20*
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.225	0.222	0.445	0.235	0.228	0.363
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.301	0.297	0.594	0.313	0.304	0.487
	Border South			Solid South		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	-----	1.80**	-----	1.02	0.46	0.801
Jewish	-----	-0.43	-----	-1.29	0.52	-1.05
Evangelical	-----	1.15	-----	-0.13	0.13	-0.20
Attendance	-----	0.36	-----	0.59	-0.10	-1.26*
Importance	-----	0.13	-----	-0.05	0.22	-1.35
Moral Values	-----	-1.60	-----	-0.63	-1.10*	-0.77
Abortion	-----	-0.32	-----	-0.32	-0.14	0.02
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	-----	0.255	-----	0.168	0.246	0.358
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	-----	0.341	-----	0.235	0.330	0.483
	Pacific West			Mountain West		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Catholic	0.40	-0.14	-0.03	-----	1.17*	-----
Jewish	1.67	1.67	-----	-----	6.64	-----
Evangelical	0.96	-0.57	-0.42	-----	1.28*	-----
Attendance	-0.02	-0.85*	0.64	-----	-0.59	-----
Importance	-0.08	0.54	1.91	-----	1.21	-----
Moral Values	-1.83	-1.16	-1.42	-----	-3.23**	-----
Abortion	-0.18	0.24	-0.77	-----	-1.46*	-----
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.234	0.288	0.492	-----	0.363	-----
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.312	0.385	0.660	-----	0.486	-----

Notes: Other independent variables have been omitted for space \* significant at the .05 level \*\* significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

## Conclusions

Both postmaterialist and moral values have resulted in unexpected and mixed results. Postmaterialism does not appear to have a great influence on American political behavior at all. In fact, all three hypotheses regarding the strength of postmaterialism failed to have garnered any support from the data. While some regions (e.g. North Central and Northeast) show more signs of a growing influence of postmaterialist values, it can hardly be said that postmaterialism explains a great deal about individual political behavior anywhere. Moral values, however, do show signs of support from the data concerning presidential voting patterns. Moral conservatism is incredibly predictive of support for Democratic presidential candidates. This effect has been growing since the 1980s to the point where moral values now have virtually the same predictive power as race. In fact, moral conservatism has been a growing indicator of negative Democratic affect since the 1980s. Perhaps most important in terms of this paper, the influence of moral conservatism has been growing during the same time that class has been declining. These moral values fail, however, to explain House voting and partisan identification anywhere in the country. With these results, and those of the previous chapter, the next chapter will attempt to merge the knowledge gained from these two chapters and to determine which matters more to American voters: class or values?

## CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

What is to be taken from the preceding analyses? What has been discovered about the relationships between class and political behavior and values and political behavior? What values do Americans take with them to the ballot box? In which regions does class matter more and in which do values matter more? To answer these questions, some final results will be shown and a more exhaustive analysis of these results will be undertaken.

In chapter three, it was shown that in all three categories of political behavior, class has had an increasing influence which peaked in the 1990s. This left the door open to the idea that values have had an increasing effect in this decade. The rise of George W. Bush to the presidency and Republican dominance in Congress are potential indicators of an increasing influence of values in politics. Chapter four concluded with the finding that moral conservatism had been rising during the same time in which class had been losing salience among voters. These facts, coupled with ever-increasing reductions in abortion and homosexual rights, make it easy to believe that a culture war is playing out in American politics. But is the void left by class in explaining vote choice and identification after the 1990s filled by the voters' values? Is moral conservatism really becoming more influential?

According to the data presented thus far it is evident that, at least in presidential voting, moral values and abortion might have become more powerful indicators of vote choice than class. Both moral values indicators had highly significant and growing negative scores in recent decades while class measures have been declining since the 1990s. There is no evidence that postmaterialist values have become influential at all, due to the inconsistent nature of the

indicators. What is left to determine is whether or not moral values have displaced class as the leading predictor of presidential voting behavior.

Table 5.1: Class and Moral Values on Presidential Vote 1980s-2000s

	1980s	1990s	2000s
Low Income	0.57*	0.42*	0.27
Middle Income	0.55**	0.27	0.27
Catholic	0.27	0.25	0.46
Jewish	1.24*	1.18*	1.16
Evangelical	-0.17	0.03	-0.24
Attendance	0.21	-0.03	0.21
Importance	0.38	-0.01	0.13
Moral values	-1.38**	-2.16***	-2.60***
Abortion	-0.33	-0.62**	-1.11**
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.294	0.325	0.416
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.394	0.435	0.566

Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. Other independent variables have been omitted. \* significant at the .05 level  
 \*\* significant at the .01 level \*\*\* significant at the .001 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table 5.1 displays the regression output for class and moral values variables on presidential vote choice. Clearly class begins to fizzle out as a predictor of presidential voting after the 1980s. By the 2000s, the effects of class are completely neutralized by the immense effect of moral values and abortion attitudes. Both of these variables are extraordinarily negative predictors of Democratic presidential vote choice starting in the 1990s and increasing into the

21st century. According to the data then, moral values are much more important to presidential voters than class, religious preference, and the importance of religion in one's life. House voting and partisan identification still fail to show the same results. In these models (which are omitted), neither class nor moral values exhibit a tendency shown by moral values in the presidential voting model.

Again the data forces the question of why presidential voting is so obviously tied to moral values and abortion attitudes while other political behavior is not. One part of this equation might be the fact that so much more attention is paid to presidential candidates than congressional candidates. Presidential candidates' lives are dissected in the national media to the point where virtually every detail of one's life is on display every day on television, in the newspaper, and more recently, on the internet. The national spotlight now shines on areas formerly considered off-limits to the public, including areas of faith and moral attitudes. Perhaps as the flow of information about moral beliefs of presidential candidates has become increasingly available and discussion-worthy, individuals have attempted to match their own values to those of the candidates. This information is much less common for congressional candidates, as they generally do not garner national attention. A suggestion for future research would be to determine the amount of media attention individual congressional candidates receive and to see if values have a greater effect on individual vote choice for those receiving more attention when compared with those receiving less.

Another hypothesis is that the incumbency of congressional candidates coupled with the lack of term limits causes moral values to play a lesser role in House voting decisions than in presidential elections.



Table 5.2: Moral Values and Class on Presidential Vote Choice By Region 1980s – 2000s

	Northeast			North Central		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Low Income	0.22	0.34	-1.13	-0.01	0.56	0.66
Middle Income	1.03*	0.14	-1.65	-0.08	0.47	0.69
Moral Values	-2.58	-2.38**	-5.32**	-0.80	0.61	-1.35
Abortion	1.29	-0.48	-0.63	-0.34	-1.98**	-0.75
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.367	0.278	0.540	0.315	0.295	0.375
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.492	0.374	0.721	0.425	0.400	0.503
	Border South			Solid South		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Low Income	-----	-1.25	-----	1.00	0.29	1.14*
Middle Income	-----	-2.07	-----	0.55	0.09	0.58
Moral Values	-----	-3.60	-----	-2.47*	-1.92**	-2.37*
Abortion	-----	3.34	-----	-0.89	-0.96*	-1.04
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	-----	0.596	-----	0.337	0.390	0.434
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	-----	0.801	-----	0.452	0.523	0.584
	Pacific West			Mountain West		
	1980s	1990s	2000s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Low Income	0.10	1.29*	0.18	-----	0.16	0.31
Middle Income	0.14	0.76	0.39	-----	-0.01	3.27
Moral Values	-0.49	-3.05**	-3.09	-----	-2.71	-9.99
Abortion	-0.49	0.63	-3.00*	-----	-1.29	-2.96
Cox and Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.350	0.408	0.525	-----	0.299	0.567
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.475	0.550	0.704	-----	0.400	0.774

Notes: Numbers represent the unstandardized B of each variable. Other independent variables have been omitted for space \* significant at the .05 level \*\* significant at the .01 level \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Individuals are more likely to vote for an incumbent candidate than a challenger for many reasons (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003). Perhaps this incumbency advantage allows House candidates to disregard moral values as a potential issue for voters. On a related note, it is possible that uncontested seats are partly responsible for the lack of influence on vote choice. If individuals have no choice at all, values can have no chance to have an influence. Future research should consider these possibilities when studying the effects of moral values on House vote choice.

Whatever is behind the difference in effect of moral values between House and presidential elections, the difference in effect is apparent in all regions. Regressions were performed as above for each region and are reported in Table 5.2. Moral values and/or abortion are significant in the Northeast, Pacific West, and Solid South regions. The Solid South's great propensity for class voting is apparent in the table as low income voters are much more likely to vote Democratic than upper income voters, despite the effect of values and all the other independent variables. Still moral conservatism has a greater effect on presidential vote choice than class even in the Solid South.

Having made these discoveries, the questions raised in the introduction can now be fully addressed. The first series of questions raised dealt with regional differences. Realignment theory was discussed in the literature review in order to provide a framework through which we might understand regional change. It is apparent from these results that there is real potential for a presidential voting realignment on a national scale from class-based to values-based cleavages. What is not apparent, however, is a significant regional difference in voting patterns. For example, in a regional realignment we might expect postmaterialist values to become more

significant than class in some regions while moral values become more salient in others. This does not appear to be happening. Instead, all regions appear to have traded class voting for values voting, with the exception of the Solid South in which class has retained its significance. Although a regional split does not seem to have occurred, there are more subtle differences in the values between regions. In the Northeast, the moral conservatism index is very strongly related to presidential vote choice, but the abortion debate does not hold much sway over these voters. In contrast the Pacific West has become much more attuned to the abortion issue. In these states, the general idea of traditional values holds less sway than the more specific moral issue of abortion. It will suffice to say here that there is a real potential for a secular nationwide realignment to occur, but not based on regional lines.

Table 5.3: Mean Values and Abortion Attitude Scores by Religious Group

	Values			Abortion		
	Mean	N	SD	Mean	N	SD
Catholic	0.59	3472	0.189	0.41	5137	0.362
Jewish	0.46	206	0.219	0.12	354	0.243
Mainline Protestant	0.61	3420	0.201	0.29	5299	0.320
Evangelical Protestant	0.67	4428	0.205	0.51	6566	0.356
Other Religion	0.61	516	0.250	0.40	752	0.387
Atheist/Agnostic	0.43	22	0.200	0.16	53	0.288
Total	0.62	12064	0.206	0.40	18161	0.360

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

The next series of questions were concerned with the effect of evangelical Christians on political behavior. The past twenty-five years have witnessed the rise of the religious right from church basements to the White House. Political discussions at dinner tables and in the halls of Congress are often dominated by talk of values that emanate from evangelical belief systems.

Due to the apparent importance of this particular religious preference, one would certainly expect a voter that holds evangelical Christian beliefs to vote differently than would a voter who prefers another or no religion. But the data insist that evangelical voters act the same as mainline Protestants in almost every case. More often, Jewish and Catholic voters tend to vote and identify more as Democratic.

Perhaps the reason why this is so is because of the fact that evangelicals claim to be more morally conservative than members of other religions. Table 5.3 displays the mean score of individuals in each religious group on the moral conservatism index and the abortion attitude scale used in the preceding analyses. Evangelical Protestants have the highest moral conservatism score and least permissive attitudes toward abortion of any religion. Scoring 0.05 higher than the mean total and 0.06 higher than mainline Protestants, evangelicals easily have the most morally conservative responses of any religious group in America. It can be concluded then that the reason evangelical religious preferences seem to wield such influence on voters is because of the moral traditionalism evangelicals hold. In other words, evangelical Christianity is politically influential by proxy of the morally traditional values its members hold.

### Conclusion

Although the question is far from settled, there is clear evidence that class voting has given way to values voting, at least at the presidential level. There are many potential implications of this finding. Politically, Democratic elites ought to work on neutralizing the effects of moral conservatism and Republicans ought to maximize this division. Moral conservatism has become more effective in every decade since the 1980s at driving voters away from Democratic presidential candidates, and the tides show no signs of stopping. If Democrats

hope to propel their own candidate to victory in 2008, how they react to moral issues must receive serious attention. Republicans are the beneficiaries of this divide. So long as the nation is more morally conservative than progressive, Republicans would do well to follow a familiar divide-and-conquer strategy.

What appears to be happening, though, is that the population is becoming more morally progressive over time. Since the 1980s, the moral conservatism index has undergone a statistically significant decline, signaling a more progressive trend. While Republicans are the current beneficiaries of this trend, Democrats need not be left out. The Democratic party has been reluctant to tackle values issues during this period of increasing salience. In order to benefit from this political trend, the Democratic party needs to unite on common values issues and communicate that unity to the voters. Without a consistent message, all the voters will know of the values of the Democratic party is what the Republicans say. Only if the Republican party is countered on the values issues with a morally progressive and cohesive message, will the Democrats have much hope in the future. This message ought to focus on acceptance of others, even if we don't necessarily agree with their morals. The results in this paper suggest that moral conservatism is driving a wedge between presidential voters; Democrats need only supply leverage to that wedge in order to gain support.

There is evidence that this is occurring on a small scale at present. Just as Republicans used state constitutional amendment ballot initiatives on moral values issues like the ban on gay marriage in recent national elections, Democrats are attempting to use a minimum wage increase as a values issue to increase turnout in the 2006 election. National figures such as Ted Kennedy have spoken passionately about that subject recently, saying that "part of American values are

economic fairness” in reference to the minimum wage (Hennessy-Fiske 2006). Churches have also weighed in on this issue, lending credence to the moral values aspect of the minimum wage raise. Steve Copley of the National Council of Churches said recently that increasing the minimum wage “is truly a moral issue, a faith issue and a family values issue” (“Huckabee Signs Minimum Wage Raise” 2006). These are signs that Democrats are becoming more aware of the necessity to tackle the values issues, and this may help win elections in the short term. But the evidence from this paper suggests that a more holistic values agenda ought to be expressed which goes beyond issues, encompassing more areas of moral progressivism.

In the meantime, Republicans have certainly had the edge on the moral values issues. With no progressive alternative, all values issues have been framed by the more conservative party. To continue benefiting from this political division, Republicans need to continue on their current path. This is still a morally conservative nation, even though it is less so since the 1980s. So long as the Democratic party is oblivious to the values issues that voters are focusing on, the Republican party will continue to fare well. The rules of the game could easily change, however, if the Democrats incorporate moral values issues and ideals. As Table 5.4 illustrates, Democrats are closer to Independents than Republicans on the moral conservatism scale and the abortion measure. Independent T-tests revealed that there is a less significant difference between Democrats and Independents than there is between Republicans and Independents on both variables. If Democrats frame values issues in a way that resonates with Independent voters, they could add many Independents that vote with the Republican party because of values issues.

It should also be noted that despite the fact that these results were only significant for presidential voting patterns, other levels of government are immune from values issues. One

hypothesis I discussed in the previous section was that media attention to the presidential race could be making the values of the candidates more available. The ever-increasing size of internet-based political action and discussion could easily change this. Media outlets have unlimited space with which to fill information (and advertisements), and the most influential blogs now have daily traffic in the hundreds of thousands of individuals. If more information about candidates for lower offices are disseminated through these newer outlets, perhaps values might have a greater effect on vote choice of lower-level candidates over time.

Table 5.4: Mean Moral Conservatism and Abortion Scores by Party Identification, 2004

	Moral Conservatism			Abortion		
	Mean	N	SD	Mean	N	SD
Republican	0.66	443	0.193	0.48	434	0.353
Independent	0.55	96	0.198	0.40	98	0.358
Democrat	0.48	503	0.220	0.33	499	0.352
Total	0.56	1042	0.225	0.40	1031	0.360

Source: 2004 NES Dataset

In terms of research, other studies could expand on these findings. The question concerning the difference in effect of values between presidential and House elections is still not answered. New research can determine whether or not moral conservatism compels individuals to vote. Special attention could be paid to individual characteristics of presidential candidates to determine if there is some charismatic influence on values voters. The nature of the realignment also ought to be studied. Analyses for this line of study might ask whether the parties themselves have changed in order to increase the political saliency of moral values or if extra-political actors such as televangelists have had a more active role in changing the political climate. The

findings in this paper can also help attain more accurate results in other political behavior research. Discussions on the political effects of class ought to take moral values and abortion attitudes into consideration.

In the introduction to this paper, I discussed how the media portrayed the electoral victories of George W. Bush. If one were to take these sources at face value, it would seem that moral values had an effect which generated massive amounts of support for the Republican candidate. Through the course of this paper, it has been determined that moral conservatism and abortion attitudes do have more influence over individual vote choice for presidential candidates. The new political reality is that holy books have begun to outweigh pocketbooks.



## APPENDIX A: EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS AND THE SOLID SOUTH

In Chapter One, some statements were made about the prevalence of evangelical Christians in the south, and their growing political behavior. I have assembled the following tables from the same dataset as the original text in order to provide evidence to these facts. Table A.1 shows that evangelical Protestantism is overrepresented in the Solid South, especially amongst individuals with low incomes. Table A.2 shows that the percentage of voters who prefer evangelical Protestantism has risen since the 1960s.

Table A.1: Percentage of Evangelical Christians in the South and Non-South

	Percent of Evangelicals	Percent of Total Population
Southerners	51.4%	29.9%
<i>Low Income</i>	25.5%	13.1%
<i>Middle Income</i>	16.0%	9.3%
<i>High Income</i>	9.8%	7.6%
Non-southerners	48.6%	70.1%
<i>Low Income</i>	18.2%	20.0%
<i>Middle Income</i>	17.2%	23.8%
<i>High Income</i>	13.2%	26.2%

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table A.2: Percentage of Voters With Evangelical Religious Preference

1960s	26.1%
1970s	27.7%
1980s	31.1%
1990s	35.2%
2000s	31.7%

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

APPENDIX B: NUMBERS OF CASES IN EACH TABLE

Due to the differences in variable choice and combinations of variables in each of the tables in the text, the number of cases in each table varies. Due to the already large amount of space taken up by the tables, I have opted to report the numbers of cases in each table in this appendix through a series of separate tables. The corresponding tables are identified in the title of each table.

	Northeast			North Central			Border South		
	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID
1950s	480	605	865	650	798	1101	56	64	147
1960s	542	679	1013	673	882	1348	130	128	277
1970s	401	684	1324	591	1010	1741	109	169	429
1980s	399	532	969	576	802	1425	88	119	252
1990s	311	501	986	465	825	1415	59	105	191
2000s	206	178	305	320	291	445	44	29	64
	Solid South			Pacific West			Mountain West		
	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID
1950s	295	329	814	172	199	324	62	73	115
1960s	437	534	1098	258	340	541	66	84	130
1970s	435	657	1696	266	453	812	67	145	227
1980s	543	717	1704	378	480	825	87	124	258
1990s	519	819	1904	249	435	772	110	192	349
2000s	353	265	577	204	169	298	65	58	105

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
President	2308	2888	2780	3169	2524	1616
House	2832	2651	2294	2300	4171	1330
Party Identification	5623	6440	9349	8266	8182	2368

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table B.3: Number of Total Income Respondents By Decade and Region, 1952-2004  
(Corresponds with Tables 3.5 and 3.6)

	<b>Northeast</b>			<b>North Central</b>			<b>Border South</b>		
	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID
1950s	674	842	1205	899	1102	1536	87	94	224
1960s	783	1001	1529	952	1285	1972	197	197	443
1970s	631	1022	2023	889	1510	2657	185	275	706
1980s	626	842	1538	931	1290	2217	136	187	372
1990s	463	725	1440	741	1325	2215	90	157	288
2000s	297	255	441	471	419	648	63	46	91
	<b>Solid South</b>			<b>Pacific West</b>			<b>Mountain West</b>		
	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID	Pres.	House	PID
1950s	391	433	1059	240	285	459	93	114	166
1960s	606	761	1538	347	493	808	97	135	199
1970s	638	977	2521	369	635	1176	117	228	365
1980s	865	1124	2568	546	712	1238	152	212	413
1990s	745	1178	2711	372	643	1140	179	314	590
2000s	504	374	801	285	243	415	98	79	151

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table B.4: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist Respondents by Model  
(Corresponds with Tables 4.1 and 4.2)

	1980s	1990s	2000s
<b>Model A</b>			
President	1263	1418	544
House	1376	2123	479
Party ID	2288	3571	667
<b>Model B</b>			
President	895	2174	1059
House	792	2960	894
Party ID	1181	4613	1263
<b>Model C</b>			
President	582	1382	535
House	512	1900	470
Party ID	759	2918	633

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table B.5: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist Respondents to Partisan Identification by Region and Decade (Corresponds to Table 4.3)

	1980s	1990s	2000s
Northeast	152	511	121
North Central	213	826	167
Border South	33	99	17
Solid South	203	826	174
Pacific West	130	444	107
Mountain West	35	240	63

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table B.6: Number of Total Moral Values Respondents by Decade (Corresponds to Tables 4.4 and 4.5)

	1980s	1990s	2000s
President	827	1821	880
House	1083	2939	744
Party Identification	1760	4622	1046

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table B.7: Number of Materialist and Postmaterialist Respondents to Partisan Identification by Region and Decade (Corresponds to Table 4.3)

		1980s	1990s	2000s
Northeast	President	158	336	157
	House	195	494	137
North Central	President	265	564	258
	House	359	947	236
Border South	President	26	60	24
	House	30	105	20
Solid South	President	208	510	252
	House	272	805	188
Pacific West	President	143	227	136
	House	185	383	118
Mountain West	President	27	124	52
	House	42	205	44

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

Table B.8: Number of Class and Moral Values Respondents to Presidential Vote by Region and Decade (Corresponds to Tables 5.1 and 5.2)

	1980s	1990s	2000s
Total	772	1701	771
Northeast	152	316	135
North Central	243	521	227
Border South	25	57	22
Solid South	199	475	221
Pacific West	128	219	119
Mountain West	25	113	46

Source: 2004 Cumulative NES Dataset

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