# AIRPORT SECURITY: EXAMINING THE CURRENT STATE OF ACCEPTANCE OF BIOMETRICS AND THE PROPENSITY OF ADOPTING BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY FOR AIRPORT ACCESS CONTROL

by

## KRISTINE M. SUMNER B.S. University of Central Florida, 1999 M.S. University of Central Florida, 2000

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Major Professor: Aaron Liberman

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#### **ABSTRACT**

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 propelled the issue of aviation security to the forefront of the U.S. domestic agenda. Although hundreds of individual airports exist in the U.S., the travel activities at each of these airports combine to holistically comprise an aviation system that represents a significant portion of the U.S. social and economic infrastructure. Disruption at one airport resulting from a criminal act, such as terrorism, could exert detrimental effects upon the aviation system and U.S national security (9/11 Commission, 2004).

Each U.S. airport is individually responsible for various aspects of security including the control of physical access to sensitive and secure areas and facilities (9/11 Commission, 2004). Biometric technology has been examined as one method of enhancing airport access control to mitigate the possibility of criminal acts against airports. However, successful implementation of biometric technology depends largely on how individual security directors at each airport perceive, understand, and accept that technology. Backgrounds, attitudes, and personal characteristics influence individual decisions about technology implementation (Rogers, 1995; Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990).

This study examines the problem of airport access control, as well as, the current trends in biometric technology. Utilizing a survey of airport security directors and security managers, this study draws upon innovation diffusion theory and organizational theories to determine what personal, organizational, and technical variables contribute to the propensity of airport security directors and managers to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

The United States, along with the rest of the world, was shocked and stunned as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 unfolded. Following the attacks, debates relating to terrorist activities within the United States and the need to enhance many aspects of security began to emerge. At the forefront of these debates was aviation security. The security of the aviation system is considered important because of its role as part of the critical infrastructure of the U.S. "Virtually every community in America is connected to the global transportation network...that moves people and goods into, within, and out of the nation. We, therefore, must promote the efficient and reliable flow of people, goods, and services, while preventing terrorists from using transportation conveyances or systems to deliver implements of destruction" (Office of Homeland Security 2002, p. 21).

Aviation is a vital part of America's critical infrastructure. A substantial disruption of the air transportation systems could have an enormous impact on the social and economic functions of the United States (9/11 Commission, 2004). As such, airports must have the design and security structure to mitigate possible criminal acts, like terrorism, that could cause such disruptions. Historically, airport security has taken a backseat in an aviation system designed to expedite passenger movement and increase financial gains for the airline industry (Hoge and Rose, 2001). The aviation industry is a "commercial enterprise that will always make poor public policy decisions when they affect profits and losses" (Hoge and Rose 2001, p.165). This notion has left U.S. airports vulnerable to numerous security threats. A breach at an airport's physical access control point is one such threat.

Section 1542.207 of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) rules dictates that airports are responsible for controlling access to secure areas and facilities at their respective airports. Each airport has a security director who is responsible for applying the rules of the TSA and who is in charge of promoting security measures at their respective airports. While all airports have some method of access control, a lack of accurate and rigorous identification of employees who are cleared to access secure areas has been seen as a serious threat. Government studies, highlighting the pervasiveness of unsecured access points, reveal that airport access control is a critical security problem and it is an area that needs to be strengthened (Bernard, 2003).

Biometric personal identification systems represent a possible solution to security threats caused by non-identification methods of access control (Perry, 2004). Non-identification methods such as card swiping systems, keys, PIN numbers, or other credentials are inherently un-secure because they allow anyone who possesses them to gain entry, even if that person is not the authorized holder. These methods cannot be controlled because they can easily be lost, stolen, borrowed, copied, or otherwise compromised (Perry, 2004). Biometric systems, however, utilize a person's unique physical characteristics to verify that person's identity. Although biometric technology has been utilized successfully for access control in many areas of government and the private sector, such technology has been slow to gain acceptability in the airport environment.

Since 9/11 there has been an effort to increase airport security, but a majority of research and funding has gone to such areas as passenger and baggage screening (9/11 Commission, 2004). Access control measures, while mentioned as important

vulnerabilities to consider, have not yet been assigned any form of standardization or enhancement strategies (U.S. General Accounting Office 2001, p. 5). Airport security directors face the problem of having to consider access control options and changes with little or no guidance from TSA on which is the best method to implement (ACI, 2005; TSA, 2005). Besides TSA guidance, differences in individual attitudes, characteristic, and background of the airport security directors may influence who is likely to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Additionally, organizational and technological factors may also influence the propensity to adopt biometric technology (Rogers, 2005). Since airport security directors, as representatives of their respective airports, will ultimately be the "end-users" of any technology that will be used to enhance access control, it is important to examine those personal and organizational characteristics that influence the likelihood of adoption of an innovative technology such as biometrics. The understanding of such characteristics can assist airport managers, TSA, and industry experts in deciding if biometric implementation would be met with acceptance or resistance among airport security directors (Rogers, 2005).

The purpose of this study, therefore, was to 1) examine the current trends in biometric acceptance, 2) measure the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, and 3) examining those factors that may be related to that propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Because "human elements" of individuals play a major role in organizational operations, it is important to examine those factors that may have an impact on the propensity to adopt and deployment new technologies (Chan, 2002). This study drew upon Roger's (1995) diffusion theory, as well as, organizational theories to

examine the relationship between social, organizational, and technical factors and the propensity of airport security directors adopting biometric technology (as an innovation) to enhance airport access control. Drawing from the available literature, the following research questions were developed for this study: 1) to what extent is airport security directors propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control influenced by social demographics, organizational factors, and attitudinal factors, and 2) to what extent is airport security director propensity to adopt biometric systems for access control influenced by characteristics of the innovation and technical readiness of the airport itself.

In order to examine the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, a survey instrument, similar to the design used by Moore and Benbasat (1991), was designed and administered to airport security directors at 380 U.S. airports. The frequencies of the responses were analyzed and summarized, and the relationships between 7 independent variables and the propensity to adopt biometric technology (the dependant variable) were analyzed using correlation.

#### 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

## 2.1. Aviation Security

After the events of September 11, 2001, questions were raised regarding the reliability and security of American commercial air travel and the safety of U.S. airports from which commercial planes depart and land. More than any other component of the U.S. transportation system, air security has garnered the most attention because historically, in large measure, the adoption of counterterrorism policies and programs are in direct response to specific events (Waugh, 2004). Airplanes were used to carry out the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, therefore the aviation sector has received a large amount of counterterrorism attention. Since 9/11 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration, several measures have been implemented to enhance aviation security. These include:

- Deployment of federal passenger screeners at the nation's airports
- Institution of 100% checked baggage screening; utilization of explosive detection systems or explosive trace detection equipment to screen checked baggage
- Background checks on all airport personnel
- Suspension of the Transit without Visa program (TWOV) and the
   International-to-International transit program (ITI), eliminating terrorists'
   ability to exploit such programs to gain access to U.S.-bound aircraft or the
   United States
- Expansion of the Federal Air Marshal program so that thousands of protective air marshals are now flying on commercial aircraft

- Commercial passenger aircraft now have hardened cockpit doors to help prevent a hostile takeover (The White House, 2003; Dillingham, 2003).

Even with these measures, however, security at airports themselves is still plagued with vulnerabilities and threats that could be exploited by criminals, including terrorists. One such vulnerability is weak physical access control to secure airport areas (Brown, 2006).

#### 2.1.1. Terrorist motivations

Before examining airport access control it is important to highlight why, especially following 9/11, these vulnerabilities have received so much attention. In a word, the answer is terrorism. While terrorism will be discussed generally to lend relevance to this study, a full discourse on terrorism is not the focus of this research. In today's society there are many different definitions of terrorism and terrorists, though unanimity on a standard definition of either term is non-existent. Terrorism is defined by the FBI as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." The U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear, intended to coerce or try to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological" (Segar 2003, p. 257).

Different terrorists and terrorist groups are motivated by different agendas.

However, there are common goals that are generally shared by terrorists. These goals provide evidence as to why terrorists could be considered motivated perpetrators of a terrorist act against airports and airlines: 1) no rules: terrorists do not hold to normal conventions that are found in arenas such as warfare; 2) no innocents: because terrorists

are fighting an established system thought to be "unjust" any member of that system is a justified target; 3) economy: terrorists attempt to frighten thousands, or millions, with a single act; 4) publicity: a public act of terrorism magnifies the event and heightens the associated fear; additionally, publicity advertises the terrorists' cause; 5) individual reward: terrorists commit acts of terror for the purpose of individual advancement, whether in this life or in the "after life"; and 6) varied objective: either political, religious, or ideological (Vito & Holmes, 1994).

## 2.1.2. Airport Susceptibility

After examining the varied goals that drive terrorists, it is important to understand why the aviation industry and airports are vulnerable to terrorist acts. The Committee for Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism identifies five characteristics that make airports susceptible targets for acts of terrorism. These characteristics are: 1) openness and accessibility: airports were designed well before security and terrorism were issues of concern in the United States. By design, airports allow a high degree of user access to accommodate a large volume of people. 2) Extent and ubiquity: there are over 500 commercial service airports and over 14,000 general aviation airports across the U.S. Many of the infrastructure facilities such as terminals, navigation aides, and operational control centers are extremely difficult to safeguard, monitor, and control. 3) Emphasis on efficiency and competitiveness. Because airports operate as for profit entities, security measures that are viewed as costly and/or that impede operations are usually rejected. 4) Diversity of owners, operators, and overseers: although the federal government establishes guidelines and regulations for airports, its ownership of commercial airports is minimal. Most airports are controlled by state and local

governments, which makes standardization of security measures complex. 5)

Entwinement in society and the global economy. Airports and airlines are essential entities that connect areas around the country, and the world. Any disruption in the air transportation system would have far reaching consequences (Committee on Science and Technology for Counter Terrorism, 2002).

## 2.2. Airport Access Control

Following 9/11, several airport vulnerabilities have been examined and, as highlighted by government studies, a terrorist could utilize weaknesses in airport access control methods to approach an aircraft (Eisenburg, 2001). The concept of airport access control is to designate who has access to various facilities, services, and sensitive airport areas (Bernard, 2003). Airports, by their nature, employ hundreds of individuals with varying jobs requiring a diverse range of access privileges. Pilots, flight attendants, baggage handlers, mechanics, fuel truck drivers, ticket agents, gate agents, airport operations staff, air traffic controllers, airport security, and airport maintenance personnel are all examples of various employees needing privileges to multiple access points located within the airport (Lazarick, 1998). Figure 1 shows a basic diagram example of how access privileges at airports can be different depending upon the job required. Each colored block on the diagram represents an access door/point in the airport.




Figure 1: Example of airport access (Source: CoreStreet Ltd., 2005)

In theory, only those employees that are granted access privileges to their respective "work zones" can access the security mechanisms (i.e. doors, gates, etc.) to enter that zone. For example, baggage handlers (represented by purple on Figure 1) can only enter areas required to move baggage from the terminal to the aircraft. They would not be permitted to enter other areas not associated with baggage handling, such as the control tower. However, as the following literature review indicates, the current methods of airport access control make limiting access to only authorized individuals an arduous task.

## 2.2.1. History of Airport Access Control

In 1973, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated that airports must have an Airport Security Plan (ASP), which includes an outline of the procedures that airports would utilize to control access to secured airport areas and facilities. It became the responsibility of each airport to regulate and control the movement of those persons who, after a background check, were granted access to secured airport areas (Radio

Technical Commission for Aeronautics, 2002). Measures, such as doors, were installed to restrict access to secure areas such as baggage handling, flight crew areas, and aircraft operations areas. The purpose of airport access control became to authenticate, or identify with a high degree of certainty, that an employee is who he or she claims to be in order to gain access to secure airport areas (Mulligan, 2002),

Federal regulations regarding access control were tightened somewhat in 1987 after the crash of Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 1711, which was overtaken by a recently fired and disgruntled employee. The employee was able to use his employee ID, which was not collected after his dismissal, to circumvent security and board the plane with a loaded 44 Magnum pistol. After take off, the employee shot the pilots, consequently crashing the plane and killing all 44 passengers on board (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992).

By 1989, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 107.14 was written into law. This regulation stipulated that any airport with regular passenger aircraft service (one flight per day) utilizing aircraft of 60 seats or more must strictly control access to airport operations areas and deny access to those who are unauthorized or whose authorization status changes (Mulligan, 2002). Despite the regulations, airport security was lax as a result of an industry goal of maximizing passengers while minimizing costs. Security became an afterthought due to its expense. "...[Aviation] is a commercial enterprise that will always make poor public policy decisions when they affect profit and losses" (Hoge and Rose 2001, p. 164).

Due to the lack of strict access control at airports, government inspectors found that it was quite easy to exploit access control vulnerabilities and smuggle weapons onto planes

or to enter aircraft operations areas without identification. Studies highlighted the possibility of a person gaining unauthorized access to secure airport areas. For example, from December 1998 through April 1999, the Transportation Department, while conducting a test of airport security, found that investigators managed to breach airport access control 117 out of 173 times. This represents a 68% success rate. The investigators were able to "piggyback employees through doors, ride unguarded elevators, and walk through concourse doors, gates, and jet bridges unchallenged" (Eisenburg 2001, p. 85). Even more critical was the discovery that the "successful penetration of secure areas almost always resulted in our boarding an aircraft," according to Alexis Stefani, a Transportation Department official (Hoge and Rose 2001, pg.170).

The areas that the investigators were able to penetrate are referred to as the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA), and each airport defines its SIDA in its Airport Security Plan. The SIDA includes those areas that are sensitive in nature; for example, the area surrounding parked aircraft would fall under this category. In order to access the SIDA, and at all times while in the SIDA, each employee is required to display his/her airport issued ID badge. However, the problem that exists is that the practices to enforce this requirement vary drastically among airports (Lazarick, 1998).

The events of 9/11 further impacted airport access control standards. In February of 2002, the FAA transferred airport security rules related to access control to the newly formed Transportation Security Administration (TSA). According to section 1542.207 of TSA's Access Control Requirements, airports must:

- Ensure that only those individuals authorized to have unescorted access to the secured areas are able to gain entry.

- Ensure that an individual is immediately denied entry to a secure area when that person's access authority for that area is withdrawn.
- Provide a means to differentiate between individuals authorized to have access to an entire secured area and individuals authorized to access to only a particular portion of a secured area (Bernard, 2003).

Despite post 9/11 standards and regulations attempting to tighten airport access control, incidences of unauthorized access to secured areas are still being reported. For example, on April 5, 2002 (at an undisclosed airport) an airline worker "escorted his girlfriend and three relatives through a lower-level door near the ramp...entering a secure area of the jetway..." without screening (Morrison 2002, pg. 2). In another such occurrence, in May of 2003, a man was able to sneak through a secure airline door at Pittsburgh International Airport, drive a United Airlines Truck around the airfield, and walk onto a U.S. Airway plane were he was found asleep the next day (Goo, 2003). As recently as May of 2005, a man who did not work at the Salt Lake City International Airport used an access badge belonging to his twin brother, a legitimate airport employee, to gain access to sterile, or secure, facilities at the airport (Desertnews.com, 2005).

## 2.2.2. Current Problems in Airport Access Control

Examples of such unauthorized admission to secured areas of airports highlight an inherent weakness in most traditional methods of access control such as lock and key or card only mechanisms: there is no control over who or how many individuals actually enter a secured area when an access media is presented. "Card access systems, PIN

numbers, keys or other credentials allow anyone who possesses them to gain entry. They cannot be controlled because they are so easily lost, stolen, borrowed, copied or otherwise compromised" (Perry 2003, p.1). These inherent problems could possibly be exploited by a criminal, including a terrorist, wishing to gain access to secure airport facilities and functions.

"[Employee entrances] are a weakness in the system that's exploitable by a terrorist group or someone who wants to make use of it," states former Federal Aviation Administration security director Billie Vincent (Salant 2002, p. 2). "We need better systems that provide protection for our secured areas," said House Transportation Aviation Subcommittee Chairman John Mica R-Fl. "There is no question we're vulnerable" (Salant 2002, p. 2). While the type of access control can be the major factor contributing to its vulnerability, a lack of innovativeness by airport security directors to embrace a new technology such as biometrics could hinder the use of secure and positive identification systems for access control enhancements.

## 2.3. Biometrics

In order to overcome the inherent problems with traditional airport access control methods and to securely strengthen access control doors that lead to secure airport areas, proactive technological innovations are being examined as to their applicability to airport security. One such technological advancement, biometric identification, is being considered as an alternative to traditional access control methods. TSA Administrator, Admiral James M. Loy, advocates such technological advances. "To stay ahead of terrorists who would do us harm, it is vitally important that TSA always develop, select, and deploy cutting edge technology" (DHS 2003, Oct. 16).

Within the realm of security, there are three ways to authenticate that a person is who that person claims to be: 1) by something one knows (a password, a PIN); 2) by something one has (a key, an ID card, a token); and 3) by something that one is (a biometric, such as a fingerprint). As previously mentioned, such items as keys and PINs can be compromised. However, a biometric represents the most secure and convenient authentication tool because it cannot be borrowed, stolen, or forgotten (Liu & Silverman, 2001).

Biometrics is defined as a technology that "analyzes and measures unique physiological or biological characteristics that can be stored and retrieved for positive identification" (Etzioni 1999, p. 2). A biometric system serves the purpose of either identification or authentication. For example, *identification* occurs when a law enforcement agency has the fingerprints of a suspect. The agency checks that set of fingerprints against a database of fingerprints in order to ascertain the identity of the suspect. By comparison, *authentication* occurs when a person uses an ATM card. A Personal Identification Number, or PIN, must be entered to verify authenticity before access is granted.

Before the ability to access authentication systems is granted to a person, that person's data must be prerecorded, or "enrolled" into the database. Users "enroll" by having their biometric information (fingerprint, iris pattern or face) scanned by the system. Key features are then extracted and converted into unique templates, which are then encrypted and stored into the database or onto an ID card. When the user attempts to gain access, the information he or she presents is compared to that pre-stored template (Anthes, 2002).

Simply stated, identification systems answer the question "Who are you?" while systems used for authentication answer the question "Are you who you claim to be?" The operational difference between identification and authentication systems lies in the number of comparisons that the system makes. "For identification, the computer may have to compare many thousands of fingerprints; authentication requires only one comparison between the card (template) and the person presenting it" (Colman, 2000, pg.9). Identification systems, therefore, make "one to many" comparisons (1:N), while authentication systems have "one to one" comparisons (1:1).

While any human physiological or behavioral trait can be used as a biometric characteristic, there are, according to Prabhakar et al, 2003, several requirements that must be met in order for the biometric characteristic to be functional in an access control system. These requirements are: 1) universality: each person should have the characteristic; 2) distinctiveness: each person should be different in terms of the characteristic; 3) permanence: the characteristic should remain constant over a period of time; 4) collectability: the characteristic should be quantitatively measurable (Prabhakar et al, 2003).

Biometric identification systems are being examined as one proactive measure that can be taken to secure employee access control points. The U.S. Congress has even recognized that biometric technologies "are a sound method of restricting access to secured airport areas" (TSA 2005, p. 1). However, biometrics technologies used for access control in airports have been applied slowly (ACI, 2005). Due to the fact that biometric technology has been promoted as being an affective form of access control, yet it has been slowly implemented in airport access control systems, the question becomes

"what factors influence an airport security directors' propensity of adopting biometric technology for airport access control?"

## 2.4. Chapter Summary

The United States aviation industry is a vital part of America's critical infrastructure. As such, a disruption within the aviation system would have an enormous social and economic impact on the United States. Therefore, any area of airport security that could be susceptible to criminal acts, including terrorism, should be closely scrutinized. Airport access control is designed to ensure that only legitimate authorized employees are able to access secure airport areas. However, studies have shown that despite post 9/11 standards and regulation lack of strict access control has allowed unauthorized individuals to successful penetrate secure airport areas.

It is apparent that traditional methods of access control need to be enhanced in order to mitigate unauthorized access. One such method of enhancement could be the utilization of biometric technology which measures unique and distinctive individual characters, however, implementation of biometric technology into airport access control systems has been slow. The remaining chapters will examine the theoretical foundations of innovation adoption and will identify factors that could influence the propensity to adopt an innovation. Further, the results of the survey instrument administered to airport security directors and managers will aid in the discussion on what factors influence the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

## 3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Although biometric identification systems have been advocated as a technological innovation that could be beneficial to airport access control, large scale adoption of biometric technology within the airport community has yet to occur. Several theories examining the personal and organizational factors that may influence airport security directors' propensity for adopting biometric technology for airport access control will be highlighted below. Additionally, these theories were used to guide the survey creation, administration, and analysis used in this study.

Airports today are typical of many organizations established throughout the business realm. As such, airport operations can be analyzed using organizational type theories. "Many theories have been developed over the past 100 years for the design and running of organizations" (Burnes 1996, p.11). Theories abound regarding every element of organizational development and management ranging from strategies, decision making, cultural change, communication, leadership, and a myriad of other organizational factors. For the premise of this research, the focus will be on those theories involving organizational and personal technological acceptance. The reasoning here is to show that organizational change, especially when discussing the propensity of adopting new technologies, requires both an organizational, as well as a managerial, investigation. For airport security, this means that the acceptance of biometric technologies must come from the both the culture of airport operations and the airport security directors themselves.

Organizational change first involves the (1) transformation of an organization between two points in time and (2) the process by which that transformation occurs

(Barnett & Carroll, 1995). Organizational change is a response to "major shifts in the environment and as a result of internal planned efforts to achieve greater profitability, quality, and effectiveness" (Whelan-Berry et al 2003, p.187). The motivations for this responsive change can be driven by a host of factors including internal, external, political, technological, environmental, or a combination of any one of these (Barnett & Carroll, 1995). Another of the primary driving forces for organizational change is the manger of the organization. As Whelan-Berry et al (2003) states, organizational change involves the adoption of change initiatives at both the organizational and at the management level.

However, while both the motivations for change and the role of the manager as a change agent are capable of affecting change in an organization, the resistance to change on both levels must first be overcome.

Every change agent has experienced resistance...Individuals are said to resist change because of habit and inertia, fear of the unknown, absence of the skills they will need after the change, and fear of losing power. Organizations are said to resist change because of inertia, sunk costs, scare resources, threats to the power base of the old dominant coalition, values and beliefs, conformity to norms, and inability to perceive alternatives (Agoes 1997, p. 917-918).

Bovey and Hede (2001) further state that resistance to change is a natural progression from the known to the unknown and that organizations and individuals differ in their willingness and in their ability to adapt to change. Organizational change, via new technologies, can also be considered a catch-22; organizations that persistently ignore technologies risk a slide into uncompetitiveness, yet being on the leading edge brings its own perils. Consequently, the process of diffusion rarely occurs in a predictable fashion

(Fichman, 1999). The theories listed below address, from a theoretical standpoint, the perceptions and intent to adopt a new technology from both an organizational as well as an individual level.

## 3.1. Total Quality Management

Total Quality Management is a theory directly related to organizational change. Total Quality Management (TQM), is an overall organizational strategy committed to improving the satisfaction of the customer or consumer (Dahlgaard et al, 1994; Dean & Evans, 1994; Gatiss, 1996). According to Gatiss (1996), TQM deals with two distinctive areas: (1) the organization or the process and (2) the individual person or attitude. Gatiss further states that individuals and organizations must continuously reassess their roles in order to improve their business functions. As an organizational process, Dean and Evans (1994), states that TQM "conveys a total, company wide effort that includes all employees, suppliers, and customers, and seeks continuously to improve the quality of products and processes to meet the needs and expectations of customers. TQM has become the basic business strategy for firms that aspire to meet the needs of the customers" (p. 12).

The primary researchers in this area, Deming (1982, 1986), Drucker (1974, 1989), Handy (1976, 1986), and Peters (1988), all suggest that organizational commitment to change and solution development to business problems are necessary for business survival (Dahlgaard et al, 1994; Dean & Evans, 1994; Gatiss, 1996). TQM, therefore, promotes the idea of continued adoptions of new technologies in order to enhance performance. For airport security, this means that biometric technology adoption would

be a useful consideration to enhance not only airport business operations but also safety considerations of the customers; which for airports are the passengers.

The basis, or driving force behind TQM in an organization is the manager, someone who will lead the organization in its continuously growing and changing environment. Management should set the goals, make the plans, and put into practice the principles of quality for the entire organization (Dean & Evans, 1994). While TQM suggests a group-oriented rather than a hierarchical-oriented management structure, TQM nonetheless places importance on the role of the manager regardless of the organizational structure. The manager should be one who has the leadership ability to make the necessary changes to ensure quality for the organization and the customers. According to TQM, the manager must: establish the vision, live the values, and lead the improvements (Dean & Evans, 1994). According to the theory of TQM, therefore, the airport security director can be seen as an important motivator behind adopting, guiding, and developing the use of biometric technologies in an airport setting.

## 3.2. Diffusion of Innovation Theory

Everett M. Rogers (1995), the most cited scholar in the area of diffusion research, states that *an innovation* is an idea or behavior that is new to the individual or organization adopting it (Swanson 1994, p. 1070; Rogers, 1995). *Diffusion*, therefore, is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over a period of time among the members of a social system (Rogers, 1995). The "degree to which an individual is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than the other members of his social system" is referred to as *innovativeness* (Roger 1962, p. 20).

Rogers (1995) suggests that diffusion is not one single theory. Rather, it is actually a number of theories, derived from many disciplines that relate to the overall concept of diffusion. Sociologists, communication researchers, economists, organizational researchers, IT researchers, and many others contribute to the multi-disciplinary history of innovation diffusion research. According to Fichman (1999), although diversity dominates the area of innovation diffusion research unification is achieved through three common research questions:

- 1. What determines the rate, pattern, and extent of diffusion of an innovation across a population of potential adopters?
- 2. What determines the general propensity of an organization to adopt and assimilate innovations over time?
- 3. What determines the propensity of an organization to adopt and assimilate a *particular* innovation? (Fichman 1999, p. 2).

Rogers argues that among the main theories that deal with the diffusion of innovations are the individual innovativeness theory and the theory of perceived attributes (Yates, 2001). Both the individual innovativeness theory and the theory of perceived attributes are concerned with the decision-making process of whether or not to accept or reject an innovation. Individual innovativeness theory focuses on the characteristics of the decision-maker, while the theory of perceived attributes focuses on perceived attributes that the innovation has to the decision-maker (Spence, 1994). Within this study, the innovation that will be examined is biometric technology, while the decision-makers will be airport security directors at U.S. airports.

Fichman (1999) argues that there are two general styles of research used to examine the three research questions listed above. These styles, which incorporate Roger's individual innovativeness theory and theories of perceived attributes are: *adapter studies* and *diffusion modeling studies*. "Adapter studies are primarily interested in understanding the differences in adapter 'innovativeness.' Diffusion modeling studies are primarily concerned with the first research question...and represent only a tiny fraction of innovation research" (Fichman 1999, p. 5).

## 3.3. Individual Innovativeness Theory

When examining the propensity of adopting an innovation, one thing is certain: whatever the nature of the innovation not all people will accept it and, of those who do, not all will adopt it at the same time (Spence, 1994). Diffusion theory, through the individual innovativeness theory, is concerned with who adopts the innovation and when. Generally, personal and social factors that may influence an individual to adopt or reject an innovation are examined. The relevance of individual innovativeness theory to this study is to determine the percentage of airport security directors that are more likely to adopt biometric technology. "In any given setting in which innovation-related activities occur, the personal attributes of participants may be equally or more important than group or organizational factors" (Tornatzky and Fleisher 1990, p. 35).

Rogers (1995) argues that certain people are predisposed to being innovative, and that those individuals will adopt an innovation earlier than those who are not innovative. Rogers places individuals into five "adopter categories" based on their likelihood of adopting an innovation. The five adopter categories are: 1) innovators; 2) early adopters; 3) early majority; 4) late majority; and 5) laggards. Rogers also highlights some general

personal and social characteristics that could influence innovativeness. Table 3.1 summarizes Rogers' characteristics of adopter categories.

Table 3.1: Characteristics of adopter categories

		Personal	
Adopter Category	Values	Characteristics	Communication Behavior
Innovators	to accept risks	Youngest age; highest social status; wealthy; highest education	Closest contact with scientific information sources; interaction with other innovators; greatest use of impersonal sources; researches innovations
Early adopters	many in the social	High social status; large and specialized operations	Greatest contact with local change agents
Early majority	consider innovations	Above average social status; average-sized operation	Considerable contact with change agents and early adaptors
Late majority	whelming pressure from	Below average social status; small operation; little specialization; small income	Secure ideas from peers who are mainly late majority or early majority; less use of mass media
Laggards	the past	Little specialization; lowest social status; smallest operations; lowest income; oldest	Neighbors, friends, and relatives with similar values are main information source

(Source: Rogers 1962, p. 185)

Based on adopter categories, it is evident that characteristics of innovators vary from those of other adopters.

## 3.4. Theory of Perceived Attributes

While the individual innovativeness theory focuses on the characteristics of the decision-maker, the theory of perceived attributes, again a focus within diffusion theory, is based on the idea that individuals will adopt an innovation based on its attributes and advantages. The theory of perceived attributes is based on the idea that individuals will adopt an innovation if it has the following attributes. First, the innovation must be

perceived as having a relative advantage over the current status quo or existing innovation. Second, the innovation must be perceived as being compatible with existing values, practices, and needs. Third, the innovation cannot be too complex. Fourth, the innovation must have *trialability*, which means that the innovation can be tested for a limited time without adoption. Fifth, the innovation must offer observable results (Rogers, 1995). Generally speaking, the purpose of examining the five innovation attributes is to determine if the innovation is viewed by the adopting individual or organization as being able to achieve the purpose for which it was intended (Tornatzky and Fleisher, 1990).

According to Rogers (1995) the perceived attributes of an innovation are extremely influential in leading to a decision to adopt a technology, and explains between 49 and 87 percent of the variance in the rate of adoption. These perceived attributes are important because they constitute the individual's subjective perceptions or beliefs about an innovate technology (Vishwanath and Goldhaber, 2003). Additionally, Ostlund (1974) argues that the more positive the individual's perceptions about an innovation are, the greater the probability of its adoption. Hence, the structure of a person's perceptions about an innovative technology impacts its acceptance (behavior) and thereby the overall rate of adoption (Vishwanath and Goldhaber, 2003). The relevance of the theory of perceived attributes to this study, therefore, is to understand how airport security directors perceive biometric technology.

Through diffusion theory, with its underlying theories of innovativeness and perceived attributes, this study will examine, among other things, the attitudes that airport

security have toward biometric technology, their general knowledge of biometric technology, and the perceived relative advantage that airport security directors have towards biometric technology in an airport environment. The following section will address the research methodology that was used in this study. By utilizing the survey instrument developed by Moore and Benbasat (1991), this study will measure the relationships between issues related to biometric technology and the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

## 3.5. Chapter Summary

Within the literature there are numerous theories related to why individuals adopt an innovation. Individual and organizational factors have been examined for their affect on the propensity to adopt an innovation. Likewise, characteristics of the innovation itself have also been examined as factors affecting innovation adoption. Rogers (1995) argues that while individual innovations vary so too do the attributes of the innovation that individual's value as important. Due to this variance, not all individuals will have the same propensity to adopt an innovation. The following chapters will discuss the research framework for this study and its utilization of Roger's (1995) theories to examine those factors that are related to the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

#### 4. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

#### 4.1. Framework

The purpose of this study is to investigate the propensity that security director's have in adopting biometric technology for access control purposes. According to Fichman (1999), well established and generalizable factors affecting diffusion can be grouped into three categories: 1) those factors pertaining to the technologies and their diffusion context; 2) those factors pertaining to organizations and their adoption context; 3) those factors pertaining to the combination of technology and organization.

"These three categories map to the three basic research questions identified earlier as follows. The first category (technologies and their diffusion contexts) have the most direct impact on the rate and pattern of diffusion of a technology (research question 1). The second category (organizations and their adoption environments) relate to the question of what determines the organizational propensity to adopt multiple innovations over time (research question 2) and to adopt particular innovations (research questions 3). The final category (factors describing the intersection of organization and innovation) only pertains to research question 3" (Fichman 1999, p. 8).

Therefore factors that could influence the propensity to adopt an innovation come from several areas such as an individual's characteristics, technology characteristics, organizational characteristics, and environmental characteristics. Based on the literature, Table 4.1 summarizes potential factors that could influence the adoption of biometric technology by airport security directors (Rogers, 1995; Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990; Akbulut, 2003; Premkumar et. al, 1994; Moore and Benbasat, 1991). Each of these

characteristics was utilized in the survey instrument and became variables within the study. The characteristics and the relevance to this study are operationalized below.

**Table 4.1: Potential Factors** 

Individual Characteristics	Technology Characteristics
Age	Compatibility
Education	Complexity
Knowledge of the innovation	Relative advantage
Years in the current position	Trialability
	Benefits
	Cost
	Risk
	Ease of use
<b>Organizational Characteristics</b>	<b>Environmental Characteristics</b>
Size	External influence
Location	External pressure
Organizational readiness	Environmental instability
Top management support	Vendor marketing efforts
Technical capability	Persuasion

### 4.1.1. Characteristics of Biometric Technology (the innovation)

Characteristics of biometric technology refers to the attributes of biometrics technology and how these attributes influence propensity to adopt that technology. Different adopters, in this study airport security directors, can perceive the characteristics of biometric technology differently, and those perceptions affect the adoption process. Following the arguments made by Rogers (1995) and Glover (1993) and the framework set forth by Akbulut (2003), the characteristics of biometric technology that will be used in this study are: 1) complexity of biometric systems; 2) costs of biometric systems; 3) relative advantage of biometric systems; and 4) compatibility of biometric systems with the current security goals.

Complexity refers to the degree to which airport security directors perceive biometric technology as relatively difficult to use and understand. Complexity issues related to biometric technology generally revolve around implementation of biometric system and the ease of use of that system. Complexity of an innovation is generally viewed as an inhibitor to adoption and can therefore affect perception of adoption; complex technologies require more skill and effort and are therefore usually negatively related to adoption (Premkumar et al., 1994).

Costs refer to the perceived potential costs of adopting biometric technology for airport access control. Costs can include such things as cost of hardware acquisition, cost of implementing the system, cost of training, and cost of maintaining the system. Costs can negatively affect adoption; the higher the cost of a biometric system, the less likely that it will be adopted (Premkumar et al, 1994).

Relative advantage of biometric technology refers to biometric technology being perceived as better than using the current method of access control (Moore and Benbasat, 1991). Relative advantage is a significant factor in adopting an innovation and is usually viewed as positive in relation to adoption (Premkumar et al, 1994). In other words, as the perceived relative advantage increases so does the likelihood that biometric technology will be adopted.

Risks refer to the perceived risks of adopting biometric technology for airport access control (Akbulut, 2003). There are certain risks that must be considered before adopting biometric technology such as the lack of standardization, the "newness" of the technology in an airport environment, and perceived privacy issues. Risks are usually

viewed as negative in relation to adoption of an innovation; as risks increase the less likely that biometric technology will be adopted.

Compatibility refers to the degree to which airport security directors perceive biometric technology as being consistent with existing security policies, values, tasks, needs, and objectives of airport access control. The ability of an innovation to fit the needs and objectives of an organization is important to its adoption (Premkumar et al, 1994; Rogers, 1995; Akbulut, 2003). The relationship between perceived compatibility and adoption is generally viewed as positive; as perceived compatibility of a technology increases, the likelihood of adoption increases.

Moore and Benbasat (1991) developed an instrument to measure characteristics of information technology including: relative advantage, compatibility, image, ease of use, result demonstrability, voluntariness, visibility, and trialability. Their study, which was utilized for this study and will be discussed in detail later, resulted in a parsimonious instrument comprising of eight scales which provides a useful tool for the study of the initial adoption and diffusion of innovations (Moore and Benbasat, 1991).

# 4.1.2. Characteristics of Airport Security Directors (the adopter)

Characteristics of airport security directors refers to the personal attributes of individual security directors and how those attributes influence adoption of biometric technology. Personal attributes of an individual are important to consider; "...if rigid and timid people are employed in jobs that are key to fostering an innovation process, it will likely fail" (Tornatzky and Fleischer 1990, p. 35). As Rogers (1995) argues, innovators are generally younger, more educated, and have a better understanding of the innovation than those that are likely to reject the innovation. The characteristics of airport security

directors that will be examined in this study are: 1) age; 2) education level; 3) years in the current position; 4) knowledge of biometric technology. With the exception of age, the characteristics of airport security directors are generally viewed as positive in relation to biometric adoption. According to Rogers (1995), those that are older are more likely to reject an innovation. The remaining characteristics are generally viewed as having a positive relationship to innovation adoption; as these characteristics increase so does the likelihood of adoption.

According to Rogers (1995) and Tornatzky and Klein (1982), how potential adopters perceive an innovation is a key determinate of adoption. "When the focus is the formal organizational decision to adopt, it is the perceptions of leaders and key decision makers that matter. Most innovations studies have concentrated on this level, and have studied the generic innovation characteristics from Rogers' classical model...The bulk of this work has focused on two constructs originally identified by Davis (1998) as part of his Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), namely perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use" (Fichman 1999, p. 18).

Postulated by Davis et al (1989), TAM attempts to provide a basis for examining the impact of external factors on internal beliefs, attitudes, and intentions to adopt a technology. The goal of TAM is to predict technology acceptance before users have any significant experience with a technology. To achieve this goal, TAM focuses on two theoretical concepts: perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use (Davis, 1989). Davis (1989) further states that perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use influence the attitude towards using a technology which directly relates to the perception to adopt technology (Figure 2). In other words, individuals form intentions to use a technology

which they perceive as positive and useful. Davis (1989) developed scales to measure perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, and because the scales were validated in previous research they will be adapted for use in this study to avoid the time and cost efforts required to develop a new measurement instrument. "In general, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use have recurred as highly salient predictors of key acceptance outcomes in prior empirical examinations of technology acceptance" (Lewis 2003, p. 659).




Figure 2: Influence on behavioral intent to use (Source: Davis, 1989)

According to Davis (1989) behavioral intent is one's intention to perform a specific behavior. Behavioral intent, according to Davis (1989) and the TAM, is determined by the person's attitude toward using a technology and perceived usefulness of that technology. According to Davis (1989), perceived usefulness is defined as "the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system or technology would enhance his or her job performance". Perceived usefulness is therefore the prospective user's subjective probability that using a specific technology will be beneficial to job performance. A technology high in perceived usefulness, therefore, is "one for which a

user believes in the existence of a positive use-performance relationship" (Davis, 1989, pg 320). Perceived usefulness closely parallels the "relative advantage" aspect in the diffusion of innovation theory. Additionally, Davis (1989) defines perceived ease of use as "the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system or technology would be free of effort" (Davis 1989, p. 320). A technology that is perceived to be easier to use than another is more likely to be accepted by users (Davis, 1989). Perceived ease of use, therefore, parallels the "complexity" aspect of the diffusion of innovation theory. As previously stated, Davis (1989) developed and validated scales for the two specific variables of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, which he hypothesized to be "fundamental determinants of user acceptance" of a technology (Davis 1989, p. 319).

### 4.1.3. Characteristic of the Airports (the organization)

The characteristics of the airport refer to the internal characteristics of the airport that could influence the perceptions of adopting biometric technology for access control. Tornatzky and Fleischer (1990) noted that there are agency factors that are important to examine when determining the propensity to adopt an innovation. The characteristics of the airports that will be examined in this study are: 1) size; 2) location; and 3) technical capability. The size of the airport refers to the number of passengers that an airport accommodates annually. U.S. airports are categorized based on passenger volume, with Category X airports being the largest. Research indicates that larger organizations are more likely to adopt an innovation due to greater need, resources, and technical ability (Akbulut, 2003). Also, based on the literature review related to terrorist activity, larger airports could represent a higher priority target to terrorists due to increased passenger

and aviation activity. Therefore, the security needs are greater at larger airports and their associated facilities.

Similar to size, airport location could also influence the adoption of biometric technology. U.S. airports in an urban setting could see a greater need for biometric technology for access control than those airports in a rural location. Again, based on literature review for this analysis, it has been demonstrated that airports in urban areas have a high probably of becoming a target to terrorists because of their proximity to higher populated areas and due to higher passenger traffic and aviation activity.

Technical capability refers to the availability of technological resources and expertise that enable the implementation of biometric systems. Technical infrastructure and equipment can affect an airport's ability to implement biometric technology; the greater the technological infrastructure, the greater the likelihood of adopting biometric technology. (Akbulut, 2003).

#### 4.1.4. Characteristics of the Environment

Characteristics of the environment refer to those external influences that could be a factor in the decision to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Influences such as governmental guidance and incentives can encourage or discourage the adoption of biometric technology (Akbulut, 2003). The characteristics of the environment that will be examined in this study are: 1) T.S.A. guidance and 2) governmental incentives. Each of these characteristics will be examined as being positively related to the adoption of biometric technology; as they increase, so does the likelihood of adopting biometric technology for access control.

According the Akbulut (2003), governmental influence is a significant factor in the adoption of an innovation. Grants, assistance, and guidance contribute to the adoption of an innovation. T.S.A. is the agency responsible for providing guidelines and technical recommendations and standards for airport access control methods. The perceived guidance from T.S.A. to airport security directors would have a positive influence on the adoption of biometric technology; as perceived guidance increases so does the likelihood of biometric adoption. Similarly, governmental incentives, such as grants, could provide motivation, as well as financial assistance that could encourage the adoption of biometric technology (Bingham, 1976).

### 4.2. Research Questions

Based on the literature review and the theoretical foundations previously discussed, the research questions for this study are: 1) to what extent is airport security director propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control influenced by social demographics, organizational factors, and attitudinal factors; and 2) to what extent is airport security director propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control influenced by characteristics of the innovation (biometric technology) and technical readiness of the airport itself. In order to examine these research questions, the potential factors that could influence propensity to adopt biometric technology will be organized into four categories, or constructs that, according to Roger's (1995), Davis (1989) and Horan et al. (2004), are highly predictive of propensity to adopt a technology: A) social-demographics, B) organizational demographics (each airport), C) environmental influence, and D) attitude towards the technology (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Influences on the propensity to adopt an innovation (Adapted from Horan et al, 2004).

Incorporating the theories set forth by Rogers (1995), Moore and Benbasat (1991) developed an instrument to measure the perceptions of adopting innovative information technology systems. The hypotheses for this study, as well as the survey instrument, were mirrored from Moore and Benbasat's design. The authors developed an instrument to measure the perceptions of adopting innovative information technology systems. While their study was conducted to investigate the perceptions and organizational attributes of using the innovation of Personal Work Stations (PWS), Moore and Benbasat (1991) developed the instrumentation to be as general as possible so that it could be utilized to examine other innovations, including biometric systems. By their own admission, the authors developed their instrument as an intended "tool for the study of the initial adoption and eventual diffusion of...innovations within organizations" (Moore & Benbasat 1991, p. 192). The authors based their instrument design on Rogers (1995) five characteristics within the theory of diffusion. The items in the instrument were placed

through a rigorous round of testing to help validate the instrument and its use as a general measure for innovation adoption. Additionally, the instrument was tested for inter-rater reliabilities, and pilot tested in a field study of over 800 respondents in seven companies from a variety of industries (Moore & Benbasat, 1991). The final survey instrument that was developed included the following items that were "designed to measure the various perceptions that an individual many have of adopting a...technology innovation" (Moore & Benbasat 1999, p.192): relative advantage, compatibility, image, ease of use, and voluntariness. By the admission of Moore and Benbasat (1991), "while the various items were developed to be as general as possible, they were worded and tested with respect to a particular innovation, the Personal Work Station, in a particular context, organizational work. Nevertheless, it is believed that they could be easily reworded by substituting the names of different...innovations, though additional checks for validity and reliability would be prudent after rewording" (Moore and Benbasat 1991, p.211).

In addition to Moore and Benbasat's (1991) study, Jeyaraj et al (2006) reviewed 48 empirical studies, conducted between 1992 and 2003, on individual adoption and diffusion of innovation. The researchers found that among the independent variables most frequently used to predict individual innovation adoption were: ease of use, attitudes, relative advantage, compatibility, voluntariness, support, age, gender, trialability, system quality, visibility, and image (Jeyaraj et al, 2006).

Moore and Benbasat (1991) concluded "it is believed that the final instrument, which was developed based on a model of general factors that have predicted the adoption of innovations quite successfully, offers a useful tool for the study of the initial adoption and diffusion of innovations" (p.211). Based on the initial research of Moore

and Benbasat (1991), the instrument items for this study were reworded and created to apply to biometric technology. Therefore, drawing from the literature and utilizing the instrument constructed by Moore and Benbasat (1991), the instrument for this study was reworded by inserting "biometric technology" as the innovation. Additionally, the independent variables list by Moore and Benbasat (1991) and Jeyaraj et al (2006) led to the construction of the hypothesis for this study. The survey instrument was then administered to airport security directors in order to measure the relationship between the independent variables and propensity of adopting biometric technology for access control.

# 4.3 Hypothesis

Drawing from literature, as well as the theories postulated by Rogers (1995) and the survey instrument developed by Moore and Benbasat (1991), the following hypotheses were constructed for this study.

H1: There is a relationship between social demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

The social demographics examined in this study were the age, the educational level, and the number of years the security director has held the current position. Based on the literature, the expectation for this first hypothesis was that the social demographics of education level and number of years in the current position positively and strongly related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The social demographics associated with age, however, were expected to be negatively related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

# H2: There is a relationship between organizational demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

The organizational demographics that were examined in this study were size (category), location, and technical capability of the airport itself. Similar to the social demographics of the individual security director, the organizational demographics may also be related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The expectation therefore is that the organizational demographics will be strongly and positively related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H3: There is a relationship between perceived compatibility of biometric technology with airport security goals and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Again, compatibility refers to the degree to which airport security directors perceive biometric technology as being consistent with existing security policies, values, tasks, needs, and objectives of airport access control. The expectation for the third hypothesis was that the compatibility of biometric technology would be strongly and positively related the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H4: There is a relationship between the perceived voluntariness of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Voluntariness is defined as the "degree to which use of the innovation is perceived as being voluntary, or of free will" (Moore & Benbast 1991 p, 195). Those individuals who feel pressured to adopt an innovation could influence the propensity to adopt that

technology. While the authority to adopt biometric technology for airport access control lies with the airport itself, those who feel an expectation from regulatory agencies such as TSA may have a greater propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control purposes. For the fourth hypothesis in the study, the expectation therefore is that the voluntariness will be strongly and positively related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H5: There is a relationship between perceived relative advantage of biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

For this study, relative advantage of biometric technology refers to biometric technology being perceived as better than using the current method of access control (Moore and Benbasat, 1991). The expectation therefore is that relative advantage will be positively and strongly related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H6: There is a relationship between the perceived ease of use of biometric technology and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

According to Moore and Benbasat (1991) and Rogers (1995), perceived ease of use is the degree to which an individual believes that using a particular innovation will be free from physical and mental effort. For example, if airport security directors perceive that biometric technology is easy to use and to implement they may be more likely to adopt the technology for airport access control. The expectation for this hypothesis, therefore, is

that there will be a strong and positive relationship between the perceived ease of use and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H7: There is a relationship between the perceived image of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Moore and Benbasat (1991) and Rogers (1995) indicate that an important motivation to adopt an innovation is image, which is the degree to which the use of an innovation is perceived to enhance one's status in a social structure. The propensity to adopt biometric technology therefore may be increased if it is believed that adoption would increase the image of security. It is expected therefore that the relationship between perceived image and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control will be strong and positive.

For this study, survey items, based on Moore and Benbasat's (1991) instrument, were constructed to examine the relationship between the independent variables and the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The subsequent chapters will address the study's methodology, survey administration, data analysis, and a discussion of the findings.

#### 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter contains a detailed description of the survey instrument, its distribution, the data collection method, and the method of analysis. This study was a national survey assessing attitudes toward, and the propensity of airport security directors and security managers to adopt, biometric technology for airport access control. The study was conducted between March 6, 2006 and August 30, 2006. The survey also examined overall familiarity that airport security directors have about biometric technology, as well as issues affecting adoption of biometric technology for airport access control.

## 5.1. Research justification

Airports have the right "to determine which biometric technology is appropriate for deployment in their staff access control system and infrastructure" (ACI, 2005, 12). The primary goal for any airport to implement biometric technology for airport access control is to insure that "only bona fide personnel have access to sensitive areas of their airport" (ACI, 2005, 5). However, to date, there is a paucity of research detailing the current use or the future projected adoption of biometric technology for airport access control. Additionally, research detailing the attitudes that security directors and managers hold toward biometric technology for access control is also limited.

The importance of this study is in its timeliness. Also, there is a critical need in the aviation industry for research of this kind due to the threat of terrorism in general and airport security specifically. Further, the dissemination of the survey on a national scale casts a wide net and this allows the responses to be generalized, which makes its contribution to the literature much richer. Additionally, this study can be used to guide

future studies on both diffusion of innovation theory, as well as, the propensity to adopt biometric technology in an airport environment.

#### 5.2. Research Methodology

Survey research can be described as the systematic gathering of information from respondents in order to understand and/or project some aspect of the behavior of the population of interest (Tull, 1986; Akbultut, 2003). It is a detailed approach that involves the collection and organization of data and a statistical analysis of the results (Tull, 1986; Akbultut, 2003). According to Shama (1983), survey research is one of the most effective techniques available for the study of attributes, values, beliefs, and motives. A survey was used for this study because it is an easy instrument to administer on a large scale; it allows for an efficient description of a large population, and it facilitates a systematic collection of information from that population.

# 5.3. Sampling frame

The universe for this study consisted of airports across the United States; a total of 380 airports comprised the sample population. Aiports Council International – North America is an organization that "represents local, regional, state, and national governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada. ACI-NA member airports enplane virtually all of the domestic and international airline passenger and cargo traffic in North America" (ACI –NA 2006, p.1). Because of its association with airports, the researcher contacted ACI in an attempt to add legitimacy to the study. According to Garson (2005), having legitimate sponsorship for a survey, especially sponsors who are highly regarded in the population being surveyed, is one

method of increasing the response rate of the survey. ACI-NA was instrumental in providing support for this survey and for providing names of airport security directors and managers, along with a mailing list (including email addresses), for 100 U.S. airports. The researcher was able to locate the addresses of an additional 280 U.S. airports for a total of 380 that were contacted and invited to respond to the survey.

## 5.4. Unit of analysis and respondents

The unit of analysis – or the unit about which statements are being made – for this study was individual airports. The survey was distributed to airport security directors or airport security managers of those airports. The job title of those who make decisions about their airports access control systems varies between airports. Therefore both the term "security director" and "security manager" was used in this study to denote those in the airport who are responsible for making decisions about their airport's access control system and method. The security director or manager of each of the airports contacted were asked to complete the survey and not delegate it to a member of their staff.

According to Sindler (1974), individuals in an organization who are the most knowledgeable about that organization can answer questions about generalized patterns of behavior within the organization. Airport security directors or managers represent key decision makers about airport security and are the most knowledgeable individuals about their airport's security. Therefore, they were identified as the most appropriate respondents for this study.

#### 5.5. Survey construction and administration

Collecting the data for this study consisted of creating the survey instrument, surveying airport security directors and managers, and analyzing the responses. The first phase involved creating the survey instrument. The survey was based on Moore and Benbasat's (1991) study described in the previous chapter. While the principle investigator contacted subject matter experts to review the instrument for clarity, no further pre-testing of the instrument was deemed appropriate since the total number of airports designated for contact was relatively small.

The 12 page survey contained 27 questions. Several of the questions had multiple items embedded; in total there were 67 comprising the survey. All of the responses, save two, were categorical and required Likert scale responses. Two of the questions were open ended and allowed the respondent to utilize free writing in order to respond. The items comprising the survey were primarily derived from previously tested survey instruments. Therefore most of the constructs for this study were operationalized by modifying these previously validated scales.

The instrument design was self-reporting and confidential. With the utilization of the instrument items created by Moore and Benbasat (1991) and Horan et al (2004), the time and cost efforts required to develop a new measurement instrument was avoided and reliability and validity of the instrument was accepted. Before survey administration was conducted, the researcher secured the approval of the University of Central Florida's Institutional Review Board (IRB). The researcher was able to secure an expedited review of the survey instrument due to the fact that it was confidential, and it posed minimal risks to the human subjects among whom the survey was administered. Additionally, the

researcher was able to demonstrate to the IRB that data from the survey responses would be secured solely by the researcher, and at no time would any individual airport be identified in this study.

The survey was administered using a bimodal design, which included a traditional hardcopy mailing that also allowed for a web-based option response. A "survey packet" was mailed to all possible respondents. The survey packet included a cover letter, a copy of the survey, and a return envelope. Additionally, along with the survey, an explanation of the purpose of the study, a statement of voluntary cooperation, an assurance of confidentiality, instructions for completion of the paper-based survey, and instructions for completion of the web-based survey option were included. The respondents were instructed to answer the survey questions by using either the web-based method or the paper-based method. The utilization of both types of survey administration, according to Dillman (2002), increases the likelihood of responses by giving respondents two opinions for participation. There were also several advantages to including web-designed surveys. According to Dillman (2002), web-based surveys have advantages for the respondent as well as the researcher. Dillman (2002) states that response rates for well constructed webbased surveys are comparable to those of traditional mailing surveys. Further, web-based surveys are more accessible, are easier to fill out, and are less time consuming for the respondent. The researcher can benefit from faster response rates and easier data collection and analysis due to automatic coding (Dillman, 2002). Another method of increasing response rates, according to Dillman (2002) is to send thank you/follow-up letters. One week after the initial mailings of the survey packet, a thank you and reminder letter was sent to the participants. The purpose of the follow-up mailing was to thank

those who already had completed the survey and to remind those who had not completed the survey to please do so.

As previously mentioned, the respondents had two methods of responding to the survey. The survey responses could have been returned via the web-based option or the traditional mailing option. The web-page option used to host the web-based survey was independently designed using the database program of "Form Manager 2." The survey that was hosted on the web-site was identical to the hard-copy survey that each participant received. The responses that were obtained via the web-based survey were automatically and directly entered into an internal data-base. The responses that were received via the paper-based survey were manually entered into the same database.

Once the data from the respondents had been entered (either manually by the researcher or directly via the web) that data was analyzed using statistical tests.

Descriptive statistics in the form of frequency tables were initially used so that overall generalizations could be made about the respondents and about the airports. Secondly, correlations were calculated to determine the relationships between 7 independent variables and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control (the dependant variable). The following chapters will summarize the statistical analysis of the data, the findings and the relevance of the findings to the literature.

#### 6. DATA ANALYSIS

While results of the data analysis in the following chapters will be cumulative and total in nature, the data that will be presented is actually a conglomeration of data from two different survey administrations conducted by the researcher. The initial administration of the surveys was directed towards the larger Category X and Category I airports in the U.S. because those airports are larger in size, they employee more individuals, and they have the highest number of passengers annually. Due to a lower than expected response rate in the initial survey administration, it was decided that additional, smaller airports should be included in this study to 1) provide a higher response rate for this study, and 2) to allow for a comparison of those larger airports that responded in the first administration of the survey to those smaller airports that were surveyed in the second round. Both administrations of the survey to airport security directors were identical. The "survey packet" was mailed to all possible respondents in each group, and the respondents were instructed to answer the survey questions by using either the web-based method or the paper-based method. Additionally, one week after the initial mailings of the survey packet, a thank you and reminder letter was sent to the participants

The survey was first administered to 150 U.S. airport security directors at primarily Category X and Category I airports. The initial administration yielded a response rate of 43%, as 65 of the surveyed 150 airport security directors responded. Due to the fact that three of the surveyed airport security directors contacted the researcher to state that they would not participate in the study because they felt it would compromise security information, it is believed that one reason for the lower that expected response

rate was a result of airport security directors feeling uncomfortable with answering the survey items. The lower that expected response rate from the initial administration led the researcher to conduct a second administration of the surveys to another segment of the airport population. Those airports that are smaller in size and annual passenger movement, namely Category II, III, IV, and general aviation airports were surveyed in the second administration to increase response rate and to allow the researcher to include, within the results, a compare and contrast analysis to the larger airports surveyed in the initial administration. In the second survey administration, 230 airports were surveyed and 66 responded; a response rate of 29%.

Although two separate survey administrations were conducted by the researcher, the data from both was combined and analyzed concurrently. The total quantitative data collected via the survey administrations was analyzed by performing the following statistical tests: 1) descriptive statistics were calculated to describe the characteristics of the responding airport security directors and managers and the airports that they represent; 2) bivariate analyses were used to test for the relationships between the independent variables and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control; and 3) a path analysis was utilized to examine the strength and magnitude of the relationships that were revealed through the bivariate analyses.

#### 6.1. Frequencies

After the data was collected via the surveys, the first statistical tests that were performed were descriptive in nature. A descriptive analysis of the data provided an interesting profile of the respondents and their knowledge about and propensity to use biometric technology for airport access control. Additionally, the frequencies derived

from the study can lend numerical evidence as to the current state of acceptance of biometric technology and to the suggested reasons why biometric technology has been slow to gain acceptance as a valued access control method (ACI, 2005; TSA, 2005).

### 6.1.1. Demographics of respondents

The survey instrument used in the study was distributed to 380 U.S. airports; 131 airport security directors or managers returned a completed survey for a response rate of 34.5%. As Table 6.1 indicates, of those airport security directors and security managers that responded, 84.7% were male and 13% were female (3 respondents did not indicate their gender).

Table 6.1: Gender of airport security directors

		Number of Respondents	Percent
	Male	111	84.7
	Female	17	13.0
		128	97.7
		3	2.3
Total		131	100.0

The largest age group represented was the 51-60 year category with 36.6% of the respondents; the age category with the least respondents represented was the 20-30 year age group with 3.1% of respondents. There were 5 respondents who did not indicate their age (Table 6.2).

**Table 6.2: Age of security directors** 

	Number of Respondents	Percent
20-30 years	4	3.1
31-40 years	28	21.4
41-50 years	36	27.5
51-60 years	48	36.6
61+ years	10	7.6
Total	126	96.2
Not Indicated	5	3.8
Total	131	100.0

When asked to respond with the highest level of education achieved, 41.2% of the respondents indicated that they have received a bachelor's degree. That category was closely followed by 32.1% of the respondents who indicated that they have received a master's degree. There were 4 respondents who did not indicate their educational attainment level (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: Education level of security directors

	Number of	Damana
	Respondents	Percent
High school diploma	2	1.5
Some college	20	15.3
Associate degree	6	4.6
Bachelor degree	54	41.2
Masters degree	42	32.1
Doctorate degree	3	2.3
Total	127	96.9
Not Indicated	4	3.1
Total	131	100.0

When asked to respond to the length of time in the position of airport security director, the range spanned from under 1 year to 30 years. 51.1% of respondents indicated that

they have been the security director of their airports for 5 or fewer years. This is an interesting frequency to note because it indicates that over half of the responding security directors gained their position after the events of September 11, 2001. 22.1% of respondents indicated that they have held the position between 6 to 10 years, 11.5% had held the position between 11 and 15 years, while 13% of respondents had held the position for over 15 years. Three of the respondents did not indicate the length of time in their current position as airport security director (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4: Number of years as security director

	Number of Respondents	Percent
0-5 years	67	51.1
6 -10 years	29	22.1
11-15 years	15	11.5
16 + years	17	13.0
Total	128	97.7
Not Indicated	3	2.3
Total	131	100.0

### 6.1.2. Demographics of airports

Besides focusing on personal demographic questions, the survey for this study also focused on the airports at which the airport security directors work. Airports in the Unites States are classified into a specific "category". According to the GAO, Category X airports "represent the nation's largest and busiest airports as measured by the volume of passenger traffic and are potentially attractive targets for criminal and terrorist activity. Category I airports are somewhat smaller with an annual volume of at least 2 million passengers. There are also other categories of airports with less passenger traffic" (GAO, 1988). The remaining airport categories are Category II, III, and IV and they are ranked

based on size and number of passengers per year. Of the security directors who responded, 14.5% represented Category X airports; 21.4% represented Category I airports; 22.1% represented Category II airports; 20.6% represented Category III airports; 16% represented Category IV airports (Table 6.5).

**Table 6.5: Airport classification** 

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Category I	28	21.4
Category II	29	22.1
Category III	27	20.6
Category IV	21	16.0
Category X	19	14.5
Other	1	.8
Total	125	95.4
Not Indicated	6	4.6
Total	131	100.0

As described in the literature review, airports can fall under different jurisdictions of authority. When asked as part of this study, 38.9% of respondents indicated that their airport operates under the jurisdiction of an airport authority; 37.4% indicated that they operate under city authority; 13% stated they fall under county authority; 6.1% indicated that they come under state authority; while 4.6% indicated that their airports fall under some other authority (Table 6.6).

Table 6.6: Operating authority of responding airports

	Number of Respondents	Percent
City	49	37.4
County	17	13.0
State	8	6.1
Airport authority	51	38.9
Other	6	4.6
Total	131	100.0

### 6.1.3. Knowledge of biometric technology

In September 2005, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued a guidance package that included the "basic criteria and standards that TSA believes biometric products should meet in order to meet the technical requirements of acceptable performance for airport access control systems" (TSA, 2005, 1). Additionally, in November 2005, ACI issued a position paper on the application of biometrics at airports which included descriptions of biometric technology and its use in airport security. Despite such examples of guidance information from regulatory agencies and airport organizations, this study found that only 5.3% of respondents indicated they were "very knowledgeable" about biometric technology; 64.9% indicated that they were "somewhat knowledgeable" about biometric technology; 22.9% indicated that they were "somewhat unknowledgeable" about biometric technology; while 6.9% indicated that they were "very unknowledgeable" about biometric technology (Table 6.7).

Table 6.7: Knowledge of biometric technology

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Very knowledgeable	7	5.3
Somewhat knowledgeable	85	64.9
Somewhat unknowledgeable	30	22.9
Very unknowledgeable	9	6.9
Total	131	100.0

Besides being asked to indicate how knowledgeable they were with respect to over all biometric technology, the airport security directors and managers participating in this study were asked to indicate on a 7 point Likert scale their level of familiarity with six individual types of biometric technology: fingerprint scanning, hand geometry, voice recognition, facial recognition, iris scanning, and retinal scanning. On the scale, 7 represented "extremely familiar" while a 1 represented "extremely unfamiliar". Of the six types of biometric technology listed, fingerprint scanning had the most respondents, 22.1%, indicating that they were extremely familiar with that type of biometric technology. Conversely, voice recognition was the type of biometric technology that had the most respondents, 17.6%, indicating that they were extremely unfamiliar with that technology. The overall frequencies for the level of familiarity with each type of biometric technology are listed below in Tables 6.8 – 6.13. Additionally, figure 4 provides a graphic representation of the familiarity that airport security directors have with each of the six biometric technologies.

Table 6.8: Familiarity with fingerprint scanning

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Extremely unfamiliar	6	4.6
Unfamiliar	5	3.8
Somewhat unfamiliar	8	6.1
About 50/50	23	17.6
Somewhat familiar	28	21.4
Familiar	32	24.4
Extremely familiar	29	22.1
Total	131	100.0

Table 6.9: Familiarity with hand geometry

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Extremely unfamiliar	19	14.5
Unfamiliar	21	16.0
Somewhat unfamiliar	14	10.7
About 50/50	33	25.2
Somewhat familiar	22	16.8
Familiar	14	10.7
Extremely familiar	8	6.1
Total	131	100.0

Table 6.10: Familiarity with voice recognition

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Extremely unfamiliar	23	17.6
Unfamiliar	19	14.5
Somewhat unfamiliar	21	16.0
About 50/50	37	28.2
Somewhat familiar	20	15.3
Familiar	7	5.3
Extremely familiar	4	3.1
Total	131	100.0

Table 6.11: Familiarity with facial recognition

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Extremely unfamiliar	20	15.3
Unfamiliar	17	13.0
Somewhat unfamiliar	17	13.0
About 50/50	32	24.4
Somewhat familiar	30	22.9
Familiar	12	9.2
Extremely familiar	3	2.3
Total	131	100.0

Table 6.12: Familiarity with iris scanning

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Extremely unfamiliar	15	11.5
Unfamiliar	15	11.5
Somewhat unfamiliar	16	12.2
About 50/50	33	25.2
Somewhat familiar	27	20.6
Familiar	19	14.5
Extremely familiar	6	4.6
Total	131	100.0

Table 6.13: Familiarity with retina scanning

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Extremely unfamiliar	17	13.0
Unfamiliar	18	13.7
Somewhat unfamiliar	15	11.5
About 50/50	34	26.0
Somewhat familiar	28	21.4
Familiar	16	12.2
Extremely familiar	3	2.3
Total	131	100.0





Figure 4: Level of familiarity of biometrics by type

After examining how familiar airport security directors were with each of the six biometric technologies listed, the researcher wanted to gauge the overall level of familiarity with biometrics in general. In order to develop an overall generalization about the level of familiarity that airport security directors have about biometric technology, the responses that each respondent gave on the six individual, 7 point scales for each biometric type were added and a new variable titled "level of familiarity" was computed. A score of 6 was the minimum score and indicated extreme unfamiliarity with biometric technology, while a score of 42 was the maximum score possible and indicated extreme familiarity with biometric technology. A score of 24 represented the midrange of "about 50/50" for overall familiarity with biometric technology. Figure 5 displays a graphic representation of the overall familiarity the airport security directors have with biometric technology. The level of familiarity score with the highest number of respondents, 13, fell exactly at the midrange of 24.



Level of familiarity with biometrics

Figure 5: Overall level of familiarity of biometrics

When the participants were asked to indicate how important their overall understanding of biometric technology is when considering biometric technology for airport access control, 16.8% of respondents indicated that it is "highly important"; 66.9% ranked it at or above the 50/50 level. Only 15.3% of respondents indicated that the importance of their knowledge of biometric technology is below the "about 50/50" level (Table 6.14).

Table 6.14: Overall understanding biometric technology

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Highly unimportant	3	2.3
Unimportant	9	6.9
Somewhat unimportant	8	6.1
About 50/50	31	23.7
Somewhat important	29	22.1
Important	29	22.1
Highly important	22	16.8
Total	131	100.0

After examining the level importance that airport security directors' place on their overall understanding of biometric technology, a cross-tabulation was developed to determine which category of airport placed the highest level of importance on the issue of overall understanding. It was determined that Category I airports had the highest number of respondents that placed some level of importance on their overall understanding of biometric technology (Table 6.15).

Table 6.15: Overall understanding of biometric technology by airport classification

		Airport classification by				
		Category	Catalgary		Category	Category X
0 11	TT' 11	1	11	III	1 1 1	Λ
Overall	Highly	1			1	1
understanding	Unimportant	1	1	4	1	2
of biometric	Somewhat unimportant		2	3	3	
technology	About 50/50	3	8	4	8	6
	Somewhat important	13	5	5	1	3
	Important	7	6	5	6	4
	Highly important	3	7	6	1	3
Total		28	29	27	21	19

When the respondents were asked to indicate whether or not there is enough information available to make an informed decision on whether or not to incorporate biometric technology into their access control system, only 8.4% of respondents strongly agreed that there was enough information available; 26.7% indicated about 50/50 as a level of agreement; while 32% of respondents indicated some level of disagreement at the statement that there is enough information available to make an informed decision on biometric technology (Table 6.16).

**Table 6.16: Availability of information** 

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Strongly disagree	11	8.4
Disagree	18	13.7
Somewhat disagree	13	9.9
About 50/50	35	26.7
Somewhat agree	29	22.1
Agree	14	10.7
Strongly agree	11	8.4
Total	131	100.0

#### 6.1.4. Implementation of biometric technology

After 9/11, biometric technology became the frontrunner in options designed to enhance airport security. However, biometric technology for airport access control has failed to be implemented as rapidly as predicted. In May 2004, industry surveys noted that half of airports would be using biometric technology to control employee access to restricted areas within two years (Airport Security Survey, 2004). However, a recent survey conducted by SITA found that only 15% of airports are using biometric technology in some form for airport access control (SITA, 2005). The survey conducted

for this study determined that 5.3% of the responding airports are using some form of biometric technology for airport access control. However, this study diverges from the timeline established by previous studies by finding that only 9.2% of the responding airport security directors indicated it would be 1 – 2 years before biometric technology becomes the primary method of access control at their airports. Additionally, 26% of the respondents indicated it would be 3-4 years before their airports use biometric technology as its primary method of access control, while 38.9% indicated it would be more than 5 years before biometric technology is the primary method of access control at their airports. Finally, 13.7% of respondents indicated biometric technology will never be the primary method of access control at their airport (Table 6.17).

Table 6.17: Years until use as primary access control method

		Number of Respondents	Percent
	Never	18	13.7
	1-2 years	12	9.2
	3-4 years	34	26.0
	Over 5 years	51	38.9
	Currently using biometric technology as the primary method	7	5.3
	Total	122	93.1
Not Indicated		9	6.9
Total		131	100.0

Again, a cross-tabulation was developed in order to examine which category of airports was associated with the number of years until biometric technology is used as the primary method of access control. Category I airports had the highest number of respondents (14) who indicated that it would be over 5 years until biometric technology is used as a primary method of access control in their airports (table 6.18).

Table: 6.18: Years until biometrics are a primary access control method by airport category

		Airport classification by category					
		Category I	Category II	Category III	Category IV	Category X	Other
Years until	Never	1	4	4	4	1	1
use as	1-2 years	3	4	1		4	
primary	3-4 years	7	9	4	6	8	
access control	Over 5 years	14	9	13	10	3	
method	Currently using biometric technology as the primary method	2	2	1		2	
Total		27	28	23	20	18	1

ACI noted that the integration of biometric technology for airport access control has been slow for several reasons. The first is the "over promise" and the "under delivery" by biometric vendors who maximize the benefits, but who may also underscore the weaknesses of biometric technology. As noted earlier, only 8.4% of respondents in this study strongly agreed that they had enough information available to make an informed decision on whether or not to incorporate biometric technology into their access control system. Secondly, ACI noted that the fast pace at which biometric capabilities are progressing introduces an element of risk to any selection of biometric technology for access control (ACI, 2005). Indeed, this study found that 85.5% of respodents ranked the newness of biometric technology as a "50/50" to "highly important" issue when considering biometric technology for airport access control (Table 6.19).

Table 6.19: Newness of biometric technology as an issue by airport category

	Number of	_
	Respondents	Percent
Highly unimportant	4	3.1
Unimportant	4	3.1
Somewhat unimportant	10	7.6
About 50/50	35	26.7
Somewhat	30	22.9
Important	28	21.4
Highly important	19	14.5
Total	130	99.2
Not Indicated	1	.8
Total	131	100.0

When the issues of newness of biometric technology is analyzed by responding airport category, the cross tabulation reveals that more security directors from Category I airports ranked the issue at or above the 50/50 level of importance (table 6.20).

Table 6.20: Newness of biometric technology as an issue by airport category

		Airport classification				
		Category	Category II	Category III	Category IV	Category X
Newness of	Highly unimportant	1	1	2	1	Λ
biometric	Unimportant			1	1	2
technology	Somewhat unimportant		2	5	3	
	About 50/50	9	7	4	7	6
	Somewhat important	8	7	5	3	4
	Important	9	8	4	3	3
	Highly important	2	4	6	2	4
Total		28	29	27	20	19

In its report, ACI also proposed that a current lack of interoperability standards and the desire by airports to utilize different pieces of biometric hardware within their existing access control system is another reason why biometric implementation has been slow in airport access control (ACI, 2005). This study lends evidence to that statement by

ACI by finding that 42% of respondents ranked the compatibility of biometric technology with current airport security operation as a highly important issue to consider when considering the use of biometric technology for airport access control (Table 6.21).

Table 6.21: Compatibility with operations

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Highly unimportant	7	5.3
Unimportant	2	1.5
Somewhat unimportant	7	5.3
About 50/50	5	3.8
Somewhat important	20	15.3
Important	34	26.0
Highly important	55	42.0
Total	130	99.2
Not Indicated	1	.8
Total	131	100.0

When asked as a follow-up question, if using biometric technology for access control would be compatible with overall airport security goals, 17.6% of respondents strongly agreed that biometrics would be compatible with overall airport security goals. Only 2.3% of respondents disagreed that biometric technology would be compatible with the overall airport security goals (Table 6.22).

Table 6.22: Compatibility with overall security goals

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Strongly disagree	3	2.3
Disagree	2	1.5
Somewhat disagree	3	2.3
About 50/50	25	19.1
Somewhat agree	32	24.4
Agree	42	32.1
Strongly agree	23	17.6
Total	130	99.2
Not Indicated	1	.8
Total	131	100.0

A cross-tabulation revealed that Category III and IV airports had the highest number of respondents who indicated that biometric technology would not be compatible with overall security goals (table 6.22).

Table 6.23: Compatibility with overall security goals by airport classification

		Airport classification by category					
		Category I	Category II	Category III	Category IV	Category X	Other
Compatibility	Strongly disagree			3			
with overall	Disagree			1	1		
security	Somewhat disagree				2	1	
goals	About 50/50	5	5	7	4	2	
	Somewhat agree	8	7	6	5	3	1
	Agree	9	14	6	4	7	
	Strongly agree	6	2	4	5	6	
Total		28	28	27	21	19	1

Finally, ACI's report identified the "lack of a cohesive approach from regulatory bodies" as the biggest factor slowing implementation of biometric technology into airport access control. "Without the appropriate level of guidance from regulators, airports will

remain intransigent on the decision of adopting biometric technology" (ACI 2005, p. 13). Additionally, in its *Guidance Package: Biometrics for Airport Access Control*, TSA concedes that it "is aware that some airport operators may be unwilling to implement biometrics to secured areas because TSA has not yet identified technologies that it believes perform acceptably" (TSA 2005, p. 1). When airport security directors and managers were asked in this study to rank the importance of guidance by TSA on which biometric standards to adopt, 28.2% of respondents ranked TSA guidance as highly important; 57.2% ranked TSA guidance at or above 50/50 on the level of importance on the 7 point scale (Table 6.24).

Table 6.24: Guidance by TSA

	Number of	
	Respondent	Percent
Highly unimportant	8	6.1
Unimportant	4	3.1
Somewhat unimportant	6	4.6
About 50/50	24	18.3
Somewhat important	27	20.6
Important	24	18.3
Highly important	37	28.2
Total	130	99.2
Not Indicated	1	.8
Total	131	100.0

As a follow-up question, the participants were asked to rank how helpful TSA guidance has been in regards to using biometric technology for airport access control. Only 26.7% of respondents ranked TSA guidance as moderately helpful; 57.3% ranked TSA between moderately helpful to not helpful at all when it comes to guidance on biometric technology. Finally, just 12.2% ranked TSA guidance between moderately helpful and

extremely helpful, with only 1.5% of those respondents ranking TSA guidance at the "extremely helpful" level (Table 6.24).

Table 6.25: Level of TSA guidance on biometric technology

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Not helpful at all	28	21.4
Unhelpful	25	19.1
Somewhat unhelpful	22	16.8
Moderately helpful	35	26.7
Somewhat helpful	9	6.9
Helpful	5	3.8
Extremely helpful	2	1.5
Total	126	96.2
Not Indicated	5	3.8
Total	131	100.0

A final question relating to the TSA was also included on the survey instrument and this question was designed to examine the perceived level of voluntariness that airport security directors feel when faced with the decision of whether or not to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. While the TSA is a national regulatory agency in terms of airport security, it is ultimately the airport operators and managers that determine technology implementation. Therefore, a question designed to measure the level of perceived voluntariness was important in this study. When asked to indicate how strongly they agreed with the statement that they are expected by TSA to use some form of biometric technology for airport access control, it was an interesting finding that 18.3% indicated they felt "about 50/50" with the statement that they are expected by the TSA to use some form of biometric technology for airport access control. 8.4% of respondents indicated that they agreed *above* the "about 50/50" level. However, 41.2% of

respondents strongly disagreed that they are expected by TSA to use some form of biometric technology for airport access control (table 6.26).

Table 6.26: Expected by TSA to use biometric technology

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Strongly disagree	54	41.2
Disagree	30	22.9
Somewhat disagree	9	6.9
About 50/50	24	18.3
Somewhat agree	3	2.3
Agree	6	4.6
Strongly agree	2	1.5
Total	128	97.7
Not Indicated	3	2.3
Total	131	100.0

## 6.1.5. Overall attitude about biometric technology for airport access control

Besides asking questions related to biometric issues, this study also asked the participants to respond to questions designed to measure general attitudes about biometric technology. When asked to indicate which biometric technology would be the most beneficial for airport access control, 45% of respondents indicated that fingerprint scanning would be the most beneficial; 15.3% indicated hand geometry; 14.5% indicated iris scanning; while 5.3% indicated facial recognition would be the most beneficial for airport access control. Additionally, 19.1% of respondents indicated that no type of biometric technology would be beneficial for airport access control (Table 6.27).

Table 6.27: Most beneficial for access control

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Fingerprint scanning	59	45.0
Hand geometry	20	15.3
Facial recognition	7	5.3
Iris scanning	19	14.5
Biometrics would not be beneficial	25	19.1
Total	130	99.2
Not Indicated	1	.8
Total	131	100.0

When asked to indicate which biometric technology would be the least beneficial for airport access control, 45.8% of respondents indicated that voice recognition would be the least beneficial; 17.6% indicated iris scanning; 12.2% indicated facial recognition; 4.6% indicated hand geometry; while 3.1% of respondents indicated fingerprint scanning would be the least beneficial for airport access control (Table 6.27).

Table 6.28: Least beneficial for access control

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Fingerprint scanning	4	3.1
Hand geometry	6	4.6
Voice recognition	60	45.8
Facial recognition	16	12.2
Iris scanning	23	17.6
Biometrics would not be beneficial	20	15.3
Total	129	98.5
Not Indicated	2	1.5
Total	131	100.0

Additionally, the participants in this study were asked to think about their security plan and then indicate how much priority they place on using biometric technology for

employee access control. Of the respondents, 20.6% indicated that using biometric technology for access control is moderately important in their list of priorities; 30.5% ranked the level of priority as higher than moderately important, with 7.6% of those respondents ranking it as extremely important as a priority. 17.6% of respondents rank biometric technology as extremely unimportant in terms of an airport priority (Table 6.29).

Table 6.29: Level of priority given to using biometrics for access control

	Number of	
	Respondents	Percent
Extremely unimportant	23	17.6
Unimportant	17	13.0
Somewhat unimportant	23	17.6
Moderately important	27	20.6
Somewhat important	25	19.1
Important	5	3.8
Extremely important	10	7.6
Total	130	99.2
Not Indicated	1	.8
Total	131	100.0

A cross-tabulation revealed that Category X airports (the largest airports) had the most respondents (5) indicate that biometric technology is given extremely important priority in their security plan. Conversely, Category III airport had the highest number of respondents (10) indicate that biometrics technology is extremely unimportant within their security plan (table 6.30).

Table 6.30: Level of priority of using biometrics for access control by airport classification

		Airport classification by category					
		Category I	Category II	Category III	Category IV	Category X	Other
Level of	Extremely	2	5	10	4		
priority of	Unimportant	3	3		6	4	
using	Somewhat unimportant	8	3	4	3	3	
biometrics for access	Moderately important	4	8	7	5	3	
control	Somewhat important	8	7	4	2	3	1
	Important	2	1	1		1	
	Extremely important	1	2	1	1	5	
Total		28	29	27	21	19	1

When asked to rank their overall attitude toward the use of biometric technology for airport access control, 32.1% of respondents indicated that their favorability towards biometric technology was at the 50/50 level on a 7 point scale; 13% indicated they are extremely favorable towards biometric technology for airport access control; while only 9.2% indicated that they are below the 50/50 level when it comes to their overall attitude towards biometric technology for airport access control (Table 6.31). Additionally, table 6.32 reveals a cross-tabulation of overall attitude towards biometrics based on the airport category that the respondents represent.

Table 6.31: Overall attitude towards biometric technology for access control

	Number of Respondents	Percent
Extremely unfavorable	1	.8
Unfavorable	5	3.8
Somewhat unfavorable	6	4.6
About 50/50	42	32.1
Somewhat favorable	34	26.0
Favorable	26	19.8
Extremely favorable	17	13.0
Total	131	100.0

Table 6.32: Overall attitude towards biometric technology by airport classification

		Airport classification by category					
		Category	Category	Category	Category	Category	0.1
		1	II	III	IV	X	Other
Overall	Extremely unfavorable			1			
attitude	Unfavorable	1	1		2	1	
	Somewhat unfavorable	1	2	2	1		
	About 50/50	6	8	12	7	6	
	Somewhat favorable	11	7	3	5	5	1
	Favorable	9	7	4	2	3	
	Extremely favorable		4	5	4	4	
Total		28	29	27	21	19	1

Finally, the participants in this study were asked to indicated, via two open ended questions, what, in their opinion, are the most and the least attractive features of biometric technology when considering its use for employee access control. Those responses were compiled and are listed in Appendix 1. In order to maintain confidentiality, if the respondent mentioned the airport or airport code specifically when answering the open-ended questions the researcher removed such identifying elements. Otherwise the answers to the open-ended questions were included verbatim.

#### 6.2. Chapter Summary

The various frequency analyses of the survey data offered in this chapter provide interesting insight into the attitudes of airport security directors towards the use of biometric systems for access control. Specifically, the frequency analysis indicated that while 70.2% of the respondents were very to somewhat knowledgeable about biometric technology, 29.8% were somewhat to very unknowledgeable about biometric technology. Also, while 66.9% of respondents placed some level of importance on their overall

knowledge of biometric technology when considering biometric technology for airport access control, 32% disagreed that there is enough information about biometric technology to make an informed decision on its capabilities for airport access control. As an issue, the compatibility of biometric technology to airport security goals was indicated as important by 83% of respondents, and 74.1% of respondents agreed on some level that biometric technology would be compatible with their airport's security goals and policies. As far as government involvement, 67.1% of respondents indicated that guidance from TSA is important on some level before the decision to use biometric technology for airport access control can be reached. However, 57.3% of respondents indicated on some level that TSA was unhelpful when providing guidance on the use of biometric technology for airport access control. Finally, while 77% of the respondents in this study indicated, on some level, a favorable attitude towards biometric technology, 40% of respondents indicated that it will be over 5 years before biometric technology is the primary method of access control at their respective airports.

Generally, the frequency analyses illustrates the various levels of familiarity and overall understanding that airport security directors have with regards to particular biometric systems, the highly perceived compatibility and applicability that biometric systems can offer to the overall security goals, and the rather lower confidence levels that security directors have that biometrics systems will be utilized in the near future in their airports. Similarly, the frequency analyses offers guidance as to the most beneficial (fingerprint scanning) and least beneficial (voice recognition) biometric applications for airports according to the security directors' assessment. Finally, the frequency analyses

highlights the highly perceived need for TSA direction coupled with the lower levels of satisfaction that security directors are currently feeling towards present TSA guidance.

While frequency analyses offers a substantial amount of information regarding the overall attitudes of airport security directors towards various factors surrounding biometric systems and use, the following chapter will provide even greater statistical analyses in order to test the study hypotheses involving the propensity by security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

#### 7. DATA ANALYSIS – BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS

The remaining portion of the data analysis will empirically assess the hypotheses regarding the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The analysis will include a restatement of the hypotheses regarding adoption of biometric technology. This will be followed by an analysis of the particular relationships as they apply to biometric technology for airport access control. Each of the independent variables and its bivariate relationship to propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control (the dependant variable) is examined in this chapter. Using SPSS 11.0, the bivariate relationships between the independent and dependant variables were assessed using a coefficient of correlation. Additionally, the standardized regression coefficients of each relationship will be diagramed using a path analysis model. The model, which was constructed using the AMOS program, will highlight the significance of each hypothesized relationship in this study.

A correlation is a statistical calculation designed to help a researcher determine if two variables are related in a systematic way; and it is designed to quantify and describe a relationship between those two variables. A correlation coefficient, a number ranging from -1.00 to 1.00 is used to describe the strength and direction of the relationship between two variables. While a correlation can describe a relationship between two variables, it does not mean that the variables are related in a causal manner. In other words, correlations can not determine that one variable causes another variable to occur. Within this study, correlations were used to determine the relationships between the independent and dependant variable. However, this study does not attempt to predict

what causes the adoption or non-adoption of biometric technology for airport access control.

Within this study, 7 independent variables were identified and they were based on an instrument created by Moore and Benbasat (1991). The 7 independent variables, the number of instrument items that pertained to each, and the specific question numbers are identified in table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Study variables

Independent Variable	Number of survey items	Hypothesis	Question(s)
Demographics (airport and individual)	6	1 and 2	19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27
Compatibility	5	3	7c, 7d, 8b, 8h, 8o
Voluntariness	1	4	8a
Relative advantage	6	5	8c, 8d, 8e, 8f, 8g, 8k
Ease of use	2	6	8m, 8n
Image	2	7	8i, 8j

The dependent variable for this study is the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. This variable was computed by adding the individual responses from instrument item #14 (how much priority do you place on using biometric technology for airport access control) and instrument item #16 (what is your overall attitude toward the use of biometric technology for airport access control). This variable was labeled "propensity to adopt", and it was used as the dependant variable in the correlations to determine the relationship, if any, to each of the 7 independent variables. Jeyaraj et al (2006) define adoption as "whether a person or an organization is an adopter or a non-adopter of an innovation. This is usually measured as a binary variable based on self-assessment." (Jeyaraj et al 2005, p. 5) Additionally, the correlations were used to determine whether the hypothesis for this study (again, based

on those created by Moore and Benbasat (1991)) could be supported. The hypotheses for this study are restated in table 7.2.

#### **Table 7.2: Study Hypotheses**

H1: There is a relationship between individual demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H2: There is a relationship between organizational demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H3: There is a relationship between perceived compatibility of biometric technology with airport security goals and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H4: There is a relationship between the perceived voluntariness of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H5: There is a relationship between perceived relative advantage of biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H6: There is a relationship between the perceived ease of use of biometric technology and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

H7: There is a relationship between the perceived image of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Seven participants in this study indicated that their airport currently uses biometric technology in some form for airport access control. Therefore, the responses from those seven participants were removed before the correlation analysis was conducted between the independent variables and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. It was believed that responses from those seven participants would skew

the results of the correlation due to the fact that their airports had already adopted biometric technology in some form.

# 7.1. Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: Demographics

The first two hypothesis examined in this study were: 1) there is a relationship between social demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, and 2) there is a relationship between organizational demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Within their study examining the predictors of innovation adoption, Jeyaraj et al (2006) listed age, gender, and experience as being frequently employed, and serving as significant predictors of innovation adoption by individuals. Experience was also listed, however, its relationship was not as significant as the others. Although, education was not listed as a predictor, it was used in this study to determine if it was correlated to the propensity to use biometrics for airport access control. The individual demographics that were examined in this study were: tenure (in years) as the airport's security director, education level, age, and gender. It was hypothesized, based on Jeyaraj et al's (2006) study, that each of these individual demographics would have a strong, positive relationship to the propensity to adopt biometric technology. After examining the correlation matrix constructed using SPSS 11.0, it was determined that of the individual demographics examined, gender was the only individual demographic to be related to the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control (table 7.3). The Person correlation coefficient for gender was -208. This relationship is likely caused due to the fact that females are underrepresented in the population of airport security directors. As indicated earlier, only 17 of the 131 participating respondents in the study were female. When examining a cross-tabulation matrix showing gender related to each propensity to adopt score, it is evident that 9 of the 17 responding females had a moderate to extremely low propensity to adopt score (table 7.4). Education level, age, and tenure as a security director were found to have no relationship to the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

**Table 7.3: Correlations** 

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to	Pearson Correlation	1
adopt	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Education level	Pearson Correlation	.079
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.388
	N	121
Age	Pearson Correlation	.104
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.258
	N	120
Gender	Pearson Correlation	208*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.022
	N	122
Tenure as	Pearson Correlation	031
security director	Sig. (2-tailed)	.731
	N	122

<sup>\*</sup>. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 7.4: Propensity to adopt by Gender

		<b>G</b>	Gen	ıder	
		Score	Male	Female	Total
Propensity	(Extremely low)	2	1		1
to adopt		3	1	1	2
		4	2	3	5
		5	11	4	15
		6	11		11
	(Moderate)	7	11	1	12
		8	19	3	22
		9	12		12
		10	23	2	25
		11	6	1	7
		12	6	2	8
		13	2		2
	(Extremely high)		6		6
		Total	111	17	128

Besides individual demographics, organizational demographics were also examined to determine if they were related to the airport security director's propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The organizational demographics that were examined were the: airport's classification and the airport's operating authority. It was hypothesized by the researcher that those airports with the highest classification levels (Category X and Category I) would have a greater propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Likewise, it was hypothesized, based on the study by Jeyaraj et al (2006) that the airport's organizational structure would be related to the propensity to use biometric technology for airport access control. However, after examining the correlation matrix (Table 7.5), it was determined that organizational demographics were not correlated to the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

**Table 7.5: Correlations** 

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to adopt	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Operation authority	Pearson Correlation	.024
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.790
	N	125
Airport classification	Pearson Correlation	.017
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.854
	N	119

Based on the examination of both individual and organizational demographics, it can be stated that there is no relationship between demographics and the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Although the individual demographic of gender showed a slight correlation to the propensity to adopt, it is believed that this is due to the under representation of females in this study.

Therefore, hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 were not supported by this study.

# 7.2. Hypothesis 3: Compatibility

Rogers (1995) and Moore and Benbasat (1991) both indicated that compatibility of an innovation consistently influences adoption of that innovation. Additionally, Jeyaraj et al (2006) list compatibility as an independent variable that is frequently used to predict innovation adoption. Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with the existing values and needs of the potential adopter (Rogers, 1995; Moore and Benbasat, 1991). Within this study, 5 survey items, reworded from Moore and Benbasat's (1991) instrument, were used to determine if the compatibility of

biometric technology is related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. To determine the compatibility of biometric technology, the participants in this study were asked to indicate on a 7 point scale how important it is that 1) biometric technology is compatible with security operations, and 2) how important are the number of access points within the airport. Additionally, the participants were asked to indicate, on a 7 point scale, how strongly they agreed that 1) biometric technology is not critical for airport security, 2) biometric technology would be compatible with overall security goals, and 3) biometric technology would be ineffective at their airport. After examining the correlation matrix (Table 7.6), it was determined that 3 of the 5 survey items regarding compatibility were significantly related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

**Table 7.6: Correlations** 

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to adopt	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Critical for use	Pearson Correlation	460*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	124
Compatibility with	Pearson Correlation	.573*
overall security goals	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	124
Effective for airport use	Pearson Correlation	340*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	125

<sup>\*\*</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Of those items of compatibility that were related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, the level of perceived compatibility with overall security goals had the highest relationship, as evidenced by the Pearson correlation coefficient of .573. In other words, as the level of perceived compatibility with overall security goals increases, so does the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The other two items of compatibility that were significantly related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control were both negatively worded questions. Therefore the relationship to the propensity to adopt were indicated in a negative direction although these same relationships were not inverse. Participants were asked how strongly they agreed that biometric technology is *not* critical for airport security, and how strongly they agreed that biometric technology would be *ineffective* for their airport. The Pearson correlation coefficients generated during data analysis were -.460 and -.430 respectively for the two survey items. In the first relationship, as the level of disagreement with the statement that biometric technology is not critical for airport security increased so did the propensity to adopt biometric technology. The more participants agreed that biometric technology is not critical for airport security, the less the propensity to adopt biometric technology. Likewise, as the level of disagreement increased with respect to the statement that biometric technology would be ineffective for their airports, so to does the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

While 3 of the 5 items regarding compatibility were related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, there were 2 items that were not related to this propensity. They are listed as follows: the compatibility with airport

operations; and the number of access points that would have to be outfitted with biometric technology (Table 7.7).

Table 7.7: Correlations

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to adopt	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Compatibility with	Pearson Correlation	.013
operations	Sig. (2-tailed)	.885
	N	124
Number of access points	Pearson Correlation	027
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.763
	N	124

While it is unclear as to why no relationships exist between these items and the dependant variable, it appears that question construction and response scale may have been an influencing factor. Both of the items that failed to establish a relationship were issues about which the participants were asked to respond on a Highly Important to Not Important, 7 point scale. Those survey items that were related to the dependant variable were all item statements that asked the participant to respond on a "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree", 7 point scale.

Although there were two items regarding compatibility that were not related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, the three items that were related indicates there is a moderate relationship between compatibility of biometric technology and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. This moderate relationship between the independent variable of compatibility and the dependant variable supports hypothesis 3 in this study and it lends support to the

literature produced by Rogers (1995), Moore and Benbasat (1991), and Jeyaraj et al (2006).

## 7.3. Hypothesis 4: Voluntariness

Voluntariness is the "degree to which the use of the innovation is perceived as being voluntary or of free will" (Moore and Benbasat, 1991), and it is listed by Jeyaraj et al (2006) as being a predictor of innovation adoption although not a very strong predictor. Airports have the authority to decide whether or not to implement biometric technology for airport access control. Moore and Benbasat (1991) point out that the perception of voluntariness is an important consideration in examining innovation adoption because if adopters feel pressured to adopt an innovation then they will do so because of that pressure. The influence of this variable would therefore be negative; propensity to adopt the innovation would increase with low voluntariness. In other words, if the innovation was to be mandated through organization policy or by an authoritative body it would follow that the propensity to adopt the innovation would increase. While Jeyaraj et al (2006) indicate that voluntariness is a predictor of innovation adoption, it does not have the significance as some the other predictors of adoption. Within this study, there was 1 survey item that was used to examine if a relationship exist between voluntariness and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Using a 7 point scale, the participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement that they are expected by TSA to use some form of biometric technology for access control. By utilizing a correlation matrix, it was determined that there is a relationship between the perceived voluntariness of using biometric technology and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control (Table 7.8).

**Table 7.8: Correlations** 

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to adopt	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Expected byTSA to use	Pearson Correlation	.365*
biometric technology	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	122

<sup>\*\*.</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The correlation analysis produced a Pearson's coefficient of .365, significant at the .01 level, which indicates a positive correlation between the independent and dependent variables. In other words, as the level of agreement with the statement increased, the level of propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control also increased. It can be stated that those airport security directors who perceive they must adopt biometric technology in some form because they are expected to do so by TSA are more likely to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Although only one survey item was used to represent voluntariness, it serves as an indicator that perceived voluntariness is positively related to the propensity to use biometric technology for airport access control. Therefore, based on this relationship, hypothesis 4 for this study is supported.

#### 7.4. Hypothesis 5: Relative advantage

According to Jeyaraj et al (2006), relative advantage of an innovation is one of the most frequently used predictors of innovation adoption by individuals. Identified by Rogers (1983), relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as

being better than its predecessor. Moore and Benbasat (1991) also indicate that the overall appeal of relative advantage is due to its being a generalizable concept. Because of the literature related to relative advantage as being a predictor of innovation adoption, it was utilized in this study to determine if it was related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Participants in this study were asked to indicate on a 7 point scale their level of agreement with the statements that: 1) biometric technology for access control will enable airports to become more secure; 2) using biometric technology for access control would improve the overall quality of airport security; 3) using biometric technology for access control would make airport security easier to accomplish; 4) using biometric technology for access control would improve the effectiveness of employees job performance; 5) using biometric technology would improve my level of control over access to secure areas, and 6) using biometric technology would eliminate piggybacking through access control points.

The responses to each of those items were then analyzed to determine if they were related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Of the 6 survey items in this study used to determine relative advantage, all 6 were related to the propensity to use biometric technology for airport access control (Table 7.9).

**Table 7.9: Correlations** 

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to adopt	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Use will enable airports to be more	Pearson Correlation	.471*
secure	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	124
Improvement to overall quality of security	Pearson Correlation	.565 *
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	122
		122
Security would be easier to accomplish	Pearson Correlation	.395*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	123
Improve effectiveness of employee's job	Pearson Correlation	.409**
performance	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	122
Improve level of control over access	Pearson Correlation	.562*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	123
Eliminate piggybacking	Pearson Correlation	.187*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.038
	N	124

<sup>\*\*.</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The item with the strongest relationship to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control was an improvement in overall security. The Pearson correlation coefficient for that relationship was .565. In other words, those who strongly agreed that using biometric technology for access control would improve the overall quality of airport security had a high propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The item of relative advantage that was the least related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control was the statement asking for the level of agreement on the elimination of piggybacking, which had a Pearson correlation of .187.

<sup>\*.</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Due to the fact that of that all six of the survey items related to relative advantage of biometric technology indicated a strong relationship to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, it can be stated that hypothesis 5 of this study is strongly supported. Additionally, the established relationships also support the literature indicating that relative advantage of innovation is a strong predictor of innovation adoption.

### 7.5. Hypothesis 6: Ease of Use

Ease of use is the perception that adopting or using an innovation will be free from physical and mental effort (Roger, 1983; Moore and Benbasat, 1991). According to Jeyaraj et al (2006), ease of use is an independent variable that serves as a predictor of innovation adoption, although its strength is debatable. Within this study, there were two survey items that were used to examine the independent variable: ease of use. The first item asked the respondents to indicate, on a 7 point scale, their level of agreement with the statement that biometric technology is cumbersome for airport access control. The second item asked the respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the statement that it would be easy for their airport to install biometric technology for access control. It was determined that a significant relationship was established between each of the two items and the dependant variable (Table 7.10).

**Table 7.10: Correlations** 

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to adopt	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Use is cumbersome for airport access control	Pearson Correlation	217*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.015
	N	125
Easy of installation	Pearson Correlation	.392*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	125

<sup>\*.</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

With a Pearson correlation coefficient of .392, it can be stated that there is a moderate relationship between the perceived ease of installation and the propensity to use biometric technology for airport access control. In other words, as the level of agreement with the statement that it would be easy to install biometric technology increases so too does the propensity to adopt biometric technology. A relationship was also found between the perceived cumbersomeness of use and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. With a Pearson correlation of -.217, this relationship to the propensity to adopt was indicated in a negative direction although the relationship was not an inverse relationship. Participants were asked how strongly they agreed that the use biometric technology would be cumbersome for airport access control. The more participants agreed that the use of biometric technology would be cumbersome for airport access control, the less the propensity to adopt biometric technology. Because the two ease of use item were significantly related to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, it can be stated that there is a moderate relationship

<sup>\*\*.</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

between the ease of use and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Therefore, hypothesis 6 for this study is supported.

### 7.6. Hypothesis 7: Image

Finally, according to Rogers (1983) image, which is the degree to which the use of an innovation is perceived to enhance one's image or status in a social system, is important in the decision of whether or not to actually adopt an innovation. Jeyaraj et al (2006) also list image as a slight predictor of individual adoption of an innovation. Within this study, there were two survey items used to measure image. First, the participants were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed with the statement that using biometric technology for access control would improve the overall public image of security at their airport. Secondly, the participants were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed with the statement that using biometric technology for access control would be seen as valuable by the employees. Both of these items used to measure image were significantly correlated to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control (Table 7.11).

**Table 7.11: Correlations** 

		Propensity to adopt
Propensity to adopt	Pearson Correlation	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	
	N	125
Improve overall public image	Pearson Correlation	.447*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	124
Value to employees	Pearson Correlation	.532*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	124

<sup>\*\*.</sup> Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

With a Pearson's coefficient correlation of .447 and .532 respectively, both overall public image and value to the employees indicate a strong relationship to propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Due to the fact that both items are related to the dependent variable, it can be stated that hypothesis 7 for this study is supported.

# 7.7. Path analysis

The previous sections in this chapter provided a detailed examination of the hypothesized relationships between the dependant and each of the independent variables of this study. The general purpose of the bivariate analysis was to determine if relationships did, in fact, exist between the independent and dependant variables. After the existence of relationships was established, a path analysis was constructed to provide further evidence of those relationships and to provide an estimate of the magnitude and significance of those relationships.

A path analysis is a tool which is used to examine the significance of the relationships between independent variables and the dependant variables. Figure 6 illustrates a diagram of those independent variables that were found to be related to the dependant variable in this study.




Figure 6: Independent variable related to the dependant variable

By utilizing AMOS, a statistical, model-estimator program capable of constructing path analysis, the strength of each of the relationships was determined (figure 7).




Figure 7: Path analysis of the propensity to adopt \* Statistically significant at 0.05 or lower level

The weight, or the standardized regression coefficient, for each of the relationships is reflected by their respective arrows. Within the path analysis, statistical significance was at the .05 level or lower. As such, it was determined that three of the relationships found to exist through the bivariate analysis were significant in strength and magnitude. Voluntariness, relative advantage, and image were shown to

have the strongest significant relationships, out of the five that exist, to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

In order to further test the research variables another, overall conceptual research model was developed and analyzed in order to determine if there were any significant relationships between *secondary* variables and the five primary research variables. The secondary variables that were analyzed were: age, gender, tenure, airport category, operating authority, education, and level of knowledge regarding biometrics. The overall conceptual model is seen in figure 8. Again using the statistical software of AMOS, a structural equation modeling (SEM) based model was developed and tested. SEM offers a strong technique of multivariate analyses that allows for statistical testing of multiple variables within a model. SEM can be classified as an extension of the general linear model (GLM) and allows the researcher to perform several tests of regression simultaneously (Gonzalez-de la Parra, 2006). Again, the purpose of developing this model was to determine if any of the secondary research variables had any significant relationship with the five primary research variables.




Figure 8: Full conceptual research model

#### 7.7.1. Overall Model Results

The SEM model (figure 8) allows for a graphical representation of the measured primary variables and the secondary measured factors, along with each of their hypothesized relationships towards the dependant variable of propensity to adopt biometrics for airport access control. In the path diagram in the model, the primary variable and the secondary factors are illustrated by rectangles. The single-headed arrows represent the paths that depict the causal relationships.

A requirement of the SEM technique is that all dependant variable be given an error term, or a value associated with the dependant variables that could be explained by

factors outside of the research model. Therefore, because the variables of relative advantage, voluntariness, ease of use, image, and compatibility were tested as dependant variables associated with age, gender, tenure, education, airport category, operating authority, and level of knowledge, each were given error measurements in the model to control for unexamined/unexplainable factors. Further, the dependant variable of propensity to adopt was also given an error measurement because it is the overall dependant variable being tested against the other research variables. Figure 9 illustrates the conceptual research model in testable form using the AMOS program. The error measurements are represented as elliptical circles next to the dependant variables.




Figure 9: AMOS testable model based on the conceptual model

Once the model was analyzed, the goodness of fit measures established to determine how well the model would fit, or adequately describe, the data. Gonzalez-de la

Parra (2006) suggests that the indices of goodness of fit (GFI), comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) be used to address the model and its fit of the data set. The GFI measure (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984) is used to indicate the "proportion of the observed covariance explained by the model-implied covariance" (cf. Gonzalez-de la Parra, 2006, p. 229). A range of 0 (poor fit) to 1 (perfect fit) is used to assess the GFI measure. The results of the conceptual model indicated a .862 GFI, meaning that, according to this measure, the conceptual model is adequate in describing the data.

The CFI measure (Bentler, 1990) is used to describe the correlation between variables within the model and measures the assumption that all variables are uncorrelated (Gonzalez-de la Parra, 2006). A range of 0 (poor fit) and 1 (perfect fit) is used to assess the CFI measure with values over 0.90 indicating an adequate fit. The results of the conceptual model used in this study indicated a .485 CFI, meaning that, within the model, there are variable that may be associated with each other, but these are unexplained using the current research variables. Further analysis revealed that the Modification Index (MI) indicated that the variables of relative advantage and image appeared to be highly correlated with each other. This correlation makes an interesting question for future research regarding the association of relative advantage and image toward the diffusion of an innovation.

Finally, the RMSEA measure (Browne and Cudeck, 1993) is used to assess how well the research model approximates a true model (Gonzalez-de la Parra, 2006). A RMSEA measure should be small with a value less than .05 illustrating an adequate fit. The result of the conceptual model was a .144 RMSEA, indicating, again, that the model

is not an adequate representation based on this index. However, this value may be indicative of the small sample size of this study (n=131), where larger sample sizes are suggested for SEM. This RMSEA indicator could also possibly be explained by the large number of variables within the model. However, based on the GFI=.862, the CFI = .485, and the RMSEA = .144, it would appear that the conceptual model does not highly fit with the suggested measures of fit.

Because of the weak goodness of fit indices of the full model, it was decided to remove those paths that had no levels of significance at the .05 level and to run the model again. The results of the full model indicated that only three paths or relationships were significant in the model. Again, those relationships were: relative advantage, voluntariness, and image. The seven secondary variables, when analyzed against the three primary variables, were seen as being weak indicators. Only age and operating authority were significantly related to any of the primary variables: both were significantly related to voluntariness. Figure 10 shows the adjusted model and illustrates only those associations that were proven to be significant at the .05 level.




Figure 10: Adjust conceptual model showing only relationship of significance

As in the earlier model, the measures of fit were evaluated to determine how well the model [Figure 10] adequately described the data. The results indicated a GFI of .856, a CFI of .615, and a RMSEA of .209. Again, it would appear that the model is not indicative of the data. However, Chin (1998) states that, in SEM, other measures besides goodness of fit measures, should be examined and actually carry more weight then the goodness of fit indices, arguing that the predictiveness of the model should be taken into account. Chin (1998) suggests using the strengths of the structural paths in the model by examining the R-square indices. By using the R-square indicators in this adjusted model, it would appear that the model is representative for the data; with propensity to adopt having a value R-square value of .35. This suggests that approximately 35% of propensity to adopt can be explained by relative advantage, voluntariness, and image. Additionally, the R-square values also suggested that 10% of voluntariness can be explained by age and operation authority. This indicator offers valuable insight into the

relationship of those two factors on voluntariness and allows for future exploration into the causalities of voluntariness.

This model [Figure 10] is interesting because the relationships do indicate that relative advantage, voluntariness, and image all affect the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, and that these relationships follow the theories utilized earlier in this study. The variable with the highest signification relationship to the propensity to adopt was image. Therefore, it can be concluded that the more an airport security director feels that biometric technology could enhance the public image of his or her respective airport, the higher the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Additionally, the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control increases if airport security directors believe that there is a relative advantage to using biometric technology over current methods of access control. Voluntariness is also a variable that has a significant relationship to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. As reported earlier in this study, voluntariness has an inverse relationship to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Therefore, the more airport security directors feel pressured to adopt biometric technology for access control, the higher the propensity to adopt biometric for airport access control. The variable of voluntariness is affected by the secondary variables of age and airport authority which is an interesting finding to note. One conclusion that can be drawn from the relationship presented in figure 10, therefore, is that the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control can increase if it can be demonstrated that biometric technology offers a relative advantage to current methods of access control and that the public image of the airport can be enhanced if biometric technology is used for airport access control.

Following the results of the first conceptual models, a final model was developed to determine what, if any, affects the secondary factors had on the level of biometric knowledge of an individual, and if that, in turn, had any affect on the propensity to adopt. While figure 11 illustrates this model, the results indicated that there were no significant relationships between the six secondary factors and the knowledge of biometrics.




Figure 11: Knowledge model

#### 7.8. Discussion of correlation and path analysis results

The remaining portion of this chapter will discuss the analysis results that were summarized above. In addition to discussing the correlations and path analysis results, an examination of their importance in relation to this study will also be provided.

## 7.8.1. Hypothesis 1

H1: There is a relationship between individual demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

The first two hypotheses for this study were related to individual as well as organizational demographics. After analyzing the correlations between individual and organizational demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control, it was determined that only one relationship (gender) exists between any of the individual demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Although Roger (1995) and Jeyaraj et al (2006) both list individual and organizational characteristics as being predictors of innovation adoption, the findings of this study failed to find any strong relationships to support the predictive powers of an individual's demographic characteristics. Through the path analysis, the only demographic that resulted in a relationship was age, and that relationship existed to voluntariness.

The lack of significant relationships between demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control is important because it indicates that other factors besides demographics influence the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The findings that neither age, education level, or experience are

related to the propensity to use biometric technology is interesting because it is an indication that, regardless of age, education level or the number of years as an airport security director, the members of this population are equally likely to adopt biometric technology for access control. This does not follow the work by Rogers (1995) which proposed that those who are younger and who possess higher levels of education and experience are more likely to adopt an innovation. Based on these findings therefore, the target market of biometric adopters in an airport environment is not limited by age or other individual demographics.

#### 7.8.2. Hypothesis 2

H2: There is a relationship between organizational demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Following individual demographics, the organizational characteristics of airports examined in this study produced no relationships to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Therefore, it was determined that neither the size of the represented airports, nor the authoritative governing bodies were found to have any relationship on the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Although Kimberly & Evanisko (1981) and Mascarenhas (1991) found positive relationships between organization size and innovation adoption, no such relationship was found in this study. As such, it would be expected that airport security directors representing smaller airports would have a lower propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. However, the lack of an existing relationship in this study indicates that airport security directors from varying airport

sizes and varying operating authorities have equal levels of propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control. Again, based on these findings, the target market of biometric adopters in an airport environment is not limited by size or operating authority of the airport.

## 7.8.3. Hypothesis 3

H3: There is a relationship between perceived compatibility of biometric technology with airport security goals and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

The third hypothesis in this study was based on the perceived compatibility of biometric technology for airport access control. Rogers (1995) lists compatibility as one of the attributes that is integral to the Innovation of Diffusion theory. Based on Rogers (1995) work, compatibility, a variable that consistently correlates with adoption behavior (Tornatzky and Klein, 1982), was expected to have a positive relationship to the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. In their study however, Jeyaraj et al (2006) determined that the compatibility of a technology is only a moderate predictor of adoption, with compatibility being a significant predictor 5 out of the 10 times it was examined in research. The bivariate analysis of this study indicates that compatibility is moderately correlated with the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The overall standardized regression coefficient of -.11 that was generated by the path analysis also indicates a moderate, rather than a strong relationship between compatibility and the propensity to adopt biometric

technology. The findings, therefore, follow more closely with Jeyaraj et al (2006) than with the findings of Tornatzky and Klein (1982). While holistically the relationship between compatibility and the propensity is moderate, the bivariate analysis revealed that three out of the five questions in this study that related to compatibility were significantly correlated with the propensity to adopt biometric technology. This is an important finding because it indicates that those airport security directors that feel that biometric technology is compatible with overall security goals have a higher propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Those airport security directors that disagree with the compatibility of biometric technology in their airports have a lower propensity to adopt biometric technology. Although not all of the survey items related compatibility were significantly correlated with the propensity to adopt, the fact that 3 out of 5 were significantly related indicates that the compatibility of biometric technology with airport security goals in an important factor to consider when examining the likelihood of it being adopting by airport security directors. Therefore, government agencies such as TSA, as well as biometric vendors, must be aware that the compatibility of biometric technology with airport security goals must be demonstrated in order to increase the likelihood of adoption by airport security directors.

#### 7.8.4. Hypothesis 4

H4: There is a relationship between the perceived voluntariness of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Voluntariness is the degree to which the adoption of an innovation is done voluntarily or under free will, and numerous innovation acceptance studies have found a relationship between voluntariness and the propensity to adopt an innovation (Rogers, 1995). Researchers have found that when an individual feels pressured by a recognized authority to adopt an innovation, then the propensity to adopt that innovation increases. This study follows the work of Rogers (1995) and Jeyaraj et al (2006) by finding that there is a relationship between the level of perceived voluntariness and the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The overall strength of that relationship, indicated by a standardized regression coefficient of .19, was determined to be significant though the path analysis. In other words, those that perceived that they were expected by TSA to use biometric technology for airport access control had a higher propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. This finding is interesting because while national regulators and authorities such as TSA determine airport security objectives, it is the airport operators themselves that decided whether or not to implement technologies, such as biometric technology, to meet those objectives. However, increased perception of authority expectations to implement biometric technology is coupled with an increase in the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. While TSA supports the use of biometric technology to increase the security of airport access control, such use by airports in not required (TSA, 2005). Airport operators and managers will always have the authority to determine what technologies to implement at their airports. However, based on the results of this study, it can be argued that if governing agencies, such as the TSA, were to in effect lower the perception of volunatriness through indirect actions such as offering rewards or incentives then the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control would increase.

## 7.8.5. *Hypothesis* 5

H5: There is a relationship between perceived relative advantage of biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Rogers (1995), defines relative advantage as the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being better that its precursor, and it is one of the integral attributes in the Innovation Diffusion theory. Indeed, Jeyaraj et al (2006) listed relative advantage as one of the best predictors of intention to use an innovation by individuals. The findings for this study indicate that there is a strong relationship between perceived relative advantage of biometric technology and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. This study, therefore, lends evidence to the statements by Rogers (1995) and Jeyaraj et al (2006) that relative advantage of an innovation is important to consider when examining innovation adoption. All 6 of the survey items designed to measure relative advantage were significantly correlated with the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. Additionally, the overall standardized regression coefficient of .35 provided by the path analysis lends further evidence to a strong relationships between relative advantage and the propensity to adopt biometric technology. Not only do the findings of this study further validate the work of Rogers (1995), they are also important because they show that airport security directors have a

higher propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control if they feel that its use would be an improvement from the systems currently in place. Therefore, in order to increase the propensity of airport security directors adopting biometric technology, national regulatory agencies, such as TSA, and biometric vendors should demonstrate that biometric technology has a relative advantage over those systems that are currently being use for airport access control.

#### 7.8.6. *Hypothesis* 6

H6: There is a relationship between the perceived ease of use of biometric technology and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

In his technology acceptance model (TAM) Davis (1986) defines perceived ease of use as the degree to which an individual feels that using an innovation would be free from physical or mental effort. While empirical studies draw conclusions that there is a relationship between ease of use and innovation acceptance (Davis, 1986; Rogers, 1995), there is disagreement over the significance of ease of use as a predictor of innovation adoption (Jeyaraj et al, 2006). For example, Jeyaraj et al (2006) found that ease of use more directly affects perceived usefulness of an innovation rather that intention to use an innovation by an individual. However, Jeyaraj et al (2006) also found that out of the 27 times the ease of use was used as an independent variable to examine the adoption of innovation by an individual, 14 times the ease of use was significant in innovation adoption.

The findings of this study indicate that there is a moderate relationship between ease of use, especially in the realm of system installation, and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The overall standardized coefficient of .12 which was generated through path analysis further indicates a moderate, rather than strong relationship. Therefore, in order to increase the propensity of adoption of biometric technology, it must be demonstrated that the system is easy to install and maintain. Further evidence that ease of installation and maintenance must be demonstrated in order to increase the propensity to adopt can be seen in appendix 1 as several airport security directors' list installation and maintainability as current negative features of biometric technology (appendix 1).

#### 7.8.7. *Hypothesis* 7

H7: There is a relationship between the perceived image of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Rogers (1995) defines image as the degree to which use of an innovation is perceived to enhance one's image or social status. Although some researchers categorize image to fall under relative advantage (Moore & Benbasat, 1991), Rogers (1995) maintains that image is one of the most important motivations for almost any individual adoption of an innovation because it is driven by a desire to gain social status. As listed by several airport security directors as an attractive feature of biometric technology (appendix 1), the public perception that airports are secure is an important consideration

when examining access control systems. Especially since 9/11, public perception and scrutiny about airport security is at a high. It is not surprising, therefore, that this study found that as the perception that overall public image would improve with the use of biometric technology, so to did the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control increase. Indeed, the overall standardize regression coefficient of .42, which was generated through the path analysis, gave the indication that image was one of the strongest relationships of this study. This finding follows Rogers' (1995) that image is related to innovation adoption. It is also interesting to note the finding that as the perception by security directors that employees' value of biometric technology increase, so to does the propensity to adopt biometric technology for access control. This relationship indicates that airport security directors' level of propensity to adopt biometric technology increases as the level of perceived value to their employees' increases. Both of these relationships are important because if biometric technology can be perceived as a technology that would increase overall airport image in the eyes of the public and of the employees then the propensity of adopting biometric technology would also increase.

#### 7.9. Chapter Summary

To summarize this chapter and its findings, the hypotheses for this study, along with the correlations and path analysis results are listed in table 7.12.

Table 7. 12: Study Hypotheses and Correlation and Path Analysis Results

Table 7. 12: Study Hypotheses and Correlation and Path Analysis Results		
Hypothesis	Correlation	Standardized Regression Coefficient
H1: There is a relationship between individual		
demographics and the propensity to adopt	AT 1.2 12	
biometric technology for airport access control.	No relationship	N/A
H2: There is a relationship between organizational demographics and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.	No relationship	N/A
H3: There is a relationship between perceived compatibility of biometric technology with airport security goals and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.	Moderate relationship	-0.11
H4: There is a relationship between the perceived voluntariness of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.	Strong relationship	0.19*
H5: There is a relationship between perceived relative advantage of biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.	Strong relationship	0.35*
H6: There is a relationship between the perceived ease of use of biometric technology and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.	Moderate relationship	0.12
H7: There is a relationship between the perceived image of using biometric technology for airport access control and the propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.	Strong relationship	0.42*
orometre technology for airport access control.	Shorig relationship	0.42

Correlation analysis was utilized in this study because it allowed for a detailed examination of the influencing factors that had a relationship to the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. A path analysis was then constructed in order to determine the strength and magnitude of those

existing relationships. From a theoretical standpoint, the relationships that were shown to exist between the various independent variables and the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control further validate previous studies regarding technology and innovation adoption by suggesting that compatibility, voluntariness, relative advantage, perceived ease of use, and image are all important factors to consider with examining the propensity of airport security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

#### 8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter discusses the contributions of the study, the limitations of this study and suggestions for further research in this area. First, a detailed discussion of the study's contributions, both theoretical and practical, will be provided. Then, the limitations of the dissertation are addressed, followed by suggestions that this study may provide for future research.

#### 8.1. Contributions

This study contributes to the growing literature regarding airport security and the role that biometric systems are deemed to have in heightening that security. After September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the area of airport security came under extreme scrutiny. The literature surrounding the need for increased airport security and the appropriate mechanisms for success, while growing, has been based primarily on tentative arguments and less on empirical data. This study's primarily contribution is to offer the only nationwide study to empirically question airport security directors on their perceptions regarding biometric systems and to statistically test hypotheses regarding the likelihood of adoption of biometric systems by security directors for airport access control.

Theoretically, this study adds credence to previous studies regarding technology adoption conducted by Rogers (1995), Moore and Benbasat (1991), and Jeyaraj et al (2006) by suggesting that compatibility, voluntariness, relative advantage, perceived ease of use, and image are important factors regarding the acceptance of biometric technology. This study also suggests, irrespective of Jeyaraj et al (2006), that demographic and organizational factors, along with perceived cumbersomeness, are not associated with biometric systems adoption for airport access control. Further, this study empirically

strengthens the theories of Total Quality Management (TQM) and Diffusion of Innovation, with its added theories of Individual Innovativeness and Perceived Attributes, by suggesting that airport security directors are essential in the adoption of biometric systems and that variables associated with these theories such as compatibility, voluntariness, relative advantage, perceived ease of use, and image are relevant for technology adoption. Additionally, this study highlights that the survey instrument designed by Moore and Benbasat (1991) was generalizable to include biometric technology as an innovation that could examined and perceptions about adopting biometric technology measured. Therefore, the same survey instrument could be utilized to examine the use of biometric technology in other areas outside the realm of airport security.

This study also has practical contributions. A strength of this study lies in the fact that it can provide a practical guideline for the adoption and implementation of biometric systems for increased security at airport access points. By utilizing the results of this study, national regulators, such as TSA, can tangibly assess the perceptions that airport security directors have towards biometric applications and can, therefore, develop practical working solutions for guidance and support. Further, by utilizing the results of this study, vendors who deal in the business of biometric applications can determine the most beneficial and least beneficial systems deemed essential for airport security by the security directors themselves.

Further practical contributions of this study can be found in the fact that it provides a starting point as to the factors that influence adoption; what airport security directors value and what they perceive as important. The knowledge of these factors is

important because it highlights those factors of biometric technology that should be promoted and those factors about which more guidance and information should be provided to increase the propensity of adoption of biometric technology for access control.

#### 8.2. Limitations

Like all studies, this study had several limitations. One of the limitations of this study could be found in the fact that a response rate of fewer than 50% was achieved. The response rate of this study was 34.5%. The low response rate for this study could be attributed to several factors. First, this study dealt with the important and ever changing issue of airport security. The survey included questions that could be considered "sensitive" in nature. During the duration of this study, the researcher was contacted by four airport security directors who stated that they would not participate in this study because they considered the survey responses to be "secure information". Although the researcher informed all potential respondents that the survey results would be anonymous and reported only in aggregate form, it is believed that several potential respondents simply felt that answering a survey based on questions related to airport security would violate their security procedures.

A second factor that could be attributed to the low response rate was the terrorist bombing plot that occurred in London on August 9, 2006. The terrorist plot, although foiled in Lonon, affected U.S. airport security polices and procedures. For example, liquids were banned from passing through airport security checkpoints in the U.S. because the terrorists in the London plot planned to use liquid explosives to carry out their acts of terrorism. U.S. airport security was tightened and information regarding

airport security became more secure and sensitive in nature. The terrorist plot could have affected the response rate for those in the second round of surveying due to the fact that airport security directors became more reluctant to share any information regarding security policies and procedures. While the response rate for this study could be considered low, due to the fact that this study was conducted on a national scale generalizability is not considered a major limitation in this study.

Another minor limitation of this study could be seen in the fact that Airport

Council International – North America assisted in providing mailing address and email addresses for a portion of the airport security directors asked to participate in this study. While this sample could be viewed as non-random in its selection, it is not considered to have effect on the generalizability of this study due to the fact that the respondents that participated represented airports from across the county and from across airport categories and sizes.

#### 8.3. Future Research

As in all studies, this study highlights that there are many additional areas of research and consideration that can be explored with regard to biometric technology for airport access control. The first is that this study could be conducted on a global scale rather than limited to only United States airports. The use of email distribution and that ability of participants to respond via a web-based survey would allow for a quick, easy, confidential, and inexpensive method to survey airport security directors world-wide on their propensity to adopt biometric technology for airport access control. The responses from a global survey could be compared and/or contrasted to the response generated by

this study which would make the responses generalizable on a world-wide scale rather than to just those airports in the United States.

An additional avenue of research could be a pre-implementation study. Within this study, nearly 10% of respondents estimated that biometric technology would be the primary method of access control in their airports within 1-2 years. This study could serve as a pre-implementation benchmark providing information on attitudes before the implementation on biometric technology for airport access control occurs. Surveying those airports after the implementation of biometric technology would further enrich the literature regarding the use of biometric technology for airport access control.

Finally, as previously mentioned, this study highlights that the survey instrument designed by Moore and Benbasat (1991) is generalizable and can be used to measure the perceptions of adopting biometric technology. Therefore, the survey instrument used in this study could be used to measure the perceptions and the propensity to adopt biometric technology by those outside the realm of airports. For example, decision makers any area in which biometric technology could be implemented into an access control system could be surveyed via the instrument used in this study. Hospitals, ports, government buildings, and nuclear plants are all examples of facilities that could potentially use biometric technology for access control purposes. Decision makers at each of these locations represent a population whose propensity to adopt biometric technology could be measured and examined.

#### 8.4. Conclusion

The events of 9/11 placed airport security in the United States at the forefront of the domestic agenda. Although hundreds of airports exist in the United States, a

disruption at one airport resulting for a criminal act, including terrorism, would have an enormous impact on social and economic functions of the United States. While there are numerous methods for controlling access to secure airport areas, those currently in use are limited due to the fact that they cannot positively identify that the person actually accessing the secure area is authorized to be there. While biometric technology offers the capability of positively identifying and verifying the identity of airport employees, its use in the airport environment is limited. Due to the fact that there is a paucity of empirical literature regarding the use of biometric technology for airport access control, this study is timely and augments the current literature in this area. Additionally, this study provides both a frequency analysis, which illustrates the various levels of familiarity and overall understanding that airport security directors have biometric technology, and correlation analysis, which suggests that compatibility, voluntariness, relative advantage, perceived ease of use, and image are all important factors to consider with examining the propensity of security directors to adopt biometric technology for airport access control.

Due to the vast amount of information that this study provides, the study can be utilized by decision makers such as the TSA, airport security directors and managers, biometric companies, and other biometric researchers when examining the implementation of biometric systems and the factors that influence that implementation.

# APPENDIX: RESPONSES TO OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

What, in your opinion, are the most attractive features of biometric technology when considering its use for employee access control to secure airport area?	What, in your opinion, are the least attractive features of biometric technology when considering its use for employee access control to secure airport area?
Positive match between the SIDA card and the biometric guarantees that only the employee can utilize the system. Lost cards and terminated employees are quickly removed from the system.	Integration with the SIDA system
Distinct identification traits.	N/A
N/A	Cost
Positive identification verification, speed (about 3 seconds on both iris and fingerprint)	Hygiene on fingerprint readers and other readers where readings must be taken by touching areas someone else has touched, because of the increasing number of communicable diseases, especially at International Airports.
Non-transferable and non-duplicative	Lack of standards from TSA; cost of infrastructure
Theoretically it is more precise than current methods but whether we are spending time and money to protect the wrong target is my question. As the recent convictions of bad TSA employees in (deleted), the enemy" is already within the system."	It makes it harder for the good guys to get to work while the bad guys always find a way around the system. Build a 10-foot wall and they will use a 12-foot ladder. Again, the enemy is already within the system.
Level of authentication  Accuracy in positively identifying an employee	Expense and employee acceptance
before granting access.  Verify the identity of a badge holder via two methodologies that are relatively tamper free	Cost.  The sense on the employee part of an invasion of privacy

The instant control identification of badge holder to biometric check. Not every airport has time to check faces with badges every day. This cuts back on "borrowing" a co-worker's badge to work that day if you "lost" your badge. Either you go home and get your badge/ or you don't work that day. Very reliable. It is very easy to track when three people go out a door and one two people come back in on camera. You can confidently go up to the third and talk to the individual about "piggybacking" "	Most people who use the features on a regular basis have worked in positions for a number of years around hazards that have "worn" their fingerprints "off" Readers are sensitive enough that even the custodial staff with cleaning chemicals on their hands may have troubles daily to get through. Also the learning curve is quite wide with biometric fingerprints access control. One person may not understand new technology as well as the next, and that can be time consuming. Having two fingerprints, i.e. one for "everyday" access and one for a "duress" situation also can cause problems for individuals who occasionally forget, or those who will use any finger to get in.
Reduces the risk of fraud and is a great physical" deterrent."	Cost and the unproven effectiveness of the technology. also it is very hard to try and integrate a system when the TSA is constantly changing their "guidance"; this is a huge capitol investment for airports, we need to know that what we are investing in is going to carry us for awhile.
None	None
Helps identify the person with the badge. Important: if badges are lost it can't provide access due to biometrics	Enrollment; compatibility of systems
Eliminates employees writing PIN # on back side of badge. Eliminates employees loaning/borrowing badge.	None
The inability of one person to use another persons identification.	Initial cost and its efficiency to the overall system.
Ability to verify personnel accessing secure areas	Equipment acquisition and installation
It verifies that the person at the access points is same person who should be granted access.  Simplicity; reliability; "no touch" is a plus	Its like securing a \$5.00 chain with a \$500.00 lock. (deleted). It keeps the bad guys from using doors and gates. What's that worth? Not sure.  Cost; data base management
Simplify, remaining, no touch is a plus	Cost, sam once management

	<u>,                                    </u>
It would start the upgrade of technology into the State systems and allow for other technological upgrades outside of access controls to better the airport operations and controls as a whole. Using modern technology improves users commitments and belief that seriousness or threat is real and that we are serious and have the means and ability to control and catch violators.	Infrastructure support and maintenance required for most government public facilities which rely on legislative funding or approvals to obtain and maintain systems and support. The most powerful persons in government are engineers and consultants who dictate systems to obtain and utilize.
I haven't been able to determine attractive features at this point.	When we ran tests at (deleted) we had outside weather problems with biometric readers.
Positive control	None
Access to secure areas.	Maintenance
Verification	Enrollment and speed of access
Positive identification; potential decrease cost for manpower requirements	Cost; maintainability
Better chance of catching piggybackers. ID cards can be stolen and used, but biometrics cannot	Still a lot to learn; price; time it takes to implement; assurance of security of records. So many still fear biometrics, therefore, are hesitant to jump in early
Positive control of employee population; decrease in piggyback violations; public acceptance and increased credibility on the part of stakeholders in the use of cutting edge technology; the ability to automate manned portals through the use of biometrics reduces staffing by leveraging technology.  Positive identification of individuals	With the exception of facial recognition, biometrics relies exclusively on the use of technology to accomplish increased security. It may be too fragile. Redundancy needed, back-up systems needed, etc.  Finding the funding
Provides an additional layer of security to ensure the individual granted unescorted access authority is that individual	Training and integration with the current system
Public perception. Higher level of security	Cost, both up front and long term operation and maintenance. Employee reluctance to accept the program.
High level of fraud protection	False positives (i.e. reliability)
It raises the reliability that the employee entering the secure area is actually the employee  Secure verification of identity; public perception;	For my airport, it would be the large number of access points used by employees  Cost of initial implementation; training of
ease of use	employees

reliable secondary identifier  Adds a measure of certainty regarding control over access. Removes the need for an obsolete swipe card system  Matching access authorization to the holder of the access media  Cost  Undecided if the cost involved will match the benefit  Cost  Undecided if the cost involved will match the benefit  Cost, infrastructure costs, maintenance, durability, perimeter security  Difficulty in dealing with rejected, non-readable biometrics as well as various environmental conditions  Money and time  To my knowledge the inability to steal or utilize other persons access media  Enhanced security  Cost to implement  Cumbersome; how to handle groups of individuals in a vehicle  You know who is where and when  To expensive and complicated for smaller airports  Helps identify the person with the badge. Important: if badges are lost it can't provide access due to biometrics  N/A  Technology  Assures that the individual that has been fingerprinted and trained is the individual that is actually using the ID  Will assure interdiction of anyone who obtains unauthorized access into a secure area  Up keep and maintenance  \$1-2 million in cost and increased training and maintenance requirements.  Cost  Undecided if the cost involved will match the benefit (Cost, infrastructure costs, maintenance, durability, perimeter security  Difficulty in dealing with rejected, non-readable biometrics as well as various environmental conditions  Unreliable technology (or unproven at this point)  Cost to implement  Cumbersome; how to handle groups of individuals in a vehicle  To expensive and complicated for smaller airports  enrollment; compatibility of systems  Inability to positively "match" employee instantly to biometric identifiers and failing to open the door  Cost; training; monitoring of such technology  Improved accountability for insuring that only the	Depending on the technology used, it provides a	
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It would eliminate proximity cards and access cards. Hopefully biometrics would be better type  Because we are a small airport, cost would be the		Because we are a small airport cost would be the
of security access control then the present system controlling issue.	1 1	

Better security	Cost
	Airport manager's view of costs along with actual
Extremely difficult to duplicate biometric features	income of the airport
Increased security and control	Cost
Accountability	Cost
N/A	Cost
Ease of use	Cost
Security	Start up costs
N/A	Implementing new technology, costs, and training considering the size of our airport
Less chance of wrong person gaining access (no	
passing of keys or cards)	Complex and expensive
Increased security authentication	Installation cost
Cannot easily be fooled; especially if a card is lost	Maintaining database; initial scanning hand, eye, or whatever that takes time and time is a great cost.
Non-transferable	Not yet perfected
Can not be used by other individuals, as a prox card can	Cost
Can not duplicate person to person all that easy; very difficult	Cost, repair, and maintenance; risk of stolen info or info that may be forwarded
Some of the devices recognize parts of the human anatomy that only belong to one individual, i.e. fingerprint, iris, and retina	Cost to establish the system; voice recognition systems could possibly be fooled by a recording of one's voice.
N/A	Cost
Security	Cost
Ease of use and 100% verification of who is accessing a particular door. Also, low maintenance of operations	New technology programming problems. Service call, support service, etc.
Not easily manipulated	Cost
Positive identification	Maintenance; employee turnover
No keys, cards, or badges	Cost, reliability, complexity
It would eliminate the cost and hassle of lost keys and swipe or proxy cards	Cost

	T
Not carrying a key or card; quicker access through doors	N/A
N/A	Cost does not justify the use of biometric systems (small airport)
Reliability, ease of use, cost	N/A
For airports that don't require a PIN# with an ID card, it will help with lost cards or fake cards. It will also help prevent employees from transferring cards and PIN#'s	It won't stop piggybacking, it won't replace ID badges (for visual identification); all but a few biometrics can be fooled with little effort
Cannot lose/misplace like code/card	N/A
People have unique biometric characteristics that may be difficult to replicate	Since I am not familiar with the costs, that may be an obstacle
Difficult to cheat; employees don't have to carry a card	Cost; reliability
Improved security	The cost for a small airport could be a major factor. The turnover rate in areas such as housekeeping would require that the system be designed to easily add new personnel without incurring large additional costs
N/A	Cost
Inability to share access media	Objection to sharing personal identifying information
Biometrics would give a accurate identity of an individual gaining access to a secure area	N/A
Unique method of ID	N/A
The ease of use and tracking of who enters and exits areas	The cost of buying and installing the technology along with the cost of training employees to use the technology
Public perception is the only real reason to use biometrics; there are much less expensive ways of accomplishing the same goal.	The least attractive feature is the additional time biometrics add to access points. Scramble pads are faster.
Not having to lose ID cards or access cards; greater likelihood actual individual is the one attempting access unless under duress	Cost and getting local pilot community to accept increased security measures
Unique to individual	Expense and number of access points
The integrity of the biometric technology (i.e. diffcult to compromise)	Cost is the major issue
Most secure, easiest to track, hardest to defeat	N/A

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Reliability and accuracy	Cost
Ensuring that person who is going through the access point is the person who is supposed to go through	Cost and processing time vs. benefits
The difficulty of compromising the system and the fact that it does not involve any cards or codes that could degrade security	You still have the need for other identification media (ID cards) to identify employees as authorized airport employees
Biometric technology would definitely improve effectiveness and ease of obtaining our security goals	Cost of implementing biometric technology would prevent its consideration at our facility; we have less than 100,000 enplanements annually and our budget would not support this upgrade
Great asset in larger airports. Not necessary in an airport as small as mine.	I have not considered any negatives. Cost would be paramount here.
Accuracy	Cost
Accountability	High cost of implementation
Unlike keys and PIN codes, I am assuming biometric technology limits access to secure areas to only those who have been scanned	1) Cost and 2) limited number of employees required to access secure areas. Biometric technology does not solve our security issues.
Biometrics would relieve the airport operator from physically checking individuals at gates and doors leading to secured areas. Also the use of biometrics with dual uses (i.e. facial recognition software) would also improve the airport police's ability to protect the passengers and visitors to the airport	Depending on the type of biometrics used, there has been issues with false positives that are generated by the system which causes more police responses. Additionally, the pass through time on most of the systems would increase causing aggravation to air carrier personnel
Convenience; reliability	Cost; training; maintenance
Efficiency and speed in processing employees through the access points. Accurate record keeping. Hard to breach.	Affordability. Funding streams not in place for GA airports.

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