

PREDICTORS OF INCIVILITY IN CONGRESS

by

NICHOLAS EDWARD JORDAN  
A.A., Young Harris College, 2000  
B.A., State University of West Georgia, 2002

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts  
in the Department of Political Science  
in the College of Sciences  
at the University of Central Florida  
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term  
2008

## ABSTRACT

Many have decried the lack of civility in Congress. However, to this point, few have attempted to isolate individual level explanations for the lack of comity. This research attempts to rectify this lapse. Through matched pair analysis using quota sampling with replacement, the significant predictors of uncivil behaviors are isolated in a Logistic regression. Initially, a sample is established using the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, 1933-2005, inclusive. This time period begins with the 73<sup>rd</sup> Congress and ends with the 109<sup>th</sup>. Incidents of incivility were catalogued and the details concerning the individuals involved were gathered. In the end, the research finds several significant predictors of incivility; tenure, ideological extremism, electoral safety, and previous state legislative experience are all significantly associated with the likelihood of engaging in uncivil acts. By isolating the factors that likely contribute to incivility, it may be possible to make recommendations concerning the recruitment of future candidates; recommendations that may lead to a more productive legislature.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I am indebted to many people for the success of this thesis. Many thanks to the committee as a whole, and to Dr. Scot Schraufnagel, in particular, for the many revisions and critiques that improved this paper. I also owe a great personal debt to my wife, who has been tolerant of many sleepless nights and listened patiently more times than I care to count.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .....	2
Research Question .....	4
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .....	8
Defining Incivility.....	8
Recruitment.....	10
Factors Affecting Incivility.....	15
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN.....	17
Dependent Variable and Sample Considerations.....	19
Control Group .....	21
Variables and Hypotheses.....	24
Key Explanatory Variables .....	25
Personal Traits .....	27
Controls for Media Bias.....	30
Representativeness of the Sample.....	34
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS.....	38
Logistic Regression and Analysis.....	41
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION .....	52
Future Work.....	54
APPENDIX A: ACTS OF INCIVILITY BY INDIVIDUAL.....	57
APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK.....	79
NOTES.....	84

## LIST OF FIGURES

Table 1 .....	34
Table 2 .....	35
Table 3 .....	39
Table 4 .....	44
Table 5 .....	45
Figure 1 .....	46
Figure 2 .....	48
Figure 3 .....	49
Figure 4 .....	50

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

When discussing this research with people who are only casual observers of congressional politics, the response is both predictable and a bit disconcerting. When it comes up in conversation that the research centers on congressional civility, the response is, almost without fail, “there’s no such thing.” Having spent considerable time reading about the Senate as a gentleman’s club where civility norms reign (Matthews 1960) and the careful socialization that takes place when one enters into congressional service (Asher 1973), This dim view that most Americans take of their legislature is a bit surprising. It has become a platitude that Americans hate Congress, but love their representatives (Fenno 1977). While ill feelings toward Congress are hardly a new phenomenon, it seems to have become more pronounced in recent years. Recently, a Harris Poll found that a full three-quarter of Americans rate the performance of Congress negatively.<sup>1</sup>

When one turns on C-Span, what one expects to see and what one may witness can vary greatly. One may imagine a grey-at-the-temples Ivy-Leaguer standing on a podium, a few scribbled notes upon the lectern. He speaks with confidence, debating with colleagues the minutiae of the issue currently under consideration. Obliging, he yields to “The Gentleman from Connecticut,” who notices a minor difference between their positions, and wants clarification. With almost painful courtesy, he concedes that their views do not reconcile completely, but feels that his version of the amendment is the superior one. He then enumerates a few reasons for this opinion. He yields the balance of his time for questions, of which there are several. All, even those from the opposition, are handled with this same gentility and quiet dignity.

Yes, this passage is entirely made up. However, this is the sort of collegial atmosphere one imagines in Congress. Indeed, there are some members for whom this description would be appropriate. However, keen observers of congressional politics can easily recall many examples of less-than-stellar behavior from our elected officials. These may range from rude comments and personal attacks on the floor of the chamber to threats to the health of the First Family should they visit a member's home state.<sup>2</sup>

Some may read these statements and acknowledge that they are true, but say, in response, "So what?" In short, why should we care whether Congress is civil when it goes about our business? After all, it is the job of the legislature to write our laws, not provide the model of behavior that our society should follow. For that matter, is not a small amount of incivility fitting? After all, some hostility between the ideologically opposed would seem to be an entirely naturally occurring phenomenon.

Much of the confusion generated by such questions is likely the result of the multi-faceted nature of legislative conflict. Some argue that there are two types of conflict in Congress, partisan difference and incivility (Schraufnagel 2006). While a more complete discussion of this will ensue in Chapter 2, a short answer is provided below. Scot Schraufnagel (2006) writes:

"Yet another way to distinguish partisan difference from incivility is to consider the prescriptive implications of each. On a normative level, most scholars welcome partisan disagreement or inter-party difference over policy. After all, having parties that compete on the issues is the central requirement of the responsible party model. It is less clear, however, that incivility in the legislative arena is a virtue. To argue that there is something to be gained from the lack of civility in Congress is a much tougher sell. If one occurrence is arguably positive and the other negative, it must be the case that these are distinct concepts. Consequently, it would seem important to our understanding of the policy implications of the legislative conflict to test the relative influence of both forms of conflict."

The research that follows will focus on the type of conflict that Schraufnagel (2006) argues may be less desirable. That is, this research is not concerned about the type of conflict that is reflected in partisan disagreement over policy options. Rather, this work focuses on the personal conflicts that have been a part of legislative processes for some time.<sup>3</sup> Eric Uslaner (1993) argues that the decline of comity in the modern Congress is responsible for many of the logjams that are currently a hallmark of many “do-nothing” Congresses. He suggests that when the individuals who make up Congress become less willing or able to get along, both the legislative process and the fruits thereof suffer.

This is more than a trivial matter. The legislative process is at the heart of democratic governance, and the manner in which a society’s laws and norms are codified. While one could imagine problems associated with members of a legislature getting too cozy with one another, it is also the case that surplus conflict can lead to institutional meltdown. Indeed, some argue that manageable conflict is a vital part of an effective legislature (Schraufnagel 2006). The key word here, however, is “manageable.” This research will endeavor to isolate those individuals who move the legislature from manageable and healthy partisan and civil conflict to the realm of personal discord and incivility. The assumption is that these individuals are part of the reason for much current stalemate in Congress.

### **Research Question**

As discussed above, the focus of this research is incivility in Congress, or the breaking of comity norms such as courtesy and reciprocity that are intended to promote effective legislative processes. More specifically, this research will separate the civil



members from the uncivil in order to tease out the differences in the background experiences of the more uncivil members. The goal is to define the “type” of individuals who are most uncivil in an attempt to further understand the prerequisites for a productive legislature. Surely, some of the negative feelings that people have toward Congress are tied to gridlock or stalemate, and any effort to more fully understand how to break the myriad impasses is warranted. In short, the question this research seeks to answer is: are there definable, systematic differences between legislators who are implicated in uncivil acts and those who are not? If so, what are these distinguishing qualities? These answers may provide the keys necessary to promote quality legislative deliberation and output.

All of Congress has not become a collection of foul-mouthed brutes who hurl insults at each other until they get their way. Members of Congress are members of an elite body. These individuals are selected by the people of the United States to represent their interests in the discussions and votes in a variety of policy arenas. They certainly carry a great responsibility on their shoulders, and are constantly in the public eye. One might imagine that members would always be on their best behavior. The reality of legislative processes is that members often lapse into discourteous and insulting behaviors.

Put again, the central research question is: What sets uncivil members apart from those who are more collegial? Are they more or less experienced than their civil counterparts? Are they from certain backgrounds, such as the legal practice or the military? Are members from certain regions more or less likely to be civil? Is incivility explained by ideological extremism? Perhaps one’s electoral safety plays a role. It is with these questions in mind that this project is undertaken. Specifically, 254 legislators

from 1932 to 2006, who were implicated in newspaper coverage, for acting in an uncivil manner while serving in their official capacity as a national legislator are identified. This group is then matched with members from corresponding Congresses that were never implicated in the same newspapers. This type of matched pair analysis is then complimented by a Logistic regression analysis that will attempt to isolate those factors that distinguish the two groups. In the following chapters, the precise manner in which this test is conducted will be elucidated.

Chapter 2 will review the literature on congressional civility. After establishing the work in this field, the discussion will move on to examine the literature to justify each of the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 3 will focus on the specifics of the research design for this project. As previously mentioned, the project utilizes a random matched pair (with replacement) sample. Some aspects of quota sampling are also employed to insure temporal and chamber consistency between the test and control group. The sampling and data collection methods will be laid out, and sources for secondary data chronicled. This chapter will also include a lengthy discussion of the control variables utilized in the research design and the reasons for their inclusion.

Chapter 4 will examine the findings from the project. There are several factors, such as previous state legislative experience, tenure, ideological extremism, and electoral margin that are statistically significantly linked to the likelihood of being implicated in acts of incivility. Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a concluding commentary. This will include the implications, both empirically and normatively, of the findings of the previous chapter. This will also serve to elaborate the need for future work to follow up on the findings from this project.



## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Any discussion of previous work in the field of Congressional civility must begin with the observation that civility has been waning. Uslander (1993) argues that civility is indeed on the decline, and that this is a function of the representative nature of Congress, and is reflective of a general abandonment of comity in society as a whole. Former Speaker Sam Rayburn's notion of "go[ing] along to get along" is no longer widely observed, neither in Congress nor in society at large.

### Defining Incivility

Uslander's work, perhaps the seminal work in this area, also makes a strong normative case for the importance of what he calls comity. Uslander isolates several congressional norms: reciprocity, courtesy, specialization, legislative work, apprenticeship, and institutional patriotism. He argues that comity is made up of reciprocity and courtesy. Reciprocity is best explained as the presence of deal-making and keeping one's word, even when the outcome is undesirable. In short, this is the Rayburn school of thought; the speaker urged his colleagues to "go along to get along." This could be promising a vote on an upcoming bill, helping drum up partisan support, or any other act one could promise to perform for another. Uslander notes that while this sort of back-scratching is often held in a dim view, it is in fact how legislative work is done, and is vital to the process. Courtesy is treating others with personal respect, refraining from name calling, and avoiding retribution whether threatened or actual. This is in keeping with the dictionary definition, "discourteous behavior or treatment,"

([www.dictionary.com](http://www.dictionary.com)).

While congressional civility inherently includes the latter of the comity norms, the former (reciprocity) can also be included at times. Certainly, when one member of Congress calls another a “faggot” (Richard Armeey, 28 January, 1995, *New York Times*, P.1) on the floor of the chamber during a televised debate, this is a breach of courtesy, and few would balk at the suggestion that this action is uncivil. However, one could also be uncivil while breaking the norm of reciprocity. If a senator is in some way angered or upset by another and places a hold upon the offending senator’s sponsored legislation as a form of revenge, this would also be considered an uncivil act as defined by this research.<sup>4</sup>

There is, however, another argument to be made. Schraufnagel (2006) divides this lack of comity into partisan conflict and personal conflict, calling the latter incivility. In this model, the name-calling incident above would certainly be included as an instance of incivility. The latter instance, however, featuring a senator placing a hold on another lawmaker’s piece of legislation, might or might not be classified the same way, depending on the surrounding circumstances. Schraufnagel (2006) uses media reporting and almanac entries to operationalize levels of incivility.

Which definition works here? As noted in more detail later, this research uses a collection of media reports similar to Schraufnagel’s as a source for the data of this project. One would think that this would necessitate the use of Schraufnagel’s definitions and classifications of incivility. While in the collection stages, this is probably a fair statement, several instances exist where individuals held issues hostage, engaged in filibusters, and otherwise held up legislative progress, and these were uncovered with the list of search terms designed to uncover personal conflicts. Indeed, a reading of these articles suggests that there is often a personal element to the event. As such, though this

work focuses on personal conflict, partisan and ideological disagreements will also be included in the sample, as long as they include a strong element of personal conflict, as well. In other words, when deciding whether an incident qualifies, this research judges the uncivil nature of the act irrespective of whether there may be substantive policy differences underlying the confrontation. Hence, this listing of civil acts is more inclusive or events will be given the benefit of the doubt, or perhaps more accurately, uncivil actors will be denied the same.

### **Recruitment**

The issue of recruitment is pertinent to this research. If one is able to ascertain the background characteristics most likely to produce uncivil legislators then establishing guidelines for the formation of a more civil legislature becomes a recruitment question. How can we find and retain legislators most inclined to behave in a manner conducive to effective legislative processes? Individuals who run for office do not do so in a vacuum. The Party definitely has a role in selecting its candidates, and it is in the Party's best interest to select the strongest-possible candidates (Black and Black 2002, Lublin 2004). This practice, selecting candidates, is known in congressional scholarship as "recruitment" and there is a vast literature that addresses this subject.

The substantive literature on recruitment breaks down into three basic areas: The electoral environment, the candidate's calculus for entering the race, and the Party's actions in attracting the candidate. Throughout the literature on recruitment a common assumption made is that when deciding whether or not to run for office, potential candidates will weigh the risks against the rewards and choose accordingly, adhering to a

traditional rational choice approach to decision making (Maisel and Stone 1997, Moncrief 1999).

With that understanding, let us examine the impact of the electoral environment on recruiting. The single largest influence on an individual's decision to run for Congress is incumbency. The incumbency advantage has been covered at great length by academics (Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004; Kazee 1983; Bianco 1984; Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989). Furthermore, it stands to reason that a strong incumbent will deter challengers and complicate a Party's efforts to recruit candidates (Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004, Kazee 1983). In order to recruit a candidate, the Party must convince that individual that there is a significant chance to defeat the incumbent (Kazee 1983). In short, incumbency is the the single largest consideration in recruiting.

But what about open seats? When there is no incumbent, surely other factors will come into play. While the following factors are (with one explicit exception) present even in races with an incumbent, they play a much larger role in open races. First, a candidate is more likely to run if his Party is strong in the district or state in question (Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997). This is basically a modern confirmation of Key's Law (Key 1947) from roughly a half century prior.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, in the current legislative environment, Congress has become a professional body not only on the national level, but also the state level, making the decision to run rational only for those with an interest in becoming professional legislators (Moncrief 1999). Finally, in seats with an incumbent, retrospective voting is a major part of an actor's candidacy, as a poor economy impacts an incumbent's chances for reelection negatively (Bianco 1984). This

decision, however, is made early in the year, so a lagged effect often exists (Wilcox 1987).

With this understanding of the environment in which an individual decides to run for Congress, we can turn our examination to the individual him or herself. While the Constitution lays out few restrictions for service in Congress (age, citizenship, residence), the reality is far different. The typical member of Congress is of higher socioeconomic status, is more strongly partisan, has some previous experience in public office, and is highly ambitious (Fowler 1996; Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997). It is mainly the second and third of these that are of importance to us, as there is no real way to measure ambition, and the socioeconomic status of strong candidates is unlikely to change.<sup>6</sup> In 1992, 72% of incoming freshmen had previous experience in public office; in 1994, with animosity toward incumbents at an all-time high, that number was still a majority at 55% (Fowler 1996). Similar benefits are gained from previous work on a congressional staff; combining these experiences can make for the strongest candidates (Herrnson 1994).<sup>7</sup>

As alluded to, when scholars examine the actions of potential candidates the rational choice model is commonly used. The role of partisanship also cannot be ignored; candidates (successful or otherwise) are more partisan now than they have been in the past (Fowler 1996, Kazee and Thornberry 1990). These partisans make strong candidates in part because they better understand the financial and personal demands of campaigning, and possess the skills necessary to address those costs with the least effort (Kazee and Thornberry 1990). This could be a function of greater competition for seats, however. Chong Lim Kim (1974) finds that legislators who are not confident in



reelection are the ones that adhere to the Party line most closely. Conversely, candidates with a strong personal appeal may be less reliable ideologically (Ishayama 2000).<sup>8</sup>

So far, we have a strong understanding of who runs for Congress and the environments conducive to that candidacy. However, there is a problem. Strong candidates already have a position, and have something to lose by running for a higher office, which a random citizen may not (Kazee 1983). How, then, can the Party attract the best candidates when they have the most to lose in an unsuccessful bid?

First, we must understand that parties do indeed actively recruit candidates. Thomas Kazee and Mary Thornberry found that over 60 percent of members of Congress acknowledge a significant recruiting function of their party (1990).<sup>9</sup> Sometimes this simply means encouraging an individual to run (Herrnson 1986). Sometimes, however, this is the endorsement of one candidate over the others in a party primary. The endorsement of party brass is an obvious advantage to any candidate in an election held only among the party faithful, and this advantage is born out in congressional primaries (Kunkel 1988).

Furthermore, the two parties can achieve this in different ways (Herrnson 1986; Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert, 1997). Joseph Kunkel studied Democratic primaries in Minnesota and found that the Party brass will often implicitly select a preferred candidate during the primary, expressing preferences within the party. Paul Herrnson (1986) finds that the Republican Party organizations tend to make contributions of cash and in-kind donations to preferred candidates, sometimes including the services of a field director, who works alongside the candidate's campaign manager, and is often every bit as

instrumental in the campaign. The net effect is that, regardless of the method, the blessing of the Party is likely to get a candidate through the primary.

However, here we must note a slight distinction. The parties are technically not recruiting in all of these instances. Rather, in instances where individuals have already decided whether or not to run, the Party is actually choosing a preferred candidate from a list of potential ones. Recall that frequently, congressional candidates are already state legislators or other officials. This means that recruitment at the national level is often preceded by a more literal recruitment at a lower level within the Party (Moncrief 1999). Here the recruiting function of the party has two functions, with a blurred line in between. On one hand, the Party selects its congressional candidates from a list of previously recruited members of state legislatures. On the other, the Party is more actively recruiting those same legislators a few years prior to their run for state office.

Tying the issue of recruitment back to the issue of incivility, if the parties are, either directly or indirectly, selecting the candidates for congressional seats, then the parties will be selecting the individuals who may be predisposed to engaging in acts of incivility or predisposed to honor norms of courtesy and reciprocity. If acts of incivility have increased in number in recent years as Uslaner (1993) suggests, it stands to reason that something may have changed about the way parties choose the individuals who are serving in Congress. Identifying, traits or background characteristics associated with incivility is a logical first step in trying to unravel the nature of the change and ultimately the consequences.

## Factors Affecting Incivility

It is the goal of this work to unearth trends and tendencies in recruitment, which may underlie the move toward a less civil Congress. What follows is a list of possible explanations found in existing literature. In the end, this research will suggest a more complete list of potential variables that may influence the likelihood that someone is implicated in an uncivil act by one of the two leading newspapers. At this stage it is possible to lay the groundwork for this work by simply discussing four variables that have been mentioned in previous literature on the topic.

One of the first questions to come up in such a discussion is that of regional differences. There are two conflicting stereotypes that are of particular interest, and they are often noted within the same works. John Shelton Reed (1993) notes, perhaps paradoxically, that the South is the most violent region in the country, whether one measures this through crime rates, survey data, or simply his own observations. But there is also the norm of the Southern gentleman, who is almost painfully polite at all times, a norm that the author also says is born out in his daily interactions with Americans living in the South.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, at the risk of spoiling the plot, several of the most often-noted members in Appendix A to this work, which lists every uncivil incident reported in either the *New York Times* or *Washington Post* (1933-2005), are from the eleven states of the old Confederacy. If Uslander's (1993) argument concerning the representative nature of Congress is accurate, region must definitely be considered.

The next factor one must consider is margin of victory. Intuitively, it makes sense that those who have nothing to fear in the upcoming election will be less likely to restrain themselves. However, Fiorina suggests (1989) that even those who are currently in safe districts often have occasional "scares" at election time, races that are uncomfortably

close. Fiorina sets the benchmark of 60 percent of the two-candidate vote as a “safe” district. David Mayhew (1974) points out that one of the major motives of anyone currently serving in Congress will be job security, and it is irrational to do anything that calls that security into question.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, one must imagine that less safe legislators will be more inclined to mind their manners.

Beyond region and electoral safety, consider for a moment the issues of age and tenure. Most members of Congress, and indeed most candidates, are comfortably past the constitutionally-mandated ages for their positions (Fowler 1996). Furthermore, there is little opportunity for freshman senators or representatives to cause too much trouble simply because they lack the power and influence to muck things up as significantly as their more-experienced colleagues, a function of the norms concerning seniority that permeate both chambers of Congress<sup>12</sup> (Asher 1973; Evans and Lipinski 2005). Also, more experienced members of Congress are generally more visible, meaning that their uncivil acts are likewise more visible. This must be taken into account, as the data for this research comes from newspaper accounts of acts of incivility.

It is now time to address a more complete listing of possible independent variables that might be relevant predictors of newspaper coverage of acts of incivility. The research design that follows will also fully elaborate all the methods employed in this exploration of uncivil behavior by members of Congress.

## CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

With an understanding of the literature up to this point on incivility in Congress, it is now time to lay out the specific methods employed for this research. The first problem is finding data for this sort of venture. Drawing on Schraufnagel's (2006) media-based method of measurement provides a solution to this problem. The author uses reports of acts of incivility from the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* from the time period of interest to obtain a sample:

After settling on these three words [comity, civility, and rancor], an online search of the full text of the *Washington Post* from 1977 to 2000 and the *New York Times* from 1981 to 2000 was conducted. All articles that use the word "Congress" and any of the three words "comity", "civility", and "rancor" were retrieved.... Each story was read to determine whether it was, in fact, describing a state of acrimony in the legislative branch (Schraufnagel 2006, 219).

Schraufnagel's method is designed to count the number of instances of incivility in a given year, measuring the level of incivility and its fluctuation from year to year. This project, however, has a different aim, and therefore a different unit of analysis, the individual implicated in an act of incivility. A similar search was performed, spanning from 1933 to 2005 in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. The sample includes everyone who was implicated in either a *New York Times* or *Washington Post* article, retrieved in the same manner as Schraufnagel, provided he or she was implicated while serving in their official capacity as a legislator in Washington, DC.<sup>13</sup>

Note that this means an article could contain the implication of a single member or multiple members. For example, if a member of Congress ("Member A") calls a colleague ("Member B") an inappropriate name during a speech on January 20<sup>th</sup>, Member A is implicated, but the target of the slur, Member B, is not. If on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, the two

exchange words (or even blows) because of the earlier squabble, both members are considered implicated on the 23<sup>rd</sup>. In this scenario, Member A has been implicated in acts of incivility on both the 20<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup>. Member B is implicated only on the 23<sup>rd</sup>. This brings up two important points, both of which warrant further discussion.

First, it is possible for a member to be implicated multiple times. Indeed, the most oft-implicated members are likely ripe fodder for qualitative work. However, this project is wholly quantitative in nature. By including multiple implications of a single individual, that individual (and his personal traits) would be counted multiple times. Some might argue that this appropriately weights those individuals who are most likely to engage in uncivil acts. However, those making such an argument would fail to realize that anyone who engages in such frequent acts of incivility as to make repeated headlines is almost by definition an outlier. Furthermore, there are many other reasons one might be implicated multiple times. Consider for a moment Jesse Helms and Huey Long. These members are implicated twelve times each, which is good for a tie for third place if the database is sorted by number of mentions.<sup>14</sup>

Huey Long, the Kingfish of Louisiana, was constantly embroiled in controversy. He was a hero to his home state, seen as a stalwart fighter against the increasingly liberal wing of his own party and preserving the ideology of his own more conservative brand of the Democratic Party (Key 1947). He intentionally obstructed the Roosevelt administration, resorted to name-calling multiple times, and was even censured by the Senate for his behavior. His incivilities even lead others to be less civil, as several members' sole mentions are for rebukes of Long. He did all of this in a three year period, (See Appendix A) his mentions coming in 1933-1935. Put another way, Mr. Long's time

in the Senate was relatively short. However, in that short time, he was constantly in the news, and it was often for quite notable acts of incivility. He single-handedly made the 73<sup>rd</sup> and 74<sup>th</sup> Congresses far less civil than they would have been otherwise.

On the other hand, consider Jesse Helms. Jesse Helms was, and is, every bit as esteemed in his home state as Long. He was also probably roughly as visible as Long was to the nation as a whole. Finally, both had major fallings-out with the regionally dominant Democratic Party, though Helms left the party before taking office.<sup>15</sup> While there are many similarities between these two cases, they are far from identical. It took Jesse Helms 18 years (1981-1999) to receive as many mentions in the media as Long did in three (again, see Appendix A for a complete list). The two have twelve mentions a piece, but the way that they got those mentions is quite different. The same can be said for the other 252 people mentioned in any of the articles. Weighting Jesse Helms as heavily as Huey Long seems somehow inappropriate. Trying to weight any other cases against these two examples would likely be very problematic. It is now prudent to turn to an extended discussion of the dependent variable.

### **Dependent Variable and Sample Considerations**

Conceptually, the dependent variable in this project is simple: whether or not an individual was implicated in one of the nation's two leading newspapers in an act of incivility while serving in Congress. As the above-example illustrates, however, putting this variable into practice can be a bit tricky. There are multiple possibilities, which must be considered.

One means of measurement is to simply create a dummy variable that indicates whether or not an individual was implicated at all. The draw back to this approach is that

it does not account for the fact that some legislators are clearly more uncivil than others. If levels of incivility are uneven, it makes little sense to weigh the efforts of lifelong statesmen as heavily as those of rabble-rousers who made as much trouble in a less than a quarter of the time. On the other hand, there does not appear to be any purely objective option for determining with perfect reliability the extent of incivility. Because of this difficulty, this research opts to simply count all people implicated as single cases.

As alluded to above, using a single mention to define the dataset of implicated members of Congress yields a sample of 254. The next step was to determine which article to count when a member was mentioned multiple times. It is necessary to do this because in the end each legislator is matched with a member that was never implicated from their same time period (the same Congress). When members are mentioned more than two times, and the total number of mentions is an odd number, the temporal median article is used. For members mentioned an even number of times the median article is determined by randomly moving back and forth between the two median articles for that individual legislator. In the same vein, when members are mentioned only twice, alternating between the first and second mention to preserves a modicum of randomness. This sample obviously provides no method for weighting the cases but does include an inclusive list of people implicated in uncivil acts in the two newspapers.

At the risk of belaboring the point regarding the necessity of weighting cases, note that one might consider the count of the number of mentions as a suitable dependent variable. Such a decision would mean using a Poisson econometric model, a regression used when there is a count dependent variable. However, one of the assumptions of the Poisson model is that one instance of the act in question does not necessarily make the



next instance more likely. *Prima facie*, this violation is at best on very thin ice with the 254 individuals who were implicated, as an individual who was implicated nine times is probably more likely to be implicated again. Since this research uses a matched pair analysis, pairing each implicated member with a non-implicated member of the same Congress and chamber, this assumption is wholly violated. Members of the control group have served for ten years or more in some cases without a single implication in an act of incivility.<sup>16</sup>

In the end, the decision is made to stick with the dummy variable approach, which measures whether the individual was implicated in an act of incivility or not. The benefit to this tactic is its improved reliability and simplicity. Determining the individuals who engaged in visible acts of incivility and contrasting them against members who have not been implicated in a single act over the course of their careers can be done in a straightforward manner and in a way that is easy to replicate (an important quality in any scientific inquiry). Put another way, this research will analyze individuals who engage in acts of civility, and not instances of incivility in and of themselves.

### **Control Group**

With the questions concerning the dependent variable addressed, it is time to consider more specific issues regarding the control group in this research. As alluded to the research employs a matched pair analysis with random quota sampling to gather an appropriate control group. In theory, the process could have been performed in a single iteration. However, there were unforeseen issues with each version of the control group, and in practice, it took three separate attempts to get it right. Examining each iteration of

the control sample is likely the most convenient way to explain a long and time-consuming process.

First, a list of random numbers from one to 535 was generated.<sup>17</sup> Then, starting with the 73<sup>rd</sup> Congress (1933-1935), this list was used to select random members, who were then “partnered” with individuals who had been implicated in acts of incivility. Time-sensitive variables (age and tenure) were calculated from the date of implication of the individual’s “partner.” This is the matched pair portion of the research design.

When the results of this test were examined, however, a problem arose. Far and away, the most statistically significant indicator of the likelihood of being implicated in an uncivil act was the chamber in which the member served. Senators were several times more likely to be implicated than their counterparts in the House. This, of course, is unlikely to reflect the reality of the situation. Time and time again, scholarly studies and the resulting literature have pointed to greater civility in the Senate than in the House (Schickler and Pearson 2005; Sinclair 2005, Evans and Lipinski 2005). It was determined that the method of establishing the sample was measuring whether a given member of Congress was implicated in an uncivil act in the Press, not whether that person is actually more uncivil than his or her colleagues. However, the former is being used explicitly, as a surrogate for the latter, a proxy measure of incivility. This presents an unforeseen difficulty. Members of the Upper Chamber are far more visible than representatives in the Press by the nature of their post; there are fewer of them and they are elected to longer terms.

To rectify this issue, quota sampling was used. Senators were paired with senators, representatives with representatives, each within the Congress in question.

Many representatives were necessarily removed from the sample and replaced with senators. This rectified the chamber problem. Perhaps more importantly, it allowed for the possibility that, holding all else constant, a regression could still uncover some importance for a variable that tapped the chamber of the individuals implicated. If Senators are indeed less civil, even after insuring that this is not a fluke of media coverage, then that will be indicated in the final model, and it will be a truly surprising and exciting finding, given the conventional wisdom and literature surrounding the supposedly-collegial senatorial “gentleman’s club.”

With that problem addressed, only one more issue remained. The randomly-selected control group sample included no members from leadership positions. The only members of leadership included in the sample at all were those who were implicated in acts of incivility. To address this issue, random quota sampling was again employed. Each chamber’s leadership group was defined as follows: Majority leaders, minority leaders, and whips from both chambers and the speaker or president pro tempore, as appropriate. New names were drawn randomly to find members of the leadership who had not been implicated in any acts of incivility over the course of his or her career. When the random drawing (with replacement) uncovered a leader the previous control member was replaced with the member from the leadership. It took multiple drawings before a sufficient number of control group members with a leadership background were found. This provided an opportunity to test the role of leadership, which will become an important control variable in the final analysis.<sup>18</sup> The manipulation of the “leadership” variable represents the only significant break from a purely random process for establishing a control group. The concern over this break in randomness is attenuated by

virtue of a large sample size. Problems associated with replacing some randomly chosen members would have been greater had the sample been smaller.

At this point, the sample is set. It is now time to consider at length the variables used in this research and the sources for the same. A variety of sources, ranging from congressional biographies, to election archives, to online date calculators were used to gather the information necessary to complete this project.

### **Variables and Hypotheses**

Each member of Congress in the sample, control or treatment, is coded on several variables. A codebook can be found in Appendix B that elaborates precisely how each variable was computed. First, the date and historical data concerning the act of incivility was recorded. This included the name of the individual(s) implicated (each as a separate case), the date the act was reported, the paper in which it was reported, and a brief description of the event. The brief descriptions can be found in Appendix A to this work. These descriptions were often kept to a few words, unless they were particularly colorful or interesting.<sup>19</sup>

Next, background information was gathered from the Congressional Biography Website.<sup>20</sup> Birthdays and tenure dates (dates upon which a member of Congress began his or her first term of service) were gathered, as were several other variables detailed below. In each case, time variable (age and tenure) use the date of implication as the end point and are measured in fractions of years, establishes a relevant ratio level variable to be used in the final regression equation.<sup>21</sup>

At this point, it is appropriate to divide all the model's variables into three groups: Key Explanatory Variables; Personal Traits; and Controls for Media Bias.

### **Key Explanatory Variables**

The three key explanatory variables are “electoral margin,” “ideological extremism”, and “previous state legislative experience.” Electoral margin is measured as the proportion of the two-candidate vote by which the member of Congress won his seat in the election immediately previous to their being implicated in an uncivil act. It is calculated as follows:

$$(X-Y)/(X+Y)$$

In this case, “X” is the number of votes the member of Congress won in the previous election. “Y” is the number of votes received by the second place finisher. In cases where an individual ran unopposed, this variable is scored 100, as the winner received 100 percent of the general election vote. In cases where only one major party was present this variable will instead use the top opposing vote-getter from a third party, who usually gained a relatively paltry sum. While a member elected with only third party opposition is safe for practical purposes, this is still different from running truly unopposed. It is for this reason that terms such as “two-party vote” and “major-party vote” are explicitly avoided in the discussion of electoral margin, even though they are frequently used in other literature (Mayhew 1974, Fiorina 1989).

This does, however, present one small difficulty. Some senators initially took office as the result of gubernatorial appointments. While senators were popularly elected in every corresponding election relevant to this study, some states did (and still do) use gubernatorial appointment to fill a seat vacated by the death or resignation of a sitting Senator. At first, it seems prudent to use the individuals’ next election as a surrogate, as this ought to still reflect relative electoral safety. However, the important point is not

actual electoral safety, but rather whether a senator perceives they are safe, making this a sloppy surrogate at best. Furthermore, some of these individuals either never sought a full term or failed in that endeavor, meaning there is no surrogate measure at all. As such, these individuals were removed from the control sample, replaced with others for whom this data was available. This occurred only about a half-dozen times, and again, because of the large number of cases involved in this project, this does little to impact the randomness of the sample as a whole.

The next variable to consider is ideological extremism. Schraufnagel (2006) suggests that ideological conflict can play a part in legislative conflicts.<sup>22</sup> Ideology is most easily measured through Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal's (accessed 2007) DW-Nominate scores.<sup>23</sup> However, the concept in question is not ideology, but rather extremism. As such, for every member, the ideology score will be the percentage of that party's delegation less aligned with traditional partisan ideology than that member. For Democrats, this will be the number of members of the party delegation that have a more conservative (higher, to use the more intuitive term) score. Republicans' polarization scores will be calculated based on the number of delegation members having a more liberal (lower) score. This is the measure that Sarah Binder (2003) has argued is most appropriate in her work on legislative stalemate. As is the case with the term "two-party vote," the term "moderate" is expressly avoided here. Though it may be intuitive to think in terms of the percentage of individuals more or less moderate than a member of the sample, this quickly breaks down. The problem lies with Republicans with negative scores and Democrats with positive scores, of which there are several in each and every

Congress during the years examined. The term will generally be avoided, simply to sidestep potential confusion.

The last key explanatory variable is previous state legislative experience. Recall that the state legislatures are the congressional “farm team” of the Parties (Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997; Bianco 1984; Fowler 1996; Ishiyama 2000; Maisel and Stone 1997; Moncrief 1999). It stands to reason that those with previous legislative experience will have a smaller acclimation period than those coming from other governmental roles, and will transition more easily into the highly reciprocal life of a member of Congress (Berkman 1993). This will be operationalized as simply the number of years, according to a member’s congressional biography, that the member served in a state legislature before beginning service in Washington.

These key explanatory variables combine to provide a fairly strong picture of a member of Congress who may or may not be implicated in an uncivil act. They tap his or her electoral safety, ideology, and previous legislative experience. However, this is not a comprehensive picture of the factors that are likely to influence the probability that a given member will be implicated in the Press for engaging in an uncivil act. Many more variables must be considered, including an individual’s background and of course variables that can control for the nature of media coverage of Congress. Let us turn now to consider several personal traits.

### **Personal Traits**

For the purposes of this study, the personal traits included will be political party, region, age, tenure, legal experience, and having served as an officer in the military. Party is fairly self-explanatory. Republicans were coded 1; Democrats were coded 0. Third-

Party members were coded as members of the Party they caucused with at the time of implication. Individuals who changed parties were coded according to party membership at time of implication. The theoretical expectation in this instance is that Republicans will be more likely implicated than Democrats because of the differences between the cultures of their respective parties. The Republican Party has typically identified itself as the party of the businessman and of small government. As such, Republicans are more suspicious of the virtues and norms of legislative service (Reichley 2000). Furthermore, members of the Democratic Party are more likely to seek a career as a legislator (Fiorina 1994)

Region is also measured using a dummy variable. More specifically, legislators from the 11 states of the Old Confederacy, the South, are coded “1” and all others “0.” Southerners are often thought to be either exceedingly polite or more prone to fits of anger, and these expectations can, paradoxically, be found in the same scholarly work (Reed 2003). These uneven expectations make it difficult to postulate whether this test will uncover either a positive or a negative relationship. The variable is included because of the unique transformations the South endured during the period in question. While certainly partisan realignment gripped the entire country during the times considered in this study (1933-2005), many argue that this realignment centered mainly on the South and the realignment of the conservative Democrats in the region (Black and Black 2002, Lublin 2004). One could imagine that such tension could be a unique source of conflict.

As alluded to above, tenure is measured by collecting data on the relevant dates, and the distance between them is then calculated. Again, the direction of the relationship between these concerns and the probability of being implicated is not clear. It is already



established that members of Congress with more seniority are typically in more powerful positions than their counterparts (Matthews 1960). However, it is also easy to imagine that those who have spent a longer time in the system are more likely to be accustomed to its norms (Asher 1973). Put another way, more-senior members of Congress most certainly have the means to create visible incidents, but may not have the desire to do so. Less-senior members, while perhaps more than willing to raise a commotion, may not be able to do so from a practical standpoint, buried in obscure subcommittee meetings and late-night speeches that are part of the Congressional Record, but rarely make headlines.

Age, on the other hand, seems likely to attenuate the probability of being implicated. Uslander (1993) rejects the idea that the influx of new members to Congress contributes to the decline of civility. However, others refer to the time incoming members must spend learning norms (Matthews 1960) and the increasing visibility of newer members (Arnold 2001), a combination that logically leads to greater exposure for younger members, makes this a worthwhile variable to include in the analysis. It is suspected that older members will be slightly less likely to be implicated than younger ones, once tenure is controlled.

The next variables on which to focus are those encompassing professional background. Lawyers make up a good portion of most Congresses. In fact, some have suggested that those with a legal background are in some way better prepared for the difficult, legalese-drenched operation that congressional service favors (Engstrom and O'Connor 1980, Schlesinger 1957). It is possible that these generalizations may carry over into questions of civility, allowing those with a legal background to be less

frustrated with the legislative process. Hence, the expectation is that members with a legal background will be less likely to be implicated, all else being equal.

Similarly, a military background may influence the probability of being implicated. Because of the structured environment of military service, it stands to reason that those who served in leadership positions in the military may well be more civil on the whole than those who did not (Huntington 1957). This “Officer and a Gentleman” argument, perhaps, alludes to the strict sense of order that military hierarchy imparts upon those who participate in it. Service as an officer is expected to be negatively associated with the likelihood of implication in an uncivil act.

### **Controls for Media Bias**

Finally, it is important to consider the issue of media bias or the possibility that the media may simply report some legislators’ incivilities more commonly than others. Several groups of individuals are more visible than members of Congress as a whole. First and foremost, members of leadership are almost by definition more visible than their peers. As a result, members of leadership tend to get more coverage than their counterparts (Cook 1986). Anyone holding a position as speaker of the House, president pro tempore of the Senate, majority leader, minority leader, or whip of either party is coded as “1.” All other members of the dataset are scored “0” on this variable and the expectation is that this test will return a robust positive coefficient in the regression analysis that follows.

Also, those from political families may be more visible in the media than the rest of the chamber, if only because of simple name recognition. If this is the case, then it stands to reason that these individuals may be more likely to be implicated in the media,

even if they are not actually less civil than their counterparts. As such, this is included as a control variable with the expectation that it will produce a modest positive relationship with the dependent variable.

Finally, the Senate is often considered the more elite chamber, and its smaller membership makes it easier to cover in the mass media. As previously cited, the Senate is typically thought to be the more civil chamber (Matthews 1960). However, it has also typically been more thoroughly covered (Cook 1986). As such, chamber is included as a control variable, with senators and sitting vice-presidents coded “1”, and all others (representatives and non-voting delegates) coded “0.” Because of quota sampling used in this study, no hypothesis as to the direction of this variable can be readily offered, though one is inclined to suspect an insignificant negative relationship.

Table 1 exhibits the range, mean, and standard deviation of each of these variables included in the models to follow. The ranges and means fall about where one would guess for this sort of sample. First, consider the Key Explanatory Variables. The one counterintuitive case may be electoral margin, where the large number of unopposed members hailing mostly from the Deep South before 1950 or so skews the distribution. That detail notwithstanding, the sample seems fairly representative of Congress as a whole. The central tendency is always one of safety, using Fiorina’s (1989) metric of 60 percent. That converts to 20 percent using this study’s metric (60-40/100). The mean, 32.04, easily exceeds this standard. The median (not shown below) value is 22.53, again exceeding the 20 percent benchmark, though notably closer to it.

Next, consider ideological extremity. Again, the range runs the gamut from the absolute least-extreme members (0) to the most (.997). The mean score here, .523, is

fairly close to the middle of the range. The standard deviation of .305 indicates that about two-thirds of the sample has a score between .217 and .828. This paints the picture of an ideologically diverse legislature, with most having at least some adherence to a Partisan ideology.

Third, there is the issue of previous state legislative experience, measured here in years. The minimum value of zero is not a surprise. The maximum value of 32 is large, and is definitely an outlier. Only 176 of the members in the sample have any state legislative experience at all, setting the median and modal values both at zero, and indicating that this variable has a strong positive skew.

The first two personal traits, Party and Region, are nominal variables. Party seems to be split roughly evenly between the two options, with more Democrats than Republicans. This is consistent with the Democratic majorities that were common in Congress throughout the time period of the sample. Similarly, the South's eleven states account for 24 percent of the sample, where those states are 22% of the current makeup of the nation. This sample covers more than two generations' worth of congressional history. It is also unusually weighted between senators and representatives. Similarly, the population of the United States has changed a great deal in that time. As such, it is difficult if not impossible to determine exactly how representative this sample is. However, given the dominance of the Senate in the sample (remembering that the Senate is only about one-fourth the size of the House), this number seems roughly appropriate.

Age and Tenure indicate that that average member of Congress is about 56, and has served about twelve years at the time of implication. The range of ages runs the gamut from those who are just beyond the age of eligibility at 30.216 (the legal

minimums are 25 in the House and 30 in the Senate, as defined in Article I of the Constitution) to those who are approaching the end of biological eligibility (that is to say, entering their twilight years) at 87.584.

Roughly half of the sample consists of individuals who have spent at least five years in the legal profession. This is perhaps a bit lower than one would expect, given the ease with which lawyers may become accustomed to congressional service (Schlesinger 1957). Similarly, former military officers account for less than 20 percent of the sample. No hypotheses were put forth as to the frequency of former officers in the sample, so this is of little consequence.

Among the Controls for Media Bias, the most interesting is Senate membership. Even though the Senate has only 100 members to the House's 435, the majority of the individuals in the sample are Senators. Members of leadership and political families are, predictably, fairly rare in the sample, as one would suspect they would be in Congress as a whole.

**Table 1**

**Descriptive Statistics:  
Variables believed to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act**

<u>Key Explanatory Variables</u>	Min. Value	Max. Value	Mean	Stand. Dev.
Electoral Margin	0.13	100	32.04	28.829
Ideologically Polarized	0	.997	.523	.305
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.)	0	32	2.207	4.162
<u>Personal Traits</u>				
Political Party (GOP = 1)	0	1	.415	.493
Southerner (former CSA)	0	1	.248	.432
Age (yrs.)	30.216	87.584	56.345	10.37
Tenure (yrs.)	.058	50.359	12.773	9.692
Lawyer (min. 5 yrs. exp.)	0	1	.467	.499
Military Officer	0	1	.185	.389
<u>Controls for Media Bias</u>				
Leadership Position	0	1	.083	.276
Political Family	0	1	.098	.298
Senate Membership	0	1	.587	.493
n = 508				

All in all, these variables tend to point toward the randomness of the sample.

Among those where a central tendency can be guessed with deduction, there are few surprises. Electoral margin is significantly skewed, but as other literature indicates, most members are now in safe districts (Mayhew 1974).

### **Representativeness of the Sample**

Table 2 examines some of the variables as they appear in the control group, as after all, a representative sample is necessary for any meaningful analysis. Put another way, before moving on, it is necessary to examine the control group and establish whether it is, after all, a good control.

**Table 2**  
**Representativeness of the Control Group by Selected Independent Variables**

<u>Key Explanatory Variables</u>	Expected Value	Actual Value
Electoral Margin (mean)	> 20 <sup>a</sup>	26.77
<u>Personal Traits</u>		
Political Party (% Democrat)	55-60% <sup>b</sup>	57.09 %
Southerner (% former CSA)	20-25% <sup>c</sup>	23.23%
Age (mean in yrs.)	55-60 <sup>d</sup>	54.98
Tenure (mean in yrs.)	10-12 <sup>d</sup>	10.37
Lawyer	42.62 % <sup>e</sup>	46.85
Military Officer	25.98% <sup>f</sup>	19.3%
<u>Controls for Media Bias</u>		
Leadership Position	1.86% <sup>e</sup>	3.15%
n = 254		

<sup>a</sup> This expected mean is extrapolated from the fact that a majority of members of Congress from 1950-1990 gained more than 60% of the two-candidate vote in the previous election (Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina 1992).

<sup>b</sup> For most of the period in question, the Democrats held a fairly comfortable majority in both chambers. Because of the nature of this research, extrapolating an exact benchmark is difficult at best.

<sup>c</sup> The sample here is mostly Senators. The 11 states of the old Confederacy constitute 22% of the union (50 states), ignoring the years before Alaska and Hawaii were admitted. The concentration of Senators in the sample mitigates the difficulties presented by the rapid growth of the South during the period in question.

<sup>d</sup> At the convening of the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress, the average age of a senator was 60, and the average age of a representative was 55. Average length of service was 9.1 years and 12 years in the House and Senate, respectively.

<sup>e</sup> This is the value of 10/535, as leadership includes the Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the majority and minority leaders and whips of both chambers. However, members of leadership were inserted into the sample via random replacement, so the actual value is inflated. Recall that the original actual value was 0%, as there were no members of leadership originally included in the sample.

<sup>e</sup> Again taken from the Senate's own statistical survey of the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress, but only indicating individuals who hold a law degree, which is slightly different from the metric used in this research, which requires five years of work in the profession.

<sup>f</sup> This value is for members of the 109<sup>th</sup> who served in the military in some capacity, officer or otherwise. The Senate site admits that this number is falling because of the lack of a recent draft.

Of the twelve independent variables suggested previously, numbers were only readily available and useful for these eight. Chamber is not representative at all because of the use of a quota sample.

First, consider margin. Fiorina's (1987) metric of 60% of the vote constituting a "safe" district characterizes over half of Congress (Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina

1992). Converting this figure to the metric used in this research (60-40/100) yields a benchmark of 20 percent. The control sample figure is just over 26 percent, which seems roughly appropriate, allowing for the fact that the mean will by definition be positively skewed because of the fair number of individuals who ran unopposed (Fiorina 1987, Mayhew 1974).

The Democratic Party held a majority of seats in both chambers for all but about a dozen of the sessions in the sample. It is therefore not surprising that Democrats make up roughly 57 percent of the control group.

Age, tenure, legal expertise, and military service were all taken from the Senate's statistical breakdown of the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress.<sup>24</sup> Age and tenure are well within the expected ranges. There are, however, more lawyers and fewer military officers than one might expect. A closer examination of the methods involved in this research, however, puts these fears at least partially to rest. This research examines individuals who served as a lawyer or judge for at least five years, those best-equipped to deal with the legalese of a legislative career. However, Congress is becoming more diverse than it once was (Fowler 1996). The Senate site alludes to a professional magician, two professional athletes, a semi-professional musician, a jackaroo (cowboy), three different kinds of pilots, and several media personalities in the current batch. In short, the number of lawyers in Congress is declining as individuals continue to run as outsiders, and this is a case where the statistics thoroughly support Fowler's (1996) assertions.

The case of military service is best explained by the metrics in use. The only figure available is for those serving in the military in any capacity. A similar metric, when applied to this sample, counts 47.2 percent of the sample as veterans of some sort.



However, as the Senate site states, the number of veterans in Congress has plummeted recently, as there has been no enlistment due to selective service since 1973. It is difficult to isolate a central tendency for military service, and numbers directly comparable to those used in the rest of this research are not readily available.

All in all, the sample seems to be fairly representative of Congress as a whole for the time period this research examines. The age, tenure, margin of victory, and legal background of the sample are all roughly what one would anticipate. With the sample and methods now in place, it is possible to tease out the influences of the various independent variables upon the likelihood of implication.

## CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

In previous chapters, the established scholarly literature and the methods for this research have been laid out. The dependent variable is dichotomous and measures whether someone in the dataset was implicated or not, as such it takes on a value of either 0 or 1, the latter indicating that the individual in question was implicated in one or more acts of incivility during the time period of this study (1932-2005).

The final model in this research uses Logistic regression. However, first, it may be prudent to get more acquainted with the data. Recall that this is a matched pair analysis that uses some aspects of quota sampling to correct for inconsistencies created by the perfectly random drawing of names for the control group. When names were drawn that were already a part of the dataset, they were replaced.<sup>25</sup> It will be helpful to begin by reporting simple correlations, which reveal something about the relationship between the independent variables of interest and the dependent variable. The major difference between these correlations and a regression is that regression models measure the effect of each variable while holding all other variables constant. Correlations, however, examine each variable with no regard whatsoever for other variables. Table 3 features the correlations with the dependent variable for each of the independent variables outlined above, along with the hypothesized direction of the relationship. For dichotomous variables, Cramer's V is also included. Cramer's V is a proportional reduction in error measure of association for dichotomous variables. In this case, Cramer's V is essentially the absolute value of Pearson's  $r$ . However, some would argue that it is technically the more appropriate measure, and as such, it is included here.

**Table 3**

**Bivariate Correlations:  
Variables believed to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act**

<u>Key Explanatory Variables</u>	Exp. Sign	Pearson r
Electoral Margin	+	.183 ***
Ideologically Polarized	+	.068 <sup>t</sup>
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.)	-	-.084*
<u>Personal Traits</u>		
Political Party (GOP = 1)	+	-.028 [.028]
Southerner (former CSA)	+, -	.036 [.036]
Age (yrs.)	+, -	.132**
Tenure (yrs.)	+	.248**
Lawyer (min. 5 yrs. exp.)	-	-.004 [004.]
Military Officer	-	-.02 [.02]
<u>Controls for Media Bias</u>		
Leadership Position	+	.186*** [.186***]
Political Family	+	-.013 [.013]
Senate Membership	+	.000 [.000]

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; <sup>t</sup>  $p < .10$  (one-tailed test)

Brackets contain Cramer's V for dichotomous variables; indicators of significance are as above.

n = 508

Most of the variables perform roughly as expected. The strongest correlations are found when considering the variables electoral margin, tenure, and holding a leadership position. Ideological polarization, previous state legislative experience, and age are also statistically significant. However, several of these findings warrant further comment.

First, consider electoral margin. This is perhaps the least surprising of the significant variables. Those who do not fear electoral defeat are more likely to do as they please, even if the things they wish to do are perhaps a bit distasteful to others.

Furthermore, many of those with the highest margins also come from ideologically homogeneous areas (the Deep South before 1960 is a prime example), where a rational

actor would not expect to face a serious challenge in any general election. All an incumbent need do in that environment is not to be so dreadful as to raise significant opposition in the primaries. Obviously, these candidates have greater leeway than individuals who routinely win their seats by lower margins.

The next variable is ideological extremism. There have been some tentative arguments that ideological distance can be a predictor of incivility (Uslaner 1993, Schraufnagel 2006).<sup>26</sup> The raw correlation tends to bear this out. It is statistically significant, but weak. This suggests two possibilities. First, the relatively large sample may be pushing this variable into the realm of significance. Second, it is possible that this finding supports the suspicion that ideology is, at best, only part of the story.

Previous state legislative experience is significant, and supports the literature on the ease of adaptation for State legislators as opposed to governors and others making the change to the life of a member of Congress (Berkman 1993).

Age and tenure both correlate significantly with implication. This makes sense, but one must wonder whether the two are somehow intertwined. After all, a forty-year-old representative will almost necessarily have less experience than one in his or her sixties. Logically, it makes sense that multicollinearity might be an issue. The two correlate with a Pearson's  $r$  of .575. This is low enough that multicollinearity is not an inherent problem. However, it is high enough to make one wonder what a regression will uncover.

Finally, consider holding a leadership position. This is a control, included because of the high visibility of Congressional leaders and the increased likelihood that they will garner media attention. As expected, the correlation analysis produces a

positive and significant coefficient. However, the Pearson's R is again quite small. Again, a logistic regression will prove illuminating.

These correlations and Cramer's V statistics give a rough idea of the association between the various independent variables and the dependent variable. However, as previously mentioned, each correlation fails to take any other factors into account, essentially analyzing the two variables in a vacuum. Regression will measure the effect of each independent variable when all others are held constant. A Logistic regression is most suitable for a dichotomous dependent variable.

### **Logistic Regression and Analysis**

Below is the Logistic regression result, followed by a table that provides predicted probabilities. First, a word on predicted probabilities is necessary. Logistic regression coefficients cannot be read in a manner consistent with those used for Ordinary Least Squares regressions, and contain no substantive significance of their own. Accordingly, predicted probabilities, which provide the average probability of moving from being not implicated to implicated given a pre-determined change in the statistically significant independent consideration. With that being said, let us turn to the Logistic model first. Note that these results may or may not be in keeping with those from raw correlations, because a regression finds the association between a given independent variable and the dependent variable when all other variables are held constant. All coefficients are listed with robust standard errors. Those achieving significance in a one-tailed test are marked accordingly.

Again, a few variables achieve statistical significance. The first surprise is that ideological polarization is now significant at the  $p < .05$  level, where it was merely at the

$p < .10$  level previously. Logistic uncovers a stronger relationship than the correlation data could find. The fact that this is a positive relationship indicates that the ideologically extreme are more likely to be implicated in an act of incivility than are moderates. This is even more strongly the case when other considerations (electoral safety, tenure, etc.) are held constant.

Again, electoral margin is significant, and again, it is significant at the  $p < .001$  level. This is perhaps the biggest story of the model. Those who do not fear electoral consequences will do as they wish, where those in more precarious electoral situations will be more inclined to show restraint. This reinforces the assertions of Mayhew (1973), Fiorina (1989), and others who claim that as legislatures have become more professionalized, reelection has become a greater concern.

The third key explanatory variable is state legislative experience. Indeed, those who have previous state legislative experience are less likely to be implicated in an act of incivility than are their colleagues with other occupational backgrounds prior to service in the US Congress. This lends credence to the “farm team” approach to recruitment mentioned earlier.

These three variables combine to tell a compelling story. First, the parties will create a more civil chamber if they continue to recruit as they have, finding their candidates in state legislative offices whenever possible. This is the one of the three, key explanatory variables that is actually under the control of a party’s political organization. The other two, ideological extremism and electoral margin, are at the least somewhat outside of the Party’s control.<sup>27</sup> A rational actor, either as a candidate or as a Party leader, will actually pursue a higher electoral margin, and it is in the Party’s interest to aid in that

pursuit. While the Parties could attempt to recruit centrist candidates, there is no explicit incentive to do so, if the ideologically extreme candidates are winning elections by comfortable margins.

The rest of the table provides a few more surprises. First, note that age is no longer significant. However, experience in years becomes a more significant predictor. This suggests that age is not really a determining factor. Rather, time spent in the system (“tenure”) appears to do one of two things. It either makes one more frustrated with legislative process and less willing to “go along to get along” or this finding is yet another factor that can be attributed to more media visibility.

Among the (other) media control variables included, only leadership achieves significance. This may partly be due to the rarity of civil leaders in the sample. However, this finding could possibly indicate that leaders are inherently more likely to be uncivil. In fact, some have found a similar phenomenon, albeit with causality reversed, finding that the firebrands of the party are more likely to achieve leadership (Schickler and Pearson 2005).

**Table 4.****Logistic Regression Analysis:  
Variables believed to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act**

<u>Key Explanatory Variables</u>	Coefficients (robust stand. errors)
Electoral Margin	.014 (.004) ***
Ideologically Polarized	.583 (.333) *
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.)	-.046 (.025) *
<u>Personal Traits</u>	
Political Party (GOP = 1)	.13 (.2)
Southerner (former CSA)	-.101 (.232)
Age (yrs.)	.003 (.012)
Tenure (yrs.)	.043 (.137) ***
Lawyer (min. 5 yrs. exp.)	-.007 (.203)
Military Officer	-.012 (.252)
<u>Controls for Media Bias</u>	
Leadership Position	1.093 (.425) **
Political Family	-.256 (.325)
Senate Membership	.198 (.213)
Constant	-1.546
Wald Chi <sup>2</sup>	53.77
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.089
n	508

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; <sup>t</sup>  $p < .10$  (one-tailed test)

Before going on, note that the R<sup>2</sup> in this model is fairly low. This is partly because of the breadth of the study. It spans 72 years, and obviously much has changed in that time, both in Congress and in American society. The other reason, or perhaps an extension of the previous one, is that this project deals with individual-level data, and attempts to predict individual behavior. Taken together, this is quite a difficult proposition. A model that predicts incivility in Congress on the individual level as reliably in 1937 as 2001 is quite a tall order. The difficulties of a large timeframe and individual-level data tend to exacerbate each other. As such, any explanations at all are a



step in the right direction. Put another way, this model explains 8.9 percent of the variation in the dependent variable from 1933 to 2005. While this is far from a comprehensive explanation, it is still certainly illuminating.

The difficulty with Logistic regressions, mentioned above, is that they do not provide an intuitively meaningful coefficient. Predicted probabilities are necessary for that. These are provided in Table 5.

**Table 5.**  
**Predicted Probabilities:**  
**Variables found to Influence the Probability of being Implicated in an Uncivil Act**

<u>Key Explanatory Variables</u>	Probability
Electoral Margin [1 stand. dev. change] <sup>a</sup>	8.4
Ideological Extremism [1 stand. dev. change] <sup>b</sup>	4.4
Previous State Leg. Exp. (yrs.) [full range 0-32]	-32.5
<u>Personal Traits</u>	
Tenure (yrs.) [1 stand. dev. change] <sup>c</sup>	10.0

Note: Ratio variables held constant at their mean values (see Table 1) and dichotomous variables held constant at their modal value.

<sup>a</sup> Using the full range of the Electoral Margin variable suggests that the probability of being implicated increases by 33.7% as we move to the smallest to the largest possible margin of victory.


<sup>b</sup> Using the full range of the Ideologically Polarized variable suggests that the probability of being implicated increases by 14.4% as we move from the least to the most ideologically polarized member.

<sup>c</sup> Using the full range of the Tenure variable suggests that the probability of being implicated increases by 46.6% moving from the member with the shortest time in office to the member who has been there the longest.

The four significant variables are shown above with their predicted probabilities. With the exception of previous legislative experience, the probabilities are given in terms of single standard deviation change. Examining these predicted probabilities for each of the variables allows one to make substantive comparisons about the relative importance of variables across the dataset.


The largest change across a standard deviation is found for the variable Tenure. The indication is that over time, individual members of Congress, for whatever reason,

become more likely to be implicated in acts of incivility. This may be due to an increase in visibility. It may also be due to a mounting frustration with the difficult nature of the legislative process. It could certainly be some of both, as the two are likely not mutually exclusive. However, plotting the tenures in years against predicted probabilities shows that, even though the prevailing trend is in the expected direction, the data is not as unified as the probability by itself would tend to indicate.



**Figure 1**  
**Predicted Probabilities of Implication in an Act of Incivility by Tenure**


Electoral margin, again, produces a strong relationship with the probability of implication. A single standard deviation change in the electoral margin produces an 8.4 percent increase in the likelihood of implication, with all other variables held constant at their mean value for ratio variables and their modal value for dichotomous variables. This is far and away the most linear of the relationships when graphed. In fact, it is the only one in which there is not some sort of unexpected bump or hiccup somewhere in the graph. Prevailing literature suggests that once individuals arrive in Congress, they do not wish to leave (Mayhew 1974). However, once their job security is assured, there seems to be less incentive to behave oneself or adhere to civility norms.



**Figure 2**  
**Predicted Probabilities of Implication in an Act of Incivility for Electoral Margin**

Ideological extremism also has a positive association with the likelihood of implication. Now, a one standard deviation change is associated with a 4.4 percent increase in the probability of being implicated, *ceteris paribus*. While this indicates that ideological distance does indeed matter, some may take solace in the fact that other


factors outweigh the importance of ideological extremism as a predictor of uncivil behavior. The findings suggest that extremism alone does not predict incivility, and that by extension it is still possible for one to hold an ideological line and remain civil. In fact, when graphed, this tendency becomes even less pronounced.



**Figure 3**

**Predicted Probabilities for Ideological Extremity**

Finally, considering previous state legislative experience, the predicted negative associated with implication is obtained. The longer a potential candidate spends getting accustomed to the demands of the legislative process on the state level, the easier the transition to the U.S. Senate or House appears to be, at least in terms of following norms intend to promote comity and a civil legislative process, with which these members are already innately familiar.



**Figure 4**  
**Predicted Probabilities for State Legislative Experience (in Years)**

This chapter began by exploring the data with simple correlations. Several significant relationships were uncovered. Then, Logistic regression showed that there are several significant predictors of uncivil behavior. Finally, predicted probabilities showed the effects of these independent variables on the likelihood of implication. There is a story in this data. The factors that are beyond the Parties' control are, for the most part, contributing to incivility. The one factor that the Parties they do control, however, and the one thing that both parties can do when recruiting candidates is look for those with previous state legislative experience. This variable is one of the factors that act to preserve civility in the national legislature.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This research examines questions of congressional civility. Chapter 2 reviewed the work in this field up to this point, paying particular attention to Uslaner's argument concerning the representative nature of Congress. While Uslaner lays out a solid framework for discussions concerning congressional civility, his arguments do little to explain who, individually, is responsible for the decline in civility. It is here that this piece makes its contribution to the literature on legislative conflict.

Having established the need for further exploration of the underlying personal causes of civility in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 turned to a discussion of methodology. After considering the possibility of Poisson regression, a Logistic model was settled upon. Variables are set and the formulae and coding practices examined.

A Logistic regression shows that there are indeed significant predictors of incivility. Four major predictors are uncovered: tenure, electoral margin, state legislative experience, and ideological extremism. Predicted probabilities further showed the substantive relationship between these variables and the dependent variable, implication in an act of civility. These predicted probabilities provide a rough analog to the intuitive coefficients derived using Ordinary Least Squares regression.

The proverbial fly in the ointment, however, is the low Pseudo  $R^2$  in this model. On one hand, this research deals with individual behavior over a 72-year period. It is difficult to imagine that every implication would be predicted correctly. However, one must wonder what makes the outliers different. The ten most-likely individuals who were not implicated are John Johnston, Jr., Marion P. Daniel, Sam Rayburn, Lindley Beckworth, Henry Steagall, John Breaux, Robert Thomas, Beryl Anthony, Spessard



Holland, John Anderson, and Carl T. Hatch. These individuals have one thing in common: all of them won their seats without opposition. They are also mostly Southern Democrats. Eight of the ten are from the South, and nine are Democrats. Indeed the 39 most-likely individuals from the control group had victory margins of over 50 percent. This is perhaps a significant caveat to the otherwise stunningly significant electoral margin. It begins to break down a bit when individuals have no opposition whatsoever. This could be explained by an interaction between region and margin, or perhaps an additional dummy variable for those who ran without a major-party opponent (several others who were high on the list were only nominally opposed by a third party).

Moving to those who were likely to be implicated, but were not, a similar phenomenon can be observed. William Benton, John Tower, Birch Bayh, Newt Gingrich, Thurston Morton, John Culver, Timothy Wirth, Anthony Beilinson, Brock Adams, and Paul Trible, Jr. all won their seats by less than 2.5 percent of the two-candidate vote. Gingrich was serving in a leadership role when he was implicated. However, Gingrich was among the most-implicated individuals in the data set, having nine mentions. That said, the rest of the “top 10” had only a single mention each. Again, margin is the major predictor, and the one that is erroneous. Four of these individuals were from the Old South. The only other variable that stands out is ideological extremism. The mean of .581 is only about .05 above the mean for the sample as a whole. However, there are a few individuals in that group (Culver, Adams, Tower, and Birch) who are quite extreme, all above a .75, meaning that 75 percent of their own party was more agreeable toward the other party ideologically.

## **Future Work**

This research begins to answer a very basic question of who is behind the incivility in Congress. However, it poses several others. Normatively, a more civil legislature is desirable, assuming that there is still some level of ideological competition, as prescribed in the responsible Party model of governance. However, does this research suggest anything that can be done to encourage civility? Let us examine each of the four variables in turn.

First, consider electoral margin. It would be possible to draw districts in such a way as to guarantee electoral competition. However, it is not in either Party's best interest to surrender its safe seats. In fact, such a practice would run exactly counter to the stated purpose of a political party, especially if the other party does not do the same. It does stand to reason, though, that one safe district may not necessarily be like another. Future work here could further explain which safe districts are more or less likely to produce members who have been implicated in acts of incivility. Of particular interest are those districts in which members were running unopposed.

Second, there is the matter of ideological polarization. While the Downsian notion of centrist candidates competing for the mass of voters at the ideological midpoint is appealing, it seems that this is not occurring on the congressional level. Future work in this area could attempt to establish whether this phenomenon systemically contributes to incivility or whether there are other issues involved. Recall that in this research, the variable was significant, but graphing the predicted probabilities showed a far less robust relationship than the numbers originally indicated.

Third, there is state legislative experience. This is the one variable that most easily lends itself to a prescription for the future. Those who have previous state

legislative experience contribute to congressional civility, and by extension congressional effectiveness if Uslaner's introductory arguments are to be believed. However, this is already the proverbial "farm team" for both Parties. As such, the only real recommendation can be to continue that which the parties are already doing, albeit perhaps in a more focused manner.

The fourth significant variable was tenure. This is perhaps the greatest opportunity for future work. There are multiple possible explanations as to why this is the case. It is possible that tenure is significant simply because those who spend years upon years in Congress simply get frustrated with the difficult processes involved and the seemingly glacial rate of progress. However, it is also possible that this is merely a function of the increased visibility that comes with prolonged service. Recall that the sample is drawn from media reports. The available data therefore cannot reliably establish which of these possibilities represents reality the best. Of course, the explanation may be partly both of these things; as the two considerations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Further work would do well to focus on isolating the different parts of tenure (visibility, position, and experience come to mind) that may impact the likelihood of being implicated in an uncivil act.

There is also the possibility that other variables may facilitate a more robust explanation. A more detailed examination of region, for example, may show that individuals from another portion of the country are in fact far less civil than even the rowdiest of Southerners. It is also possible that removing the South's unopposed districts, even with a simple dummy variable, could refine the model.

Furthermore, it is entirely possible that a contrast between urban and rural districts may be partly to blame for the rise in incivility as of late. This would be measured simply as the square mileage of the various House districts, since each district includes the same number of voters.

This research examines the predictors of uncivil behavior in Congress. If there is one story in the data, it is one that we as a community have heard before. Those with the least to fear in the next election have the least reason to behave in a civil and reciprocal manner when dealing with their colleagues. There may be little hope for changing the electoral structure that leads to safe districts. However, it may be possible through careful recruitment practices to mitigate these effects, leading to a more civil, and hopefully productive, Congress.

## **APPENDIX A: ACTS OF INCIVILITY BY INDIVIDUAL**

Name	Details	Date
Abouezk, Jim	Broke Senate traditions by refusing to run for reelection	9 October, 1977, <i>Washington Post</i> , 3
Abzug, Bella	Abandoned Congressional norms as freshman	8 March, 1972, <i>Washington Post</i> , A20
Adams, Brock	Reference to longstanding uncivil rivalry vs. colleague	11 May, 1992, <i>Washington Post</i> , C13
Allott, Gordon	Rebuked opposition party	15 August, 1955, <i>New York Times</i> , 8
Arends, Leslie C.	Rebuked other chamber	24 October, 1971, <i>New York Times</i> , 56
Armey, Richard	Accused opposition of doctoring statistics	26 May, 1991, <i>New York Times</i> , E2
Armey, Richard	Slurred colleague's sexual orientation	28 January, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Armey, Richard	Slurred colleague's sexual orientation	29 January, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , E14
Armey, Richard	Challenged colleague	16 March, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , E2
Armey, Richard	Rebuked first lady	28 August, 2002, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Armey, Richard	Rebuked colleague	13 July, 2001, <i>Washington Post</i> , A7
Aspin, Les	Sent out gloating press release	5 August, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A16
Bailey, Josiah William	Rebuked colleague	6 Aug, 1938, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Bailey, Josiah William	Lamented "group of socialists" in own (dem) party, party division	13 January, 1938, <i>Washington Post</i> , X2
Barkley, Alben William	Extended uncivil exchange with colleague	18 April, 1944, <i>New York Times</i> , 13
Barry, David S.	Rebuked multiple colleagues	8 February, 1933, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Bayh, Birch	Prolonged attack on fitness of presidential nominee	14 May, 1967, <i>Washington Post</i> , C7
Bellenson, Anthony	Decried lack of civility in Congress	23 January, 1996, <i>New York Times</i> , B6
Bennett, Wallace F.	Rebuked colleague	19 June, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 7
Benton, William	Disparaged Colleague	2 February, 1951, <i>Washington Post</i> , 2
Biden, Joseph R.	Rebuked colleague	22 October, 1987, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Bilbo, Theodore Gilmore	Threatened campaign against colleague @ reelection	26 January, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 6
Bilbo, Theodore Gilmore	Campaigned against colleague @ reelection	25 January, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 6

Black, Hugo Lafayette	Rebuked multiple colleagues	4 June, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Blanton, Tom	Introduced resolution supporting MOC parking violators	23 February, 1936, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Bond, Christopher S	Heated exchange vs. colleague	18 March, 1992, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
Bono, Sonny	Disparaged colleague	25 September, 1996 <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Boxer, Barbara	Held nominee "hostage"	25 October, 1999, <i>Washington Post</i> , A27
Bradley, Michael Joseph	Rebuked speaker	4 June, 1943, <i>New York Times</i> , 11
Bridges, Styles	Rebuked opposition party	15 August, 1955, <i>New York Times</i> , 8
Bridges, Styles	Disparaged Colleague, Opposition Party	10 March, 1938, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Brooke, Edward	Rebuked colleague	27 September, 1975, <i>New York Times</i> , 10
Brooks, Jack	Disparaged current state of Congress re: civility	1 June, 1989, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Brooks, Jack	Refused information to colleague	28 November, 1994, <i>Washington Post</i> , C1
Burke, Edward Raymond	Engaged in heated, nearly violent debate	17 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Burke, Edward Raymond	Rebuked colleague	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 34
Burke, Edward Raymond	Rebuked colleague	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Burke, Edward Raymond	Heated exchange vs. colleague	17 August, 1937, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Burke, Edward Raymond	Accused colleague of breach of rules	6 August, 1939, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Burton, Daniel	Disparaged President	13 May, 1998, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Bush, George H.W.	Called Senator "wimp" in note passed during session.	28 September, 1987, <i>New York Times</i> , B6
Byrd, Harry Flood	Rebuked colleague	12 July, 1953, <i>New York Times</i> , E3
Byrd, Harry Flood	Rebuked colleague	12 June, 1934, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Byrd, Harry Flood	Disparaged Bureaucrats	2 May, 1942, <i>Washington Post</i> , 6
Byrd, Harry Flood	Demanded colleague's resignation from partisan position	16 December, 1943, <i>Washington Post</i> , 15
Byrd,	Initiated roll call votes to	30 May, 1987, <i>New York Times</i> , 8

Robert C.	highlight absenteeism on a Fri.	
Byrd, Robert C.	rebuked other chamber	19 January, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Byrd, Robert C.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	11 August, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Byrd, Robert C.	Heated exchange vs. Vice President	6 February, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A6
Byrd, Robert C.	Rebuked opposition party	14 May, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A10
Byrd, Robert C.	Rebuked opposition party	20 May, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
Byrd, Robert C.	Used roll call votes to ensure attendance on Fridays	30 May, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A8
Byrd, Robert C.	Rebuked opposition party	16 September, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Byrd, Robert C.	Threatened treaty failure due to Congressional inefficiency	27 May, 1988, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Byrd, Robert C.	Rebuked multiple colleagues	21 December, 1995, <i>Washington Post</i> , A15
Byrns, Joseph Wellington	Disparaged colleague	5 June, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 3
Byrns, Joseph Wellington	Rebuked colleague	18 January, 1933, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Cain, Harry P.	Belittled Senate proceedings	11 August, 1951, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Cannon, Clarence	Manipulated rules to protest cmte denying desired debate	17 July, 1955, <i>New York Times</i> , E6
Cannon, Clarence	Held budget hostage in intrachamber dispute re: norms	17 June, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 35
Cannon, Clarence	Held budget hostage in intrachamber dispute re: norms	25 June, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 17
Cannon, Clarence	Refused to adhere to conference cmte norms	15 July, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 108
Cannon, Howard W.	Rebuked lobbyists	13 June, 1959, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Capehart, Homer E.	Disparages colleague	29 May, 1957, <i>New York Times</i> , 15
Capehart, Homer E.	Rebuked colleague	14 July, 1955, <i>Washington Post</i> , 56
Case, Clifford Philip	Verbally battled colleague	15 May, 1964, <i>New York Times</i> 1
Case, Clifford Philip	Rebuked colleague	9 October, 1977, <i>New York Times</i> , E4
Celler, Emanuel	Rebuffed governors before hearing re: state officials	2 July, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , 37
Celler, Emanuel	Rebuked multiple colleagues	11 January, 1967, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Chavez,	Introduced bill after agreement	27 January, 1946, <i>New York Times</i> , E10



Dennis	to await State of Union	
Chelf, Frank Leslie	Heated exchange vs. colleague	11 June, 1945, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Cheney, Dick	used profanity while rebuking majority party for tactics	19 November, 1983, <i>New York Times</i> , 12
Cheney, Dick	Rebuked Speaker	16 March, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A22
Clark, Joel Bennett	Withdrew uncivil comments about colleague	7 April, 1934, <i>New York Times</i> , 4
Clark, Joel Bennett	Rebuked colleague	6 June, 1940, <i>New York Times</i> , 14
Clark, Joel Bennett	Rebuked Colleague	28 October, 1939, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Clark, Joel Bennett	Rebuked colleague	2 April, 1942, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Cochrah, Thad	Questioned fitness of committee leadership	30 June, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A13
Coehello, Tony	Resigned rather than face financial investigation	28 May, 1989, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
Coelho, Tony	Sent out questionable press release re:opponents' junkets	6 September, 1981, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Conable, Barber B.	Rebuked other chamber	6 November, 1971, <i>New York Times</i> , 18
Connally, Thomas Terry	Disparages Colleague	4 April, 1934, <i>New York Times</i> , 4
Connally, Thomas Terry	Rebuked colleague	29 October, 1939, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
Connally, Thomas Terry	Silenced opponent's questions on Senate floor	10 May, 1949, <i>New York Times</i> , 3
Connally, Thomas Terry	Disputed colleague on floor	14 January, 1951, <i>New York Times</i> , E3
Connally, Thomas Terry	Various Tongue in Cheek comments	21 November, 1937, <i>Washington Post</i> , B7
Connally, Thomas Terry	Rebuked Colleague	28 October, 1939, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Conyers, John Jr.	Sent letter challenging colleague's actions	18 September, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Conyers, John Jr.	Rebuked appointed special prosecutor (Ken Starr)	20 November, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A25
Cooksey, John	Rebuked President	17 December, 1998, <i>Washington Post</i> , A37
Copeland, Royal S.	Disparaged Court nominee for KKK ties	17 August, 1937, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Couzens, James	Resisted recess to press favored policy	4 June, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Cox, Eugene E	Physically battled colleague on floor	26 June, 1949, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
Crane, Daniel B.	Sexual affair with underage page	21 July, 1983, <i>New York Times</i> , A1

Culver, John C	Rebuked multiple colleagues	18 July, 1979, <i>Washington Post</i> , A17
Cunningham, Randy	Rebuked colleague	12 June, 2000, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
Curtis, Carl T.	Left committee meeting room in anger	24 March, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
D'Amato, Alfonse M.	Disparaged colleague	12 March, 1984, <i>New York Times</i> , B28
D'Amato, Alfonse M.	Rebuked colleague	28 January, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , B3
D'Amato, Alfonse M.	Disparaged Judge Lance Ito	23 October, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A12
D'Amato, Alfonse M.	Rebuked colleague	22 October, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , B1
Danforth, John C.	Rebuked multiple colleagues	12 July, 1991, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Daschle, Tom	Rebuked opposition	6 March, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , B12
Daschle, Tom	Threatened to keep Senate in session through recess	20 June, 2001, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Daschle, Tom	Disparaged colleague	27 July, 2001, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
De Priest, Oscar Stanton	Threatened Colleague Physically	24 January, 1934, <i>New York Times</i> , 26
DeConcini, Dennis	Rebuked multiple colleagues	20 May, 1982, <i>New York Times</i> , B16
DeFazio, Peter A	Rebuked colleague	12 June, 2000, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
Delay, Tom	Rebuked opposition	27 January, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , A15
Delay, Tom	Physically assaulted colleague	18 April, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A14
Delay, Tom	Rebuked state court	9 December, 2000, <i>Washington Post</i> , A16
Delay, Tom	Rebuked colleague	18 January, 2004, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Dicks, Norm	Interrupted colleague's interview to assert himself	13 May, 1990, <i>New York Times</i> , SM34
Dies, Martin Jr.	Disparaged government bureaucrats	2 February, 1943, <i>New York Times</i> , 40
Dieterich, William Henry	Engaged in heated, nearly violent debate	17 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Dietrich, William H.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	17 August, 1937, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Dirksen, Everett McKinley	Rebuked colleague	24 May, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Dirksen, Everett McKinley	Expressed contempt for proposed rule change.	8 January, 1965, <i>New York Times</i> , 30
Dirksen, Everett McKinley	Rebuked Vice President	24 May, 1960, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Dirksen, Everett McKinley	Rebuked President	2 August, 1969, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1

Dole, Robert	Challenged Vice President	5 February, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Dole, Robert	Rebuked colleague	24 November, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A21
Dole, Robert	Rebuked colleague	24 November, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Dole, Robert	Gloated over political victory over partisan rival	25 June, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , 16
Dole, Robert	Locked presidential primary rival out of meaningful positions	9 October, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A11
Dole, Robert	Rebuked colleagues	24 July, 1985, <i>Washington Post</i> , A5
Dole, Robert	Heated exchange vs. colleague	11 August, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Dole, Robert	Rebuked opposition party	14 May, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A10
Dole, Robert	Heated exchange vs. Vice President	5 February, 1988, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Dole, Robert	Rebuked opposition party	18 July, 1990, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Dole, Robert	Rebuked opposition party	22 July, 1990, <i>Washington Post</i> , A16
Dole, Robert	Rebuked opposition VP nominee	5 October, 1992, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Dole, Robert	Rebuked opposition party	7 June, 1995, <i>Washington Post</i> , A5
Domenici, Pete V.	Rebuked opposition	6 March, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , B12
Dornan, Robert	Physically assaulted colleague	5 March, 1985, <i>New York Times</i> , B2
Dornan, Robert	Rebuked President, disciplined	26 January, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A18
Dornan, Robert	Disparaged President	27 June, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A14
Dornan, Robert	Rebuked President	23 October, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A12
Dornan, Robert	Disparaged President	16 March, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , E2
Dornan, Robert	Accused President of treason	6 March, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Douglas, Paul H.	Rebuked own party	19 August, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 142
Downey, Thomas	Challenged colleague	16 March, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , E2
Durenberger, David F.	Questioned motives of presidential administration & CIA	19 May, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Eastland, James O.	Disparaged Supreme Court decision	12 March, 1960, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Ellender, Allen Joseph	Exploited unanimous consent to hold issue hostage	20 June, 1948, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Fazio, Vic	Rebuked colleague	8 September, 1989, <i>Washington Post</i> , A6

Filner, Bob	Disparaged opposition party	18 April, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A8
Flanders, Ralph E	Moves to strip colleague's powers	12 June, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Flanders, Ralph E	Called for dismissal of colleague	12 June, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Flanders, Ralph E	Interrupted Colleague on floor	12 June, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Flanders, Ralph E	Called for Censure of Colleague	28 July, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 10
Flanders, Ralph E	Called for Censure of Colleague	31 July, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Foley, Thomas S.	Called for return to Comity	2 June, 1989, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Ford, Wendell	Cited Puerto Rico's cultural differences	22 February, 1991, <i>New York Times</i> , A28
Frank, Barney	Lamented "meanness and intolerance" since Republican takeover	29 January, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , E2
Frank, Barney	Implied bigotry of opposition party	2 February, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A23
Frank, Barney	Disparaged Speaker	18 April, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A8
Frank, Barney	Rebuked Opposition party	18 September, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Frank, Barney	Challenged appointed special prosecutor (Ken Starr)	20 November, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A25
Frist, Bill	Rebuked opposition	8 November, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , A12
Frist, Bill	Campaigned against colleague @ reelection	20 November, 2004, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Frist, Bill	Rebuked opposition party	27 May, 2005, <i>New York Times</i> , A8
Fulbright, William	Challenged colleague	2 August, 1969, <i>New York Times</i> , 24
Fulbright, William	Rebuked colleague	2 October, 1971, <i>New York Times</i> , 11
Fulbright, William	rebuked colleague	15 August, 1972, <i>New York Times</i> , 6
Fulbright, William	Called attention to pork, rebuked colleague	4 October, 1972, <i>New York Times</i> , 97
Fulbright, William	Rebuked colleague	15 July, 1966, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Fullbright, William	Rebuked opposition party	2 July, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Gandy, Fred	Decried lack of comity in Senate	1 October, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Garn, Jake	Rebuked colleague	20 May, 1982, <i>New York Times</i> , B16
George, Walter Franklin	Rebuked President, disparaged party	27 January, 1946, <i>New York Times</i> , E10
Gephardt, Richard A.	Rebuked opposition	6 March, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , B12
Gephardt, Richard A.	Disparaged own party	17 January, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A9
Gephardt, Richard A.	Profanity during address	13 July, 2001, <i>Washington Post</i> , A7

Gibbons, Sam	Physically assaulted colleague	25 September, 1996 <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Gibbons, Sam	Physically assaulted colleague	6 March, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Gingrich, Newt	Rebuked multiple colleagues	19 May, 1984, <i>New York Times</i> , 7
Gingrich, Newt	Initiated investigation of colleague's royalties from book	27 May, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A13
Gingrich, Newt	Referred to passed bills as "trash" humorously	7 October, 1992, <i>New York Times</i> , D19
Gingrich, Newt	Disparaged President	14 November, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , A17
Gingrich, Newt	Implied opposition might destroy documents	14 November, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , A17
Gingrich, Newt	Rebuked colleague	27 January, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , A15
Gingrich, Newt	Disparaged opposition party without warning	20 May, 1984, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Gingrich, Newt	Assorted assaults on Congressional comity	3 January, 1985, <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Gingrich, Newt	Unspecified House ethics violations	11 January, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Glass, Carter	Rebuked Colleague	22 February, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1.
Glass, Carter	Heated exchange vs. colleague	28 January, 1937, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Glass, Carter	Disparaged government bureaucrats	26 February, 1938, <i>Washington Post</i> , X1
Glenn, John	Rebuked colleague	20 November, 1983, <i>New York Times</i> , E4
Gore, Albert Sr.	Rebuked own party	12 January, 1960, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Gorton, Slade	rebuked other chamber	18 July, 1985, <i>Washington Post</i> , A3
Gorton, Slade	Reference to longstanding uncivil rivalry vs. colleague	11 May, 1992, <i>Washington Post</i> , C13
Gramm, Phil	Threatened party change after cmte reassignment	4 January, 1983, <i>New York Times</i> , A14
Gramm, Phil	Resigned in protest, reelected as member of other party	11 February, 1999, <i>New York Times</i> , A30
Grassley, Charles E	Questioned fitness of committee leadership	30 June, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A13
Grassley, Charles E	Verbally accosted colleague in office	15 June, 1981, <i>Washington Post</i> , D13
Grassley, Charles E	Rebuked opposition party	28 January, 1988, <i>Washington Post</i> , A14
Gravel, Mike	Disparaged colleague	8 October, 1976, <i>Washington Post</i> , A3
Gray, Kenneth J.	Decried lack of comity between chambers on floor	28 September, 1968, <i>New York Times</i> , 20
Green, Edith	Questioned strength of passed bill.	11 June, 1972, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
Green, Theodore F.	Formally rebuked colleague	23 July, 1950, <i>New York Times</i> , E2

Guffey, Joseph F	Disparaged colleagues	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Guffey, Joseph F	Rebuked bipartisan alliance	16 December, 1943, <i>Washington Post</i> , 15
Hancock, Clarence Eugene	Accused unnamed colleague of caring judges/policemen	25 April, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 3
Harkin, Tom	Demanded vote be voided	12 May, 1981, <i>New York Times</i> , D22
Harkin, Tom	Rebuked colleague	2 August, 1983, <i>New York Times</i> , A16
Harrison, Byron Patton	Refused ceremonial courtesy of colleague	27 December, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , E9
Hatch, Orrin G.	Loudly protested perceived violation of rule of debate	22 October, 1987, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Hatch, Orrin G.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	15 July, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , A14
Hatch, Orrin G.	Rebuked colleague	5 May, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , A22
Hatch, Orrin G.	Rebuked colleague	28 October, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , A19
Hatch, Orrin G.	Repeated arguments to take floor from colleagues	22 October, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A14
Hatch, Orrin G.	Rebuked Colleague	25 February, 1988, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Hatch, Orrin G.	Referred to colleague's drunk driving in rebuke	17 October, 1991, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Hatch, Orrin G.	Mild rebuke of colleague	1 May, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , C3
Hayden, Carl	Held budget hostage in intrachamber dispute re: norms	17 June, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 35
Hayden, Carl	Held budget hostage in intrachamber dispute re: norms	25 June, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 17
Hays, Wayne	Personal grudge with colleague of other house	4 December, 1973, <i>Washington Post</i> , A8
Helms, Jesse	Reneged on intricate Senate deal	21 September, 1981, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Helms, Jesse	Rebuked multiple colleagues	21 September, 1982, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Helms, Jesse	Threatened to hold military policies hostage	2 December, 1982, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Helms, Jesse	Held nominations hostage	31 October, 1985, <i>New York Times</i> , A26
Helms, Jesse	Attempted to take over committee position from colleague	3 December, 1986, <i>New York Times</i> , B14
Helms, Jesse	Questioned fitness of committee leadership	30 June, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A13
Helms, Jesse	Rebuked colleague	23 July, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , B6
Helms, Jesse	Sexually and racially harassed colleague	12 August, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A24
Helms,	Filibustered nominee to	11 October, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A16

Jesse	prevent vote	
Helms, Jesse	Threatened well-being of president	23 October, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A12
Helms, Jesse	Rebuked multiple colleagues	13 September, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , 23
Helms, Jesse	Held up nomination of former rival	5 November, 1999, <i>New York Times</i> , A28
Hoffman, Clare Eugene	Heated argument with labor leader	31 August, 1948, <i>Washington Post</i> , 10
Holifield, Chester Earl	Rebuked multiple colleagues	5 May, 1950, <i>Washington Post</i> , 20
Hollings, Ernest F.	Blocked consideration of treaty	1 October, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Hollings, Ernest F.	Racially offensive remark	1 March, 1994, <i>Washington Post</i> , A17
Hollings, Ernest F.	Various quips mentioned in retrospective of career	14 October, 2004, <i>Washington Post</i> , C1
Holt, Rush Dew	Rebuked colleague	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 34
Holt, Rush Dew	Rebuked colleague	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Holt, Rush Dew	Disparaged Colleague	8 August, 1940, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Holt, Rush Dew	Disparaged Colleague	11 August, 1940, <i>Washington Post</i> , 21
Hopkins, Larry J.	Rebuked colleague	16 July, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
Hosmer, Craig	Scheduled floor time to air grievances vs. president	10 April, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 26
Howell, Robert B.	Rebuked Colleague	10 February, 1933 <i>New York Times</i> , 2
Humphrey, Hubert Horatio	Challenged speaker	2 October, 1971, <i>New York Times</i> , 11
Hyde, Henry	Sexual indiscretion	21 December, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A28
Inhofe, James M	Rebuked colleague	2 October, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A6
Inouye, Daniel	Rebuked multiple colleagues	7 January, 1973, <i>Washington Post</i> , B7
Jackson, Henry M.	urged supporters to leave, usurping leadership duties	12 August, 1972, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Jackson, Henry M.	Rebuked colleague	15 August, 1972, <i>New York Times</i> , 6
Jackson, Henry M.	Rebuked Colleague	8 October, 1976, <i>Washington Post</i> , A3
Javits, Jacob K.	Threatened Filibuster	2 May, 1964, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Javits, Jacob K.	Rebuked colleague	6 November, 1971, <i>New York Times</i> , 18
Jeffords, James	Boycotted committee meeting to block presidential nominee	2 October, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A6

Jepsen, Roger W.	Rebuked colleague	2 August, 1983, <i>New York Times</i> , A16
Jepsen, Roger W.	Verbally accosted colleague in office	15 June, 1981, <i>Washington Post</i> , D13
Johnson, Hiram W.	Snubbed Colleague at swearing-in	4 January, 1941, <i>Washington Post</i> , 19
Johnson, Lyndon B.	Rebuked opposition party	15 August, 1955, <i>New York Times</i> , 8
Johnson, Lyndon B.	Reacted personally to disparaging comments	29 July, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 55
Johnston, Olin D.	Rebuked colleague	13 May, 1958, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Keating, Kenneth B.	Rebuked colleague	2 July, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , 37
Keating, Kenneth B.	Rebuked colleague	28 February, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Kem, James Preston	Rebuked colleague	10 May, 1950, <i>New York Times</i> , 27
Kennedy, Edward M.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	15 July, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , A14
Kennedy, Edward M.	Rebuked colleague	16 October, 1991, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Kennedy, Edward M.	Rebuked colleague	17 October, 1991, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Kennedy, Edward M.	Rebuked President	24 September, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A25
Kennedy, Edward M.	Rebuked President	18 January, 2004, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Kingston, Jack	Disparaged multiple colleagues	19 October, 2001, <i>Washington Post</i> , A16
Knowland, William F.	Rebuked opposition party	15 August, 1955, <i>New York Times</i> , 8
Koch, Edward I.	Eulogized enemy leader, interrupted colleague	7 September, 1969, <i>New York Times</i> , 51
Kyl, John	Rebuked colleague	28 October, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , A19
LaHood, Ray	Rebuked own party	19 July, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Langer, William	Held up judicial nomination	2 March, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 24
Lautenberg, Frank R.	Rebuked colleague	20 November, 2004, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Leahy, Patrick J.	Rebuked rivals	23 November, 2000, <i>New York Times</i> , A33
Leahy, Patrick J.	Rebuked colleague	28 October, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , A19
Leahy, Patrick J.	Rebuked opposition party	5 October, 1998, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Leahy, Patrick J.	rebuked other chamber	24 January, 1999, <i>Washington Post</i> , A17
Leahy, Patrick J.	Rebuked Vice President	26 June, 2004, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Leland, Mickey	Disparaged colleague	7 September, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , SM59



Levin, Sander, M.	Rebuked colleague	13 May, 2005, <i>New York Times</i> , A20
Lewis, John	Rebuked Speaker	24 January, 1995, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Lewis, John	Prolonged attack on speaker	16 February, 1995, <i>Washington Post</i> , A25
Logan, Marvel Mills	Rebuked multiple colleagues	7 July, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Logan, Marvel Mills	Rebuked counsellor	15 November, 1933, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Long, Huey	Rebuked Atty General	22 February, 1933, <i>New York Times</i> , 2
Long, Huey	Obstructed Nominations	27 March, 1934, <i>New York Times</i> , 20
Long, Huey	Threatened Political action vs. colleague	6 April, 1934, <i>New York Times</i> , 22
Long, Huey	Withdrew uncivil comments about colleague	7 April, 1934, <i>New York Times</i> , 4
Long, Huey	Disparages President	28 April, 1935, <i>New York Times</i> , E7
Long, Huey	Filibuster	14 June, 1935, <i>New York Times</i> , 2
Long, Huey	Constant threats of Filibuster	16 June, 1935, <i>New York Times</i> , E3
Long, Huey	Failed filibuster	16 June, 1935, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
Long, Huey	Disruptive on Congress Floor	21 January, 1933, <i>Washington Post</i> , 2
Long, Huey	Rebuked colleague	31 January, 1933, <i>Washington Post</i> , 3
Long, Huey	Rebuked colleague	6 March, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Long, Huey	Filibuster	22 May, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Long, Russell B.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	25 February, 1965, <i>New York Times</i> , 7
Long, Russell B.	Rebuked Vice President	27 February, 1975, <i>New York Times</i> , 73
Long, Russell B.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	20 June, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Long, Russell B.	Heated conflict with partisan	19 January, 1966, <i>Washington Post</i> , A21
Lott, Trent	Rebuked President	11 Novemer, 1996, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Lott, Trent	Rebuked multiple colleagues	2 November, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , WK6
Lott, Trent	attempted to eliminate opposition from proceedings	8 January, 1999, <i>New York Times</i> , A15
Lott, Trent	Avenged defeat with disruptive votes	16 March, 2002, <i>New York Times</i> , A11
Lott, Trent	Rebuked opposition party	8 February, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Lowey, Nita	Rebuked opposition party	8 August, 1996, <i>New York Times</i> , B9
Lucas, Scott W.	Rebuked colleague	10 May, 1950, <i>New York Times</i> , 27
Lucas, Scott W.	Rebuked Colleague	16 December, 1943, <i>Washington Post</i> , 15
Lucas, Scott W.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	31 July, 1949, <i>Washington Post</i> , B5
Lucas, Scott W.	Rebuked Colleague	30 August, 1949, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Lugar, Richard	Rebuked colleague	9 August, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Lungren, Daniel E	Called colleague on violation of rules on floor	30 September, 1988, <i>Washington Post</i> , A25
Mack, Connie	Rebuked president	21 December, 1995, <i>Washington Post</i> , A15

Mansfield, Michael Joseph	Rebuked opposition party	2 July, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Mansfield, Michael Joseph	Rebuked Senate inefficiency	21 February, 1963, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Mansfield, Michael Joseph	Verbally battled colleague	15 May, 1964, <i>New York Times</i> 1
Mansfield, Michael Joseph	Stormed out of chamber after moving to adjour (no vote)	23 January, 1967, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Mansfield, Michael Joseph	Called amendment to avenge usurping of leadership power	12 August, 1972, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Mansfield, Michael Joseph	Rebuked colleague	28 February, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Mansfield, Michael Joseph	Heated conflict with partisan	19 January, 1966, <i>Washington Post</i> , A21
Marcantoni o, Vito Anthony	Heated exchange vs. colleague	11 June, 1945, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Markey, Edward J	Disparaged opposition Party	17 December, 1998, <i>Washington Post</i> , A37
Martin, Joseph W.	Disparaged colleague	13 August, 1957, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
McCain, John	Rebuked own party	23 May, 2004, <i>Washington Post</i> , D1
McCarran, Pat	Heated exchange vs. colleague	31 July, 1949, <i>Washington Post</i> , B5
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Rebuked colleague	22 July, 1953, <i>New York Times</i> , 6
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Vulgar statements on record	4 March, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 24
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Rebuked presidential administration	7 March, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Rebuked Colleague	12 June, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Rebuked colleague	9 November, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Refuses to apologize for uncivil acts	12 November, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Disparaged Colleague	14 November, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 44
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Accused communist sympathy	30 March, 1950, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Accused communist sympathy	2 February, 1951, <i>Washington Post</i> , 2
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Sarcastic remarks aimed at witness	23 April, 1954 <i>Washington Post</i> , 30
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Gross violation of Congressional Ethics	11 August, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
McCarthy,	Rebuked colleague	2 September, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 8

Joseph R.		
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Spoke accepting censure, rebuked communists	11 November, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 33
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Repeatedly Disparaged colleagues	17 November, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 14
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Various improprieties (litany of charges)	19 November, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 61
McCarthy, Joseph R.	Attempted to block vote on own censure	30 November, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 14
McClellan, John L.	Challenged colleague	7 March, 1958, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
McClellan, John L.	Outburst on Floor	7 April, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 9
McClellan, John L.	Rebuked colleague	18 June, 1955, <i>Washington Post</i> , 39
McCormick, John W.	Rebuked colleague	9 November, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
McCrery, Jim	Rebuked colleague	13 May, 2005, <i>New York Times</i> , A20
McDermott, Jim	Rebuked speaker	17 January, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , A22
McDermott, Jim	Released intercepted cell phone calls of rivals	14 November, 1999, <i>Washington Post</i> , Bq
McGee, Gale	Personal grudge with colleague of other house	4 December, 1973, <i>Washington Post</i> , A8
McKellar, Kenneth Douglas	Filibuster in cmte w/o being a member of same	4 March, 1947, <i>New York Times</i> , C24
McKellar, Kenneth Douglas	Prolonged attack on fitness of presidential nominee	2 November, 1947, <i>New York Times</i> , E10
McKellar, Kenneth Douglas	Disparaged Colleague	28 March, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 2
McKellar, Kenneth Douglas	Rebuked Colleague	10 March, 1938, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
McKellar, Kenneth Douglas	Disparaged Bureaucrats	2 May, 1942, <i>Washington Post</i> , 6
McKellar, Kenneth Douglas	Disparaged Bureaucrats	24 May, 1944, <i>Washington Post</i> , 8
McKellar, Kenneth Douglas	Assaulted Colleague with weapon (gavel)	27 August, 1950, <i>Washington Post</i> , B5
McMahon, Brien	Formally rebuked colleague	23 July, 1950, <i>New York Times</i> , E2
Meany, George	Challenged colleague	2 August, 1969, <i>New York Times</i> , 24
Meehan, Martin T.	Rebuked appointed special prosecutor (Ken Starr)	20 November, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A25
Metzenbaum, Howard M.	Placed holds on bills with excessive riders.	1 October, 1982, <i>New York Times</i> , A20

Metzenbaum, Howard M.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	15 July, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , A14
Mica, John	Disparaged President	25 September, 1996 <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Mica, John	Disparaged President	6 March, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Michel, Robert H.	Rebuked opposition leadership	8 March, 1985, <i>New York Times</i> , A22
Michel, Robert H.	Rebuked Opposition	16 March, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A22
Michel, Robert H.	Disparaged colleague	7 September, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , SM59
Michel, Robert H.	Rebuked colleague	16 July, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
Miller, George	Rebuked Speaker	11 January, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Mills, Wilbur	Refused to pass administration bill til demands met	4 August, 1968, <i>New York Times</i> , E14
Minton, Sherman	Rebuked multiple colleagues	7 July, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Minton, Sherman	Rebuked Journalist	5 April, 1936, <i>Washington Post</i> , B4
Minton, Sherman	Disparaged Colleague	4 May, 1938, <i>Washington Post</i> , X8
Minton, Sherman	Disparaged Colleague	8 August, 1940, <i>Washington Post</i> ,
Minton, Sherman	Disparaged Colleague	11 August, 1940, <i>Washington Post</i> , 21
Monaghan, Joseph Patrick	Challenged speaker	5 June, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 3
Mondale, Walter F.	Supported change in filibuster rules	27 February, 1975, <i>New York Times</i> , 73
Monroney, Almer Stillwell Mike	Rebuked colleague	22 July, 1953, <i>New York Times</i> , 6
Moran, Jim	Physically assaulted colleague	6 March, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , B1
Morse, Wayne	Disparages Colleague	29 May, 1957, <i>New York Times</i> , 15
Morse, Wayne	Moved to stem opposition's filibuster efforts	6 March, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
Morse, Wayne	Verbally battled colleague	16 August, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 14
Morse, Wayne	Rebuked own party	19 August, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 142
Morse, Wayne	Heated exchange vs. colleague	25 February, 1965, <i>New York Times</i> , 7
Morse, Wayne	Rebuked Colleague	25 July, 1946, <i>Washington Post</i> , 6
Morse, Wayne	Ongoing personal feud vs colleague	27 August, 1950, <i>Washington Post</i> , B5
Morton, Thurston	Ripped up colleague's motion on floor	6 March, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , E1

Moseley Braun, Carol	Accused Senate of racism for defending confederate flag	23 July, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , B6
Moynihan, Patrick	Rebuked colleague	20 January, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , A5
Moynihan, Patrick	Without proper warning, rebuked absent colleague on floor	22 January, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , A12
Moynihan, Patrick	Heated exchange vs. colleague	18 March, 1992, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
Mundt, Karl E.	Shouting match with union lawyer during hearing	7 March, 1958, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Mundt, Karl E.	Rebuked Pentagon	12 December, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Murphy, Austin J.	Allowed someone else to cast his vote, reprimanded	19 December, 1987, <i>New York Times</i> , 10
Muskie, Edmund Sixtus	Challenged colleague	17 May, 1973, <i>New York Times</i> , 35
Neely, Matthew Mansfield	Refused ceremonial courtesy of colleague	27 December, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , E9
Neely, Matthew Mansfield	Left committee meeting room in anger	17 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Nunn, Sam	Rebuked President	5 August, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A16
Nunn, Sam	Heated exchange vs. colleague	16 September, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Obey, David R.	Rebuked multiple colleagues	18 April, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A8
Obey, David R.	Rebuked colleague	12 June, 2000, <i>Washington Post</i> , A19
O'Connor, John J.	Refused to release witness to Senate	15 August, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
O'Connor, John J.	Rebuked colleague	16 April, 1936, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
O'Daniel, W. Lee	Disparaged Judicial nominee	3 March, 1943, <i>Washington Post</i> , 11
Oepel, John Henry	Disparages Colleague	30 January, 1935, <i>New York Times</i> , 5
O'Mahoney, Joseph Christopher	Rebuked colleague	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 34
O'Mahoney, Joseph Christopher	Rebuked colleague	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
O'Neill, Thomas P. Jr.	Rebuked president	16 November, 1973, <i>New York Times</i> , 85
O'Neill, Thomas P. Jr.	Rebuked colleague	19 May, 1984, <i>New York Times</i> , 7
O'Neill, Thomas P. Jr.	Rebuked opposition leadership	8 March, 1985, <i>New York Times</i> , A22

Overton, John Holmes	Disparaged party	27 January, 1946, <i>New York Times</i> , E10
Packwood, Robert	Disparaged President	19 April, 1982, <i>Washington Post</i> , A11
Packwood, Robert	Rebuked Colleague	19 April, 1982, <i>Washington Post</i> , A11
Packwood, Robert	Arrested, glib comments re:arrest afterward	25 February, 1988, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Packwood, Robert	Inappropriate interactions with female office employees	6 December, 1992, <i>Washington Post</i> , C1
Pastore, John O.	Verbally battled colleague	16 August, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 14
Pastore, John O.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	20 June, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Pastore, John O.	Fiery rhetoric at keynote address of convention (type of con unclear)	17 November, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A17
Pearson, James B.	Supported change in filibuster rules	27 February, 1975, <i>New York Times</i> , 73
Pelosi, Nancy	Rebuked opposition party	18 December, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Pelosi, Nancy	Rebuked colleague	19 July, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Pepper, Claude Denson	Rebuked colleague	6 Aug, 1938, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Pepper, Claude Denson	Rebuked multiple colleagues	6 August, 1939, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Percy, Charles H.	Rebuked colleague	5 May, 1981, <i>New York Times</i> , A2
Pittman, Key	Exploited rules to silence colleagues	11 July, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 49
Pitts, Joseph R.	rebuked president	18 December, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Plumley, Charles Albert	Rebuked Colleague	16 April, 1936, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Powell, Adam Clayton	Rebuked multiple colleagues	11 January, 1967, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Pressler, Larry	Questioned fitness of committee leadership	30 June, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A13
Proxmire, William	Embarrassed colleague in writing	14 February, 1972, <i>Washington Post</i> , D13
Rabaut, Louis C.	Manipulated rules to protest cmte denying desired debate	17 July, 1955, <i>New York Times</i> , E6
Rangel, Charles B	Rebuked opposition party	19 July, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Rankin, John Elliott	Rebuked Journalist	24 May, 1945, <i>Washington Post</i> , 6
Rayburn, Samuel Taliaferro	Rebuked multiple colleagues	6 May, 1941, <i>New York Times</i> , 5

Reece, Brazilla Carroll	Rebuked colleague	16 July, 1957, <i>Washington Post</i> , A12
Reed, Daniel A.	Refused cooperation with presidential administration.	5 July, 1953, <i>New York Times</i> , SM9
Reid, Harry	Rebuked colleague	30 November, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , WK10
Reid, Harry	Disparaged President	15 May, 2005, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Robinson, Joseph Taylor	Disparages Colleague	22 January, 1933 <i>New York Times</i> , 20
Robinson, Joseph Taylor	Exploited rules to silence colleagues	11 July, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 49
Robinson, Joseph Taylor	Rebuked Colleague	6 March, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Robinson, Joseph Taylor	Disparaged Colleague	22 May, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Rockefeller, John	Ignored opposition cries to be recognized on floor	27 February, 1975, <i>New York Times</i> , 73
Rockefeller, John	Apologized for refusing to recognize opposing speaker	24 April, 1975, <i>New York Times</i> , 73
Rohrabacher, Dana	Disparaged President	17 December, 1998, <i>Washington Post</i> , A37
Rostenkowski, Daniel	Postured for prolonged battle with partisan rival	19 January, 1989, <i>New York Times</i> , B9
Rothman, Steven R.	Rebuked opposition party	17 January, 1999, <i>New York Times</i> , NJ2
Rudman, Warren B.	Rebuked opposition	24 April, 1985, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Russel, Richard B.	Interrupted colleague on floor	2 May, 1964, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Russel, Richard B.	Decried lack of comity on floor	19 January, 1968, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Russel, Richard B.	Rebuked colleague	28 November, 1963, <i>Washington Post</i> , A6
Russel, Richard B.	Rebuked colleague	15 July, 1966, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Russell, Richard Brevard Jr.	Angrily refuted colleagues	15 August, 1959, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Sabath, Adolph J	Physically battled colleague on floor	26 June, 1949, <i>New York Times</i> , E1
Santorum, Richard	Rebuked president	21 December, 1995, <i>Washington Post</i> , A15
Saxbe, William B.	Disparaged colleague	16 January, 1971, <i>New York Times</i> , 18
Schroeder, Patricia	Disparaged Senate as an institution	14 July, 1993, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Schumer, Charles E.	Rebuked colleague	22 October, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , B1
Schumer, Charles E.	Rebuked opposition party	25 June, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A21

Schwellenbach, Lewis	Rebuked Journalist	5 April, 1936, <i>Washington Post</i> , B4
Scott, Hugh	Rebuked colleague	24 March, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Simpson, Alan K.	Rebuked colleague	24 December, 1982, <i>New York Times</i> , A12
Simpson, Alan K.	Rebuked multiple colleagues	12 July, 1991, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Simpson, Alan K.	Regularly defied norms of freshman deference to superiors	22 January, 1980, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Simpson, Alan K.	Rebuked opposition party	16 September, 1987, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Simpson, Alan K.	Rebuked opposition VP nominee	5 October, 1992, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Smathers, George A.	Rebuked colleague	12 January, 1960, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Smathers, George A.	Heated exchange vs. colleague	20 June, 1964, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Smith, Robert C	Accused bureaucrats of cover-up conspiracy	8 September, 1993, <i>New York Times</i> , A16
Snell, Bertrand Hollis	Rebuked colleague	16 April, 1936, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Snyder, Gene	Held rival's issues hostage as revenge for vote	13 May, 1990, <i>New York Times</i> , SM34
Sparkman, John J.	Disparaged Colleague	29 July, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 55
Specter, Arlen	Rebuked opposition party	1 October, 1994, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Stark, Pete	Exchanged obscenities in committee meeting	24 July, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , A15
Steed, Tom	Threatened blackmail to protect franking privilege	28 November, 1963, <i>Washington Post</i> , A6
Stennis, John C.	Denied request to delay vote, manipulating turnout	2 October, 1971, <i>New York Times</i> , 11
Stevens, Ted	Threatened to campaign against colleague	1 October, 1982, <i>New York Times</i> , A20
Stevens, Ted	Disparaged colleague	2 December, 1982, <i>Washington Post</i> , C5
Stevenson, Adlai E.	Advocated minority policy in foreign press	24 May, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Studds, Gerry E.	Sexual affair with underaged page	21 July, 1983, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Sweeney, Martin Leonard	Rebuked colleague	8 March, 1935, <i>Washington Post</i> , 2
Taft, Robert Alphonso	Disputed colleague on floor	14 January, 1951, <i>New York Times</i> , E3
Thomas, William	Called police to break up opposition meeting	19 July, 2003, <i>New York Times</i> , C1
Thomas, William	Called police to break up opposition meeting	19 July, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Thomas, William	Called police to break up opposition meeting	24 July, 2003, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1



Thompson, Fred R	Rebuked colleague	25 June, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Thompson, Fred R	Rebuked President	8 October, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A1
Thurmond, Strom	Challenged colleague	17 May, 1973, <i>New York Times</i> , 35
Thurmond, Strom	Manipulated rules to bar door and seal records for floor debate	13 April, 1963, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Thurmond, Strom	Disparaged colleague	13 September, 1980, <i>Washington Post</i> , A8
Tower, John	Wrote letter demanding co-chairmanship of committee	29 September, 1981, <i>New York Times</i> , A14
Trible, Paul S. Jr.	Rebuked opposition	27 October, 1987, <i>New York Times</i> , A32
Tunnel, James Miller	Rebuked multiple colleagues	21 November, 1945, <i>New York Times</i> , 3
Tunnel, James Miller	Rebuked colleague	13 July, 1946, <i>New York Times</i> , 3
Tydings, Millard E.	Formally rebuked colleague	23 July, 1950, <i>New York Times</i> , E2
Utt, James B.	Scheduled floor time to air grievances vs. president	10 April, 1962, <i>New York Times</i> , 26
Vandenberg, Arthur Hendrick	Rebuked colleague	4 March, 1947, <i>New York Times</i> , C24
Walker, Robert S	Disparaged opposition party without warning	20 May, 1984, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Walter, Robert	Litany of disruptive/mildly uncivil activities	7 September, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , SM59
Warner, John	Rebuked Secretary of State	12 May, 2004, <i>New York Times</i> , 14
Waters, Maxine	rebuked colleague	18 December, 1998, <i>New York Times</i> , A1
Watkins, Arthur Vivian	Challenged colleague	9 November, 1954, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Watkins, Arthur Vivian	Demanded censure of colleague	17 November, 1954, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Watson, Albert W.	Rebuked colleague	7 September, 1969, <i>New York Times</i> , 51
Watt, Melvin D.	Disparaged independent prosecutor's investigation	20 November, 1998, <i>Washington Post</i> , A31
Waxman, Henry	Rebuked opposition party	25 June, 1997, <i>Washington Post</i> , A4
Weber, Vin	Rebuked Speaker	16 March, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A22
Weicker, Lowell	Rebuked Colleague	26 June, 1979, <i>Washington Post</i> , A3
Wellstone, Paul	Demanded colleagues to take positions immediately	8 January, 1997, <i>New York Times</i> , B8
Wheeler, Burton	Rebuked colleague	22 Aug, 1937, <i>New York Times</i> , 1

Kendall		
Wheeler, Burton Kendall	Rebuked colleague	12 June, 1934, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Wheeler, Burton Kendall	Rebuked colleague	28 October, 1939, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Wherry, Kenneth S.	Rebuked colleague	30 August, 1949, <i>Washington Post</i> , 1
Wherry, Kenneth S.	Ongoing personal feud vs colleague	27 August, 1950, <i>Washington Post</i> , B5
Wherry, Kenneth S.	Rebuked Colleague	24 June, 1951, <i>Washington Post</i> , B3
Wiley, Alexander	Extended uncivil exchange with colleague	18 April, 1944, <i>New York Times</i> , 13
Wiley, Alexander	Rebuked opposition party	2 July, 1960, <i>New York Times</i> , 1
Williams, John J.	Rebuked colleague	13 May, 1958, <i>Washington Post</i> , A2
Williams, Pat	Rebuked party vice presidential nominee	30 September, 1988, <i>Washington Post</i> , A25
Wirth, Timothy	Rebuked colleague	28 January, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , B3
Wright, Jim	Rebuked colleague	27 May, 1988, <i>New York Times</i> , A13
Wright, Jim	Postured for prolonged battle with partisan rival	19 January, 1989, <i>New York Times</i> , B9
Wright, Jim	Disparaged colleague	7 September, 1986, <i>Washington Post</i> , SM59
Zioncheck, Marion Anthony	physically battled police over traffic ticket	24 April, 1936, <i>New York Times</i> , 23
Zorinsky, Edward	Rebuked Secretary of State	8 March, 1984, <i>New York Times</i> , A11

## **APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK**

Name – the name of either the implicated legislator or a control group member

Margin – The margin of victory for the individual in his/her most recent election, computed as  $100 * (x - y) / (x + y)$ , where x is the individual's votes in previous election and y are the votes of the number two vote-getter. Multiplication by 100 gives us a more intuitive number, as this figure will be used in regression analysis and a predicted probability. Put another way, this measures the percentage of the electorate that voted for the delegate above and beyond the number that voted for his or her chief opponent. For Steven Young (74<sup>th</sup> Congress, R-OH), difference between himself and third vote-getter was used (at large, two appointments at stake). Members with no opponent listed will be coded 100, as they are among the safest members of Congress. Those members whose only opponent is "write-in", "scatter," or "scatter or blank" will be coded 100, as they are essentially unopposed.

Carl Curtis (R-NE) uses his score for the 1954 election, though he appears as a control for 1953, as he won his seat in the '54 election and was appointed to the remainder of the term of his predecessor. As he was never implicated in an act of incivility, before or after that election, it is appropriate to use that score as a surrogate, as he was acting with knowledge of the outcome of that election, and did not serve before that election took place.

Paper – the paper in which the mention occurred. "1" = *New York Times* and "2" = the *Washington Post*

Mentions – the variable equals the number of times someone was implicated in an article. For control group members this will always equal "0"

Year – the year the article was published

Day – the day the article was published

Month – the month the article was published

Birth year – the year the legislator was born

Birth day – the day the legislator was born

Birth month – the month the legislator was born

Tenure Year – the year the legislator was first sworn-in the first time

Tenure Day – the day the legislator was first sworn-in the first time

Tenure Month – the month the legislator was first sworn-in the first time

Age in Days – the age in days between their birth and the date of implication. The following website is used to calculate days:  
<http://www.calendarhome.com/cgi-bin/date2.pl?month1=4&date1=3&year1=1933&wd=Monday&month2=2&date2=8&year2=1933&wd2=Wednesday>

Age in Years – age in days/365.25

Tenure in Days – the number of days of experience in days from when the legislator was first sworn-in and the date they were implicated

Tenure in Years – tenure in days/365.25

Lawyer – scored “1” if the member passed the bar and “0” if not

Real Lawyer – scored “1” if the individual served for 5 or more years as a lawyer or judge and “0” if not. In the case of lawyers who became judges or state attorneys (district attorneys, etc), the time spent as a lawyer and time spent in public office will be combined, as both roles grant the exposure to decorum that this research is attempting to measure.

Military – scored “1” if they served in the military and “0” otherwise

Military leadership – scored “1” if they reached the rank of lieutenant or its equivalent (any officer rank) and “0” other wise.

South – If the legislator was from one of the states of the old confederacy the variable is scored “1” and “0” otherwise.

Party – This research will use the party affiliation on the date of implication (for those cases where a legislator switched parties). Members of the GOP are scored “1” and members of the Democratic Party are scored “0.” Third party members were originally scored “99.” However, third-Party members were eventually included in the parties with which they caucus.

State Legislature – scored “1” if he or she served as legislator in a state Congress and “0” if not.

State Legislative Leadership – scored “1” if they served in a leadership position in a state Congress and “0” if not.

State Legislative Years – the years of experience in a state congress; this variable equals “0” if they had no state legislative experience

Political Family Membership – scored “1” if the Biographical Directory of the US Congress mentions some family involvement in politics and “0” otherwise.

DW-Nominate Score – The legislator’s own personal DW-Nominate score for the Congress in which the member was implicated. For those with missing values: Thomas O’Niell’s (D-Mass) scores were missing because as speaker, one does not vote often enough to develop a score. Score from the 94<sup>th</sup> Congress is used for cases with missing values. (-.445)  
James Wright’s (D-TX) value from the 99<sup>th</sup> Congress is used for missing values. (-.444)  
Vice President George H.W. Bush’s missing value (1987) is replaced with his presidential score from 1989 (101<sup>st</sup> Congress). (.64)  
Robert Dornan (R-Cali) was removed from the sample in years that he was implicated in acts of incivility but was not serving in an official capacity (1997).  
Marilyn Bouquard is in the DW-Nominate database under her married name, Marilyn Lloyd (3<sup>rd</sup> Dist, TN-R), DW-Nominate Score is -.045 in 1990.  
Frank Tejada (D-TX) uses score from 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, as there was no score for 105<sup>th</sup>.  
Virgil Chapman (D-KY) uses score from 81<sup>st</sup> Congress, as he passed away during the 82<sup>nd</sup> and has no score for that session.  
Jennings Randolph (D-WV) uses his score from the 86<sup>th</sup> Congress, as he served only part of the 85<sup>th</sup> Congress, and has no score for that session.

Party Score – the median DW-Nominate score for the party that the member belongs to

Ideology 1 – the absolute value of the difference in the member’s DW-Nominate score and the Party Score for the same Congress

Chamber Score – the Median DW-Nominate score for the chamber for the Congress in question

Ideology 2 – the absolute value of the difference between the member’s DW-Nominate Score and the chamber median score for the same Congress

Ideology 3 - percent of the party caucus that has ideology scores more liberal for Republicans and conservative for Democrats than the person in question. We use the DW-Nominate score of the person during the year they are implicated or for control the year that their “partner” was implicated. For example, if a Republican has a DW-Nominate score of .99, if this is the most conservative Republican in this caucus, and 100% of the caucus is more liberal. Conversely, if the Republican has a DW-Nominate score of -.35, the member will likely be the most liberal in his party, and have a score of 0. A high value on this variable suggests that the person is an ideologue. A low score suggests that he or she is generally moderate or (in extreme cases) may be caucusing with the opposition. Hence, one should expect a positive association with the likelihood of being implicated in an uncivil act. That is, if we can assume that ideologues are more likely to be implicated. Some theories suggest that uncivil behavior is not analogous to ideological extremism. Values are rounded to the third decimal place. For example, 0.4345 becomes 0.435, but 0.4344 is 0.434. If the ten-thousandths place is 5 or greater, the thousandths place will increase by 1. Exceptionally small values are reported at

whatever length necessary to give a significant value, defined as one non-zero digit plus one additional place, rounded according to the above rule.

Leadership – Those serving as Speaker of House, Majority or Minority Leader or Whip, or President Pro Tem of the Senate will be coded “1”, all others coded “0”

Chamber – Senators are coded “1”, all others “0”. In the case of a member who moved from one chamber to the other (usually House to Senate), the position held on the day in question will be used for this variable. Members who were not Senators (delegates from territories, for example) are also coded “0”. A Vice President implicated in an uncivil act will be coded “1”, as the Vice President is the tiebreaking vote and presiding officer of the Senate. No sitting Vice President was selected as part of the control group.

# NOTES

---

## Chapter 1

<sup>1</sup> The poll finds very low approval ratings for the president, vice-president, Congress as a whole, and several prominent individual members of Congress. These findings are indicative of those represented elsewhere in the popular media, and this article is included here as an example, rather than an exhaustive list of findings. “President, Vice President, and Congress Continue to Have Very Low Approval Ratings.” February 14, 2008. [http://money.aol.com/news/articles/\\_a/president-vice-president-and-congress/n20080214050209990014](http://money.aol.com/news/articles/_a/president-vice-president-and-congress/n20080214050209990014) (February 25, 2008).

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix A. Any entry for which the description reads “disparaged colleague” describes general demeaning statements about a fellow member of Congress that are of a personal nature. Those reading “rebuked colleague” refer to statements that become personal and vicious in nature, but are born of a policy debate. When there was any question as to which term was appropriate, the transgression was considered a rebuke, giving the individual the benefit of the doubt. While the latter are notably more common, the former are certainly plentiful. The threat to the well-being of the president and vice-president was a comment by Jesse Helms, one of the more colorful members of the Senate where incivility is concerned. See 23 October, 1995, *New York Times*, A12

<sup>3</sup>Schraufnagel (2006) draws a distinction between partisan difference and personal conflict. The former refers to ideologically-founded disagreement. The latter, simply referred to as incivility, is the sort of name-calling and grandstanding that one might typically imagine when one hears the term “congressional incivility.” Appendix A includes copious examples of incivility.

## Chapter 2

### Defining Incivility

<sup>4</sup> A hold is the refusal of unanimous consent in the consideration of a bill. This maneuver is unique to the Senate. This is often tantamount, at least strategically, to a filibuster, and those threatening holds rarely have to follow through with an actual objection to unanimous consent (Evans and Lipinski 2005).

### Recruitment

<sup>5</sup> Key’s Law (1947) states that stronger candidates will run if the party is strong.

<sup>6</sup>As noted later, state legislatures are a primary source of candidates for US Congressional elections. As such, any effect present in state legislatures will tend to affect the talent pool from which candidates are drawn

<sup>7</sup> One may note that even the framing of our Constitution was the product of a meeting of lawyers and other elites. While no normative opinion is to be inferred from anything in this writing, changes in this status quo are at best highly unlikely, and the static nature of this set of potential variables will be postulated throughout this piece.

<sup>8</sup>Herrnson (1989) defines strong candidates as those that not only make it through primaries, but win general elections as well. This definition is appropriate here as it is in keeping with the goals of a political party.



---

<sup>9</sup>Inferences should not be drawn from this finding, as it suffers from selection on the dependent variable. The reference is included here only to show that many successful candidates are actively recruited by their parties. No data was available in the piece cited (Kazee and Thornberry 1990) concerning strong candidates who failed to win an office.

### **Factors Affecting Incivility**

<sup>10</sup> Reed's (1993) work is one of many, and is included here as a single example

<sup>11</sup> These works refer to a member of Congress's actions, in general. The statements therein should generally be valid for inferences concerning congressional civility, assuming a reasonably attentive public. Mayhew (1973) notes that most members of Congress imagine that the public is more attentive than it actually is, so this inference has at least reasonable face validity.

<sup>12</sup> Again, the practice of placing "holds" on legislation in the Senate is an exception to this statement.

### **Chapter 3**

<sup>13</sup> A complete list of implicated members can be found in Appendix A. This yielded a raw total of 524 implications.

<sup>14</sup> Bob Dole is 2<sup>nd</sup> with 13, and Joseph McCarthy leads the pack with 16. Similar comparisons could be made between Dole and McCarthy, but Helms and Long having exactly the same count of mentions strengthens the example.

<sup>15</sup> Helms switched parties early in his career, prior to his election to Congress, because of the ideological difference between himself and the Democratic Party. Huey Long did not

### **Dependent Variable and Sample Considerations**

<sup>16</sup> The textbook example of this violation is a Poisson used to predict the number of cigarettes an individual will smoke in a given day. This will not work if the group contains non-smokers. The control group is, in essence, analogous.

### **Control Group**

<sup>17</sup> These numbers were provided by a layperson with no knowledge of their intended use.

<sup>18</sup> By default, STATA excludes casewise, removing cases with the non-modal value in this situation. This means that if the sample includes no civil members of leadership, then the cases of uncivil leaders are removed from the analysis. The other option, listwise exclusion, would remove the variable entirely. It seems likely that the impact of either of these approaches would impact the results more than the replacement of a handful of control cases.

### **Variables and Hypotheses**

<sup>19</sup> E.G., "rebuked colleague", "interrupted floor speech", etc.

<sup>20</sup> <http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp>

<sup>21</sup> Time between dates, measured in days, was taken from <http://www.calendarhome.com/date.shtml> and divided by 365 to get the final figure in years.

---

<sup>22</sup>Schraufnagel (2006) finds that the ideological distance between the president and the opposition party impacts the length of time it takes to reach a decision on judicial nominees. Schraufnagel also states, in his conclusion that ideological conflict can certainly contribute to incivility.

<sup>23</sup>Scores range from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative), and tend to follow a bimodal distribution along party lines. Scores can be found at <http://polisci.ucsd.edu/faculty/poole.htm>.

### **Representativeness of the Sample**

<sup>24</sup><http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22007.pdf>

### **Chapter 4**

<sup>25</sup>See Chapter 3 for a complete explanation of these terms, their meanings, and the implications therein

<sup>26</sup>Schraufnagel (2006) points to the distance between the opposing party and the president as a predictor of the time spent debating a judicial nominee. Uslaner acknowledges that in some situations, ideological difference can lead to a lack of comity. In all fairness, neither piece suggests that ideology is the end-all-be-all on this issue, and these findings agree.

### **Logistic Regression and Analysis**

<sup>27</sup>While the classic Downsian argument for centrist candidates is certainly strengthened by these findings, Downs argues from the point of view of a candidate, not necessarily the party. The parties do not have the luxury of creating the ideal candidate, but rather must in practice choose between those who make themselves available.

---

## REFERENCES

- Ansolabehere, Stephen, David Brady, and Morris Fiorina. 1992. "The Vanishing Marginals and Electoral Responsiveness." *British Journal of Political Science* 22: 21-38.
- AOL News. 2008. "President, Vice President, and Congress Continue to Have Very Low Approval Ratings." February 14, 2008.  
[http://money.aol.com/news/articles/\\_a/president-vice-president-and-congress/n20080214050209990014](http://money.aol.com/news/articles/_a/president-vice-president-and-congress/n20080214050209990014). (February 25, 2008).
- Arnold, Laura W. 2001. "The Distribution of Senate Committee Positions: Change or More of the Same?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26: 227-248.
- Asher, Herbert, B. 1973. "The Learning of Legislative Norms." In *Classics in Congressional Politics*, eds. Herbert F. Weisberg, Eric S. Heberlig, and Lisa M. Campoli. New York: Longman Press.
- Berkman, Michael B. 1993. "Former State Legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives: Institutional and Policy Mastery." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 18: 77-104.
- Bianco, William T. 1984. "Strategic Decisions on Candidacy in U.S. Congressional Districts." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 9: 351-364.
- Binder, Sarah. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press.
- Black, Earl and Merle Black. 2002. *The Rise of the Southern Republicans*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Press.

- 
- Bond, Jon R., Richard Fleisher, Jeffery C. Talbert. 1997. "Partisan Differences in Candidate Quality in Open Seat House Races, 1976-1994." *Political Research Quarterly* 50: 281-299.
- Cook, Timothy E. "House Members as Newsmakers: The Effects of Televising Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11: 203-226
- Engstrom, Richard L., Patrick F. O'Connor. 1980. "Lawyer-Legislators and Support for State Legislative Reform." *Journal of Politics* 42: 267-276
- Evans, C. Lawrence and Daniel Lipinski. 2005. *Obstruction and Leadership in the U.S. Senate*. In *Congress Reconsidered*, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, D.C. CQ Press.
- Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1977. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *American Political Science Review* 71: 883-917.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1994. "Divided Government in the American States: Biproduct of Legislative Professionalism." *American Political Science Review* 88: 304-316
- Fiorina, Morris. 1989. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London: Yale University Press.
- Fowler, Linda L. 1996. "Who Runs for Congress?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 29: 430-434.
- Herrnson, Paul S. 1986. "Do Parties Make a Difference? The Role of Party Organizations in Congressional Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 48: 389-415.
- Herrnson, Paul S. 1989. "National Party Decision Making, Strategies, and Resource Distribution in Congressional Elections." *The Western Political Quarterly* 42: 301-323.

- 
- Herrnson, Paul S. 1994. "Congress's Other Farm Team: Congressional Staff." *Polity* 27: 137-156.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *Solder and the State: The Theory of Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press.
- Ishiyama, John. 2000. "Candidate Recruitment, Party Organisation and the Communist Successor Parties: The Cases of the MSzP, the KPRF, and the LDDP." *Europe-Asia Studies* 52: 875-896.
- Kazee, Thomas A. 1983. "The Deterrent Effect of Incumbency on Recruiting Challengers in U.S. House Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 8: 469-480.
- Kazee, Thomas A. and Mary C. Thornberry. 1990. "Where's the Party? Congressional Candidate Recruitment and American Party Organizations." *The Western Political Quarterly* 43: 61-80.
- Key, V.O., 1947. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press.
- Kim, Chong Lim. 1974. "Attitudinal Effects of Legislative Recruitment: The Case of Japanese Assemblymen." *Comparative Politics* 7: 109-126.
- Kunkel, Joseph A. III. 1988. "Party Endorsement and Incumbency in Minnesota Legislative Nominations." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13: 211-223.
- Lublin, David. 2004. *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Maisel, Sandy L. and Walter J. Stone. 1997. "Determinants of Candidate Emergence in U.S. House Elections: An Exploratory Study." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22: 79-96.

- 
- Matthews, Donald R. 1960. "The Folkways of the Senate". In *Classics in Congressional Politics*, eds. Herbert F. Weisberg, Eric S. Heberlig, and Lisa M. Campoli. New York: Longman Press. Pp. 207-25.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Moncrief, Gary F. 1999. "Recruitment and Retention in U.S. Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24: 173-208.
- Reed, John Shelton. 1993. *My Tears Spoiled my Aim and Other Reflections on Southern Culture*. Sea Harbor, Florida. Harvest Books and University of Missouri.
- Reichley, A. James. 2000. *The Life of the Parties*. Lanham, Maryland. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Schickler, Eric and Kathryn Pearson. 2005. "The House Leadership in an Era of Partisan Warfare". In *Classics in Congressional Politics*, eds. Herbert F. Weisberg, Eric S. Heberlig, and Lisa M. Campoli. New York: Longman Press.
- Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1957. "Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 1: 26-39.
- Schraufnagel, Scot D. 2006. "Testing the Implications of Incivility in the United States Congress, 1977-2000: The Case of Judicial Confirmation Delay." *Legislative Studies* 11: 216-34.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 2005. "The New World of U.S. Senators". In *Classics in Congressional Politics*, eds. Herbert F. Weisberg, Eric S. Heberlig, and Lisa M. Campoli. New York: Longman Press.

---

Stone, Walter J., Sandy Maisel, Cherie D. Maestas. 2004. "Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politician Model of Incumbent Deterrence." *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 479-495.

Uslaner, Eric M. 1993. *The Decline of Comity in Congress*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Wilcox, Clyde. 1987. "The Timing of Strategic Decisions: Candidacy Decisions in 1982 and 1984." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 12: 565-572.