

A REALIST INTERPRETATION OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

by

XIANSHENG ZHANG

MA University of International Relations, Beijing, China, 1996

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Science
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2010

Major Professor: Waltraud Morales

©2010 Xiansheng Zhang

ABSTRACT

Realism theory provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war and the rise and fall of great powers. It expounds the important concepts and themes like national sovereignty, security, survival, interests, balance of power, balance of terror, alliance, dominance, hegemony and polarity. Realism can be classified as classical realism, structural realism and neoclassical realism. In recent years, liberalism, globalism and constructivism also have greatly influenced academics and policy-makers under the new phenomena of globalization and terrorism.

This paper explores how classical realism theory has been applied to and revealed in the issue of American policy towards China. The past years of U.S. relations with China have been marked by many wars and diplomatic issues that bear important messages for contemporary policy-makers. Based upon the most representative incidents in the chronicles, this paper categorizes American relations with China into three periods: period one, from commercialism in 1784 to imperialism in 1899; period two, from dominance in 1900 to confrontation in 1949; Period three, from enemies in 1950 to competitors in 2009. From a brief retrospective of major events that occurred, it is concluded that most incidents are related to national interest and power issues, while only several cases are about ideological disputes.

The emergence of China as an economic power within the last few years will shape the world as much as the United States in the late 19th century. As America is the world's greatest power and China is the world's greatest emerging power, the relationship between these two

countries will largely determine the history of the twenty-first century. History teaches that such power transitions are inherently fraught with dangers and opportunities. Thus, it would serve the interests of the United States to rethink its relationship with China and make its policies more global and focused on the long term. No matter what happens in China, American policy towards that country should be guided by a clear and firm sense of American national interests.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My deepest debt of gratitude goes to Dr. Waltraud Morales, Dr. Robert Bledsoe and Dr. Quan Li for their well-prepared classes and the insightful illustrations for lectures on international relations theories, American foreign policies and quantitative methods in political research. I thank them for their time, patience, guidance and suggestions to modify and improve this paper. This thesis couldn't come into being without their ideas about the hypotheses, central arguments, concepts, methodology and the reorganization. Their invaluable comments have improved the paper immeasurably. Hopefully this paper reflects the level of advising received from these faculty members.

I also express my thanks for the information and help from other members of the Department, especially Dr. Jonathan Knuckey and Nicole Jobson. Thanks to UCF Library, the UCF Office of Instructional Resource, and the UCF Writing Center as well. Thanks to all the professors, teachers, and faculty members who helped me in my past two years of study and experience at UCF.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	vii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Research Questions.....	11
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	13
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY	33
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES	38
CHAPTER FIVE: FROM COMMERCIALISM TO IMPERIALISM.....	44
(1784-1899).....	44
CHAPTER SIX: BALANCE OF POWER TO CONFRONTATION	59
(1900-1949).....	59
CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM ENEMIES TO COMPETITORS.....	78
(1950-2009).....	78
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS	93
REFERENCES	104

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Total Investments in China of the Principal Countries in 1902, 1914 and 1931	62
Table 2 American Exports to China and Japan, 1932-1940	71
Table 3. Projections of GDP, 2005-30 Projections of Defense, 2003-30	92

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

When I took classes of international relations theories and international relations history, I was always deeply impressed and intrigued with the insightful and impregnable analysis and arguments of classical realism about human nature, self-interest, survival motivation, self-help anarchy, national interest, power struggle and balance of power. Plus, I was also very interested in the intercourse and exchange between the United States and China, in which there were so many fascinating stories and episodes. These events include the early American commercial adventures in the remote Chinese Empire; the first treaty between the two countries after China's defeat by Britain in the Opium War; the "Open Door" policy to the Big Powers when America became dominant in the Far East; the sympathy and neutrality when China was afflicted by Japanese encroachment; the mediation and hesitation during the upheavals of Chinese Civil War and communist came to power; the animosity between America and China after the Korean War; the "ice breaking" of the visit by Kissinger and Nixon to Beijing; the tragedy in Tiananmen Square and the issue of human rights; the missile tests and the crisis over the Taiwan Strait; and the emergence of China as a global power.

I was inspired by the idea that I can apply a realist interpretation to U.S. relations with China. Specifically, I was intrigued by how U.S. relations with China can explain and justify the arguments and principles of classical realism theory and how the practices and realities of American foreign policy towards China test and vindicate the credo formulated by the ageless wisdom of classical realism. History serves as a rich data base for constructing theories about how the world operates. Past U.S. relations with China can also reflect and reveal how America

and China acted and reacted, by what principles the American policy-makers were motivated intrinsically and how American foreign policies were interpreted properly.

This paper focuses on the key concepts of national interest and power (national strength) of classical realism theory. From U.S. relations with China, this paper mainly analyzes from the American perspective. For the majority of the past two hundred and twenty five years of U.S.-China relations, America has been in a superior position that enabled it to enjoy more power and influence. American foreign policies were therefore more offensive; in contrast, China was relatively weak in power and defensive in policy.

When I emphasize the vindication of classical realism theory, I don't deny the noble and moral theme of liberalism theory and its claim on the function and impact of law and institution. Yet morality itself is a kind of representation of power and morality sometimes is swallowed up by self-interest as rivers are lost in the sea. I agree with globalism on the issues of market, colony and imperial scrambles for their own gains. However, globalism is limited by time and scope in international relations research as a whole. Similarly, social constructivism serves as a very good approach to analyze interest and identity. However, constructivism is primarily a kind of methodology, less useful for the exploration of international relations. The reason I choose classical realism as the interpretation of U.S. relations with China is that I believe national interest and power represent the ultimate motivations and goals of American foreign policy towards China.

This thesis covers the extensive and broad historical sweep of U.S. relations with China and does not focus on one issue or one period in order to avoid viewing events in isolation or losing the overall context and background. This discussion and conclusion from the

brief description and narrative of the history of U.S.-China relations doesn't intend to discover and sum up the entire foreign policy-making processes of every American administration; it is based on inductive reasoning drawn from the major U.S.-China incidents and bilateral foreign policies to explain and validate the explanatory insight and persuasiveness of classical realism theory.

Very few works apply international relations theories to American foreign policy towards China and the numerous books that do address U.S.-China relations rarely correlate them to international relations theories. This analysis will combine international relations theories, especially classical realism theory, with American foreign policies towards China to demonstrate how classical realism theory stands out whenever the spectrum of U.S. relations with China vacillates from trade priority. "Jackal diplomacy", "Open Door" policy, sympathy and neutrality, hostility, to conciliatory and adversarial perspectives are some of the characteristics of American policies towards China. Hopefully this work will demonstrate to the reader the mutually paramount role of national interest in U.S. relations with China.

National Interest

This paper is an interpretation of the realistic perspective about U.S. relations with China. The central concepts of classical realism theory are national interest and power. National interest is like the common currency of international relations and has to be universally applicable to all states, whatever their form of social organization. If national interests were to vary among nations, then they would no longer speak the same language about these interests.

National interest is the most comprehensive description of the complex study of foreign policy. It is a very attractive and intellectually sturdy term yet, in practice, it is also an

exceptionally unclear concept and proves difficult to define. We can simplify and modify the concept by breaking it up into elements and components until it becomes manageable. The imprecision and ambiguity of the concept of national interest suffers from too many meanings instead of no meaning. It assumes a variety of meanings in the various contexts in which it is used.

National interest usually refers to foreign policy, but it is also applied to domestic politics. When referring to the domestic sphere, we often employ alternative terms, such as “public” or “general” interest, etc. National interest consists of two parts—national and interest. National refers both to the nation as a social group and to the state as a political organization. According to Joseph Frankel, as a social group, “the definition of national interest further depends upon the position a person takes up between several pairs of extremes, such as altruistic-egoistic (ideals v. self-interest, idealists v. realists), short-and long-term concerns, activist-reactive, radical-conservative, hard-and tender-minded, traditional-innovating, collectivist- individualists, etc.” (1) And as a political organization, a nation has no feelings but only interests. David Clinton argues that “nations as well as individuals, act for their own benefit, and not for the benefit of others, unless both interests happen to be assimilated.” (2)

Interest is an organizing concept and the governing principle for the understanding of international relations. It can be retrieved to the early civilizations, it is deeply rooted in the human society, and it dominates all human activities. The doctrine of the national interest draws on a particular view of human nature and emphasizes man’s radical and ever-present drive or lust for self-interest. Joseph Frankel categorizes national interest into vital interest, the spatial dimension of national interest, and the time dimension of national interest. He argues

the vital interest is “that the state is unwilling to make concessions on it and that it prepared, if necessary, to go to war over it.” (3) The adjective “vital” has an emotional appeal and, as it lacks clear legal or political definition, it is open to abuse in political argument. The spatial dimension of national interest means the territory, which is of paramount importance since it guarantees in legal theory that the state enjoys complete sovereign authority and no other state is entitled to trespass across them. As in U.S. relations with China, the issue of Taiwan remains a flash point, for both countries agree Taiwan is part of China. Yet America has a Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), with commitments to provide safety for Taiwan’s political, economic system and life style. The time dimension of national interest is involved in dealing with current problems, or with plans for the future, or with the evaluation of the past.

Charles A. Beard gives the overall scope about the contents of national interest in his book *The Idea of National Interest*. (4) From his review over the pivots of American diplomacy since her independence, he lists the Constitution as a conception of national interest, national interest in territorial expansion, national interest in commercial expansion, foreign implications of domestic affairs, moral obligations in national interest, interpretation, advancement, and enforcement of national interest. National interest is classified by Joseph Frankel into four categories: aspirational national interest, operational national interest, explanatory national interest and polemical national interest. (5) W. David Clinton concludes four charges of national interest in his book *The Two Faces of National Interest*: the undemocratic national interest, the irrational national interest, the obsolescent national interest, and exclusive national interest. (6)

Charles A. Beard agrees national interest includes moral obligations, so political

affiliation, value orientation, ideology and institution all have inherent impact to the identification of national interest. Though some vital parts of interest and the methods to secure are impervious to ideological and institutional changes, the permanence of national interest is sometimes relative, and subject to reinterpretation, especially in the light of changing world politics. Nevertheless, these ambiguities in defining the national interest do not necessarily invalidate national interest as the central concept, just as the alleged vagueness of natural law does not refute its existence. (7)

The concept of national interest can perform three basic functions. First, national interest can guide people's attention to foreign policy. The invocation of national interest won't necessarily result in unanimity regarding the proper diplomatic, military, and other steps a government should take abroad. Second, national interest can provide a justification for leadership. Third, national interest can serve as a tool in the formulation, execution and analysis of foreign policy.

Power

As Morgenthau argues, "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power." (8) Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man, nation over nation, and it covers all social relations which serve that end, from physical forms to psychological ties. As political policies in domestics, foreign policies in world affairs seeks either to keep power, which is a policy of the status quo; to increase power, prone to be imperialism; or to demonstrate power, a policy of prestige.

The inevitability and centrality of power politics comes also from human nature, as

Morgenthau points out, “there is no social action which would not contain at least a trace of this desire to make one’s own person prevail against others. It is this ubiquity of the desire for power which, besides and beyond any particular selfishness or other evilness of purpose, constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action” (9)

When in daily conversation or academic convention, we refer to states as big powers or small powers, which demonstrate the importance of the possession of power. Some states have great power and others have much less, there will always be the danger that the difference in power opens the possibility for profitable aggression. The distribution of different powers largely determines the pattern and structure of international relations, and the relations between states have long been called “power politics”, for power and use of force has never been excluded.

If power politics is regarded as a game, the power itself is solely a scoring device. The great wealth, great population, great strength and large territory all relatively increase the overall power of a nation. When talking about why some nations are strong and others weak, Harold & Margaret Sprout mention some criteria, among which the first is the standing armaments that each nation maintains ready for action in time of peace. In some cases, the peace time military forces give a fair indication of a nation’s total strength and its relative position. Related with military power and war, what count heavily are the countries with large area and consequent depth for retreat if necessary, for the space of territory can also turn into military power.

Population is always a logical starting point when making an overall estimate of the position for a nation in the world. Without people there would be no power or politics. The

number of the people, the age, health, education and other qualities do affect a country's position. Yet population itself does not spell power; for example, China had over four hundred million people from 1840 to 1945, yet China was very weak.

Economic resources are important. Without food, people starve; without raw materials, people cannot build or produce. Furthermore, tools, skills, organization and technology are required to transmute the essential materials into political power and influence. Economic development is a factor of greater importance. Advanced and efficient methods of production, adequate and smoothly transportation system, scientific research and development all play vital roles in determining a country's status in the world.

Harold & Margaret Sprout also emphasize the roles of soft power. "Organization consists of regulations and other means for securing cooperative disciplined work toward a desired end" (10) Moral qualities, moral stamina of the people, their unity, discipline, confidence in government, and ideology are of equal importance to the national strength as the physical forms. When nations are in pursuit of power, the factor of ideologies necessarily involves the contest for power psychologically and morally, which is acceptable, although the use of ideologies is always regarded as a disguise of one's immediate goal. The immediate goal is power, and national power is power over the minds and actions of other nations.

According to E. H. Carr, politics is always power politics, and power is always an essential element of politics. Failure to recognize this will vitiate all attempts to establish international forms of government, and confuse nearly every attempt to discuss the subject. "Political power in the international sphere may be divided, for purposes of discussion, into three categories: (a) military power, (b) economic power, (c) power over opinion." (11) Since

war and the possibility of war is always a dominant factor in international relations, military strength becomes a recognized standard of political values, not only as an instrument, but also sometimes as an end in itself. Economic power is, in fact, political power, either in the form of export of capital or in the form of control of foreign markets. As for the third form of power, power over opinion is a modern weapon for the masses like propaganda. In Carr's point of view, the victory of World War I was achieved by a skillful combination of military power, economic power, and power over opinion. Since opinion is conditioned by status and interest, the dominant powers can manipulate opinions favorable to their advantage and also can easily impose opinions on others.

Ray S. Cline's *World Power Assessment: a Calculus of Strategic Drift* presents us a helpful formula of basic conceptual framework for measuring national power: (12)

$$Pp=(C+E+M) * (S+W)$$

Where:

Pp=perceived power

C=critical mass=population + territory

E=economic capability

M=military capability

S=strategic purpose

W=will to pursue national strategy.

The fundamental flaw of Cline's power formula is that he adds the quantifiable things but multiply them by judgmental things, thus heavily showing the outcome. There are too many variables and human intangibles in measuring the power of a nation. The estimation of national

power is not a science, so we cannot expect a nation's strength and political influence to be measured with mathematical exactness. Classical realism assumes that power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. In foreign policy, American government has always enthusiastically explored, justified, and applied other instruments of power: alliances, economic and military aid, bases abroad, weapons development, covert action, intervention, propaganda campaigns and so on. (13)

Balance of Power

Balance of power is viewed as a “universal concept” by Hans Morgenthau, who believes “balance” and “equilibrium” are synonyms, and equilibrium is common in many sciences, like physics, biology, economics, sociology, and political science. The equilibrium within a system relies on a number of autonomous forces, and it is influenced by outside forces or disturbed by forces inside the system. Its stability or reestablishment depends on the degrees that the forces change. In international relations, each nation aspires to obtain power either by maintaining the status quo or overthrowing it, which leads inevitably to a configuration that is called the balance of power and the policies that aim at preserving or altering it.

The nature of multiplicity in international relations and the antagonism among the individual nations determine the international conflicts, and the distribution of power decides the patterns of the balance of power—direct opposition between two big powers or blocs, and competitions among several actors. Thus the structure of the balance of power is divided into dominant system and dependent system. According to Hans Morgenthau, there are different methods of the balance of power. First, divide and rule, when a nation tries to make or keep its

competitors weak by dividing them or keeping them divided. Secondly, compensations, mainly implying territorial acquisitions. Thirdly, armaments, which means a nation tries to keep up with, and then to outdo the military forces of the competitors. The last is alliances, a matter of expediency other than principle.

Balance of power is usually used “with four different meanings: first, as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs; secondly, as an actual state of affairs; the third, as an approximately equal distribution of power; the last as any distribution of power.” (14) Most of the time, balance of power refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.

Research Questions

Research questions in this paper mainly cover international relations theories, especially realism and classical realism. Since this thesis focuses on the realist interpretation of U.S. relations with China, liberalism, globalism and constructivism are not introduced in detail. Key questions consider how classical realism theory informs and explains U.S relations with China;

what are the implications of the history of American foreign policy towards China; why classical realism can be best explained and justified from the ups and downs of U.S.-China relations; and how national interest and power issues play a vital role in formulation and execution of American foreign policy making. These research questions are thus framed into the following patterns:

H1: Classical realism theory is the most effective of international relations theories, and can best explain U.S. relations with China.

H2: National interest is the central concept in realist international relations theories, and it is also the central doctrine for American foreign policy-makers when dealing with China.

H3: National strength and balance of power best explain classical realism theory, and power relations are central to U.S. relations with China.

H4: Soft power, such as ideology, value system and human rights are parts of national interest, yet they are always secondary compared to core interests like territory, commerce and the military in U.S. relations with China.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

During the preparation process, this paper focused on books and references from four aspects: international relations theory, American diplomatic history, U.S. relations with China, and American power and American national interest. The first aspect includes *National interest* by Joseph Frankel, *The Two Faces of National Interest* by W. David Clinton, *National Interest, Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy* edited by W. David Clinton and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Foundations of National Power* edited by Harold & Margaret Sprout, *Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace* by Hans J. Morgenthau, *Contending Theories of International Relations* by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

The second aspect concerning American diplomatic history includes *The Idea of National Interest, an Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* by Charles A. Beard. The third aspect includes: *America's Response to China, a History of Sino-American Relations* by Warren I. Cohen, *The United States and China* by Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990* by Charles R. Kitts, *Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784* edited by Thomas H. Etzold, *Sino-American Relations 1945-1955* edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, *Nixon and Mao* by Margaret MacMillan, *China Cross Talk* edited by Scott Kennedy. The last aspect includes two books: *The Practice of Power, U.S. Relations with China since 1949* by Rosemary Foot, and *American National Interest, Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy* by Karl Von Vorys.

1. Whether politics is an exact science or not remains one of the debated questions in political science, and some political concept like “national interest” fills in our daily speech,

yet by the very passion it raises, it can often obscure a proper understanding of the sense in which it is, or should be. Analysis and reassessment of national interest is the theme of the book *National interest* by Joseph Frankel of University of Southampton in 1970. This publication is one of the series of short books, discussing the key concepts in political science, for the benefits of academics and the reading public.

According to the author, “national interest is a singular vague concept. It assumes a variety of meanings in the various contexts in which it is used and, despite its fundamental importance, these meanings often cannot be reconciled; hence no agreement can be reached about its ultimate meaning.” (15) Yet the author analyses this concept from the history of its usage, the purpose of foreign policy, from foreign-domestic distinctions, the basic components, the spatial and time dimensions, the formulation of process and agencies, the ideas of images, motivations and values.

Joseph Frankel holds that national interest is unlikely to disappear as a general organizing concept with the foreseeable future, although the states will probably find it hard in its definition. There is some hope that it may be interpreted in a more liberal and enlightened form, yet the claims of the individual states that they act to the benefit of humanity as a whole, protecting freedom or civilization or culture may be sheer hypocrisy or a mere rationalization. Self-interest and national interest are by far more important sources of motivation than broader moral considerations, nevertheless, they can also be enlightened.

2. *The Two Faces of National Interest* by W. David Clinton was published by Louisiana State University Press in 1994. The author admits the concept of national interest is so pervasive that one can hardly avoid coming across it in news, articles and commentary on a

host of subjects, yet he also agrees to the points of view by David Singer, “the national interest is a smokescreen by which we all too often oversimplify the world, denigrate our rivals, enthrall our citizens, and justify acts of dubious morality and efficacy.” (16)

Part one of the book is devoted to a search for definition. After a brief survey of the origins and development of the concept of national interest as it has been used to explain and justify the actions of states, this section responds to critics’ case against national interest as ambiguous and subjective. David Clinton points out the four dangers of the national interest: (1) the undemocratic national interest, in formulating of which it have played no, or at best only a marginal role; (2) the irrational national interest, the inability of the policy makers to achieve full rationality in their decisions; (3) the obsolescent national interest, for nations are obsolescent and their interests are illusory; (4) the exclusive national interest, excluding consideration of the rights and interests of most mankind.

In part two, the author focuses on the analysis of national interest issues in practice. All the four cases are after World War II, including the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, the Nixon Doctrine, and Carter’s human rights policy. Each of them marked a significant turn in policy, an occasion for the reexamination of the requirement of the national interest. From the episodes of the brief cases, the author tries to suggest that national interest is ubiquitous in discourse because it refers to something of substance and weight in the life of nations and states.

3. The book *National Interest, Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy* edited by W. David Clinton and Kenneth W. Thompson in 1988 is Volume 13 of the Exxon Education Foundation Series on rhetoric and political discourse. It consists of two parts by five scholars: part one, defining national interest, national regimes, international rules, and ethical precepts; part two,

national interest and national responsibilities. In the first article, Daniel G. Lang insists that “a foreign policy which promises to replace the struggle for power with a new era of peace and justice cannot succeed and must not be legitimized.” (17)

Kenneth W. Thompson’s “Beyond National Interest” is actually a critical evaluation of Reinhold Niebuhr’s theory of international politics. In Thompson’s view, Niebuhr believes the demands of self-interest and national self-protection inspire actions that appear to override all accepted moral impulse. Even in the consideration of the Marshall Plan, Niebuhr calls it an act of wise self-interest other than an act of benevolence. As to the international organization, Niebuhr conceives it as essentially another framework with which historic and emergent national purposes might be pursued and adjusted, and it associated with the vital stakes of one or more major powers. David Clinton analyses the two realms of national interest—domestic and international. Alan Tonelson explores the reasons why Americans do not think in national interest terms. First, the longstanding American suspicion of power of any kind; the second, the importance that Americans have always attached to morality and idealism in foreign policy; the third, the strong predisposition to look to foreign policy in order to validate beliefs about domestic political issues. Inis L. Claude, Jr claims in his article “The United States and Great Power Responsibilities”, “theoretical preoccupation with the self-interested behavior of states and awkwardness in accommodating the idea of states’ responsibilities can be misleading.” (18)

4. *Foundations of National Power* edited with introduction and other original text by Harold & Margaret Sprout was published by Princeton University Press in 1945. World War II has profoundly changed the relations of America with other nations. Some foreign policies like neutrality towards European wars and avoidance of military alliances with foreign powers

require fresh appraisal in the light of new situations. The statesman, staff officer, and the ordinary citizen like to achieve a clear and realist view of the current world and of the major trends in sight. This book aims to help Americans to frame a strategy of peace that meets the requirements of national security and fits the facts of world situation. It expresses the conviction of the editors that broad and comprehensive knowledge of the strength, the aims, and the policies of nations is fundamental to understanding the problem of security in a dynamic world. As Harold & Margaret Sprout admit this book offers no doctrine, no panaceas, no cut-and-dried solutions.

The contents of this book are collected from many sources representing many specialized field of knowledge, like diplomacy, political science, history, economy, demography, geography, physical science, engineering, journalism and military. The readings are organized to fit these specialties together into a pattern or mosaic that is both readily comprehensible and faithful to the realities of the current world and its developing trends. The frame of this book is divided into five parts. Part I is about the essential conditions and factors that have shaped the course of the international relations through the centuries. Part II, III, and IV present the pattern of international relations and the major political forces in Europe, Asia and America. The last part deals with the term of peace and the international organizations.

In chapter 2 of part I, Harold & Margaret Sprout provide a list of reasons why some nations are strong and others weak. It covers the military, territory, population, economy, resources, technology, organization, morality, national character and morale. It reminds us of another publication in 1948, *Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace* by Hans. J. Morgenthau. In Chapters 8, 9, and 10 of part III of that book, Morgenthau explains and

illustrates the essence of national power, the elements of national power and the evaluation of national power. The elements of national power by Morgenthau are almost the same as the factors listed by Harold & Margaret Sprout, with the differences that Harold & Margaret focusing on the size of the territory and the number of the population, yet Morgenthau emphasizes the position of geography and the distribution of the population.

5. The name of Hans J. Morgenthau and the name of his book *Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace* have almost been the symbol of realism theory in international relations. The influence and popularity of his work can be easily seen from the seven editions of the publication since 1948. For over five decades, this book has been considered by many the premiere text in international politics. Its main themes, national interest and power, are commonplaces among practitioners of foreign policy. In part I of the book, Morgenthau puts forward the six principles of political realism, and mainly covers the theme and the contents: realism, object laws, human nature, the concept of interest, the term of power, objective category yet not once for all, moral aspirations and significance, the profound difference from the other schools of thoughts. He categorizes power as means to the nation's ends, other than nation's ends for power. To maintain or change the current power determines the three types of struggles for power: status quo, imperialism and policy of prestige. The three methods of imperialism are separately military, economy and culture, which provide great help in understanding the policies of the big powers in their grab for colonies.

Besides the focuses of power and balance of power, Morgenthau does not neglect the struggle for peace, nor does he deny moral significance and human rights. He admits that "there exists of necessity a certain relativism in the relation between moral principles and foreign

policy; one cannot overlook this if one wants to do justice to the principles of morality in international politics.” (19) Yet, Morgenthau insists that it is not for the United States to impose its own principles of government upon the rest of mankind by fire and sword, but, rather to attract the rest of mankind through the successful example of the United States.

In Chapter Five and Six, the author regards international morality, world public opinion and international law as “limitations of national interest”, actually they must not be the limitations, they can be parts of national interest instead or enforcement of national interest as soft power. On page 294 of Chapter 19, when mentioning the Korean War in the security issue, the author puts China and North Korea both in a clear-cut case of aggression. He agrees collective security would have required that all members of the United Nations came to the aid of South Korea, the victim of aggression, yet the author forgets or omits deliberately the security challenge that China faced, when in September, 1950, American forces succeeded in amphibious landing in Inchon and then crossed the 38th parallel to the border of China. China was forced to intervene in the Korean War in November.

6. The book of *Contending Theories of International Relations* is a comprehensive survey by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. The fifth edition of this book in 2001 implies the wide use by teachers and students in international relations courses in America and abroad. With the emergence of new literature and the continuing development in the field, the authors have revised the text throughout and updated the notes.

Out of the twelve chapters, almost eight chapters explore realism theories, from realist to neorealist and neoclassical realist theory, from system and structure to social context, from old theories of conflict and war to microcosmic theories and international war, from theories of

deterrence to game theories and decision making. The authors define classical realism with national interest and power, structural realism as neorealism, and social constructivism as neoclassical realism. As to the limitation of realism, this book agrees that realist writers only focus on the past Eurocentric system and draw a series of political concepts for the analysis of a vastly different contemporary global international system. Yet, “despite its critics, realism ranks as the most important attempt thus far to isolate and focus on a key variable in political behavior—namely, power –and to develop a theory of international relations.” (20)

Liberalism is only briefly mentioned in Chapter 9, international political economy, with three pages’ introduction of the early development of capitalism. Chapter 10 is about the theory of international cooperation and integration, functionalism and neofunctionalism. The related issues of international morality, legalism, value system, ideology and human rights are not mentioned at all, which make the survey of this book somewhat incomprehensive.

7. *The Idea of National Interest, an Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* by Charles A. Beard was published in 1934. This book is one of the earliest works about American national interest, and even today its ideas look so profound and significant. Charles A. Beard is one of America’s most distinguished historians. He served as president of both the American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association. When the book first appeared, it helped to stimulate the regrowth of the idea of “national interest”, as well as providing its genealogy. This book remains unique in its field by developing the theme and defining and investigating a formula by which governments supposedly live and for which men are still asked to die.

The concept of national interest is an European strain of thought. It has been appealed to

in America from the very beginning of that country, though it appeared sporadically or tacitly, other than the center point of the argumentation. Charles Beard expresses his hope that national interest as a new conception, with positive core and nebulous implications will find its “formulation at the hands of a statesman as competent and powerful as Hamilton or Jefferson.”

(21) After Beard’s death, the concept of national interest was thus gaining strength abroad and receiving a greater attention in the United States. From presidential statements, it can be seen that Truman and Eisenhower rarely employed the phrase, yet John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson more often stressed that they would do everything they could to ask both parties to be responsible and to act in the national interest.

Charles Beard begins his book with the assertion that “foreign policies are not built upon abstractions. They are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective.” “Self-interest is not only a legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy; one which needs no cloak of hypocrisy. As a principle it does not require justification in general statement.” “It is just as true as ever that it is vain to expect governments to act continuously on any other ground than national interest.”(22) Then the author states the American Constitution is as a conception of national interest, and he explains how national interest manifested in America’s territorial expansion in the Continent, in commercial expansion, including the commercial relations with China, national interest in action, the moral obligation of national interest, the interpretation, advancement, enforcement and challenges of national interest. In this book, the concept and the goals of American national interest penetrate all the history of American foreign relations.

8. Warren I. Cohen’s *America’s Response to China, a History of Sino-American*

Relations, 3rd edition, is one of the best U.S.-China relations works. Not only does it narrate many interesting episodes in the intercourse of these two countries, with its wide range from the 1784 *Empress of China* sail to the rapprochement and normalization in 1979, but also it is full of the author's insightful analysis and generalization, which exemplifies the inductive conceptualization of national interest and power from the versatile data of historical context. The narrative is brief, the conclusion is concise, the remark is cogent, the opinion is unbiased.

Since the first edition, the author focuses his attention on the American response to China, compared to John K. Fairbank's *The United States and China* that focuses on introduction to China. In Warren's view, American response mainly came from the American statesmen who sought to devise an East Asian policy, consistent with the ideals and interests of American people, and embedded in a broad international setting. After the second edition of the book, the author traveled to the mainland China nine times. He interviewed Chinese leaders and exchanged opinions with the privileged Chinese scholars who accessed to policy-making process. The declassification of many documents also has provided new insights into his thoughts about the policies of the Presidents and their secretaries of state.

This book covers most of the significant events of U.S.-China relations, from tribute system, treaty system, America as a Power in East Asia, Japanese factor, Chinese Civil War, communism in China, to hostility and rapprochement. The book points out power and change of power functioned in the transition from tribute system to treaty system, America's words of sympathy yet lack of material support when China needed help, America's discrepancy between the theory and practice in the exclusion and discrimination of Chinese immigration from the 1860s to the 1880s, America's self-interest in the "Open Door" policy, Theodore

Roosevelt's balance of power policy in China, Wilson's high morality and his giving in, Franklin Roosevelt's indifference to China's sufferings and his sacrifice of China's territory to the Soviet Union. From many events, it is concluded America's self-national interest has always been considered as the top priority in America's response to China.

9. One book is very similar to Warren I. Cohen's *America's Response to China* in structure, content, style, and even in remark. This is the book entitled as *The United States and China* by Arnold Xiangze Jiang, who is from China. This book reflects U.S. relations with China from the perspective of a Chinese. Jiang is from Guizhou Province of South China, attended the University of Nanjing in Chengdu, China and earned his Ph. D from the University of Washington in the United States in 1951. Drawing on primary and secondary Chinese and U.S. sources, Jiang offers the reader the critical insight into the Chinese interpretation of events, other than the traditional American perspective. An awareness of the different interpretations that two nations draw from a set of shared event is crucial for understanding the bilateral relations.

In this book, the first and most central theme is that, between the two aims that defined U.S. policy towards China—a generous friendship and an aggressive self-interest—the latter dominated. For example, Jiang argues that the “Open Door” policy was a tool to enhance America's economic dominance and to open up the way for an American hegemony in the Far East. The second theme of the book is that America was a consistent supporter of corrupt, unpopular, and repressive regimes in China. The third theme developed by Jiang is that America often involved in contradictions and unrealities in its pursuit of friendship and self-interest. Whether you agree or not to the author's point of view, this book broadens and

deepens the reader's understanding of U.S. relations with China, which is also of great importance for the future.

10. During the nineteenth century when China grew older and weaker, the United States grew stronger and richer. In the twentieth century when China emerged as a communist state from revolution, the United States emerged as the leader of the anti-communist Western bloc. The history of U.S.-China relations has been ubiquitously full of misconceptions, distortions, confusions, illusions, disillusion, dreams, myths, prejudices, and half-truths. The book *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990* by Charles R. Kitts in 1991 gives a good starting point, good explanation and also good analysis to the study of U.S. relations with China. The author emphasizes the American role in the intercourse of the two countries and focuses on Western sources. At the end of each chapter, the book provides a list of further reading for reference. Most of the chapters present detailed accounts of the events that occurred, with the exception of the last chapter that gives a brief description of the "recognition and beyond" period from 1969 to 1990 within only twenty pages.

The author mentions more realism and less emotionalism are urgently needed in the study of U.S.-China relations, and his attempt in this book provides a starting point that may alter and improve matters. In Chapter Four and Chapter Nine, Charles R. Kitts admits that both Anson Burlingame and Woodrow Wilson were sincere and well-intentioned, however they too were out of touch with the politics of the real world. He criticizes the strong prejudice and racism of the California legislative committee in the anti-Chinese immigration issue in the 1880s, compares the "Open China Door" policy with "Shut America Door" to Chinese, points out the self-centered interest of America when facing more Japanese demands in China,

ridicules the treaties signed at the Washington Conference as toothless, agrees to the Chinese complaints in the 1930s that America only helped with words but no force, doubts the clamor of “red China menace ”, explores the wrong judgment of American government to China’s intervention in Korea, and analyses the rigidity of John Dulles’ China policy.

11. Another book, *Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784* edited by Thomas H. Etzold was published in 1978, one year before the diplomatic normalization of American and China. The book comprises of six essays by six different authors who focus on the haziness of American policy in the Far East, and its confusing legacy. The first chapter by William J. Brinker discusses the meager understanding of Chinese culture in the first phase of American trade contact with China. Chapter Two by Frederick B. Hoyt and Eugene P. Trani highlights the stark contrast of the American discrimination against Chinese immigration to the “Open Door” policy the American government simultaneously demanded from China, which showed a major contradiction between the domestic and foreign policies of the United States.

Raymond A. Esthus states in Chapter Three that from the history since 1899 to 1922, American “Open Door” policy seemed more ambiguous other than clear and consistent. Chapters Four and Five by David F. Trask and Thomas H. Etzold demonstrate the inconsistency of American foreign policy towards China due to the unexpected and uncontrollable circumstances after the two World Wars. The authors blame the post-war problems more to the circumstances than to the policy makers’ lack of proper assessment and proper decision. In the last chapter, Jerome K. Holloway and Thomas H. Etzold conclude from American relations with Chinese leaders since the 1920s to the 1970s that Chinese self-centered attitudes impeded the normal relations between the two countries. The authors

believe that the United States was prepared to treat China like a world power, but China refused to respond as one. But the authors seem forgetting American “isolation and containment” policy towards China from the 1950s to the 1970s and American ignorance of the existence of the 800 million people in “Red China”. As the authors mention, “relations between countries are always a mixture of positive and negative, of good will and irritation, conflicts of interest and convergences of interest.” (23) The authors’ confusions in their points of view and in the events of U.S. relations with China are due to their lack of analysis from the perspective of national interest, and their lack of the guideline of classical realism theory.

12. The ten years from 1945 to 1955 represents a critical turning point in the history of contemporary international relations. With the end of World War II emerged the transition of competition for dominance among the traditional European Powers to the new international system of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The deterioration of the relationship between America and China is the result of such a new international order. Particularly, this decade witnessed the most difficult and hostile period in U.S.-relations with China. The War in Korea, the further military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, the worsening of mutual diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, all made the two countries enemies for a quarter of century. Proper understanding of this period is essential if Washington and Beijing are to avoid similar conflicts in the future, for some of the mutual misunderstanding that contributed to the deterioration of the two countries in the late 1940s still exerts its influence sporadically on contemporary relations of both sides. With more archival materials declassified through the mid-1950s from American government and the availability of some firsthand material of the Chinese side, the time has come for a scholarly assessment of the evolution of

the relationship between China and America for the critical decade, and then came the book *Sino-American Relations 1945-1955* edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming.

This book comprises of seventeen articles focusing on different points, the historical setting, difficult choices, years of confrontation and the legacy of the decade. The authors are a group of senior American and Chinese scholars in U.S.-China relations, including John Lewis Gaddis, Steven M. Goldstein, Steven I. Levine, Robert L. Messer, Jonathan D. Pollack, William Stueck, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Chen Xiaolu, He Di, Jia Qingguo, Rao Geping, Tao Wenzhao, Wang Jisi, Zhang Baijia. In this book, there are lots of insightful analyses and revisionist's views about Chinese Communist Party's ideology and its relations with Moscow.

13. The week when Nixon visited China and talked with Mao in February 1972 really changed the world. This was not only the first ever visit of an American president to China as symbolism, it also ended the long standoff where neither country had recognized the other. "It was an earthquake in the Cold War landscape and meant that the Eastern bloc no longer stood firm against the West." (24) How did that happen and why did the both sides of America and China make such a drastic and dramatic change in their foreign policy? What did Nixon and Mao talk about and what impact did this stunt have to U.S.-China relations? The book *Nixon and Mao* by Margaret MacMillan gives us an excellent answer.

Based on the focus on this significant event, the author envisages all the aspects that concern this concurrence, including both of the two countries' domestic situations, the current international relations, the past vicissitude of misunderstanding and hostility, the introduction of Chinese history and the development of Chinese communism, the episodes in the political careers of Nixon, Mao and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier. All these factors together combine

a vivid mosaic for better understanding of U.S. foreign policies towards China.

Margaret MacMillan received her Ph. D from Oxford University and her work *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* won her international reputation. The book *Nixon and Mao* was published in 2007 and included the latest documents of both the United States and China. Besides the inspiring narratives, this book is also full of insightful analysis and is intended to justify the argument of national interest and power struggle in the realism theory. According to the author, the first goal of Nixon administration was to support American interest. As Nixon said, “the more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others’ interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.” (25) For both America and China, the talk between Nixon and Mao in 1972 provided a counterbalance to potential enemies: Japan and the Soviet Union in the case of China; the Soviet Union, above all, for the United States, especially at that time when America was dragged into the Vietnam War that diminished the dominance of American power in the East Asia and in the world.

14. U.S.-China relation is today the most difficult bilateral relationship for America and one of the most important bilateral relationships for the world. The United States and China share many interests in common and as well as many divergent interests. The China policy debates have been one of the most contentious debates in America. The participants and issues may have changed, yet the theme has remained the same: how should America approach this very complex and very important nation? The book *China Cross Talk* edited by Scott Kennedy provides a wide-range of collection of articles, speeches, and documents on U.S.-China

relations since the diplomatic normalization in 1979. The polemics reflects the diversity and intensity of American policy debates about China based on each individual's subjective interpretation of American interests and other factors.

There are five fundamental issues concern America among this book's selections: China's power, China's foreign policy intentions, China's domestic political and economic situations, China's help to American goals and China's behavior with liberal means. Six periods are grouped according to a key event from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush's administration. The weak point of this book is the limited attention to Chinese perspectives on the relations in general or on American policy.

One interesting phenomenon we can see from the arguments is that almost all the presidents have been far more critical and hard-line toward China as candidates than as occupants of the White House. The reasons why presidents' going soft on China might be China's transforming in the interim, the change of president's view, the expediency for more votes to be won, or president's policy failure.

As to the issue of American interest, President Reagan said during his visit to China in April 1984, "A strong China, dedicated to peace, clearly is in the best interest of international stability and in the best interest of the United States." (26) President Clinton asserted in 1997, "The emergence of a China as a power that is stable, open, and nonaggressive, that embraces free markets, political pluralism, and the rule of law, that works with us to build a secure international order, that kind of China, rather than a China turned inward and confrontational, is deeply in the interests of the American people." (27) The United States has a profound interest in promoting a peaceful, prosperous, and stable world, in peace and stability in Asia, in

keeping weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated weaponry out of unstable regions and away from rouge states and terrorist, in fighting drug trafficking and international organized crime, in making global trade and investment as free, fair, and open as possible, and in protecting global environment and climate. American interests and values can be advanced fundamentally by working with China, expanding areas of cooperation and dealing forthrightly with the differences.

15. As to how American power or American superpower applied in the practice of U.S. relations with China, especially with the communist China since 1949, how the two powers clashed, collided, struggled, balanced, cooperated and then competed, the book *The Practice of Power; U.S. Relations with China since 1949* by Rosemary Foot, provides a good demonstration by its case study analysis. The argument of the book is based on a wider structure of relationships at the global and domestic levels; it also embraced areas other than bilateral concerns about the global strategic balance, which deepens our understanding of the evolution in American policies to China. From the concept of power, America as hegemon, to power and U.S.-China relations, the author concludes that the United State has been the center of China's foreign policy concerns both negatively and positively post 1949. It is the U.S. position in the global system, its structural power, allowed Washington to keep Beijing relatively isolated. America's recognition as equal and diplomatic normalization seemed one of the most priorities to China.

The People's Republic of China was blocked out of the United Nations from 1949 to 1971, and was deprived of her permanent seat in the Security Council. The issue of communist China's claiming representation at U.N. can be seen clearly as an area where the United States

used its command power to maintain a policy reflecting its interests, utilizing both coercive as well as persuasive means. The topic of this case study is a very good complement to the argument of my paper. Rosemary Foot also mentions American trade embargo to China and U.S. public opinions, American power balancing against threats in the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, America's perception of China's conventional military power and nuclear power, U.S. structural power and China's rising power after 1979.

16. Contrary to the skepticism about the contribution of the concept of national interest to public policy, Karl Von Vorys, the author of the book *American National Interest, Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy*, proposes to develop national interest as a pre-policy standard, a common base for foreign policy and its evaluation.

According to the author, the concept of national interest cannot be vague and abstract, it must gain content and acquire an identifiable structure. American national interest needs to spell out its hierarchy quite unambiguously: (1) challenges to American vital interest, American national existence; (2) challenges to American special interests, American friends and allies; (3) challenges to American general interests, international order. When talking about American vital interest, the author mentions Americans may be driven by altruism or motivated by enlightened self-interest, but in American national interest these sacrifices must stop short of sacrificing the United States for any purpose, however exalted. To avoid becoming targets of aggression, three preconditions can be identified and analyzed: hostility, capability and utility. As to American special interest, two conditions make it particularly strenuous: being ephemeral and being imprecise. The author lists reasons for American general interest: American domestic reality will no longer permit a policy of splendid isolation;

America has reached the age of global interdependence; U.S. government should actively participate in, perhaps even lead, the efforts toward a stable international order. It looks the author forget mentioning American power or superpower has enabled the policy- makers to hold such general interest.

The author reminds the readers that national interest does not shut out the universalist perspective, and does not disregard the interests of mankind, nor does it delegitimize the personal and group perspectives. Yet the author does not include ideology, value system and human rights as part of American soft power and American national interest. It is difficult to identify and classify the range of appropriate policy options. The author believes as to whether some kinds of national interest worth America to fight, to pay, to work or even to leave it alone, depend on the assessment and wisdom of the American policy-makers.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses the qualitative method to analyze the phenomena and events in U.S. relations with China and to develop important observations and conclusions. The qualitative method is the traditional approach in the analysis of classical realism. It has its origins in history, sociology and anthropology, and is particularly useful when the goal of research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences.

The nature of qualitative research lies with the assumption that meaning, implication, understanding and the way of interpretation are all socially constructed as individuals interact with the world. Some fields and phenomena in society are abstract, intuitive, value-oriented and non-quantifiable and thus unsuitable for positivist and quantitative research. Over a period of time, the constructions and interpretations of reality may be in a state of change. "Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding what those interpretations are at a particular point in time and in a particular context. Learning how individuals experience and interact with their social world, the meaning it has for them, is considered an interpretive qualitative approach."

(28)

Interpretative and qualitative research designs include several key characteristics. The first characteristic is that researchers strive to understand the meaning people have constructed about their world and their experiences. The second characteristic is that the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and data analysis. The third element is that the process is inductive, which means the researcher gathers data to build concepts, hypotheses, or theories rather than deductively deriving postulates or hypotheses to be tested. Finally, the product of a

qualitative inquiry is richly descriptive. Words and pictures rather than numbers are used to convey what the researcher has learned about a phenomenon.

As an analogue, this paper with interpretative qualitative research design first explains and interprets the meaning and understanding that has been constructed in U.S. relations with China. American national interest and power stand out in the historical relations with China, with the occasional focus on ideology, value differences and human rights only masking the real concerns of national interest and power. Second, data collection and data analysis covers the major incidents and important policies since 1784 to 2009. Third, by employing inductive reasoning the paper supports the hypothesis and theoretical conclusion that national interest and national power are central or core concerns in U.S.-China relations. Finally, this research employs mainly descriptive and narrative analysis and critique.

The qualitative research approach includes several types: first, critical qualitative research, which focuses on how the social and political aspects of the situation shape the reality. Second, there is postmodern or post-structural that questions all aspects of the construction of reality; what it is and what it is not, how it is organized, and so on. Third, qualitative research considers phenomenology, which focuses on culture, on the essence or structure of an experience. Fourth, there is grounded theory that derives inductively from data. Fifth, case study, that is an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon or social unit such as an individual, group, institution, or community. Sixth, there is ethnographic study of human society and culture. Seventh is the narrative analysis, the use of stories as data, biography, autobiography, life history, oral history, and life narratives.

The quantitative method, on the other hand, rests on the observation and measurement of

repeated incidences of political phenomenon, such as voting, allocation of resources by government or citizens' attitudes towards a policy. With this method, the researcher draws inferences based on the data at hand and the laws of probability. It strives for natural science-like rigor and certitude within the social sciences and humanities, and often involves the reduction of concepts, variables and situations into quantitative forms. The quantitative approach seeks to discover causal relationships by using descriptive and inferential statistical methods, survey instruments, and other tools. In this thesis, three tables are presented to further amplify and strengthen the basically qualitative arguments.

Table one is about the comparison of the total investments of the big Powers in China in the years of 1902, 1914 and 1931. From the figures we find a phenomenon that America was almost the least in investments in China during that period compared to Britain, Japan, Russia, France and Germany, yet it is interesting that this happened even at the time when minimum U.S. interest and involvement in China in 1902, three years after the United States initiated the "Open Door" policy to the big powers status in 1899. America just won the War on Spain, and obtained Cuba in Caribbean and the Philippines in Asia, which symbolized America's new position in the East Asia and her influence in the world. The success of John Hay's policy indicated not only the emerging power of America, but also the beginning of more America's share of interests in China's trade and investment. The figure in 1914 shows that President Taft's "dollar diplomacy" began to work, with more America's loans to China's big construction contracts. The comparison of the figures between America and Japan in 1931 shows us clearly the drastic increase of Japanese investments in China, and also helps us understand the relative advantage of Japan over America in China's Manchuria area and the

reasons of American appeasement policy when Japan began to invade China from 1931.

Table two demonstrates the importance of American exports to China and Japan from 1932 to 1940, when Japan escalated from enlarged invasion in China to the full scale war with China in 1937, until the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. From the figures, we see the values of American exports to China remained all the same from \$56 million to \$78 million during the year from 1932 to 1940, yet the American exports to Japan almost doubled from \$135 million to \$227 million in the same period. The percentage of total U.S. export trade to China decreased by half, yet the percentage to Japan remained almost the same. One may induce from this table that America did little to help when China was under Japanese invasion and needed help; and instead, America exported more than before to Japan, including the war material oil and steel, which actually helped the aggressor and hurt the victim.

Table three compares the projected GDP and the defense budgets of China, America and OECD countries from 2005 to 2030. The projection shows us that China's overall GDP in purchasing power will overtake that of America in the year of 2020 by \$ 30 trillion to \$ 28 trillion. The Chinese military budgets will increase by four times from \$60 billion to \$238 billion from 2003 to 2030, yet American military budgets will increase by two times. The table presents a clear picture that China is emerging as a great power not only in economy and also in military, which is a doubtless reality and challenge that America will have to face. Based on the historical research of U.S. relations with China, it is essential and vital to rethink and recalculate current and future American foreign policy towards China, in order to maintain and best promote American national interests and the international prestige through a realistic interpretation and a more appropriate policy formulation and execution process.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

“Realism is the dominant theory of International Relations.” (29) It provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war and the rise and fall of great powers. The unifying themes of realism include the nation state as the actor; national sovereignty, security, survival and interests as the ultimate goal; balance of power and alliance in a state of anarchy as the key strategy; balance of terror as the method of temporary truce; dominance, hegemony and polarity as the types of international system structure; change, method and calculation as the policy. The great nineteenth century British statesman Lord Palmerston formulated the credo of realists: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” (30)

Realism can be viewed from three aspects: classical realism, structural realism and neoclassical realism. Classical realism emphasizes the endless power struggle and its roots in human nature. “The war has its origin in dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche.” (31) People organize the state, and the state makes people what they are. Like man is born with the nature of survival and self-interest, violence is common in a society. So when a state pursues its own interests, force is used when necessary. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there is no final authority for the conflict of interests in the state of international anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image is neither moral nor immoral, it embodies merely a reasoned response to the world. War is politics with blood, and politics is a bloodless war. “States are natural enemies not because states are never honorable and peaceful, but because

they may at any moment become dishonorable and belligerent.” (32)

Power refers to the material resources available to a nation, while interests refer to a nation’s goals or preferences. A state leader has to accept or adapt to the changing power of political configurations in world politics. Justice and law only play a limited role on the world stage. Just like the nineteenth century is sometimes seen as the golden age of international order, and of mythologies of laissez-faire, free trade, and freedom of the seas during the Pax Britannica, in reality Britain was never reluctant to apply military force when necessary to maintain and enforce such norms. Historian Thucydides wrote in *The Peloponnesian War*, “the stronger do what they want to and the weaker accept what they have to”, and “the growth of Athenian power caused the fear in Sparta.” (33) In his book *The Prince*, Machiavelli says the prince “must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if constrained” for “morality is the product of power.” (34) E. H. Carr holds that “theories of international morality are, for the same reason and in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant nations or groups of nations.” (35) Morgenthau states in his *Politics among Nations*, “all history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war” (36) and a nation defines its interests “in terms of power.” (37)

Structural realism emphasizes that the anarchy of the international system fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity among the states. As Kenneth N. Waltz points out in his book *Theory of International Politics*, “The national realm is variously described as being hierarchic, vertical, centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and contrived; the international realm,

as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, and mutually adaptive”,(38) so the force of a national government is exercised in the name of right and justice domestically, yet the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own protection and advantage internationally. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye emphasize power and interdependence, “the world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspiration” that are creating a “world without borders”. (39)

Neoclassical realism focuses on the necessity of better accounts of the unit level variables, such as how power is perceived and how leadership is exercised. To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units like people, corporations, and states must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make in a condition of anarchy. State structure, scope, and capacity are crucial factors in explaining the process how nations become increasingly active on the world stage. Capabilities shape intentions, but state structure limits the availability of national power. Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its government, so what matters is state power. Fareed Zakaria gives a better description about American expansion in his *From Wealth to Power*, “ranging from the balance of power to the influence of various interest groups to ideology—racism or social Darwinism or manifest destiny—to the idiosyncrasies of America’s leaders.” (40)

Apart from realism, international theories consist of liberalism, globalism and constructivism. Liberalism is a tradition of political thought composed of a set of practical goals and ideals. It is interchangeably called pluralism or idealism. For classical liberal theorists, the individual is the most important unit of analysis and the state is to play a minimal role as arbiter in a liberal society. “The liberal outlook can be summed up in the four concepts

of 'equality', 'rationality', 'liberty' and 'property'." (41) Liberalism is also classified as *commercial liberalism* of international economy expansion, *democratic liberalism* of domestic public opinion and *regulatory liberalism* of international law and organizations. (42) The most influential scholars on liberalism are Adam Smith, David Ricardo and their works in economics, and in the political economic realm are John Locke and Immanuel Kant.

Globalism emphasizes dependency and the capitalist world system. Resource, market and colony are the concepts often mentioned. Constructivism believes "state action influenced by 'structure' (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus 'process' (interaction and learning) and institutions." (43) As Alexander Wendt points out anarchy is what states make of it and "identities are the basis of interests." (44)

Most national policy-makers claim themselves to be realists. Then how has international relation theory, especially the realism theory been applied to and revealed in the issues of American foreign policies, especially its policies towards China? "History serves as a rich data base for constructing theories about how the world operates," (45) and for the past two hundred and twenty-five years since the first contact, U.S.-China relations have been studded with many episodes of major wars and diplomatic events that bear important messages for contemporary policy makers.

There are many works on international relations theory and on U.S.-China relations, yet few combine the abstract assumptions and explanations of the international relations theories with the dramatic ups and downs between America and China. Theory should derive from the empirical observations, and reflect, explain, instruct and even predict the reality. As great theory reveals its vital importance and instruction through the verification of the actual and

complete occurrences, realism provides a persuasive answer to U.S.-China relations as seen through the historical facts and realities of what happened, what is happening, and even what may happen. This paper will analyze and justify how realism has been central and critical to the history and process of America-China policy. Based on key historical events and the changing correlations of power, the two hundred and twenty five years of U.S.-China relations can be organized in three periods.

The first period covers 1784 to 1899, when America developed from a new republic to a great power, and shifted from its commercial priority to imperialist orientation. At the same time, China deteriorated from a powerful empire to a semi-colonial pariah. The second period focuses on 1900 to 1949, and U.S. emphasizes on “dollar diplomacy” and “neutral diplomacy” in the power struggle for global dominance. In the same period, however, Chinese power shifted from empire to republic and became weakened by civil wars. The third period spans 1950 to 2009, when American superpower status prevailed and Chinese power was revived and increasing.

From the major events that occurred, it is obvious that most incidents in U.S. foreign policy have been directly or indirectly related to power struggle and national interest issues, with only several cases related to ideological disputes. For example, Taiping Rebellion was characterized by the indigenous Christian belief-system. However, America and other Western powers determined that their interests rested more with the Manchu government than the similar pseudo Christian Taiping ideology. The 1870s’ anti-Chinese immigration issue showed the great discrepancy between the theory and practice of American ideals and realist interests. Wilson’s “self-determination” was doubted when he gave in to Japan’s greedy demands for

control over the territory of China. Franklin Roosevelt did not stop selling oil and steel to Japan until the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack. McCarthyism was a shameful and destructive episode in the history of the United States. The human rights issue after the 1989 incident in Tiananmen Square yielded to the mutual economic benefits and the continuation of China's most favored nation (MFN) status. These events demonstrate that above all, national interests are the most vital priority for the state, and that realism is the driving force for relations among nations. National strength is the best way to guarantee the interests of a nation, and power determines the changes in relations between competitive countries like the United States and China.

CHAPTER FIVE: FROM COMMERCIALISM TO IMPERIALISM

(1784-1899)

Almost as soon as winning the independence from Great Britain, the Americans wasted little time in reaching the Chinese market. The cargo ship, *Empress of China* sailed out of New York, went around Cape Horn and directly headed to Guangdong (Canton), China in 1784. “The modest profits of this voyage excited emulation. Other ports and merchants, particularly in New England, took up the trade to China.” (46) In those first years of American involvement in China, the American government played a minimal role, consistent with the fundamental American policy of seeking to extend trade without much political complications. As private businessmen in quest of wealth, they made their own way to China, took their risks, operated within the Chinese permission and adopted a policy of respect of Chinese sovereignty and authorities, which their trade and fortune depended on. There were no treaties, nor diplomatic relations between the governments of China and of the United States.

By the time of the first American trade with China, the conditions imposed by the Chinese government on the Western merchants were the tribute system, which had long been a vehicle for trade. Since ancient times, the Chinese people were very ethnocentric, considering their realm the center of the universe, the Middle Kingdom, and regarded all cultural differences as signs of inferiority. All who were not Chinese were treated as barbarians, no matter where they came from, whether they were Inner Asian tribesmen or Europeans and Americans arriving by sea. The relations with the “barbarians” had been regulated under the tribute system.

Theoretically, all peoples in contact with China were tributaries. The procedures for this form of contact had been highly ritualized and the “barbarian” envoys had to pay homage to the Chinese emperor.

American businessmen remained in China, though they were restricted to a small area of Guangdong, without protection from American government. Obviously, the profits were worth the bother, even in the period of the Terranova affair in 1821. (47) An Italian sailor named Francis Terranova aboard the American ship *Emily* was seized and executed by Chinese authorities, for he was charged responsible for the death of a woman by discarding a jar from the ship. The American business community decided to allow Terranova to be seized after a show of protest. After the death sentence was carried out, the American government did not protest and the Americans in Guangdong were commended by the local officials for their properly submissive behavior.

From the point of power comparison, the United States entered Chinese tribute system within one year after her independence, at a time when America was still weak, yet the Manchu dynasty’s strength was at its peak and Chinese power was strong enough to control the relations with America and Europe. So long as the Chinese retained this position of relative strength, they treated Westerners at their own will, so in the latter days, the Americans responded the same way when the shift of power became irresistible and regrettable to China. Besides, according to Charles Beard, American moral obligation in national interest kept the government of the United States to follow the practice of recognizing *de facto* governments, avoiding a judgment upon their wisdom, their virtues, or their domestic policies. Always holding an even balance, America did business with the haughty Emperor of China, guided by

the policy of non-intervention and bent on safeguarding national interest, practically viewed.

In the 1830s, during the administration of Andrew Jackson, the American government sought to expand trade relations with China on a treaty basis. Edmund Roberts, “a pioneer in America’s Far Eastern diplomacy”, (48) was sent on a mission to find new commercial opportunities in the Orient. Roberts reached China in November 1832 but failed in establishing communication with the local Chinese authorities, except to receive an order to set sail immediately. Also in the 1830s, the first American missionaries visited China despite of the harsh conditions. These efforts gave a new and increasingly important dimension to the interests of America in China, for religious involvement inspired some of the American desires to find a place for the Chinese in the Kingdom of God.

China that time was a limitless market with about four hundred million people, yet at the same time, the American merchants also felt the pressure of finding some merchandises to sell. They just had limited markets for their furs, sandalwood, and ginseng, and they failed to match the value of the items the Americans sought to purchase. Some of the businessmen were involved in the sales of opium to China, though English merchants were largely responsible for the opium trade, and they succeeded in petitioning their government for military support. Very soon the opium trade became a critical problem for the Chinese government, for it “was draining China of specie and impoverishing the country.” (49)

Before the Opium War, industrialization and the growth of nationalism had made the West more powerful and more assertive in dealing with China, and the Manchu dynasty had passed the peak of its power and began to decline, yet the Chinese mandarins remained still arrogant and ignorant without perceiving that the Westerners had become powerful enough to

demand diplomatic equality. The balance of power had shifted, yet the Chinese government was reluctant to conceive of this and couldn't escape the humiliation in the century that followed.

As early as May 1839, American merchants in China petitioned Congress for a commissioner to negotiate a commercial treaty—and for warships to keep the natives friendly. Congress took no action, yet Commodore Lawrence Kearny and the East India Squadron were ordered to the vicinity of Chinese waters. Finding the American merchants in no danger, Kearny refrained from interfering in the Anglo-Chinese war, yet he “requested of the Chinese authorities that American merchants be put on the same footing as those of the nation most favored.” (50)

The administration of President John Tyler didn't have a clear mandate concerning with the China trade policy and continued inaction. Yet Dr. Peter Parker, a medical missionary to China, related by marriage to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, had been in Washington urging a diplomatic mission. Congress finally voted \$40,000 for a special mission, and Caleb Cushing, a former Whig Congressman was named to be the commissioner to China and followed by four warships.

On July 3, 1844, Caleb Cushing and Qiying (Ch'i-ying), imperial commissioner of the Emperor Daoguang (Tao Kuang), signed the “Peace, Amity and Commerce Treaty” at Wangxia, a village near Macao. “The Treaty of Wangxia imposed on China more concrete and harsher obligations in regard to extraterritoriality, fixed tariff duties, unilateral most favored nation treatment, revision of the treaty after twelve years and permission for American warships to enter China's ports.” (51) The Americans, without firing a shot, were able to expand their

commercial operations along the coast of China. The American flag followed the British to the treaty ports, and as junior partners, the Americans followed the British for the rest of the century.

Having acquired a treaty of its own, the government of the United States did little to implement it. After July 1844, Americans had access to five Chinese ports and in accordance with the treaty's provisions for extraterritoriality, the American consuls in these ports had sole jurisdiction over Americans accused of crimes in China, but no American consular service was set up in China until mid-1850s. In the interim, American merchants in the treaty ports carried on business as usual, providing consuls out of their own ranks, occasionally from the very firms involved in the opium trade. The British and their subjects continued to dominate trade, but the Americans offered increasing competition, particularly in the carrying trade. During the early 1850s in China, Americans carried about one third of China's trade to the West, with her only twenty five firms out of the approximately two hundred Western businesses. And of the burgeoning trade of Shanghai, rapidly becoming the major treaty port, American ships carried fully half. (52)

In 1856, Dr. Peter Parker was named American commissioner to China. He preferred the technique developed by British when dealing with China: firmness was essential and force had to be used where necessary. Parker also developed a plan for more American involvement in China. He suggested that the United States establish a foothold in the area, equivalent to the British possession of Hong Kong, and he urged that Taiwan (Formosa) be occupied for that purpose. (53) He also suggested the United States build coaling stations in the area and expand naval operations off the China coast.

In the 1850s, China's new emperor Xianfeng (Hsien-feng) determined on a new confrontation with the West, refusing to acknowledge the treaty provisions. Yet the provocative policy would not be successful under the international circumstances when the West enjoyed more relative power and when the Taiping Rebellion occurred in China, one of the most destructive wars in history and its scale even dwarfed that of the American Civil War.

The Taiping Rebel leader appeared to be the "presumed convert to Christianity." (54) In fact, the rebel leader Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-chuan) had studied briefly with an American missionary Issachar Roberts. The strength of the Taiping movement was readily apparent to the West as the Taipings occupied Nanjing, the ancient capital and influenced the lower Yangzi (Yangtze) valley and Shanghai area.

Difficulties with the Chinese government allowed most Westerners to harbor hopes for the success of the rebellion. But gradually, they came to believe that the interests of their respective countries would not be served by the victory of the rebellious forces. The more they learned of the ideology and governmental practices of the Taiping movement, the less attractive it seemed to them. The rebellion was hurting trade, the key U.S. goal in China. Humphrey Marshall, the American Commissioner from 1852 to 1854, believed that the British government was working for the collapse of the Chinese government in order to further British designs. He concluded that the Taipings had to be defeated and that the American government had to support the emperor and avoid the division of China between Britain and Russia. The Pierce administration was not intended to act, for the events in China were far from the focus of American government.

In November 1856, American gunships under Commodore James Armstrong leveled

five Chinese forts on the Pearl River near Guangdong. The forts fired on an American vessel that passed by and caused the systematic bombardment of retaliation. President Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy regretted Armstrong's harsh response. To the Chinese, who received the shots, not the regrets, Armstrong's action made it hard for them to regard the American presence as more beneficent than other Westerners.

The Buchanan administration replaced Parker with William Reed, the first American representative in China with the title of minister. Secretary of State Lewis Cass advised him that the United States sought no other purpose than those of lawful commerce, and for the protection of the lives and property of its citizens. The reason why American government deprived of territorial aggrandizement or the acquisition of political power in China is that America was too distant from that region.

In June 1859, during the process of exchange ratifications of the treaties of Tianjin (Tientsin), war occurred between China and the alliance of Britain and France. The Chinese defenders fired back and they wounded the British admiral in the ensuing battle. As the fight progressed, Commodore Josiah Tatnall, U.S.N, escorting the American minister, was disturbed by its course. With the approval of the minister, Josiah Tatnall entered the fray, using a chartered steamship to tow British sailing craft into the line of battle. He ordered his crew to assist the English gunners, muttering "Blood is thicker than water". (55) American neutrality was compromised.

In 1860, British and French forces returned, smashed the Chinese coastal and river defenses, and marched overland to Peking. The emperor surrendered his hopes of using American barbarians to curb English barbarians and he concluded that the United States was in

collusion with China's enemies. The armies of Great Britain and France marched into Peking and into the emperor's magnificent Summer Palace. They looted and put it to flame, destroying the priceless treasures of centuries of Chinese civilization. As a result of the battles of 1859 and 1860, the British and French heaped further humiliation on China. Tianjin was added to the treaty ports. The British took Jiulong (Kowloon) on the mainland across the bay from Hong Kong, and the French inserted a clause giving missionaries the right to lease or buy land and to build houses anywhere in China, and the West exacted new concessions and privileges. British and American merchants continued their involvement in arms trade with the Taiping rebellion, yet their small mercenary army, whose first two commanders Ward and Burgemine were Americans, was incorporated into the Manchu forces under Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang).

(56)

In the middle of the nineteenth century, America was in its preindustrial state with its vast unoccupied territories and potential domestic market. The center of power rested in Europe and the Orient mattered little in the world balance of power. The United States was a weak and underdeveloped power. Given its status among the powers, given its limited interests in China or elsewhere in the area, the American practice of trailing British power and utilizing the most-favored-nation clause furthered these interests. Although this tactic, which several historians have labeled "jackal diplomacy," (57) permitted no claim of moral superiority over the procedures employed by the Europeans, it was nonetheless a most realistic and satisfactory policy for the United States. Like the lion roars and makes the kill, the jackal smiles and picks the bones. And so long as the more powerful predators were willing to tolerate the American presence, jackal diplomacy would work.

American practices suited well to the interests of the United States and its nationals, it cannot be assumed that these practices served the best interests of China. The United States had been a junior partner, but it was nonetheless a participant in the events that exploited and humiliated China. None of the big powers assumed responsibility for the needs and advantages of a colonial-status China.

At the time of the Opium War, Chinese officials had hoped that they could count on American support, if not loyalty, because of traditional American hostility toward England. The Chinese were disappointed, and in subsequent years the Chinese government felt and realized that Americans only gave words of sympathy, but never any material support. Increasingly, the mandarins who dealt with foreign affairs came to suspect the complicity of the United States in England's schemes. They warned that the Americans always followed in England's wake—allowed British gunboats to humble the Chinese and moved in to share whatever new privileges had been exacted.

When William Seward became the Secretary of State in 1861, his principal task was to muster whatever foreign support he could for the Union to prevent the rebellious South from receiving any kind of support from abroad. Toward this end, he determined to remove any dispute in the relations between the United States and the Powers, especially Great Britain and France. In the affairs of Asia and China, America stood shoulder to shoulder with the Europeans. Seward sent Anson Burlingame to China, with instructions that made cooperation with the powers the official policy of the United States.

The death of the emperor in 1861 had left a power vacuum at the court, which the empress dowager Cixi (Tz'u Hsi) gradually filled. The new Chinese government began to know more

about the Western “law of nations”. The process of westernization had begun and the Chinese voluntarily moved away from traditional attitude and method. In 1867, China sent the first diplomatic mission, headed by Burlingame, the retiring American minister, to Washington and Europe. (58) In the United States, Burlingame exceeded his instructions and signed a treaty with Seward in which the United States pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. From European countries, he also obtained assurances of future moderation.

One provision of the treaty Seward signed with Burlingame gave Chinese immigrants the right to enter the United States with the promise of MFN treatment. Seward attempted to treat China as an equal among the powers and he also sought to stimulate and regularize the immigration of cheap Chinese labors for the rapid development of the West Coast. There were 100,000 Chinese in America in 1868 and growing numbers of Americans wanted fewer Chinese rather than more. The ethnocentrism in America soon turned into racism against the Chinese.

On the West Coast, and particularly in California, violence against the Chinese immigrants was rampant. Individual Chinese were subjected to beatings and humiliations, and occasionally they were wantonly murdered. In the 1870s and the 1880s, anti-Chinese agitation grew more violent, as lynchings, boycotts, and mass expulsions gave witness to racism in America, which came to be one of the “darkest chapters in Chinese-American relations.” (59) The injustice showed the great discrepancy between the theory and practice of American ideals. The pressure to exclude Chinese immigrants forced the Congress to pass a bill in 1879 that limited the number of Chinese that could arrive in the United States on one ship. (60) As the bill violated American obligations under the Burlingame treaty, President Hayes vetoed it—and

was soundly condemned on the Pacific Coast. Congress continued to pass laws violating the spirit of the treaty with China. In 1885, twenty-eight Chinese miners were brutally murdered in Wyoming and smaller-scale atrocities continued to occur through the American West. The immigration issue became a constant irritant in Sino-American relations, with the United States acting unilaterally in violation of its treaty obligations.

American treatment of Chinese in the United States taught China some interesting lessons. The Westerners had come to China in violation of the wishes and occasionally the laws of the Chinese people and their government. When these foreigners were treated as barbarians contemptuously, the Western powers demanded to be treated as equals with gunboats to impose the “superior” values of Western civilization on the unwilling Chinese. The Chinese had been taught, with shot and shell, that violations of treaty obligations were not tolerated. China had been forced to admit foreigners to its territory and American gunboats to patrol in China, but China had no gunboat to send to America. China had no power to protect its people in the United States, nor power to force the American government to admit Chinese as equal and require the United States to live up to its treaty obligations.

In 1894, war broke out between China and Japan on the issue of Korea. Within six months, the Japanese utterly destroyed China’s fleet and rolled over its armies in Korea and Manchuria, astonishing the Chinese and the entire world. In 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed between the two countries, with “seven new Chinese ports and three rivers opened, some internal taxes abolished, and above all, foreigners’ rights to create their own industrial enterprises in China were granted.” (61) China was labeled contemptuously as “dwarf nation” and faced the threat of imminent partition. To Japan, victory brought increased prestige and

great interests. In Washington, the Sino-Japanese War and its outcome were easily accepted. To the Cleveland administration, the war did not appear to threaten any American interests. Indeed, sentiment in America was pro-Japanese. In part, American sympathies were with Japan because of its role in Japan's opening and the disparity in the size of the combatant countries. There were also tremendous feelings of contempt for the Chinese and their apparent slothfulness. The Sino-Japanese war was regarded as a contest between barbarism and civilization.

Soon after the war, European powers like France, Germany, Russia and Britain expanded their spheres of influence in China, with mining and railroad development privileges—new sorrows for a powerless China—and cause for anxiety among Americans concerned with markets and with the balance of power in East Asia.

By 1899, the United States had become a world power in the sense that it was not only the greatest industrial nation, but it was also willing to use its new military power. Expansionism and militarism were accepted in America as a national policy, for these theories were not peripheral but central to the thinking of some governmental and opinion leaders. President McKinley had remained concerned about the events in China even during the War on Spain. He insisted that American interests should not be disturbed. There were other currents flowing through the United States, ideas about the importance of China in the world balance of power and about the importance of the United States in the Far Eastern balance. Brooks Adams and Alfred Mahan, generally recognized as the ideologues of American imperialism, both placed great stress on the importance of the power struggle in East Asia, and their views were often reflected in the writings and speeches of Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. In

1899, the acknowledged “old China hand” was William W. Rockhill, an adviser on Far Eastern affairs for the Secretary of State John Hay. (62)

According to Rockhill, the breakup of China would be a disaster. He was convinced that a sovereign China able to preserve order within its own boundaries was essential to the balance of power in Asia. On the contrary, the collapse of China would lead to an intensification of the imperialist rivalry already begun, even a world war. To prevent catastrophe, he believed the United States should use its new position in Asia and its growing influence in the world for the preservation of China’s existence as a nation. If necessary, he was willing to have the United States declare its intention to assist China in maintaining its territorial integrity. “The policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.” (63) Rockhill viewed stability in East Asia as essential to the development of American economic interests. Nonetheless, neither McKinley nor Hay was eager to make such a bold policy.

Hippisley, an Englishman, worked in the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service. He exchanged his ideas with Rockhill of his concern over the scramble for concessions in China and drafted a statement that later became John Hay’s “Open Door” notes. Hippisley’s draft requested that within the spheres of influence, the powers should not discriminate against the trade of other countries nor to interfere with Customs Service. If the imperialist powers acquiesced, the goods of all nations would be assured equal treatment in all parts of China. For the United States, which had no sphere of its own, such an agreement was of obvious value.

The existence of spheres of influence would cease to be a threat to the growing American trade with China. Markets would be available to those who sought them, pleasing the American Asiatic Association and alleviating concern over economic stagnation. The United States had not challenged the existence of spheres of influence, nor had it asked for equal opportunity for investment in the various spheres. For all the powers, though there was little to gain from agreeing to the American policy declaration, there was also little to lose, so no country was willing to reject the American request. Hay's effort seemed successful and he and McKinley announced that American interests in China had been safeguarded.

Both Hay and Rockhill were convinced that they contributed meaningfully to the preservation of the Chinese empire, yet Hay had not consulted with the Chinese government, nor sought any expression of China's needs. The notes were intended to serve the interests of the United States, and their value to China was incidental. China showed little gratitude for this, and the relations between China and the United States were very tense as a result of American discrimination against Chinese immigrants. In the following years, instead of the goodwill that Rockhill and Hay had hoped for the United States, they harvested the bitter reward due to American racists.

In the 1890s, the American missionary effort in China had been revitalized after it had begun in the 1830s. There is no need to doubt the inherent idealism of the American men and women who served the Christian missions in China. They surrendered the comforts to face the unknown dangers, perhaps the greatest danger they faced came from the very people to whom they hoped to bring salvation. The Chinese had not asked the missionaries to come and the Chinese government hoped to forbid the propagation of Christianity in China. Over the years,

the Western gunboats had forced China to concede, the missionaries functioned as a part of the treaty system, a reminder of China's humiliations. In China, the faith of the Christian missionaries clashed with Chinese culture, and the church sometime disputed with the local communities, which inevitably antagonized many Chinese and led to widespread unrest. The Boxers, a new movement, was fomented to drive the foreigners out of China.

CHAPTER SIX: BALANCE OF POWER TO CONFRONTATION

(1900-1949)

In June 1900, the German minister was killed by a Chinese soldier and the Chinese court declared war on all the powers, with the siege against the Foreign Legations in Beijing, the slaughter of missionaries together with thousands of Chinese Christians in North China and Manchuria. “The United States moved into the role of direct participant, and American troops joined in the expedition to lift the siege of the Legations.” (64) In the besieged quarter sat the American minister, E.H. Conger, who months earlier had urged the use of American gunboats, insisting that nothing but a show of strength would move the Chinese. And the strength of the United States was shown in its troops among the eight countries that had liberated the missionaries and diplomats in Peking.

The protocol ending the war was signed in September 1901, after a delay occasioned by disputes over the size and distribution of the indemnity from China. The powers ultimately agreed on an enormous sum, equivalent to more than \$300 million, of which the United States got \$25 million. (65) In addition, foreign troops were allowed to station between Peking and the sea. And American naval circles in Washington had been pressing the government to acquire territory in China for a coaling station.

In 1901, following the assassination of McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United States, and John Hay still dominated the Far Eastern policy until 1904, when the Russo-Japanese war began. During these years, American trade declined sharply in China. The

balance of power in the area was threatened by Russian adventurism, especially in the Manchuria area of China. Sino-American relations in these years were really a three-cornered game, with Russia playing the third hand. Following the defeat of the Boxers, the Russians intended to control Manchuria completely. Given the limits of American interests in Manchuria, Hay and Roosevelt sought merely Russian assurances of fair treatment for American trade. But to Japan, Russia's advances in this area presented a much more tangible threat. Failed the alliance with the United States in 1901, Japan soon found an ally with Great Britain in 1902, and in February 1904, Japan suddenly attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

Roosevelt rejoiced with Japan's assault on Russian hegemony in Manchuria because of his conviction that no damage to American interests would result from a Japanese victory. Yet he hoped Russia at least survived as an Asiatic power to be a check on Japan, keeping Japan's attention focused on the mainland instead of looking toward the south like to the Philippines. For the following years, the problem how to coexist with Japan troubled those American foreign policy makers. "Japan emerged to be one of the first-class military powers of the world," (66) and good relations with Japan had to be central to Roosevelt's Asian policy. For the United States, not any interest in China was worth the risk of antagonizing Japan. (67) Roosevelt's contempt for China came from their failure to defend themselves against imperialism, and he assumed that they could never develop a national spirit.


Changes were taking place in China. The Chinese government had undertaken a series of important reforms for gradual modernization and there were manifestations of a rising sense of nationalism among the Chinese. Chinese people began to focus their attention on the sovereignty and the special privileges the powers had wrested from China. They also became

increasingly sensitive and angry with the American Congress for the permanent exclusion of Chinese immigrants since 1904, which was a disgrace, a mockery of American ideals and a shortcoming of American government. In the late spring of 1905, Chinese merchants and students in the major cities launched a boycott of American goods, which “stood as China’s first modern demonstration of national resentment against the West.” (68) A number of American missionaries were murdered in China. Fearing another Boxer uprising, Roosevelt ordered the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet and had the War Department draw up plans for possible operations against China. The President knew the cause for such a situation and placed responsibility for the difficulties with China on the American people. He insisted in his annual message to Congress that grave injustice and wrong had been done by this nation to the people of China. He reminded Americans that they had insisted on just treatment by the Chinese, but warned that Americans couldn’t receive equity unless they were willing to do the same.

In 1909, William Howard Taft became President of the United States. His Asian policy constituted a sharp departure from past American practices, aggressively promoting the economic interests of the United States to an extent never before attempted. As governor of the Philippines and during his Asian tour as secretary of war, Taft had become apprehensive about Japanese intentions in East Asia. He concluded that Roosevelt’s appeasement of Japan was misguided, for Roosevelt subordinated American interests in China to the strong will of Japan. Taft personally believed China’s Manchuria being menaced by the railway concessions to Japan and Russia, which ought to be stopped, and he desired a “dollar diplomacy” of “share for American corporations henceforth in China’s foreign loans and big construction contracts.” (69) Taft’s new policy coincided with the views of Philander Knox, his Secretary of State,

Huntington Wilson, the first assistant Secretary of State, Willard Straight, the chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. All of these men believed that in the pursuit of American interests, they were helping China. They assumed the congruity of American and Chinese interests. The Taft administration insisted that the “Open Door” policy assured Americans equal opportunity for investment throughout China.

Table 1
Total Investments in China of the Principal Countries in 1902, 1914 and 1931



Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomacy History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC, New York, 1965, p499.

Financial circles in the United States were generally unenthusiastic about investment opportunities in China; they preferred surer profits elsewhere, yet Taft soon found banking support for his policy. China hoped to use American support and investment to counter Japanese and Russian influences in Manchuria. The Taft administration’s diplomatic offensive disturbed the other powers with interests in China. This offensive was over in 1911 and 1912

by Taft's withholding recognition for the new Chinese republic, when the Chinese people rose to rid themselves of both the Manchu dynasty and foreign domination.

A successful revolution occurred in China on October 10, 1911, and its acknowledged leader Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) was elected Provisional President of the Republic of China. Within five months the weak Manchu dynasty was forced to abdicate. Since then, "China means to become a nation in the western sense of the word,

" (70) yet the real power rested with Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai), a general of the former government. Without his support, the future of the Republic of China was bleak. In March 1913, Yuan had the parliament leader assassinated. At the same time, Woodrow Wilson became President of the United States.

Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan didn't trust Roosevelt's militarism and Taft's dollar diplomacy. Wilson later explained that he felt keenly the desire to help China. His administration demonstrated more sympathy to the new Chinese republic government. Soon after his inauguration, Wilson advised his cabinet that he had decided to recognize the Republic of China on a unilateral basis, and refused to be bound by the decision of other governments. Wilson's cabinet was exhilarated by his high moral purpose, but the other powers were not. Japan warned Wilson that the Chinese republic was on the verge of civil war.

World War I in Europe since 1914 left Japan as China's principal source of economic assistance—and the Japanese didn't believe a strong China was good for their interests. Each of the loans made to China was with an eye toward the enlargement and strengthening of Japan's continental empire. During the war, Japan took over German possessions in East Asia, including the German concession in Shandong province (Shantung), China. In January 1915,

the Japanese minister to China presented Yuan Shikai with the notorious “Twenty-One Demands”, with terms that Japan intended to have China “directly under the control of Tokyo”.

(71) Clearly, the Japanese recognized the fact that the European War left them with a free hand in Asia, and they sought to make the most of the opportunity.

Helpless before Japanese pressures, unable to hope for assistance from the European powers, the Chinese again turned to the United States. Robert Lansing, then counselor of the Department of State, assured sincere American friendship, but for him it would be quixotic that the United States be entangled in international difficulties for the issue of China’s territorial integrity. In Lansing’s view, American interests in China were commercial only, and a Japanese guarantee of equal treatment for American goods satisfied the requirements of the “Open Door” policy. But others in the State Department advanced a broader conception of American interests in East Asia. E. T. Williams, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, believed that with the modernization of China, the myth of the Chinese market would become reality. He argued that despite commercial interests being greater in Japan than in China, a farsighted policy would be based on the assumption that American interests would be best served by a strong and independent China.

In the summer of 1917, a Japanese mission headed by Ishii Kikujiro was sent to Washington to negotiate Japan’s special position in China. The discussion between Ishii and Secretary of State Lansing indicated little agreement between the two nations. Nonetheless, the two diplomats exchanged notes, which couched in the ambiguous language of their profession over different views between the two governments. In the notes, Lansing acknowledged that Japan’s geographic position allowed it to have “special interests” in China, but in his

discussions with Ishii he specially denied that “special” meant “paramount”. (72) To Wilson, this agreement was a great stroke on behalf of Chinese as well as American interests, but the Chinese were not reassured and full of a mood of despairing.

During the Paris Peace Conference began from January 18 to June 28, 1919, the overshadowing issues were security for France against future German aggression and the League of Nations. On the issue of the Far-East, the American and Chinese delegations worked closely together as Wilson hoped to free China from restrictions on her sovereignty. The Chinese dreamed of ridding themselves of all the symbols of their semi-colonial status, and they were particularly interested in regaining control of Shandong as their minimal demand. Japan, however, had signed secret treaties with the European allies that bound them to support Japanese claims to the German concessions in China. Under the circumstances, China’s hope and Wilson’s efforts on China’s behalf came to nought. When the Japanese threatened to quit the Peace Conference, Wilson accepted the Japanese position. To Wilson, Japan was much stronger and more important than China, Japan’s quitting meant failure of the League of Nations, “Without the League, there could be no hope for an effective collective security system. Without collective security, wars would come again.” (73)

Wilson’s decision to yield to the Japanese on the Shandong issue proved to be one of the most strongly criticized decisions he made at Paris. The Chinese and some of the American delegation, including Lansing, were outraged. In China, students went on an extended rampage, beginning the May Fourth Movement as a sign of modern China. In the United States, opposition to the Shandong decision brought influential liberals to the side of Henry Cabot Lodge in opposition to the Treaty of Versailles. The subsequent failure of the United States to

join the League postponed the great-power cooperation in China for which Wilson had worked. Wilson initiated the “Fourteen Points” in 1918 and the moral standard of “national self-determination”, yet he suffered defeat in the presence of the stubbornness of Japanese power, and Wilson himself reiterated the importance of power when he later fought for the ratification of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles after the Conference. He declared that American isolation had ended, not because America chose to go into the politics of the world, but because by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of American power. In the contest between moral obligation and material interest, Woodrow Wilson saw interest usually emerging triumphant. He admitted “We have sympathized with freedom everywhere, have pressed handsome principles of equity in international dealings. And yet, when issues of our own interest arose, we have not been unselfish. We have shown ourselves kin to all the world, when it came to pushing an advantage.” (74)

The following Harding administration faced with strong domestic pressures for disarmament and the rapid Japanese naval building up. Charles Evans Hughes, the Secretary of State realized the arms race could not be isolated from a host of other problems, especially the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japanese imperialism in China, and the balance of power in East Asia. Thus, it was in response to the American quest for security outside the League of Nations, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 was convened.

China was viewed as a potential source of friction among nations, its weakness a temptation to adventurism. Ultimately, in the Nine-Power Treaty, the participants in the Conference agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of China; to allow the Chinese to solve their domestic problems, unify their country and modernize it, in their own way and at their

own pace. This was the “internationalization” of the American “Open Door” policy, and the Nine-Power Treaty came nowhere near fulfilling the hopes of the Chinese delegates who had come to Washington. The first article of the treaty involved four principles that designed to freeze rather than to modify the status quo in China. The article required a respect both for China’s sovereignty and for those “rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states” that infringe that sovereignty. (75)

From 1922 to 1925, Jacob Gould Schurman, President Harding’s minister to China, and J.V.A. MacMurray, Hughes’ principal advisor and “America’s gunboat minister,” (76) had control over American policy toward China. They agreed that concessions to China, especially the abolition of extraterritoriality, would have to await order in China. Attributing China’s new burst of nationalism to Soviet agitation, they described the Chinese as having become very self-assertive, and their response became inadequate. A combination of sterile legalism and a rigid insistence on order shaped American policy during that time.

With Frank Kellogg becoming the new Secretary of State, he decided to yield to the Chinese demands for treaty revision. He was deeply influenced by the views of Nelson Johnson, his principal advisor on Chinese affairs. (77) Johnson had concluded that revolution and its accompanying violence and disorder were necessary before the Chinese could slough off the moribund civilization that thwarted their development. In the process, Kellogg and Johnson were determined to retain what they believed to be America’s image as China’s leading friend. Concerned about Soviet imperialism, they concluded that the success of the Chinese nationalists would be the best defense against that threat. They fortified the view of the Chinese revolution as a worthy imitator of the American Revolution—the independence and freedom to

determine their own future. And if the United States remained friendly to China, the Chinese nationalists could only reciprocate this friendship. In short, this policy was congruent not only with American ideals but with American interests as well.

In July 1928, America and China signed a new tariff treaty, granting tariff autonomy to China and containing a mutual guarantee of MFN treatment. (78) Constituting recognition of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang kai-shek)'s national government of China, the signing of the treaty symbolized the successful conclusion of Kellogg's quest to establish America as China's principal friend. In 1928, it was clear that Americans had reason to be satisfied with their government's policy. The influences of the Soviet Union, the nation that had aided the Guomindang (Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party), manipulated the Chinese Communist Party, had been exclude totally from China. Japanese meddling won few friends in Chinese government. American policy had facilitated a rapprochement with Nationalist China. Once again, Americans could view themselves as champions of the sovereign rights of China.

Throughout the 1920s, China witnessed civil strife and great upheavals. The nationalists under Sun Zhongshan and then under Jiang Jieshi, resumed plans for the military reunification of the country. The Chinese Communist Party was formally established with the help of the Soviet Union. The warlords in both South and North China continued to fight for their own powers. With Jiang gradually defeated all other opponents and took the upper hand, he and his followers formed the national government of China in Nanjing on October 10, 1928. Yet at the same time, Japan attempted military conquest of China.

When the Japanese army attacked Manchuria in September 1931 and "inaugurated the Far Eastern crisis," (79) Jiang appealed to the League of Nations. Unfortunately for China, the

autumn of 1931 proved to be a poor time to attract support, for Europe had suffered grievously by the Great Depression. In the United States, the search for an escape from economic stagnation and collection of war debts fully occupied the administration of Herbert Hoover and the Secretary of State, Henry Stimson. Besides, America had grown accustomed to living with the Japanese domination in Manchuria. Leading American diplomats, like Nelson Johnson and Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern affairs, who were long reputed to be pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese, were prepared to accept the reality. These men recognized the fact of Japan's vital interest in the area and the absence of any significant American interest. In 1931, the American minister to China, Nelson Johnson wrote that "if Manchuria is destined to become part of Japan, I do not see why that should necessarily embroil us." (80)

As the Japanese army rolled on, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley concluded that the American army and navy were unprepared and not strong enough to fight. And the President was resolutely opposed to the use of force, even the use of economic sanctions. Given this complex of circumstances and attitudes, a decision to appease Japan seemed obvious. In January 1932, Stimson informed both China and Japan that the United States would recognize no impairment of its treaty rights. Yet, Japanese army created a puppet state of "Manzhou Guo (Manchukuo)" in February 1932, totally under Japanese tutelage. (81)

In November 1932, the American people chose a new President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Initially Roosevelt followed a course of returning to Theodore's policy of appeasing Japan. The American public expressed the regret at seeing China under Japanese control, yet they insisted if China lacked the strength to protect herself from aggression, she could not reasonably expect

other nations to do the job for her. “Certainly America is not going to court trouble by any quixotic attempt to checkmate Japan in Asia.” (82)

Throughout 1935 and 1936, Japanese encroachments on China continued, but American policy remained basically appeasement to Japan. As to the growing Chinese dissatisfaction and complaints with the United States, Johnson and Hornbeck often stated that American policy was supposed to serve American ends first. They were quick to counter the suggestions that the United States fight China’s battles. In July 1937, as the fighting in China intensified and developed into a major war, the American response remained unchanged. Hornbeck made essentially the same points, declaring that the United States had always favored a strong and united China, but that American policy was designed to do more than merely help China. He claimed for the United States the privilege of acting on its own conception of national interest. “America’s decision to isolate itself from China’s misfortunes was neither totally selfish nor difficult to understand. It seemed sheer folly to risk war with Japan, and China’s confused political situation made it even more difficult for Washington to consider any form of intervention.” (83)

Throughout the 1930s, events in Asia concerned Roosevelt little more than that of the American domestic priorities. Despite his frequently voiced affection for China, he was largely indifferent to her fate, deeming American interests there to be slight, unwilling to concede that Japanese hegemony over China would threaten the United States. And American power then was insufficient to challenge Japanese predominance in East Asia. In a speech in October, 1937, Roosevelt called vaguely for “quarantine” on aggressors to check the “epidemic of world lawlessness.” (84) After the speech, the President admitted he had no plan, but

American isolationists responded to the speech by warning him against any bold action. In Washington, there arose a conviction that so long as the Japanese were drawn deeper and deeper into China, they would trouble no one else. This conviction continued until Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor. In the defense of the interests of the United States, it was important to give the Chinese enough aid to keep them fighting, but it was not necessary to give them enough to win. And if China would not fight, Asian affairs could await the settlement of vital issues across the Atlantic. The fight to liberate China was not an important American priority, merely a sideshow in the war against the Axis.

Table 2
American Exports to China and Japan, 1932-1940

Year	Value of Exports (in \$ millions)		Percentage of Total U.S. Export Trade	
	To China	To Japan	To China	To Japan
1932	56	135	3.5	8.4
1933	52	143	3.1	8.5
1934	69	210	3.2	9.9
1935	38	203	1.7	8.9
1936	47	204	1.9	8.3
1937	50	289	1.5	8.6
1938	35	240	1.3	7.8
1939	56	232	1.8	7.3
1940	78	227	1.9	5.6

Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p123.

Roosevelt refused to apply the Neutrality Act to the “incident” in China, thus making it legal to sell arms and munitions to Jiang’s government, yet it could not obscure the preponderance of American trade with Japan. “As late as 1940, \$78 million in American

exports went to China, whereas \$227 million were shipped to Japan, and oil, the most vital ingredients in Japan's war machine, was not withheld until July, 1941." (85) Just before the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor, the United States gradually tightened the screws on Japan—not out of sudden concern for China, but because of the threat posed by Japan's southward thrusts and ultimately by its adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis. Thus China was transformed into an American ally. America renounced the last privilege under the "unequal treaties"—at least in theory, and talked much of China as a great power after the war.

In February 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met at Yalta, negotiating the subjects of United Nations, the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Poland, Germany, the Far East and the Pacific War. In the Far East, the Soviet Union intended to regain everything the Tsars had lost or traded to the Japanese—the Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, control of the Manchurian railways. America hoped to expel the "imperialists"—Britain, France, and Japan—from China and Korea, and possibly from Indochina and Hong Kong, and to substitute American economic hegemony. As to the influence of sphere, Stalin and Churchill regarded China, "the sleeping giant of Asia as America's baby." (86) "Believing that an invasion of Japan's home islands would be necessary to unconditionally defeat Japan and always eager to minimize American casualties, Roosevelt saw the benefits of a Soviet attack on Japan's army in Manchuria, China." (87) The details of the Far East settlement were worked out on the last day of the Conference, at a meeting between Harriman and Molotov, the representatives of the American and Soviet delegations. Specifically, the draft agreement mentioned that in two or three months after Germany had surrendered, the Soviet Union would enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that "the status quo in Outer-Mongolia should be preserved, the

former rights of Russia in Port of Dairen and Port of Arthur, the Russian rights to operate the China-Eastern and Southern-Manchuria railroads should be restored.” (88)At Yalta, Roosevelt undertook to dispose of Chinese territory without China’s prior consent, which was consistent with traditional American indifference as to the real Chinese interests. Once again, the Roosevelt years demonstrated that American policy was designed to serve American interests without particular regard to China. At the end of World War II, Roosevelt nominated China as a great power and one of the five members of the United Nations Security Council, more or less for the compensation to the past wartime neglect. Had Roosevelt reviewed his administration’s policies toward China, he would have realized how absurd were American pretensions to the role of China’s champion of interest preserver. The undeniable fact is that China benefited incidentally and when the interests of the two countries could coincide. Roosevelt’s East Asian policies gave Americans no cause for grievance—and the Chinese no cause for gratitude.

In the year 1945 the United States defeated the Japanese Empire and became the dominant military power in the Pacific and in the world. The Truman administration hoped China could police its East Asia affairs and be part of the global containment strategy against the Soviet Union. (89) America began to negotiate a new treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government. Conflicting visions and policy differences were manifested on the issues of the post-war China economic model, American most-favored-nation status or national treatment, time limit conditional or unconditional, etc. The American negotiators recommended using a U.S. government loan as a bargaining chip to bring the Chinese Nationalist government to terms and finally on November 8, 1946, the treaty was signed.

Soon after the signing of the treaty, a stunned American Embassy in China reported that

the treaty was received with reservations or even an attitude of hostility. Most Chinese newspaper editorials, articles and public opinions were overwhelmingly against the treaty. In February 1947, when an American professor visited China, he was surprised to find how many businessmen and financiers, along with intellectuals in China, believed that the Nationalist government was beyond any hope. Even some British observers described the treaty as “an act of economic aggression, unprecedented and most savage.” (90) The signing of the treaty became the occasion for a communist-declared National Humiliation Day. By November the communists were claiming that Jiang had turned the economic, political, and military control of China over to the United States.

“Truman was the first U.S. President to stress the useful role China could play in the adversarial post-war dynamic to help protect U.S. interests,” (91) yet the Truman administration fundamentally misjudged China’s economic conditions and aspirations, for Washington’s economic reconstruction plans for Nationalist China was based on the American-Soviet rivalry, rather in the context of China’s historical quest for modernity and new identity. The Chinese economy worsened rapidly in the aftermath of signing the treaty, until the Nationalist was finally defeated by the communists in 1949.

In November, 1945, President Truman appointed General George C. Marshall as his special representative in China to continue the work of mediation between the nationalists and the communists, which had previously begun by Hurley since 1944. (92) On December 15, 1945, Marshall arrived in China and began his mediation between the Nationalists (KMT) and the Communists (CCP). When he arrived, the KMT-CCP negotiations had just reached an impasse. Urban Chinese, particularly the Third Force, were overjoyed by his arrival. On

January 10, 1946, with Marshall's effective mediation, the Chinese Political Consultative Conference (PCC), convened in Chongqing (Chungking) and soon passed a resolution declaring that a democratic coalition government including the KMT, the CCP, and the Third Force. The armed forces would be nationalized and the National Assembly established. Yet, the resolution triggered an angry uproar within the conservative factions of the Nationalists. For them, it was like a coup against the party or criminal behavior. (93)

With the Soviet military withdrawal from Manchuria, the Nationalists immediately took over the key cities and ports. The eruption of the civil war in Manchuria put Marshall in a political dilemma. On June 10, 1946, Jiang publicly changed his position and pledged to solve the communist issue through military means in one year. On June 26, 1946, in Washington, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported favorably on the military assistance bill to the Nationalists' government. One day later, the Truman administration announced that the United States was to provide the KMT government with \$51.7 million equipment. Very soon, Marshall reported to Truman that it would be impossible for him to continue his mediation in China. (94)

By mid-1946, the communists were in great disadvantage compared with the Nationalists military forces. America intervened in the Chinese civil war and stood on the side of Jiang. The American military came up with detailed plans for training ten Nationalist divisions and air-lifted Nationalists' soldiers to the fronts during late 1945 and early 1946, allowing them to take control of key cities and positions in China's heartland. American involvement into Chinese Civil War not only alienated the communists, but also strengthened Jiang's intransigence against any compromise.

Jiang lost most of his best troops in 1948 and in 1949. On April 23, 1949, the

Nationalist government evacuated from Nanjing and then moved to Taiwan. The People's Republic of China was founded on October 1, 1949. During the dramatic and drastic change, U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart delayed his departure from China, waiting to get the chance to discuss possible diplomatic relations with the new government.

The discussions between Stuart and Huang Hua, the communist representative in Nanjing resulted in an invitation to Stuart to visit Beijing in July, 1949 for an informal meeting with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. (95) John M. Cabot, Consul General in Shanghai pointed out that a meeting between Mao and the American ambassador would have been welcomed by American businessmen and employers, yet Washington rejected the invitation, which was viewed as a confirmation of American hostility to the new government. At the very least, the U.S. lost a chance for an earnest Sino-American dialogue. On July 1, 1949, Mao declared that China would lean to the side of the Soviet Union in international affairs. (96) In February 1950, the two communist countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Help.

While "waiting for the dust to settle" during the summer of 1949, Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State decided to release the facts and American policy about China. Believing that the "human mind could be moved by facts and reason," (97) Acheson had the State Department prepare a thorough study of the recent Sino-American relationship, which he hoped, would dispel some of the misrepresentations. This government document carried the imposing title *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, commonly known as the *China White Paper*. (98)

The 1,054-page report issued on August 6, 1949 placed the entire blame for the loss of China on the Nationalist government, and portrayed Jiang and his government as corrupt and

incompetent. The *China White Paper* summarized that “The reasons for the failure of the Chinese National Government---do not stem from any inadequacy of American aid. Our military observers on the spot have reported that the Nationalist armies did not lose a single battle during the crucial year of 1948 through lack of arms or ammunition. Nationalist China received in the form of grants and credits approximately two billion dollars---and large quantities of military and civilian war surplus property with a total procurement cost of over one billion dollars.” (99)

Acheson concluded that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that America did or could have done within the reasonable limits would have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by America has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces that America tried to influence but failed.

The United States insisted on maintaining diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government at Taiwan and imposed economic sanctions on the new communist regime, Beijing chose to respond in kind. It took several hostile steps toward the United States in 1949-1950, including the detention of Angus Ward, the American consul in Shenyang, on espionage charges, the seizure of the American military barracks in Beijing, the harassment of U.S. diplomats seeking to leave China, and the arrest of American missionaries working in the country. Some Americans, and even a few Chinese, have argued that there was a “lost chance” in 1949—that greater flexibility on the American side could have avoided a hostile relationship between the new People’s Republic and the United States.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM ENEMIES TO COMPETITORS

(1950-2009)

In late 1949, when the CIA warned that the Chinese communists were planning to launch their military campaign against Taiwan in the summer of 1950, and when the Pentagon reported that America's military force was not yet ready to defend the island, the State Department faced a dilemma: if the CCP's Taiwan campaign were to take place the following summer, what would be the United States' policy toward Taiwan? Should the United States try to deter the CCP by threatening military intervention, as recommended by the Pentagon? Or should the United States seize this opportunity to send a message to the Chinese Communists that the United States would not intervene in their Taiwan campaign, thereby undermining the ongoing Sino-Soviet alliance treaty negotiation in Moscow, as recommended by the Division of Chinese Affairs? Of the two positions, Acheson believed that the latter was far better than the former. Thus America's military withdrawal from Taiwan, he asserted, could effectively and powerfully isolate the Soviet Union as the only nation that was seeking territorial aggrandizement in Asia.

Truman agreed with Acheson's recommendation. On January 5, 1950, he issued an official statement on America policy toward Taiwan. He declared that America's traditional China policy, or the "Open Door" policy, "called for international respect for the territorial integrity of China." Then, he emphasized that Taiwan's legal status was part of China. (100)

Despite their opposing ideological rhetoric, the State Department's China policy and Beijing's America policy from 1949 to mid-1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, bore

amazing similarities. The first, neither side attempted to establish a diplomatic relationship with the other in the short run; the second, neither side formulated a confrontational policy against the other; the third, and most important, both sides intended to build a limited working relationship, starting in the economic arena.

These policy similarities can be attributed to both sides' overriding objective: splitting the other's strategic partnership. Washington's goal was to break up the Sino-Soviet coalition, and Beijing's was to weaken the Washing-Jiang alliance. A war with Beijing, from Dean Acheson's viewpoint, could only drive China into the arms of the Soviet Union. A war with Washington, from Mao's perspective, could only compel Washington to rescue the Nationalist government in Taiwan.

The Korean War ended any hope that the passage of time would allow the dust to settle. Although the outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula in June 1950 was not the result of decisions made in either Beijing or Washington, Sino-American relations were still one of the war's principal victims. Acting as the instrument of the United Nations, American forces came to the aid of the disintegrating South Korean Army, and with the help of units from a dozen other U.N. members, they held the Pusan perimeter. In September, General MacArthur launched a brilliant amphibious operation at Inchon, and by the end of the month, American forces were in virtual control of South Korea. Then the United States broadened its objectives to include the liberation of North Korea and cross over the 38th parallel. MacArthur hoped to end the war before Thanksgiving and the soldiers could be home before Christmas. All members of Truman's advisory group regarded China as a weak nation, whose main source of potency in world affairs came from its affiliation with the Soviet Union. This unrealistic image

was based on the ideological presuppositions that were popular then in the United States. The government's miscalculation failed to take account of Red China's possible responses to American troops in Korea, to America's military power to gain control over China's neighbor and ally. (101) The prospect of a pro-American, non-communist regime on China's northeastern frontier was unacceptable to Chinese leaders, who viewed the American decision as a harbinger of a much broader effort to overthrow the new communist government in China.

Beijing therefore threatened to intervene if American forces approached China's border. Washington ignored the warnings by misreading China's intentions and capabilities, so Mao decided to intervene in force, despite the reservations of his military and civilian lieutenants and the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to provide direct military support. "By November 1950, a half million Chinese and American troops were locked in a brutal war that lasted until mid-1953." (102) The result was about 150,000 Chinese, and approximately 50,000 Americans lost their lives. Chinese intervention in Korea hardened American opposition to Beijing and widened the circle of Americans who sought Jiang's return to power.

The Korean War made China and America enemies, the road to recognition was impassable. The war deepened and institutionalized the confrontation between China and the United States. With the outbreak of the conflict, Washington imposed even tougher sanctions against Beijing. In addition, the Korean War also occasioned a very significant change in American policy toward Taiwan. With American Seventh Fleet patrolling the Taiwan Strait, the military assistance to Jiang was resumed. In 1954, America signed a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. At the same time, in order to deny the communist government in Beijing any claim to sovereignty over the island, the United States also adopted

the position that the legal status of Taiwan was undetermined. “Supporting Taiwan became the single most way of containing China and integrating other Asian countries, economically and militarily, into an American security system in Asia. After the outbreak of the Korean War, isolating China and remaking Asia diplomatically and ideologically became inseparable goals” (103)

On February 9, 1950, Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy from Wisconsin delivered a speech to a small Republican gathering in Wheeling, West Virginia. He assaulted that two hundred and five communists, i.e., traitors, had infiltrated the State Department, which was part of an international conspiracy that had delivered China to communist rule, Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union and more betrayals. (104)With breathtaking audacity, McCarthy offered no proof but more accusation by names. The State Department specialists on China, like Edmund Clubb, John Paton Davis, John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent, were abused and persecuted. During the McCarthy era, lots of people were suspected as spies of the Soviet Union and China, and the work of Department of State was severely damaged. McCarthyism was one of the most shameful and destructive episodes in the history of the United States. It looked preposterous but not accidental, it was a manifestation of the rage which the American leaders, because of their embarrassment and shame, felt more intensely when the Chinese people liberated themselves from imperialism, which the Americans never believed or expected. From 1954, McCarthy began to be disgraced and soon forgotten after his death. It is as though Americans had become ashamed of themselves for having permitted such a man to speak for them, to exploit their credulity in their moment of vulnerability. McCarthyism was defined in the Webster’s Dictionary in 1961 as “political attitude of the

mid-twentieth century closely allied to know-nothingism and characterized chiefly by the opposition to elements held to be subversive and by the use of tactics involving personal attacks on individuals by means of widely publicized indiscriminate allegations, esp. on the basis of unsubstantiated charges.” (105)

The 1950s witnessed the further hardening of anti-Chinese attitudes and policy. The Eisenhower administration tolerated and abetted the McCarthyite emasculatation of the Department of State, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles convinced himself of the immorality of communists, particularly the Chinese communists. He pledged to end the neglect of the Far East, and tried to isolate, encircle and overthrow the Beijing government. The United States would recognize only the Republic of China in Taiwan, and would not tolerate the seating of Beijing in the United Nations. In August 1958, America helped Jiang move one hundred thousand of troops onto the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), where the Nationalist army had been bombarding the mainland China. Beijing resumed harassing the shipping and shelling the offshore islands and America threatened to defend and retaliate with nuclear weapons.

In 1961, John F. Kennedy took the reins of the American government, determined to reduce the tensions of the Cold war. However, despite considerable success in the policy toward Eastern Europe, Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk concluded that China had become the more dangerous of the two leading communist states. Though some obvious disagreements over the key issues like ideology and strategy had emerged between China and the Soviet Union, the Kennedy administration didn't intend to exploit it. Regrettably, the Johnson administration perpetuated Kennedy's decision to draw the line in Vietnam. In the

mid-1960s more and more of American vast resources were poured into Vietnam, with disastrous effects on the people of that hapless country and little benefit to anyone.

At the same time, the relations between China and the Soviet Union are undertaking dramatic changes. Since Stalin's death in 1953, Mao was less willing to obey Soviet leadership. In Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev was not ready for confrontation with America, despite of all his rhetoric of bellicosity. During the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958, Khrushchev advised China to accept the two-China policy that America liked to offer, rather than support Beijing's determination to liberate Taiwan. The Chinese were outraged and their hostility to the Soviet leader was apparent to Western observers by 1959. Angered by Chinese criticism, Khrushchev recalled Soviet aid missions from China. By 1960, the Chinese communists had begun to carefully document the differences between the two countries. "In substance, Beijing argued that there should be peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, but that the international class war between oppressors and the oppressed should continue unabated." (106) More ominous than these polemics were the growing boundary disputes and conflicts between China and the Soviet. In March 1969, Sino-Soviet tensions erupted in two serious border clashes that resulted in heavy casualties. (107) China became a nuclear power in 1964, and the prospect of nuclear war was frightening to the world.

When Richard Nixon came to be President, he and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger seemed to understand the changed mood of the American people and their conciliatory attitude towards China. Improvement with Beijing was essential to the change of balance in international relations and to the negotiation of ending the Vietnam War. Since July 1969, travel and trade restrictions after the Korean War were eased, the patrols of the Seventh

Fleet in the Taiwan Straits stopped. Early in 1970, Sino-American ambassadorial-level conversations began anew. Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and then a public one in October to “reestablish direct communication and decided on a Presidential trip to China.” (108)

Mao and Nixon, the two leaders of China and America, both had international reputations as committed opponents of each other’s political philosophy, found that their ideological differences would have little relevance to the conduct of their relationship. Mao and Nixon were decision-makers of *realpolitik* and wanted to engage in the areas of their common interest, the apprehension about the Soviet Union. Under Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow undertook a sustained expansion of its military power, conventional and nuclear, much of which deployed along the Sino-Soviet frontier. At the same time, the Soviet Union was clearly gaining advantage in the global balance against the United States that being tangled in the Vietnam War. The war cost America “more than \$150 billion, the loss of more than 58,000 lives, yet the world’s most powerful nation failed to achieve its objectives and suffered its first defeat in war, a humiliating and deeply frustrating experience for a people accustomed to success.” (109) In the aftermath, “the Americans, for their part, hoped for a major realignment in the balance of power that would give them China, with its massive population, huge territories, and enormous potential, as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union and also as a new means of pressuring North Vietnam.” (110)

Such circumstances provided a compelling motive for a rapprochement between the United States and China. At a maximum, the two countries could find ways of coordinating in a united front against Soviet expansion. At a minimum, ending the Sino-American confrontation

would mean the Kremlin would face a possible two-front war. “Thus, simply by shaking hands at the Beijing airport, Zhou Enlai and Richard Nixon had fundamentally altered the contours of global geopolitics.” (111)

Besides, Chinese leaders were more and more interested in resuming economic and cultural ties with the United States. An improved relationship with the United States would be an important part for China’s economic modernization. Many in the United States were also aware of the advantages of renewing cultural and economic ties with China. American business would benefit from regaining access to a big market. For Henry Kissinger and Nixon, these considerations would help gain domestic support for the reorientation of American China policy that they envisioned.

On February 28, 1972, the last day of Nixon’s visit to China, the two governments declared the Shanghai Communiqué, (112) identifying the common interests of the two countries as opposing Soviet expansion in Asia, reducing the prospects of bilateral military confrontation, and expanding Sino-American economic and cultural relations. On the issue of Taiwan, both sides made significant concessions, proclaiming the “One China policy” and Taiwan is a part of China. The United States would not support a Taiwan independence movement, and Nixon would seek Sino-American normalization.

Domestic problems in both the United States and China precluded decisive action in either country from 1973 to 1977. By the end of 1976, the patterns of new leadership in both countries were clear. In China, the government was in the hands of men committed to an improvement of relations with the West in general—and the United States in particular. In the United States, the election of 1976 brought Jimmy Carter into White House.

A Gallup poll in mid-1977 indicated popular resistance to the “abandonment” of Taiwan. It seemed clear that Carter had no sense of urgency, no appreciation of opportunities lost in the past, for his administration was dominated by the issue of the superpower nuclear stand-off. (113) In the spring of 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor persuaded the President to press for “normalization”, though Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State argued China was not a major strategic power. In June 1978, Leonard Woodcock, the labor leader who was heading the liaison office in Beijing, was instructed to present American terms for normalization. (114) After arduous negotiations, Deng Xiaoping and Woodcock reached agreement on December 13. The public responded favorably to the President’s announcement of his intention to establish normal diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China from January 1, 1979.

In March, 1979, American Congress ratified the *Taiwan Relations Act* by the margin 339-50 in the House and 85-4 in the Senate. (115) The main contents included amendment that would upgrade future American relations with Taiwan and more explicit American commitment to Taiwan security. The United States still placed under its protection not only Taiwan’s security but also its social and economic system.

Anyway, normalization enabled rapid and dramatic growth in the economic and cultural ties between China and the United States. During Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Washington in 1979, the two countries signed a further accord on scientific and technological cooperation. Under that agreement, about fourteen programs were approved by the end of 1980. And the Carter administration decided in mid-1980 to sign a trade agreement with Peking that would extend most-favored –nation treatment to China.

During the Presidential race of 1980, Ronald Reagan declared his desire to restore some official relations with Taiwan and increase arms sales to defend the island. Fortunately, China and America tried to prevent a serious rupture of the relationship. On August 17, 1982, the two countries reached an understanding on the parameters of American arms sales to Taiwan, it “will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level since the establishment of diplomatic relations, and to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to final resolution.” (116) The United States announced a further relaxation of its restrictions on the transfer of advanced technology to China.

The intensification of Chinese political and economic reform beginning in 1984-85 inaugurated yet another cycle in the contemporary Sino-American relationship. A more open China greatly facilitated the quantitative and qualitative expansion of the relations between the two countries. Some Americans were convinced that China was on the verge of capitalism and perhaps even democracy. Despite differences over human rights, commercial relations, and China’s arms sales abroad, the mutual perception of a more stable and mature relationship between China and the United States lasted until June 1989.

The incident in Tiananmen Square sparked the most severe crisis in U.S. relations with China since the rapprochement in 1972. As the demonstration in Beijing mounted in late April and early May, the Bush administration struggled to find an appropriate American response. The crackdown in Tiananmen Square on June 4th forced America to take bolder action. The White House immediately issued a statement saying the president “deeply deplored the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators.” (117) Horrified at the signs of repression in Beijing, and dismayed at the seeming reversal of political and economic reform,

Americans demanded that their government impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against China. Chinese leaders, angered at the intervention in their internal affairs, responded with countersanctions. As a result, U.S-China relations suffered on almost every front from trade, investment and official contact.

The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident revealed the roles that ideology and human rights played in Sino-American relations. Ideological considerations have been a constant source of ambivalence and opposition to the two countries since 1950s. These considerations obstructed the moderation of each country's policy toward the other. Development in the late 1980s, however, led to a resurgence of the ideological factor in the relationship. Chinese conservatives saw the growing American economic and cultural presence in China as a dangerous intervention in their internal affair. For American society, the 1989 Tiananmen incident was viewed as the accumulation of Chinese government's repression of the democracy movement and human rights. During the crisis of 1989, U.S. relations with China were severely weakened and human rights emerged as a critical and constant issue between the two countries.

“The story of how human rights became an integral and legitimate part of foreign policy and international relations illuminates the power of principled ideas to shape policy.” (118) Human rights ideas entered foreign policy debates in the United States after World War II. Yet for America, human rights was an external issue, one easily subsumed by and subordinated to the Cold War, which had emerged at the top of the foreign policy agenda, human rights policies virtually disappeared in American foreign policy for twenty years from the 1950s to the 1970s.

The emergence of human rights policy is not a simply victory of ideas over interests. Rather, it demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape the understanding and perception of

national interests, especially long-term national interests. China's human's rights situation was first reported only in 1978 by Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch's Asia division was not founded until 1985. In the early 1980s, American government and experts were still discussing whether this issue was legitimate or not in making foreign policy and how to effectively promote human rights without sacrificing other interests.

Human-rights policy, it was argued, would be useful in a number of ways. One was that the policy would strengthen domestic support for government actions abroad. Second, advocacy of human rights would also appeal to popular opinion abroad and improve Washington's international image. Finally, "there are some conservative human-rights activists who feel that this theme can be exploited for purposes of anti-communist and anti-totalitarian propaganda." (119)

In 1992, when Bill Clinton ran for the presidency, he proclaimed "he would stand up to the tyrants in Beijing and promote democracy." (120) Indeed, the Democratic Congress challenged the Bush administration over its granting of the MFN status to China due to the Tiananmen crisis and nearly passed a resolution overriding a presidential veto on at least one occasion. In a quick policy reversal shortly after his election in November 1992, Clinton announced that he would continue the past Bush policy. In May 1993, he granted China provisional renewal of MFN status, but he required that China make real progress in the human-rights area for subsequent renewals. In May 1994, however, the Clinton administration not only decided to renew MFN to China, but the administration delinked future renewals from human-rights considerations in his "broader engagement" strategy. (121) Since then, the Clinton administration routinely renewed MFN, arguing that a free trading relationship with China is

the most practical way to promote long-term political change to democracy.

In 1995 and in 1996, during the election season in Taiwan, China roiled the waters of the Taiwan Strait by testing three ballistic missiles in the areas around Taiwan to demonstrate its will to prevent Taiwanese independence. Since President Carter normalized relations with mainland China, America kept good relations with Taiwan. Taiwan has moved from dictatorship to democracy and Taiwanese business invested heavily in the mainland. Beijing likes the Taiwanese investment, but cannot compromise upon its sovereignty over the island. It is a constant challenge for China's leaders to find the right balance between economic pragmatism and national unification. In response to this missile crisis, the Clinton administration sent a carrier group from the Pacific fleet into the Taiwan Strait, signaling its determination to prevent the use of force against Taiwan, as Clinton proclaimed "We had never said whether we would or wouldn't come to the defense of Taiwan if it were attacked." (122) Another setback followed when American cruise missiles struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War in 1999, which was widely regarded in China as an intentional act of war.

When George W. Bush came to be President in 2000, a rising China was regarded as one of the three vital threats to American security, besides Bin Laden terrorists and the weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (123) After the 9/11 attack, Bush administration began to seek more help and cooperation from China on the issues of counter-terrorism, Non-proliferation, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the maintenance of stability in the Middle East. More and more, Washington has also started to seek China's cooperation in fields such as trade and finance, despite increased friction over currency exchange rates, intellectual property rights, and the

textile trade.

During Bush administration, neo-conservatives (neocons) were more influential in the academy and government. Neocons foreign policies include unilateralism, militarism and evangelicalism. America waged the wars against Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, yet U.S. relations with China improved smoothly during the Bush administration. Progress was made in bilateral economic, trade, counterterrorism, military and law enforcement exchanges and cooperation. It is clear that the Bush administration has “placed a priority on positive, productive Sino-American relations at the expense of its commitment to international human rights”, (124) though from the Chinese perspective “the United States continued to use issues concerning human rights, religion, the Dalai Lama and Hong Kong to interfere in China’s internal affairs.” (125)

President Barack Obama visited China from November 15 to 18, 2009. This trip set a constructive tone for the future. President Obama claimed in his speech that he welcomed the emergence of China as a new force in the global economy and rebuffed suggestions that China’s rise should be seen as a sign of American decline. China has been building reserves and now has in excess of \$2.2 trillion, which shows that China is rapidly becoming an economic superpower, while America has been accumulating debt and owes about \$800 billion to China. (126)

During his stay in China, Obama proclaimed the importance of more open and freer communication and the universal value of freedom and human rights, yet he did not put too much pressure on China. Obama has tried to avoid blunt confrontation in favor of something more cooperative. He has sought to focus on common ground and shared interests, hoping for

clearing away “old preconceptions or ideological dogmas” so that the nations will be more likely “to cooperate than not cooperate”. Despite of his objection to Chinese Internet censorship, he recognized that “different countries have different traditions.” (127)

Table 3.

Projections of GDP, 2005-30				Projections of Defense, 2003-30			
At PPP in U.S. Dollars (trillions)				in U.S.Dollars (billions)			
	China	U.S.	OECD		China	U.S.	OECD
2005	9	12	34	2003	60	417	740
2010	14	17	44	2010	88	482	843
2015	21	22	55	2015	121	554	962
2020	30	28	73	2020	152	628	1089
2025	44	37	88	2025	190	711	1233
<u>2030</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>2030</u>	<u>238</u>	<u>808</u>	<u>1398</u>

(*Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2008, p36-37)

The emergence of China will shape the world much as that of the U.S. did in the late 19th century. What remains to be seen is whether the rise of China will complement the U.S. or undermine it; whether the future will bring a new, cooperative and mutually beneficial economic order or a predictable replay of one great power giving way to the next. As America being the world’s greatest power and China being the world’s greatest emerging power, the relationship between these two countries will largely determine the history of the twenty-first century. History teaches that such power transitions are inherently fraught with dangers and opportunities that best managed with grand visions. Thus, it would serve the interests of both the United States and China to rethink their relationship in the future, to “set aside the self-limiting and outmoded notions of an earlier era in favor of a mature pragmatism,” (128) which is appropriate to the two nations’ transformed status as global powers.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS

The issue of war has occurred and been referred to frequently during past U.S.-China relations. The Opium war resulted in the first governmental treaty and diplomatic relations between America and China in 1844. During the Chinese Taiping Rebellion and civil war from the 1850s to the 1860s, America decided to support the Manchu government because of considerations of trade and political-economic interests. The American Civil War from 1861 to 1865 forced America to cooperate more willingly with the powers in dealing with China affairs. After the 1895 Chinese defeat in the war with Japan, America turned its emphasis on Japan more than on China. The American victory over Spain in 1898 made America a great power and made possible the “Open Door” policy in China. Theodore Roosevelt rejoiced over Japan’s assault on Russian hegemony in China’s Manchuria region because he believed there would be no damage to American interests after a Japanese victory. After World War I, China was on the winners’ side and pinned its hope on national self-determination. Nevertheless, Wilson still sacrificed Chinese territory and interests to Japan. In the 1930s Japanese invasions in China, Franklin Roosevelt preferred the neutrality policy, and in the 1945 Yalta conference, America sacrificed China’s Outer Mongolia and Manchuria to gain Stalin’s military help in the Far East. Until 1949, America was more or less involved in China’s civil war and had to see a communists’ victory in China. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 made China and America enemies. The Vietnam War became a long time nightmare for America due to China’s consistent support and supply to North Vietnam. The border conflict and the danger of war between China and the Soviet Union pushed Nixon and Kissinger to change their foreign

policy towards China. In the 1999 Balkan war, American missiles bombarded the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, an event which China considered a deliberate act of war. American war in Afghanistan in 2001 and war in Iraq in 2003 made China's help and cooperation more important.

Power and the use of power are also very obvious in U.S.-China relations. From the initial contact of the two countries, China first acted as a big power and dominated relations with America and other nations. Yet Chinese power was humbled because of defeats by British power and then by French power. America enjoyed limited power in the 1840s and then had to follow "jackal diplomacy" and more cooperation with the major powers in dealing with China. Since then American government could assume that "the superior firepower would be able to validate the just cause of Western civilization." (129) When America became a major power, it began to initiate its own policy towards China and in the East Asian region. Among major powers in the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan was more powerful and more influential in China due to its geographical position. During World War II, America had to deal with Japanese power, and then very soon after the war, America faced the growing power of the Soviet Union and the rise of Chinese power. Given "the U.S. position in the global system, its structural power, allowed Washington to keep Beijing relatively isolated" until the 1970s. (130) Recently, with the burgeoning Chinese economy, American superpower has been and will continue to be challenged by China, the greatest emerging power.

Naturally the concepts of power and balance of power are closely related. During the early period of U.S.-China relations, America balanced between the established power of the Chinese Empire and the British Empire. After the Opium War, the balance obviously moved

favorably towards British power. When America became major power, it began to balance competing major powers in China with the “Open Door” policy in order to achieve the maximum benefits for America. Theodore Roosevelt rejoiced when Japan acted as a counter force to the Russian hegemony in China’s Manchuria. Meanwhile at the same time, he also hoped that Russia would serve as a check and balance to Japanese power. William Taft believed that the political goal of the United States in East Asia was a stable balance of power resting on a sovereign China and secured by “dollar diplomacy.” Japanese dominance in China in the 1930s destabilized the balance of power and severely damaged American interests, and the Soviet alliance with China in the 1950s completely demolished American influence in China. In the 1970s, America and China improved relations and exploited in the balance of power against the Soviet Union, and in the 1990s China and Russia worked together to counter balance American unilateral and superpower status. Today America works closely with Japan and India to balance the power of China, and America’s policy of maintaining the status quo of Taiwan is obviously serves as checking the rising strength and influence of mainland China.

“Sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.” (131)

Every country is endowed with unalienable rights of sovereignty, equality and security. Due to different geographical positions and different history, the sensitivity of the sovereignty issue means differently to America and to China. Since the independence, most Americans concerned very little about their national existence, for the two vast oceans protected much of their borders, the two neighbors were more or less friendly and far weaker, and the big powers were far away in Europe. Yet for China, since the Nanjing Treaty with Britain in 1842 until the Japanese surrender in 1945, China’s national sovereignty and security suffered severely.

China experienced perils and humiliations of military occupation, territorial concession and even partition by the powers during her century of decline. American involvements in the Korean War and in the Vietnam War were regarded by Chinese leaders as proof of animosity and threat to the region and to China's own security. The Taiwan status issue concerns China's core interests of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, while for America it is only of peripheral interest and a way to check China. The Taiwan Strait dispute remains one of the world's dangerous flash points, and America should take care not to "play with fire". (132) As to the current issues of Tibet and the Dalai Lama, Xinjiang and the secessionists, China will not concede her ultimate rights of territory and interests even when faced with pressures and challenges from America. In the end "no matter what happens in China, American policy toward that country should be guided by a clear and firm sense of American national interests" (133), without indulging in any dispute in China's territory issue.

In the early period of U.S. relations with China from 1784 to 1844, China occupied a position of dominance through her great military power and unparalleled economic leverage. In the 1820s, China shared 30% of the world's GDP. Since China's defeat by Britain in the 1840s, British power of military dominance was prevalent in China's foreign relations. America followed the "Jackal diplomacy" due to her own limited power and influence. Only after the War with Spain, did America become a global power and adopt imperialist policies, with military occupation of Cuba and the Philippines. The "Open Door" policy of John Hay witnessed the rising American dominance in U.S.-China relations. At the same time, Russia and Japan vied and fought in China's Manchuria in 1904 for territorial control. In the 1930s and in the 1940s, Japanese militarists were eager to take over all of China as its colony, which was

one reason for the showdown between Japan and America in the Far East during World War II. From 1946 to 1949, the transient hegemony America enjoyed in China was lost when the Nationalist government was defeated by the communists in the civil war. The subsequent Soviet dominance in China was soon replaced by the Chinese Soviet rifts and conflicts, followed by U.S.-China rapprochement and cooperation against Soviet global hegemony. Whether in the system of Cold War bipolarity or the unilateral power system after the Soviet collapse, America occupied and still occupies the dominant and offensive position due to its overwhelming and unrivalled economic and political power.

After the independence from Britain with the help from her French alliance, America abided by George Washington's advice of noninvolvement in the old continent's affairs as noted in his Farewell Address to avoid "the insidious wiles of foreign influence" and to "steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." (134) During the Civil War in the 1860s, America more willingly cooperated with the big powers to deal with the issues related to China. At the beginning of the 1900s, America refused the Japanese proposal for the alliance against Russia. During World War II, China allied with America to fight Japan, yet soon after the war, the two countries became enemies, and the former enemies of America and Japan allied against China and Russia. The Sino-Soviet alliance gradually came to an end, and in the 1970s it was replaced by the quasi-military cooperation and alliance between China and America to counter the Soviet global expansion. Today, U.S.-China relations are positioned as a strategic dialogue and partnership, and America fears a possible re-alliance between China and Russia against America's unilateral superpower status.

The four liberal concepts of "equality", "rationality", "liberty" and "property" are hard

to apply to the past U.S.-China relations. From 1784 to 1844, China, the Middle Kingdom, was a big empire with great economic and military power and tribute system. Chinese at that time regarded all other nations and countries including America as barbaric and inferior, which had to pay homage to the Chinese emperor. America had recently achieved independence and freedom from the British tyrant George III, and held it to be self-evident “that all men are created equal,” and “harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand.” (135) In the absence of governmental treaties between the two countries, the American merchants in China had to obey the tyrannical Chinese authorities and were at the mercy of the Chinese emperor. For the next century from 1844 to 1945, China was afflicted by defeat and humiliation from the big powers, including America. China was deprived of sovereignty, forced to open ports, with foreign controlled customs tariffs, extra-territorial jurisdiction, spheres of influences and foreign military occupation. In fact, no equality existed between China and the big powers, much less the principles of rationality, liberty and sanctity of property.

As to *commercial liberalism*, *democratic liberalism*, and *regulatory liberalism*, we see that international economic expansion does not necessarily prevent wars. On the contrary, it caused the outbreak of World War I among the imperial big powers. Certainly, domestic public opinion does not always prevent the use of force, because the public may be manipulated by the media. International laws and organizations seem to play more important roles in the world affairs, nevertheless, the League of Nations lacked the power to protect China and Ethiopia from the invasion of Japan and Italy, and it surely could not avoid the coming of World War II.

The Korean War actually was between China and the United Nation's sixteen-nation-armies led by America. The international organizations' authority and power is relative and comparative. It is stronger when it challenges the weaker and smaller nations, yet it becomes weaker when it faces challenges from the stronger and bigger powers. Michael Hunt argues that moralism and legalism are "errant and inappropriate to international affairs", (136) for moralism is devoted to virtue yet without power, and legalism is suited to domestic and not to world politics. On the contrary, if moralism is strengthened with power and force, there can also be problems. Hans Morgenthau believed that "moral crusaders and ideological self-righteousness constitute the most important threat to international relations: what is good for the crusading country is by definition good for all mankind, and if the rest of mankind refuses to accept such claims to universal recognition, it must be converted with fire and sword." (137)

During the long history of U.S.-China relations, several cases were related to liberalism. The Chinese Taiping Rebellion was characterized by indigenous Christian beliefs, yet this similarity of ideology with the West didn't guarantee that the big powers including America would support the rebellion against the moribund tyranny, because of the more important considerations of trade and national interests. The anti-Chinese-immigrant violence in the 1870s and the exclusion of Chinese immigration in 1904 revealed the discrepancy between the American ideal of equality and the reality of racial discrimination. Wilson's idealism of "self-determination" was shattered in relations with China by his compromise to the greed of Japan. President Franklin Roosevelt's sympathy to China was tarnished by his sacrifice of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria to the Soviets. The phobia against communism postponed

America's recognition of China's new government in Beijing, and radical McCarthyism drew America into one of the most shameful and destructive episodes in its history. John Dulles' intransigent anti-communism and Domino theory impeded the improvement of U.S.-China relations. Presidents John Kennedy and Johnson neglected the rifts and disputes between the two biggest communist countries and missed the early chance of reconciliation with China. The antagonism of the ideology between China and America in the 1970s did not prevent the two countries from cooperating against Moscow, which shared the same ideology with China. The human rights issue took center stage in relations between China and America after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, yet China's most-favored-nation status was never suspended. And especially for the recent years, America often has been outmaneuvered by China in the U.N. Human Rights Commission due to America's Iraq War and the abuse of prisoners by American personnel. Even today the American government and experts are still discussing whether the United States is "justified in making human rights in other countries a legitimate issue and, if so, how to effectively promote those rights without sacrificing other goals." (138)

Constructivism focuses on the anarchical nature of the international system and how a nation identifies itself and its interests. From the first contact until today, the word of "interest" has been possibly the most frequently used word in American foreign policy toward China. It is agreed that interests and power are the ultimate goal for a state, yet different persons, groups, parties, and policy-makers may conceive interests differently. "The goals and interests that affect players' desired outcomes include national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests." (139)

Like all relations between states, U.S. relations with China are fundamentally based on interests. As the global leader, America occupies dominant positions in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other global institutions. American national power is still unparalleled and the political system and ideology are different from that of China. America still takes the offensive role and projects more powerful influences on China. “The process of China’s emergence as a great power is underway, but this achievement needs not lead to conflict.” (140) Many Chinese view America as a major threat to their nation’s security and domestic stability, for America is the only country that has the power and might to curtail or destabilize China. Yet, today the U.S.-China relationship is not that of confrontation and rivalry for primacy as in the Cold War, it is a relationship of competition and cooperation on many issues.

Despite the ups and downs in U.S.-China relations over the past years, Beijing has persisted in the belief that there are more opportunities than challenges for China today. China can transcend ideological differences for peace, development, and cooperation, rather than vye for global domination. In recent years, “China has begun to take a less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and at times, more constructive approach toward regional and global affairs.” (141) The U.S.-China relationship will mainly depend on how the two countries define their interests. Washington and Beijing must pragmatically seek out opportunities for action where realism and both sides’ interests can intersect.

China is a country with a long history and great influence, not just a relic of the communist era. America is a country with a liberal culture and pragmatic policies, not a final arbitrator of universal values. By necessity, U.S. relations with China generally have more

interests in common than common values. In the past, America and China shared the common anti-Japanese sentiment in World War II and the same European enemy--the Soviet Union--during the 1970s and the 1980s. Even today, anti-terrorism is one of the common grounds for the cooperation of the U.S. and China. America has been a democratic country with checks and balances since her independence, yet China has an authoritarian and totalitarian tradition dating back to ancient times. These two nations seldom share common values. During the past years, whenever the two countries focused on trade, business and common interests, U.S.-China relations progressed smoothly; whenever ideology, value and human rights overrode these interests, America and China were always entangled in antagonism and animosity. American racism and anti-Chinese immigration laws in the 1870s, the rise of communism in China, McCarthyism in the 1950s, the Tiananmen Square crisis and human rights issues in 1989 are examples of ideological disputes leading to conflicts between the two countries. From the history of U.S.-China relations, we see clearly power and interest have dominated during their two hundred and twenty five year history, while differences in beliefs only affected relations transiently and negatively. Precisely at this time when U.S.-China relations are full of unprecedented hope, U.S. policymakers should conclude that “the old dichotomy between realism and idealism has never really applied to the United States,” (142) and universal ideals shouldn’t be at odds with the top priority--American power and American national interest. Even the Chinese government believes “China-U.S. relations have growing global significance. To maintain healthy and stable growth of U.S. relations with China in a changing international environment is fundamental to the interests of both China and America, and is conducive to upholding and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.” (143)

The U.S. policy towards China represents a mixed historical record, with extreme shifts ranging from business only, “semi-colonial repression, benign neglect, active hostility, barely concealed animosity,” (144) finally to secret partnerships and strategic competition. Inconsistency in policies became apparent after World War II, but what has been consistent is the self-centered American interests and American power. It is obvious that the relations between the two countries are sometimes “like images and perceptions that the two peoples have of each other, and have swung between two extremes: friends or enemies, love or hate.” (145) The American foreign policy-makers should try to avoid the temptation of either coddling or demonizing China, the world’s next superpower. Instead the U.S. should stick to the motto by Palmerston: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” (146)

The History of U.S. relations with China has demonstrated crucial testimony and verification for the interpretation of classical realism that emphasizes national interest and national power. Even today in America, different interest groups, parties and policy-makers might still perceive different strategies and policies towards China. Whether offensive or defensive, short-term or long-term, business as a top priority or human rights as the banner issue, the point that should always be kept in mind is how American interests and power are identified, affected and preserved. The American government needs to understand how China will conceive, calculate and respond in current and future relations, based on their respective interests and power status.

REFERENCES

- 1, Joseph Frankel, *National Interest*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p17.
- 2, W. David Clinton, *The Two Faces of National Interest*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1994, p12.
- 3, Joseph Frankel, *National Interest*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p75.
- 4, Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1934, p1.
5. Joseph Frankel, *National Interest*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p31.
- 6, W. David Clinton, *The Two Faces of National Interest*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1994, p72.
- 7, W. David Clinton, *National Interest, Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy*, University Press of America, Inc, Lanham, MD, 1988, p18.
- 8, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1993, p5.
- 9, Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1946, p194.
- 10, Harold & Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of National Power*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1945, p29.
- 11, Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1964, p108.
- 12, Klaus Knorr, *Power, Strategy, and Security*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1983, p14.
- 13, Stanley Hoffmann, Realism and its Discontents, *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1985, p132.

- 14, James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations*, Addison Wesley Longman, Inc, 2001, p79.
- 15, Joseph Frankel, *National Interest*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p1.
- 16, W. David Clinton, *The Two Faces of National Interest*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1994, p x.
- 17, W. David Clinton, *National Interest, Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy*, University Press of America, Inc, Lanham, MD, 1988, p6.
- 18, Ibid, p85.
- 19, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1993, p246.
- 20, James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations*, Addison Wesley Longman, Inc, 2001, p97.
- 21, Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest, an Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy*, Quadrangle Paperback, Chicago, 1934, p xxiii.
- 22, Ibid, p1.
- 23, Thomas H. Etzold, *Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784*, New Viewpoints, New York, 1978, p159.
- 24, Margaret MacMillan, *Nixon and Mao*, Random House, New York, 2007, p xvii.
- 25, Ibid, p9.
- 26, Scott Kennedy, *China Cross Talk, the American Debate over China Policy since Normalization*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Lanham, MD, 2003, p63.
- 27, Ibid, p172.

- 28, Sharan B. Merriam, *Qualitative Research in Practice*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, San Francisco, CA, 2002, p4.
- 29, John Baylis, Steven Smith, Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, p91.
- 30, Joseph Frankel, *National Interest*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p18.
- 31, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p25.
- 32, Ibid, p25.
- 33, Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, rev. ed. N.Y. Penguin Books, 1972, p 49.
- 34, Machiavelli, *The Prince*, chs.15 and 23, Engl.transl., Everyman's Library, pp121 to 193.
- 35, Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1964, p79.
- 36, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, Inc, New York, 1993 ,p50.
- 37, Ibid, p5.
- 38, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Massachusett, 1979, p113.
- 39, Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Scott, Foresman and Company, Glenview, Illinois, 1989, p1.
- 40, Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1998, p8.

- 41, Torbjorn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, Manchester University Press, New York, 1997, p150.
- 42, Paul R. Viotti, Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1999, p202.
- 43, Ibid, p435.
- 44, Ibid, p438.
- 45, John J. Mearsheimer, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1988, p218.
- 46, Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC. New York, 1965, p341.
- 47, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p4.
- 48, Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, Meredith Corporation, New York, 1968, p302.
- 49, Kenneth W. Rea, *Early Sino-American Relations, 1841-1912*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1977, p56.
- 50, Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, Meredith Corporation, New York, 1968, p303.
- 51, Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p5.
- 52, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p12.

- 53, Ibid, p13.
- 54, Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, Meredith Corporation, New York, 1968, p305.
- 55, Ibid, p306.
- 56, Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p14.
- 57, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p24.
- 58, Charles. R. Kitts, *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990*, University Press of America, Lanham, N.Y., 1991, p36.
- 59, Foster Rhea Dulles, *China and America, The Story of Their Relations since 1784*, Kennikat Press, INC. N.Y., 1946, p78.
- 60, Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy*, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1977, p173.
- 61, Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p20.
- 62, Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1975, p374.
- 63, Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC. New York, 1965, p487.
- 64, Paul A. Varg, *The Making of a Myth: the United States and China, 1897-1912*, Michigan State University Press, 1968, p24.
- 65, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York,

- 1990, p49.
- 66, Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1975, p51, p378.
- 67, Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC. New York, 1965, p498.
- 68, Paul A. Varg, *The Making of a Myth: the United States and China, 1897-1912*, Michigan State University Press, 1968, p135.
- 69, Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC. New York, 1965, p498.
- 70, Jerry Israel, *Progressivism and the Open Door, America and China, 1905-1921*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, p100.
- 71, Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1975, p51, p384.
- 72, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p78.
- 73, Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson, Revolution, War, and Peace*, Harlan Davidson, Inc. Wheeling, Illinois, 1979, p117.
- 74, Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest, an Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy*, Quadrangle Paperback, Chicago, 1934, p124.
- 75, Michael D. Gambone, *Documents of American Diplomacy*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 2002, p200.
- 76, Charles. R. Kitts, *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990*, University Press of

- America, Lanham, N.Y., 1991, p125.
- 77, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p96.
- 78, Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p76.
- 79, Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1975, p536.
- 80, Charles. R. Kitts, *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990*, University Press of America, Lanham, N.Y., 1991, p131.
- 81, Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC. New York, 1965, p817.
- 82, Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p114.
- 83, Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, N.Y. 1990, p43.
- 84, Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy*, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1977, p346.
- 85, Ibid, p383.
- 86, Jim Bishop, *FDR's Last Year, April 1944-April 1945*, William Morrow & Company, Inc., N.Y. 1974, p371.
- 87, Wilson D. Miscamble, *From Roosevelt to Truman, Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, N.Y. 2007 , p66.
- 88, Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta*, N.Y. Oxford University Press, 1970, p310.

- 89, Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies, Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.—China Diplomacy, 1945-1960*. Harvard University Press, 2007, p33.
- 90, Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, *Sino-American Relations 1945-1955, A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*. A Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1989, p54.
- 91, S. Mahmud Ali, *US-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971-1989*, Rutledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2005, p3.
- 92, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust, Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, p323.
- 93, Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, *Sino-American Relations 1945-1955, A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*. A Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1989, p54.
- 94, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust, Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, p9.
- 95, Hongshan Li, Zhaohui Hong, *Image, perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations*, University Press of America, Inc. Lanham, N.Y. 1998, p183.
- 96, James Gregor, *The China Connection*, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, California, 1986, p53.
- 97, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*. Norton, New York, 1969, p302.
- 98, Lewis McCarroll Purifoy, *Harry Truman's China Policy. McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947-1951*. New Viewpoints, New York.1976, p125-126.
- 99, Tajen Liu, *U.S.-China Relations, 1784-1992*. University Press of America, New York.1997. p198.
- 100, Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies, Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.—China*

- Diplomacy, 1945-1960*. Harvard University Press, 2007, p103.
- 101, Irving L. Janis, *A Victim of Groupthink*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1972, p61.
- 102, Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, N.Y. 1990, p136.
- 103, James Peck, *Washington's China*, University of Massachusetts Press, Boston, 2006, p111.
- 104, Jolyon P. Girard, *America and the World*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 2001, p189.
- 105, Albert Fried, *McCarthyism, The Great American Red Scare*, N.Y. Oxford University Press, 1997, p2.
- 106, James Gregor, *The China Connection*, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, California, 1986, p67.
- 107, Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies, The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*, Stanford University Press, 1990, Stanford, California, p285.
- 108, Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1982, p46.
- 109, George C. Herring, *America's Longest War, the United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, 4th edition, N.Y. 2002, p1.
- 110, Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao*, Random House, New York, 2007, p321.
- 111, Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, the Brooking Institution, Washington D.C. 1972, p4.
- 112, Henry Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?* Simon & Schuster, New York, 2001, p150.

- 113, S. Mahmud Ali, *US-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971-1989*, Rutledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2005, p119.
- 114, Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall*, A Century Foundation Book, Public Affairs, N.Y. 1999, p255.
- 115, Henry Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?* Simon & Schuster, New York, 2001, p151.
- 116, Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall*, A Century Foundation Book, Public Affairs, N.Y. 1999, p326.
- 117, Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, the Brooking Institution, Washington D.C.1972, p225.
- 118, Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane , *Ideas and Foreign Policy, Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, p139.
- 119, Benjamin Frankel, *In the National Interest*, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1990, p402.
- 120, Steven E. Schier, *The Postmodern Presidency*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, p69.
- 121, P. Edward Haley, *Strategies of Dominance*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C. 2006, p81.
- 122, Bill Clinton, *My life*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2004, p703.
- 123, Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002, p35.
- 124, Chi Wang, *George W. Bush and China*, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2009, p xv.
- 125, *China's Foreign Affairs*, Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, World Affairs Press, Beijing, 2007, p406.
- 126, Zachary Karabell, Can an Eagle Hug a Panda? *Time*, Nov. 30, 2009, p45.
- 127, Michael Scherer, The Deference Debate, *Time*, November 30, 2009, p18.

- 128, Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University, New Haven, 1987, p12.
- 129, John K. Fairbank, *China Perceived, Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations*, Alfred Knopf, N.Y. 1974, p120.
- 130, Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power, U.S. Relations with China since 1949*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p13.
- 131, Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Norton & Company, Inc, New York, 1997, p1.
- 132, John F. Copper, *Playing with Fire, The Looming War with China over Taiwan*, Praeger Security International, Westport Connecticut, 1995, p1.
- 133, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1997, p204.
- 134, Jerald A. Combs, *American Diplomatic History*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, p3.
- 135, Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1975, p51.
- 136, Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University, New Haven, 1987, p5.
- 137, Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1946, p37.
- 138, Scott Kennedy, *China Cross Talk, The American Debate over China Policy since Normalization*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC, Lanham, N.Y. p43.
- 139, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971, p167.

- 140, Charles-Philippe David, David Grondin, *Hegemony or Empire?* Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, VT, 2006, p168.
- 141, Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, China's New Diplomacy, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December, 2003, p22.
- 142, Condoleezza Rice, Rethinking the National Interest, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2008, p25.
- 143, *China's Foreign Affairs*, Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, World Affairs Press, Beijing, 2007, p407.
- 144, S. Mahmud Ali, *U.S.-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971-1989*, Rutledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2005, p2.
- 145, Hongshan Li, Zhaohui Hong, *Image, perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations*, University Press of America, Inc. Lanham, N.Y. 1998, p2.
- 146, Joseph Frankel, *National Interest*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p18.