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Incumbent Violence and Insurgent Tactics: The Effects of Incumbent Violence on Popular Support for Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism
- Date Issued:
- 2013
- Abstract/Description:
- Insurgency has two main strategies, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, which should be treated as linked, but distinct, strategies. This thesis examines the role of incumbent violence in leading insurgents to select one, or both, of these strategies. It argues that incumbent violence can create support for insurgency by causing fear and a desire for revenge and reshaping the social structures of a community. It also argues that incumbent violence increases popular support for terrorism in particular by creating outbidding incentives and desires to respond in kind to civilian deaths and as a way of punishing norm violations against attacking civilians on the part of the incumbent. The paper tests this theory with a qualitative case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and a quantitative analysis of insurgent violence in the Kirkuk, Diyala, Babylon, and Salah al Din provinces during the 2003-2009 Iraq conflict.
Title: | Incumbent Violence and Insurgent Tactics: The Effects of Incumbent Violence on Popular Support for Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism. |
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18 downloads |
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Name(s): |
Williams, Jonathan, Author Dolan, Thomas, Committee Chair Wilson, Bruce, Committee Member Mirilovic, Nikola, Committee Member , Committee Member University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor |
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Type of Resource: | text | |
Date Issued: | 2013 | |
Publisher: | University of Central Florida | |
Language(s): | English | |
Abstract/Description: | Insurgency has two main strategies, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, which should be treated as linked, but distinct, strategies. This thesis examines the role of incumbent violence in leading insurgents to select one, or both, of these strategies. It argues that incumbent violence can create support for insurgency by causing fear and a desire for revenge and reshaping the social structures of a community. It also argues that incumbent violence increases popular support for terrorism in particular by creating outbidding incentives and desires to respond in kind to civilian deaths and as a way of punishing norm violations against attacking civilians on the part of the incumbent. The paper tests this theory with a qualitative case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and a quantitative analysis of insurgent violence in the Kirkuk, Diyala, Babylon, and Salah al Din provinces during the 2003-2009 Iraq conflict. | |
Identifier: | CFE0004959 (IID), ucf:49598 (fedora) | |
Note(s): |
2013-08-01 M.A. Sciences, Political Science Masters This record was generated from author submitted information. |
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Subject(s): | Terrorism -- civilian victimization -- insurgency -- incumbent violence -- guerrilla warfare -- conflict -- civil war | |
Persistent Link to This Record: | http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0004959 | |
Restrictions on Access: | campus 2016-08-15 | |
Host Institution: | UCF |