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Incumbent Violence and Insurgent Tactics: The Effects of Incumbent Violence on Popular Support for Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism

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Date Issued:
2013
Abstract/Description:
Insurgency has two main strategies, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, which should be treated as linked, but distinct, strategies. This thesis examines the role of incumbent violence in leading insurgents to select one, or both, of these strategies. It argues that incumbent violence can create support for insurgency by causing fear and a desire for revenge and reshaping the social structures of a community. It also argues that incumbent violence increases popular support for terrorism in particular by creating outbidding incentives and desires to respond in kind to civilian deaths and as a way of punishing norm violations against attacking civilians on the part of the incumbent. The paper tests this theory with a qualitative case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and a quantitative analysis of insurgent violence in the Kirkuk, Diyala, Babylon, and Salah al Din provinces during the 2003-2009 Iraq conflict.
Title: Incumbent Violence and Insurgent Tactics: The Effects of Incumbent Violence on Popular Support for Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism.
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Name(s): Williams, Jonathan, Author
Dolan, Thomas, Committee Chair
Wilson, Bruce, Committee Member
Mirilovic, Nikola, Committee Member
, Committee Member
University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor
Type of Resource: text
Date Issued: 2013
Publisher: University of Central Florida
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: Insurgency has two main strategies, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, which should be treated as linked, but distinct, strategies. This thesis examines the role of incumbent violence in leading insurgents to select one, or both, of these strategies. It argues that incumbent violence can create support for insurgency by causing fear and a desire for revenge and reshaping the social structures of a community. It also argues that incumbent violence increases popular support for terrorism in particular by creating outbidding incentives and desires to respond in kind to civilian deaths and as a way of punishing norm violations against attacking civilians on the part of the incumbent. The paper tests this theory with a qualitative case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and a quantitative analysis of insurgent violence in the Kirkuk, Diyala, Babylon, and Salah al Din provinces during the 2003-2009 Iraq conflict.
Identifier: CFE0004959 (IID), ucf:49598 (fedora)
Note(s): 2013-08-01
M.A.
Sciences, Political Science
Masters
This record was generated from author submitted information.
Subject(s): Terrorism -- civilian victimization -- insurgency -- incumbent violence -- guerrilla warfare -- conflict -- civil war
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0004959
Restrictions on Access: campus 2016-08-15
Host Institution: UCF

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