

INCUMBENT VIOLENCE AND INSURGENT TACTICS:
THE EFFECTS OF INCUMBENT VIOLENCE
ON POPULAR SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TERRORISM

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2013

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ABSTRACT

Insurgency has two main strategies, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, which should be treated as linked, but distinct, strategies. This thesis examines the role of incumbent violence in leading insurgents to select one, or both, of these strategies. It argues that incumbent violence can create support for insurgency by causing fear and a desire for revenge and reshaping the social structures of a community. It also argues that incumbent violence increases popular support for terrorism in particular by creating outbidding incentives and desires to respond in kind to civilian deaths and as a way of punishing norm violations against attacking civilians on the part of the incumbent. The paper tests this theory with a qualitative case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and a quantitative analysis of insurgent violence in the Kirkuk, Diyala, Babylon, and Salah al Din provinces during the 2003-2009 Iraq conflict.

Dedicated to all those whose lives were lost in the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Iraq, that we may remember that their deaths are more than just statistics.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge all of those that helped me to complete this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis committee: Dr. Thomas Dolan, Dr. Bruce Wilson, and Dr. Nikola Mirilovic.

I would also like to thank my classmates who aided me, particularly Clayton Besaw, who provided invaluable assistance in writing this thesis.

Finally, I wish to thank Drs. Shapiro, Condra, Berman, and Felter, along with Carrie Lee Lindsay, Michael O'Hanlon, and Ian Livingston, for providing me with the data on the Iraq conflict.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Insurgency, a global phenomenon, has two large components: guerrilla warfare and terrorism. To combat insurgency, it is useful to predict which tactic insurgents will use. Accurate predictions allow one to better combat the insurgency and avoid tactics which can fuel insurgency or a particular, undesirable, tactic. Current research seems to focus on a more general picture of the relationship between incumbent and insurgent tactics, the populace, and popular support. For example, in studies such as Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas (2011) one might see a simple, positive relationship between popular support and insurgency. Many of these studies also approach the problem from the perspective of either the incumbent or insurgent, not developing both sides and the populace sufficiently. This research attempts to fill a gap by providing a theory with a more nuanced and comprehensive approach to insurgency and insurgent tactics. It looks at how incumbent tactics shape popular support for the insurgency and how this popular support subsequently shapes insurgent tactics. Popular support can be specific in that the people can show preferences over which tactics the combatants use.

Generally, the prediction of the theory is that increased incumbent indiscriminate violence against the populace will increase popular support, not only for the insurgency in general, but also for terrorism specifically. The first four mechanisms serve to create general popular support for the insurgency when the incumbent attacks the insurgents' population. Fear of incumbent violence drives the populace towards the insurgents. Anger, humiliation, and the loss of honor coming from being attacked create desires for revenge. Violence against the populace which destroys livelihoods creates a pool of displaced, out of work individuals who

may seek out the insurgents to ameliorate their situations. Finally, violence against the populace poses a threat that can activate latent social structures, such as the union of tribes or clans, which can more effectively generate popular support and mobilization in favor of the insurgency.

A second set of mechanisms serves to divert the popular support mentioned above to favor terrorism over guerrilla warfare. Insurgent groups attempt to outbid each other for popular support by using terrorism. The use of terrorism allows these groups to gain more honor and prestige. As mentioned above, violence against the populace creates desires for revenge. The anger and humiliation from such violence is better ameliorated through the use of terrorism as it is more directly reciprocal to the incumbent violence since both tactics target civilians. Third, the norm-breaking nature of the incumbent violence eliminates restraints against using terrorism as a reciprocal way of punishing this violation. This idea of reciprocal punishment makes terrorism a moral tactic in the face of the incumbent's inhumanities and violations. The combination of the first four general mechanisms and the three secondary ones increases the relative use of terrorism as a response to incumbent violence against the populace.

The research testing this theory will consist of a mixed methods approach using a case study of Northern Ireland as well as a quantitative study using data from Iraq during the US-led operations there. Though there are several issues to deal with in testing the theory, mostly data and coding issues, careful searching and coding of the data should enable a robust testing of the theory's predictions. Below, the topic, prior research, and the theory's mechanisms will be laid out in more detail.

Importance of the Topic

Terrorism is a major academic and policy concern, as is guerrilla warfare and insurgency in general, yet the field's literature is not well developed, indicating a need for the current study. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare need to be recognized and handled as two separate phenomena within insurgency. They involve attacking different targets, sometimes using different methods of attack, and require different forms of intelligence and operations to defeat or prevent. Therefore, it is necessary to be able to identify and predict the conditions when insurgent groups might be more likely to use terrorism over guerrilla warfare and vice versa. One would be able to prepare for and predict attacks better if one knew which tactics one was likely to face.

Another potential of theories such as this one in terms of policy creation is the ability to lessen pressures for insurgents to use terrorism over guerrilla warfare via an understanding of the mechanisms which transform general popular support into popular support for terrorist operations. Such an understanding will allow one to not only target the end result of terrorism, but the processes which fuel it, such as desires for vengeance. For example, one could avoid using violence against the populace, or, if such activities are already occurring, one could engage in more hearts and minds tactics and engage the populace in such a way as to build better relationships with them. One could give more aid, try to foster an environment of security and law and order, and enforce proper rules of engagement to make the populace feel secure and protected. A more nuanced view of why terrorism occurs during insurgency thus becomes very useful in cases of wars of insurgency, especially third-party interventions where one's allies might be less restrained in their use of force. In these cases, one needs to understand how to better shape one's own tactics to control damage from the violence perpetrated upon the

populace and how to more effectively influence allies' tactics in order to prevent further fueling of the insurgency and terrorism.

Such a theory as this one also illuminates one's own tactics before they cause counterproductive effects. Scholars have noted that some states fall into using more coercive and indiscriminate tactics to combat insurgency due to desperation and the desire for cheap, public tactics (Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Downes 2008). The current study can illuminate the pitfalls of succumbing to the temptation of using such tactics. It explains that these tactics fuel insurgency and can exacerbate it by shifting insurgents' focus from guerrilla warfare to terrorism and the targeting of civilians. Therefore, a study such as the present one is needed to show a more nuanced view of what might happen if violence against the populace occurs and how one might ameliorate conditions if it has already been used.

Literature Review

Studies from the Insurgent Perspective

The Populace and the Origin of Terrorism

Crenshaw (1981) indicates that the characteristics of the populace can help to determine whether or not terrorism occurs. As an example, Crenshaw proposes that "social facilitation," to what degree norms and customs in society foster violent behavior, justifies and enables certain acts of political expression, such as terrorism (382). Perceptions about the source of popular

suffering and the ability to express grievances and cause change can also cause terrorism. This has implications for incumbent tactics, such as widespread repression or indiscriminate violence.

Participation and Recruiting

Scholars have also examined how population characteristics can affect popular participation and recruitment. For instance, poverty has been linked to increased participation in terrorism, rebellion, and counterrebellion (Kavanagh 2011; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). This can affect who and how insurgents recruit. More educated people may be recruited during periods of bad economic conditions. The higher education of new recruits might lead to more complex and successful attacks. In addition, more generally, insurgents could target those parts of the population which are worse off economically. This could change some ways that the insurgents interact with the population. For instance, they might engage in more public service provision, building and maintaining public services in order to alleviate poverty and increase recruiting and operational ties with the populace (Flanigan 2008). Insurgents can also use more economic incentives to entice participation, making use of a narrower, yet cheaper (in the short term) alternative to utility provision. Characteristics such as political alienation and lack of access to education and other such services can have similar effects because insurgents can provide these services and reap the benefits in recruitment and participation. Participation stemming from grievances from poverty, alienation, and repression is often more prevalent amongst rank-and-file members of insurgent organizations (Marks 2006). These grievances give insurgents the opportunity to interact and help the populace, thereby gaining recruits and support.

An interesting, and somewhat counterintuitive, way that the population and participation can promote terrorism is through widespread apathy towards the terrorists' motive or goal, creating a power base too small for population-wide rebellion or full blown insurgency (Crenshaw1981). Since terrorism does not require as large of a power base, according to the author, and serves to gain publicity for the group, it becomes a preferred tactic. Thus, unlike much of the literature, this theory indicates popular support and terrorism might have an inverse relationship. Therefore, in addition to the insurgents influencing popular participation, the involvement of the population can influence insurgent tactics.

In addition to the tactics above, organizations can also use non-material tactics to influence recruiting and participation. Groups need to have charismatic justifications and goals in order to convince the populace to support their movement. If their specified goals do not engage the populace's desires, then the movement is likely to fall out of favor with the populace, inhibiting the operations of the group. Such declines in popular support can lead to lower recruitment, higher rates of defection or departure from insurgent service, or public calls against insurgent operations (Alonso 2011; Mockaitis 2011). This is contrary to what Crenshaw (1981) specified, saying that lack of support actually spurred terrorism. However, cases such as that of the ETA clearly show that a lack of charismatic goals and ideology has led to a decrease in terrorism and more difficulty in conducting viable operations (Alonso 2011). The implication of these studies is that insurgent groups need to incorporate sound ideology into their recruitment strategies in addition to the material incentives outlined above.

Indiscriminate Violence as the Cause of Insurgency

Most of the authors below propose that indiscriminate violence creates popular grievances, forcing the people to seek out the insurgents for security and vengeance (Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; Woodworth 2001; Alexieva 2006; Joshi 1996; Kaarthikeyan 2005; Richardson 2006). In situations of incumbent indiscriminate violence, it is more perilous to be outside of the insurgent organization, since this leaves one without any sort of protection. The insurgents can provoke indiscriminate attacks, increasing the popular need for security, making nonparticipation risky, and making free-riding by the populace costly. The insurgents can also withhold security as a club good, using it to maximize participation and recruitment (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Similarly, widespread repression and lesser forms of violence, such as occurred in the Basque region of Spain under Franco and in Sri Lanka in the beginning stages of the Tamil insurrection, can cause a similar sort of reaction. However, in these cases, grievances and a feeling of reciprocity seem to be the driving factors. If the entire population is treated as if they were connected to the insurgents, the opportunity costs of participation are lowered, leading to more active and passive support. Another mechanism dealing with the effects of widespread violence and repression is outlined by Findley and Edwards (2007). They find that latent institutions are activated in the population by an overt threat, such as that posed by indiscriminate violence. These popular institutions, such as clan structures, unify and drive the population to more effective participation.

Tactical Insurgent Responses to Indiscriminate Violence

Some insurgent groups anticipate increased popular support stemming from indiscriminate violence, using provocation to try to get their opponents to overreact and use repressive or indiscriminate measures against the populace (Kydd and Walter 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Guevara 1961). Provoking the incumbent power into retaliating indiscriminately radicalizes the population and justifies insurgent actions. Civilians who supported the incumbent may come to fear this connection, coming to believe that the government needs to be replaced and that radical actions are justified in the face of the government's evil. Civilians may be more apt to believe insurgent propaganda saying that the government's actions lessen their security, even though the government's actions are a reaction to the insurgents' own actions. Such provocation strategies are most useful against governments feeling the need to publicize their counterinsurgent actions in order to placate domestic public political concerns (Bueno de Mesquita 2007). Thus, one can see that insurgents can recognize the strategic advantages coming from the incumbent's use of indiscriminate repression and move to foster such tactics through provocation.

Insurgent groups also use non-physical action to achieve the same effects. The pressing need for popular support drives many terrorist and guerrilla groups to put a lot of effort into propaganda intended to radicalize the populace, justify their actions, and gain participation (Cordes 1987; Picard 1991; Leeman 1991). This technique often uses and exaggerates instances of incumbent violence to further increase support. Rumors and other types of rhetoric can be used to create participation, violence, and activism (Horowitz 2001). Through the use of these tactics, insurgents can gain support by manipulating the population into fearing for their security,

desiring revenge, and acting upon perceived grievances and threats even if the threats are not imminent. As a whole, the use of provocation and propaganda represents a more complex and insightful insurgent strategy regarding the populace than just reaping the benefits of unprovoked incumbent repression upon the population.

Non-Violent Insurgent Tactics

Insurgents use some nonviolent tactics to target the populace, in addition to the methods listed above. These types of methods usually seek to gain popular influence through the provision of public services, governance, security, and social reform (Guevara 1961; Flanigan 2008; Kasfir 2005). Such provisions can increase the dependence of the population on the insurgents, institute useful social reforms, and facilitate the use of propaganda. For instance, individuals brought into interaction with the insurgents through social utilities might be more accepting of ideological appeals and recruitment attempts. These types of provisions are especially prevalent in cases where ideological goals are key components of insurgent motivation and popular interaction as was the case with many of the classical guerrilla movements, such as those of Mao and Guevara, and insurgent groups such as the National Resistance Army in Uganda (Tse-tung 1961; Guevara 1961; Kasfir 2005). Service provision and social reform allow insurgents to portray their ideology favorably, especially if the incumbent neglects or represses the populace, not allowing desired reform. This amiable popular interaction aids in transmitting ideology, increasing recruitment, and fostering active and tacit support and participation. Using such methods allows a group to avoid using violence, and they can be used to gain support when

propaganda, provocation, and security mechanisms are ineffective, though social provisions are often used in conjunction with these factors.

The Populace and War Outcomes

The populace plays a role in why powerful state organizations, such as the United States military, lose wars against weaker foes, such as insurgents in places like Vietnam. Several studies name factors such as political vulnerability and resolve as primary reasons for this pattern while others point out that asymmetric tactics, such as states attacking guerrillas with conventional, direct combat strategies, lead to the state losing (Mack 1975; Arreguin-Toft 2001; Sullivan 2007). What is central to all of these factors is continued public support for the insurgents and the withdrawal of support for the incumbents. Continued popular support contributes to insurgent endurance, since they have a broader supply network, access to more recruits, and the ability to use information strategically. The incumbent must play to their own publics, who desire a quick resolution to conflict and may not put a high priority on the outcome of the war. In terms of asymmetric strategies, guerrilla warfare requires at least tacit popular support to be effective. Without this support, insurgents would not be able to muster the resolve and endurance that come from a ready supply of recruits, intelligence, supplies, etc. The necessity of gaining and maintaining public support impels insurgents to adapt their tactics to target the populace in a way favorable to their goals. Incumbents can also try to interact with the populace to try to remove support from the insurgents, though this may be more difficult since

they are not as often amongst the people, unable to interact with them on the same level as the insurgents.

Studies from the Counterinsurgent Perspective

“Hearts and Minds” and Related Tactics

While the above literature mostly looks at the role of the populace from the insurgent perspective, the studies below approach this issue from the counterinsurgent, or incumbent, perspective. The first type of literature on this subject looks at tactics which aim to clear an area of insurgents, hold the area, and form relationships with the populace in order to affect support and gain access to local networks of supply and intelligence (FM 3-24; Trinquier 1964; Katagiri 2011; Galula 1964). The purpose of these tactics is to cut off the insurgents from their main advantage over the incumbents: support and supply from the populace. In many cases, this support is an absolute necessity for the existence of the insurgent groups. The populace is key in shaping these tactics with the political battle for popular support being the primary focus. To this end, participants in this strategy have employed teams specifically to study the populace, understand their culture, customs, and mentalities, and use this information so that the incumbent can better interact with the people (Jager 2007; McFate and Fondacaro 2011). Though widely embraced, this ‘hearts and minds’ strategy seems to have mixed results in practice. Nevertheless, this theory shows that, just as insurgent strategy is often adapted to try to affect the political opinions and support of the populace, counterinsurgent practices are also adapted in a similar way. In fact, tactics such as social provisions and propaganda are widely used by both sides. An

important part of these tactics is that the incumbent is often forced to make more concessions due to the necessity of making partnerships with the populace and domestic organizations which then put constraints on the behavior of the incumbent side (Katagiri 2011). Such constraints indicate that the domestic organizations and populations targeted by these tactics have even more influence on incumbent behavior than might at first be thought.

Knowing the specifics of the insurgent group also aids in selecting a counterinsurgent strategy. Miller (2007) theorizes that different types of insurgent groups, such as reactionary, revolutionary, and nationalist-separatist groups, require specific techniques to combat. For instance, reactionary groups are best combated with legal reforms which inhibit the operations of the group and dissuade popular participation. Thus, though the population is not central, it still plays a major part in determining what tactics are to be used. Still other studies look at ways to influence terrorists who, because of their ideology and determination, might not be easily dissuaded through fear of death or imprisonment. In these cases, the counterinsurgent must often operate through the populace, basing strategies on groups such as the families of potential terrorists or the followers of terrorist groups though these tactics are often costlier in terms of resources and intelligence (King, Noor, and Taylor 2011; Trager and Zagorcheva 2006).

Information-based COIN Tactics

To conduct successful counterinsurgent operations, incumbent forces need to have sufficient intelligence to be able to identify who is and who is not an insurgent. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) theorize that incumbents try to balance social provision and coercion in order

to optimize the chance that civilians will cooperate and share intelligence with the counterinsurgents. They find that more social provisions reduced insurgent violence in Iraq, presumably because it led to more intelligence being gathered, allowing for more effective operations against the insurgents.

Indiscriminate incumbent violence can reduce the amount of information provided by the populace. Condra and Shapiro (2012) examine how collateral damage, serving in place of indiscriminate violence, increased insurgent violence in Iraq. They hypothesize that this increase was due to reduced sharing of intelligence between the people and counterinsurgents, allowing the insurgents to operate more freely. In contrast, Kalyvas (2006) sees the causal pathway working in a reverse fashion. The availability of information determines whether or not indiscriminate violence is used with selective violence being used when information is available.

In addition to indiscriminate violence affecting information supplies, Lyall and Wilson (2009) theorize that limited interaction with the populace can reduce counterinsurgent intelligence availability, thus inhibiting their operations and leading to more insurgent violence. Similarly, Lyall (2010) finds that coethnics are more useful in combating insurgents, largely because they have access to better, local information and greater interaction, enabling them to issue credible threats to supporters of the insurgents. This makes their counterinsurgent sweeps and operations more effective.

Explaining the Continued Use of Indiscriminate Violence

Several states have used indiscriminate violence to combat insurgency. For instance, Spain used widespread repression and low level violence against the Basque population to try to hamper ETA operations (Alexieva 2006; Woodworth 2001). Other governments, such as Israel (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007), Libya(BBC), and the United States (Kocher, Pepinsky and Kalyvas 2011; Ricks 2006) have also made use of such tactics. In these cases, desperation to win and the inability to identify insurgents due to intelligence shortages has led to civilian victimization. However, these tactics seemed to increase insurgency, revitalizing it by increasing recruitment and resistance by the insurgents and the populace. In a few cases, such as Sri Lanka's war against the LTTE, indiscriminate violence has been relatively successful (Joshi 1996). In the early periods of the conflict, indiscriminate violence seemed to increase insurgency, but in later periods, targeting civilians seemed to work to decrease the manpower and support of the insurgency, ultimately contributing to its downfall (Washington Post). One of the differences in this case, however, was the scale of the repression. Much of the population was transferred to camps, shelled, or killed, thus eliminating access by the LTTE. Indiscriminate violence seems to work in cases where extreme levels of violence or repression are used, to where the populace simply cannot exist as an independent group. Lesser forms of violence, even if deadly and widespread, seem to increase insurgency and make incumbent victory less likely, yet incumbents still use such tactics to try to subdue insurgencies.

Grossman (1996) hypothesizes that atrocities committed against an opposing side create enough terror to effectively defeat them. These atrocities go beyond the norm of expected behavior, causing shock, panic, and awe amongst the targeted population. Indiscriminate

violence meant to destroy the insurgents' will to fight and the populace's will to continue supporting the insurgency may operate in the same way, providing a very effective way of fighting, destroying the enemy, and removing their sources of support.

Lyall (2009) posits that indiscriminate violence is effective because it drives a wedge between the insurgents and the populace. The insurgents are implicated in the population's suffering and the populace may no longer see them as a viable source of security. This causes the populace to exert pressure on the insurgents to stop their actions and may promote cooperation with the incumbents, thus making counterinsurgency operations more effective. Thus, contrary to most of the literature, Lyall concludes that indiscriminate violence is used because it is effective.

Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) and Downes (2008), contrary to Lyall, conclude that incumbents only use indiscriminate violence when they are facing a major insurgency. When other strategies have failed, incumbents turn to indiscriminate tactics. Incumbents recognize the possible negative effects of indiscriminate violence but use it anyway in a last-ditch effort against insurgent forces that pose a significant military threat to the regime. Downes proposes that states may also use indiscriminate violence to clear an enemy populace from territory acquired through conflict.

Finally, another way of looking at why indiscriminate violence still occurs is to look at the internal characteristics of groups. Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) hypothesize that the internal characteristics of groups play a role in how they interact with the populace. More specifically, those groups which have mechanisms for internal monitoring and enforcement show fewer tendencies to abuse or kill civilians than those groups which are less disciplined. This conclusion is important in that it shows indiscriminate violence, not as a general strategy of

combat, as the aforementioned theories do, but as a simple breakdown of order with brutality and criminality taking over as the controlling impulses for group behavior.

Much of the above literature deals with the effects of popular support in too general a way, with popular support assumed to be a monolithic force. For instance, popular support changes lead to general increases or decreases in insurgency. However, none of the literature really deals with the possibility of secondary effects from popular support changes, such as support for specific tactics. Thus, a theory such as the one below is necessary as a more nuanced handling of violence against the populace, popular support, and insurgent tactics.

Description of Thesis Chapters

In this thesis, the next chapter will elaborate on the theory and proposed problem and discuss the limitations and assumptions mentioned of the theory and testing. Chapter three will examine the conflict in Northern Ireland, looking for evidence of violence against the populace and its effects on the population and insurgent tactics. As mentioned above, special care will be taken to look for the theorized mechanisms, their function, and whether they contribute to increased terrorism relative to guerrilla warfare. Due to the in-depth nature of the case study, intervening causes for a switch to terrorism which might otherwise have obscured the results can be better identified. The case study will be used to test the effects of violence against the populace on both the levels of overall insurgency and guerrilla warfare relative to terrorism. The latter parts of the chapter will discuss the findings of the test and their implications for the theory.

Chapter four will be a quantitative analysis using casualty and conflict data from Iraq from 2004-2009. Tests will be conducted to determine changes in both overall insurgency and the ratio of guerrilla to terrorist attacks relative to civilian deaths. This will provide a better, more robust test of the theory than the previous case studies. In the latter half of the chapter, the findings and implications of the tests will be discussed.

Chapter five will provide a summary of the previous chapters and then discuss the overall implications of the results. Weaknesses and other problems in the testing processes will be examined and suggestions for improvement outlined. In addition, avenues for future research will be proposed.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORY

The main phenomenon examined in this theory is that of the tactics used in insurgency. Some insurgents use guerrilla warfare, while others use terrorism, and still others use both. These different tactics are analyzed within this theory in light of the idea that indiscriminate violence or repression (indiscriminate in that it applies to entire groups, not just individuals) causes popular support for insurgency to increase. It may be possible that violence against the populace causes support to increase for some tactics relatively more than for others due to the mechanisms outlined below. Generally, violence against the populace conducted by the state or incumbent leads to greater use of terrorism relative to the use of guerrilla warfare as an insurgent tactic.

Definitions

Several central terms need to be defined to clarify the theory. The first term is insurgency. O'Neil defines insurgency as "a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources...and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics" (O'Neil 2005, 15). The object of violence in O'Neil's definition should be changed from "to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics" to "cause political change." This removes the problems of clarity with the phrase "aspects of politics" while allowing the definition to include groups which may seek limited goals such as a change in particular policies as opposed to the legitimacy of the government or some part

thereof. The key points in the definition are that insurgency movements are violent and systematic in their methods, political in their goals, seek change in the status quo, though this need not mean systemic change, and that the movements can include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or both. The systematic and political nature of these movements is important because it differentiates such activities from common crime, which can share characteristics with insurgency such as the use of widespread violence.

Guerrilla warfare can be defined as the use of violent attacks, such as hit-and-run tactics or ambushes, by insurgent combatants to target incumbent combatants. Though noncombatants may be killed or injured during guerrilla attacks, they are not the primary targets. Another common characteristic of guerrilla warfare is that it often serves to establish areas of control particularly through the use of small unit tactics (Ganor 2002, 296). For the purposes of this study, the definition of guerrilla warfare is restricted to nonstate actors. While state security forces could, and do, use similar hit and run, small unit tactics, restricting the definition to nonstate actors helps to create a more manageable scope for study. Attacks are coded as being guerrilla warfare or not by examining whether the targets are noncombatants or combatants. The characteristics surrounding the attacks, such as the decisionmaking process used in determining who to attack and why, also factor into the coding process. Attacks must be committed by insurgents, be violent, and the targets must be combatants. The targets do not necessarily need to be armed, however, since they can be involved in supporting armed individuals conducting combat operations (i.e. medics, guides, communications technicians, etc.) However, the targets must be operating in a combat or supporting role during the attack. For instance, soldiers on duty would be coded as combatants, but off duty, off base soldiers would be coded as noncombatants.

As another example, law enforcement personnel conducting regular law enforcement duties would be coded as noncombatants, but officers involved in counterinsurgent or counterterror roles would be classified as combatants.

Generally, a noncombatant is anybody not directly involved in carrying out or supporting combat operations. These can include, in addition to the examples above, civilians, soldiers who have surrendered, and prisoners of war (Grossman 1996, 193). This classification leads to the definition of guerrilla warfare as any attack by insurgent combatants on incumbent combatants, though it is important to note that one's role as a combatant or noncombatant can change over time. The coding of a subject's role depends on what activity they are engaging in. The same policeman might be a noncombatant while engaging in normal duties, but be a combatant if he or she then engages in counterinsurgent activity. This ease of changing roles can cause difficulties during coding, but these difficulties should only occur in some cases and can be overcome through careful examination of the subject to see what they were doing and why they were attacked.

One could make the case that ties to combat operations extend farther into society than is noted above. For instance, state employees or factory workers can have a relatively indirect connection to military activities in that they may help to manage policies or create munitions which can facilitate military action. However, given that these individuals are not involved directly in combat or combat support, these categories of people are still considered noncombatants, and attacks against them by insurgents will be considered terrorism.

Terrorism is difficult to define as evidenced by the innumerable definitions used in terrorism literature. For instance, the United States' State Department, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense all have markedly different definitions for terrorism, something which they deal with as an important part of their mission (Hoffman 2006, 31). However, for this study, the definition needs to be narrowed down in order to make it practical. In contrast to guerrilla warfare, terrorism should be defined as the systematic use of violence against noncombatants in order to establish influence, through coercion, towards a political goal. The systematic nature and political goal stated in the definition help to exclude simple criminal violence from the study's sample. The targets mentioned in the definition are the main difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare and are the principle characteristic of terrorism (Ganor 2002, 294-295). With regards to targeting, terrorism can be seen as being very similar to the below definition of violence against the populace. In order to differentiate the two definitions better, the definition of terrorism is restricted to nonstate actors. The part of the definition stating that the point of terrorism is to create influence through coercion establishes that the violence is a means, not an end. Terrorism is a tactic, not an entity in itself. The influence created through terrorist attacks is aimed to influence the state or ruling entity through the targeted population by coercing them.

For the purposes of this study, violence against the populace is defined as indiscriminate violence from the state or incumbent directed at the populace from which the insurgency is based. This populace is often a separate group than that to which the incumbents belong. For example, violence was directed by Protestant groups against Catholic ones in Northern Ireland and by Sinhalese against Tamils in Sri Lanka. This violence can take various forms. In its lighter forms, it can consist of things such as arrests, beatings, detainment, and the destruction of livelihoods. Heavier forms of violence might include torture and killing, even widespread

massacres. The level of violence is relative to the amount of violence normal in the given system. For instance, if beatings of arrested individuals are common amongst the entire population, then such activity would not be included in the definition for this study. However, if the targeting or degree of the violence escalates beyond the status quo, then this would be coded as an example of violence against the populace. Violence itself is defined as physical or bodily harm, death, destruction of property and/or livelihoods, or the denial of needs such as jobs or housing. An example of violence against the populace might include the practice known as migratory genocide perpetrated by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Soviet troops destroyed farms and residences with incendiary or chemical weapons or landmines in order to displace civilians who might have supported the Afghan resistance (Tanner 2005, 255-257).

Theoretical Mechanisms

Mechanisms Contributing to General Popular Support

There are several mechanisms in the theory which serve to transform the effects of violence against the populace into popular support. The first set of mechanisms generates general popular support for the insurgency when violence against the populace occurs. The second set causes popular support for terrorism to increase more so than popular support for guerrilla warfare. This diversion will then make the use of terrorism more likely, as the populace will desire its use and the benefits for the insurgents from using terrorism will increase.

The first general mechanism is the fear and insecurity that come from the indiscriminate nature of incumbent-directed violence. This violence can cause people to seek protection from

incumbent attacks. They will often approach insurgents for the security which they can offer (Kalyvas 2006, 157). Survival may be more likely with the insurgents than if one attempts to remain neutral. On one's own one might be killed regardless of one's neutrality if civilians are being targeted by incumbent forces (154-156). This fear and threat solves the insurgents' collective action problem by giving the populace an impetus to participate in the insurgency and making free riding highly costly. The simple logic and desire for survival on the part of the population provides insurgents with the opportunity to foster and develop popular support and participation by providing safety when incumbent attacks target civilians rather than just insurgents.

When it comes to fear, the rationale behind the incumbent's use of indiscriminate violence may become relevant. One possible rationale is simple, essential animosity or hatred towards the targeted population based on race, religion, or other such characteristics. In such cases, the population's choice is stark. They can support the insurgency, thus gaining security provided by the insurgents, or they can try to survive on their own. The latter possibility is illogical, as the danger coming from being neutral is great since the incumbent violence is based on identity, not allegiance. Only by giving support and allegiance to the insurgents can the populace gain security. However, if the incumbent is using indiscriminate violence as a way of curtailing popular support, then it might be possible for the populace to stop supporting the insurgency and thus achieve a level of security. Thus, one might see the opposite of the above theorized effect, that indiscriminate violence might actually lessen support for insurgency. However, uncertainty is an intrinsic part of conflict. It is difficult for the populace to be sure of incumbent motives and future plans. Thus, a security dilemma develops where, when the

populace forgoes insurgent security, they make themselves vulnerable to future incumbent violence. Thus, the populace can choose an uncertain route to security by giving up support for the insurgency, or they can gain more credible guarantees of security by supporting the insurgency. Since supporting the insurgency is a less uncertain option, incumbent indiscriminate violence is likely to cause greater support for the insurgency regardless of motive.

The second general mechanism is the desire for revenge on the part of the victim population. Indiscriminate violence results in the killing and destruction of lives in the targeted population. This type of activity creates resentment and further develops popular grievances towards the incumbent actor. Thus, atrocities will increase the number of people who will actively participate in the insurgency by creating a greater pool of individuals who have the motivation to fight and kill members of the incumbent's force (Silke 2005, 244-245). Individuals will desire to act on their revenge and can do so through the insurgency, the most convenient and effective local outlet. In addition, atrocities and the grievances they inspire will increase popular tolerance and tacit support amongst those in the targeted population who are still not willing or able to participate in the active insurgency.

Though acting upon feelings of revenge or other emotional changes may seem irrational, it shows a reframing of rationality on the subject's part, rather than a transgressing of it. This idea is best explained in terms of honor and face with revenge attacks seen as demonstrations of honor. Honor itself can be seen as an estimation of strength as well as a quality denoting respect and person or nationhood (O'Neill 1999). Violence against the population serves as a test of this honor. Honor is attacked, challenged, and insulted. Violence against the populace is symbolic of weakness and the inability of the people to defend themselves. O'Neil likens territory to a house

with attacks such as these seen as a humiliating intrusion into the insurgents' territory. This symbolism and insult to honor humiliates the people and creates massive amounts of anger within the population (Saurette 2005; Fattah and Fierke 2009). Such a challenge to honor requires a response, but not just any response. It needs to be one that is costly to the insurgents and demonstrates their strength. These demonstrations assure the population of their security and insurgent commitment, serve as warnings against the incumbent, and act as deterrence, sending a message to the incumbent about insurgent levels of strength and honor. Furthermore, the preservation of social face (the quality which tells outsiders how to treat an actor in the future) that comes through attacking in revenge serves as a symbolic message to the incumbent that future attacks will be answered, further bolstering defense and deterrence (O'Neill 1999). In addition, these demonstrations of honor serve to restore the dignity and sense of nationhood of the population, reducing the impact of the intrusive, humiliating attacks and the anger that they create.

Because honor plays such a big role in seeking revenge, such revenge attacks may be especially prevalent in populations where honor and revenge are prized cultural values (O'Neil 2005, 105-106; Henry 2009). This could potentially limit the utility of the theory to honor cultures. However, other studies have found that ideas of honor may still be present in other cultures, and the humiliation that comes from incumbent attacks works on individual, family, and group levels (Mosquera et al. 2002). Therefore, these mechanisms should be strong in honor cultures, but still work, although to a lesser degree, in less honor-bound cultures.

A third mechanism is the destruction of social structure and livelihoods or the denial of basic needs which leaves a portion of the population displaced, with no means of making a

living. A displaced and out of work population creates an excellent recruiting pool for insurgents. Insurgents can offer an occupation and sometimes supplies or money for individuals and/or their families (Maley 2002, 155). Thus, insurgents can attain higher levels of recruiting and gain more supporters if violence has displaced a portion of the population, leaving them possibly dependent on the insurgents for occupation or livelihood. An example of this, as mentioned earlier, is the migratory genocide conducted by the Soviets in Afghanistan. By destroying the crops, farms, and residences of many rural Afghans, the Soviets caused the displacement of populations who then fled to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. Once in the camps, many young men became radicalized through the influences of mujahideen actively recruiting and teaching in camp madrassas. An entire generation grew up in the camps not learning to work or farm, leaving them little recourse but to learn how to fight. This type of activity, stemming from Soviet violence, helped strengthen mujahideen groups and helped sustain and strengthen the fledgling Taliban (Nojumi 2002, 119). This type of mechanism may be more prominent in more skilled or educated individuals, since their opportunity costs are lowered more drastically through the loss of livelihood than would be the case in poorer sections of the population (Kavanagh 2011).

A fourth and final mechanism is that of latent social structures activated by an outside threat (Findley and Edwards 2007). Within societies, there are often social structures which, when activated by an outside threat, allow the resistance to increase and channel popular participation, recruiting, and popular support. For example, religious institutions might serve during times of threat as the basis for organization, communication, and operations. Similar activations might occur with the unification and use of tribal or clan structures when the population is under threat. This activation can increase insurgent control over the population by

creating more opportunities for fostering popular support and greater interaction with the populace.

This first set of mechanisms leads to the first hypothesis on the effects of violence against the populace on popular support for insurgency in general:

H₁: Violence against the populace will generally increase popular support for insurgency.

Mechanisms Contributing to Specific Popular Support

Three more mechanisms serve to divert popular support and shape it so that terrorism gains more support relative to other tactics, such as guerrilla warfare, when incumbent violence reaches higher levels. Since the mechanisms that lead to increased insurgency and terrorism rely largely on fear and other emotions, such as humiliation and anger, it makes sense for high levels of violence to amplify the effect of these mechanisms and create incentives to use reciprocal violent actions, thus increasing terrorism (seen as a more extreme way of responding) faster than guerrilla warfare, in addition to generally increasing insurgency. This increasing and channeling of popular support occurs through the below mechanisms.

The first of these mechanisms is that of outbidding presented by Kydd and Walter (2006). Terrorism is seen as a way to outbid other groups for popular support. This idea is best explained through the aforementioned ideas of honor, face, and prestige. Insurgent groups serve as the potential defenders of the population, so the challenge to honor and the insult to the population affects them severely. The enemy came into their territory and embarrassed them, making them seem weak. This apparent weakness and loss of honor causes the insurgents to lose prestige, the

quality that allows them to have a level of influence and popularity (O'Neill 1999). Without prestige, the insurgents cannot exert enough of an influence over the populace to conduct effective operations. Terrorism and outbidding can be seen as ways to regain this prestige. The public, dramatic, norm-defying nature of terrorism suits the insurgents. These attacks serve as focal symbols for the insurgency and the populace. When the population thinks of the insurgency, they will think about these attacks and the insurgent groups that conducted them. These attacks show insurgent determination and dedication. Their costly nature, in terms of violating norms against killing civilians, indicates commitment to the defense of the population. They also demonstrate the honor of the insurgent groups as defenders of the population by showing them taking the fight to the enemy. This increased honor makes the insurgent groups seem like better candidates to serve popular interest and gives them more prestige to influence the population. This process is best carried out through terrorism for reasons similar to those outlined under the aforementioned general revenge mechanism in that terrorism shows a greater demonstration of strength and undoes humiliation suffered by the people. In turn, the honor and prestige gained by the insurgents through terrorism allows them to accrue more of the popular support created by violence against the populace for the insurgency in general. Using terrorism allows insurgent groups that use terrorism to therefore outbid other groups for invaluable popular support

The second mechanism is similar to the general revenge mechanism but with reciprocity added as a way to direct the anger and humiliation from incumbent violence into terrorism. Attacks on the population enrage, humiliate, and insult the populace (O'Neill 2009; Fattah and Fierke 2009; Saurette 2005). They also challenge the people's honor. The incumbent comes into

their territory and violates their sense of honor and nationhood by attacking them and showing them to be weak. Such affronts cannot be tolerated and must be avenged in order to restore honor, enforce deterrence, and demonstrate strength. Since the incumbent violence targets civilians, this affront is likely to be more effective if it is answered in kind through an intrusion into incumbent territory where insurgents can demonstrate their own power and ability to challenge incumbent honor (O'Neill 1999). This reciprocal demonstration shows that the insurgents and populace have a level of honor and prestige equal to the incumbent's, that the populace and insurgents are not weak or defenseless. Such an attack restores popular honor and expresses the anger coming from violence against the populace in a way that is more proportional than guerrilla warfare would be. This type of restoration and satisfaction is thus only possible through truly reciprocal actions, that is, terrorism targeting incumbent civilians.

This situation of honor challenges, humiliation, and anger from violence against the populace thus creates a tit for tat kind of mentality. Since the incumbent chose to attack civilians, they create a scenario where insurgent counterattacks against civilians are justified, perhaps even required. This whole complex creates massive incentives for insurgents to switch from harder, military targets to softer, civilian targets. The insurgents can show the population that they are directly retaliating for their suffering, playing into popular anger and gaining prestige and honor in the process. Overall, such anger coming from violence against the populace is likely to increase popular support for terrorist activity.

The third mechanism deals with the psychological effects of incumbent violence upon the target population. According to Grossman, atrocities allow one to better overcome the natural human resistance to killing other people. This is particularly true for killing in the manner of

atrocities (Grossman 1996, 217-225). This mechanism works by dehumanizing the enemy who committed the atrocities making it easier to kill them. The use of atrocities by incumbent forces also legitimizes atrocities as a means of fighting. The atrocities described by Grossman have similar effects to the incumbent violence against the populace described in this research. Thus, if atrocities beget atrocities as a method of fighting, it stands to reason that incumbent violence can also facilitate the adoption and use of counteratrocities (here, terrorist tactics) that target civilians as a legitimate means of struggle.

Similarly to Grossman's theory, Bandura's idea of moral disengagement comes into play in the relationship of incumbent and terrorist violence, particularly in the way that norms come into effect. According to Bandura, moral disengagement depends on the ability to see one's actions as moral due to the inhumanities and dehumanization of the opposing side (Bandura 2006, 95-105). This moral disengagement is made easier by the norm-breaking nature of violence against the populace. Such a violation of norms against attacking civilians creates anger and incentives to punish the violation and enforce the norm on the part of the insurgents and populace (Welch 1993; Liberman 2012; Ohbuchi et al 2004). If the violation is not punished, the incumbent can continue to violate the norm with impunity. However, psychologically, one can legitimately justify going beyond the norm in order to punish prior violations, in this case, using terrorism to counter violence against the populace (O'Neill 1999). Such action makes clear the severity of the violation. Therefore it becomes necessary for reciprocity to be used as a deterrence mechanism against future violations (Morrow 2007). This mechanism, therefore, works similarly to the revenge/reciprocity mechanism above, but the driving force is not anger, but the norm violation itself and the honor and prestige received through punishing the

incumbent's violation. The incumbent's use of violence against the populace violates the norm and thus legitimizes the use of terrorism as punishment. In this sense, terrorism, a violation of the norm itself, is no longer immoral. It is a moral action because it is done to punish a former violation, thus allowing for the aforementioned moral disengagement. Terrorism is justified and seen as necessary in the eyes of the people. With morality behind terrorist operations, restraints against its use are eliminated, making terrorism more likely.

Taking the first set of mechanisms together with the second set leads to increased popular support for terrorism. This idea, in turn, leads to the second, and main, hypothesis of this study:

H₂: Higher levels of violence against the populace will increase the ratio of terrorist to guerrilla operations due to increased support for terrorism relative to guerrilla warfare.

Alternate Explanations

The issue of examining why insurgents might choose terrorism over guerrilla warfare is complicated by alternate explanations which might produce the same results as the theorized mechanisms, but do so through different processes. The first alternate explanation is the logic of escalation. Violence against the populace might create a desire for escalation. If a group just uses guerrilla warfare, it might not be possible to escalate and still use solely guerrilla warfare. Thus, insurgents might turn to terrorism as part of the escalation because they do not have the capacity for sustained, increased, and high intensity guerrilla operations. This provides an alternate pathway than theorized above, where the switch to terrorism was not due to capacity, but largely because it is seen as a harsher tactic. This alternate explanation could create problems during

analysis of the theory. The same results, a switch to terrorism, will be evident, but the theory is not operating as it is expected to. To get around this problem, in the case study, personal motivations need to be examined. Sources such as memoirs or other personal narratives should be analyzed to see what mechanisms individuals cite for their use of terrorism or guerrilla warfare and any changes between the two.

Another alternative to the above theory is that of insurgent weakness. Similarly to the first alternative explanation, insurgents might turn to using terrorism because of group capacities. Terrorism is a more asymmetric tactic with fewer resources and operatives needed to inflict a given level of damage. Therefore, insurgent groups might be tempted to use terrorism in place of guerrilla warfare when they are short of resources. Thus, popular support does not enter into the decisionmaking of the insurgents except in that less popular support might reduce group resources. Insurgents use terrorism because guerrilla warfare becomes too difficult, not because of the theorized mechanisms involving popular support. In order to determine whether it is capacity or popular support causing the change in tactics, personal documents and narratives should once again be consulted, especially those of rank-and-file members who have less of an incentive to lie about group capacity relative to group leaders. The motivations of these members can be assessed, and one should be able to evaluate whether frustration with lack of success in the war or changes in popular support are causing the use of terrorism. In this type of evaluation, the case study will be invaluable for examining the context of the changes and in tracing their processes.

A third alternative explanation is outside influences upon the insurgency. It is possible that actors other than the insurgency, populace, and incumbent have influence over insurgent

actions. This has been the case in conflicts such as Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, when groups outside Afghanistan, such as Pakistan, contributed funding and personnel in such a way as to radicalize the conflict. Radical individuals entered the conflict or were bolstered within it, thereby changing the development of the conflict to favor radical organizations and tactics. These groups may favor more aggressive tactics, such as terrorism, thus changing the tactics used in the conflict and creating results similar to the above theory. However, though outside influences may reduce the role of popular support, such support will still exist and have an influence over the insurgency since operations will be made more difficult without the populace's backing. One will need to examine the data carefully for signs of external influences and evaluate their magnitude and effects if present. Though such influences may lessen the effect of the theorized mechanisms, the mechanisms should still be present and working to some degree.

A final possible explanation for a switch to terrorism is that of individual influences. Popular support mechanisms may be reduced if the planning of operations is centralized under radical individuals, for instance, if more moderate leaders are killed off. In such a case, the insurgency will not be radicalized by violence against the populace or popular support. It will already be radicalized by the makeup of the groups. If such radical leadership desired to use more aggressive tactics such as terrorism, one might see a switch in tactics without changes in popular support. However, popular support will likely still have an influence on the insurgency as, without it, any operations will be difficult to conduct or sustain. Popular support in this case would serve to either support the preferred tactics of the radical leadership or moderate such

tactics in favor of less aggressive ones. Thus, the theorized mechanisms should still be operating as theorized, albeit in a more subdued or contested manner.

Though these alternative explanations might cause difficulties with the testing of the theory, most of them should be manageable with careful handling of the data and the extensive use of personal narratives and process tracing in the case study. Other alternatives, such as outside or individual influences, will likely only lessen the effect of the theorized mechanisms. Care must be taken to find and evaluate the existence of these alternatives and to develop the proper course of action to properly test the theory.

Key Assumptions and Limitations

The creation of this theory and the carrying out of its tests rests on several key assumptions. The first of these is that insurgency, or the potential for insurgency, exists. Without an available or potential insurgency movement, the grievances, fear, and humiliation of the populace will have no outlet for expression, so there will be no terrorism or guerrilla warfare. A second assumption is that insurgent groups actually interact with, depend on, and react to popular support and demands. Without this, no amount of popular support could influence insurgent behavior. Another assumption is that violence against the populace in the test cases does not reach the genocidal level at which the mechanisms would cease to function. If the population is decimated, then the mechanisms, which rely on a sizeable population being present, will not function. The theory can work even if violence is widespread and severe, but not if it tends towards total destruction. The theory also relies on the assumption that the insurgency has the

capacity to use either guerrilla warfare or terrorism. Relative changes in the frequency of use of either tactic occur due to insurgent decisions in response to outside stimuli such as changes in popular support. If insurgents do not have a choice as to what tactics they use, then no outside stimuli could influence this change, and the theory's mechanisms and processes cannot be maintained. One of the most important assumptions is that of rationality on the part of the insurgents and populace. The insurgents seek popular support and better, more effective ways to fight the incumbent and serve the populace. The populace seeks security, protection, and retaliation with retaliation being seen as a form of defense. The rationality assumption is less important for the incumbent, since why the incumbent uses indiscriminate violence is less important than the fact that it is used. Finally, the population is assumed to have agency and seek its own interest. The populace acts on its interests, and it acts upon the insurgency with the ability to influence them. In turn, the populace can be influenced by the insurgency.

In addition to the assumptions, there are several limitations that might be encountered during testing. These limitations need to be recognized in order to be dealt with. Thankfully, with care, most of these limitations are surmountable. The first limitation is data availability. In areas where insurgencies are going on, data recording may not be a priority or be within the capacity of the actors there, and existing records might be lost in the chaos. Records may also be classified, obscured, or corrupted by actors wishing to conceal their activities. This problem becomes even more troublesome in cases of insurgency since insurgent groups tend to be secretive, making studying them difficult. In the absence of a reliable source of data, testing the theory may be difficult. The field of possible cases may be limited, but with careful analysis of the available information, this limitation can be overcome.

Coding can be difficult when it comes to distinguishing terrorism from guerrilla warfare. Coding should be simple in most cases, but in situations such as the killing of informers, it can be unclear. One will need to examine the role the subject was playing and why they were attacked. Borderline cases will need to be examined closely or dropped.

The multicausal nature of terrorism might present difficulties. It may be hard to know how much of the change in insurgent behavior is due to changes in popular support or other factors, such as insurgent capacity. The intensive nature of the case study allows for the examination of personal records, memoirs, and statements which will help to bypass this limitation.

Another difficulty stemming from the data used is in determining what data is just propaganda and what is fact. Insurgent groups could obscure the reasons for their behavior, perhaps saying that they changed tactics due to popular support to conceal other motives, such as weakness. The case study should be useful in overcoming this since it will allow for careful examination of intervening variables such as weakness.

The final limitation is generalizability of the results. How useful might the results of this study be? The mechanisms in this theory should be seen as sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for terrorism to flourish. While this theory's utility might be confined to certain situations where factors such as incumbent indiscriminate violence and others mentioned above exist, this research still provides a framework with which to analyze many areas around the world. The scope may not cover every insurgent conflict, but it does cover enough of them to be of widespread usefulness. Thus, though this limitation should be recognized and kept in mind, it need not affect the theory, testing, or analysis of the results.

Contribution to the Literature

Much of the literature on popular influences on combatant tactics, though it deals with popular support, deals with it in a general fashion. For example, some studies conclude that as violence against the populace increases, popular support increases, leading to increased insurgency (Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; Woodworth 2001; Alexieva 2006; Joshi 1996; Kaarthykeyan 2005; Richardson 2006). Other studies say that, in the opposite fashion, as violence against the populace increases, popular support falls, leading to decreased insurgency (Lyll 2009). Similarly others might say that as hearts and minds approaches become more effective, popular support for the insurgency falls, leading to a fall in the level of insurgency (FM 3-24; Trinquier 1964; Galula 1964). Regardless of the specific theory, most of the reviewed literature deals with popular support and violence against the population in too general a way.

The present theory, however, is more nuanced in its handling of the subject. It encompasses the previous studies by theorizing the general effects of violence against the populace on insurgency leading to the first prediction that violence against the populace increases popular support for insurgency in general. The theory surpasses previous ones, however, in that it theorizes that this violence affects popular support for specific tactics. This focus leads to the second prediction that violence against the populace causes popular support for terrorism to increase more relative to popular support for guerrilla warfare.

The present theory looks at how combat strategies shape popular support, but it then also examines the influence of popular support on specific tactics rather than just assuming a

relationship where more popular support simply equals greater insurgency. The theory also lays out the processes through which these shifts in support and their later effects occur. Thus, the theory gives a more nuanced handling of popular support and the populace's role. The theory gives the populace more agency in that they can support specific tactics. This type of specificity and increased theorizing gives the theory the detail and nuance to better reflect reality. Also, adding to this ability to represent reality, the theory incorporates both combatants and the populace in a more meaningful way than many theories. Many of the previous theories handle only one of the combatants or the relationship of one combatant with the populace. For example, hearts and minds theories often look at the counterinsurgent and the populace in detail, leaving the insurgents and their actions more nebulous. This theory, however, looks at how the effects of incumbent violence against the populace create popular support which then interacts with insurgent tactics to come to bear once again on the incumbent side. Due to this incorporation of all actors, this theory is more comprehensive than many of the theories that came before it.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ‘TROUBLES’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND FROM 1962-1973

Introduction

This chapter consists of a case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland, commonly referred to as “The Troubles.” The time period examined will stretch from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. Northern Ireland was picked for a qualitative case for a number of reasons. This conflict exhibits all the necessary variables needed to properly analyze the theory’s mechanisms. The incumbent consists of the British army and Loyalist forces such as the Royal Ulster Constabulary.¹ The insurgents consist of the Irish Republican Army. Insurgents used guerrilla warfare as well as terrorist attacks such as car bombs and sectarian reprisal attacks in Belfast neighborhoods (Bishop and Mallie 1987). The case also exhibits violence against the populace with widespread arrests, some killing, discrimination, attacks by Loyalist forces, and destruction of homes and livelihoods taking place. The research will examine these variables, their interaction, and whether the theorized mechanisms are working as outlined. This analysis will also further elaborate on the theories and will provide a test of the general hypotheses of the theory as well as the specific mechanisms through which the theorized relationships between incumbent and insurgent violence are formed. This test will not be as robust, given the nature of the case study, than the quantitative test of the theory in the next chapter, but should serve as a test of the theory’s plausibility.

¹ Throughout the literature on the conflict, it is clear that the RUC was an integral part of counterinsurgent operations. Thus, though the RUC is a police force, RUC personnel are considered to be combatants when on duty.

To carry out this case study, various types of sources will be used. Primary sources are paramount in supplying evidence for the test and include such materials as journalistic accounts, interview transcripts, memoirs, public records, and various statistics on violence throughout the conflict. Secondary materials about the conflict, the IRA, and Irish history were also consulted to provide background information for the analysis.

The layout of this chapter will include a brief overview of the conflict, looking at 3 time periods or cases: the pre-1969 period from the ending of Operation Harvest in 1962 to just before the Battle of the Bogside in August 1969, the post-1969 period from August 1969 to the introduction of internment in 1971, and the third period from internment to December 1973. These time periods signify different levels in the independent variable, incumbent violence. The first time period is low violence, the second is medium violence, and the third is high violence. The thresholds for moving from different levels of violence involve major events in each time period. In each major event, the number of deaths is examined. If this number exceeds a certain threshold, then the following time period is counted as a new case. This case continues as long as a status quo of repression or deaths is continued. This continuation of deaths is necessary to maintain levels of resentment and anger amongst the population. If there is a period of peace or another incident meeting a higher threshold of deaths, then a new case begins. Increased numbers of deaths should cause increased anger and resentment. As long as deaths continue after the main precipitating incidents, popular resentment should manifest itself in a step function with resentment peaking and then remaining steady until the next precipitating incident.²

² Mueller (1985) proposes a similar type of function involving war casualties and public opinion.

The first period (1962-1969) begins with the end of Operation Harvest, a violent IRA action, in February 1962. The ensuing time period contained little violence and few deaths, but a new case begins in August 1969 when the Battle of the Bogside occurs, meeting the threshold of three deaths in a single incident.³ Occasional deaths occur regularly (Sutton), allowing this case to continue, until internment, when over 15 Catholics were killed by the security forces, thus meeting the threshold for high violence (ten deaths).⁴ Higher rates of deaths continued after this incident and Bloody Sunday (14 deaths) until later in 1973, when deaths began to drop (CAIN; Sutton).

These time periods will be used to test the theory and its mechanisms. For clarity, the two hypotheses outlined in the theory will be combined to make one hypothesis which says that at medium levels of incumbent violence, insurgency will increase, but with guerrilla warfare increasing relatively more than terrorism. At higher levels of incumbent violence, terrorism will increase more relative to guerrilla warfare. In both cases with incumbent violence, insurgency should escalate. More formally, the hypothesis for this case study is:

H1: As incumbent violence increases, popular support for general insurgency will increase, and, at higher levels of incumbent violence, popular support for terrorism will increase relatively more than for guerrilla warfare.

Next, each mechanism will be tested to see if they functioned as theorized in the above periods. If the mechanisms differ from their theorized form, the implications of this deviation for

³ Three deaths is chosen to avoid incidental casualties (such as when a protester died in 1968 from a head injury). Three deaths is a reasonable minimum for which this might be true. Thus, though the selection of three deaths as a threshold is, to a degree, arbitrary, there is an underlying rationale to its use.

⁴ Ten deaths is chosen as the threshold because events resulting in that high of a casualty count are more likely to be widely publicized, indiscriminate, and be perceived as the effect of extreme aggression by the security forces. Ten deaths is a reasonable minimum for which this might be true.

the theory will be discussed. Alternate explanations for some of the study's findings will be put forth. Finally, the study will end with conclusions about the validity of the theory and its mechanisms. The implications of these conclusions for the theory, suggestions for further theoretical development, and avenues for future research will then be explored.

Conflict Cases and Incidents

The conflict will be briefly described before analyzing the hypotheses' evidence in detail. There are three cases used to test the theory. The first of these time periods is the pre-1969 period. In this time period, violence was relatively low. The IRA was small and inactive, having lost a lot of support and resources after the failure of Operation Harvest (Coogan 1993). This left it weakened and with little real presence amongst the Catholic communities of Northern Ireland.

During this time period, state violence had not begun on a large scale. There were some riots and marches led by Loyalist leader, Ian Paisley, and the RUC conducted some beatings of nationalist marchers towards the end of this time period. This type of incumbent violence pales in comparison to the burnings, shootings, and other destruction which began in August 1969. However, in the later 1960s, the civil rights campaign, driven by groups like NICRA (Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association), began to gain support. This was a protest movement modeled on the American Civil Rights movement, with marchers stressing nonviolent methods (Coogan 1993, 123). This movement protested the inferior status of Catholics in Northern Ireland, who were discriminated against in employment, funding for industrial development, voting rights, and housing. Protestant areas were often given more investment from the state. Many Catholic

majority areas were governed by Protestant majority local governments which controlled the allocation of jobs and housing. Thus, the system, upheld through heavily gerrymandered districts, allowed for the monopolization of control, power, and wealth by Protestants to the detriment of the Catholic population, though this was often played down by Stormont and the Westminster government (Hewitt 1981; Tuzo 1972).

The next time period examined stretches from August 1969 to the introduction of internment in August 1971. There are two important incidents within this time period, the first the 1969 Battle of the Bogside and the period immediately afterwards. In August 1969, the Orange Apprentice Boys, a Loyalist group, planned a march that was to go provocatively close to the Catholic area known as the Bogside, in Derry.⁵ As they passed by, violence erupted between the marchers and Catholics from the Bogside. The RUC reacted by charging into the Bogside, thus beginning the battle. The Catholic residents set up barricades and fought, using stones and petrol bombs, to keep the RUC and the Protestant mobs which followed them from entering the Bogside. Rioting lasted for several days in Derry, and Catholics began to riot in Belfast in order to stretch the RUC thin and help their beleaguered co-nationalists in the Bogside, even attacking an RUC barracks (Adams 1997, 98-100). The Protestants in Belfast reacted by attacking Catholic areas and destroying large numbers of Catholic homes.⁶

Eventually, the RUC lost control and Westminster sent British army units to separate the warring communities (Black 1969; Formal Government Decisions 1969). These troops were

⁵ Also known as Londonderry.

⁶ The Scarman report of 1972 concluded that the Protestants were acting out of “communal anger against what they believed to have been a Catholic assault...on the established order of the province” and were “retaliating against what they believed was Catholic aggression” (Conroy 1987, 33-34; Scarman 1972). The Loyalist mobs burned nearly 200 houses, thousands of families were displaced, and over a thousand individuals, mostly Catholic, were injured (McKearney 2011, 52; McVea and McKittrick 2002, 56; Taylor 1997, 69).

welcomed by the Catholics who saw them as saving them from the Protestant mobs (Berry 1969).

Despite the violence, the IRA was not officially involved in the unrest in both Derry and Belfast. Some IRA volunteers did stand up to stop the Protestants and the RUC (Adams 1997, 100-102). However, the IRA as an organization was absent (though Stormont tried to portray them as the instigators of the violence), causing resentment, initially, towards the IRA for not defending the Catholic communities (Chichester-Clark 1969). In fact, a common graffiti after the riots was “IRA = ‘I Ran Away’,” showing the disgust towards the IRA’s performance by the populace (Moloney 2010, 62).

The second incident, the Falls Road Curfew, occurred in 1970. Stormont, in response to Loyalist petitions for the disarmament of the Catholic population, put a curfew on the Falls Road area, a heavily nationalist part of Belfast, in order to allow British troops to conduct house-to-house searches for arms. Three thousand troops entered the Falls Road, sealed off the area, and used large amounts of CS gas to suppress resistance. The gas drifted throughout the neighborhood, affecting residents indiscriminately. There was lots of property damage, intrusive searches, and beatings. The state of the area after the curfew was dire, with damage to many houses (Taylor 1997, 102). Six people were killed by the army (Bartlett 2010, 512). Humiliation was added to the physical and emotional toll when two Unionist MPs were taken by the British on a tour of the damage (102-103). The curfew ended the period of good feeling between British troops and the Catholic population. The incident caused massive anger and resentment, and increased positive perceptions of the IRA by the population. As Gerry Adams (1997), IRA battalion and Sinn Fein leader, put it, “Thousands of people who had never been Republicans

now gave their active support to the IRA; other who had never had any time for physical force now accepted it as a practical necessity” (103).

The third time period stretches from August 1971 to December 1973. In August 1971, internment, the first major precipitating policy, was introduced to remove those posing a “serious and continuing threat” to law and order (Faulkner 1971). On August 9, the first major arrest operation was launched. However, since it used a mixture of faulty and old intelligence, most of the 300 arrested were either innocent or IRA members who were no longer active and were released shortly. No Protestants were arrested, though later documents indicate that Protestants fell under the provision as well (Bulloch 1972; Whyte 1995, 346). During the arrest operation, 19 civilians were killed by the army (Adams 1997, 159). Allegations soon arose that internees were tortured with beatings, threats, and other techniques (Keogh 1994, 347; Taylor 1997, 116-117). Internment caused a big impact amongst the nationalist population due to the rough nature of the arrests, killings, treatment of prisoners, and the focus of the arrests on Catholics. IRA recruiting and operations increased, and massive protests began (Kelley 1988, 157).

On January 30, 1972, later known as Bloody Sunday, an anti-internment march entered Derry. Soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment opened fire on the crowd (other units are alleged to have been involved as well (Mullan 1997), killing 13 and wounding 14, several of whom were teenagers. The troops, official reports, and news reports stated that 1 Para had been fired on by individuals within the crowd, and that they had come under attack from nail bombers as well (Coogan 1996, 135; Ministry of Defence 1972). However, the march’s organizers ordered the IRA to stay away to keep the march from becoming violent. On the British side, the troops had been told to expect to be fired upon, perhaps making them more

aggressive, and 1 Para was widely known to be a very aggressive unit with a history of violence towards the populace (Taylor 1997, 137). Even the Widgery Report, the official report on the incident which was lambasted as a whitewash in favor of the troops, stated that most of the victims were unarmed. This shooting led to an increase in IRA operations and recruitment and radicalized the population, leading to a more virulent “Brits Out!” movement (McKearney 2011, 109). 1972 would later prove to be the bloodiest year of the Troubles.

Period 1 (February 1962-July 1969): Low Violence

Independent Variable-Incumbent Violence

In the pre-August 1969 period (Period 1), starting in February 1962, civilian victimization was present. There was discrimination in housing, jobs, development, and voting. For instance, Catholics were discriminated against in terms of jobs, with civil service employment heavily biased towards Protestants. Protestants also made up nearly 100% of the security forces (McKearney 2011, 3-13). Industrial development was concentrated in Protestant areas (12). Finally, the gerrymandering of electoral districts guaranteed that, even in many areas with Catholic majorities, Unionists would form the majority on local councils and government. This was especially important since these councils controlled the allocation of housing, often exhibiting preferential treatment towards Protestants (Kelley 1988, 100).

The Catholic population as a whole was limited in their power and opportunities, largely living in poorer areas. The Catholic population felt alienated from the government, which was

majority Protestant and was set up in such a way as to preserve Protestant hegemonic power, bolstered by Westminster's tacit support.

In Period 1, civilian victimization was not violent, for the most part. There were some violent periods, but they did not reach the levels of violence seen later in 1969. Loyalists, led by such individuals as Rev. Ian Paisley, conducted countermarches and riots, such as a riot meant to take down a tricolor flag put up in a Sinn Fein office in 1964 (Taylor 1997, 37). Further stoking tensions, the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) conducted beatings of peaceful marchers, including MP Gerry Fitt, in 1968. This act began the more rapid rise of tensions which would later explode in August 1969, as seen in this quote by future IRA member, Martin McGuinness:

It was the event that totally changed things in this city and made people extremely angry...I was eighteen at the time and like ninety-five percent of my acquaintances would have been very angry and distraught (Toolis 1995, 299-300).

This violence, though, was not widespread, often targeting only the marchers or specific areas. It was not as severe or widespread as the civilian victimization of August 1969 and afterwards. The violence in Period 1 was more discriminate in that it only targeted those individuals involved in the marches or in the immediate area. The violence in Periods 2 and 3, as discussed below, was indiscriminate and targeted communities as a whole, rather than specific groups of individuals.

Dependent variable-popular support for insurgency and terrorism

In looking at general evidence for the hypothesis, certain patterns should be expected. In Period 1 (February 1962-July 1969) the study should find no escalation of violence. There should

be little support for insurgency outside of a few radical individuals. If there is resistance, it should be peaceful, for the most part.

One does not see an escalation of violence in Period 1. There are no calls for IRA violence, and the IRA did not play a big role in public life. The IRA was weak after failing in Operation Harvest, which largely failed due to a lack of popular support, and, afterwards, the IRA was left disorganized and without much popularity. It was still present as an organization, but mostly operated through Republican clubs (Coogan 1996, 56). The IRA, at this time, did not operate openly, unlike in Period 2. Also, the IRA was increasingly focused on Marxist and constitutional politics rather than armed struggle in the name of the nationalist community. IRA members and the public saw armed struggle as a tactic which was no longer viable, with the IRA even going to the point of selling most of their arms to Welsh nationalist groups (Coogan 1993, 250). Cathal Goulding, who became leader of the IRA, openly denounced the “physical force” model, saying it was a “ridiculous pipe-dream” because the IRA “never had the support of the people north and south to do it [successfully fight the British]” (Taylor 1987, 35). Lower ranking members also saw the armed struggle as over. One member, Billy McKee, commented, saying “I believed that it [the IRA as a militant organization] was dead, completely dead. And it was except in the minds of myself and other old republicans” (40).

There was some violence conducted by Republican groups in this time period. However, unlike Periods 2 and 3, this violence was not based on the community. It sprang from ideology and group needs. For instance, militant groups such as Saor Eire carried out a series of bank robberies to obtain funding (Coogan 1993, 250). There were also some attacks by the IRA against targets of “economic imperialism,” mostly foreign corporations (Taylor 1987, 35).

The IRA did not have a big presence in public life. It did not operate openly, and members of the public saw the armed struggle as over. It was seen as a sort of folk history piece (Taylor 1987, 40). One Republican woman said, in response to being asked about the IRA's role in public life, that it meant "absolutely nothing. I hadn't heard of the IRA. There was no IRA activity on the streets...It was just part of history" (40).

The populace's reaction to civilian victimization also supports the hypothesis. The population responded to civilian victimization in the form of discrimination by massively participating in the civil rights movement. However, this movement was peaceful and did not have specifically nationalist goals, such as unification of the island (Coogan 1996, 63). In 1968, after marchers were attacked by Loyalists and the RUC, the movement responded with increased protests, sit-ins, and other types of peaceful methods. There was some rioting, but it was short-lived (McVea and McKittrick 2002, 42). Thus, one does not see the massive calls for violence that one sees in Periods 2 and 3. There was no escalation in violence, nor were there widespread calls for the IRA to act as a defender of the population or avenge popular victimization. This is in stark contrast to Periods 2 and 3, where the higher level of incumbent violence led to increased operations and support for the IRA.

Mechanisms

Fear

In Period 1, there seems to be little fear of the government. There is a sense of injustice, but people, when they did act, seemed to predominantly do so through the civil rights movement,

using largely peaceful means. Others seem to have accepted the status quo. Northern Ireland did have a violent history, so future violence was a possibility in people's minds, but this did not seem to be enough to cause them to rise up in arms. This may have been due to the segregation of communities, which may have limited contact and, thus, antagonism.

Revenge

In Period 1, though the populace was discriminated against and was the subject of some violence, there was no escalation in the insurgency. The IRA remained weak and small. Protests against the Unionist government remained based on the peaceful model of the American civil rights movement. Therefore, though resistance may have increased through recurrent protests, insurgency did not escalate as a result of civilian victimization and desires for revenge.

Destruction of Social Structures and Livelihoods

In Period 1, Unionist policies served to disenfranchise and discriminate against Catholics in terms of employment and development. However, this did not cause violence, with frustration going into the civil rights movement and using peaceful methods. As mentioned above, there was no increase in support for the IRA, and there were no calls for increased violence in defense of the community.

Activation of Latent Social Structures

One does not see any latent organizations coming together in Period 1. The civil rights movement did not seem to spring from any preexisting structure and therefore cannot be considered a latent structure.

Outbidding

With the IRA weak and not openly operating, there is no evidence of outbidding behavior. There is no escalation in the insurgency which would be necessary for outbidding to occur. Therefore, this mechanism does not function in this time period.

Revenge and Reciprocity

As mentioned above, there is no escalation in insurgent violence and revenge does not seem to be a factor in determining popular actions. Thus, no reciprocal attacks based on revenge were discovered, and the above mechanism is not supported for this time period.

Psychological Mechanisms

As with the above mechanisms, this mechanism was not supported due to the lack of violent escalation. There was some anger as evidenced by the 1968 McGuinness quote, but there does not seem to be any dehumanization of the Loyalists by the nationalist population.

Period 2 (August 1969-July 1971): Medium Violence

Independent Variable- Incumbent Violence

The Battle of the Bogside

In August 1969, the violence was started by just a few individuals, Orange marchers and select Catholics, but it escalated to engulf the entire Bogside in Derry and many Catholic areas of Belfast. In Derry, the RUC attacked not just the marchers or protesters, but the community itself. Their attempted incursions into the Bogside amounted to an invasion of the Catholic neighborhood. The Catholics, in response, set up barricades and formed defense committees. They saw the RUC and Protestants as allied and feared for the security of their neighborhoods (Berry 1969; Conroy 1987, 34; Moloney 2010, 51; Visit of Northern Ireland M.P.s to Department 1969). This fear caused a reaction from the entire community with young people manning the barricades and others doing tasks such as filling petrol bombs.

The RUC attacks affected all. The RUC used CS gas which drifted indiscriminately through the Bogside, affecting those on the barricades and bystanders alike. This was the first major use of CS gas in the Troubles; over 1000 canisters were used, a very substantial number (McClellan 1997). The casualties from the RUC attack were extensive with over 1000 wounded and many others traumatized by the use of gas and violence against the community.

In Belfast, there were many burnings by Protestant mobs (Brady 1969). The Loyalist mobs burned 180 houses (McVea and McKittrick 2002, 56), destroying streets such as Bombay Street (60% destroyed) and Conway Street (48 houses destroyed) (Taylor 1997, 69) and displacing 1500 families, 82.7% of them Catholic (McKearney 2011, 52; McVea and McKittrick

2002, 56). In Derry, 1000 were injured, while in Belfast, 5 Catholics and 2 Protestants were killed (Bartlett 2010, 505; Taylor 1997, 70). Since most of the damage fell upon the Catholic population, resentment rose sharply amongst that community (54). The authorities made some reparation to afflicted families, but this seemed to do little to assuage popular anger over the damage and suffering.

The burnings were conducted by the mobs, but the Catholic population saw the RUC as at least tacitly supporting the hostile actions. B Specials, the overwhelmingly Protestant, Loyalist paramilitary troops, were also seen as being involved in the burnings and other violence (Mac Giolla 1969). The RUC shot several individuals including a 4 year old boy killed in his bed when the RUC fired on several flats with heavy machineguns in what was seen as a highly disproportionate response to rioters armed with stones and petrol bombs (Taylor 1997, 70).

The Falls Road Curfew

Between June 3-5, 1970, the British authorities and Stormont ordered the sealing off of the Falls Road area and the emplacement of a curfew in order to search for hidden arms and catch IRA members. The IRA slipped away or hid quickly after engaging the troops in firefights, so much of the impact of the ensuing operation fell upon the rest of the population. Troops entered houses and conducted searches with little regard to personal property or well-being. There was considerable destruction and fear amongst the population:

We were all forcibly ushered into our homes and told that we would be shot, man, woman, or child, if you opened your door and put your foot out onto the footpath (Catholic woman living the Falls area) (Taylor 1997, 100).

And the place was still saturated with tear gas. Children were coughing, I remember. I'm talking now about the toddlers, kids of three, four, five. It affected everyone but children especially ("John" an English soldier) (101).

Some of the houses I had seen were totally wrecked. Holy statues were smashed on the floor...Furniture was ripped and overturned. Windows were broken...Some of the people who'd been beaten were still lying there, bloody and bruised (Marie Moore-woman entering the area upon the lifting of the curfew) (102).

Four people were killed by the army. These people were seen as innocent by the population, thus increasing the resentment and anger felt towards the British. After the curfew was lifted, two Unionist MPs were given a triumphal tour of the Falls Road to look at the destruction (Taylor 1997, 102-103). This insult added to the humiliation and resentment already felt from the intrusion and destruction of the curfew.

Dependent Variable-Popular Support for Insurgency and Terrorism

In Period 2 (August 1969-July 1971) there should be an increase in violence and an escalation in general insurgency. The insurgents should increase the frequency of their operations as well as operational intensity. There should be greater support from the population (in terms of intelligence, food, housing, resources, recruiting, etc.) for IRA operations and the

IRA in general. Finally, there should be greater public tolerance and support for violence and greater public participation in the resistance.

The evidence from Period 2 serves to support the hypothesis. One sees a massive increase in violence from 1969 onwards. There was a significant rise in total(civilian, IRA, and incumbent) deaths from 1969 onwards, indicating an escalation in the conflict: 1969 (14), 1970 (25), 1971 (174), 1972 (470). Shooting incidents rose even more severely, from 73 in 1969 to 10361 in 1972 (CAIN). 1972 was the bloodiest of the entire Troubles period with almost 5000 injuries and almost 2000 explosions. The car bomb was also first introduced and used widely in this year, marking a large escalation in the conflict (McVea and McKittrick 2002, 83).

After the Battle of the Bogside, in 1969, one sees clear evidence in favor of the hypothesis, which contrasts to what one sees in Period 1. After civilian victimization became more violent in August, one sees increased participation in armed resistance through neighborhood defense committees which served to organize the setting up of barricades, resistance to RUC and Protestant incursions, and the separation of Catholic neighborhoods to create effective autonomy (Adams 1997, 115). In addition, there was a rush to obtain arms and ammunition to make up for the IRA's relatively disarmed state during the Battle of the Bogside. Militant recruiting increased with many of the rank and file recruits citing the burning of Catholic homes as motivations for joining. Brendan Hughes described this new wave of recruits as angry and desiring blood (Moloney 2010, 47). People began to flock to the IRA which, according to Gerry Adams, "mushroomed out of all proportion to its previous numbers" (Adams 1997, 116).

Through this rise in recruitment, support for younger, more militant leaders, like Hughes, increased, allowing them to push aside much of the older leadership based in Dublin which had begun to focus on political, rather than armed, struggle. This eventually led to the split in the IRA which brought the Provisional IRA (Provos) into being. The Provos saw the Official IRA (Officials) as not having the right priorities, focusing on politics rather than territorial defense. The Provos attention and duty in regards to protecting Catholic areas led public support for them to increase in line with the hypothesis. They began to be regarded as “Robin Hood” types who “wanted to terrorise the security forces the way they terrorized our[the Catholic] people” (Dillon 2003, 125). Public tolerance for militancy also rose, to the point at which the IRA could maintain an overt, public, armed presence on the streets, which served to visibly show their protection of the people (Moloney 2010, 48).

The impact of the Falls Road Curfew, in July 1970, also provides support for the hypothesis. Participation in support of the IRA is visible even before the operation ended, as people helped hide the IRA from the troops and smuggled arms out of the area underneath clothes and inside prams(Adams 1997, 138). After the curfew, the Provos increased the training of new recruits, sending some to camps in the Republic, thus showing other forms of popular participation in correlation with the curfew (McKearney 2011, 75). Recruitment was massive after the curfew, even causing a shortage of arms for the incoming volunteers (O’Doherty 1993).

The curfew is thought to have caused a widespread radicalization of the conflict. This radicalization and increased support is seen in the following quotes from Brendan Hughes and Gerry Adams, respectively:

On the night of the curfew, 99 per cent of the people on the Falls Road would have been sympathetic to us (Moloney 2010, 57).

Thousands of people who had never been republicans now gave their active support to the IRA; others who had never had any time for physical force now accepted it as a practical necessity (Adams 1997, 140).

Armed conflict was seen by many to be the only option for an increasingly violent situation, and, that same summer, the IRA moved to a more offensive stance, bombing stores, banks, and other non-military targets. The IRA felt pressured to respond to the previous incumbent violence and began attacking British forces. The same night of the curfew's lifting, July 5, the first attacks on British forces during the Troubles occurred in Ballymurphy and Andersontown. (Adams 1997, 139) Furthermore, public tolerance for such violence grew. As one IRA member said, there was "no way the IRA could have shot Brits" before the curfew occurred (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 173). This quote indicates that the IRA feared alienating the populace and decreasing support through engaging in over-aggressive attacks. After the curfew however, the IRA saw the people as "sufficiently alienated" to tolerate such attacks (175).

However, this alienation did not reach the point in Period 2 at which terrorism was tolerated. Terrorist attacks on non-personnel economic targets in the spring of 1971 increased, but attacks on personnel were not as well tolerated. For instance, in March of 1971, three off-duty soldiers were lured away from a party and then murdered. The IRA suffered a negative backlash, indicating that the population would not tolerate this kind of violence at that time (Taylor 1997, 112). In response to this negative popular perception, the IRA denied responsibility for the attack, even failing to include it in the official IRA account of the campaign

between 1970 and 1973, *Freedom Struggle* (Moloney 2010, 75). Summing up the media and popular perception of the attacks, the *Belfast Telegraph* commented:

After all the horrors of recent weeks and months, Ulster people have almost lost the capacity for feeling shock. But the ruthless murder of three defenceless young soldiers has cut to the quick. These were cold blooded executions for purely political reasons (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 65).

In addition, the Catholic community's actions show their negative perception of the attack. Catholics visited the three soldiers' barracks to pay their condolences and give money to the men's families. Over 6000 dock workers, both Catholic and Protestant, marched in Belfast to protest the attack and to express their desire for an end to confrontation in Northern Ireland (Foreign Notes 1971). This type of reaction is in stark contrast with those in Period 3, discussed below, which showed greater tolerance for terrorist violence.

Mechanisms

Fear

In Period 2, in contrast, there were numerous instances of people citing fear as a reason for increased violence and participation in insurgency. The population shamed the IRA when they failed to defend them, and the graffiti, "IRA= 'I Ran Away'," became common in Belfast (Moloney 2010, 62). Since the IRA did not adequately defend Catholic areas, the people were also cynical about the IRA statement made from Dublin after the outbreak of violence in August which said that the IRA was at that time active and in action to protect Catholic areas (Berry 1969; Goulding 1969; Goulding 1969). However, the IRA became more popular when they

began to act in more of the defender role. They tried to portray themselves as defenders of the people in their literature, such as the above Goulding statement and the Green Book, but it was not until their actions supported these proclamations that support from the population rose (Irish Republican Army 1977). In the defense of St. Mathew's church during the Battle of Short Strand, where a number of IRA volunteers were shot, the IRA regained credibility, and their popularity increased significantly (Adams 1997, 137; Coogan 1993, 96-97). Afterwards, there were several incidents where the IRA operated due to popular fears. For instance, in Belfast, where Protestant attack was a continuous threat, the IRA guarded Catholic neighborhoods (271). The IRA had to protect Catholics because they would have lost support if they did not. Catholic fears of incumbent violence would not have been assuaged, leading them to look elsewhere for security. Popular support for the IRA would have decreased, leading to fewer recruits and resources, and it this possibility of less support which drove the IRA to act as an aggressive defender. Fear also helped to increase participation as many young Catholics saw it as their duty to protect their people through joining the IRA, which was seen as a convenient outlet for such needs (McKearney 2011, 73; O'Doherty 1993, 66).

The split in the IRA can be illuminating in regards to the fear mechanism. The Officials were deciding to end abstentionism and privileged political struggle over armed struggle. This outlook was unpopular with the population, who felt that they needed defense. The Provos began outcompeting the Officials because they made the defense of Catholic areas their main priority in the beginning of the conflict, later moving to defense and retaliation (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 140). In their official plans of action, defense is first on the IRA agenda, and, to carry this out, the IRA began raising units and training Catholics soon after the outbreak of major violence.

The Provos ran more risks in 1969 in order to obtain arms and began to build a large arsenal over the year after August 1969. This increased their stock with the population, according to Tommy Gorman, an IRA member, who said, “People didn’t question where they came from. Just the fact that the weaponry was there made people feel at ease” (Taylor 1997, 105). Increased support, partially due to the fear of incumbent actions, allowed the IRA to increase their operations as well. After Bloody Sunday, people looked at the IRA as defenders, increasing their support in terms of arms, recruits, and operational assistance. This increased support allowed the IRA to drastically increase their operations (156).

Due to popular fears, the IRA was able to consolidate areas of town inhabited by Catholics as nearly autonomous neighborhoods. In these areas, the IRA was able to keep an overt, armed presence on the streets. They did this because they wanted to be seen by the people and wanted them to know that the IRA was there to protect them. Also, these open patrols were symbols to threatening actors that the IRA would defend the area against attack and that they were not scared of enemy patrols (Moloney 2010, 48-50; O’Doherty 1993, 88). Thus, one can see from these actions that, due to fear, the population not only supported the IRA in this consolidation of territory, but also became more tolerant of their armed struggle when they began to look upon the IRA as defenders.

Revenge

In Period 2, revenge for violence against the populace motivated participation, support for the IRA, the escalation of IRA operations, and the selection of targets. After periods of

violence against the populace, recruitment increased. Amongst the motivations for joining the IRA, revenge was often noted. For instance, according to interviews with IRA members, some recruits said that they wanted to join simply because they hated the RUC and British and wanted to hurt them (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 196). These recruits showed resentment stemming from the violence and other types of harmful treatment inflicted on the Catholic population. A moderate local councilor, when describing recruitment after the Falls Road Curfew, said that, “overnight the population turned from neutral or even sympathetic supporters for the military to outright hatred of everything related to the security forces” (McVea and McKittrick 2002, 62). Brendan Hughes, an IRA leader, similarly mentioned that most of the rank and file recruits were motivated by resentment over Catholics being turned out of their homes rather than political ideology and that they joined because they wanted blood (Moloney 2010, 47). For example, Shane O’Doherty, speaking of his early years in the IRA, said that he wanted to kill policemen for what the security forces had done to Catholics (O’Doherty 1993, 96).

Increased popular support stemming from revenge extended beyond recruitment. After violent incidents, the people would become more active in support of the insurgency, with people giving up houses to hide insurgents, offering food, holding weapons, and assisting with intelligence (Moloney 2010, 66-67, 83). Another way they would support the insurgents was by using bin lids to warn of oncoming British patrols. This seemed to become especially prevalent after the Falls Road Curfew (Adams 1997, 135). In other instances, community members would pester the security forces by throwing stones or bottles, leading them into cul-de-sacs where they would then be ambushed by the IRA (White 1989). In a specific example, soon after the curfew, a 19-year old was killed during a riot. Afterwards, the community rose up and got involved in the

violence towards the authorities, engaging in intense riots and stonings of British soldiers. As Adams put it, the sense in the community was that “if it was war they wanted, then it was war they would get” (143). Thus, here one sees an increase in belligerency on the part of the population as well as a greater desire for violence to be conducted against the perpetrators of incumbent violence.

Desires for revenge also caused the IRA to escalate their operations. As incumbent violence increased, the IRA began to conduct more and bigger attacks. For instance, in response to the curfew, on the same night, the IRA attacked British soldiers for the first time (Adams 1997, 139). Likewise, after another RUC attack in August 1970 in which a man was killed, operations conducted against the RUC increased (Taylor 1997, 106). Later, the first British soldiers were killed in February 1971 as part of the retaliation for the death of another nationalist man on February 5 (110). Looking at the attacks in 1971, one sees a definite and drastic increase from previous years which had less incumbent violence.

A sense of honor was important in shaping revenge. Honor was seen as a reason for joining the IRA, in that it was one’s duty to join and fight those who had attacked one’s people (Dillon 2003, 123; Toolis 1995, 306). This sense of honor and duty also appears frequently in IRA literature (Dillon 2003). Lots of members and recruits cite humiliation (the absence of honor) as part of their angry response leading to revenge. In several popular IRA songs of the time, actions such as being insulted or beaten by British troops are answered by ambushes by the IRA (Morrison 2004). Likewise, the shame of hearing British chants and jeers on one’s own streets led to anger on the part of the population (Adams 1997, 134). Obviously, in addition to

the physical insults and humiliation of suffering violence, these types of challenges played a role in shaping revenge and retaliation, as predicted by the theory.

Destruction of Social Structures and Livelihoods

In Period 2, one does not see an increase in the destruction of livelihoods, though there is some destruction of housing. While this destruction did increase insurgency, it seems to have done so through the anger and resentment felt by the population rather than the loss of housing in and of itself. Though there were some reforms in terms of voting and other areas, discrimination in housing and employment still existed (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 229). Though we do not see an increase in the destruction of livelihoods, the preexisting discrimination and status of Catholics did help the IRA in some ways. A lot of IRA recruits came from the working classes, the poor, and the unemployed, as the IRA provided a way to leave one's "miserable indignities" (McKearney 2011, 99). Many young men felt that they had no prospects and no future, so they joined the IRA (Toolis 1995, 203). Because the lack of livelihoods did contribute some to the insurgency, the mechanism can be said to have some support. However, this support is indirect and weak since it was not an increase in the poor status of Catholics which caused the rise of the IRA but, instead, the rise of the IRA which then gave poor Catholics an outlet from their position. The mechanism was therefore not initiated by incumbent violence. The poor status of Catholics did not change drastically between periods. Therefore, the mechanism does not work, in this case, as predicted in the theory with the line of causation running from the rise of the IRA from other factors, rather than from incumbent violence causing a destruction of livelihoods.

Activation of Latent Social Structures

Like the previous mechanism, the activation of latent social structures is not as well supported as the first two mechanisms. However, in Period 2, one does see some sorts of latent organizations coming together. The community itself can be seen as a sort of latent social structure which, when activated by incumbent violence, supported and facilitated the insurgency. As a result of attacks on Catholics, Citizens Defence Committees were set up which represented all of the areas behind barricades after August 1969 (Brady 1969). These armed defensive organizations defended Catholic areas from further threats from the RUC and Protestant forces. In later instances, the community once again united in support of the insurgency. As Gerry Adams said, “as military intervention in the neighborhood increased...so the local people, out of their own feelings of self-respect, outrage, and resistance, organized more and more their own response to the military presence” (Adams 1997, 134). With increasing incumbent violence, the community became more politicized and acted as a unit in support of the IRA. They gathered intelligence, warned of the location of patrols using bin lids, and helped set up IRA ambushes (Adams 1997, 135; Moloney 2010, 83). Therefore, because of these community actions, one could say that Catholic communities, so closed and tight due to repression, were activated by incumbent violence in ways that unified them and made them able to participate in the insurgency and support the IRA. However, there did not seem to be as many examples in the data of this mechanism working as with the first two mechanisms, so the support for this mechanism must still be seen as tentative.

Outbidding

In Period 2, a clear case of outbidding occurs in the split between the Provos and the Officials. The Provos split and made the defense of Catholic areas their priority. They then set about attacking the RUC. This allowed them to outcompete the Officials in recruitment (Assessment of Operations in Northern Ireland 1971). The Officials were too focused on politics which hindered them from regaining credibility after August 1969. Only later, in 1971, did they begin more intensive operations. However, it is clear that the more militant behavior of the Provos gave them a competitive edge over the Officials. A clear example of the kind of superiority in support the Provos gained is the 1971 Easter Rising commemorations held by both groups. The Officials attracted only half the supporters at their march compared to the Provos' (CAIN: Chronology of the Conflict 1971). It is likely that the levels of support at the parades reflect the militant attitude of the Provos in Period 2.

Revenge and Reciprocity

In Period 2, insurgent attacks consisted mainly of attacks on the RUC, army, and attacking Protestants with some sporadic sectarian killings. Much of this violence was motivated in part by revenge, as detailed in the discussion of the general revenge mechanism, however, these attacks were not done on a reciprocal basis since attacks on nationalist civilians were not

being answered by attacks on British or Loyalist civilians. Such reciprocal attacks are what one would expect in cases of terrorism being used out of revenge.

Psychological Mechanisms

In regards to this mechanism, one sees a little bit of evidence of a psychological basis for violence. However, overt evidence is limited. In Period 2, one sees some evidence of norms-breaking having an effect. During the Battle of the Bogside, the population saw the RUC as being engaged in violence against the populace, including the burning of civilian homes. This led the RUC to be seen as lawbreakers or outlaws. This made it easier to justify attacking and killing them (O'Doherty 1993, 51). However, these attacks would not be considered terrorism since the RUC was heavily engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Though one sees some evidence of norm-breaking, one does not see very much evidence, if any, of terrorism based on dehumanization of the other side through inhuman epithets or other, similar, language.

Period 3 (August 1971-December 1973): High Violence

Independent Variable-Incumbent Violence

Internment

When internment was introduced on August 9, 1971, the army and RUC arrested 342 people, all of them Catholic (Bartlett 2010, 512). Most of those arrested were innocent, and

fewer than 100 were actually IRA (Kelley 1988, 155). During this initial arrest operation, 15 civilians were killed. Some of these people were killed in ways particularly infuriating to the Catholic population. For instance, while helping children evacuate from Springfield Park in Belfast on August 9, 19-year old Bobby Clarke was shot in the back. A priest tried to reach him to help him, but was also killed, and, shortly thereafter, another man was killed trying to aid Clarke. Over the next few hours, any individual trying to aid Clarke was shot at. In another incident, a 41-year old man was shot in the leg, then shot with rubber bullets at close range. Afterwards, he was kicked and beaten by British troops and died two weeks later. An 11-year old boy was also killed elsewhere (Adams 1997, 157-158). The troops also caused massive damage during searches and arrests. The trauma of seeing one's sons or father dragged out of bed and taken away can be seen in the popular Republican song released later in 1971, called "Men Behind the Wire," which contained verses about the British "marauding" to take away the community's sons, "wrecking little homes with scorn...heedless of the crying children," and "beating sons while helpless mothers watched the blood pour from their heads" (McGuigan 1971). Listening to the song, one can see the sense of collective resentment coming from the community.

Parts of the Protestant population added to the Catholic sense of grievance by humiliating them with chants of "Where's your daddy gone?" and raining stones and bottles down on the Catholic parts of town (Adams 1997, 151). Further adding to Catholic grievance, there were allegations of the torture of detainees. They were said to have been beaten, threatened, and subjected to many other hardships (Cunningham 2001, 11; Moloney 2010). Altogether, the

casualties, arrests, searches, humiliation, and torture served to victimize the nationalist population.

Bloody Sunday

One of the most straightforward cases of civilian victimization was that of Bloody Sunday. During this incident, 15 people were killed and 14 were wounded. All the victims were widely seen throughout the nationalist community as innocent victims of government aggression, and this view was bolstered by official reports saying some of the dead were found to be unarmed (Widgery 1972). Nationalists, such as Gerry Adams, saw the incident as a deliberate attempt to subjugate the Catholic population through fear, citing things such as the use of 1 Para, a notoriously aggressive unit, the accurate (and thus seen as deliberate) marksmanship of the shooters, the fact that all the victims were young men, and other evidence of purposeful selection on the part of the authorities (Adams 1997, 178-179; Mullan 1997). Nationalist humiliation caused by the seizure and rough treatment of victims' bodies, as well as threats against individuals attempting to aid the wounded, increased resentment and anger. For instance, when an Irish medic asked British soldiers about the location of an ambulance, the soldiers misdirected the medic and later, laughing, said that the medic's white coat would make a good target (216). In other instances, the Paras laughed at the panic of the marchers, telling bystanders that "there will be more of you pigs dead in the morning" (219). This type of treatment exacerbated the resentment and anger arising from the previous shootings.

Dependent Variable-Popular Support for Insurgency and Terrorism

In this case, one should expect to see continuing escalation in the general insurgency, but instead of the escalation consisting of predominantly guerrilla attacks on the RUC and British soldiers, more terrorism should be incorporated. Terrorism should increase more relative to guerrilla warfare, though guerrilla warfare will continue to increase. Terrorism should be justified by references to incumbent violence. Popular participation and toleration of these attacks should increase, allowing the IRA to increase operational intensity and frequency.

One of the biggest drivers of IRA operations and recruitment was the introduction of internment, and it provides further evidence in support of the hypothesis. Some detainees, innocent upon being arrested, were radicalized in their time in prison and joined the IRA upon leaving. Other types of recruitment were also increasing, often motivated by the harsh treatment of the detainees. For instance, Dominic McGlinchey, a prominent IRA member, joined the Provos in order to seek revenge on the RUC and British for internment and alleged torture (Dillon 2003, 123). Internment confirmed the IRA in its role as the defender of Catholics, and armed struggle became even more legitimate in the eyes of the people. According to Adams, “armed struggle was seen as a legitimate tactic by most nationalists...For the first time in the Six Counties there was the combination of armed struggle and mass popular struggle” (Adams 1997, 171). Semi-autonomous areas behind barricades were consolidated, and many Irish who had moved abroad moved back to join the resistance (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 192). Among many of the new recruits, politics and ideology were secondary to hatred of the British and RUC (196). Internment made it obvious to the populace that reform was not going to occur, thus causing active participation in the resistance to increase dramatically.

The IRA's reaction to internment is also supportive of the hypothesis. Within 36 hours of internment's introduction, 3 soldiers were killed. Before August 9, 11 British soldiers had been killed in all of 1971. After August 9, 32 British soldiers were killed in the rest of the year. The UDR lost 5 men in 1971 after August 9, having lost none before, and overall civilian deaths (both nationalist and Loyalist) rose from 17 in 1971 before August 9 to 97 in the following months (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 191). Operations were stepped up. November 27-28 alone saw nearly 100 attacks against troops, buildings, and government installations, and, in the months after internment, the IRA was carrying out nearly constant operations (192). The ability for the IRA to do so shows their increasing abilities in light of increased support, participation, and tolerance from the population which can be attributed to internment's introduction and the "standards of violence" it brought to nationalist communities (Annex A: Extract from "The Immaculate Deception" 1972).

Bloody Sunday also offers clear evidence of increasing insurgency in response to violence against the populace. After the shootings, the number of IRA attacks increased sharply. The IRA felt pressure from the population to respond, due to the massive increases in recruitment. Therefore, the IRA tried to conduct as many operations as possible (McKearney 2011, 105). In 1972, by March 20, 56 soldiers had been killed (Conroy 1987, 37). In 1971, there were 171 overall deaths (civilian, IRA, and security forces) and 1756 shootings whereas in 1972 there were 470 overall deaths and 10361 shootings (CAIN). From another perspective, in the six months following Bloody Sunday, there were more deaths than in the previous three years combined (Mullan 1997, 47).

Bloody Sunday also seemed to increase participation. It destroyed the mass movement of unarmed protests in response to internment and put the impetus of the resistance into armed struggle, which was seen as the only way to combat British heavy-handedness. Reform seemed less likely, given the perceived aggressiveness of the British government (McKearney 2011, 87). Violent opposition thus became more acceptable, and the nationalist population moved to a more radical “Brits Out!” posture (108). The population’s attitudes “hardened” after Bloody Sunday, leading the population to become more tolerant of violence and give “major support” to IRA operations (Adams 1997, 180; Mullan 1997, 47). The IRA was able to create several large, armed, and trained units, making them more effective. As IRA success increased, popular identification with the IRA continued to rise (Adams 1997, 180). Bloody Sunday had a significant impact on the views of Catholic youths. The shootings caused a lot of anger amongst the younger population, leading many to join the IRA or other militant organizations (Daly 2000). As an example, Mike Devine, concluded as he saw the coffins of the victims that there could be no peace with the British, and he joined the INLA (Mullan 1997, 239). Father Daly (later Bishop of Derry) realized how much the youth were affected by the incident:

A lot of the younger people in Derry who may have been more pacifist became quite militant as a result of it [Bloody Sunday]. People who were there that day and who saw what happened were absolutely enraged by it and just wanted to see some kind of revenge for it. In later years, many young people I visited in prison told me...they would not have become involved in the IRA but for...Bloody Sunday” (McVea and McKittrick 2002, 77).

Overall, the incident cemented the population to militant nationalism, particularly the IRA. It increased pressure and participation from the populace and allowed the IRA to reach their peak power in 1972, as shown by their ability to get the British to the negotiating table that summer. The IRA leadership agreed a truce with the British government. Gerry Adams and other leaders met with William Whitelaw, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and other ministers to discuss the possibility of withdrawal and other concessions. Eventually, public pressure for militancy broke down the truce, further evidence of popular pressure to act. In a conflict between nationalist civilians and the RUC and Loyalist mobs over housing at the Lenadoon estate, a military truck rammed nationalist vehicles in order to keep them from moving into the housing. The IRA stepped in and attacked the security forces, engaging them in a firefight. As Sean MacStiofain put it, if the IRA did not act, it “would have lost the defense initiative and all credibility with the people” indicating that IRA actions were due to perceived popular pressure(Mallie and Bishop 1987, 229).

In addition to an escalation in general insurgency, Period 3 also saw an increase in the use of terrorism, as predicted by the theory. Beginning in the spring of 1971(still Period 2), there were more attacks on non-military targets such as stores or other economic targets. This was likely a response to army actions in the area (Taylor 1997, 113). However, the population was still not ready for more violent terrorism, as shown by the reaction to the three off-duty soldiers killed in March 1971. After internment, there was more support for wider terrorism, as can be seen from the IRA targeting of off-duty RUC and UDR personnel which then became official IRA policy (191). After Bloody Sunday, the move to terrorism is even more noted. The IRA began to conduct prominent attacks against civilian targets, blowing up the Abercorn

restaurant(2 dead, 130 injured) and exploding a car bomb on Donegall Street (7 dead, 148 injured) (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 217; McVea and McKittrick 2002, 78). In an even more audacious plan, the IRA exploded multiple bombs throughout Belfast on what came to be known as Bloody Friday in July 1972. These bombs targeted railway stations, ferry terminals, banks, busy roads, and railway lines. Twenty-two bombs exploded in the course of 8 minutes, killing 9 and wounding 130 (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 231).

The terrorist response to Bloody Sunday and other incidents of incumbent violence continued with the England campaign. Several IRA members, even leaders such as Brendan Hughes, cite incumbent violence as a reason for carrying the war to England (Moloney 2010; O'Doherty 1993). The purpose of these attacks was to force the war into the minds of the English public and let them feel what the Irish public had been feeling. Paul Holmes, one of the England bombers, put the rationale as the IRA trying to “bring home to the British people that there is a war going on here and there is more than one participant that’s going to have to suffer” (Taylor 1997, 181). As another nationalist put it, the campaign was done so that the war “urged in their [England’s] name would be felt at close quarters” (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 249). Thus, one sees elements of revenge in the decision to bomb England. While in England, the IRA targeted government ministers, military officers, major institutions, and a number of civilian targets. For instance, in one attack, IRA bombers placed small bombs throughout London (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 253-257). Reginald Maulding, the security minister in charge during Bloody Sunday was targeted, and car bombs were placed throughout some English cities. The IRA sent letter bombs to a chaplain who had defended 1 Para’s actions, as well as the prime minister and other targets (O’Doherty 1993, 139-140). The conclusion that revenge, in part, led to the England campaign

must be tempered, however, since there is a relative dearth of non-IRA views in the data. While revenge may have been a factor for some IRA members engaging in the campaign, the populace may have had a lesser (or greater) desire to see revenge taken to England itself.

Sectarian attacks began to increase throughout 1971 and especially 1972 with Loyalist paramilitaries targeting random Catholics and bombing nationalist pubs (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 180). Some murders were done in horrific fashion, with some victims tortured and raped before death (Coogan 1993, 339). In response to this threat, the IRA began bombing Loyalist homes, as well as the homes of Special Branch members (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 180). Later, the IRA leadership authorized the use of revenge killings targeting random Protestants to answer the murder of Catholics (236). These reactions show a move to terrorism to respond to incumbent violence.

Incidents such as Bloody Sunday and internment also increased popular tolerance for terrorism. At the end of Period 2, the population reacted strongly against the killing of off-duty soldiers but supported the bombing of civilian economic targets. However, in Period 3, after internment, the killing of off-duty RUC and UDR became official policy without any such backlash. In addition, revenge killings against Protestants were tolerated. Thus, the public seems to have become more tolerant of terrorist action after internment and Bloody Sunday, in stark contrast to Period 2.

Overall, there seems to be support for the hypothesis. From 1971 onwards, one sees an increase in terrorist incidents as well as increased civilian casualties. Tolerance also increased as seen by the lack of backlash from terrorism compared to previous terrorist attacks (see above). Guerrilla warfare also increased and was always at a higher level than terrorism, but there seems

to have been a relative increase in terrorism from Period 2 to 3. To make a more robust test, one should try to calculate the percentages of each type of attack to see if terrorism is actually increasing faster than guerrilla warfare. Unfortunately, the available data does not allow for this more robust test. Despite this, the available evidence shows that the hypothesis is plausible and generally supported.

Mechanisms

Fear

In Period 3 there were several incidents where the IRA operated due to popular fears. For instance, in Belfast, where Protestant attack was a continuous threat, the IRA guarded Catholic neighborhoods (271). Regarding the aforementioned Lenadoon incident in 1972, where the IRA broke their 1972 truce with the British, Sean MacStiofain reflected that, “there was no option. If our units had been ordered to stand aside, the consequences would have been disastrous” (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 229). Looking at the mechanism working in the other direction, increased fear, such as occurred after Bloody Sunday, made even less militant nationalists look to the IRA as necessary protectors (Taylor 1997, 156). However, fear itself does not seem to have led to terrorism.

Revenge

Some recruits cited specific instances of violence against the populace as their reason for joining, with Bloody Sunday being the clearest example. Father Daly said that several IRA prisoners cited Bloody Sunday as the reason they joined the IRA (McVea and McKittrick 2002, 77). In addition to increases in the number of attacks, larger attacks seemed to occur more frequently as incumbent violence increased. In 1972, when the effects of internment and Bloody Sunday overlapped, there were a series of large attacks. The Officials attacked the barracks of both 1 Para in Aldershot, England and the RUC in Belfast (Adams 1997, 180-81; Mallie and Bishop 1987, 199). The IRA also began to conduct prominent attacks against civilian targets, such as the Abercorn restaurant, Donegall Street, and Bloody Friday (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 217, 231; McVea and McKittrick 2002, 78). According to Adams, the Bloody Friday attack was part of a retaliation for Bloody Sunday and other similar incidents of incumbent violence (Adams 1997, 208). While the other attacks do not have as clear a connection to Bloody Sunday, coming so soon after that attack, one can infer that the escalation is connected to the incumbent violence. Like the aforementioned attacks, the England attacks seem to have been motivated out of revenge. Several IRA members indicate that one of the reasons to attack England was to pay back the English for incumbent violence suffered in Northern Ireland. The England campaign, and the idea of revenge, is dealt with in more detail in the revenge and reciprocity section below.

Destruction of Social Structures and Livelihoods

In Period 3, like Period 2, one does not see this mechanism leading directly to insurgency. Rather, as above, it does so indirectly, with people in poor or unemployed conditions turning to involvement in the insurgency as a way out of their situations. Therefore, this mechanism contributes only indirectly to insurgency and does little, if anything, to contribute to terrorism.

Activation of Latent Social Structures

As in Period 2, there is limited support for this mechanism. The community structures described in Period 2 were still active in much the same way in Period 3. The Defence Committees fought, particularly during Operation Demetrius. The British were unable to complete some of their arrest operations due to community resistance (Adams 1997, 154, 159). However, as in Period 2, evidence is limited in supporting this mechanism since there are relatively few examples of activated latent social structures.

Outbidding

In Period 3 there do seem to be some attempts on the part of the Officials to outbid the Provos. However, either because they misjudged popular support or because they fumbled the operations, the Officials were unsuccessful. The Officials, in response to Bloody Sunday, attacked the 1 Para barracks at Aldershot. However, the operation was bungled and the attack

only killed some cleaning staff and a Catholic priest (Adams 1997, 180-81; Mallie and Bishop 1987, 199). Thus, the Officials were thwarted again in their attempt to gain popular support through action, though this attack still serves as evidence of increased terrorism due to Bloody Sunday. In another attack, the Officials kidnapped and killed a British soldier, William Best, who was home on leave. However, the soldier was an Irish Catholic home visiting his mother. Therefore, the public saw this attack as a failure, and the Officials failed to outbid the Provos (Moloney 2010, 96). Because these incidents represent attempts at outbidding, but were unsuccessful, it is unclear how well the outbidding mechanism is supported. One does see outbidding occur in Period 2, but with little terrorism involved. In Period 3, one sees attempted outbidding using terrorism, but all of the attempts failed. Therefore, we have no evidence of successful outbidding using terrorism, leaving the results inconclusive.

Revenge and Reciprocity

In Period 3, when terrorism became more common, one does see indications of revenge attacks taking a reciprocal basis and involving terrorism. One sees attacks on civilians justified as being retaliation for previous incumbent violence. Also, even when this type of justification is not explicit, there is a correlation between incumbent violence and later increases in terrorism which supports the reciprocity mechanism.

After internment, the IRA proclaimed that all off-duty RUC and UDR personnel were legitimate targets (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 191). This escalation was due to the widespread, intrusive, and highly traumatic nature of internment. Therefore, one can see that this

proclamation is a reciprocal action stemming from internment. The justification of targeting off-duty personnel, some in their own homes, was that the security forces had come and attacked the nationalist populace in their homes, so now, as revenge, the same types of attacks would be returned upon them.

Bloody Sunday also spurred lots of terrorism which can be seen as reciprocal responses to the attacks on nationalist civilians. The Donegall Street car bomb and the Abercorn restaurant bombing targeted civilians and occurred less than two months after Bloody Sunday. Though these attacks were not directly pronounced as reprisals for Bloody Sunday, coming so soon after Bloody Sunday, and targeting civilians, they correspond to what one should see if the mechanism is working as theorized. Further evidence of reciprocal attacks can be seen in the Bloody Friday attacks in July 1972, which were said to be related to be related to Bloody Sunday by Brendan Hughes (Moloney 2010, 104). Like in the previous two attacks, civilians were targeted. Warnings were given but were either insufficient or inaccurate, leading to civilian casualties. Finally, the England campaign was directly said to be a response to Bloody Sunday and other incidents of incumbent violence, among other justifications. For instance, Shane O'Doherty said he felt good about targeting the English and said that the English people needed to "face the consequences of the British military occupation of Ireland" (O'Doherty 1993). Similarly, Brendan Hughes cited British raiding and killing as justification for bombing England, and another IRA supporter said that "if the English send soldiers to make war in Ireland, the IRA should in return visit war on England" (McKearney 2011, 125; Moloney 2010, 148). These sentiments, along with the targeting of civilians, especially people like Reginald Maulding and a

chaplain who defended 1 Para's actions on Bloody Sunday, make it clear to an observer that this campaign is a reciprocal act of revenge for previous incumbent violence.

The IRA's responses to Loyalist paramilitary violence can also be seen as reciprocal revenge. Some Loyalist paramilitaries would abduct, kill, and commit atrocities against random Catholics. For instance, some Catholics would be taken into what were known as "romper rooms" where they would be cut, burned, and otherwise tortured before being killed. In another case, a Loyalist group raped a mother in front of her handicapped child, then killed the child (Mallie and Bishop 1987, 86). The IRA responded to these types of attacks by calling for revenge attacks on Protestants and engaging in the bombing of Loyalist homes and pubs (236). This led to tit-for-tat cycles of reciprocal revenge between the two sides.

Overall, there seems to be evidence that the upsurge in terrorist attacks in Period 2 were due, in part, to the idea of terrorism as a reciprocal method of revenge. There are various instances where revenge is directly cited as justification for the use of terrorism. In other attacks, one sees indirect evidence in the timing and targets of the attacks though they may not be directly justified by references to incumbent violence.

Psychological Mechanisms

In Period 3, there is not much evidence of psychological factors having much of a role. Terrorist attacks such as Bloody Friday or the England campaign, though partially motivated by revenge, did not seem to arise from the theorized psychological effects. However, there is some evidence relating to Loyalist sectarian killings. As mentioned above, there were several

atrocities, such as the romper rooms, random killings, and the killing of a retarded child, committed by paramilitary hit squads (Dillon 2003, 110-111; Mallie and Bishop 1987, 86, 236). In return, the IRA committed revenge killings and bombings against Protestants. It is possible that the nature of the Loyalist actions made it easier to kill Protestants in general, as evidenced by the fact that many of the revenge killings and bombings targeted random Protestants. This conclusion is troublesome though, as the revenge killings may have been random simply because it was harder to target the paramilitaries themselves. The IRA may have felt that it needed to respond, so it attacked more readily available targets.

In addition, there seems to be some evidence of dehumanization from the Loyalist side. In a copy of the *Loyalist News*, the UVF was chided for not being militant enough. The article refers to the IRA as “animals...crawling into Ulster” and needing to use fire to drive them out (Boulton 1973, 144). This type of sentiment would later help lead to the rise of the UDA, a more militant terrorist force than the UVF was.

Conclusion

Overall, the hypothesis is generally supported. The overall levels of violence, motivations, and types of violence indicated that, as incumbent violence escalated, the insurgency both escalated and, at higher levels of violence, began to involve more terrorism. However, not all mechanisms were equally supported. The first two mechanisms, fear and revenge, were well supported. They led to increased insurgency in Periods 2 and 3, while not being as present in Period 1, as predicted. The second two mechanisms, destruction of

livelihoods and latent social structures, were not as well supported. As previously discussed, poverty did have an effect in Periods 2 and 3, but not a direct one. As the IRA rose in relation to popular support due to other factors, there were more opportunities for the poor to participate, thus making it seem like poverty and lack of opportunity were increasing IRA recruiting. Community structures may have played a role in increasing IRA effectiveness as latent social structures. However, it is clear that the main causal push behind the rising insurgency came from fear of incumbent violence and desires for revenge rather than the latter two mechanisms.

The outbidding and psychological mechanisms were not well supported. This indicates that the main causal push for rising terrorism in response to incumbent violence came from the revenge and reciprocity mechanism which did seem to produce terrorism in Period 3. Reciprocity did not produce terrorism in Period 2, likely because incumbent violence was not severe enough. Outbidding was seemingly attempted in Period 3, but never successfully, leaving support inconclusive. There is some evidence of psychological factors playing a role, but it is tenuous, and one cannot say with confidence that the mechanism is supported.

It is possible that these mechanisms might still work as theorized in other contexts. Therefore, a necessary avenue of future research is the testing of this theory using in-depth case studies of other conflicts. This may be difficult, however. The Northern Ireland case contains more available data than many other conflicts, especially in regards to primary sources from the insurgent perspective. Other potential cases, such as the Chechen conflict and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, may be more difficult in this respect. Still, further testing should be attempted.

Within the Northern Ireland case, it would be useful if one could obtain a quantitative account of attacks to see if trends qualitatively discussed in this study have statistical

significance. This data exists in terms of counts of deaths in the conflict. However, through reading various sources in the course of this study, it is clear that many attacks on the RUC or the British resulted in no fatalities, likely due to incumbent training or equipment compared to the IRA. Thus, just looking at deaths only might severely bias the data when coding attacks as guerrilla or terrorist. If data counting attacks, rather than deaths, is available, then the Northern Ireland case could produce a robust quantitative test.

Outside Northern Ireland, a quantitative test would allow for the theory to be more robustly tested. It would also show whether the plausibility of the theory shown in Northern Ireland can show up as statistical significance elsewhere. This type of test makes up the following chapter in this thesis.

CHAPTER FOUR: IRAQ FROM 2004-2009

Introduction

The second test of the theory consists of a quantitative test using information from the United States' recent conflict in Iraq. Using data from 2004 to 2009, a panel data regression analysis was conducted to measure the relationships described by the theory in terms of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and insurgent violence. This chapter begins with an explanation of the selection of Iraq for this study and a description of the data, followed by a short background of the Iraq conflict. The hypotheses of the theory are discussed in light of the Iraqi data and the variables and methods are discussed. The results of the analysis will then be presented, and the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the results' implications for the theory, gaps in the analysis, and proposals for future study.

Iraq Case Selection and Data Sources

The Iraq case will be used to test the theory, because, like Northern Ireland, it both contains all the variables necessary to properly test the theory and is a data-rich environment, providing a substantial population size to work with. In Iraq, the incumbents consist of Coalition troops and Iraqi government forces. During the conflict, incumbent forces did commit violence against the populace. This violence was largely accidental, but there were occasional incidences of intentional violence against civilians (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Ricks 2006). The insurgents are those groups conducting attacks against incumbent forces and civilian targets. These groups

include the Higher Command of the Mujahideen in Iraq (nationalist group), the Islamic Army in Iraq (Sunni Islamist group), and the Mahdi Army (Shia Islamist group), among others (Hashim 2006, 37, 172-175). These groups carried out attacks on combatants and noncombatant targets, thus exhibiting both types of insurgent violence relevant to the theory.

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Violence Data

Governorate	Kirkuk	Diyala	Salah al Din	Babylon
Civilian Deaths(Terrorism)	548	1529	1255	588
Civilian Deaths(Sectarian)	1558	6485	2518	3173
Civilian Deaths(Incumbent)	65	410	525	160
Total Civilian Deaths	2171	8424	4298	3921
Significant Actions (<i>Sigact</i>)	8423	18398	22567	4090
Significant Actions (<i>SigactI</i>)	7539	14800	21352	3461

Iraq also represents a very data-rich environment. The Coalition data-recording infrastructure, combined with intense media attention, has led to a large amount of detailed information being available for research use. For this test, data gathered by Berman, Condra, Felter, and Shapiro (2011; 2012) will be used. Summary statistics from this data are presented in Table 1. This dataset includes information on civilian deaths, attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces, IED numbers, ethnicity, population, and other community characteristics. Much of this information is broken down to show monthly changes in these variables, thus allowing a high resolution in analysis. In addition to this dataset, select information, such as electricity

availability and Coalition and Iraqi security force strength, are obtained from alternate sources, such as the Brookings Institution (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2011) and Lindsay (2013). The data used in the quantitative tests covers the time period from February 2004 to February 2009.

In addition, Iraq may represent a strong case for many of the theory's mechanisms. Honor and revenge are part of Iraqi traditions (Ricks 2006, 252; Shadid 2006, 356). Since many of the mechanisms in the theory deal with ideas of honor and vengeance, the effects of incumbent violence might be particularly strong, making this case a strong one, where effects are more likely to be noticeable.

Iraq is, however, a complicated case. There are multiple causes for violence in this conflict. Sectarian antagonism might lead to the killing of civilians from other groups. Resistance to a foreign occupier could lead to attacks on Coalition troops, and ideology might lead individuals to engage in guerrilla or terrorist attacks due to anti-American sentiment or nationalism. These factors might create and affect insurgent violence regardless of what the incumbent does in regards to civilian victimization. Therefore, incumbent violence against the populace will not account for all of the violence in Iraq. However, the insurgency is still likely to respond to popular demands and changes in popular support since the populace represents a source for recruitment, supplies, shelter, and other necessary resources. Thus, one should still see incumbent violence against the populace affecting insurgent violence. In addition, some of the factors noted above might be enhanced by incumbent violence. For instance, if Coalition troops are killing civilians, this might cause nationalist or anti-American sentiment to increase, perhaps, in turn, increasing insurgent violence.

Background to the Conflict

The war began in 2003 when the United States issued an ultimatum to then-Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, commanding him to leave the country within 48 hours or face military attack (BBC 2003). Hussein did not leave the country, and, on March 20, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. The Iraqi army was quickly defeated in its organized form, but, soon after the fall of the country, an insurgency emerged to combat Coalition (US and allied nations) troops. The insurgency was fueled by the dissolution of the army and discrimination (both real and perceived) against Sunnis in the reconstruction of Iraqi institutions by Coalition forces, who favored Shia and Kurdish groups (Hashim 2006).

The large pool of experienced, unemployed soldiers, most of whom were Sunnis, led to the formation of insurgent groups. In the beginning of the insurgency, the fighting groups were organized along former-military or Baathist lines, but the insurgency began to take on sectarian and religious motivations, attracting both individuals from the larger Iraqi population and jihadist volunteers from other Muslim countries (Hashim 2006, 138-139; Shadid 2006, 342). Shia insurgent groups, such as the Mahdi Army, also began to form.

Increased violence led to a surge in United States personnel in what was known as the “Surge” in 2007. President Bush announced the addition of 20,000 more troops. These troops were supposed to “to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security” (Bush 2007). Though most of these troops were initially supposed to go to Baghdad, only two of the six brigades added in the surge deployed to Baghdad, with the rest going to other provinces (West 2009). Violence continued to rise, but the effects of the surge became noticeable

later in 2007, when the surge's objectives were largely declared to have been met (Petraeus 2007). Violence continued to decline beyond the departure of US troops in 2011, but unrest continues during the writing of this chapter. Overall, the Iraq war has cost 4805 Coalition dead and 176000 to 189000 overall dead (Watson Institute for International Studies).

The analysis below examines violence in four governorates of Iraq. The governorates were selected to be representative of ethnic and other characteristics.⁷ The first of these provinces is Kirkuk (aka Tameem), which is located in the northern part of the country. With around 1100 civilian deaths, Kirkuk was the least violent of the selected provinces. It also had the lowest population, but with a mid-range population density. It is a mixed ethnicity province with a fairly even balance of Kurds and Sunnis. The province is around 58% rural (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012).

The northern part of Iraq tended to be less violent than the rest of the country. This is likely due to the higher numbers of Kurds in the area (Tripp 309). The Kurds had been persecuted under Saddam and welcomed the American invasion. Kurdish peshmergas, or militias, would later fight alongside Coalition troops in some conflicts (Hashim 2006, 305). Because it is a mixed province, and because of the presence of oil reserves in the province, there was a certain degree of ethnic tension in the area, particularly in the capital, Kirkuk city (van Bruinessen 2005). This tension contributed to violence, making the area around the capital a relatively intense operational area. This tension has continued, though less violently, into the

⁷ They also were selected because they met a data threshold of 1000 civilian deaths. This threshold was chosen in order to provide enough data to estimate more reliable predictors in the regression analysis, thus allowing for a more robust test of the hypotheses. It is possible that reliable predictors could have been estimated using a smaller data population, and the inclusion of provinces with less violence provides a future avenue for further study.

present, with many Kurds wanting Kirkuk city to become part of semiautonomous Kurdistan while other ethnic groups oppose such a move.

The second least violent governorate used in this study, with around 1200 civilian deaths, is Babylon (aka Babil) governorate. Babylon is located in central Iraq, just south of Baghdad. It borders the violent Sunni triangle area along its northern border. It has nearly twice the population and population density of Kirkuk, and the population is 99% Shia. It is 56% rural (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012).

Though the population is overwhelmingly Shia, Sunni insurgents were active in Babylon due to its proximity to hotbeds of Sunni insurgency, such as Baghdad (Wallace 2004). Shia groups, such as Sadrists, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and the Dawa party, also came into conflict with each other, sometimes violently (Alsumaria 2008). Iranian influence also contributed to the violence. Babylon was one of the main routes for Iranian-supported groups and Iranian arms to be infiltrated into Baghdad, and the Iranian government supported several of the Shia insurgent groups in the province (Institute for the Study of War 2008). The Special Inspectors General for Iraq Reconstruction ranked Babylon as the eighth most violent province in the country (Special Inspectors General for Iraq Reconstruction 2008). However, the US military, in 2007, began to organize armed tribal groups into what became known as the Sons of Iraq, militias which assisted in Coalition and government security operations. By 2008 violence had considerably lessened, and the province was handed over to full Iraqi control (Raghavan 2007).

Next, in terms of increasing civilian casualties with around 1500 civilian deaths, is Salah al Din province (aka Saladin province). Salah al Din borders Kirkuk on its western boundary,

and comes into contact with two insurgent hotbeds, Baghdad and Anbar province, to its south and west, respectively. Much of the province is located in the Sunni triangle, a very violent area, and this has probably contributed to the violence in the province. It is a Sunni province, with around 76% of the population being Sunni and 16% and 8% being Kurdish and Shia, respectively. The country is around 54% rural and has a relatively low population density, with about 57 people per square kilometer (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012).

Because of its largely Sunni population, Salah al Din was a hotbed of insurgency after the 2003 American invasion. It is the location of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's hometown, which provided further motivation to former Iraqi soldiers and nationalists to fight on as insurgents. The city of Balad, a majority Shia town, is also located in Salah al Din. This town was the site of heavy sectarian violence in 2006 (Associated Press 2006). One of the alleged reasons for this violence was control of existing oil reserves in the province.

The most violent province in this study, in terms of civilian deaths, is Diyala, with around 2600 civilians killed. Diyala is located in west-central Iraq and borders Baghdad on the west. The western portion of Diyala is located in part of the Sunni Triangle. The province is about 61% rural, thus being the most rural of the four provinces, and has a relatively low population density (about 70-80 people per square kilometer). It is a mixed province with the population being approximately 51% Sunni, 24% Kurdish, and 25% Shia (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012).

Due to its proximity to Baghdad, Diyala became a hotbed of Islamist insurgency, particularly in 2006. Insurgents from Baghdad began to move to Diyala in 2006 and used the

area to stage operations into Baghdad and within Diyala itself (Kagan 2007). Other Islamist groups, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, declared Baquba (Diyala's capital) or nearby areas to be their headquarters (Roggio 2007). At the end of 2006, insurgents moved to take Baquba, spurring the incumbents to launch an operation to wrest control of the province from the insurgents. The operation, Arrowhead Ripper, lasted from December 2006 to October 2007 and involved around 10000 US and Iraqi troops (Kagan 2007; West 2009). The incumbent operation ended in October 2007 with the help of a former insurgent group made up of former soldiers, the 1920 Revolution Brigade (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2007; Kagan 2007). Unrest continued in the province, however, necessitating a follow-up operation in January of 2008 (Institute for the Study of War). Therefore, overall, Diyala can be said to have been one of the more violent areas outside of Baghdad.

Hypotheses

The analysis of this data will be conducted in two parts, based on the two hypotheses of the theory. The first hypothesis, in relation to Iraq, is that incumbent violence (here, collateral casualties) should lead to increased insurgent activity, due to increased popular support. Though it is impossible to examine popular support directly using the above data, the results of the analysis should show increased insurgent attacks. Insurgent activity is measured in the analysis through looking at the number of significant actions reported by Coalition troops.⁸ According to Hypothesis 1, we should see an increase in significant actions in the time period following

⁸ Reported significant actions may not include significant actions involving Iraqi troops working independently of Coalition troops. However, though this measure may leave out some attacks on Iraqi forces, it should provide a reasonable proxy of overall guerrilla attacks.

incumbent violence. Hypothesis 1 is as follows: H_1 : Violence against the populace will generally increase popular support for insurgency, causing an increase in significant actions.

The second hypothesis of the theory, in relation to Iraq, is that there will be an increase in insurgent terrorism relative to guerrilla attacks in correlation with Coalition killings of civilians. To measure this, a ratio of the log of terrorist victims to the log of significant actions is used to see if it is correlated with incumbent violence. According to Hypothesis 2, there should be a positive relationship between this ratio and the number of civilians killed by incumbent troops across all four provinces. Hypothesis 2 is as follows: H_2 : Violence against the populace will increase the ratio of terrorist to guerrilla activity due to increased support for terrorism relative to guerrilla warfare.

Unlike with the Northern Ireland case study, the data period in Iraq is not divided into periods of differing violence levels. Given the amount of violence occurring in Iraq during the conflict, it is reasonable to say that the entire period examined falls into the “high violence” level, corresponding to Period 3 in the Northern Ireland case study. As a result, no comparison is possible between the effects of low or medium violence periods and periods of high violence. Therefore, in Iraq, one should see both increasing insurgency and increasing terrorism in relation to guerrilla warfare occurring throughout the data period.

Variables

Independent variable

The independent variable for both hypotheses is collateral civilian killings conducted by incumbent (Iraqi or Coalition) security forces. In the data gathered by Condra and Shapiro, incidents resulting in civilian deaths were recorded. The locations of the deaths were also recorded, allowing one to aggregate monthly civilian death tolls by governorate. There were some discrepancies as to the number of deaths in some incidents, with a range of possible death tolls provided. In these cases, the median death toll was calculated and used. There were also some cases when multiple parties were listed as culpable for the civilian deaths in a given incident. In these cases, the number of civilian deaths was split between the parties. Civilian deaths were coded as being a result of incumbent violence if they resulted from the actions of Coalition or Iraqi troops or Iraqi police forces. These deaths were then aggregated at the monthly level. The highest number of collateral deaths in any given month in the dataset is 41 deaths (Salah al Din province in 2007) and the lowest number in any given month is 0 (multiple provinces and times). This measure of incumbent violence is represented by the variable *VAP*, meaning violence against the populace.

Dependent Variables

Hypothesis 1 is about the effects of incumbent violence on the overall levels of insurgency. Insurgent activity will be measured using the variables *Sigact* and *Sigact-1*. The first

variable measures enemy attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces, civilians, infrastructure, and government facilities or organizations. Any significant insurgent action made known to the Coalition authorities is included in this variable. *Sigact1* is similar, but excludes criminal attacks, attacks on civilians, attacks on other insurgents, and sectarian violence, and is thus a better measure of what we define as guerrilla warfare (Berman, Condra, Felter, and Shapiro 2012). These variables will be regressed using monthly time lags since any effects from civilian deaths on insurgent activity are not likely to be immediate. The results should show that the effects of incumbent violence increase the number of significant actions. The effects should peak and then fade over time. The effects of incumbent violence on the above variables is measured at the time of the incumbent violence ($t=0$) and then at monthly intervals up to three months after the initial civilian deaths ($t=3$).⁹ Logs of the *Sigact* and *Sigact-1* variables are also used to measure the percentage change in significant actions and to help provide part of the ratio used to test Hypothesis 2 (see below). The monthly time lags are also used on the logged variables.

Hypothesis 2 is about the effect of incumbent violence on terrorism, particularly in relation to guerrilla warfare. The first dependent variable used in this regard is *Terrorism*. This is a measure of overall terrorist activity. It is calculated by looking at the recorded civilian casualties and aggregating those listed as being killed by insurgents. Since terrorism is defined in this study as attacks by insurgents on noncombatants, an aggregation of civilian deaths caused by insurgents should provide a suitable measure of terrorist activity. These data are aggregated on a monthly basis. As with *VAP*, there are some cases with a range for the death toll or with death tolls split between culpable parties. These situations are handled in the same way as above

⁹ After three months, the effects of *VAP* are insignificant or approaching insignificance. Thus, using three month lags is sufficient to capture the significant effects of *VAP*.

regarding *VAP*. Three monthly time lags are used. A logged version of this variable (*Logterr*) is also used for reasons similar to the logs of *Sigact* and *Sigact1*. The results should show that terrorism increases but that this effect peaks and then fades, much like general insurgent activity.

The *Terrorism* variable does not include civilians killed in attacks listed as sectarian in the data. Since sectarian fighting in this conflict does not include Coalition troops (since they, ostensibly, were not Sunni, Shia, or Kurdish), sectarian conflict might arise due to a different logic than other types of violence. The incumbent does not have as big a role in the sectarian civil war arising in Iraq. Therefore, incumbent violence against the populace may not affect sectarian killings in the same way that it affects guerrilla warfare and terrorism listed as insurgent-based in the original dataset. However, since these attacks also involve armed groups killing noncombatants, they could arguably be included as terrorism. Therefore, a second terrorism variable, *Terrplus*, is used which includes those civilians killed in sectarian attacks. *Terrplus* provides an alternate indicator of overall changes in terrorist activity. Like *Terrorism*, a logged version of this variable is also used and three monthly time lags of *Terrplus* are used in the analysis. As with *Terrorism*, the results should show an increased level of *Terrplus* from $t=0$ onwards, with effects peaking and then declining with time.

The last, and most important, dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 is the ratio of *Logterr* to the logged versions of *Sigact* and *Sigact1*. This ratio shows how the percentage change in terrorism compares to that of the measures of guerrilla activity. If the ratio is positively correlated, this means that terrorism is increasing faster than guerrilla activity. Likewise, a negative or no correlation means that guerrilla activity is increasing faster or at the same rate as terrorism. Three monthly time lags are used in the analysis. The results should show, according

to the theory, that incumbent violence increases the ratio of terrorism to guerrilla activity over time, with effects peaking and then declining with time.

Controls

A number of controls will be used in the analysis of the data. The first of these are the year dummy variables. Dummy variables for years 2004-2009 are included in order to control for time effects or year-specific factors which might impact the dependent variables.

As mentioned above, the analysis uses data from four governorates: Diyala, Kirkuk, Babylon, and Salah al Din. Province is controlled for using dummy variables for each province since some areas, such as those in the “Sunni Triangle” (such as Salah al Din) suffered higher levels of violence relative to other provinces, such as those in the north (Kirkuk), indicating a systematic pattern to violence (Hashim 2006).¹⁰ These four provinces, as mentioned above, were chosen because they are representative in terms of rural/urban and ethnic composition and met a threshold for violence which indicated that there would be enough data for robust analysis (over 1000 civilian deaths over the examined time period). Salah al Din and Diyala should have more violence, due to their ethnic makeups. Babylon and Kirkuk should have lower levels of violence due to their ethnic compositions.

The next controls are those regarding ethnicity. It is necessary to control for ethnicity because much of the violence in Iraq was based on ethnicity. There was a large amount of sectarian violence, and the majority of the insurgents were Sunnis. Provinces were coded as

¹⁰ This difference in violence levels might arise from several factors not related to incumbent actions such as proximity to Baghdad, ethnic makeup, ratio of rural to urban area, etc.

belonging to a particular ethnic group if that group made up at least 60% of the population. The selected mixed provinces are Diyala (51% Sunni, 24% Kurdish, and 25% Shia) and Tameem (Kirkuk) (56% Sunni and 44% Kurdish). The Sunni province is Salah al Din (76% Sunni, 16% Kurdish, and 8% Shia). The Shia province is Babylon (0.3% Sunni and 99.7% Shia). Coding the provinces in this way allows one to control for the above mentioned sectarian effects on violence. Sunni and mixed provinces should have the most violence, due to the Sunni nature of the insurgency and increased intersectarian violence, while the Shia province should have the least violence. Violence in Kirkuk may be hard to predict. It is mixed, but there is no large Shia population, which might inhibit sectarian fighting. There is also a large Kurdish minority. The Kurds were not as involved in the insurgency as the Sunnis were, leading to a possibly lower level of violence in Kirkuk than we might expect in other mixed provinces.¹¹

Also included in the analysis are controls for population and population density. Population and population density are controlled for since higher populations might lead to more opportunities for insurgent and Coalition operations, and collateral casualties are likely to be more common in densely populated areas. Population is calculated by averaging World Food Program estimates from 2005 and 2007 (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012). Higher populations and population density should be positively correlated with increased violence.

It is possible that decreased utilities might cause grievances leading to increased violence. In order to control for this possibility, a control for the average number of hours of electricity

¹¹ There is a large degree of collinearity between these controls and the province controls, therefore, ethnicity is omitted in the full models. However, these controls were used in their own models to test any separate effects. These models provide different results for ethnicity compared to the province controls, particularly in regards to the *Mixed* control variable.

available is used. The data used comes from the Brookings Institute's Iraq Index (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2011). There should be a negative correlation between *Electricity* and insurgent violence. The fewer hours of electricity are available, the more grievances should be felt by the population, possibly spurring support for insurgent violence.

Finally, controls are used to account for Coalition (*Coalbatt*) and Iraqi (*Iraqsec10*) government strength. Increased incumbent forces should have contrasting effects on violence. Increased presence can act as a deterrent against insurgent activity, since insurgents are more likely to be neutralized and operations made more difficult. However, an increased incumbent presence could increase popular grievances and provide insurgents with more opportunities to attack incumbent security forces, thus increasing violence. Regardless, incumbent strength is likely to have some effect and should thus be controlled for. *Coalbatt* uses the number of battalions in the selected governorates, accounted for on a monthly basis, thus allowing for an accurate proxy for Coalition strength at a high resolution (Lindsay 2013). Using data from the Brookings Institute, the number of Iraqi troops in all of Iraq (in tens of thousands) is used to control for Iraqi strength (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2011). Unfortunately, higher resolutions of this data at the governorate level were unavailable at the time of this study, so the controls used are less accurate proxies of Iraqi strength than might be preferred.

Methods

The data outlined above is analyzed using a random effects, GLS, panel data regression examining the effects of incumbent violence over time and across the four provinces. This type

of model was used because the study examines data across both time and province, but only looks at a subset of the data for Iraq as a whole, thus precluding the use of a fixed effects model. In each model the dependent variable is regressed on *VAP* and the controls for year, province, electricity, and incumbent strength. In the models using all of the controls, the controls for 2008, 2009, ethnicity, population, and population density are omitted due to statistical collinearity, therefore, they are not included in the tables in the results section below. The effects of these controls were analyzed separately and are discussed in the text.

Results

The results were generally supportive of the hypotheses. However, there were some deviations from expectation which provide interesting avenues for further analysis. Below, the results are discussed for each dependent variable. It should be noted that the results reported here use robust standard errors. Regular standard errors were used as well, but did not deviate greatly from the results using robust standard errors.

Hypothesis 1

VAP

The results for the *Sigact* models are presented in Table 2. The results for *VAP* supported the hypothesis. *VAP* is significant at the 1% level from $t=0$ to $t=2$ and the effect decreases over time from 4.9 in the first month to 3.2 in the second month lag. In the third month, *VAP* is no

longer significant, but the decreasing effect continues with a coefficient of 1.3. This decreasing trend can also be seen in the gradually decreasing significance of *VAP*, as well as the decreasing overall R-squared of the model from 0.73 in the first month's model to 0.68 in the third month's model.

Table 2: Effect of Incumbent Violence on Insurgent Significant Actions (*Sigact*)

<i>Sigact</i>	Initial Month (t=0)	1 Month Lag (t=1)	2 Month Lag (t=2)	3 Month Lag (t=3)
<i>VAP</i>	4.903 (5.26)**	4.095 (4.57)**	3.287 (2.54)**	1.383 (0.73)
2004	29.825 (0.51)	31.335 (0.31)	-117.768 (0.88)	-55.668 (0.54)
2005	52.949 (0.85)	37.507 (0.41)	-73.938 (0.63)	-34.884 (0.41)
2006	170.994 (4.80)**	183.648 (3.06)**	121.857 (2.28)*	164.892 (2.54)**
2007	268.173 (3.73)**	249.786 (3.05)**	189.859 (2.71)**	192.920 (2.61)**
<i>Kirkuk</i>	-204.608 (6.71)**	-218.574 (11.16)**	-230.807 (12.92)**	-252.413 (14.14)**
<i>Diyala</i>	-61.267 (8.55)**	-62.802 (13.72)**	-66.774 (15.97)**	-72.597 (17.38)**
<i>Babylon</i>	-292.685 (8.63)**	-307.947 (13.30)**	-321.700 (15.17)**	-340.258 (15.67)**
<i>Electricity</i>	-10.827 (2.54)**	-9.591 (2.55)**	-6.748 (1.65)*	-14.926 (2.84)**
<i>Coalbatt</i>	5.191 (0.54)	1.693 (0.22)	-0.365 (0.05)	-1.177 (0.13)
<i>Iraqsec10</i>	0.852 (0.85)	0.076 (0.04)	-3.833 (1.38)	-3.228 (1.62)
Constant	317.918 (10.28)**	355.461 (6.63)**	528.627 (6.65)**	600.092 (6.77)**
Overall R-Squared	0.73	0.70	0.68	0.68
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses			N=200	
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level				

In real terms, the effect of *VAP* can be quite substantial. For every additional civilian killed by incumbent forces, there are nearly 5 additional insurgent attacks on the security forces in the initial month. In months with civilian deaths, the number of civilians killed ranges from 1 to 41. This means, that these deaths could add 5-200 attacks in the initial month, 4-168 additional attacks in the following month, and 3-135 attacks in the second month after $t=0$. The average monthly number of civilian deaths over the entire time period examined is 4.75, which means that incumbent violence contributed, on average, to more than 23 extra attacks on incumbent security forces per month when not counting lagged effects. Out of a monthly average of 219 significant actions, this means that incumbent violence contributed to about 10% of monthly attacks on incumbent forces when not counting lagged effects, once again. Looking at the entire number of civilian deaths caused by incumbent violence from February 2004 to February 2009 (about 1159), one can see that this incumbent violence led to around 5679 extra attacks on incumbent forces. Looking at the total number of significant actions over the examined time period (53478), incumbent violence against the populace led to around 10% of these attacks, when looking at the initial effects of incumbent violence. It is difficult to calculate the entire number of attacks which may have resulted from incumbent violence. Since there are lagged effects from incumbent violence, there is a considerable amount of overlap from month to month. Therefore, the calculated numbers above likely underestimate the actual real effect of *VAP*. Though the effect of *VAP* is not as large, in comparison, as that of the *Salah al Din* province control variable, which is significant at the 1% level with an effect of 204 extra attacks per month, *VAP* still contributes a substantial number of additional attacks per civilian death.

Table 3: Effect of Incumbent Violence on Insurgent Significant Actions (*Sigact1*)

<i>Sigact1</i>	Initial Month (t=0)	1 Month Lag (t=1)	2 Month Lag (t=2)	3 Month Lag (t=3)
<i>VAP</i>	3.948 (6.97)**	3.269 (5.03)**	3.028 (3.97)**	1.398 (1.00)
2004	-28.797 (0.41)	31.264 (0.42)	-56.443 (0.69)	37.083 (0.89)
2005	10.305 (0.14)	38.617 (0.53)	-25.606 (0.33)	37.303 (1.27)
2006	87.305 (2.41)**	126.014 (2.42)**	90.891 (1.91)*	146.719 (2.59)**
2007	193.127 (3.28)**	199.745 (2.67)**	162.561 (2.50)**	179.513 (2.46)**
<i>Kirkuk</i>	-206.591 (8.05)**	-213.955 (12.39)**	-219.400 (13.34)**	-234.246 (12.00)**
<i>Diyala</i>	-111.186 (18.52)**	-111.109 (27.76)**	-113.445 (29.48)**	-117.560 (25.54)**
<i>Babylon</i>	-288.466 (9.70)**	-296.223 (13.64)**	-303.750 (15.86)**	-315.289 (14.68)**
<i>Electricity</i>	-6.398 (2.17)*	-6.956 (2.16)*	-6.271 (1.84)*	-14.200 (2.45)**
<i>Coalbatt</i>	5.111 (0.56)	3.610 (0.46)	2.290 (0.37)	3.018 (0.44)
<i>Iraqsec10</i>	-0.651 (0.47)	0.013 (0.01)	-2.394 (1.53)	-0.941 (2.03)*
Constant	353.356 (6.49)**	328.308 (10.14)**	442.676 (10.56)**	460.570 (10.75)**
Overall R-Squared	0.75	0.72	0.71	0.71
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses			N=200	
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level				

Table 3 shows the results from the models using the more refined measure of guerrilla warfare, *Sigact1*. Regarding *VAP*, we see similar results to the *Sigact* models. *VAP* is significant at the 1% level from t=0 to t=2. There is also a gradual decrease in effect from 3.9 in the first month to 3.0 in the second month lag. As before, this decreasing effect trend continues into the third month lag, though the effect is no longer significant in that lagged model. Likewise, one

can see the decreasing trend in both the significance of *VAP* and the overall R-squared of the model which further supports the idea that the effects of incumbent violence decrease over time.

In terms of real effects, *VAP* has a similar effect on *Sigact1* compared to *Sigact*. The coefficient in the first month is 3.94 meaning that an additional civilian death caused by incumbent forces leads to about 4 additional insurgent actions per month. Looking at the range of deaths in months with civilian deaths (1-41), we see that *VAP* increases the more refined measure of significant actions by about 4-160 additional actions in the first month, about 3-134 in the following month, and 3-124 in the second month after $t=0$. Since the average monthly civilian death toll was 4.75, *VAP* may have led to (when not counting lagged effects) 19 additional attacks per month, or about 9% of the average number of attacks per month (193). Looking at the total number of civilian deaths over the entire time period (1159), *VAP* (when not looking at lagged effects) can have contributed to as many as 4575 additional insurgent actions, or 10% of the total number of attacks (47152). Therefore, the overall effect of *VAP* using the *Sigact1* variable is similar to that of *VAP* when looking at the *Sigact* variable.

The results of the logs of the two previous dependent variables are similar and are presented in Tables 4 and 5. *VAP* in both the *LogSA* and *LogSa1* models is positively significant at the 1% level in the first and second month lag. It is insignificant in the initial month and in the third month lag. This indicates that it may take some time for the percent change in both *Sigact* and *Sigact1* to be significantly affected by incumbent violence. The results also show that the effects of incumbent violence on the percent change in both dependent variables disappears by the third month lag. The effects of *VAP* are nearly identical in both dependent variables' models.

Table 4: Effect of Incumbent Violence on Insurgent Significant Actions (log of *Sigact*)

<i>LogSA</i>	Initial Month (t=0)	1 Month Lag (t=1)	2 Month Lag (t=2)	3 Month Lag (t=3)
<i>VAP</i>	0.001 (0.31)	0.004 (5.09)**	0.003 (5.26)**	0.001 (0.32)
2004	-0.005 (0.02)	-0.007 (0.05)	-0.291 (2.25)*	-0.062 (0.37)
2005	0.169 (1.07)	0.109 (1.00)	-0.103 (0.86)	-0.015 (0.13)
2006	0.420 (3.29)**	0.419 (5.58)**	0.287 (5.34)**	0.370 (3.94)**
2007	0.531 (4.84)**	0.472 (8.33)**	0.350 (8.93)**	0.372 (7.29)**
<i>Kirkuk</i>	-0.369 (6.66)**	-0.334 (8.99)**	-0.355 (8.58)**	-0.379 (8.17)**
<i>Diyala</i>	-0.135 (10.25)**	-0.123 (14.29)**	-0.132 (13.67)**	-0.134 (12.34)**
<i>Babylon</i>	-0.707 (13.10)**	-0.688 (15.08)**	-0.725 (14.52)**	-0.746 (13.77)**
<i>Electricity</i>	-0.015 (1.83)*	-0.014 (2.74)**	-0.015 (4.33)**	-0.028 (6.65)**
<i>Coalbatt</i>	0.019 (1.60)	0.018 (1.13)	0.011 (0.68)	0.009 (0.54)
<i>Iraqsec10</i>	0.003 (1.08)	0.001 (0.75)	-0.007 (2.92)**	-0.006 (4.03)**
Constant	2.264 (23.92)**	2.327 (36.14)**	2.748 (22.42)**	2.837 (27.51)**
Overall R-Squared	0.79	0.77	0.76	0.83
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses			N=200	
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level				

Regarding substantive results, each civilian death caused by incumbent violence causes an increase of 0.4% in the first month lag and 0.3 or 0.4% in the second month lag, depending on the model (*Sigact* or *Sigact1*). This means, since the range in *VAP* values (excluding months with no civilian deaths from incumbent action) is 1-41, that *VAP* may cause a 0.4-16.4% increase in insurgent action in the first month after t=0. In the second month after t=0, *VAP* can cause a 0.3

(0.4)-12.3 (16.4)% increase in *Sigact* (*Sigact1*). The average month had 4.75 civilian deaths attributable to incumbent forces, meaning that the average effect for both models in the first month lag would be about a 2% increase, while in the second month lag, the average percentage increase would be 1.5-2%.

Table 5: Effect of Incumbent Violence on Insurgent Significant Actions (log of *Sigact1*)

<i>LogSA1</i>	Initial Month (t=0)	1 Month Lag (t=1)	2 Month Lag (t=2)	3 Month Lag (t=3)
<i>VAP</i>	0.001 (0.21)	0.004 (4.57)**	0.004 (7.11)**	0.002 (0.95)
2004	-0.080 (0.38)	0.007 (0.05)	-0.210 (2.06)*	0.060 (0.50)
2005	0.117 (0.74)	0.127 (1.18)	-0.032 (0.32)	0.088 (1.43)
2006	0.310 (2.60)**	0.351 (4.75)**	0.247 (5.11)**	0.347 (4.33)**
2007	0.439 (4.79)**	0.417 (8.33)**	0.321 (7.40)**	0.362 (7.62)**
<i>Kirkuk</i>	-0.395 (7.31)**	-0.352 (9.74)**	-0.368 (9.96)**	-0.387 (7.77)**
<i>Diyala</i>	-0.185 (14.33)**	-0.171 (20.32)**	-0.177 (20.62)**	-0.178 (15.24)**
<i>Babylon</i>	-0.749 (14.24)**	-0.722 (16.08)**	-0.755 (16.86)**	-0.771 (13.59)**
<i>Electricity</i>	-0.011 (1.43)	-0.012 (2.33)*	-0.014 (4.59)**	-0.027 (7.56)**
<i>Coalbatt</i>	0.018 (1.46)	0.017 (1.10)	0.011 (0.76)	0.011 (0.62)
<i>Iraqsec10</i>	0.001 (0.23)	0.000 (0.68)	-0.006 (2.81)**	-0.004 (5.01)**
Constant	2.350 (26.46)**	2.318 (59.73)**	2.665 (28.55)**	2.697 (27.74)**
Overall R-Squared	0.79	0.77	0.77	0.84
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses			N=200	
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level				

Governorates and Ethnicity Controls

In the Hypothesis 1 models, all of the governorates were significant across all models, though not always in the expected directions. Kirkuk, though it is a mixed province, was expected to have less violence due to the large number of Kurds living there. The results support this, with *Kirkuk* being negatively significant. *Diyala* is also negatively significant, though it was expected to be positive as a mixed province. Though insurgent groups like al Qaeda in Iraq did have their base in Diyala, many of these groups used the province as a staging area for attacks in neighboring Baghdad. This might make Diyala seem relatively less violent than, for instance, Salah al Din province. *Babylon* is both negative and significant, while *Salah al Din* (omitted from the full model) is positive and significant, as expected, due to the overall levels of violence in the provinces and their ethnic makeup (see background section). The governorate variables also had substantial effects, with *Diyala*, the least substantial province control variable, decreasing significant actions by around 61-72 attacks per month and *Salah al Din* increasing significant actions by around 164 extra attacks per month.

The ethnicity controls, though highly correlated with the governorate variables, provided some contrary results. Supporting the results for *Salah al Din* and *Babylon*, *Sunni* is significant and positive across all models while *Shia* is significant and negative. Both of these results were expected. However, *Mixed* is insignificant, which contrasts with expectation (which was that mixed provinces would be more violent) and with the governorate controls, where the two mixed provinces, Kirkuk and Diyala, had negative, significant effects. This indicates that these provinces were negatively significant for reasons other than their mixed ethnic makeup. The other ethnicity effects are substantial, at times increasing violence by over 200 attacks (*Sunni*).

Population was significant and positive for the *Sigact* models with a minor effect, but it was insignificant for the *SigactI* models. However, population density was unexpectedly negative and significant for both dependent variables with a moderate effect.

Year Controls

All of the year results were fairly consistent. 2004 and 2005 were largely insignificant over all the models. Both 2006 and 2007 are positively significant across all models, which is expected, given that those years marked the height of the insurgency (Tripp 308). 2008, like 2005, is insignificant across all models. 2008 was omitted from the full models due to collinearity with the other year controls, and 2009 is omitted due to data limitations. 2009 did not have full values for all the controls, meaning that it had to be omitted from the full model.

Security Controls: Incumbent Troop Strength and *Electricity*

The security controls exhibit fairly regular patterns across all models. The number of Coalition battalions present, *Coalbatt*, is insignificant across all models, perhaps due to conflicting effects. The presence of Coalition troops can increase insurgency due to increased popular grievances but can also suppress insurgency due to increased security capability. The number of Iraqi troops in the country is significant at times, but the effect is never very large. This perhaps reflects a diminished combat effectiveness amongst the newly formed and ill-

trained Iraqi army. *Electricity* is negatively significant across all of the models, but the effect is modest given that the number of hours only changed gradually from month to month.

Hypothesis 2

VAP

The results show a different pattern in *VAP* when looking at the dependent variable, *Terrorism*¹², albeit one still supportive of Hypothesis 2. These results are presented in Table 6. *VAP* is significant at the 1% level in the initial month ($t=0$), but then becomes insignificant in the first month lag. However, *VAP* becomes significant at the 1% level again in the second month lag before becoming insignificant again in the third month lag. The effect also decreases between $t=0$ and $t=2$, from 0.634 to 0.441, respectively. This pattern differs strikingly from the models using measures of guerrilla activity, where *VAP* maintained its significance throughout the first three months of the model. While at first puzzling, this pattern is perhaps evidence of a different organizational pattern between guerrilla and terrorist attacks. Whereas the insurgents might have the capability and infrastructure in place to maintain increased guerrilla attacks in response to incumbent violence, terrorist attacks might take more time to organize. Insurgents, in response to incumbent violence, expend available, already planned terrorist attacks in the initial month (thus making *VAP* significant at $t=0$) but then require more time to develop additional operations in

¹² The *Terrplus* variable was also used. The results were similar in the first month, though at a much smaller magnitude, and the effect became insignificant in later month lags. This perhaps supports the idea that sectarian violence might follow a different logic than the violence captured in *Terrorism*.

response to the initial incumbent violence. Therefore, it might not be until the second month lag (t=2) that the insurgents can respond with increased terrorism again. This difference in organization time thus plausibly explains the wave pattern seen in the results.

Table 6: Effect of Incumbent Violence on Insurgent Terrorism (*Terrorism*)

<i>Terrorism</i>	Initial Month(t=0)	1 Month Lag(t=1)	2 Month Lag(t=2)	3 Month Lag(t=3)
<i>VAP</i>	0.634 (4.01)**	0.067 (0.92)	0.441 (8.25)**	-0.107 (0.62)
2004	9.939 (0.68)	-26.318 (2.48)**	-20.064 (1.58)	22.909 (1.13)
2005	9.440 (0.64)	-20.028 (1.71)*	-19.840 (2.18)*	13.850 (1.26)
2006	5.155 (0.59)	-14.866 (1.30)	-13.284 (2.45)**	13.196 (1.31)
2007	9.673 (3.03)**	-1.090 (0.29)	-1.732 (0.48)	15.187 (1.55)
<i>Kirkuk</i>	-7.742 (4.28)**	-12.692 (6.67)**	-12.154 (19.66)**	-14.112 (5.10)**
<i>Diyala</i>	6.058 (13.97)**	3.532 (8.04)**	3.575 (24.13)**	3.312 (5.04)**
<i>Babylon</i>	-9.701 (5.98)**	-13.253 (5.39)**	-14.094 (25.10)**	-13.639 (4.87)**
<i>Electricity</i>	-0.816 (0.66)	-0.257 (0.35)	-0.092 (0.17)	-2.291 (2.25)*
<i>Coalbatt</i>	-0.259 (0.94)	-0.111 (0.12)	-1.036 (10.12)**	0.269 (0.40)
<i>Iraqsec10</i>	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.862 (2.73)**	-0.866 (3.67)**	0.146 (0.35)
Constant	20.066 (2.00)*	62.446 (2.41)**	61.094 (5.30)**	31.501 (2.00)*
Overall R-Squared	0.32	0.28	0.33	0.33
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses			N=200	
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level				

In real terms, the effects of *VAP* in regards to terrorism can be substantial. The coefficient in the initial month is 0.634, meaning that every civilian killed by incumbent violence leads to 0.6 civilian deaths from terrorist violence. The effect is less in the second month lag, with a coefficient of 0.441. While these effects seem small, looking at the range of deaths caused by incumbent violence, one sees that these effects can accumulate to substantial levels. In months with at least 1 death from incumbent violence, there were between 1-41 civilians killed by incumbent security forces. Therefore, *VAP* could cause 0.6-26 additional deaths due to terrorism in the initial month, with an additional 0.4-18 deaths added in the second lagged month. Looking at the total number of civilians killed by incumbent violence (1159), one can see that *VAP* could have contributed up to 735 deaths in the initial month and 511 in the second lagged month. Out of a total number of 3920 deaths attributable to terrorism in the dataset, *VAP* explains a fairly large percentage of the terrorist violence.

As with the *Terrorism* models, the results for the *Logterr* models (using the log of *Terrorism* as the dependent variable) both support Hypothesis 2 and show a wave pattern in the effect of *VAP*. These results are presented in Table 7. *VAP* is significant at the 1% level in both the initial month and in the second month lag. It is significant at the 10% level in both the first month lag and the third month lag. In the initial month and second lagged month, *VAP*, in addition to being more significant, is stronger than in the first and third month lags. In fact, in the third month lag, the coefficient becomes negative. Though at first, this negative effect may be surprising, it is possible that insurgent groups, through their reaction to incumbent violence in the earlier months, have expended available resources for continued terrorism. This expenditure, along with the declining effects of *VAP* due to time, could create a negative correlation between

VAP at t=0 and the percent change in *Terrorism* at t=3. Another interesting result is that the effect at t=2 is actually stronger than at t=0, indicating that the effects of VAP on the percent change in *Terrorism* take longer to peak before declining rapidly in the third lagged month.

Table 7: Effect of Incumbent Violence on Terrorism (Log of *Terrorism*)

<i>Logterr</i>	Initial Month (t=0)	1 Month Lag (t=1)	2 Month Lag (t=2)	3 Month Lag (t=3)
<i>VAP</i>	0.009 (2.84)**	0.003 (1.90)*	0.011 (10.92)**	-0.004 (1.69)*
2004	0.314 (0.88)	-0.886 (5.77)**	-0.947 (1.91)*	0.412 (1.11)
2005	0.480 (1.41)	-0.564 (3.01)**	-0.775 (2.02)*	0.325 (2.22)*
2006	0.373 (1.44)	-0.327 (1.38)	-0.428 (1.74)*	0.404 (3.63)**
2007	0.400 (2.84)**	-0.023 (0.32)	-0.135 (0.60)	0.445 (3.08)**
<i>Kirkuk</i>	-0.243 (6.45)**	-0.280 (5.11)**	-0.237 (9.01)**	-0.359 (3.99)**
<i>Diyala</i>	0.189 (21.10)**	0.164 (12.84)**	0.177 (29.05)**	0.145 (6.82)**
<i>Babylon</i>	-0.332 (8.60)**	-0.346 (5.18)**	-0.335 (10.08)**	-0.394 (4.03)**
<i>Electricity</i>	-0.020 (0.97)	0.006 (0.61)	0.001 (0.02)	-0.064 (2.79)**
<i>Coalbatt</i>	-0.012 (1.02)	-0.007 (0.32)	-0.018 (1.53)	-0.001 (0.03)
<i>Iraqsec10</i>	0.001 (0.14)	-0.030 (5.65)**	-0.036 (2.92)**	-0.006 (0.64)
Constant	1.019 (5.78)**	2.312 (5.31)**	2.642 (6.15)**	1.778 (4.72)**
Overall R-Squared	0.36	0.34	0.41	0.43
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses			N=200	
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level				

In terms of real effects, an additional civilian killed by incumbent forces increases terrorism by 0.9% in the initial month, 0.3% in the first lagged month, 1.1% in the second lagged month, and decreases terrorism by 0.4% in the third lagged month. The number of civilians killed by incumbents in months where at least one civilian was killed ranged from 1-41 deaths meaning that *VAP* could increase terrorism by 0.9-36.9% in the initial month, 0.3-12.3% in the first lagged month, and 1.1-45.1% in the second lagged month. The average number of civilians killed by incumbents per month is 4.75, meaning that the average increase in *Terrorism* due to *VAP* in the initial month and first two lagged months is 4.3%, 1.4%, and 5.2%, respectively.

LogRatio, as mentioned earlier, is the ratio of the *Terrorism* variable to the *Sigact* variable and should allow one to compare the relative rates of increase of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The results (presented in Table 8) support Hypothesis 2, that terrorism will increase more relative to guerrilla warfare due to the effects of incumbent violence. The results also show the wave pattern in the *VAP* variable evident in the models measuring terrorism. *VAP* is positive and significant in the initial month, insignificant in the second month, positive and significant in the third month, and then significant but negative in the final month. The effect in the second lagged month (0.0045) is also stronger than in the initial month (0.0042). Therefore, the patterns in the results for *LogRatio* essentially mirror those of the *LogTerr* models. The wave effect can be explained by varying organizational needs between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The rising effect between the initial month and the second lagged month also shows that the effects of *VAP* are still peaking in the second lagged month. Finally, the negative, significant result in the third

lagged month provides evidence that terrorist capacity may be spent and/or the effects of *VAP* are declining with time.¹³

Table 8: Effect of Incumbent Violence on the Ratio of Terrorism to Guerrilla Warfare (*LogRatio*)

<i>LogRatio</i>	Initial Month (t=0)	1 Month Lag (t=1)	2 Month Lag (t=2)	3 Month Lag (t=3)
<i>VAP</i>	0.0042 (2.93)**	0.0005 (0.65)	0.0045 (4.70)**	-0.0021 (1.79)*
2004	0.2071 (1.26)	-0.3923 (5.15)**	-0.4372 (1.37)	0.1633 (1.08)
2005	0.2136 (1.28)	-0.2939 (5.55)**	-0.4110 (1.72)*	0.1430 (1.94)*
2006	0.1043 (0.81)	-0.2443 (2.76)**	-0.3093 (1.85)*	0.1002 (2.31)*
2007	0.0830 (1.17)	-0.1185 (2.85)**	-0.1781 (1.27)	0.1185 (2.24)*
<i>Kirkuk</i>	-0.0326 (3.98)**	-0.0583 (1.78)*	-0.0274 (0.89)	-0.0960 (2.28)*
<i>Diyala</i>	0.1110 (57.67)**	0.0966 (12.66)**	0.1070 (14.92)**	0.0869 (8.79)**
<i>Babylon</i>	-0.0043 (0.41)	-0.0154 (0.39)	0.0055 (0.16)	-0.0369 (0.80)
<i>Electricity</i>	-0.0081 (0.78)	0.0068 (1.23)	0.0079 (0.51)	-0.0234 (2.55)**
<i>Coalbatt</i>	-0.0122 (2.36)**	-0.0106 (0.83)	-0.0122 (1.12)	-0.0053 (0.42)
<i>Iraqsec10</i>	-0.0006 (0.18)	-0.0155 (5.06)**	-0.0184 (2.18)*	-0.0029 (0.66)
Constant	0.4721 (5.70)**	1.0893 (5.41)**	1.1918 (3.96)**	0.7467 (3.34)**
Overall R-Squared	0.19	0.21	0.27	0.27
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses			N=200	
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level				

¹³ It should be noted that the same model was run using the log of *Sigact1*, in addition to *Sigact*. The results mirrored those described above in effect and significance. Therefore, for the sake of conciseness, they are not reported here.

In more practical terms, the effects of *VAP* on *LogRatio* seem modest except at the higher values of *VAP*. In the initial month, every additional civilian death due to incumbent action increases *LogRatio* by 0.0042. In the second lagged month, each civilian death increases *LogRatio* by 0.0045, and in the final month, each civilian death decreases the ratio by 0.0021. At the average number of *VAP* (4.75 deaths per month), the ratio is increased in the first month by 0.019 and by 0.021 in the second lagged month. This is a modest increase given the mean value of *LogRatio*, which is 0.47. However, at the highest level of *VAP* (41 deaths per month), *LogRatio* is increased by 0.17 in the initial month and by 0.18 in the second lagged month. This is a substantial increase.¹⁴

Though the effects of *VAP* on *LogRatio* seem modest, the significance and sign of the coefficients are more important than the magnitude of the effect. The results of previous models show that *VAP* substantially increases both guerrilla warfare and terrorism, so the main purpose of the *LogRatio* model is to simply find out which type of violence is increasing faster. Any positive effect means that terrorism is increasing faster while, conversely, a negative effect means guerrilla warfare is increasing relative to terrorism. While terrorism never overtakes guerrilla warfare in the data, the model does show the hypothesized effect that *VAP* causes terrorism to increase relative to guerrilla warfare while causing both to increase in absolute terms.

¹⁴ Since the *Logratio* variable compares civilian deaths for terrorism and significant actions for guerrilla activity, calculating a substantive effect for *Logratio*, in terms of increases in deaths or attacks, is impractical. The importance of the results lies in the direction and significance of the effect, which tells us that terrorism increases more relative to guerrilla activity.

Governorate and Ethnicity Controls

In regards to terrorism, some of the governorate and ethnicity controls differ from the Hypothesis 1 models. *Kirkuk* is still significant and negative, but *Diyala*, which was negative before is now positive and significant. This means that, while significant actions were suppressed due to being in Diyala, terrorism is not, reinforcing the idea that these two kinds of violence stem from different logics. *Babylon*, as before, is negative and significant in the *Terrorism* and *Logterr* models, but is insignificant in the *Logratio* models, meaning that it has no effect on whether terrorism or guerrilla warfare increases relatively faster. *Salah al Din* is both positive and significant in the *Terrorism* and *Logterr* models, but is insignificant when it comes to the *Logratio* models. The province controls can be relatively substantial, increasing or decreasing terrorism by over 10 deaths per month at times.

With regards to ethnicity, *Sunni* is positively significant in the *Terrorism* models, insignificant in the *Logterr* models, and then negatively significant in the *Logratio* models. *Shia* is negatively significant in the *Terrorism* and *Logterr* models, but positively significant in the *Logratio* models, thus supporting the findings for *Babylon*. *Mixed* is insignificant in all models. The effects of the ethnicity controls are all modest, only increasing or decreasing terrorism by about 5-6 deaths per month.

Population was positive and significant, as expected, in both the *Terrorism* and *Logratio* models, though with only a minor effect. Population density was negative and significant in the *Terrorism* models, as in the Hypothesis 1 models, however, the effect was much smaller than in the previous models. It was insignificant in the *Logratio* models.

Year Controls

2004 and 2005 are never significant in the initial month of any model, but become significant in some of the later months. There does not seem to be much of a pattern in 2006's significance in the *Terrorism* and *Logterr* models, though it does become significant in some of the lagged months. In the *Logratio* models, 2006 is significant in all the lagged months, but switches signs from positive to negative in the third lagged month. 2007 is significant and positive in the initial month of the *Terrorism* models and the third lagged month of the *Logterr* models. In the *Logratio* models, 2007 is significant in the first and last lagged months. 2008 is barely negatively significant in the initial and second lagged months of the *Terrorism models*, but is positively significant in the first and second lagged models of the *Logterr* models. In the *Logratio* models, 2008 is negatively significant in the initial month but then becomes positively significant in the first lagged month. The effect of the various year controls, when they are significant, can be fairly substantial, at times decreasing terrorism by up to 26 deaths per month, though these effects do not seem consistent. It seems clear that what patterns there are among the year controls' results are not as strong as the patterns seen in the Hypothesis 1 models.

Security Controls: Incumbent Troop Strength and *Electricity*

Once again the number of Coalition battalions, *Coalbatt*, does not seem to have much of an effect, only being significant in the second lagged month of the *Terrorism* models and in the initial month of the *Logratio* models. The number of Iraqi forces is consistently negatively significant in the first and second lagged months of all of the Hypothesis 2 models. The effect is

stronger than in the Hypothesis 1 models, but still small. Each extra ten thousand troops decreases terrorism by 0.8 deaths per month. *Electricity* is only negatively significant in the last lagged month of all of the models, so it does not seem to have as regular an effect on terrorism as it does on guerrilla warfare.

Discussion

Regarding Hypothesis 1, incumbent violence was expected to increase guerrilla activity with the positive effect peaking and then gradually decreasing with time. The results support these expectations; they show *VAP* affecting the measures of guerrilla activity in a significant, positive, and substantial way. The general pattern is for the effects to peak in the initial month. This is a quick reaction on the part of the populace and insurgents, possibly attributable to existing infrastructure and capability which could support a rapid increase in guerrilla activity. After the first month peak, the effects gradually decrease until the third month lag, when they become insignificant. Since the patterns in the results match expectations, Hypothesis 1 is supported.

These findings confirm those of previous authors who examined violence in Iraq and found that insurgent activity increased with Coalition-caused civilian casualties (Condra and Shapiro 2012). As explained in the results section, the above findings show that incumbent violence can account for substantial numbers of insurgent attacks. Thus, not only do the results confirm Hypothesis 1, but they show that incumbent violence had a large role in fueling the Iraqi

insurgency and that it is an integral part of understanding this insurgency and insurgency in general.

The present study goes beyond that of the above mentioned authors by looking at the different effects of incumbent violence on terrorism as compared to guerrilla warfare in Hypothesis 2. The expectations accompanying Hypothesis 2 were that incumbent violence would increase terrorism with effects peaking and then declining with time. Also, since terrorism is seen as a more effective way to react against incumbent violence, terrorism should increase more relative to guerrilla warfare. Therefore, the ratio of the log of terrorism to the log of significant actions should be positive with effects, once again, peaking and then declining with time.

Overall, the results support these expectations, but the pattern of effects takes a surprising form. Terrorism is significant and positively correlated with *VAP* but only in the first and third months, showing a wave pattern. As explained before, this can plausibly be explained by proposing that terrorist infrastructure and capacity is perhaps not as developed as that of guerrilla warfare. Initial capability might be used up in the first month reaction and may only recover by the second month, after which the effects of *VAP* decline. This pattern gives one an insight into possible differences in the organization of terrorist attacks compared to guerrilla attacks. Understanding these differences can thus help one to better predict and prevent terrorism. Since the effects of *VAP* are also substantial, this wave pattern, when compared to the pattern of effects in the Hypothesis 1 models, bolsters the idea that terrorism and guerrilla warfare form differently and should thus be studied as linked, but different, phenomena. This idea adds to previous literature which often either lumps terrorism and guerrilla warfare together under the label of

insurgency when analyzing the effects of incumbent violence and other actions or simply looks at one type of violence without acknowledging the other as a linked form of insurgent activity.

The latter portion of Hypothesis 2 is supported by the findings from the *LogRatio* models, though the pattern requires further explanation. Incumbent violence has a significant and positive effect in the second and third months of the models, but is insignificant in the first month and negative in the fourth month. These results show that terrorism increases relative to guerrilla warfare in the second and third months. The pattern of the effects show that incumbent violence does not affect relative rates of increase immediately, but takes a month to begin increasing terrorism more relative to guerrilla warfare. Once again, this pattern gives one insight into the relation of terrorism and guerrilla warfare and the organizational characteristics of each. This type of understanding can help to predict the reaction of the insurgency and populace to incumbent violence and shows that the insurgency's reaction is more complicated than proposed in previous literature which groups together terrorism and guerrilla warfare (for example, Condra and Shapiro (2012) and Kalyvas (2006), among others).

There are some alternate explanations for some of the above findings. The first of these involves the incumbent's operational intensity as an unforeseen outside factor shaping the data. If incumbent operations became more intense, even without increasing troop levels, then this would likely cause increasing civilian deaths and more significant actions because the troops would be more active in seeking out confrontations with insurgent forces. Thus, the incumbent, not the insurgents or the populace, would shape the number of significant actions. The incumbent strength controls could account for part of this effect, but the incumbents could still intensify operations without a corresponding increase in troop levels. However, two things increase the

credibility of the study's findings despite the aforementioned problem. The month lags show that the effects of civilian deaths extend beyond the month when they occurred. Increased contact between troops and insurgent which might bias the data would not produce lingering effects such as these. The terrorism findings also build credibility in the overall findings of the study. It seems difficult to fathom why incumbent intensification would cause insurgents to kill more civilians through increased terrorism. The similar effects of *VAP* on terrorism and guerrilla warfare show that the patterns seen in the results reflect insurgent rather than incumbent actions, thus building the credibility of the findings.

Conclusion

Overall, the theory is supported by the results, and, in so doing, these results confirm the findings of previous literature such as Condra and Shapiro (2012) which claim that incumbent violence increases insurgency. At the same time, the findings show that much of the literature cited in the literature review is inadequate due to its failure to recognize how terrorism and guerrilla warfare form differently and that popular support can affect different types of insurgent violence in different ways.

There were a few limitations in this study. Because of the nature of the study, one sees the relationships between incumbent and insurgent violence, but not the motivations that go into shaping the insurgent violence. Incumbent violence increases both terrorism and guerrilla warfare, but one cannot see whether this is due to increased popular support or motives amongst the insurgents alone. However, since the results match a scenario where popular support is

shaping the types of insurgent violence (such as that seen in the Northern Ireland case study), one can infer that popular support is a factor in determining the findings of this study.

Another limitation involves the terrorism measure. Unlike the measure of guerrilla warfare, which uses the numbers of attacks, the terrorism variable uses deaths as a proxy for terrorist activity. Therefore, it is possible that terrorists are not increasing their activity but making it appear so by using deadlier tactics. However, if there is a learning effect, this does not explain why the number of deaths decreases with time in the lagged models. Additionally, if terrorism becomes deadlier in response to incumbent violence, then this also confirms Hypothesis 2 since incumbent violence is making more violent attacks possible.

A final limitation involves the case itself. Does the fact that incumbent-caused civilian deaths in Iraq were mostly unintentional affect the response of the populace and insurgents? If the incumbent forces had purposely targeted civilians, particularly if they did so in response to insurgent activity, the reaction, in terms of insurgent violence, may have been different. In other words, intentionality might be a factor in determining responses to incumbent actions. The solution to this limitation is to find a case where incumbent violence is intentional and conduct a replication study.¹⁵ Another option would be to conduct a case study of Iraq to more closely examine insurgent and popular motivations.

Following the limitations of this study, there are a few possible avenues for future study. A case study of Iraq would be useful to better understand the relationships one sees statistically and to discover the motivations behind the different actors' actions. However, the data necessary might be difficult to acquire. While the Coalition was meticulous in recording things such as

¹⁵ The Northern Ireland case may serve for this if one can find enough statistical data to conduct a quantitative analysis similar to the one done in this chapter.

civilian deaths and significant actions, there is likely less data available on the personal accounts of both the populace and insurgents. Data problems afflict another course of future study, replication studies of other cases. Data on insurgent and incumbent activity in Iraq is plentiful, but other conflicts, since they tend to be chaotic, might present one with difficulties in acquiring the same level of data. However, if one were to find such data elsewhere, replication studies would allow one to bypass problems in the Iraq case and to increase the generalizability of the results. Finally, more advanced models incorporating interaction variables, such as interactions between *VAP* and the governorate dummies, would allow one to better understand factors which might impact the effects of incumbent violence.

Overall, the models confirm the findings of the Northern Ireland case study in a more robust way. Incumbent violence increases both types of insurgent violence, but causes terrorism to increase more relative to guerrilla warfare. These effects can be substantial at times. Also, the patterns of the effects give one avenues for further theorizing about and understanding of terrorism and how it develops. This study confirms previous studies on the effects of incumbent violence and goes further to show that incumbent violence affects popular support in ways that favor terrorism over guerrilla warfare.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to test the effects of incumbent violence on popular support for guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The populace has the agency to divert their popular support so that insurgents begin to favor one tactic over the other in response to incumbent attacks upon the populace. Incumbent attacks humiliate and anger the populace, thus making them desire a response from the insurgents. Due to fear, the populace seeks to ally itself with the insurgents, thus bolstering their resources and capabilities and increasing insurgency. Desires for vengeance, anger, and dishonor amongst the population pressure the insurgents to attack the incumbent forces. In addition, incumbent violence can destroy social structures and livelihoods, decreasing the opportunity costs of participation in the insurgency. Finally, incumbent violence can activate latent social structures, such as religious or clan systems, in such a way as to facilitate population-insurgent interactions and insurgent activities. Thus, the populace and insurgent groups should foster higher levels of general insurgency in response to incumbent violence.

Where the theory goes beyond much of the literature is in its incorporation of terrorism and its proposition that, not only will incumbent violence foster higher levels of general insurgency, but it will cause terrorism to increase faster relative to guerrilla warfare within this general increase. Insurgent groups might try to outbid each other for the increasing popular support, using terrorism as a way to gain publicity, attention, and prestige. Terrorism can also be seen as a more reciprocal response to incumbent violence, since both types of attacks target civilians. Therefore, popular support for terrorism may increase as a way of regaining honor,

detering future attacks, and seeking vengeance. Finally, since incumbent violence breaks norms against attacking civilians, it becomes easier and perhaps even necessary for the insurgents to break the norm by using terrorism as a way of punishing the incumbent's initial transgression. Therefore, incumbent violence should increase popular support for general insurgency as well as the relative level of terrorism compared to guerrilla warfare.

In order to further expand on the theory and to test its mechanisms in detail, the study examined the conflict in Northern Ireland from 1962-1973 between the incumbent Loyalists and British and nationalist insurgents, such as the Irish Republican Army. The hypotheses were combined to propose that as the levels of incumbent violence increased, popular support for general insurgency would increase and terrorism would gradually become more favored relative to guerrilla warfare.

The Northern Ireland case study's findings supported the general pattern suggested by the theory. During the period of low violence, generally from 1962 to August 1969, popular support for insurgency did not appear to increase. At medium levels of insurgent violence, popular support for general insurgency and guerrilla activity appeared to increase drastically. Finally, at higher levels of incumbent violence, general insurgency seemed to continue to increase, but terrorism also seemed to become more popular and more frequently used and accepted. Therefore, the theory and hypotheses were generally supported.

Not all of the mechanisms were supported. In terms of general insurgency, the destruction of social structures and livelihoods and the activation of latent social structures were not very well supported. Most of the impetus for increasing insurgency seems to come from fear and revenge. For the terrorism mechanisms, outbidding and psychological mechanisms were not

well supported, but the revenge and reciprocity mechanism received support. Thus, revenge and reciprocity seems to be the main driving force in causing popular support for terrorism to increase in response to incumbent violence.

To more robustly test the theory, the study included an analysis of violence in Iraq to see if insurgent activity and terrorism were correlated with the number of civilians killed by Coalition or Iraqi troops. The results of the Northern Ireland case study were supported by those found in the Iraq data. Both guerrilla warfare and terrorism seemed to increase substantially in correlation with incumbent violence, though the pattern of increase differed between the two types of violence. The Iraq case went further than the Northern Ireland case study, however, in that it directly compared the ratio of the percent change in terrorism to that of guerrilla warfare and found that terrorism increased relatively quicker than guerrilla warfare in the months following civilian deaths.

The two cases complement each other and therefore give one a much deeper insight into the development of popular support for terrorism and insurgency. The patterns seen in Northern Ireland indicate that both guerrilla warfare and terrorism may be increased by incumbent violence. These patterns are supported by the Iraq analysis and shown to be both statistically significant and substantial. Meanwhile, the Northern Ireland case sheds light on the causation behind the statistical correlations seen in Iraq by explaining in greater depth the ways by which incumbent violence can lead to increased guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Thus, the process tracing and intense detail of the case study can better illuminate the less detailed, though more robust, regression analysis. In addition, the combination of the two contexts shows the generalizability of the theory. While Northern Ireland is European, largely Christian, and more

developed, Iraq is Middle Eastern, largely Muslim, and relatively less developed. Thus, the fact that similar patterns are seen in these two very different contexts adds to the credibility of the theory.

The findings of the study add to the literature on insurgency and terrorism. With the exception of studies such as Lyall (2009), most of the literature on the effects of indiscriminate violence finds that it is counterproductive to the incumbents' goals and increases insurgency. This idea is supported by the results of the two studies above. The various mechanisms through which insurgency increases range from decreased information for incumbents (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Kalyvas 2006), to dehumanization (Grossman 1996), to increased opportunities for the insurgents to interact with and endear themselves to the public (Kydd and Walter 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Guevara 1961). What most of these studies have in common is the fact that they either discuss terrorism on its own, without acknowledging it as a part of greater insurgency, or they discuss the insurgency in general without discussing how popular support and insurgent strategy can differ between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Popular support is seen as monolithic, with the population not having the agency to support specific tactics rather than just the insurgency in general.

The overall findings of the Northern Ireland and Iraq studies support the theory's propositions that guerrilla warfare and terrorism need to be treated as different, though related, phenomena. In Northern Ireland, reciprocity seemed to gain in importance in deciding popular support and insurgent behavior as incumbent violence increased. This reciprocity appeared to make terrorism more favorable. Likewise, in Iraq, while both terrorism and guerrilla warfare increased in correlation with incumbent violence, terrorism increased faster relative to guerrilla

warfare. Also, in Iraq, the results support the idea that incumbent violence increased terrorism in a wave pattern while guerrilla warfare increased in a more continuous fashion. This suggests that terrorism and guerrilla warfare operate on different organizational principles and logic. This suggests the need for a theory such as this one that acknowledges the differences between terrorism and guerrilla warfare and their origins. Insurgents have the rational choice to target combatants or civilians. This theory therefore adds to the literature by explaining possible reasons why terrorism might be chosen over guerrilla warfare.

Another way that this theory adds to the existing literature is in the way it examines popular support. As mentioned above, the literature surveyed in the literature review often portrays popular support simplistically: incumbent violence causes popular support for insurgency to increase or decrease. The populace is not given the agency in these theories to give their support to specific tactics, rather than the insurgency as a whole. Though some of the studies, such as Lyall (2009), do acknowledge that the populace can pressure the insurgents to change their behavior, often the more complex relationship between incumbent violence, popular support, and insurgent behavior is left unexplored. The findings of this study, however, show that popular support, increasing due to incumbent violence, can perhaps differ between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, thus allowing the populace to express greater support for one tactic over the other. This more complicated relationship needs to be explored in order to be able to better predict when insurgents might use terrorism and to better understand both the effects of incumbent violence and the role of the populace in insurgency. Therefore, this exploration of popular support and agency represents a potentially important addition to the literature on insurgency.

Outside of the academic study of insurgent conflict, this study has real-world implications that may be relevant to the United States and other countries dealing with insurgency in places like Iraq. Since incumbent violence seemed to increase insurgency and terrorism, specifically, by a substantial amount, governments should recognize the need to limit violence against civilians. Governments should put in place rules of engagement which will limit civilian casualties, accidental or not, and should make attempts to lessen hostile interactions with the populace, such as intrusive searches or arrests. Though some interactions of this sort are necessary in combating insurgency, certain techniques, such as reparations, might allow the incumbent to keep relations with the populace from deteriorating. Additionally, the incumbent might consider engaging in activities meant to improve their public image, such as utility provision.

Though the United States already makes attempts to spare the populace from excessive violence, allies engaged in insurgency may not make these same attempts, thus inhibiting counterinsurgent efforts. Other countries, such as Syria, seem to currently engage in widespread civilian victimization in order to “instil fear in the civilian population in opposition strongholds, and also to deprive the opposition of its support” (Death from the Skies). Research such as this study can show the concrete negative effects of incumbent violence, perhaps shoring up arguments for human rights as well as increasing counterinsurgent effectiveness. Strengthened arguments for protecting civilian populations may allow the United States to more easily inform and control allies in insurgent conflicts worldwide and dissuade other governments from using widespread violence against their populations.

Research along the lines of this study should be continued in order to better develop and test the theory and to increase its generalizability and credibility. Since some of the mechanisms did not find support in the Northern Ireland case, further investigation into the causal mechanisms behind the relationship between incumbent and insurgent violence may be necessary. Additional case studies in contexts other than Northern Ireland should allow one to see if the findings of that case study are replicated in other conflicts. This research will allow for the further development of the theory and more specific identification of the causal processes behind the main relationships of the theory.

In addition to further case studies, extra quantitative research along similar lines to the Iraq study should be conducted. As mentioned in the conclusion of the Iraq chapter, the intentions of the incumbent committing the violence may play a role in determining popular and insurgent responses. The United States attempts to limit civilian casualties, so most of the incumbent violence in the Iraq case is accidental. Further research should attempt to examine the effects of incumbent violence in a conflict (or across multiple conflicts) where the incumbent is purposefully targeting civilians on a widespread scale, such as in Syria currently. Such research would show how the theory operates under slightly different conditions and would further illuminate the role of the nature of the incumbent in determining responses to incumbent violence.

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