

# **POMPEY'S ORGANIZATION OF THE EAST**

by

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis illustrates how Pompey's annexations and organizing of the eastern provinces for Rome were more pragmatic than imperialistic. Greek and Eastern specialists are used in order to give a better back story than the imperialist thesis offers in its reasoning for the annexations. By adding more detail from the Greek and Eastern perspective, other dimensions are opened that shed new light upon the subject of Pompey's eastern settlements. Through this method, the pirate campaign and the annexation of Syria are greatly developed, especially in concern to changes in culture that Pompey's settlements forced. The culture of piracy and banditry were curbed by the eastern annexations. In Syria the Greek settlements were revived and protected from the expansion of Arab and Jewish dynasts. Considering the annexation of Pontus, a more detailed analysis on the *lex Pompeia* and the new taxation system is developed, which questions parts of the imperialist thesis especially in regards to role of the *publicani*. Graeco-Roman cultural spread is also developed in the Pontus chapter to show some of Pompey's motives. Previous works are expanded upon and synthesized into this work, the aim being to reconcile some of the arguments, concluding with the proposition that Pompey, his efforts, and his settlements, were more pragmatic than imperialistic.

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## INTRODUCTION

The prelude to the Third Mithridatic War involves political disturbances in Rome, Spain and the ambitions of Mithridates VI of Pontus to take more of Asia Minor. When Lucius Cornelius Sulla died in 78 BC the treaty he had made with Mithridates after the first war, was still not ratified. The senate, after Sulla's death would not give audience to the ambassadors of Mithridates.<sup>1</sup> Mithridates then coaxed his son-in-law king Tigranes of Armenia to invade Cappadocia, which he (Mithridates) had taken in the first war. Tigranes did so and carried away 300,000 people to populate his new capital Tigranocerta. From 82-73 BC the Roman governor of Spain, Q. Sertorius, maintained a rebellion and formed a new senate in that province, which kept the Marian-Sullan Civil War alive. The pro-consuls Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus were sent by the senate to take Spain back. Mithridates supposedly made some kind of pact with the rebel governor and sent two rebel Roman envoys.<sup>2</sup> Appian also brings the Cilician pirates into the mix claiming they were in league with Mithridates and Sertorius. Mithridates saw these distractions as opportunities to regain what he had lost after the first war. Added to these distractions was the Spartacus slave revolt (73-71 BC) which took place inside Italy in the middle of the first phase of the Third Mithridatic War.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Appian, Horace White, "trans.," *Roman History Vol. II*, "The Mithridatic Wars", Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932. 2005. p.365-367.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *Mithr. Wars*, p. 365-67.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, Horace White, "trans.," *Roman History Vol. III*, "The Civil Wars", Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932. 2005. p. 215-223.

The Third Mithridatic War started with the death of King Nicomedes IV *Philopator* of Bithynia in 75/74. He had left his kingdom to the Roman people in his will as an insurance policy against Mithridates, who had tried to seize his kingdom several times in the past. Mithridates invaded and attempted to set up a puppet king. Aurelius Cotta, the Roman governor sent to organize Bithynia as a province was forced to flee. The senate protested Mithridates' actions and war was declared. The governor of Asia, Lucius Lucullus was given command against Mithridates.<sup>4</sup> Lucullus was able to destroy much of Mithridates' forces by keeping supplies from reaching them. This forced Mithridates to abandon his conquest of Asia and move back into Pontus, pursued by Lucullus. Lucullus eventually pushed Mithridates out of Pontus and into the kingdom of Armenia to seek aide from his son-in-law king Tigranes. In Armenia Lucullus continued his successful campaign destroying two massive armies led by Tigranes and Mithridates.<sup>5</sup> Mithridates was able to escape again and move back into his own kingdom and destroy a large force under Lucullus' legates. This massive defeat of a Roman army and the inability of Lucullus to capture Mithridates made the senate recall his army and to replace him in his command with two Roman pro-consuls.

During the first phases of the Third Mithridatic War the Mediterranean Sea had become filled with pirates who benefited from several wars that Rome was involved in. In 67 BC a massive command was given to Pompey by the *lex Gabinia* to clear the entire sea of pirates. He was able to do this in a very short time, about three months.<sup>6</sup> The success of Pompey allowed him to be voted the command of the Mithridatic War which

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<sup>4</sup> Appian, *Mithr. Wars*, p. 371-74.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, *Mithr. Wars*, p. 399-405. This was c. 69-68 BC

<sup>6</sup> Appian, *Mithr. Wars*, p. 417. Plutarch, Bernadotte Perrin, "trans.," *Lives Vol. V*, "Pompey" London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1917. 1968. P. 187

had not been concluded by Lucullus after seven years, nor by the replacements sent by the senate. The *lex Manilia* of 66 was the law which gave Pompey the command over the Third Mithridatic War. Both the *lex Gabinia* and the *lex Manilia* were passed by the Popular Assembly and the Tribunes whose names the laws carry. The laws were somewhat unprecedented in that the Tribunes and the Popular Assembly were not the usually political body that invested foreign commands, that was usually reserved for the senate. The senate had sent out two replacements for Lucullus in 67 but their failure to carry out the war made it possible for the Tribunes to override the senate's authority and send in their current favored general, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great).<sup>7</sup> With this command, Pompey was given a great deal of power to bring war and peace to any and all in the whole of Asia Minor who were involved with king Mithridates and king Tigranes.

This work covers Pompey's two commands in the east (67-62 BC) leading up to the final creation of three provinces, Pontus, Cilicia and Syria. There had been three wars between Rome and Mithridates VI of Pontus going back to 89 BC. Pompey was given command over the final stages of the third war just after he successfully completed a naval campaign against pirates in the entire Mediterranean Sea. Pompey has not received the attention that he should, especially in regard to these eastern settlements. Within the historiography Pompey is too often simplified as an aggressive imperialist with little or no qualification to what that means in the Roman context. I will show that he and his arrangements are more complex than that thesis.

Most works are concerned with what happened just after his eastern settlements, namely the Gallic Wars of Caesar and the last civil wars of the republic. Scholars within

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<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, "*Pompey*," p. 191-195.

the historiography use the time during and after the civil wars to make many of their judgments on how and why Pompey organized the east. Pompey's actions have been judged in the historiography as being driven by economics, imperialism, the spread of Hellenism, and for administrative ease of the empire. The main historiography is focused on what Pompey did in Pontus and barely touches Syria, if at all; moreover, most do not connect the pirate campaigns either. Within this work, the "East" refers to Asia Minor and Greater Syria. The peoples of the east at the time were largely made up of Greek, Persian, Graeco-Persian, Arab, Jewish, Galatian, and multiple tribal cultures.

The current historiography develops highly focused yet unconnected pieces of the greater picture; I tie these pieces closer together and modify the imperialist theses. There are three separate historiographies concerning this period that I will join together, one covering the pirate campaign, one covering Pontus and one on Syria. Though the organization of Pontus comes second in chronology, it must be discussed first as this is the basis for most of the debates concerning Pompey's settlements. A. H. M. Jones states that "Pompey organized the east for administrative ease and that he had no elevated cultural purpose in mind".<sup>8</sup> A. N. Sherwin-White and Badian put forth a strategic purpose while showing that Rome was a reluctant empire until the end of the Republic; they too deny the cultural motivations of Pompey.<sup>9</sup> Fletcher and Magie agree with these strategic

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<sup>8</sup> A. H. M Jones, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces Second Edition*, London: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 172.

<sup>9</sup> E. Badian, *Roman Imperialism In The Late Republic*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968. 1971, p. 1-5.

A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 B.C. to A.D. 1*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983. P. 8-11.

reasons and add trade as a major factor.<sup>10</sup> Frank and Jones see Pompey's arrangements and annexations in the east as directly connected to the financial interests of the tax farmers (*publicani*), which gives weight to the imperialist thesis.<sup>11</sup> Fletcher counters this economic drive and shows how the *publicani* were not given *carte blanche* in Pontus.<sup>12</sup> Kallet-Marx agrees with Fletcher on the restrictions placed on the *publicani* but agrees with an economic drive in annexation of new territory, pushed by the popular Tribunes and not the senate; this process was accelerated in the decade of Pompey's annexations.<sup>13</sup> Sullivan and Braund see a different motive behind the financial questions; they believe that client-kings paid no tribute or taxes while others, especially Badian, disagree.<sup>14</sup> Greenhalgh sees Pompey as the new Roman Alexander the Great and says that he sought to Hellenize cities and kingdoms of the east as a way to emulate him, Kallet-Marx disagrees and states that Pompey did this purely for self-aggrandizement.<sup>15</sup>

The historians above have chosen one great impetus behind Pompey's organization of the east, while excluding other factors. I attempt to tie together multiple factors and impetuses to reveal the complexity of Pompey and his arrangements. Pompey

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<sup>10</sup> William G. Fletcher, "The Pontic Cities of Pompey the Great," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, vol. 70 (1939), pp. 17-29.

David Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor: To the End of the Third Century After Christ*, New York: Arno Press, 1950. 1975. P. 370-1, 375, 378.

<sup>11</sup> Tenney Frank, "The Background of the Lex Manilia," *Classical Philology*, vol.9, No. 2 (Apr., 1914), pp.191-193. This older and short article is one of the few to detail any business in Syria until very recent scholarship.

<sup>12</sup> Fletcher, p. 24. Further developed in Ch. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Morstein Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. p. 322-33. This may imply that Pompey was the model for imperialism that Caesar and Crassus followed. They manufactured their wars much more than Pompey could have.

<sup>14</sup> Richard D. Sullivan, *Near Eastern Royalty and Rome 100-30 B.C.*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, p. 5. This may back the idea that Rome desired to maintain their indirect hegemony as before. David Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King: The Character of the Client Kingship*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 63-66.

<sup>15</sup> Peter Greenhalgh, *Pompey The Roman Alexander*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981, pp. 11, 122, 171-3. Kallet-Marx, p. 329-30.

could have been many or all of the things that those within the historiography have separately highlighted. Pompey could have brought in more revenue to the Roman state; he could have spread taxation more evenly while satisfying both the people taxed and the *publicani*; he could have brought Hellenism to parts of the east and have been seen as a new Alexander while doing so. Pompey could have been a philanthropist and an ‘imperialist’ at the same time, despite those within the historiography seeing these in opposition. Badian refutes the financial and imperialist interests as the chief motives that shaped Rome’s foreign policy until the very end of the Republic.<sup>16</sup> Badian and Kallet-Marx do show a shift in the economic motive for empire in the last decades of the republic. They both give evidence of the lower and middle classes pushing empire for economic gains, but they both conclude by blaming the senatorial class for carrying out such measures. Their evidence would implicate Caesar and Crassus more than Pompey in deliberate and aggressive imperialism. They do blame Pompey for the shift in foreign policy which takes events after the fact into consideration. Pompey’s actions were more pragmatic than aggressive. These arguments are further developed in chapter 2.

Modern views of imperialism that are focused on the negative aspects of empire have been projected on Ancient Rome. Pompey may have been an imperialist in a loosely defined way, but he was at the same time concerned with other factors, including, philanthropy, and gaining new friends and clients for Rome and himself. Roman ‘imperialism’ did bring positive things, such as more uniform laws in the *lex Pompeia*, and it brought order to regions which had been destabilized by a level of anarchy between

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<sup>16</sup> Badian, p.70, 76, Frank and Jones saw economic factors pushing expansion, Badian and Kallet-Marx, 331, show this only in the last decades of the Republic, especially post-Sulla. Badian blames the elite while Kallet-Marx shows the intervention of the tribunes into foreign policy as the problem, though he also blames the elite.

Greek city-states and kingdoms for decades. Gruen and Grainger show that Rome's imperialism brought about a more just footing to Rome's subjects than modern interpretations of the term would imply. Especially with Greek subjects, Rome did not see itself as superior in intellectual achievements; in fact, they sought to emulate the Greeks in many ways. For this reason Roman imperialism has to be redefined and separated from the modern idea, which assumes a superior and exploitative position for the conqueror.

My thesis is that Pompey was not merely an imperialist; his settlements of the east as well as the man himself were more pragmatic than that reduced explanation. He sought pragmatic results to situations that were not of his making. The imperialist thesis implies that much of what was annexed in the east was pre-arranged by Pompey and his clients in Rome. The imperialist thesis is given too much weight in Roman history and must be questioned and revised. My work will show that there are many other factors that motivated Pompey besides greed, though it is not excluded. Since I discuss imperialism and the imperialist thesis I must qualify what that means in the context of Roman history. There is little to no definition of 'imperialism' within the historiography so this can lead to ambiguity. Gruen gives a fully developed historiography to the imperialist debates in the political, philosophical and historical fields beginning in the late 1800s and moving on up to the current time period. I summarize his imperialism discussion here as this paper is not about the general topic of imperialism, rather it is the specific discussion over late Republican Roman imperialism which I go into some detail.

Imperialism generally implies aggressive expansion for economic gain and for the projection of national power.<sup>17</sup> In the early 1900s, imperialism is attributed to the highest stage of capitalism, another term that is dangerous to attribute to Rome properly. Though these definitions do show how annexation is not necessary to project imperialism, it can be perpetuated through hegemony, i.e. indirect control. Rome did experiment unsuccessfully with hegemony in the east for more than a century.<sup>18</sup> Another definition of imperialism does not involve economics but is driven by a subconscious push to project the superiority of a state over its rivals.<sup>19</sup> Gruen states, “The debates swings between the two poles. Imperialist strivings can be analyzed either as rational policy, with definable objects, notably material gain, or as inchoate impulses, an urge to extend power and control over others.”<sup>20</sup>

Both of the ideas above can also be rejected. Roman’s aggression can be denied by showing that they did not seek to expand their territory whether rationally or impulsively. In this view, backed by historical evidence, Rome expanded defensively as a result of fear of powerful neighbors.<sup>21</sup> Rome’s offensive actions had defensive aims and were not primarily pushed by economics or self-aggrandizement.<sup>22</sup> Rome did become an empire but it is debatable on how, why, and exactly when. In the Republic, Rome expanded through defensive wars that resulted in annexations but only as a last result and after more than one war with the same party. Rome did benefit from annexations but the economic gain was after the fact and this is not what drove Rome to war.

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<sup>17</sup> Erich S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic world and the coming of Rome Vol I-II*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. p. 3

<sup>18</sup> Badian, p. 1-9.

<sup>19</sup> Gruen, p. 4-5.

<sup>20</sup> Gruen, p.5

<sup>21</sup> E. Badian, p. 1-5.

A. N. Sherwin-White, p. 8-11.

<sup>22</sup> Gruen, p.5.

The ancient histories emphasize the victories of the Roman Empire and do not dwell on the failures and defeats of many Roman armies. This can make it appear to modern scholars that these failures and losses of men and resources had little effect on voting for future wars. The cost of war both in deaths and in money did absolutely effect the senate and assembly's votes on going to war. The voting assemblies which were comprised of men liable for service actually voted to go to war or not. These factors kept Rome's 'imperial' expansion very limited.<sup>23</sup>

Rome did force their will upon conquered peoples and so could be defined as imperialists in that facet but this coercion was not the drive behind expansion, once again this came after the fact, there were previous negotiations which failed. The above argument that shows a subconscious drive to project a state's superiority over its rivals can only explain a part of what Rome did; there is no way of knowing what Romans had in their subconscious minds as a whole or as individuals. Many Roman elites actually saw Greeks as culturally superior to them; so that thesis cannot define those particular Romans. This aspect could suggest that Greek culture had hegemony over many Roman elites even while Rome had political control over their physical territory.

In the republic many Romans sought acceptance by the Greeks in the east and even practiced anti-imperialism. They sought to free Greek city-states from Hellenic despots and reset their freedom to earlier models.<sup>24</sup> Some of Rome's allies and clients were Greek and Graeco-Persian kings who themselves decided to expand their power at the expense of other free city-states and kingdoms. When Rome put an end to this and broke up their kingdoms, many of which they had help to create, it is accused of being

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<sup>23</sup> Sherwin-White, p. 9. Badian, p. 1-9.

<sup>24</sup> Gruen, p. 6. Rome was asked on several occasions to protect independent Greek city-states from the dynastic heirs of Alexander and his companions.

imperialistic in the historiography. In a pragmatic way they did become imperialists, but this was not the original aim. Resetting Greek city-states to a past golden age did not work and seemed to cause more in-fighting between them. Greek cities often called on Rome to mediate between themselves; this was a normal practice. Plutarch later saw this as the biggest threat to Greek independence because by willingly accepting Roman judgment the Greek elites gave away the authority of the Greek senates, popular assemblies, courts, and the entire local government.<sup>25</sup> Greeks were complicit in their subjugation in this manner. Plutarch also complains in the same work that warfare between Greeks was often only ended by Roman intervention, for which he also reproaches his fellow Greeks.<sup>26</sup> This of course could still be deemed imperialistic and hegemonic, but with complications because allowing Greeks to fight it out could threaten Rome and her other allies.

Roman imperialism was real but very different from modern models. The drive behind empire is different in every situation and cannot be reduced to a simple one size fits all formula. “The negative ring of the term imperialism can prejudice rather than facilitate understanding.”<sup>27</sup> I agree with this view due to the fact that the debate over what imperialism is, and how and why it spreads varies widely. There is no consensus of what imperialism is, especially when applied to ancient empires. My work is not about the argument over general imperialism and all the politics and moral philosophy that weighs down such an endeavor, it is to add other motives behind Pompey that show that he was concerned with more than just spreading empire and gaining wealth. He

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<sup>25</sup> Plutarch. Harold Fowler “trans.” “Precepts of Statecraft,” *Moralia Vol. X*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936. 1969. p. 245

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch, p. 241-247.

<sup>27</sup> Gruen., p. 5

deliberately pushed cultural change, especially in the spread of Greek and Roman political and legal systems.

I will argue that Rome spread an empire almost by default and by a long series of defense wars. An empire was built up by Pompey after the war. Rome did not seek to spread an empire for the sake of power or for economic gain, these things came as a result of and after the fact of such wars. There is no historical evidence that Pompey sought a command in the east for the purpose of creating or expanding an empire.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, there had been three wars with Mithridates, the first and third, were started by the king himself. Rome had negotiated with him and returned his territory after the first war. He again decided to try and expand his empire while Rome was dealing with a prolonged civil war in Spain and also dealing with pirates and a slave revolt. To add insult to injury, Mithridates opened dialogues with Rome's enemies while they were vulnerable.

At the end of the Third Mithridatic War Pompey with the approval of the senate annexed portions of Pontus and added them to the newly acquired Bithynian province. Security, not economic gain caused the war and annexation of Pontus and Syria. Cultural behavior via the lack of the rule of law and acceptable norms which perpetuated war and violence between neighbors also caused war in Asia Minor until Roman enforced international law. I link security to not just external military threats, i.e. Parthia and other powers, but also to domestic security which was not and could not be enforced by tribal or city-state confederacies which did not recognize interstate or international law.

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<sup>28</sup> Tenney Frank, "The Background of the Lex Manilia," *Classical Philology*, vol.9, No. 2 (Apr., 1914), pp191-193. This is the main article used by the imperialist thesis to show an economic drive to annex Syria, but it takes after the fact evidence to prove a conjectural alliance between Pompey and the publicani. It is overturned in some way by Robert Morstein Kallet-Marx, p. 322-33. He still agrees with financial reason behind empire but dismisses this early relationship with Pompey and the publicani. The wealth brought in by the east made others desire similar fame and power especially Caesar and Crassus who did in fact go to war to push imperialistic gains for themselves and Rome.

My methodology uses some Greek and Eastern perspectives from Gruen and others, who crosses over the Roman and Greek historical field. I go back further in time than most who have written about Pompey's eastern settlements within the Roman historiography. For example, in chapter 1, the pirate campaigns of 67 will be linked to the eastern command because it is relevant to the final conclusions of the war. The clemency that Pompey gave pirates was later given to those he fought in the Mithridatic War and in settling the rest of the east. Pompey forced some Greek cultural beliefs to change, especially those involving private violence; for example, piracy, banditry and traditional mercenary culture were functionally outlawed as never before.<sup>29</sup> This overturns the view that Pompey did not change any culture in the Greek east or that he had no cultural motivations.<sup>30</sup> Within the historiography of the eastern settlements the pirate campaign is often ignored, so it is easy to see why some historians have missed some of the cultural shifts after Pompey's time in the east.<sup>31</sup> There is little cross over among historians who cover Pompey's eastern settlements in Pontus and those who cover the settlements in Syria. The settlements in Syria were made in the middle of, and as part of the same command. For this reason I link all three portions of his eastern campaigns. This allows for a comparison of his actions.

Though Pompey's diplomatic behavior varied with time and place, it does have some patterns of leniency and enlightened behavior concerning the common people. The pirate problem is often blamed on Rome whose manipulation of Greek powers weakened

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<sup>29</sup> A. H. Jackson, "Privateers in the Ancient Greek World," M.R.D. Foot, "edit." *War and Society: Historical essays in the honour and memory of J.R. Western 1928-1971*, New York: Harper & Row Publisher, Inc. 1973, p. 241-253.

<sup>30</sup> Badian, p. 1-5, Jones, p. 172, Sherwin-White, p. 8-11.

<sup>31</sup> Most works on Pompey's settlements are articles on specific regions. Within them conclusions are drawn that do not take other regions into consideration nor do they develop enough back history on the region that they cover. Other works often give Pompey a chapter in a book and only choose to emphasis one particular campaign in his early or later life but do not combined them.

their hold on the seas. There is little or no responsibility for the rise of piracy placed on the Greek city-states. This takes agency out of Greek hands and makes them appear as mere victims of a greater power. This simply is not true, especially in the time before Rome claimed control over the Mediterranean. Using maritime history can show that the Greek states shared in the responsibility for the rise in piracy; they all, in fact, took part in the act.<sup>32</sup> The level of trade in the Mediterranean makes it evident how and why piracy was such an attractive occupation; this aspect is ignored by Troster, who claimed that it was due mainly to poverty and insecurity.<sup>33</sup> That thesis ignores Greek cultural aspects of competition between themselves. It also ignores that the occupation of piracy and brigandage was quite acceptable until after Rome annexed the east, as Jackson, Shaw and Ormerod demonstrate.<sup>34</sup> The pirate problem was made worse by three wars with Mithridates (88-63 BC), the collapse of the Seleucid state, and the decline of Rhodes, Ptolemaic Egypt and other maritime powers in the Mediterranean. Much of the cultural factors surrounding piracy have been omitted in the historiography of Pompey's settlements. These factors will be included in this work to develop a more in-depth picture of the political, cultural, and economic factors leading to the eastern annexations. This will help to counter the arguments that Pompey had no cultural motives. The history of Mediterranean Sea is added to land history, which is often separated or ignored in the different historiographies.

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<sup>32</sup> Philip De Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 98. Lionel Casson, *The Ancient Mariners: Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient Times, Second Edition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 1991. p. 180

H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World*, New York: Dorset Press, 1924. 1987. p. 22-26

<sup>33</sup> Manuel Troster, "Roman Hegemony and Non-State Violence: A Fresh Look at Pompey's Campaign against the Pirates," *Greece and Rome*, vol. 56, No.1, April 2009, p.23-24.

<sup>34</sup> Jackson, p. 214-53, Ormerod, p. 22-26, Brent D. Shaw, "Bandits in the Roman Empire," *Past & Present*, No. 105 (Nov., 1984), p. 24.

Within the historiography of Pompey's settlements in Pontus, much has been omitted on the events leading up to the Third Mithridatic War. The previous settlements by Sulla and other generals in the east have not been included in the sharply focused assessments of why and how Pompey managed the region after he annexed Pontus. The economic situation in the east fuelled the First Mithridatic War and Sulla's settlements, leading to the rather large war indemnity, fueled the third war. While Lucullus was in command of the Third Mithridatic War (74-67), he first recognized that the war debt of Sulla had to be dealt with. He reduced the overall debt, which had ballooned because of the outrageous interest rates, and made it more manageable.<sup>35</sup> Pompey retained Lucullus' arrangements concerning the reduction of debt but little else. The rest of Lucullus' settlements were mostly overturned or modified by Pompey, thus strengthening my argument that debt was a major cause for war and the disaffection of the eastern subjects which Pompey did not wish to recur. This is the exact reverse of the economic/imperialist drive. I develop a tax, debt, slavery cycle in chapter 1 that illustrates the complexities that Pompey and Rome were forced to deal with when they claimed hegemony in the Mediterranean. This is a major reason why I link the pirate campaign to the overall historiography. This adds much to the social factors that are denied or ignored in the historiography. It also counters the economic interests as being the chief concern of Pompey, he recognized that previous economic interests had been a factor in starting another war. Something different had to be done and was done by Pompey. Kallet-Marx claims that Roman foreign policy had shifted to a punitive control

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<sup>35</sup> Plutarch, Beruadotte Perrin, "trans.," *Lives vol. II*, "Lucullus," Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914. 1985. P. 533-535.

after Sulla, versus the earlier protective control Rome afforded to its allies.<sup>36</sup> Pompey did the opposite by reversing a punitive debt model and spreading out the tax burden more evenly.

Similar to the case of the pirate settlements, Pontus' annexation has been explained in the historiography in a simplified manner. Pontus was annexed for several reasons, but the chief one is that Mithridates fought Rome in three wars over a thirty-year period and caused much disturbance between several of Rome's allies in the east. This would support the security thesis of Sherwin-White, but there are other factors for the annexations. Pompey had to keep the peace, so he could not merely annex the territory and go home. He had to arrange it in a manner that would be acceptable to the new provincial subjects, and this involved creating a new way of taxing the provinces which included everybody, even free city-states and client-kings who may have been exempt before. It also involved Pompey's creating new city-states inside Pontus, setting up local governments, giving them constitutions, and creating citizens out of former subjects and serfs. By doing this Pompey was able to spread the empire, administer the provinces through local governments which spread Hellenism through civic involvement, and collected taxes in a broad and more just system. Putting all of his arrangements together makes his eastern settlements much more complex than the aggressive imperialistic greed thesis. Pompey negotiated with the Greek east; he did not merely dictate as had Sulla.

The historiography concerning Pompey's organization of the east are separated by province due to the fact that Syria is often ignored or glossed over. With the use of Greek and Eastern specialists, it is now possible to fill many of the gaps and to understand what Pompey did in Syria. For Syria, some within the historiography have stated that Syria is

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<sup>36</sup> Kallet-Marx, p. 336-37.

beyond their scope of study, even though they focus on the rise of the empire through the annexations in the east, which should include Syria.<sup>37</sup> There was hostility towards Flavius Josephus (37-100AD) the Jewish statesman and later friend of the emperor Vespasian due to the fact that his two separate accounts have some discrepancies. Bellemore explains this was due to his use of Jewish sources for his *Jewish Wars* and the use of outside Greek sources for his *Antiquities*.<sup>38</sup> She shows how this was actually a way for him to balance different perspectives of the same events, the Jewish sources were more anti-Roman and the Greek sources were a bit more pro-Roman. There was a general hostility towards eastern sources in general by modern scholars in the last century which kept many of these sources out of the arguments.

S. Sherwin-White and Kuhrt explain that most Roman historians do not give Parthia enough credit for taking a large share of the Seleucid kingdom and that European, i.e., Roman, perspectives are preferred over eastern and Greek perspectives within the historiography. This could make it appear as though Rome were an unstoppable imperial force in the region, which was simply not the case. There were other competitors and checks on Rome's potential power. This is a major reason the historiography needs to be updated and combined with the work done by Greek and Eastern scholars. This would show Rome as just one of a few powers and therefore weaken the imperialistic and deterministic theses that dominate the historiography on the rise of the Roman Empire.

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<sup>37</sup> Kallet-Marx, p. 7. 336-7. He claims that the revenue that the eastern annexations drew in should not be used to argue for economic drive behind the empire after the fact, but he later concludes by contradicting that very fact.

<sup>38</sup> Jane, Bellemore, "Josephus, Pompey and the Jews," *Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 48, H. 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Qtr., 1999), p. 94-118.

If Greek and Eastern specialist are used to fill in the Roman historical gaps leading up to Pompey's annexation, one can see the deteriorating situation inside Syria when he arrived.<sup>39</sup> This can help to develop some reasoning behind his settlements beyond greed. In the century leading up to Syria's annexation Rome had little or no interest in spreading an empire. Rome had fought and won a war against the Seleucid empire (192-188 BC) and did not annex any territory, just as Macedon was not annexed after a second war (196s BC). During the same time the Seleucids lost all of their lands east of the Euphrates to the Parthian empire, therefore bringing them closer to Roman allies.

Externally, Syria was threatened and even invaded by king Tigranes of Armenia; Parthia also invaded on two occasions.<sup>40</sup> Parthia's interests in Syria are ignored or deflated by A.N. Sherwin-White while stated as common knowledge in the works of Grainger and S. Sherwin-White. This should be a major factor of Pompey's annexation of Syria and if ignored does make his actions seem more aggressive than defensive, giving strength to the imperialist thesis.

Internally, Syria was in chaos when Pompey arrived; the Seleucid house was divided by civil war, again, and it only controlled two or three cities in the north. The Jewish kingdom, a former Seleucid subject, was in its own civil war. Arab dynasts were involved in both, the Jewish and Seleucid dynastic struggles, as well as their own

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<sup>39</sup> Susan Sherwin-White and Amelie Kuhrt, *From Samarkhand to Sardis: A new approach to the Seleucid empire*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1993. p.217-18.

John D. Grainger, *The Cities of Seleukid Syria*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. P.170-5.

Erich S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic world and the coming of Rome Vol II*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1984. p. 668-9.

<sup>40</sup> Grainger, p.170-7.

internal bickering.<sup>41</sup> These factors at that time and in the past destabilized Syria to the point where outsiders could invade. These security reasons forced Pompey to do something; he chose to annex Syria and to break up the Jewish and Arab dynasties and to re-establish the Greek Decapolis as an internal buffer zone against them. The province of Syria along with the surrounding client-kingdoms were set up as an external buffer zone against Parthia, which (as Pompey must have known) had entered Syria on at least two occasions in the decades leading up to his arrival.<sup>42</sup> He also must have known that Parthia had destroyed two Seleucid armies in the decades leading up to his campaign. Because of these details it is hard to say that Pompey annexed Syria out of imperialistic greed.<sup>43</sup> In fact, when he annexed the province, it was not economically sound and so the theory supporting that reason should be questioned. It did later, much later, become a lucrative province, but not until long after Pompey's death and the conclusion of the civil wars and the fall of the Republic.<sup>44</sup>

The blending of the events, before, during, and after Pompey's arrival in the east must be considered together to fully appreciate his actions. This is why I add the pirate campaign to the Pontus settlements and develop a more detailed background to the Syrian settlements; and finally combine them all into one scheme as has before been divided into separate studies. Connecting all of the eastern campaigns of Pompey will back my thesis that Pompey was not merely an imperialist but had much more complicated issues to deal with besides greed and glory.

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<sup>41</sup> Josephus, Ralph Marcus, "trans.," *Antiquities* Vol. VII, London: William Heinmann Ltd., 1943. 1961. p. 443-455

<sup>42</sup> Grainger, p. 170-5.

<sup>43</sup> Frank, p. 191-193. He claims that Pompey annexed Syria for the tax farmers.

<sup>44</sup> Louis C. West, "Commercial Syria under the Roman Empire," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 55 (1924), pp. 159-189.

## CHAPTER 1 POMPEY, CILICIA AND THE PIRATE CAMPAIGN

The pirate wars of Pompey need to be added to his overall eastern campaigns. The pirates were part of the destabilization of the east and the Mediterranean and were linked in some ways to Pontus, Syria, Rhodes, and several city-states. The Cilician pirate wars were an ongoing event that lasted at least thirty years until Rome finally took decisive action under Pompey's command. Whether Rome had neglected the sea or whether it was preoccupied with other troubles is debated, but it is a fact that up until Pompey's command there were several years of civil war, the Social Wars, three servile wars, and disturbances on the western borders, all of which kept most of Rome's pro-consuls and pro-praetors busy along with their legions. When Rome was ready to take on the pirates in earnest, they did so under Pompey's direction most zealously, and this coincided with the west being quiet: the civil wars ending, the last servile wars completed, and Lucullus' report that the Third Mithridatic War was all but over. This freed the hands of Pompey and Rome and allowed a properly financed and manned operation that took place on land and sea in a concerted and simultaneous operation that was without precedent.<sup>45</sup>

The settlements that followed the pirate war and the Mithridatic War were made by Pompey with the past disturbances in mind, especially with regards to taxation, war indemnities, and slavery. Thirty plus years of wars with pirates and slaves in the

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<sup>45</sup> Lionel Casson, *The Ancient Mariners: Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient Times, Second Edition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 1991. p. 181-182. He claims that Pompey was handed a blank check to do what was necessary to clear the sea of pirates.

Republic's Empire must have impressed upon Pompey and Lucullus, as well as other Romans, the importance of not just how to win a war but how to secure a lasting peace with a vanquished foe, whether they be pirates, slaves, or subjects of the eastern kingdoms and city-states. Lucullus' and Pompey's dealings in the east reflect a different approach than previous generals such as Sulla. Sulla's punishment of the east, which included a large war indemnity of twenty thousand talents (120 million denarii), is part of what caused the Greeks to go over to Mithridates in the third war, as debt had driven them in the first war.<sup>46</sup> The enslavement of people due to debts may have also driven the Greeks to him, and some into banditry and piracy to escape slavery; they often became slavers themselves. The vicious cycle of debt, slavery and piracy had to be reconsidered by those commanders who wanted to secure a lasting peace. Lucullus and Pompey both approached peace terms differently than their counterparts in the generations preceding them, this is the opposite of what the imperialist thesis states.<sup>47</sup> Pompey's settlements not only gave clemency to the belligerents, which most historians recognize to a degree, but it also forced a cultural change in the way people in the Greek east viewed mercenaries, banditry and piracy; this aspect is not developed by most in the historiography, but will be here. There is a completely separate historiography covering banditry, piracy and mercenary culture that focusses on the Greek viewpoints of those occupations. The Roman historiography does not even speak of these at all.

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<sup>46</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 355. Kallet-Marx, p. 336-7. He claims that punitive annexation became the norm after Sulla but Lucullus and Pompey both decided to reverse much of Sulla's debt.

<sup>47</sup> Plutarch, *Lucullus*, p. 533-535.

## The Cilician Pirates: Where did the pirate problem stem from?

Cilicia and other rocky regions around the Mediterranean offered ideal refuge for fugitives, rebels and pirates as did many of the islands. The use of these rocky places as pirate havens goes back to the time of Homer's and Thucydides' works.<sup>48</sup> There are several reasons why pirates arose in various regions: these include wars, opportunistic men, political upheaval and cultural behavior that actually saw such occupations as acceptable if not honorable in certain contexts.

The decline of Rhodes and other naval powers in the eastern Mediterranean, due in part to Rome punishing them, is usually cited as the major reason behind the massive piracy build up.<sup>49</sup> Rome took the island of Delos from Rhodes, weakening its financial strength and therefore its ability to fund anti-pirate campaigns in which they had often been engaged. They were punished by Rome for their part in the Macedonian revolt. Rome had relied too heavily on allies to police the seas since the end of the Second Punic War, but after Rhodes' punishment no one else filled the vacuum except the Cilician pirates themselves.

Many pirates were exiles and rebels of the Seleucid Empire who were protected by the fact that it was forbidden to enforce its will west of Syria after the Treaty of Apamea (188 BC) was dictated by Rome.<sup>50</sup> The weakened abilities of Rhodes and the Seleucids to fight piracy may have made the Cilician pirates get out of control. This, coupled with Rome's neglect of the sea, suggests that they allowed piracy to create a

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<sup>48</sup> H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World*, New York: Dorset Press, 1924. 1987. p. 22-26.

<sup>49</sup> Lionel Casson, *The Ancient Mariners: Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient Times, Second Edition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 1991. p. 163-169

<sup>50</sup> Philip De Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 98. Lionel Casson, p. 180.

level of anarchy in the Mediterranean. Some historians who have put this idea forth show Rome as irresponsible, indicating that it was more concerned with imperialistic matters than with the growing piracy.<sup>51</sup> It is true that Rome thought it could control their holdings by land power alone, though this proved otherwise as Rome expanded further from Italy. Officials in Rome grew the empire very conservatively, not taking on more than they could manage. For this reason the Republic's Empire and even the later Empire constantly expanded and contracted between client-kingdoms and provinces depending on the situation and needs of Roman administration. The realm of the sea and the pirate problem were no different. They were left alone due to other concerns, but they were not totally neglected. Also, one must look further into the past to fully appreciate the decline of the eastern naval powers; the reasons for this decline include many factors, including a naval arms race between the Ptolemaic and Macedonian kingdoms which financially devastated both kingdoms before the Punic Wars in the 200s BC. Constant warring among other Greek city-states also had a lot to do with the destabilization of the sea as powers rose and fell, leaving much of the sea to mercenaries and pirates.<sup>52</sup>

After the death of Alexander the Great the heirs of his empire, the Antigonids of Macedon, the Ptolemies of Egypt and the Seleucids of Syria, went to war with each other; and all of them extensively used pirates even if they had strong navies.<sup>53</sup> These powers used pirates not to decide wars but to add elements of nuisance by attacking supply lines and other strategic points of interest. Many pirates were not even paid, but the promise of

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<sup>51</sup> De Souza, p. 159-164. He also implies a strategy of undermining the Mediterranean powers for imperialist gain even though Rome was concerned with the west at the time.

<sup>52</sup> Manuel Troster, "Roman Hegemony and Non-State Violence: A Fresh Look at Pompey's Campaign against the Pirates," *Greece and Rome*, vol. 56, No.1, April 2009, pp.17-19.

<sup>53</sup> A. H. Jackson, "Privateers in the Ancient Greek World," M.R.D. Foot, "edit." *War and Society: Historical essays in the honour and memory of J.R. Western 1928-1971*, New York: Harper & Row Publisher, Inc. 1973, p. 243. There is little to no distinction between privateers and pirates in antiquity.

booty and allied ports to sell it in attracted many to the profession. This kind of license created a level of anarchy during war time that continued in peace: this should be added to the equation to explain how Cilician pirates grew out of hand; De Souza and Casson blame Rome. There was a great level of piracy before Rome was even a naval power. The Greek culture of piracy and the use of mercenaries should be given some, if not the lion's share, of the blame as the city-states all used pirates and mercenaries against each other in war and peace. Pirates were less expensive and more expendable than citizen soldiers or professional mercenaries.<sup>54</sup> A major drawback to pirates, however, was they often used war as an excuse to raid both sides; of course mercenaries did the same, but the employer knew where to find them afterwards, unlike pirates, who could flee using the sea to shadowy ports.

The fact that piracy was lucrative is often ignored as a primary draw to the profession; instead social ills are chiefly blamed by De Souza and Troster. For example, in 400 BC, the cost of living was around 60-100 drachmas a year. A single wealthy Athenian's ransom could fetch 2-3000 drachmas and a common rower, 100-200 d. It would appear that a man could be ransomed for about a year's pay/expenses depending on his class. If one could not pay the ransom, they were enslaved; during war the price of such slaves fell to as little as 20 drachmas; as such one can conclude that ransom was the preferred transaction. In 189 BC, political envoys were ransomed by pirates for 3 talents each (18,000 drachmas). In 355 BC, a heavily laden merchant ship could fetch 9 ½

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<sup>54</sup> A.H. Jackson, p. 245.

talents (57,000 drachmas). Similar prices for ransom and slaves continue up to the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD.<sup>55</sup>

What the Hellenistic world could do in war, moving supplies and men by sea, evolved for the use in the logistics of trade as well as with capturing, kidnapping and the selling of captives for slavery. The average merchant ship could hold 200-300 tons of cargo, some much larger; one was described as capable of holding 1900 tons; these cargo ships were not equaled in size and cargo capacity until the 18-19<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>56</sup>

It is easy to see, in light of the size and scope of the trade in the Mediterranean, why piracy was so attractive, especially in the time before Rome controlled the sea. Commerce and war between the Greek kingdoms and city-states were vaguely defined and both could be seen as merely competition. The fact that pirates were allowed to play in this game with the kingdoms should not escape the notice of those who would blame Rome for Cilician or any other pirates' rise, especially before Rome became fully aware of how vast the trade in the east really was. Rome managed the overall trade after the eastern conquest, but the logistics was still controlled by the old players: the Syrians, Phoenicians, Rhodesians, Cretans, Egyptians, and other Greek brokers.<sup>57</sup> Until Rome took over this trade, she probably did not appreciate how vast it really was and only then did it realize why it was important to safeguard it from pirates. The major cause of the rise in piracy was money and competitive, anarchic trade practices that by far predate the advent of Rome in the east. Piracy could not be deterred by anyone unless all ports enforced the law, which few did. Every port and customer that bought stolen goods and

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<sup>55</sup> A.H. Jackson, p. 247. A Greek drachma was a small silver coin about equal to the Roman silver denarius.

<sup>56</sup> Casson, p. 156, 191.

<sup>57</sup> Casson, p. 166

slaves were guilty of helping enrich pirates. One kingdom or empire cannot be blamed without indicting all others who benefited and took part in the piracy trade.

Several Greek states had agreements not to 'knowingly' purchase each others' citizens or slaves.<sup>58</sup> The problem was that these pacts were only between a few city-states that still allowed buying and selling of people who were not from cities in the agreements. Third parties, 'pirates', were used to buy citizens of cities in these pacts to circumvent the agreements. This was just as much a threat to interstate peace as piracy, and it actually fostered piracy; so the two cannot be separated in their effects on interstate stability. The economics of theft was given legitimacy by most if not all Greek city-states and kingdoms in war and in peace. One can see similar trends throughout the history of slavery and its trade systems; slaving often, if not always, caused anarchy among neighbors who preyed off each others' citizens. Reprisal and revenge are often linked to the taking and ransoming of other peoples, not just to destruction or theft of property.<sup>59</sup>

Roman tried to deter piracy; they just underestimated its strength. Romans viewed pirates as contemptible, just as they did slaves who revolted, for this reason Roman generals were reluctant to take commands against them. Until Pompey's pirate command such a position was not desirable to the elite among the senate. Pirate commands had been given to Marcus Antonius in 102 BC and to his son in 74 BC--the grandfather and father of the tribune Marcus Antonius (Caesar's adjunct). These commands, though, were not given the same support as Pompey's command in 67. Their commands were lofty in scope but were not financed properly nor were they given the

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<sup>58</sup> Vincent Gabrielsen, "Piracy and the Slave Trade," Andrew Erskine, "ed.," *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003. 2005. p. 401-2.

<sup>59</sup> Gabrielsen, p. 392

other resources or men that Pompey was given. They also lacked the concerted land and sea campaigns that Pompey had under his command. In 102 BC and 74 BC Rome was still preoccupied with other more pressing matters, such as the Cimbric invasions and later the Spartacus revolt, Sertorius' rebellion in Spain, and the Mithridatic wars in Asia Minor. The pro-consul of Cilicia from 77-75 BC, Servilius, had some success in upper Cilicia, earning the name Isauricus. He never reached the coast, and the death of his successor Octavius, who was to help Marcus Antonius by land in 74, ensured the failure of that campaign. The start of the Third Mithridatic War, which took precedence over Marcus Antonius' campaign of 74, hampered his efforts in the suppression of the pirates especially on land as resources were shifted elsewhere.<sup>60</sup> The efforts of Rome to prosecute a joint land and sea campaign against the Cilician pirates never came to full fruition until Pompey's command. So it is unfair to state that Rome did nothing to curb the rise of piracy; perhaps it did all it could during the earlier Mithridatic Wars and while dealing with disturbances elsewhere in the rising empire.

The connection of the Cilician Pirates to Seleucid rebels, to the Roman rebel Sertorius in Spain, to the Spartacus revolt in Italy, and to Mithridates since the first war through the third war shows how and why Rome gave more notice to their activities. De Souza claims that most of these allegations of pirate connections were for propaganda and that Rome allowed piracy for its own gain.<sup>61</sup> He also points out that Mithridates called the Romans a race of pirates, his own deflection of that propaganda, although put forth by the hostile source of Sallust, who was skeptical about Rome's rising empire. In 74, before he attacked Crete, Marcus Antonius claimed that the Cretans had given aid to

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<sup>60</sup> Ormerod, p. 216-219.

<sup>61</sup> De Souza, p. 99. 131-134.

Cilician pirates and the Pontic navy during the First Mithridatic War. The Cretans were also charged with supplying mercenaries and pirates to the king's war efforts against Rome. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Metellus was so zealous in his prosecution of the war in Crete and why he sought to execute the majority of the pirates he captured there, unlike how Pompey dealt with pirates. To be fair to Metellus, he fought an actual state that may have sponsored piracy and helped Mithridates, whereas Pompey was dealing with non-state sponsored piracy, but a growing organized crime network that only claimed a quasi-state status of Cilicia. Not all the pirates were in fact from Cilicia, but the name 'Cilician' was the most powerful pirate confederacy of the time, so many claimed the title for that reason, just as they would have used the name of Illyrian pirates, Tyrrhenian Sea pirates, or Cretan pirates in the generations before their own.<sup>62</sup> Cilicia's evolution into an actual Roman province took thirty-plus years of fighting bandits on the land and pirates on the seas of Cilicia and other places that gave them safe harbor. After the Third Mithridatic War and the pirate war, Rome was no longer interested in entertaining the idea of new and independent kingdoms arising near their provinces or clients. They wanted to control who had power over the lands of their provinces and their clients. The Cilician pirates and others were a threat to their claim to ultimate power and interstate stability and trade.

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<sup>62</sup> Casson, p. 179.

## Cilician Pirates and Slavery

The link between piracy and slavery has much to do with the rise of the Cilician pirates. Delos as an open trade port to slavers, pirates and tax farmers brought much wealth to the Cilician pirates, who had supposedly been checked by Rhodes while they owned the port. When Rome handed the port back to Athens and made it a port free of tariffs or taxes, it devastated Rhodes' economy and in turn their navy. Rhodes' port revenues plummeted from 1 million drachmas to 150,000 drachmas in the first year.<sup>63</sup> This is why De Souza, Casson, and Troster claim that Rome destroyed Rhodes' power. The fact is that Rhodes had a port tax of 2 to 4% on all good that came in or out of the port while Delos had 0% tax.<sup>64</sup> Since Delos did not have this tax, most trade shifted there. Rhodes could have competed with Delos, but it kept the tax. Also the fact that Rhodes was hostile to pirates is overblown; they just gave them an extra tax. Rhodes, like Crete, expected a 'war tithe' which did not differentiate between legitimate war spoils and those of pirates; that tithe was 10%.<sup>65</sup> The opening of the free port at Delos that neither charged the 2% to 4% port tax nor the 10% 'war tithe' on pirates pushed trade to that island. Most legitimate and probably a majority of illicit trade went there and to other ports who asked no questions. In this view Rhodes is not the victim of Roman imperialism as De Souza claims but simply the more greedy port that fell due to its excessive taxation of pirates that basically had laundered their money at a much higher commission than others.

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<sup>63</sup> Casson, p. 163-66.

<sup>64</sup> Casson, p. 163.

<sup>65</sup> A.H. Jackson, p. 253.

Another free port, Side later became a second Delos for the Cilician pirates who brought massive amounts of slaves and other stolen goods there. This port was practically owned by the pirates themselves; others followed suit for monetary gain. Delos later became an attractive target for the pirates themselves, who sacked it in 88 BC during the First Mithridatic War and again in 69 BC in the third war. The second sacking of Delos ended its use as the major free port and thereafter the main slave trade moved to Southern Italy, to Puteoli, where many of the Italian trade brokers lived.<sup>66</sup>

Many, including Strabo, claim that Rome's hunger for slaves drove this trade and enriched the pirates making them stronger.<sup>67</sup> At first Rome did not question where and how slaves made it to these ports. It was only after Marius had asked the king of Bithynia, Nicomedes III, for assistance during the Cimbric War (104-100 BC) that Rome took notice of where slaves came from. Nicomedes told Marius that the tax farmers had enslaved all his citizens and that he had no soldiers to give; for that reason the Roman Senate made a proclamation that no free citizen of their allies could be enslaved in a Roman province.<sup>68</sup>

The following of this proclamation by the governor of Sicily and his later retraction of it was a major cause of the Second Servile War in Sicily. This is pertinent to Pompey's dealings with the pirates and his later organizations in the east especially with regards to the *publicani* who were checked to a large degree by some of his settlements. These past issues over slavery and their link to the Servile Wars and the reluctance of an

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<sup>66</sup> Casson, p. 169.

<sup>67</sup> Jean Rouge, Susan Frazer, "trans.," *Ships and Fleets of the Ancient Mediterranean*, Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1975. 1981. p. 109. Strabo, Horace White, "Trans.," *The Geography of Strabo*, London: William Heinmann Ltd., 1929. 1970. p. 329-331.

<sup>68</sup> Diodorus, Francis R. Walton, "trans.," *Diodorus of Sicily*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. 1984. XXXVI, 3. p. 151.

allied king to help Rome in a time of emergency must have had some effect on Lucullus' and Pompey's arrangements and their more just dealings with the provincials. When Lucullus turned his attention to Asia Minor, Plutarch said, "so that he might do something to further justice and law since its people were plundered by the tax-gatherers and money lenders."<sup>69</sup> The link with slavery, piracy and the *publicani* could not have escaped Pompey's notice either, since in his eastern dealings he came into contact with the problems created by all of those factors. In his earlier career he was also exposed to such factors when he assisted in ending the Spartacus Revolt. He saw what slaves could do if they were pushed over the edge. He too would have been schooled in the First and Second Servile Wars and their causes mentioned above in Diodorus. These revolts were led almost exclusively by Greek subjects who had been enslaved in war or by debt. Previous captured slaves came from more diverse regions and many did not speak the same language as did the massive influx of Greek slaves following the conquest of Greece and the subsequent wars that followed.

There is some evidence that the slave markets shifted into the lower Danube region after Pompey's settlements to perhaps lessen the amount of 'civilized' Greek slaves Rome took into its slave system. The evidence is circumstantial yet compelling; it involves some of the largest silver *denarii* hordes ever found with terminal dates coinciding with Pompey's time in the east.<sup>70</sup> The hordes are absent in the time of Caesar's massive sell-off of Gallic slaves but return after the markets recovered. This may show that the Mediterranean slave markets were shifted into what Romans

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<sup>69</sup> Plutarch, Bernodette Perin, "trans.," *Lives, Lucullus*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914. 1985. xx.1-4, p. 533-535.

<sup>70</sup> Michael H. Crawford, "The Republican Denarii in Romania: The Suppression of Piracy and the Slave-Trade," *Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 67 (1977), pp. 117-124.

considered 'less civilized' areas where slaves from that region would have less in common with each other and therefore less likely to revolt on a massive scale. Nowhere is it suggested that Pompey sought to end slavery, but the idea that certain people made better slaves for specific jobs was probably on many Roman minds at the time. Greeks were still enslaved but not on the scale as before.

The major problem with the capture and sale of people in the slave markets was that the individual slaves could not be properly distinguished from a captive of a pirate, or war, or a tax collector. The middlemen did find out who was worth more and attempted to ransom the captive to his family or to attain a 'loan' for them. The captive was worth more to a family member or to himself by a loan than on the slave market. Because of this kidnapping and ransoming cycle there was a market for selling protection by pirates and by naval powers.<sup>71</sup> Athens and Rhodes took turns controlling this protection racket, which often involved large annual tributes. Those who could not pay, whether they be merchants or towns near the sea, were open to attack by pirates. The fact that these powers also bought slaves from pirates blurs the line between their policing position and that of the pirates who also gathered tributes. Both pirates and naval powers offered protection.<sup>72</sup> Many cities including Crete also issued blanket grants of "right of violent seizure" to their citizens or anyone who sold them goods.<sup>73</sup> This was not recognized by all other states of course, and these grants of violent seizure could be confused with those of other states who allowed similar activities by their citizens during war or for reprisal. There was no uniform interstate law between the Greek City-States and far too much allowance of private violence among their citizens. This is all

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<sup>71</sup> Gabrielsen, p. 397.

<sup>72</sup> Gabrielsen, p. 397.

<sup>73</sup> Gabrielsen, p. 401-403.

overlooked by historians who blame Rome for the rise in piracy. They were overall a very small factor.

### Rome a reluctant naval power

Rome was a reluctant naval power, and this in part is attributed to the rise of the Cilician pirates. Rome always preferred land warfare and never maintained a standing navy for more than a few years at a time, usually during war. Bad luck and bad seamanship were major reasons for their distaste for naval warfare; Rome lost 4/5 of her ships due to amateur sea captains and admirals' inability to navigate weather conditions and only 1/5 to enemies.<sup>74</sup> Rome's political/military system was the problem; a land general could be an amateur and often be successful, but on the sea amateurs brought death and destruction on massive scales more devastating than the worst land battles. During the First Punic War, after Rome defeated a large Carthaginian fleet, a storm killed 100,000 men (twice the number killed at Cannae in the Second Punic War, one of Rome's blackest days) and destroyed most of the victorious fleet.<sup>75</sup> A short while later, another storm took out most of Rome's remaining fleet. The First Punic War lasted 24 years, in which Rome lost 700 ships while Carthage lost 500, Rome's mostly to weather as stated above.<sup>76</sup> The loss of so many men and resources was a major reason Rome was reluctant to keep large navies unless it was necessitated by a war against a naval opponent. Recruitment was also a problem, especially after such disasters; instead of

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<sup>74</sup> Casson, p. 143. This is most likely the number lost during the First Punic War, but he does not specify. This amounted to more dead than on land and so was a deterrent to keep a large navy.

<sup>75</sup> Casson, p. 149-50.

<sup>76</sup> Appian, Horace White, "trans.," *Roman History Vol. I*, "Of Sicily and the other Islands", Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932. 2005. p. 129-131.

slaves, the lower classes were recruited as rowers and regular marines, the numbers of lost men deterred many from service in the navy.<sup>77</sup> The navy also offered poorer conditions and lower pay, which kept many citizens from desiring service at sea. By the Third Punic War, Rome only had 50 ships and thereafter relied more upon allies, especially Rhodes, for naval operations.<sup>78</sup>

Around 100 B.C., Rome set up the *lex de provinciis praetoriis* which attempted to enforce some level of Maritime law concerning piracy. According to De Souza it was only a rhetorical proclamation to claim primacy in the Mediterranean world in the same way that Athens and Macedon once had. Like those powers, he states, Rome only claimed to enforce maritime law, but in reality did little or nothing to suppress piracy.<sup>79</sup> The pirate law is the first mention of piracy in Roman law and does at least point to Rome's desire to become a maritime power even if it was premature at the time it was enacted. The initial pirate campaigns of Marcus Antonius in 102-100 BC and of Servilius in 77-74 BC were primarily land campaigns with little naval cooperation, emphasizing Rome's reliance on land battles over naval engagements.<sup>80</sup> They initially sought the land bases of pirates and assumed that it was those that gave the pirates their strength. Although this is partially true, a major problem was that the Cilician pirates' land bases were not necessarily in their country of origin. Pirates used many ports to sell goods (and to hide if necessary), but many probably had no home base at all, making their destruction more difficult. This is why Pompey sought them out in multiple ports

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<sup>77</sup> Chester G. Starr, *The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. p. 24. In regards to slaves not being used except in emergencies and even then they were often freed before enlisted into the naval service.

<sup>78</sup> Jean Rouge, p.

<sup>79</sup> De Souza, p. 241.

<sup>80</sup> Rouge, p. 110.

simultaneously to catch them off guard. Without concerted efforts, pirates could shift from sea to land at will, and bounce from port to port to which ever one had no naval presence. Rome had to figure this out by trial and error over thirty years of campaigns, most of which were waged on land.

### Cilician Pirates and their links to Mithridates

Appian explains that in the First Mithridatic War the Cilician pirates assisted Mithridates in his war effort, and for their help they evolved from a motley pirate band to a more formally organized network which now had fleets more like navies and were commanded by captains and admirals.<sup>81</sup> This links the pirate wars and the Mithridatic Wars. The pirate networks controlled many harbors and ports throughout the Mediterranean Sea. On occasion they assisted each other and had allies on land that gave them safe harbor and fenced their stolen goods without question. They had a type of spy network that gathered intelligence in port taverns and docks; these would report which ships were going to particular ports and probably what their cargoes contained.

Mithridates' use of the pirates in the first war was conspicuous in their attacks on Roman fleets, particularly Lucullus' while he was gathering more allies near Egypt and Cyprus. De Souza denies that these pirates who attacked a Roman warship carrying a *legatus* were linked with Mithridates, and claims that they were independent pirates.<sup>82</sup> It seems strange that independent pirates would attack such a strong target which promised little of the reward that a defenseless merchant ship might bring them. It makes more

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<sup>81</sup> Appian, *Mithri Wars*, IX, 63, p. 357.

<sup>82</sup> De Souza, p. 118.

sense that these pirates were ‘privateers’ of Mithridates who were paid to hamper Lucullus’ efforts in building up a fleet for Sulla, who was trapped in Greece without a proper navy. There was little to no distinction in antiquity between a privateer and a pirate especially during war time.<sup>83</sup> The line was often blurred for the benefit of both the pirate and the patron who hired or invited them to attack their enemies’ merchants and allied ports. Because of this, the sources are not certain about who often attacked ports or Roman ships. Appian shows that at the end of the first war, Mithridates, unable to hold what he had taken, released the pirates to do their bidding as a form of revenge and reprisal.<sup>84</sup> This may be how many attained warships, as he was deprived of them by Sulla at the end of the war. He could have given many ships to the pirates to keep them out of Roman hands.

Mithridates’ use of Cilician pirates was even more overt in the third war where he used thousands to garrison Sinope against Lucullus’ siege. When Mithridates lost a fleet to a storm, he was forced off his own ship. It was Cilician pirates who saved him by taking him safely to shore in their own vessel.<sup>85</sup> De Souza explains too that these pirates were independent and only happened to be around the Roman and Pontic fleets at the time. He further explains that Mithridates’ advisors warned him about boarding a pirate ship as if this would not have happened if they were allies. The boarding of the king on a pirate ship should have been a concern to his advisors, but that does not mean that they were not in his employ. When Lucullus broke the siege of Sinope and stormed the city, his men killed 8,000 Cilicians, many of whom were either mercenaries or pirates in the

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<sup>83</sup> Ormerod, p. 60-1. The line between pirate and privateer was very fluid as was the line between mercenary and bandit.

<sup>84</sup> Appian, *Mithr.* IX, 63, 357.

<sup>85</sup> Appian, *Mithr.* XI, 78, p. 385-7. Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XIII, p. 509.

employment of Mithridates. Still De Souza claims that pirates were not in league with Mithridates.

### Pompey's Pirate Command

Leading up to Pompey's pirate command in 67, the Cilician pirates grew in such strength that they had sacked four hundred cities, both unfortified and fortified; the number of ships they commanded was over a thousand.<sup>86</sup> With larger ships which they acquired during the First Mithridatic War they had become formidable enemies; and like other unemployed mercenaries they banded together to create their own form of war and to capture slaves. The pirates became so emboldened that they started to raid Italy itself and attacked the Appian Way. They seized high-ranking citizens as hostages, supposedly two magistrates along with their lictors; Omerod says of the pirates, "their chief weapon was terrorism".<sup>87</sup> The daughter of Marcus Antonius Cretecus was also ransomed by the pirates during this time; he was the former victor over pirates in recent campaigns and so added humiliation to the act. The last straw was that the grain supply from Sicily and elsewhere was practically at a standstill and Rome was in danger of mass starvation. The ancient sources indicate that the rise of piracy was built up at a frenzied pace until Pompey was charged with their destruction.<sup>88</sup> It is more likely that it was a slow build-up that was ignored until it affected Rome.

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<sup>86</sup> Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXIV, 2-5, p.175.

<sup>87</sup> Ormerod, p. 228. Tying terror with ransoming was lucrative, this is how they collected protection money.

<sup>88</sup> Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXIV, 2-5, p.175.

The *Lex Gabinia*, passed by the assembly at the direction of the Tribune Gabinius, gave Pompey an unprecedented amount of power over the whole Mediterranean Sea and inland up to 50 miles from the shore. The command eventually was enlarged to include 24 legates (Lieutenant Generals) of praetorian rank and approximately 500 ships, 120,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry.<sup>89</sup> Pompey assigned these commanders to quadrants of the western Mediterranean Sea to clear it of piracy in concerted and simultaneous attacks. This was accomplished in about 40 days. Then the fleet moved to the east where many pirates had fled to Cilicia, their home base. Here Pompey personally attacked with his fleet of 60 ships, and the east was cleared in another 45 or so days, making the entire operation over in 3 months. The rapid deployment and size of his fleet is questioned by De Souza despite the fact that the size of Pompey's fleet and its build-up are comparable to that of the First Punic War, which took only 60 days to increase from 20 ships to over 350. Many of the ships which Sulla had confiscated from Mithridates in the first war could have been utilized in the third war.<sup>90</sup> Pompey also called on allies to supply ships and sailors, so it is quite possible that the numbers of ships could have been raised within the time given by the ancient sources. Despite the sources referring to the pirates' organization as if they were actual navies, they were no Carthage. It was possible that Pompey's fleets captured hundreds of ships and secured the surrender of hundreds more in a short time especially when clemency and perhaps rewards were offered.

Rome never had a problem with raising a navy; her problem was maintaining one in times of peace. These problems were not remedied until Augustus took full control

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<sup>89</sup> Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXVI, 2-3, p.179-181. Appian, *Mithr.* XIV, 94-96, p. 417-23.

<sup>90</sup> De Souza, p. 167-8. De Souza questions Pompey's rapid build up. Casson, p. 145. Casson shows how it could have been possible. Appian, *Mithi Wars*, p. 341. Sulla confiscated Mithridates' fleet after the first war and took it back to Rome.

and built up a standing imperial navy with a professional officer corps that stayed in service much longer than traditional commands.

Just prior to Pompey's command, the land armies were freed up in the west and a shift to the east seemed rational at the time due to the winding down of the Third Mithridatic War and the need to occupy newly annexed Bithynian and Pontic territory there. Pompey, unlike his predecessors, enjoyed more support both in money and in concerted ground and naval actions in his pirate campaigns.<sup>91</sup> He was also able to follow up his sea campaigns with the Mithridatic command in 66, giving him a few more years to enforce what he had done on the sea. He retained at least his eastern fleet during the war which was sent into the Black Sea to keep Mithridates held up in the Bosphorus. This prolonged command allowed him to enforce some stability on the regions once ravaged by the pirates and so did not allow their immediate return to piracy, as De Souza suggests. After the war, legions were left in the east and small coastal fleets were maintained by provincial governors, but not consistently.<sup>92</sup> These factors should be brought into the equation for those who deny that Pompey's efforts cleared the sea of piracy. It was his actions that initiated the clearing of the pirates, but it was the follow up of annexation and the policing of the land and sea by subsequent governors that maintained much of Pompey's work. Rome was in the east to stay, unlike in previous generations when Roman delegated control of the region to client-kingdoms and city-states exclusively; now it took more direct action to maintain peace and order in the region. The east became more tied together after Pompey's settlements in every way.

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<sup>91</sup> Casson, p. 182.

<sup>92</sup> . Cicero, C. McDonald, "trans.," *Pro Flacco*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. XII-XIV.

There are various opinions about the success of Pompey's pirate command; Casson calls it one of the most successful naval operations in history. De Souza calls it a manufactured rhetorical myth made up by Cicero in defense of the *lex Manilia* in order to give the Mithridatic command to Pompey. In Ormerod's view Lucullus is more deserving of destroying pirates, though he still gives Pompey some credit.<sup>93</sup> The fact is Pompey was the commander in the east when the wars against piracy and Mithridates were finalized. He did settle the pirates and divide up the provinces that he annexed. Many before and after him came to the eastern commands, but few if any could claim the activities that he could. He did enjoy more support from Rome than his predecessors. Because of this He and Rome deserve the credit for greatly reducing piracy in the Mediterranean.

#### Pompey's Settlements with the Pirates

According to the ancient sources, Pompey offered clemency to the pirates who surrendered.<sup>94</sup> He gave them land supposedly far from the sea to farm. Pirates were settled in Mallus, Adana, Epiphaneia, and other thinly or depopulated towns in Cilicia Tracheia; some too were sent to Dyme in Achaia.<sup>95</sup> Plutarch adds Soli, which was renamed Pompeiopolis, and notes that the depopulated cities were restored and that territory was added to them, hinting that they too may have been set up like those city-states in Pontus to which Pompey later gave constitutions and assemblies. Epigraphic evidence also points to colonies of ex-pirates in Cyrenaica; the whole of that province would have been within Pompey's 50 mile inland jurisdiction under the *lex Gabinia*.

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<sup>93</sup> Casson, p. 182. De Souza, p. 117, 173-4. Ormerod, p. 220.

<sup>94</sup> Appian, *Mithr.*, XIV, 96, p. 421-423. Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXVII- XXVIII, p.185-7.

<sup>95</sup> Appian, *Mithri.* XIV, 96, p. 423.

Those pirates there show a variety of ethnic backgrounds among the ‘Cilician’ pirates settled there. The stone inscriptions name men and the lands they were given by Pompey through the authority of his legate Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus in 67 BC.<sup>96</sup> Some pirates were even settled in Calabria, Italy.<sup>97</sup>

It is true that many pirates were settled in seaside cities which, De Souza notes, would make it tempting if not inevitable for these men to become pirates again. The power dynamics of the Mediterranean though had changed making that option less attractive and the deterrence more serious than ever before. The attraction to legitimate maritime work, however, would have increased as trade was secured in the hands of Rome, which needed experienced men in the navy and in the merchant fleets. Since the Romans were landlubbers they used seafaring people to a large degree in their navy and in their sea trade. The later navy was full of provincials from these traditional seamen communities; they served 26-year terms to gain citizenship, a bit longer than in the legions, which was about 20 years' service. Those who uphold Poseidonios, Pompey's advisor, as one of the chief sources to the settlements of the pirates show how his humanitarian views either influenced Pompey's settlements or more realistically the writing of the events by Plutarch, Diodorus and Appian.<sup>98</sup> Pompey's clemency was more favorable compared to Caesar's treatment of the Gauls only a few years later, but this clemency also demanded good behavior from ex-pirates which was never guaranteed. The pirates were mostly Greeks and so he treated them differently than Gauls would have been treated by any Roman governor.

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<sup>96</sup> Joyce Reynolds, “Cyrenaica, Pompey and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus,” *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 52, Parts 1 and 2 (1962), pp. 97-103.

<sup>97</sup> Ormerod, p. 241.

<sup>98</sup> Herman Strasburger, “Poseidonios on the Problems of the Roman Empire,” *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 1/2, Parts 1 and 2 (1965), pp. 40-5

Piracy and banditry always had several rationalizations which made them quasi-legal actions, including war (either declared or undeclared by the parent country). The act of reprisal was common and was itself in a grey area of legality among the ancient Greeks, one which a state or an individual could claim.<sup>99</sup> Not until after Pompey's pacification of the Cilicians did the raiding disguised as reprisals end or at least become illegal in the Greek world. Cultural changes were forced on men who had seen banditry and piracy as just another way to make a living. Some probably did return to piracy, but others domesticated themselves by farming or by legitimate maritime work. Despite what De Souza says about the success of Pompey's settling pirates on land, they had to now assimilate themselves in a changed world or risk death or enslavement. The sea and the lands of the east and the entire Mediterranean were now under Roman control. Since Rome now had a monopoly on sea trade, it was not in her interest to let piracy grow out of control again. Rome too had once benefited from piracy, but after Pompey's settlements it had to police the waters and ports of its allies and provinces. There was now an interstate and maritime law that was more universal than ever before. Free pirate ports were no longer left alone; if they arose, Rome and her allies would crush them.

The culture of piracy was no longer acceptable and Rome enforced this more than any other power up to that time because, unlike the Greek world it was not an independent city-state with only a few colonies. The Greek city-states had always accepted a level of piracy as long as it was perpetuated against the outsider of the community.<sup>100</sup> With the advent of Rome in the east as the master, there was no outsider open to piracy anymore, so this culture had to change. The pirate culture was very much

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<sup>99</sup> Ormerod, p. 62-3. A.H. Jackson, p. 250-1.

<sup>100</sup> Ormerod, p. 68, 72.

related to the mercenary culture that had been a normal occupation of the Greeks since the time of the *Iliad*. Within that work the Greek words associated with banditry, *lestas* and *lesteia*, are derivatives of “booty” or “spoils,” which were normal prizes in war; and at that time it was not seen as dishonorable to steal an enemy’s goods or citizens.<sup>101</sup> As time went on the culture of piracy became less acceptable, as described by Thucydides and Aristotle, but even they admitted that in their own day it was seen by many as another legitimate and even honorable way of making a living.<sup>102</sup> The more positive view on mercenaries did not change until Rome stopped the Greeks from the practice by monopolizing force through the legions and auxiliaries. The rise of the state in Greece and Rome effected a change in the vocabulary of what a bandit was and no doubt in the behavior and law that governed the act.<sup>103</sup>

The skepticism of De Souza and Troster about Pompey’s settling ex-pirates too close to the sea and thereby enabling their almost inevitable return to piracy ignores the fact that Roman law was now being enforced over the Mediterranean Sea. The Roman laws concerning piracy and banditry, detailed by Shaw, were extremely harsh in comparison to those of the old Greek city-states which had allowed ‘private adventure’ to a much larger degree. Those who were seen as bandits or pirates usually were not afforded a trial, even if they were Roman citizens. The action of banditry or piracy forfeited one’s rights. The worst forms of execution and enslavement were reserved for bandits and pirates.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Brent D. Shaw, “Bandits in the Roman Empire,” *Past & Present*, No. 105 (Nov., 1984), p. 24

<sup>102</sup> Aristotle, “trans.,” H. Rackham, *Politics*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. 1977. I. 8.6-8. Thucydides, “trans.” Rex Warner, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1954.1972. I: 5-7.

<sup>103</sup> Shaw, p. 26.

<sup>104</sup> Ormerod, p. 55.

During the Civil Wars, bandits and pirates did rise again to take advantage of the chaos and to the fact that borders were more fluid. Bandits even roamed freely throughout Italy, enslaving free and slave alike until Augustus put a stop to it in a severe one-year campaign led by Sabinus.<sup>105</sup> The link with banditry and piracy to political upheaval and rebellion was taken very seriously by Rome. Augustus later made certain gatherings and organizations called *collegia* illegal if they were outside the normal political structures, such as official priesthoods and other colleges of men. This affected the legions greatly who often had social clubs, warrior cults and community networks within them that could potentially become threats to the state. Augustus also secured the countryside of Italy by setting up police detachments of the army in strategic locations and by taking power from local magnates who threatened law and order. This was Augustus' way of changing the warrior and mercenary culture inside the Roman state just as Pompey had imposed it on the Greek states of the east.

The later Roman legal codex gives Roman citizens the right not only of defense against bandits and pirates but allowed them to seek them out and to execute them without trial; basically being a vigilante was legal against that criminal class.<sup>106</sup> These laws evolved over time, but it is noteworthy that these types of crimes were seen as actual threats to the state. Attacks on trade and commerce were a threat when they cut off food supplies. These ideals of defending commerce and of a greater empire came into sharper focus after the acquisitions of Pompey's eastern organization due to the fact that Rome controlled the entire Mediterranean afterwards. It was no longer conducive to social order or trade to allow 'private adventure' by land or sea. Those men who sought

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<sup>105</sup> Shaw, p. 33.

<sup>106</sup> Shaw, p. 20.

adventure now had fewer options; they could join the Roman auxiliaries of the army or the navy or they could move further east into client-kingdoms which had to deal with ‘barbarians’ on their periphery. Optionally, they could move to the Parthian empire where they could maintain their mercenary lifestyle which was no longer legal, ethical or even seen by Romans as a viable option to making an honest living. Augustus co-opted these mercenary elements in society by enlisting the strongest ones into the auxiliaries and by giving local elites authority through Rome to keep them in check. This was a major reversal in Greek morals and behavioral norms, which were first imposed on these men in the east by Pompey.

### Legacy of the Roman Fleet

Pompey asked that fleets be maintained throughout the Mediterranean after his return. There was, however, little support for the idea in the senate and some hostility towards governors who later tried to levy funds from their provincial subjects to maintain their own provincial fleets.<sup>107</sup> Because of the failure to maintain fleets during the last civil wars of the Republic, De Souza points out that piracy returned throughout the Mediterranean. He makes it appear as if Rome carelessly allowed this to happen again, but he does not explain the details. The assertion of non-maintenance of the navy and ignoring piracy during the civil wars is not exactly true. There were massive fleets built up in the civil wars, but they were distracted by fighting other Romans rather than arresting pirates. Some pirates were even used in the civil wars by Sextus Pompey (Gn.

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<sup>107</sup> Ormerod, 248. Cicero, C. McDonald, “trans.,” *Pro Flacco*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. XII-XIV.

Pompey's son). Sextus Pompey, Octavian, Antony and Cleopatra all built massive fleets at this time; if added together, they would count as many as 900-plus ships, although serving different Roman factions.<sup>108</sup> Any pirate activity during this period should not be attributed to the lack of a Roman navy; instead the climate of anarchy during civil war would have been the major cause. The rise in piracy during the last civil wars should not be blamed on Gn. Pompey either, since he was dead at the time. De Souza and Troster imply that Pompey's settling of pirates near the sea made them inevitably fall back into that profession.<sup>109</sup>

Pompey's organization of the Roman fleets into squadrons with regional bases during his pirate command was copied by Augustus, who used it as a template for the Imperial Roman Navy. This navy was maintained at a more consistent level than during the Republic, keeping the Mediterranean secure for at least two more centuries.<sup>110</sup> The imperial navy used smaller vessels, which cost less to maintain and took less men to man; it was thus more efficient. Trade was quite secure during most of the imperial period due to the navy's presence in and near key ports. Rome's reluctance in becoming a naval power was overcome, but it took a few hundred years to realize that fact. It also took a few men with good organizational skills such as Pompey and Augustus to recognize the importance of a standing navy.

The end of the pirate wars brought Pompey into the east for the first time, and with victory under his belt and the authority to make sweeping changes, he was given the Mithridatic command. He began his annexation of Pontus, Syria, and Upper Cilicia as well as resetting the client-king network in the entire region.

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<sup>108</sup> Casson, p. 184-5.

<sup>109</sup> De Souza, p. 176. Ormerod, p. 241-8.

<sup>110</sup> Casson, p. 182-3, 185-7.

He was given all of Asia Minor as his command and retained much of his naval fleet. Pompey used it to blockade Mithridates, who fled into the upper Black Sea region of his kingdom after his army was defeated. Pompey entered the east with unprecedented power and authority to make war and peace as he saw fit. Through this authority he put together what became the eastern portion of the Roman Empire.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **POMPEY'S ORGANIZATION OF THE EAST: BITHYNIA-PONTUS**

The organization of the eastern provinces following the Third Mithridatic War (74-66/3 BC) by Pompey has great significance to the later Roman Empire and its administration of that region and other provinces. The majority within the historiography look at Pompey's actions in annexation and organization of the east as being inspired for one reason, mainly imperialism, and economics, as explained in the introduction. Several other motivations are excluded that could and should be explored. Pompey's organization of the east was much more complex than is currently portrayed, especially by the aggressive imperialist/economic thesis. Many of the motivations in the historiography are brought together in this chapter to show how they did not have to be in conflict with one another. The major points that I develop to question the imperialist thesis are Pompey's more just taxation system that he set up in the provinces, and the *lex Pompeia* which gave a level of democracy to the rural peoples of Pontus. The background of the First Mithridatic War (88-85 BC) will also be used to show that its influences upon Pompey had a lot to do with the final organization; too many have ignored these aspects. It is my assessment that the previous wars and settlements made Pompey do something different than his predecessors. What he did may have been necessitated by past events and not necessarily what he desired. On the other hand, he may have seen an opportunity to spread Hellenism to a region that had not experienced democratic government.

In either case his final settlements did ensure a longer peace in Asia Minor than had occurred in the previous generations. His annexations and organizations were less aggressive that put forth by the imperialist thesis.

### Mithridates' Last Stand

The Third Mithridatic War (75-63 BC) was initially commanded by Lucullus, who had been quite successful against overwhelming odds (supposedly 300,000+ of Mithridates' forces v. his 30,000).<sup>111</sup> Lucullus did more by starving Mithridates' armies than by any other tactic. After this starvation of troops, Mithridates fled to Armenia to his son-in-law, king Tigranes who had built considerable power for himself, even taking the Persian title King of Kings. Lucullus followed and invaded Armenia. He defeated a massive force of Tigranes, supposedly 250,000 strong. Mithridates, however, escaped, returned to Pontus, defeated a Roman force under the command of Lucullus' legate and then began rebuilding his armies. Meanwhile back at Rome, Lucullus was recalled from his command, and others were sent in to finish off what he had claimed was already done.<sup>112</sup> Added to this, there was a mutiny within the ranks, especially among men who were supposed to retire soon. The senate released these men from their obligation just before Lucullus lost his command; this was a major factor in Mithridates reentering and rearming inside Pontus.<sup>113</sup>

At first, two other commanders were sent off to organize Bithynia and Pontus as new provinces in 67 BC. When the governor Glabrio first arrived in the region, he

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<sup>111</sup> Appian, Horace White, "trans.," *Roman History Vol. II, Mithridatic Wars*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1912. 2005. vii, p.373

<sup>112</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 409-411.

<sup>113</sup> Appian, *Mirthr. War*, p. 411.

noticed that the war was not finished and that Lucullus had been abandoned by two of his veteran legions. Glabrio fled into Bithynia, the newly acquired province, and stayed there rather than make war on Mithridates. Marcius Rex was sent into Cilicia and Syria to arrange settlements with the Seleucids. Word came to Rome that the situation was worsening and so the popular assembly passed a law, the *lex Manilia* in 66 which gave Pompey the eastern command, removing the two replacements of Lucullus.<sup>114</sup> Frank makes this episode choreographed by Pompey and his allies so he could gain the Mithridatic command.<sup>115</sup> The problem with this assessment is that Glabrio only has one connection to Pompey before the time and it was not amicable. Sulla had forced Glabrio's pregnant wife to marry Pompey during the civil war because Glabrio was a supporter of Marius. His wife died in child birth shortly afterwards. There is no evidence that Glabrio would have done Pompey any favors, especially one that would bring further humiliation to himself. It is implied that he failed on purpose and was therefore replaced by Pompey.

Pompey had just defeated the Mediterranean pirates in a three-month campaign and was in the east settling them in Cilicia, when he was given word of his new command. He was ordered to wage war against Mithridates and Tigranes and to finish what Lucullus had begun in organizing the province of Bithynia and Pontus. Pompey coaxed the retiring men from Lucullus' army to sign on with him for the duration of his command; those who stayed were greatly rewarded in the following campaigns, which annexed Pontus, Syria and the upper parts of Cilicia.

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<sup>114</sup> Plutarch, "*Pompey*," p.189-191.

<sup>115</sup> Frank, "The Background of the *Lex Manilia*," pp191-193. Using Plutarch, Fletcher and Sherwin-White refute this by showing how Glabrio was wronged by Pompey's patron Sulla.

Pompey, through diplomacy, kept king Tigranes out of the war by sending envoys to the Parthian king Phraates, asking him to invade Armenia.<sup>116</sup> Pompey moved to take Mithridates who had been reduced to a shadow of his former strength. Mithridates initially stalled for time when Pompey entered the eastern theatre. When some sort of settlement was offered, Pompey countered by a request for an in-person interview and a surrender of the king, Mithridates declined.<sup>117</sup> This may have been a further stall tactic or perhaps they both entertained a tribute and a return of some of the king's land and power. The fact that this was the third war with Mithridates makes the acceptance of any conditions highly unlikely. Pompey with the authority of Rome was there to annex Pontus, not make any more deals with Mithridates, who was a repeat offender.<sup>118</sup>

As described in Appian's work, Mithridates tried to use the tactics which Lucullus used against him, that is, choking off supplies from Pompey. He then drew Pompey further into Pontus and eventually into Armenia. Mithridates was unsuccessful in withholding supplies, and in fact, was himself deprived of water to the point of desperation. Pompey first destroyed Mithridates' cavalry by a ruse, drawing them into a wooded area then pursuing the remaining infantry into the valleys of Armenia.<sup>119</sup> There was one final battle in which Pompey used a surprise to attack in the darkness. With his legions running down hill throwing their pilum into the enemy, he destroyed the remaining army of Pontus in a matter of minutes. Mithridates fled and Pompey pursued as far as his army could, but the terrain prevented the legions from catching him.

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<sup>116</sup> Dio Cassius, Earnest Cary, "trans.," *Roman History Vol. III*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. 2001. xxxvi. 45-46. p. 75-77.

<sup>117</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 425-427.

<sup>118</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 425.

<sup>119</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 427-429.

Pompey then invaded Armenia, and Tigranes came to submit to him and Rome; this will be expanded below. Pompey then wintered in Armenia and fought against the Albanians and the Iberians (eastern ones).<sup>120</sup> These excursions into further territory and his attempt to discover the Caspian Sea for Rome has been seen by some historians as indicating that Pompey desired to emulate Alexander the Great in his journeys.<sup>121</sup> Pompey desired exploration as much as he did conquest, though he actually cared more for his men's health than completing such journeys.<sup>122</sup> The same could not be said of Alexander, who lost thousands so that he could prove an army could march across a desert. After these treks Pompey marched into Syria to annex the territory once belonging to Tigranes and the Seleucid Empire. Pontus was divided up and annexed while Mithridates was still alive and on the run. Parts were distributed before Pompey went to Syria, and others were portioned off after Mithridates' death, which occurred while Pompey was nearing Petra. His resolutions with the Jewish and Arab dynasts in Syria happened in-between this period and are discussed in chapter 3.

### Background of the Financial Factors of the Eastern Organization

After Mithridates was defeated and fled into the Bosphorus, Pompey began re-arranging the kingdom of Pontus and Bithynia into a Roman province and various client-kingsdoms.<sup>123</sup> There is a question as to whether or not Pompey was a tool of the tax collectors (*publicani*) in his organization of the east; whether it was he or they who

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<sup>120</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 435-7.

<sup>121</sup> Greenhalgh, Plutarch, Appian. All discuss the adventures of Pompey which are paralleled with those of Alexander who also sought exploration as much as conquest.

<sup>122</sup> Plutarch describes these journeys in a similar way that Arrian describes Alexander's explorations.

<sup>123</sup> Plutarch, "*Pompey*," p. 195-217, Appian, *Mithr. War*, p.461-65.

dictated, what was annexed or not.<sup>124</sup> To understand why Pompey organized and annexed parts of the east the way he did, one must look back to the early years of the region and at the three Mithridatic Wars. Taking a larger perspective of the past conflicts in the region helps explain why certain places were annexed and why some places were placed in the hands of client-kings. This background is also very important for explaining the way Pompey set up the new governments and the new taxation systems. Many focus on the tax system and whether it was fair or unfair, but do not ask what the previous model had been and what the consequences were of that model.<sup>125</sup> It does seem that Pompey set up a more just taxation of the east after the Third Mithridatic War. According to Badian and Sherwin-White, he taxed everybody, including free cities and client-kings not just direct provincial subjects.<sup>126</sup> This was a change in Roman policy to tax free-cities and most client-kings: beforehand many among these two groups were exempt or immune for taxation.

There are a few facts that often get overlooked in the new taxation system; these are the state of financial affairs before and after the First Mithridatic War. Before the First Mithridatic War (88-85 BC), there were already tax farmers and bankers throughout Asia Minor.<sup>127</sup> The *publicani* were not collecting 'taxes' as much as they were collecting debts for the money lenders at that time. Those in the east who owed money to Roman lenders could suffer enslavement or death if they did not pay the *publicani*. The *publicani* were a type of collection agent for the bankers; they were private contractors who purchased debts and kept anything over the original amount collected.

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<sup>124</sup> Frank, p. 191-193.

<sup>125</sup> Frank, p. 191-193. Badian, p.77-78. Sherwin-White, p.231-233. Others also comment on the tax system without discussing the previous model.

<sup>126</sup> Badian, p.77-78. Sherwin-White, p.231-233.

<sup>127</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p.277-79.

It was these Romans who Mithridates had ordered the Greek cities to kill en masse along with all other Roman citizens in the region (around 80,000 in total).<sup>128</sup> The Greeks' compliance in killing so many Romans was the main reason Sulla harshly punished them after the First Mithridatic War.<sup>129</sup> Sulla imposed a punitive five-year indemnity of 20,000 talents (120 million drachmas) that was to be paid immediately. This was done by mortgaging the Greeks' towns and classical art works to Roman lenders who charged excessive interest, which, once again, caused financial ruin in Asia Minor.<sup>130</sup> This again, brought in the *publicani* to collect the debts or to enslave, or kill those who did not comply. This made the financial situation worse than it had been before the First Mithridatic War.

The Second Mithridatic War (83-81 BC) consisted of little more than a few skirmishes between Sulla's legate Murena and Mithridates. When Sulla ordered that Murena stop hounding Mithridates, the war came to an end.<sup>131</sup> Mithridates, not satisfied with his settlements with Sulla, once again capitalized on financial hardship in Asia Minor. He also wanted the kingdom of Bithynia, which had just been bequeathed to Rome by the will of king Nicomedes. Mithridates had an eye on that kingdom for decades as well as others in the region. So Mithridates declared that he would cancel all debts in Asia and for that, many Greeks sided with him again. This brought Lucullus into the command of the Third Mithridatic War (74-66). During the war Lucullus modified the war indemnity of Sulla to mitigate the debt which had financially devastated Asia; he also forgave the debts of several cities that had remained loyal. By doing this Lucullus

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<sup>128</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 279.

<sup>129</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 353-55

<sup>130</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 355.

<sup>131</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 361-63.

made it more difficult for Mithridates to gain and maintain Greek support. Mithridates hurt himself by executing many nobles in the region because of his paranoia over assassination threats or attempts. This damaged relations in Galatia most of all, because he killed off many of the chieftains who could have been allies. Lucullus' modification of the debts also allowed the free cities to pay off their debts in five years and to once again become economically viable, and therefore more willing partners in Roman rule.

When Pompey arrived in the east, he reversed nearly all of what Lucullus had done politically but left the war debt modifications alone.<sup>132</sup> Those who argue that Pompey was a tool of the *publicani* ignore this major factor.<sup>133</sup> The *publicani* had lost a great deal of money by Lucullus' actions; their contracts to collect the war debt were not mitigated until well after Pompey had returned home. These acts were pushed by Crassus, his once political rival and ally of the *publicani*.<sup>134</sup>

The way Pompey set up the new governments and new tax system seems to have taken some of the financial history of the region into consideration. He did not want the Greek cities or the new provinces to feel that they bore too heavy a burden. So he spread out the burden. Taxing everyone in the new provinces and kingdoms made the tax burden less on the individual but most likely brought in more to the Roman treasury by expanding the overall tax base. Badian and Sherwin-White discuss the amount of revenue that Pompey brought to the treasury and state that it had to have included

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<sup>132</sup> Plutarch, "*Pompey*," p. 195.

<sup>133</sup> Frank, p. 191-3. He takes it from Plutarch who wrongly cites political alliances between certain tribunes and Pompey before they actually knew each other. Appian also use hindsight in some of Pompey's political relationships making them appear to have more preordained significance.

<sup>134</sup> Dio Cassius, Ernest Cary, "trans.," *Roman History Vol. III*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914. 2001. p. 211.

client-kings and free cities to amount to the level that it did.<sup>135</sup> Badian even asserts that it was Pompey who first taxed client-kings and free cities, learning this technique from Seleucid's precedents in Syria. Pompey's actions in the development of a more broad taxation system could have achieved many things at the same time. Spread out taxation brought more revenue into the state and most likely lightened the burden on the individual payer.

Not only did Pompey make taxation more even in the provinces, but he could have made the job of the *publicani* easier. In Pontus the new system of indirect rule which Pompey set up, the *publicani* were excluded from direct taxation.<sup>136</sup> However, they still collected from the local censors and senates who collected taxes from their own regions.<sup>137</sup> This made the system have more checks and balances, but it also made the job of the *publicani* easier and probably less expensive due to the fact that they did not have to range all over the new territory. Badian put forth the idea that the *publicani* were not overly interested in expansion at this time because they did not have the manpower or the resources to spread out their activities at a whim.<sup>138</sup> Also, they probably did not want new equestrians to rise up in the provinces which would compete with their tax companies.

The equestrians were like the senatorial class in this respect; they too guarded their territories and did not like newcomers within their class who would compete with them. The Republic's senatorial class tried to keep the number of new praetors within their families' control. This was a reason for the *publicani* to be a reluctantly growing

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<sup>135</sup> Badian, p. 78-79. Sherwin-White, p. 231-233.

<sup>136</sup> Kallet-Marx, p. 328. Sherwin-White, p. 231-233

<sup>137</sup> Fletcher, p. 24

<sup>138</sup> Badian, p. 70-72. He details how both the senatorial and equestrian class guarded their membership.

class and why the Republic, as a whole, was a reluctantly growing empire.<sup>139</sup> Pompey's indirect system could have allowed a *publicani* company to cover more territory indirectly, therefore keeping more of it in one company's hands. Pompey could have pleased the tax payers and the tax collectors in this new system at the same time without any contradictions. This is overlooked within the historiography; which makes it seem as though Pompey could only serve one interest at a time; but this does not necessarily have to be the case.<sup>140</sup> Pompey like other politicians in Rome attempted to serve as many interests as he could. Without multiple clients of all classes, one could not get elected into powerful positions in the senate or be appointed as a general over armies. Also there is the fact that each of the three major classes in Rome were not necessarily in opposition to each other. There were coalitions but no political parties, and they were usually temporary alliances that shifted rapidly. The *publicani* were of the equestrian class no doubt, but that class was not in lockstep with each other politically or in other ways. What Frank tried to show was that Pompey was able to make promises to the equestrians that no one in Rome could have kept or predicted. For that reason it is hard, if not impossible, to prove that Pompey was a tool for the *publicani* in his annexation of Pontus or Syria.

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<sup>139</sup> Sherwin-White, p. 7-9.

<sup>140</sup> Fletcher, Badian, and Sherwin-White are the main exceptions to this financial view of the imperialist thesis. Though Badian shows how the equestrians could have pushed some expansion; he places most imperialist notions on the men of senatorial rank who followed in Pompey's footsteps, mainly Crassus and Caesar. Even Badian pushes the imperialist thesis for Pompey but not before his large eastern command.

### Annexation: Imperialistically Desirable or Strategic Necessity?

The Roman Republic was a reluctantly growing empire that preferred to maintain indirect hegemony in Asia Minor as it had for a century. Badian points out that these precedents were followed by Marius and Sulla, who conquered many lands but annexed nothing, not in Africa, Gaul, Egypt or Asia; they nor Rome had interest in direct rule at those times.<sup>141</sup> Sulla, while he was dictator, could have annexed Egypt but did nothing to take that kingdom. Annexation of Pontus after the Third Mithridatic War was seen by many Romans as a necessity. Annexation was not the preferable method of Roman rule for several reasons including lack of finances and man power.<sup>142</sup> There is no evidence that Rome ever went to war with the express reason to bring revenue to the state or to expand the grain dole or to further public works; in fact, many wars cost more than they were worth; Romans were aware of this fact.<sup>143</sup> A major exception to this would be individual generals like Caesar and Crassus who manipulated wars for their own gain on more than one occasion. The western provinces, which were the precedent, were not as profitable as might be expected and so many Romans did not perceive a new province as a large money maker and did not want to expand into the east. The later profits from the east took decades to make the new acquisitions worthwhile.<sup>144</sup> Pompey could not predict the economic future of the east he and others initially sought to balance power in the region and to maintain a hegemonic check on eastern powers. Eventually the east

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<sup>141</sup> Badian, p. 27-28, 33-34.

<sup>142</sup> Sherwin-White, p. 9-11.

<sup>143</sup> Sviatoslav Dmitriev, "The Rise and Quick Fall of the Theory of Ancient Economic Imperialism," *Economic History Review*, 62, 4 (2009), p. 793.

<sup>144</sup> Badian, p.27-34.

became very profitable, but this cannot be used to determine what Pompey did a decade or so before; he had no way of knowing just how profitable it would become. Added to this was the new expense of administrating a province and the cost of armies, of which Syria alone was given four legions. The army was nearly doubled after the annexations of Pompey just to maintain what had been acquired; these expenses are only discussed in-depth in Sherwin-White's work. He explains that these economic aspects of empire kept Rome in a conservative growth pattern for more than a century after her first acquisitions in Asia.<sup>145</sup> He also details how troubles in the western provinces kept Rome occupied well up into the Mithridatic Wars, especially in Spain, which was under the control of the rebel general Sertorius. Sertorius had made overtures to Mithridates for support and some sort of alliance.<sup>146</sup> Basically Rome was spread thin and could not or did not desire to conquer at will, especially in the east.

After the Romans had defeated Sertorius (under Metellus' and Pompey's command), ended the slave revolts and defeated the pirates in the Mediterranean, they could focus on Asia Minor. Even after Rome's hands were free, annexation was not the first option in the east. Lucullus initially re-installed the Seleucid king on his throne.<sup>147</sup> Pompey removed him by right of conquest of Tigranes' territory, which had included the Seleucids lands in Syria and Cilicia. Lucullus had also initially given portions of Pontus to Mithridates' son Machares.<sup>148</sup> This son was later killed by his father and Pompey found another son, Pharnaces, to give the Bosphorus region. Pompey by annexing land

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<sup>145</sup> Sherwin-White, p. 9.

<sup>146</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 365-367.

<sup>147</sup> Plutarch, "*Lucullus*," p. 529, 549. Glanville Downey, "The Occupation of Syria by the Romans," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, vol.82 (1951), p. 151. Sherwin-White, p. 180.

<sup>148</sup> Appian, p. 397-99.

was following the precedent of other Romans who took land primarily for security purposes, not for financial gain and only after other options were exhausted. Mithridates was allowed to keep his land after two wars with Rome, but a third war was too much and so his land, at least a portion of it, had to be annexed and broken up. Even Lucullus saw fit to annex portions of the kingdom and so by that time it was almost certain that Pontus would be reduced in power and size by any governor sent into the region.<sup>149</sup> Lucullus did not see fit to annex Syria during his command, and this is where the idea that *publicani* punished him by having the tribunes in Rome replace him.<sup>150</sup>

Frank calls Pompey in his annexation of Syria a radical expansionist and says that he did it for payback to the *publicani*. Downey details some political wrangling that went on in Syria for the years between Lucullus and Pompey's commands. He shows how Rome was trying to find a suitable client-king to control the Seleucid dynasty. This could suggest that Pompey's annexation of Syria was not a forgone conclusion and that Rome had experimented with a compromise that failed. He was forced out of security reasons to annex the territory for direct rule.<sup>151</sup> This would back the thesis that Pompey was not a tool of the *publicani* in this matter, nor was he necessarily a ravenous imperialist. It would also appear as though Pompey was concerned with security more than with the growth of the empire at the time. Therefore the reluctant empire thesis of Badian and Sherwin-White seems to make more sense in Syria and in Pontus' annexation than does an aggressive imperialist policy pushed by economics and lust for power.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Plutarch, "*Lucullus*," p. 529, 549.

<sup>150</sup> Frank, p. 191-3. He gets this from Appian and Plutarch who with hindsight made some of Pompey's political deals seem foreordained. A major problem with this assessment is that he was initially replaced by the senate, not the popular assembly.

<sup>151</sup> Downey, p. 162-3.

<sup>152</sup> Badian, p. 1-5. Sherwin-White, p. 8-11.

### Provinces, City-States and Client-Kingdoms

After the annexation of new provinces Pompey had to organize them. The reasons why Pompey created city-states in some areas and client-kingdoms in others is a major question. Most look at the imperialist, financial and strategic reasons behind Pompey's divisions.<sup>153</sup> Most either ignore or deny outright that Pompey had any cultural motivations in his organization of the eastern provinces and client-kingdoms. Pompey broke the old kingdom of Pontus into pieces, some of which were given to client-kings and other portions were divided into eleven city-states and added to the province of Bithynia, which Rome had recently acquired upon king Nicomedes' death.<sup>154</sup> Mithridates had been the last independent king in the region, afterward Rome controlled directly or indirectly the whole of Asia Minor.

The city-states included Greek and Graeco-Persian cities on the Black Sea coast and small towns and cities of Pontus that Pompey re-organized. These were all brought into the new province of Bithynia-Pontus. In these towns and cities Pompey built or repaired many buildings and temples and re-dedicated them, often by naming them after himself, either from a form of his name Pompey, or from his title Magnus. These city-states were situated along the great trade routes that linked the east to the west and therefore served as trade outposts.<sup>155</sup> They were all contiguous and so formed a larger

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<sup>153</sup> Fletcher and Magie, trade and strategic, Frank, financial/imperialist reasons, Badian and Sherwin-White, strategic reasons, Jones, for administrative ease. They all deny cultural reasons behind the settlements of Pompey.

<sup>154</sup> Strabo, Horace Leonard Jones, "trans.," *Geography Vol. V*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928. 1988. p. 373.

<sup>155</sup> Magie, p. 370-1. Secured trade and other movement.

cooperating community. The names of these internal Pontic cities were Pompeiopolis, Neapolis, Amaseia, Magnopolis, Zela, Diospolis and Megalopolis.<sup>156</sup> Nicopolis was built up with his own veterans on the border or inside of Armenia on the site of his final victory over Mithridates' army. The existing Greek cities on the coast were Amistris, Sinope, and Amisus; Strabo adds Heraclea to the province of Bithynia-Pontus, but he does not say if it was added by Pompey or afterwards.<sup>157</sup> To the internal cities Pompey drew peoples from existing villages and towns and rebuilt many which were destroyed in the last war. Pompey finished construction on the royal capital Amaseia renamed by Mithridates to Eupatoria and then again by Pompey, to Magnopolis.

Pompey gave these new city-states a uniform constitution, the *lex Pompeia*, that governed the way they set up local senates and assemblies; it was a mix of Greek and Roman government with more power invested in the aristocratic senates than in the Roman model. The local governments were in charge of collecting taxes from their own region; these taxes were then collected at the central city within these city-states.<sup>158</sup> This was a more efficient way to collect taxes and administer these often remote rural territories than to send *publicani* all over each region. The local constitutions did not govern local custom or actual civil law except for citizenship, which was strictly enforced to ensure that the new city-states did not dissolve immediately.<sup>159</sup> These citizenship laws were still in effect at least a hundred years later, according to a letter from Pliny the

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<sup>156</sup> Strabo, p. 375. Fletcher, p. 18.

<sup>157</sup> Jones, p. 158-60.

<sup>158</sup> Kallet-Marx, p. 328.

<sup>159</sup> A.J. Marshall, "Pompey's Organization of Bithynia-Pontus: Two Neglected Texts," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol.58, Parts 1 and 2 (1968), p. 103-109.

Younger to the emperor Trajan.<sup>160</sup> That fact contradicts the idea that Pompey's organization was premature and that the region needed or preferred royal rule; Sullivan is a proponent of that view. He cites actions during the civil wars of Antony and Octavius, which put much of the eastern lands back into the hands of kings.<sup>161</sup> What Sullivan does not detail is what lands exactly were involved, how many were reverted to royal hands, and how long they remained so. Fletcher answers these questions by showing that both Antony and Octavius used kings to collect taxes and control their territory in their time of emergency, but not long after Octavius became master of the Roman world he reverted those regions back to the system which Pompey had set up under the *lex Pompeia*.<sup>162</sup> Braund and Sherwin-White add to this argument in their view of how Rome dealt with royalty. They both agree that Rome would have no problem in making a kingdom into a province and later back into a kingdom again. It was not contrary to Roman practice to make and break kings as they were used in a similar fashion as Roman governors; in fact, many were given *ornamenta* of pro-praetors or pro-consuls and some were later given Roman citizenship.<sup>163</sup> The practice of making kings citizens probably began under Antony or Caesar, but it happened on a larger scale after the principate emerged. Kings becoming citizens of Rome no doubt brought them into the Graeco-Roman cultural elite and therefore helped to acculturate them as well as their subjects to Roman ideals.

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<sup>160</sup> Pliny the Younger, Betty Radice, "trans.," *Letters Vol. II*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. 2004. p. 305-7.

<sup>161</sup> Sullivan, p.331-332.

<sup>162</sup> Fletcher, p. 27-28.

<sup>163</sup> Braund, p. 26.

Jones sees the organization of city-states by Pompey as a convenient and efficient way to rule indirectly; he also states that Rome was incapable of ruling the region itself.<sup>164</sup> He argues that the yearly system of governors would have been inadequate to rule such a vast and rural landscape; this ignores the system of longer term governors which had been normal for a few decades. Jones also put forth the idea that Pompey had no elevated cultural motivation for the way he organized the new city-states. If that were true, he could have given them to client-kings to govern and not allow Greek style democracy to flourish. Instead, he took non-royals into consideration giving them some level democracy. Fletcher and Magie put forth a primarily strategic and trade motive behind Pompey's actions; but also state that no cultural changes occurred even though they detail how serfs and subjects of Pontus were converted into free citizens by Pompey's acts.<sup>165</sup>

Serfs within Pontus were freed and given their own lands and a civil government which they could take part in. This would have had the potential for dramatic cultural shift. They were linked to the existing Greek city-states on the coast of the Black Sea and this too could have fostered cultural exchange. Nearly all within the historiography deny any cultural motives in Pompey's organizations and therefore deny his desire to be likened to Alexander in that aspect. This stems from the fact that the economic thesis for expansion is linked to the imperialist thesis. The imperialist thesis is too weighted in modern politics to allow any positive ideas to come out of any ancient or modern empire. Something must have happened culturally by massing populations together, giving them new civic identities, securing them militarily and by bringing trade from around the

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<sup>164</sup> Jones, p.157.

<sup>165</sup> Fletcher, p. 27. Magie, p. 369.

empire to all of the new city-states. This did have massive cultural effects upon the new citizens, especially in making them more Greco-Roman over time; after all, many of the ancient historians who wrote about these very event for Rome, came from Asia Minor and the east.<sup>166</sup>

The *lex Pompeia* gave and even forced new civic identity upon many peoples who had been tribal and living in rural villages. The cities of Bithynia-Pontus were allowed to give citizenship to anyone so long as they were not already a citizen of any other city in the new province.<sup>167</sup> Pompey's law took away tribal identities and gave them a new civic one, this was a negative aspect of cultural change but it counters those who deny any cultural motives. The new citizens had to embrace their new identity if they wanted to participate in civic government. They were given legal protection as citizens by this act so this may have drawn or pushed many to do so.

By Pompey's laws these new citizens were given political expression, which is one of the most fundamental cultural aspects of a free city or an individual citizen within Greco-Roman ideals. By their participation, the citizens both governed their own actions and also governed the region for Rome. This was a two-fold benefit for Rome. These citizens lifted the burden of direct rule from Rome, but they also were being Romanized at the same time, which was a cultural shift, bad or good, in a fundamental way. Their old ethnic identities would eventually fade, and their children would adopt the new civic and imperial identity. Strabo, criticizing Rome, says that very thing about the region around Mysia; that many kings and empires had influenced the region before,

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<sup>166</sup> Appian, Arrian, Dio Cassius, Strabo, Josephus, all these and more came fro provinces in Asia Minor and Syria which should add to the fact that these areas were eventually brought into Roman culture as all of them wrote Roman history though they were not technically Roman. They were however all, full Roman citizens.

<sup>167</sup> Pliny the Younger, X. cxiv, p. 307.

the Greeks, the Persians, and the Macedonians but by his time (64 BC- 25 AD) all of the names and accents of those other peoples including earlier tribes had disappeared due to Roman influence.<sup>168</sup> Many of Pompey's laws were still in effect by Dio's time (150-235 AD) and the Graeco-Romanization would have been even more concrete by then.<sup>169</sup>

For these reasons it would suggest that Pompey did have some desire for spreading culture. This does not mean that it was superior it just means that it may have been a motive behind his organizations. If not he could have simply annexed the region and divided it among client-kings. He did not have to free serfs in Pontus serving on royal lands. Pompey gave a level of freedom to people who had never known it before.<sup>170</sup> Other Roman commanders may have enslaved and sold those serfs for profit as was common after large wars. In 167 BC after the Pyrrhic Wars 150,000 were enslaved by Roman generals in Epirus. In 57 BC, Caesar enslaved 53,000 from one Gallic tribe.<sup>171</sup> If it was greed that chiefly motivated Pompey this could have been one of the options for Pontic the serfs. The past wars and debt in the region must have made Pompey want a different solution that fostered a longer lasting peace.

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<sup>168</sup> Strabo, p. 463.

<sup>169</sup> Dio Cassius, p. 133. Dio was from the region of Bithynia as well, and served the Severen emperors who were themselves part Syrian and North African. This more than suggests that enculturation was rather developed.

<sup>170</sup> Fletcher, p. 27. Magie, p. 369.

<sup>171</sup> Sandra R. Joshel, *Slavery In The Roman World*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p. 54-55.

## Client-Kings

After Pompey took over the east he distributed Paphlagonia (part of it), Armenia, Achaea, Iberia, Colchis, Mesopotamia, Sophane and Gordyne to client-kings; the main body of old Pontus did not become a Roman province until under Nero's reign.<sup>172</sup>

Rome had always partnered with kings to run the indirect empire and as it became more direct, the practice did not cease. As Braund points out, Rome's use of kings varied, and each relationship was different; therefore none of them can be compared on an equal footing.<sup>173</sup> Weak and strong kings were both used by Rome and neither was preferred across the spectrum. Weak kings were often desired in areas that were secure and had natural barriers protecting them; such was the case in Egypt. The case was different in Asia where strong kings were preferred due to the threat of the rising Parthian power; Cappadocia's king Ariobarzanes was an exception. Ariobarzanes had been deposed several times by Mithridates and was always loyal to Rome, so despite his weakness he was retained as king until he stepped down in favor of his son. The last of the Seleucids (Philip II and Antiochus XIII) were also weak but due to greater instability and their proximity to Parthia, they were removed by Pompey.<sup>174</sup> There were other reasons which will be explained in chapter 3.

Pompey, in his organization of client-kingdoms, chose weak and strong kings based on their past loyalty.<sup>175</sup> One of the strongest of these kings was Tigranes of

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<sup>172</sup> K. Wellesley, "The Extent of the Territory Added to Bithynia by Pompey," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, Neue Folge, 96. Bd., 4. H. (1953), p. 309-11.

<sup>173</sup> Braund, p. 185-6. He does not even like the term "client-king" as their relations were much more equal than typical clients.

<sup>174</sup> Downey, p. 160-63. Sherwin-White, p. 49, 212-213.

<sup>175</sup> Sherwin-White, p. 226. The strong Galatian king Deiotarus and the weaker Cappadocian king Ariobarzanes were retained and even given more land by Pompey.

Armenia, who regained his traditional kingdom by surrendering and submitting to Pompey. Tigranes had been utterly defeated by Lucullus in the previous year's campaign but was still a threat. His own son, also named Tigranes, had joined with the Parthian king Phraates to invade Armenia, partly due to the coaxing of Pompey. King Tigranes defeated their joint forces and put his son to flight. At first the younger Tigranes sought refuge with Mithridates, his maternal grandfather, but upon learning that he was fleeing from Pompey, chose to go to Pompey himself and offer his service as guide through Armenia. This is one reason king Tigranes supplicated himself to Pompey so easily. He had little of his military strength left and he did not want to lose his kingdom to a treacherous son. So Tigranes became a client of Rome in much the same way as many before him, first as an enemy who surrendered and later as a loyal friend and ally who helped keep Parthia in check.<sup>176</sup>

The other strong king was Deiotarus of Galatia, who was increased in his lands and power for his long service and loyalty to Rome in all three Mithridatic Wars. As deterrence against Parthia, Pompey recognized him and other kings in the region. Pompey split up lands from Pontus and Armenia Minor among Deiotarus' fellow Galatian chiefs, as a further check upon Tigranes and on each other. Pompey in this manner was following long held precedent in which Rome maintained hegemony through indirect rule by maintaining multiple royals within an important region. This had been done for more than a century in that very region, and it was Mithridates who had upset this balance of power. Pompey reset the balance and further checked these client-kings by placing free city-states within some of them. This was done with the city-state of Nicopolis, which was most likely inside or on the border of Lesser Armenia and therefore

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<sup>176</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 437-439.

inside the Galatian chiefs' new territories.<sup>177</sup> He did the same for the Bosphorus kingdom of Pharnaces II, Mithridates' son. There the Greek city of Phanagoria was given its independence perhaps to keep an eye on Pharnaces II and perhaps to assimilate the territory into a more Greco-Roman region.

The merging of two separate kingdoms, Bithynia and Pontus under a new constitutional province was an immediate cultural and legal change.<sup>178</sup> The new cities inside the province had freedom in controlling their own affairs but now there was a provincial governing body that would resolve disputes between them. Cultural exchange could not be avoided as Rome's hegemony grew. Cultural exchange went both ways as Romans brought Greek and eastern ideas home. So perhaps Pompey should be given more credit for his organization and his spread of culture as a conscious effort. The fact that Pompey set some cities free brings the imperialist thesis into question. He could have completely turned the east over to client-kings as had been done in the past, but he did not. The imperialist thesis that denies cultural motives deny that Romans and her subjects affected each other's culture both positively and negatively.

### Pompey's Clientage

The issue of personal clientage in the east may be another major reason behind Pompey's organizations. This is one argument that can be combined with other motives without contradiction. The ancient institution of clientage is more complex than creating

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<sup>177</sup> Strabo, Horace Leonard Jones, "trans.," *Geography Vol. V*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928. 1988. p. 425.

<sup>178</sup> Jesper Majbom Madsen, *Eager to be Roman: Greek Response to Roman Rule in Pontus and Bithynia*, London: Duckworth, 2009. p. 27. Madsen claims that few would argue that cultural change did not happen but there are many who denied it as illustrated above and in the introduction.

a vassal or subject. The historiography has over stated the subservience of clients, be they fellow Romans, eastern subjects, or kings. Clients in the ancient world could have been and were treated more as friends, family and allies. Clientage and patronage was a two way relationship that was not always permanent in nature. Pompey could have certainly gained personal clients without any illegal or unethical intentions. Many clients were gained by Pompey and his legates and advisors who helped negotiate the eastern settlements.

Badian points out that Pompey himself became the lender to most of the new kings in the region and perhaps also gained vast amounts of land along with these 'loans' to kings.<sup>179</sup> He also posits that Pompey upon his return had more clients and wealth than any other Roman, including Crassus, who had been the wealthiest in both money and clients up to that point. The problem with Badian's arguments on clientage and loaning is that it overturns his own thesis about Rome being a reluctant empire by one man's actions based on gaining massive wealth and clients. He first states that Pompey and Rome were not ravenous imperialists, then he concludes that Pompey and the senatorial elite became greedy imperialists after they witnessed the wealth of the east.<sup>180</sup> There is little to no evidence that Pompey actually loaned out money; surely he did but the levels that Badian states are too extreme. He makes it seem as though Pompey was the owner of more land in Asia than anyone else and that it was gained in nefarious ways through overcharging interest. This would seem to contradict what Pompey actually did with the

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<sup>179</sup> Badian, p. 83-4.

<sup>180</sup> Badian, p. 86-7. The wealth of the east in future tax revenues did not materialize as rapidly as the imperialist thesis implies. It took more than a generation for this to happen and this was after multiple civil wars and after the death of Pompey and Caesar.

tax system to prevent the provinces from desiring more war with Rome. So why would he wish to create the same situation and make himself the reason for it on top of that?

The courts in Rome did not prosecute him for any discrepancies upon his return. He had plenty of enemies who would have loved to indict him under the extortion laws that other governors had been convicted under. Lucullus and others did everything in their power to thwart Pompey's political influence and the ratification of his eastern settlements.<sup>181</sup> Lucullus actually came out of retirement to do so. Some of Pompey's 'clients' were convicted of bribes and extortion later, namely Gabinius, while governing the newly annexed Syrian province.<sup>182</sup> He supposedly took a bribe from King Ptolemy Auletes to restore him to the throne of Egypt. Gabinius supposedly did it for Pompey and Crassus, although that cannot be proven and is anachronistic in that it supposes the First Triumvirate was active before it was fully formed.<sup>183</sup> Gabinius was convicted and went into exile for a time. There is no clear evidence that Gabinius and Pompey were still in a 'client-patron' relationship at the time of the events in Egypt.

The point being that, Pompey was never prosecuted for any of his dealings in the provinces nor was he even charged with anything related to them. Pompey obviously made plenty of legitimate money and clients in the east, so he had little need to break any extortion laws. Pompey did become the richest Roman of his time, but this does not mean that in the process, he did not help the new citizens and subjects of Rome.

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<sup>181</sup> Plutarch, Bernadotte Perrin, "trans.," *Lives Vol. V*, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1917. 1968. p. 235.

<sup>182</sup> Mary Siani-Davis, "Ptolemy XII Auletes and the Romans," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 46. H. 3 (3<sup>rd</sup> Qtr. 1997), p. 331-337. He supposedly took a 10,000 talent payment from Ptolemy. Richard Williams, "The Role of 'Amicitia' in the Career of A. Gabinius (Cos. 58)," *Phoenix*, vol. 32 No. 3 (Autumn, 1978), p. 207-8. He also shows how a once client did have to be in a long term alliance with a patron. Clientage and patronage could last as short as the passage of one law.

<sup>183</sup> Williams, p. 203-4.

In fact part of his settlements which the senate did not want to ratify were land grants to his retiring soldiers.<sup>184</sup> The Roman Republic had a problem with paying the retirement of soldiers and often left it up to army commanders to provide for their men. This is a major aspect overlooked by the imperialist economic/greed thesis. Pompey had to look out for the welfare of his soldiers, especially the older retiring ones. Nobody else would have done so for the thousands of men who had given 20 plus years of service to the army.

Most of the money that he spread out to clients, the army, and portions that he kept had come out of Mithridates' vast hordes, which were buried in mountain fortresses. It took a month to catalog all the gold and valuables in just one of these fortresses.<sup>185</sup> Much of this money was probably just given away to friendly kings and city-states, not as loans, as Badian suggests. Pompey in a sense freed up lines of credit and made cash flow possible by investing and loaning, and allowing others to invest. Before, only Mithridates had that kind of wealth, and much of it was in these useless hordes, only for him to adore. By taking Mithridates' vast wealth Pompey had no need to extort other kings in the region. Quite the contrary, he was able to pay them off and give them gifts. He was also able to pay his men bonuses and retirement pay.<sup>186</sup>

None within the historiography detail the ancient institution of Graeco-Roman gift giving to friends and clients except Braund. This makes it appear that only loans with interest were given. Much of what Pompey gave to kings was just that, a gift that

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<sup>184</sup> Plutarch, "*Pompey*," p. 239. Plutarch, "*Lucullus*," p. 607. Pompey had to bargain with Crassus and Caesar to achieve his eastern settlements' ratification and to gain land for his retired veterans. This was one of the First Triumvirates' earliest political actions.

<sup>185</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 463-465.

<sup>186</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War* p. 465. He paid each soldier 1500 Attic drachmas (silver pieces). His officers were paid more. In total he paid the army 16,000 talents (96 million drachma/denarii)

required no tangible repayment and only implied a favor owed to him.<sup>187</sup> Many kings did return the favor during the civil wars by serving Pompey and later on his son Sextus. A major issue in the historiography that needs to be revised is that wealth and power did not always include corruption, and that becoming wealthy and creating empire could be positive and beneficial to multiple levels of society. Badian attempted to clean out some of the imperialistic language of the 19th-20<sup>th</sup> century from Roman history, but he concluded with much of the same language himself. He placed blame on the individual person of Pompey and on the later Republic's senatorial class for becoming too greedy.<sup>188</sup> He paints Pompey as one of the first to figure out the game of massive exploitation and claims that others followed. He denied, though, that those who preceded Pompey were guilty of the same exploitation even though they too had to buy soldiers land and pay their retirements. When he had the ultimate power in his hands, he always laid it down to enter the city as a private citizen. He was not like Marius and Sulla before him nor was he like Caesar afterwards in that respect. He mitigated high debts of the east and did not punish the new subjects as had Sulla.

As shown above, Pompey could have been loosely imperialistic in a sense, at the same time being concerned with positive *clientela* development, depending on what region and situation one is looking at. There is no way to judge Pompey's dealings across the board as they differed with each king and city-state. In this Pompey was not innovative; he was following long held Roman precedent in dealing with foreign peoples and policies. Badian's assessment makes Pompey's actions seem out of the norm for a

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<sup>187</sup> Appian, *Mithr War*, p. 463. Some of these favors were cashed in during the civil wars when Pompey was given support against Caesar.

<sup>188</sup> Badian, p. 79, 86-7.

Roman proconsul. His actions were not so different than those of previous Romans; it was the size and scope of these dealings and his gain of clients that were unprecedented.

### Pompey as an Alexander Figure

The idea that Pompey was an Alexander figure is two fold; he was portrayed as such by the primary literature to a degree and he purposely tried to orchestrate such a public image.<sup>189</sup> He was not the only Roman to emulate Alexander nor the only one to be compared to him: Caesar himself tried to live up to the standards of Alexander, especially in conquest. Pompey definitely saw himself as a new Alexander by many of the actions he took throughout his life. He like other elites surrounded himself with the Greek philosophers of the day, among them, Poseidonios. That philosopher was his Aristotle and moral guide. Much of the history concerning Pompey and his eastern campaigns are attributed to Poseidonios, though it is lost now. However, some of his ideas are discernible in the works of Plutarch and Appian.

At a very young age (23), Pompey became a very successful general during the Civil Wars of Sulla and Marius. Legally he was not old enough to hold a generalship, nor was he in the senatorial class, but civil war made it possible to circumvent the law.<sup>190</sup> Many at that time compared him to Alexander in likeness and action. Pompey showed a balance of strength and clemency throughout his military career, whether against other Romans, Gauls, Celt-Iberians, pirates, or those he fought in the Mithridatic War. He gained as much by diplomacy as he did by military action if not more. This reputation

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<sup>189</sup> Appian, *Mithr War*, p. 469.

<sup>190</sup> Appian, *Civil Wars*, p. 147-9.

spread in the pirate war and allowed him to capture, through surrender, the majority of those outlaws.<sup>191</sup> Those dealings also allowed him to draw Mithridates' supporters and family members to seek his clemency. This clemency can be perceived in multiple perspectives which do not have to be contradictory. In giving clemency Pompey could have been diplomatic in some cases while in others he was merely seeking clients, but both could work hand in hand. In receiving new client-kings he could also gain payments of indemnity or other gifts for himself or the state; but he could also give gifts and friendship himself. Rome's and Pompey's relationships with clients were not one-sided as often described.<sup>192</sup> Pompey like other Romans pursued friendship in the classical Greek way that fostered elite bonds that were nearly universal throughout the Mediterranean. Because of this, elite Romans had much in common with the eastern dynasts and elites in Greek language, education, and culture.<sup>193</sup>

Appian details how Pompey sought to explore new regions and to be the first Roman to see places like the Caspian Sea and the Red Sea. He failed in both because he paid more attention to duty than to side treks that may have angered the senate if something had gone wrong. Though powerful and invested with imperium in the east, Pompey was mindful of the senate. One reason he brought all of his philosophers on his campaign was to record their discoveries. Many of these are copies of myths like Amazon women and such, but other observations actually describe the geography of new territory.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Appian, *Mithr. War*, p. 423.

<sup>192</sup> Braund, p. 81-82. He refuses to call kings 'clients' because of the freedom most had over their own kingdom and the good relations they had with Rome. They often used Rome as much as Rome used them. Their relationship was more mutual in his assessment.

<sup>193</sup> Braund, 7-12. Many kings sent their sons to Rome to be educated and to make connections. The armies in the provinces also hosted kings and their sons who spent time with Roman governors and generals.

<sup>194</sup> Strabo, Vol. V. xi. p.233.

Pompey did spread Hellenism by the act of annexation and making alliances with kings and free city-states. He founded cities just as Alexander had and perhaps for the same reason of Hellenizing non-Greek peoples. Pompey could have administrated the east in a more totalitarian way, but he chose not to; this should be taken into consideration in the imperialist thesis. He gave attention to the common people of the east by including them in their civic governments. In this he definitely spread Hellenism and therefore forwarded the idea that he was like Alexander in that respect.

The image of Alexander was present in Pompey's triumphs, going back to the very first, over his victories in Africa during the Marian-Sullan Civil Wars. He attempted to triumph on a chariot drawn by four elephants, an Alexander image, but the gates of Rome were too low so he had to continue on a horse-drawn triumphal chariot instead.<sup>195</sup> In his Mithridatic War triumph, he supposedly wore a silk cloak of Alexander's that was given to him by one of the Ptolemies.<sup>196</sup> Even Appian scoffed at the idea that the cloak was actually Alexander's, but that does not take away from the idea that perhaps Pompey and many in the crowd believed it was, and that he shared that mantle with Alexander the Great metaphorically and physically.

Perception was very important to projecting his image, so Pompey wisely paid court to various Greek cities on his way home from the eastern. He visited Mitylene and Athens and attended the performances of poets, sophists and philosophers. In Mitylene he gave the sophists a talent each (6000 denarii) and did the same with the philosophers

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<sup>195</sup> Plutarch, p. 149-151.

<sup>196</sup> Appian, p. 469.

in Athens.<sup>197</sup> This is probably a major reason why Pompey is remembered so positively in those circles and perhaps why Plutarch recounts that particular story.

Plutarch was very concerned with detailing which Romans had embraced Greek *paideia* and those who had not; those who had, he considered true gentlemen of education and enlightenment. Memnon of Herakleia judged Romans the same way, not as a group but as individuals and those who embraced Greek education were seen as good men; those who did not were considered tyrants.<sup>198</sup> Those who see Pompey as one not concerned with culture should re-examine his visits to Greek cities and the Greek cultural elite.<sup>199</sup> Pompey may have simply been proactive in making sure his image was an enlightened, educated Greek one, especially among those who were the greatest orators and writers of the east. The historiography should at least recognize that he either manipulated a cultured image or that he actually desired to spread culture.

Sulla's actions against these Greek cities in the First Mithridatic War should be taken into consideration in Pompey's dealings after the Third Mithridatic War. Sulla had sacked Athens and other cities for allying with Mithridates in the first war.<sup>200</sup> Perhaps Pompey wanted to make amends for the destruction that Sulla wrought upon the Greek cities. He did not want his image to be likened to Sulla. The ancient sources who detail his return make it a point to say that he dismissed his army at Brundisium and entered Rome with only a few friends. Appian and Plutarch both call it one of his greatest

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<sup>197</sup> Plutarch, p. 225.

<sup>198</sup> Daniela Dueck, "Memnon of Herakleia: On Rome and the Romans," Tonnes Bekker-Nielsen, ed., *Rome and the Black Sea Region: Domination, Romanisation, Resistance*, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006

<sup>199</sup> Nearly all in the historiography deny that Pompey had any cultural motivation in his settlements.

<sup>200</sup> Appian, *Mithr. Wars*, 307

achievements, since many in Rome feared him marching on the city as had Sulla.<sup>201</sup>

However, this act did cost him a political hand that he could have played.

For this reason many of the ancient sources judge him to be of a more enlightened character than Sulla. Perhaps that is one of the things he had set out to do in his tour of Greece on the way home. Appian and Plutarch wrote that they wished that Pompey would have died right after his return, also an allusion to Alexander, who died before he could ruin his own reputation through political infighting. The imperialist thesis that claims that Pompey was not emulating Alexander actually contradict themselves in a manner. Alexander was most certainly an aggressive imperialist for several reason especially in spreading Hellenism. One reason the imperial thesis does not use Alexander is that he too sought cultural spread and exploration as much as material wealth. This model weakens the imperialist /economic thesis which overstates economic drive in imperial expansion. This is why the imperialist thesis distances Pompey from Alexander.

### Pontus Conclusion

Pompey could have been many or all of the things that have been attributed to him. After the organization of the east Pompey brought in more revenue to the Roman state; he spread taxation more evenly while satisfying both the people taxed and the *publicani*; he brought freedom and Hellenism to many uncivilized parts of the east and he was seen by many in his own time as the new Alexander. Pompey was a beneficiary to citizens, city-states and kings, as well as an imperialist (loosely) at the same time.

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<sup>201</sup> Plutarch, p. 227. Appian, *Mithr. Wars*, p. 465.

These things were all possible for a Roman senator or Greek king in antiquity. Pompey is a much more complicated and multifaceted character than he is portrayed by the imperialist and economic theses alone. Pompey certainly affected cultural change in the eastern provinces. He did so by settling a lasting peace in Asia Minor after 30 years of war with Mithridates.<sup>202</sup> Pompey upheld Lucullus' debt reduction, and settled the east in a way that did not punish too harshly those he had defeated.<sup>203</sup> He brought self-government to those who had only known rule by kings. By doing these things, he eventually made those who were conquered partners in their own rule. Eventually the Greek east became the most important part of the Roman Empire culturally, economically and politically.

Pompey's annexation of Syria and the settlements in Pontus are mixed up chronologically, so the next chapter covers Syria separately even though Pompey did begin arranging Pontus first, but did not finish until he left Syria. For convenience, the organization of Pontus' territory is kept together above and Syria is discussed below. What Pompey encountered in Syria may have influenced some of his arrangements later in Pontus so this must be kept in mind.

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<sup>202</sup> Appian, *Mithr Wars*, 267-471. 89- 63BC.

<sup>203</sup> Plutarch, "*Pompey*," p. 195. Plutarch, "*Lucullus*," p. 533-535.

### **CHAPTER 3**

## **POMPEY'S ANNEXATION AND ORGANIZATION OF SYRIA**

The historiography of the Roman annexation of Syria has had few commentators in the last century.<sup>204</sup> Greek and Hellenic specialists, however, have begun to fill the gaps. In this chapter, I meld much of the recent Hellenic works into the Roman works, which barely overlap and rarely have been connected. The main argument is, as with Pontus, the imperialist/economic thesis vs. the security thesis for annexation. The cultural thesis here asks different questions than in the Pontus and pirate campaign historiography. Syria already had Greek cities, though several had fallen into disuse or had been conquered by Arab and Jewish expansion. Syria had no need of 'civilizing' in the Roman perspective as did the rural interior of Pontus. Here the cultural thesis is about Rome's relationship to the Jewish and Arab subjects that go beyond Pompey's dealings with them. But Pompey's preferential treatment of minor cities due to their Greek make-up does point to where his motivations in culture were.<sup>205</sup> Neither Pompey nor Rome was open to the spread of Jewish and Arab culture in Syria. Pompey sought to curb both of their peoples' ambitious expansion by corralling them in with the Greek Decapolis and the Roman province of Syria.

Pompey's entrance into Syria (64 BC) following his rearrangements of Tigranes' domain was largely diplomatic. There was little to no resistance to Pompey's armies,

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<sup>204</sup> A.N. Sherwin-White, p.209, 213. He gives the subject a fair amount of attention, but his is one view, the internal security thesis, he claims that Parthia was not a threat to Rome yet nor were they seen as such by Pompey. Frank, Syria annexed for imperialist/economic reasons. Downey, shows how Rome sought compromise with the last Seleucids.

<sup>205</sup> A.N. Sherwin-White, p. 218. He states that for Pompey the restoration of the Hellenic cities of Northern Palestine and the Transjordan was the primary object of intervention in Syria.

though Appian does mention some fighting against Antiochus of Commagene and Darius of Media; these were probably more negotiations than actual wars.<sup>206</sup> Pompey by right of conquest annexed the remaining kingdom of Syria which included portions of upper Cilicia, both of which Tigranes had taken from the Seleucids a decade before. He annexed and rearranged much more territory than Tigranes or the Seleucids, at the time, actually had in their possession, including the Decapolis and regions that were currently under the control of Jewish and Arab dynasts. Pompey annexed what had been the Seleucid kingdom before its decline. By doing so he came into conflict with local dynasts, who had gained their lands from the Seleucids beginning around the 160s BC. He was able to do all of this because the Seleucids were fighting each other again. The Jewish kingdom was also in a civil war, and Arab dynasts were involved in both of these conflicts, as well as their own dynastic struggles. Pompey thought it necessary to take control of the situation and to annex portions of upper Syria, while recognizing client-kings in other portions controlled by Arabs and Jews. This was fairly easy for Pompey due to the chaotic state of Syria upon his arrival.

### Reasons for annexation of Syria

There are many debates as to how and why Pompey annexed Syria.<sup>207</sup> We know much more about the lower portion and his arrangements with the Jewish state because of Josephus' writings, though they give little detail about the rest of the Syrian annexation.

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<sup>206</sup> Appian, p.441.

<sup>207</sup> Frank, p. 192-3. He sees the annexation as payback to the publicani by Pompey, 'he was their tool.' Fletcher, p. 24. Counters the notion that Syria's annexation was pay back to the publicani by Pompey. A.N Sherwin-White, p. 209, 213. Badian, p, 1-5. Internal security was reason for annexation and thought Parthia not a recognizable threat to Pompey. Kallet-Marx, p. 336-7, oddly excludes Syria from work.

The other sources, Strabo, Appian, Dio Cassius, and Diodorus, give some details to the client kings in the northern borders, but even this is limited. Modern scholars have looked at the scope of the annexation and questioned why Pompey annexed more territory than his conquests would have legally allowed.<sup>208</sup> Questions of imperialism, trade and security are the main debates in these modern studies. Just as with the pirate campaigns, it is fruitful to go back further in Hellenic history to capture the atmosphere in Syria leading up to Pompey's arrival. We know more about the periods before and after his settlements than the actual time itself.

Parthian interests and their potential power are not explained fully by the Roman historiography and are dismissed as reasons for Syrian annexation.<sup>209</sup> Parthia involved itself in political wrangling in the region for some time in a similar fashion as the Greek cities had done. They too were making alliances to weaken their enemies and strengthen their allies in their home regions and in border territories. The Parthians had their own implied right to Seleucid territory by their conquest of the eastern portions, especially the eastern capital Babylon. There is no reason why the Parthians saw a limit to their potential empire, as is implied by A. N. Sherwin-White, especially at this time. Susan Sherwin-White points out that European historians give too much weight to Rome weakening the Seleucid Empire; in fact, the largest share of the empire was conquered by Parthia.<sup>210</sup> European historians do not fully appreciate the power of Parthia until later on. Parthia did have dealings within Syria and perhaps had an eye on it decades before

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<sup>208</sup> Pompey was given power to make war and peace and to end the war with Mithridates and Tigranes, the lower portions of Syria were not involved with Tigranes or Mithridates. Pompey annexed it for internal and external security issues due to infighting between the Jewish and Arab dynasts.

<sup>209</sup> A. N. Sherwin-White, p. 209-213. He emphasizes internal security breakdown as main reason.

<sup>210</sup> Susan Sherwin-White and Amelie Kuhrt, *From Samarkhand to Sardis: A new approach to the Seleucid empire*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. p.217-18.

Pompey came into the region. They had destroyed two Seleucid armies in 139 and 129, weakening the dynasty beyond repair. When the city of Beroia broke away from Demetrios III in 88, a Parthian satrap came to the aid of the rebel Strato, crossing the Euphrates most likely at Seleucia-Zengma. This may have meant that Parthia already had established a bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates at that time.<sup>211</sup> Shortly after this Philip I died in 84/5 leaving the Seleucids in control of only Antioch and Apamea and perhaps Laodikeia. The magistrates of the Greek cities and the local northern kings met and invited king Tigranes into Syria. The cities had debated who they should invite into Syria to rule over them. They had supposedly made up a list of candidates which Tigranes topped.<sup>212</sup> Parthia was not considered due to its support of Beroia, the enemy of Antioch. Rome and Mithridates were also considered, but at the time Tigranes was in the best position to offer the cities the freedom they desired. After he entered Syria he was able to secure the region and retake Zengma from the Parthians; other kings in the region soon came over to him to give their allegiance.<sup>213</sup>

Tigranes became the successor of the Seleucids in the position of protector of the Greek cities. The cities had lost much of their independence due to the weakening of the Seleucid house and the rise of the indigenous Arab and Jewish dynasts. Tigranes took Syria, city by city, and recognized their traditional rights and immunities. In effect Tigranes' control of Syria halted the growth of Arab and Jewish dynastic appetites, a precedent that Pompey followed and expanded. Tigranes had left his general Magadates

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<sup>211</sup> John D. Grainger, *The Cities of Seleukid Syria*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. P.170-5. He and other Hellenic historians, S.Sherwin-White, and Gruen, mention the Parthians crossing the Euphrates twice. This is not mentioned by Roman historians and can make Pompey more imperialistically minded if ignored. .

<sup>212</sup> Grainger, p. 187-8.

<sup>213</sup> Grainger, p. 175-6.

in command of Syria, where he remained until being recalled to help his king defend Armenia from Lucullus' invasion in 69.<sup>214</sup> This is how Tigranes lost Syria, and with the vacuum of power, the Syrian cities sent their magistrates to Pompey while he was in Armenia. They sought his protection and recognition of their rights and immunities. The Seleucid house was no longer strong enough to secure their Greek subjects and so they were cast off not only by Pompey but by the Greek cities themselves. This was not the first time the Greek cities had invited others to protect them. The Roman historiography does not discuss the previous invitations by the Greek cities to outside kings, but the Hellenic one does and is developed below.

Syria was a prize of war; this is how Pompey rationalized the annexation to the last Seleucids who had retaken the throne when Tigranes' forces had withdrawn to defend Armenia.<sup>215</sup> The Seleucids had lost their throne to Tigranes and only regained it through Roman (Lucullus') destruction of Tigranes' forces. Pompey took all of Tigranes' possessions and returned a portion to gain the king as a friend and ally of Rome. Pompey's judgment was a rational one that the Seleucid dynasty was unfit to rule, due to past and current infighting which had weakened their state to the point of insecurity. Outside forces such as Armenia and Parthia and internal forces such as the Jewish and Arab dynasts had grown in strength at the expense of Seleucid failures. Pompey therefore dismissed the claims of Antiochus XIII and Philip II, who asserted their rights to the Seleucid throne, yet could not come to terms with each other or defeat the other decisively. The two rivals were backed by the Arab kings Azizos (Philip's supporter) and Samsieramos (Antiochus' supporter); in effect these four men were all

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<sup>214</sup> Appian, *The Syrian Wars*, p. 197

<sup>215</sup> Plutarch, "Pompey," p. 217. Appian, *The Syrian Wars*, p. 197-199.

claimants to the Syrian Seleucid throne upon Pompey's arrival.<sup>216</sup> The two Arab kings conspired together to kill the rival Seleucids, but they failed and fled. Besides the four men, there were several other dynasts who had claim to portions of the Seleucid kingdom including Dionysios, ruler of Beroia; Herakleia and Hierapolis; Antiochus of Commagene, who desired northern territory added to his own; the hill men of Bargylos; collectively the tetrarchy of Nazerini; the Jewish kingdom; and several Arab tribes and dynasts. Pompey had to find a solution to tie all of these separate and belligerent groups together. Pompey denied the request of Antiochus XIII to remain on the throne, citing that he would not leave Syria to be the prey of Arabs and Jews; this response also automatically excluded Philip II, Azizos and Samsigeramos.<sup>217</sup>

Rome had some negotiations in the interim period between Lucullus' and Pompey's commands. Lucullus had allowed the Seleucids to retake their throne or he simply ignored the action; either way Antiochus XIII was recognized in some way by Lucullus in 69/8. Another claimant, Philip II, took the throne the next year. Marcus Rex visited Philip in 67 and was asked for some sort of tribute to help with the pirate campaign, and so must have been recognized in some way for that tribute. In 65/4 Philip was forced off the throne for unknown reasons and Antiochus XIII was restored for a short time.<sup>218</sup>

The failure of these two Seleucids to negotiate and their further infighting forced Pompey's to come up with a different solution, one in which the Seleucid house was dissolved. Pompey could see that the further infighting between the two rivals and their Arab supporters was not conducive to securing the borders or the internal territories.

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<sup>216</sup> Grainger, p191.

<sup>217</sup> Grainger, p. 194-5

<sup>218</sup> Glanville Downey, "The Occupation of Syria by the Romans," p. 150-1.

He had the precedent of Tigranes' invasion and occupation for more than a decade and Parthia's past destruction of Seleucid armies and invasions into the Syrian territory. The weakening of Tigranes by Rome potentially made Parthia stronger. The Parthians sought to reclaim territory Tigranes had taken from them during one of their civil wars, including territory west of the Euphrates. Deterrence of Parthia is a major factor in Pompey's annexation of Syria and his arrangements of client kings on the border of Syria and Parthia. He had to strengthen the region to ensure some level of peace and order. Parthia's presence on the western side of the Euphrates a decade before must have been known by Pompey. This is not recognized by the Roman historiography, but Hellenic historians state this fact.<sup>219</sup> Parthia therefore must have been perceived as a more serious threat in Pompey's eyes than is usually admitted. It has been argued that Pompey did not see Parthia as a threat to Roman interests at this time and that Parthia had no interests west of the Euphrates.<sup>220</sup> The situation was more complex due to the fact that Parthia did cross the Euphrates on more than one occasion before Pompey came into Syria.

Pompey's legates' negotiations with Parthia supposedly set up Rome as the superior. Though, the power relationship was not further defined until the loss of Crassus' legions and the invasion of Syria and Asia Minor a decade later.<sup>221</sup> Only after these events was a higher level of respect given Parthia by Rome. Up to that point Rome assumed it was superior, but since this was still not certain, a strong border with them was seen as a necessity by Pompey. The Roman mediation between Tigranes and Parthia

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<sup>219</sup> Grainger, 170-5. S. Sherwin-White, and Gruen, all mention the Parthians crossing the Euphrates twice and perhaps holding Zengma, west of the river. This is not mentioned by Roman historians.

<sup>220</sup> A.N Sherwin-White, p. 209, 213. He sees internal security as the reason for annexation but thought Parthia not a recognizable threat to Pompey at that point. He downplays their threat but implies that Pompey was still cautious about them.

<sup>221</sup> Appian, *The Syrian Wars*, p. 201.

supposedly set up Rome in a superior position within the historiography.<sup>222</sup> This ignores the traditional Greek method of third party negotiation, not necessarily by a superior. Rome and Pompey were acting as any other Greek community might have in negotiation between two other states. For this reason it should not be a foregone conclusion that at this time Pompey saw Rome superior to Parthia; quite the contrary they must have been seen at a more equal level until a full contest proved otherwise. This uncertainty gives weight to why Pompey secured the borders against Parthia the way he did. Not one single kingdom was given the burden; instead it was spread to many including Rome herself by annexing Syria, which touched a small portion of Parthia's border.

### Syrian Internal Security

Antiochus III's defeat at Magnesia in 190 BC is often seen as the point at which the Seleucid Empire began its decline--at the hands of Rome. It is true that the taking of Seleucid hostages and the manipulation of the royal succession did weaken the authority of Seleucid power, but most of the weakening of the kingdom came from within and also by manipulations of Greek neighbors.<sup>223</sup> Several local dynasts broke away from the Seleucids, beginning around 160 BC, and their loyalty depended on the proximity and current power of Parthia and rival Seleucids. These local dynasts did not initially seek

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<sup>222</sup> Magie, p. 361. He points out that Pompey sought peaceful relations between Parthia and Tigranes at the time. He did not want to provoke a war with king Phraates of Parthia, as Lucullus did with Tigranes earlier. It is debated if this was actually a peace treaty with Parthia or a mediation in-between Armenia and Parthia. Augustus did later make a treaty with Parthia setting a border at the Euphrates River.

<sup>223</sup> Brian McGing, "Subjugation and Resistance: to the Death of Mithridates," Andrew Erskine, "ed.," *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003. 2005. p. 74-75. Sherwin-White, Kuhrt, p. 222. They agree but offer a more balanced approach to Rome's role in Seleucid decline; they give more focus to internal strife and Parthia. Erich S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic world and the coming of Rome Vol II*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1984. p. 668-9.

total independence, just local control, even the initial Jewish revolt did not claim total independence, and at first the Jews prided themselves in being recognized as friends of the Seleucid house.

As time went on and internal struggles widened the gulf in the Seleucid family, these same local dynasts worked for and against the rivals, which further weakened the empire and its authority.<sup>224</sup> The local dynasts negotiated and gained more and more independence as the Seleucids weakened. Interstate wars in Asia were allowed to run their course as Rome did not involve herself in most of these conflicts, adding to the argument that Rome did not purposely weakened any particular state. The Seleucids had worked to undermine their neighbors when they were strong, especially under Antiochus III, but when they weakened, especially in the wake of the rising Parthian threat, those same neighbors got revenge with their own manipulations, often with Roman help or acknowledgement.

Greek dynasts sided with rival Seleucids and set up younger and weaker Seleucids; Rome helped in this on more than one occasion by supplying a royal heir which they held. Ultimately, Rome did not want the Seleucids to fall; this would have created a problem that may have forced legions further into the east than they had ever gone or were prepared to go at the time.<sup>225</sup> In the end it was the Seleucids who destroyed their own house, allowing others to easily carve it up for their own gain, including Rome's.

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<sup>224</sup> Susan Sherwin-White, Amelie Kuhrt, p. 225-6.

<sup>225</sup> Gruen, p. 668-9. He states, "The idea that Rome worked behind the scene to cripple the Seleucids is manifestly absurd."

## The Jewish Kingdom and its Civil War

The Jewish kingdom at the advent of Pompey was no longer in Seleucid hands and the Jews had no part in the Mithridatic War.<sup>226</sup> So the annexation of portions Judea by Pompey brings up questions of his purpose in their territory. The pretext for annexation of Syria--not just the current Seleucid lands but a wider region--has many facets. The Jewish territory itself was in a civil war between two brothers vying for the control of the kingdom. These brothers, like the Seleucids, each had an Arab dynast backing their claims while manipulating their own designs. This situation created an atmosphere of lawlessness in which Pompey and his legates claimed increased banditry and piracy in the region.<sup>227</sup> So in this sense Pompey took interest in lower Syria under the authority of his previous pirate command in which he had authority over all the Mediterranean and inland up to fifty miles. There is some debate whether there was a pirate connection in the region or if banditry was as bad as claimed. Some of the first Cilician pirates were in fact Seleucid rebels as described in chapter 1; so there may be something to the claim of increased anarchy in the region.<sup>228</sup>

The fact that there was at least a four-way struggle over the region was all the pretext Pompey needed, taking advantage of the weakened territory himself, just as the Arab dynasts were in the process of doing. The main difference was that the Arab and Jewish dynasts were not united; Pompey's forces were, making the conquest of the lower Syria much easier for him to accomplish. The Jews resisted, so Jerusalem was taken in a

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<sup>226</sup> Strabo, *The Geography of Strabo*, 16.2.40, p. 289. Josephus, *Antiquities*, 357-61. He illustrates the long line of struggles between the Seleucids and the Hasmonaean dynasty.

<sup>227</sup> Josephus, *Antiquities*, p. 471, 487. Strabo, *The Geography of Strabo*, p. 16.2.17-19, p. 263.

<sup>228</sup> A.N. Sherwin-White, 212-213. He states that it was not piracy but land based bandits that were the problem.

siege and the temple sanctum was “violated” by Pompey and his men. He only threatened to invade Petra but never made it there as he was recalled to Pontus after Mithridates was killed by himself or his son.

It was fortuitous for Pompey that, upon his entrance into Syria, the once strong Maccabean family, was itself in decline. Originally the Maccabean revolt started around the 160s BC, when other dynasts were also breaking with the Seleucids. Many Jews were angry over Hellenized Jews, who had the audacity to exercise nude in the public gymnasium, wear Greek garb, and partake in other foreign customs. Antiochus IV tried to suppress their revolt as well as their religion, which only made things worse for his control over the Jewish people. After his death Antiochus V reinstated the concord that the Jews had with Antiochus III.<sup>229</sup> Though separate politically, they were friendly with the Seleucid state as long as their independence was not threatened again. The Jewish state, not unlike the other autonomous states, broke with the Seleucids nearly every time there was a dynastic struggle within the empire and like others they sought Roman intervention and recognition.<sup>230</sup> Rome only gave verbal support, and there is no evidence of an actual treaty with the Jewish state during the Seleucid period. There is a treaty spoken of in Maccabees I which is most likely propaganda, and it is nearly ignored in Maccabees II in its discussion of the same events.<sup>231</sup>

With each Seleucid civil war the Jewish state grew in power until it became an actual kingdom under Aristobulus (r.104-103 BC), the fifth Hasmonean to rule Judea. The kings before and after him manipulated the dynastic struggles in both the Seleucid

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<sup>229</sup> Susan Sherwin-White, Amelie Kuhrt, p. 225-228

<sup>230</sup> Josephus, Ralph Marcus, “trans.,” *Jewish Antiquities Vol. VII*, London: William Heinmann Ltd., 1943. 1961. p. 357-61.

<sup>231</sup> A.N. Sherwin-White, p. 78.

and Ptolemaic houses to the benefit of their own state. In the process the Jewish state was nearly destroyed by Ptolemy Lathyrus. His mother, Cleopatra, jealous of her son's power, sent an army of her own commanded by a Jewish general to halt Lathyrus' advance. The Queen then made alliance with the next Jewish king, Alexander Jannaeus (r.103-76 BC).<sup>232</sup> Alexander then devastated the lands of Gaza who had originally called in Ptolemy for assistance. Afterwards Alexander went to war with Arab invaders and his own people who sided with Demetrius of the Seleucid house. For a while Alexander was forced out of his own kingdom. When Demetrius left Judea to fight his brother, Alexander came back with a vengeance, took back his power and punished the disloyal Jews; thus once again the Jewish kingdom benefited from the internal dynastic struggles of both the Seleucids and Ptolemies.

Demetrius' brother Philip defeated him with help from Arabs and a Parthian satrap, most likely the governor of Mesopotamia.<sup>233</sup> This Parthian intervention into Seleucid/Syrian affairs could not have been a secret to Pompey two decades later; this could have impacted his view on their designs. Philip's other brother Antiochus Dionysus also had his eye on the Seleucid throne; he invaded Judea but was killed there by Arabs (86/5 BC). This background ties in the Jewish and Seleucid civil wars and rising Arab dynasts nearing the advent of Pompey and illustrates just how convoluted the political situation had become inside Syria.

Just prior to the time Pompey entered Syria the Nabataean chief Aretas, who claimed Coele-Syria, invaded Judaea but came to terms with Alexander Jannaeus. After a twenty-nine-year reign of expansion, Alexander died leaving his queen Alexandra

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<sup>232</sup> Josephus, *Antiquities*, p. 393-403.

<sup>233</sup> Josephus, p. 419.

(r.76-67) on the throne. He left instructions for her to make peace with the Pharisees, who had been separated from the royal house by Hyrcanus I (r.134-104). He had left their sect and joined with the Sadducees in protest of the request for him to give up the high priesthood and retain only the crown.<sup>234</sup> The queen took Alexander's advice, but the Pharisees took horrible vengeance on his old supporters which split the Jewish state into rival factions. Alexandra's sons, Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II, took separate sides in the struggle. Aristobulus, the younger and stronger son, took the side of his father's old friends and allies within the Sadducees sect while Hyrcanus sided with the Pharisees who supported his mother. During these internal conflicts, King Tigranes of Armenia, who had invaded Syria years earlier with 300,000 soldiers and took all of the Seleucid territories, came near Judaea; Queen Alexandra bribed him to leave the kingdom to its own rule.<sup>235</sup>

As Alexandra neared death Aristobulus took action and seized twenty-two forts in Judea fearing that the Pharisees would take the throne from his weak brother. When Queen Alexandra died in 67 BC, Hyrcanus II was named king and Aristobulus declared war on him; the two fought until a compromise came about.<sup>236</sup> They agreed that Aristobulus would be king and Hyrcanus would maintain the high priesthood. The two were peaceful for a short while until Hyrcanus' friend and advisor Antipater (the father of Herod the Great) persuaded him to ally himself with the Arab King Aretas. Hyrcanus offered to return the Arab lands that were taken by his father in return for support in

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<sup>234</sup> Josephus, p. 373-5, 427-31.

<sup>235</sup> Josephus, p. 439-441

<sup>236</sup> Josephus, p. 437-451.

regaining the throne. Aretas agreed and assaulted Jerusalem during Passover, forcing Aristobulus to flee into the Temple sanctum.<sup>237</sup>

Pompey was in Armenia accepting the supplication of Tigranes when he sent his legates into Syria to investigate the current state of affairs. In 65 BC, Scarus moved into take Judaea as Lollius and Metellus took Damascus. Both Aristobulus and Hyrcanus sent envoys to Scarus asking for assistance and mediation. Supposedly, Aristobulus paid Scarus a bribe of 400 talents which was accepted, and he was given favor over his brother. Aretas and Hyrcanus withdrew, but when Scarus left to Damascus, Aristobulus pursued his rivals, killing 6000 of their men including Antipater's brother Phallion.<sup>238</sup>

In 64 BC, Pompey entered Syria and moved into Damascus where all the dynasts and chiefs of the region met him to pay tribute and ask for favor. Aristobulus sent an envoy and brought charges of bribery against the legates of Pompey, which was probably not a wise thing to do in his current situation. Hyrcanus in return charged his brother with instigation of their war and of supporting pirates in the sea, a charge no doubt tailor-made for Pompey's ear.<sup>239</sup> Pompey delayed his decision until his campaign against Nabataea was complete, but Aristobulus, being impatient, left and gathered his forces. This delayed Pompey's campaign, so he marched against Aristobulus, who fortified himself in the Alexandreion citadel. Eventually the fight moved into Jerusalem, where Pompey put the city under siege. He broke through with the help of insiders; Aristobulus fled to the Temple where he held out for three months. When the Temple fell, 12,000

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<sup>237</sup> Josephus, p. 457-461.

<sup>238</sup> Josephus, p. 465.

<sup>239</sup> Josephus, p. 467, 471.

Jews were killed within and Pompey and his officers entered the forbidden sanctuary, the Holy of Holies, yet took nothing from its treasury.<sup>240</sup>

Pompey named Hyrcanus II high priest and ethnarch (king) of the Jewish people, Aristobulus was taken to Rome, and the Jewish kingdom was reduced in size and power and made a tributary of Rome.<sup>241</sup> Pompey sided not just with a dynast but his supporters, whom were the Pharisees. Pompey chose to support the conservative faction most likely being advised about the religious and political implications of that choice; though Aristobulus' impatience and downright foolish behavior also aided in the decision. He initially had the upper hand; if he had acted more diplomatically, his position may have turned out very differently.

Pompey's arrangements also took several cities away from Judaea and reinstated them into the Decapolis or gave them other grades of independence. Besides freeing cities Pompey rebuilt others, but he only gave one immediate attention before he left: the city of Gadara, home of his Jewish freedman Demetrius: it was renamed Pompeia.<sup>242</sup> Demetrius was most likely an invaluable advisor to Pompey on the local customs and religious laws. Pompey's legate Scarus was left in Syria to deal with the Arabs as he was recalled to Pontus to recover the body of Mithridates. Antipater negotiated a deal between Scarus and Aretas in which the legate was paid 300 talents to leave Petra at peace, though this was after Scarus failed to take it by force. Pompey brought peace and stability to the Jewish kingdom and reduced their and the Arab dynasts' power at the

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<sup>240</sup> Josephus, p. 473-485. Jane Bellemore, "Josephus, Pompey and the Jews," *Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 48, H. 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Qtr., 1999), p.106.

<sup>241</sup> Josephus, p. 485

<sup>242</sup> Josephus, p. 487. A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces Second Edition*, London: Oxford University Press, 1971. P. 257-8

same time. There were simply too many political interests in the region to please, so Pompey had to break them up and reduce their potency.

Rome divided the Judaeo-Samaritan region into four areas, each controlled by one capital that was further subdivided into toparchies. This system was very similar to the Seleucid and Persian system of satrapies and their subordinate toparchies; once again Rome reverted to the status quo of earlier empires though with less central control. These four administrative regions were Galilee, Peraea, Samaria, and Judaea.<sup>243</sup> The Judaeon region has more detail left to us through Josephus and so we know of its eleven toparchies, which were subordinated to the capital Jerusalem.

The decentralization kept power from dynasts and potential dynasts. Previously they had been able to grow due to their taking more central control over their regions of authority. The Persians and the Seleucids often lost territory to satraps, governors and toparchs who became small dynasts themselves; this had to have been common knowledge when Pompey entered the region and therefore affected his settlements. The toparchies Rome reinstated dated at least to the Seleucid times so Pompey did not have to create administrative zones. He merely re-instated some of their old power, which had been reduced or taken away under the Jewish and Arab expansions.<sup>244</sup> Syria was a very different region than Pontus, where new city-states had to be created and given constitutions. Pompey did, however, make sure that the Syrian toparchies had constitutions; some probably already had their own which he recognized or modified.

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<sup>243</sup> A.H.M. Jones, "The Urbanization of Palestine," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 21 (1931), p. 78.

<sup>244</sup> Jones, "The Urbanization of Palestine," p. 78.

### Pompey's settlements with Arab dynasts

Pompey's dealings with multiple Arab dynasts involved dividing them to keep them weak, yet loyal to Rome, due to the fact that he officially recognized their territory. By doing this he set up multiple clients among the Arabs in Syria while keeping them divided. The Ituraean Arab dynastic regions were dissolved much more rapidly than the Jewish kingdom, with which Rome shared a much longer and usually friendly relationship. The Ituraeans were described by Strabo as an Arab people who joined with the Jews in customs and religion; some may have been forcefully converted by John Hyrcanus (r.134-104 BC).<sup>245</sup> They, like the Jews, took advantage of Seleucid civil wars to increase their principalities, encroaching on the Phoenician coast and valleys that straddled the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon ranges. Pompey demolished some of their forts in the coastal regions, perhaps bandit and pirate affiliates. Their principalities were divided and broken up just as the Jewish kingdom had been, adding to the evidence that Pompey was attempting to re-set the Seleucid kingdom that had existed before its internal collapse in the 160s.<sup>246</sup>

Augustus further divided the Ituraean territories as their dynasts died out; he awarded much of it to Herod in 24 BC. Antipater, the father of Herod the Great, had family relations with the Ituraean people and Babylonian Jews; this relationship must have helped him in assimilating some of their tribes. Rome had charged him with such a task. Some of Herod's veterans were Ituraean Jews whom he settled in the less developed Ituraean regions to help govern there. Later on Agrippa (the Roman General)

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<sup>245</sup> A.H.M. Jones, "The Urbanization of the Ituraean Principalities," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 21 (1931), p. 265.

<sup>246</sup> Grainger, p. 194-98.

settled two veteran colonies in Ituraean territories and further split their lands.<sup>247</sup> The two colonies acted as garrisons that with the help of Herod forced most of these nomadic dwellers to take up agriculture. Three of the remaining Ituraean principalities were passed into the hands of King Agrippa II (great-grandson of Herod). Later on Rome annexed the area adding it to Syria, although epigraphic evidence shows local autonomy over some tribal customs and control over village life, some of which have been identified as Bedouin.<sup>248</sup>

Jones shows a pattern of continually shifting policy governing towns, villages and regions within the Syrian province and its independent satellites.<sup>249</sup> His scholarship, though older, agrees with much of the modern works concerning the empire which show that Rome was quite flexible in its administration of the provinces. There is little uniformity in how Rome imposed government on its subjects. This is proven by the ebb and flow of direct and indirect control and even levels of autonomy for cities, towns and villages. For example, some towns and villages in the Ituraean regions were exempt from the local centurion administration and were allowed to govern themselves regardless of size. Time, place, and current situations are what governed the Roman administration's focus on a particular region.

Further south the Nabataeans were dealt with differently. Pompey's legate Scarus as temporary governor did attempt to conquer the Nabataean capital Petra but failed; he was able to negotiate with their king Aretas and ultimately left them alone after being paid off.<sup>250</sup> Due to the long period of quelling tribal peoples in upper and middle

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<sup>247</sup> Jones, "The Urbanization of the Ituraean Principalities," p. 266.

<sup>248</sup> Jones, p. 269-70.

<sup>249</sup> Jones, p. 257

<sup>250</sup> Josephus, *Antiquities*, p. 489.

Syria, the Nabataeans were mostly left alone until the early second century AD. Aretas' relationship with Hyrcanus and Antipater also helped to secure friendship with current and future Jewish dynasts.

The Arab peoples are not given any attention in the Roman historiography of Syria, besides Jones. This may be why the imperialist thesis covering the region does not give security enough weight in the annexation. Gruen's and Grainger's Hellenic histories of the region do add the Arab peoples into the equation, which fills a 70-year gap from Jones' work. They show that Syria was in a state of convulsive war when Pompey arrived, to the point that an outsider was able to negotiate peace between Jews, Arabs and Greeks. Up to that point Syria had been involved in decades of struggle, which the Seleucid Empire was no longer able to cope with.<sup>251</sup> Pompey's attention to the region brought desired peace, using the Greek tradition of mediation between all parties. Force was used by Pompey, but peace was ultimately the most desirable thing in the region: that is how he was able to negotiate with so many warring parties.

### The Decapolis

Pompey reset some of the old Seleucid political system by re-establishing the Decapolis, the independent Greek cities inside Syria. Many of them had faded or had been taken over by the Jewish and Arab dynasts. This was done just as much for curbing Arab and Jewish power as it was for re-establishing Greek freedom, which any philhellene would have striven for at the time. Pompey's re-establishment of these cities

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<sup>251</sup> Gruen, p. 659-671, 723-725. He states that "a simple formulaic theory for Roman expansion on the basis of sheer aggression and militarism is simplistic." Grainger, p. 194-5, Pompey saw that no one dynasty could control Syria and so decided to break it up and annex it under Roman control.

was just as artificial as Seleucid I's constructions in 301 BC, in that they were not fully aligned with each other, and their actual locations were not necessarily in the best geographic locations for trade, defense or production.<sup>252</sup> For these reason many of the original cities had disappeared altogether or faded into towns or villages. The Decapolis created buffer zones inside Syria mainly dividing and or surrounding Jewish and Arab territory, a very similar reason why Seleucus I had set them up where he did. In fact, Pompey only rebuilt one city while in Syria as a favor to one of his freedman, as described above. There was no need for him to build new cities because on several sites there were already active Greek cities that were designed on the same or similar model as all other Hellenic cities built by Alexander and the Seleucids.

These cities shared many of the same features, both physical and administrative, such as: a basic rectangular grid pattern, surrounding walls, a monumentally defined agora, a theatre, at least one gymnasium, stoas, fountain houses, and a council house or town hall (*prytaneion*).<sup>253</sup> For the Decapolis cities that survived the collapse of the Seleucids, there was a sense of cultural relation even though many were not politically linked. By the late Hellenic age Greek cities shared so many of the common features that there was a basic consensus of what it meant to be Greek and to be civilized, which meant the same thing to them.<sup>254</sup> Even though Pompey did not technically link the Decapolis into one political unit, it became a strong force against neighbors' ambitions, especially with the backing of Rome.

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<sup>252</sup> Grainger, p. 67-81. 194-199.

<sup>253</sup> Richard Billows, "Cities," Andrew Erskine, "ed.," *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003. 2005. P. 196-197.

<sup>254</sup> Billows, p. 197, 213.

The Decapolis cities, which had faded in size and had dilapidated infrastructures, had to wait for generations to actually receive any major funding to rebuild or to have better connection to each other by an improved road system. These smaller and neglected cities were attached to the Syrian province; their initial function must have been to curb local powers by keeping them out of their hands. They were outposts of Hellenism that were given favor and protection from ambitious local powers, which allowed them to strengthen over time. This allowed the Arab tetrarchies and eventually the Jewish kingdom to be dissolved into the province of Syria as they were choked off from further expansion.<sup>255</sup> This was probably not Pompey's ultimate goal, but his organization set up the machinery which allowed this to happen over time, though more rapidly against the Ituraean Arab powers than for the Jewish kingdom.

The Decapolis cities were receptive to their new government just as they had on several occasions welcomed rival Seleucids or Ptolemies and even Tigranes; they readily accepted Rome when Pompey arrived. As long as their cities' rights and privileges were maintained, the citizens of the Decapolis had a long history of receiving new kings with little resistance.<sup>256</sup> Pompey marched through several of the Decapolis cities granting or recognizing their rights and freedoms. In Apamea, the home of his advisor Poseidonius, he demolished the old Acropolis, which had served as a garrison for centuries and had been a symbol of Seleucid central control. Other forts were also demolished to keep strong positions out of potential enemy hands; the same was done in Pontus. Strabo calls them robber forts and attributes most of these 'robbers' to the Nabataean and Ituraeans,

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<sup>255</sup>Jones, "The Urbanization of the Ituraean Principalities," p. 265-7.

<sup>256</sup> Grainger, p. 142-3, 158, 198. He points out that most of the Greek Decapolis cities never sought autonomy. They sought relations with kings for protection and beneficia, they revolted from kings for better treatment not for 'freedom'. This was a Macedonian model that they had been accustomed.

perhaps giving weight to Hycanus' claim that his brother aided bandits.<sup>257</sup> However, he himself was aided by the king of the Nabataeans and so too could have been blamed for the same bandit support.

The Tetroplis, the four great cities of the old Decapolis, were given their autonomy or had it reconfirmed; they were Antioch, Apamea, Seleucia (on the sea) and Laodikeia (on the sea). Antioch took the Pompeian era to advertise its renewed rights, and Arados, the most independent city in the region, stopped minting tetradrachmas to display loyalty and loss of its old autonomy.<sup>258</sup> There is no evidence that any of the secondary Decapolis cities took the Pompeian era, most likely because they did not receive the level of autonomy as the larger cities at the time. Seleucia-Zengma was given to king Antiochus of Commagene by Pompey as a check on the Parthian border; its suburb was on the east side of the Euphrates.

The free cities functioned much the same under Rome as they had under the Seleucids; they desired no political power as long as their freedom was maintained by their protectors.<sup>259</sup> They did, however, expect *beneficia* from their new masters just as they had of their past kings. Syria, like other settlements of Pompey, became a divided patchwork of political entities including kingdoms, tetrarchies, cities and autonomous village communities. They functioned to separate powerful rivals and to help Rome administrate the region.

Grainger calls the Decapolis cities "artificial" in the sense that they flourished when protected or under the favor of a strong government, be it Seleucid, Ptolemaic or

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<sup>257</sup> Strabo, Horace Leonard Jones, "trans.," *The Geography of Strabo Vol. VI and VII*, London: William Heinmann Ltd., 1929. 1970. 16. 2. 17-19. p. 263

<sup>258</sup> Grainger, p. 195.

<sup>259</sup> Grainger, p. 198.

Roman. He illustrated just how fragile many of these cities were by detailing how many of them fell out of favor and dissolved when the Muslim invasion came in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> centuries AD. The Arab towns that had been neglected under Seleucid and Roman rule were given favor and therefore flourished.<sup>260</sup> The Crusades once again revived many of the neglected Greek cities, especially Antioch, and it again flourished. The ebb and flow of favor and importance of location due to strategic or trade purposes either doomed a town or gave it life.

Grainger makes a convincing argument about ethnic bias in antiquity that is usually ignored.<sup>261</sup> It seems that the Seleucids and Roman governments did give obvious preferential treatment to Hellenic cities. That should come as no surprise since the Hellenes in Syria were descended from Alexander's and Seleucus' veterans. The observation of note that Grainger makes has cultural implications regarding assimilation and resistance to Greek and Roman lifestyles. These cultural struggles were long lasting and seem to have never been fully resolved in Syria, even up to the end of Byzantine control. Of course, some Arabs and Jews assimilated partially or completely, especially the elite; such was the case in Pontus and the other eastern provinces. A prime example of Graeco-Roman assimilation was Herod the Great's family, but this brought further resistance from their subjects in a very similar fashion that led up to the Maccabean revolt a century earlier. The end result was the Jewish Wars against Rome (66-73 AD) and the final destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem by the future emperor Titus and the diaspora of Jewish peoples throughout the Roman Empire.

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<sup>260</sup> Grainger, p. 199-200

<sup>261</sup> Grainger, p. 199. He shows how the Greek cities were "parasitic" to the Syrian peasant economy in the rural villages. This did not change until the Islamic conquest when the tables were turned in favor of the Arab inhabitants and their cities.

Gruen describe a Roman empire that had become more Hellenic in its expansion and administration of its provinces. Romans in some ways became more assimilated by Greek culture in the way they governed.<sup>262</sup> Gruen does not go into any great detail on the non-assimilation of the Arabs and the Jews, but it is obvious in the later wars between the Jewish state and Rome that this was a serious problem. The Arabs are more mysterious since they have no Josephus to tell their story until a much later date, and by then they are the conquering power. Rome had always treated Greek advisories differently than any other; the rest were considered barbaric. Rome sought to assimilate those who were not Hellenized. Those who were Hellenized assimilated Romans with great success, especially the elite who traveled east as magistrates and governors.

The Decapolis helped to assimilate any of the Arab or Jews who desired to become more Graeco-Roman by providing all the amenities of a civilized Greek city. This would have included citizenship and participation in government as well as general Greek entertainment such as theaters and gymnasiums. These Greek cities in Syria therefore were a converging of many cultures, Greek, Persian, Jewish, Arab and Roman. Those who utilized these cities could take out of each culture what they chose. This created many variations of hybrid cultures, which were probably more diverse in Syria than any where else in the Roman Empire. Syria was a cross roads of many ancient civilizations as well as being connected to the great trade routes of the east. It is no wonder that Antioch soon became a prominent city only slightly behind the cities of Rome and Alexandria.

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<sup>262</sup> Gruen, p. 721-22, 730.

### Pompey's eastern settlements' ratification and the struggle in Rome

Pompey's dissolution of the Seleucid kingdom, which Lucullus had allowed to be revived, was a major contention between the two men. This took away a major client of Lucullus and replaced it with several for Pompey. As with most of Lucullus' settlements, this was overturned by Pompey and later argued over in the senate before the eastern arrangements were ratified by compromising with Crassus and Caesar. The settlement and compromise did, however, rectify some of the inconsistencies left by Lucullus' settlements, especially in regard to debt in the east. Lucullus had settled much of the debt and reduced the interest; he did not, however, modify the tax collectors' contracts, which still obligated them to return the investments of their backers and to the treasury. This was a major failure on Lucullus' part, in that he modified one end of a debt contract while leaving the other end still obliged to the original terms. Crassus and Pompey rectified this problem with Caesar's help as consul; this act of the First Triumvirate was their first open manipulation of politics.<sup>263</sup> With Caesar's sway over the popular assembly, he circumvented the senate, which would not or could not agree to do anything on the issue.<sup>264</sup>

The argument that Pompey was given command over the Mithridatic War due to Lucullus' failure to annex Syria is anachronistic in their viewpoint. The *publicani* were angered over the reduction of debt in the east, but they could not have known that Pompey would have annexed Syria or reduced their obligations; there is no proof that he ever gave such a promise nor could he have guaranteed that it could have been

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<sup>263</sup> Appian, "*The Civil Wars*," 251-253. Pompey's Eastern settlements were passed along with land grants for his retired soldiers. Crassus received a one-third reduction in the *publicani*'s contracts for the eastern debt which Lucullus had reduced for the debtors but not for the *publicani*. All this was passed in one law.

<sup>264</sup> Plutarch, "*Pompey*," p. 239

fulfilled.<sup>265</sup> The senate still had to ratify such measures. For this reason the imperialist thesis on the annexation of Syria and-- that it was backed by the equestrians before Pompey took command in the east-- is quite conjectural.

Syria was annexed at the time because Pompey saw a different situation on the ground than Lucullus did. The situation had changed in a few short months. Pompey had negotiated a surrender of Tigranes' conquests in 65, even though Lucullus had actually defeated him a year before. The war being left unfinished allowed Mithridates to reenter Pontus and for Tigranes to rearm. The situation for the Seleucids had changed as well, Antiochus XIII, whom Lucullus had recognized as king, was again in a struggle with a rival Seleucid, Philip II.<sup>266</sup> Jews and Arabs were also involved in their own dynastic struggles at the time. Basically, multiple civil wars were in progress at the same time. Outside dynasts had also claimed portions of the Seleucid kingdom, Commagene had broken away and taken territory, Parthia had assisted local governors and also taken a bridgehead on the western side of the Euphrates, and finally Tigranes had conquered and held much of Syria for fourteen years.<sup>267</sup> This was the situation that Pompey came upon when he entered Syria. It was in utter chaos; and since no one group could control all of Syria, he broke every portion into smaller manageable regions. This allowed any future governor to maintain control of Syria because all other powers were weakened to a subservient position under Rome.

Pompey's annexations must have been unwelcome to some in the senate, as it was necessary to maintain a large military force in such a volatile region. This of course

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<sup>265</sup> Kallet-Marx, p. 313-14. He points out that the initial replacements sent out to take over Lucullus' command were appointed by the senate and not the Tribunes with the Popular Assembly.

<sup>266</sup> Downey, p. 150-1.

<sup>267</sup> S. Sherwin-White, Kuhrt, p. 217-218, Gruen, 668-671. Grainger, p. 170-177.

would have been expensive. The senate had always been reluctant to spend money on a province that did not pay for itself unless it was necessary for security purposes. Pompey partially rectified this by imposing a tax on Pontus, Syria, Cilicia, and on all the client kings and cities in the region.<sup>268</sup> Syria was seen as a failed state that had become the battle ground for various dynasts, both internal and external. Like Macedon and Pontus, Syria was allowed to cause problems with Rome multiple times before it was annexed.<sup>269</sup> Thus the imperialist thesis that suggests Rome conquered the east out of ravenous greed must be greatly revised. Only after years of failed negotiations with the Seleucid dynasty and its inability to maintain order was it seen necessary by Pompey to annex the territory. This was a slow process that neither Pompey nor Rome tried to accelerate in Syria or any other province.

The eastern provinces must have been a financial burden for many years. The multiple civil wars that Rome was involved in spread to the east and greatly stripped its resources for more than thirty years after Pompey's settlements. Syria could not have been very profitable until several years into the reign of Augustus. Pontus was not developed until much later. This should be taken into account in the imperialist and economic theses. Pompey did not live to see Syria become an economic prize for Rome, so how could he be blamed for desiring the region solely for economic gain or for simple

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<sup>268</sup> Appian, "*The Syrian Wars*," p. 199. He states that Syria and Cilicia were taxed at 1% of the value of every person's property.

<sup>269</sup> Gruen, *Macedonian Wars*: First War 214-205 BC was a stalemate, p. 375-9. Second War 200-196 BC, Rome won and forced a treaty on Philip V but did not to annex, p.385-6, 399-402. , Third War 172-167BC, Macedon divided into four republics by Rome, p. 403-417. Fourth war 149-8BC annexed as Roman province of Macedonia, p. 431-36. Pontus annexed after three wars with Mithridates, first war 88-85, second war 83-2, annexed after the third war 74-63 BC. Syria annexed after series of wars and treaty negotiations starting with the first war with Antiochus III 192-189BC, p. 620-644. Tigranes, king of Armenia annexed Upper Syria and held it for 14 years. Pompey defeated Tigranes and annexed Syria in 64/63 BC taking it from two rival Seleucids whom had fought over the throne after Tigranes' forces were forced to leave their country.

imperialistic prestige? The main problem with the imperialist/economic thesis is that it assumes that Pompey gambled on the future and that this future dictated his actions. Pompey made decisions that may have been temporary at the time. Nothing Rome had done in the east was necessarily permanent; this can be illustrated by the rearrangements during the civil wars of Caesar and Pompey and the civil wars with Augustus and Antony.<sup>270</sup> The arrangements in the east were modified constantly during the civil wars and were further modified afterwards.

As innovative as Pompey's settlements may seem in Syria, there was a great level of continuity that followed the precedent of the Seleucids and even the Persian control of the region.<sup>271</sup> The Seleucids gave more attention to Syria than the Persian Empire did, revitalizing it after centuries of decline. They did this mainly by setting the dynastic seat in Antioch. This personal presence made Syria prosper, but it also allowed the Seleucid eastern kingdom to fall away to the Parthians. The Seleucids maintained the Persian institution of satrapies to govern all their lands including Syria.<sup>272</sup> In a similar fashion, Pompey recognized Arab and Jewish kingdoms in Syria who were subordinate to the Roman province, although ruled by their local chiefs or kings rather than satraps.<sup>273</sup> Like the Seleucids, Pompey set up or re-established cities of the Decapolis and recognized their rights and immunities, thereby showing to these cities that he was the rightful heir to the Seleucids and Alexander.<sup>274</sup> He and Rome became their new protector in the Greek traditional sense of relationship between king and city-state. Pompey continued the

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<sup>270</sup> Magie, p.371. Sullivan, p. 330-332. Braund, p. 83. Braund shows how kings could be made and unmade by Rome. A provinces could be formed and later dissolved back into a kingdom, Roman administration was very flexible.

<sup>271</sup> Grainger, p. 194-198. Gruen, p.730

<sup>272</sup> Grainger, p. 30, 48-50.

<sup>273</sup> Jones, "The Urbanization of Palestine," p. 78-85. Grainger, p. 192-198

<sup>274</sup> Grainger, p. 189-191.

Greek aims of spreading of Hellenism in the east. This was further continued by his establishment of the new city-states in Pontus both before and after his time in Syria.

Antony and Augustus continued Pompey's path in the east in their own ways. Antony relied more on dynasts while Augustus allowed most to fade away as the region assimilated, not to Roman institutes but more along the lines of a Greek provincial system.<sup>275</sup> A blending of Graeco-Roman culture ensued. Augustus put the region more and more under the control of legates. Legates were appointed personally by the emperor in a very similar fashion that the Seleucids and Persians appointed satraps and sub-satraps who worked directly for the kings. Romans in this sense were more assimilated by Greek institutions in the east than were the Greeks by Roman institutions. Under Augustus and later emperors, appointees, legates and prefects, were utilized more than elected governors, thus moving away from traditional Roman foreign policy which had been controlled by the senate. During the century leading up to Pompey's conquests, Rome was slowly assimilated into using Greek institutions, such as *philia*, mediation, liberator/protector of the Greeks, alliances and so on.<sup>276</sup>

Rome's initial reluctance to entangle itself in the east cooled and the empire eventually became the master of these Greek institutions and ultimately took them as its own, or was taken over by them. Rome became more Greek in a sense, especially in foreign policy and administering provinces within a more Hellenic system. This system slowly worked its way back to Rome itself, where the power of the senate was slowly ceded to the monarchy of the emperor. The imperialist thesis fails to see that through

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<sup>275</sup> Sullivan, p. 330-332. He shows how Pompey's arrangements may have been premature in Pontus due to that region desiring a king after Pompey left a 'vacuum of royal power.' He says that the people there were not ready to govern themselves. Gruen, p. 721-22, 730. He shows how Rome took on Greek forms of provincial governance in the east after years of resisting physical intervention.

<sup>276</sup> Gruen, p. 720-722.

conquest, Rome itself was conquered by Greek and eastern ideology in regards to monarchy and other institutions that were not part of the Republic's institutions. The imperialist thesis also fails to focus any blame on the lower and middle classes who supported the rise of monarchy in Rome and aided in the deterioration of the elite senatorial power in the empire. Badian does discuss the lower and middle classes pushing expansion for wealth but in the end of his work he still places all the blame on the senatorial elite and Pompey. Kallet-Marx does the same; he details how the return of the tribunes' powers and their intervention in the 60s BC into foreign policy in the east made it possible for commanders to annex for the purpose of exploitation. He too puts the ultimate blame on the commanders, not on those who elected them. <sup>277</sup>

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<sup>277</sup> Badian, p. 44-51, Kallet-Marx, p. 322-23. Both give conclusive evidence about the rising power of the peoples' assembly and the power of the tribunes to push empire. They both oddly deflect the blame to the senatorial elite for the consequences. The tribunes do share in much of the deterioration of the republic, but are overlooked. Perhaps it is because it goes against the imperialist thesis' proclivity to vilify elite members of society while upholding democracy as the highest paradigm of governance.

## CONCLUSION

The imperialist thesis tries to point at too few men and blame them for the fall of the republic. The historiography of Pompey in that respect gets ahead of itself by looking at events after Pompey's death and placing much of the ills on him after the fact. This moral judgment has made the historiography ignore the eastern settlements of Pompey and to focus on the fall of the republic. This is done by trying to make connections to Pompey's rise as a catalyst which made Crassus and Caesar desire to compete with his prestige. Political alliances are anachronistically created to form conspiracies that did not exist until a later time. This has damaged the historiography of the annexation and organization of Bithynia-Pontus, Cilicia and Syria.

Badian makes a much better argument for the lower-class push for empire, led by the equestrian tribunes, beginning with the demagoguery of the Gracchii.<sup>278</sup> He shows that they desired the spread of empire, so as to gain wealth for the common good (public works and free grain). After Badian makes a compelling argument in that direction, he retracts it and shifts the blame on a few men of the senatorial class with a much less compelling argument and less evidence.<sup>279</sup> His evidence for a lower-class push for empire is much more detailed, but it seems that he does not want to blame the lower and middle class of Rome for pushing the idea. This makes the imperialist thesis fit in a neat package that blames a few men. The moral judgment in the imperialist thesis is that wealth, power, and prestige equal corruption.

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<sup>278</sup> Badian, p. 44-48. He claims that money from Asia corrupted the Roman state but attributes it too early.

<sup>279</sup> Badian, p. 79-81. He claims that Pompey saw that the people expected benefits from conquest. Pompey and subsequent generals and emperors gave it to them. Badian blames the elite for this even though the popular assembly was the political body who gave Pompey his command, not the senate.

For all Badian's use of modern parallels, mainly the British Empire, it is odd that he excluded the middle class from helping create that empire, or the Roman Empire. He says nothing of the rising German Empire, which was very much spread by middle-class investors who desired a maritime empire, while the elite in the army did not wish to expand beyond Europe, nor invest in navies. The imperialist thesis is based on the 18-19<sup>th</sup> century's rise and fall of empires. Yet, within the arguments of the imperialists certain omissions occur that undermine their own conclusions. Some of these omissions fail to recognize that democratic institutions can and do foster empire. In the ancient world this is also true. Athens had an empire and was democratic. Sparta, though more aristocratic, did have some level of democracy and too became an empire. Rome had democratic institutions and become an empire. A single person cannot be blamed for fall the Roman Republic or for the rise of the Roman Empire. The imperialist thesis does just that, not usually with one person, as Badian does with Pompey, but usually it is blamed on a small group of elites (e.g. the First and Second Triumvirates) who supposedly had the power to create empire without the consent of the people and to do it within a short time period.

The imperialist thesis is flawed in this aspect and fails to see that empire is built up over generations and usually with the consent of the people, not merely an elite desire. Elites in Rome had much to lose in empire, namely the monopoly over the limited amount of governing positions which their families controlled (the pro-praetorships and pro-consulships). This is exactly what happened under Augustus, the senatorial class lost much of their traditional power to the equestrian class whom had desired expansion more than the patrician class. All of the important military provinces were held by the emperor

himself, who sent out legates to govern in his stead. This circumvented the traditional role of the senate whom had the power in the republic to send out fellow senators to govern the provinces.

Nearly all of the factors attributed to Pompey's annexation in the current historiography are derived from future events that revolve around the fall of the republic and the rise of the empire. The situations that Pompey came into, when he annexed the eastern provinces are often clouded by these later debates. The century and decades leading up to Pompey's settlements are far more important in understanding the reasoning behind his actions. What happened after he left the east and after his death are important in discerning what impact Pompey had on the region but should have little to no bearing on why he arranged the east as he did; such an approach is too anachronistic. This is what the imperialist/economic thesis has done.

Pompey was not the sole architect of his career he had the help and manipulation of many others who are often not given the proper credit in the imperialist thesis; though some are given too much credit. Many of the so-called paybacks given to Pompey were actually politicians reaching out to make an ally of Pompey in an un-solicited manner and in an attempt to ride his coattails. These actions did pay dividends to those who gave Pompey commands but they were not alliances that Pompey necessarily pre-arranged. The imperialist thesis makes Pompey's political alliances appear to be under his sole control.<sup>280</sup> Cicero barely knew Pompey when he supported the law that gave him the Mithridatic Command.<sup>281</sup> The Tribune Gabinius, who sponsored the law that gave

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<sup>280</sup> Frank, p. 191-193.

<sup>281</sup> Cicero, *Pro Lege Manilia*, p. 17-83. Cicero used this as a political speech to attach himself to the most popular general of the day, therefore elevating his own prestige. There was still a level of competition

Pompey the pirate command was later given a legate position by Pompey and even became the governor of the newly annexed Syrian province.<sup>282</sup> This legate position given by Pompey was the real payback not the reverse order as the imperialist thesis states.

Much of what Pompey did in the east followed past Greek ideals of governing with a bit of Roman innovation. Overall, he sought a return to normalcy and the status quo or at least his Roman perception of what that meant. The Greek world was not fully assimilated by Rome, but certain aspects of Greek culture were no longer given free rein, especially in regard to competition in arms and in private reprisals on land or sea. Piracy and brigandage were no longer acceptable or legal under Roman law. Kings and dynasts were also no longer given the freedom to expand their power and territory as before. Mithridates was the last of these independent kings to be allowed such autonomy. Client-kings became more tightly bound to Rome afterwards and performed similar duties as pro-praetors and pro-consuls. Their autonomy was only acceptable to a degree, and this could be expanded or contracted by Rome at any time.

Pompey brought stability to the eastern provinces and regions by more tightly binding them into networks that were also bound to Rome. This caused more blending of culture and ideas in the east. Rome assimilated in the ways it dealt with the Greek east that allowed for expression of multiple cultures to co-exist rather peacefully. There was definitely much negotiation between the Greeks and Romans on how to administer the eastern provinces. Eventually, the Greek elite became partners in this empire and so it

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between Pompey and Cicero later on. Cicero wrote a letter extolling his own bravery during the Catolinian Conspiracy and tried to compare it to Pompey's achievements.

<sup>282</sup> Appian, *Syrian Wars*, p. 201. Appian shows an intimate connection to Pompey and Gabinius but he also shows the First Triumvirate active before it was actually formed. This brings into question that it asked Gabinius to intervene inside Egypt while he was governor of Syria. Dio Cassius, p. 37. Dio leaves both possibilities open, that either Pompey prompted Gabinius to enact the pirate command law or that Gabinius was reaching out for future favors, which he did attain.

could fairly be called a Graeco-Roman empire.<sup>283</sup> The east was not merely a group of Roman vassals, as the imperialist thesis may suggest. The struggles with Jewish and Arab peoples, however, show that Rome had less ability to negotiate with their cultures. Rome held a bias for Greek culture which clashed with other eastern ones. Despite the clashes with these peoples, there were long periods of peace in the east and part of that should be attributed to Pompey's arrangements and their continuation by future governors and emperors.

Pompey's settlements in the east did create the eastern Roman Empire that lasted with little modification for hundreds of years, for this reason more attention should be given to his ideas which were implemented to govern the region. Though modified by succeeding generations, Pompey's arrangements and eastern borders were still largely in effect well into Dio Cassius' time.<sup>284</sup> His arrangements were not premature, as suggested by Sullivan; they were not made out of pure greed as Frank suggests, or imperialistic desire.<sup>285</sup> They were made with a sober mind to the past events leading up to his commands.<sup>286</sup> His decisions were guided by his past victories over enemies to whom he most often gave clemency. The past and current situations of each region also dictated much of what Pompey annexed or gave to kings. He took land and power away from those who were repeat offenders to the peace that Rome and her eastern allies had tried to maintain. Rome annexed Macedon only after multiple revolts. Pompey followed this precedent in Pontus by annexing Mithridates' lands after three wars. In Syria he annexed

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<sup>283</sup> Gruen, p. 721-723.

<sup>284</sup> Dio Cassius, p. 133. Dio Cassius lived from 150-235 AD, almost three hundred years after Pompey's settlements in the east.

<sup>285</sup> Sullivan, p. 331-332. Frank, p. 191-193.

<sup>286</sup> Gruen, p. 721-725. He shows that past conflicts with their roots in Greek interstate conflicts drove Rome reluctantly and defensively to eventually annex the east.

the territory due to weakness and past disputes with the Seleucids; he was actually invited by the Greek cities inside Syria for their protection against Jewish and Arab expansion.<sup>287</sup> Cilicia was annexed after decades of pirate and bandit wars which ended under Pompey's command.

The security and reluctant empire thesis makes more sense than most other arguments in the historiography. The fact that Pompey arranged the east with the subjects' and citizens' rights in mind strengthens and adds another angle to the security thesis. He sought a more lenient and enlightened annexation than may have occurred under another's command. The *lex Pompeia* gave civic rights to many who had never known them before. Pompey knew this and gave it to advertise his *beneficia* and his embracing of Greek *paideia*. These arrangement also helped foster peace whereas in the past punitive settlements had rekindled war.

Pompey organized cities the way he did so the new citizens would help administer the region for Rome without having to be under constant supervision. He joined them to Rome in partnership for their own control. The experiment benefited common people whereas in the past client-kings were given preference. Pompey's actions do not have to be contradictory; he arranged the east in a way that pleased several groups at once. Pompey was a Hellenizer, and an imperialist in a loosely defined way. His form of imperialism was not driven purely by greed of money or for prestige, though these things came as a result. Pompey exploited situations that had arisen outside of his control and used them to his benefit. In the process he spread Greek and Roman culture as well as law and order to regions long disrupted by anarchy and warfare.

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<sup>287</sup> Grainger, p. 189-190.

## APPENDIX A: ROMAN POLITICAL OFFICES AND INSTITUTIONS

Roman political institutions cannot be separated from the military as the two were interconnected. There were no political parties so individuals had to run their election campaigns based on their personal reputation. The candidate's family reputation also helped or harmed in these elections. A young Roman had to enter service as a military officer or aide for about ten years before being eligible for his first electable position. The political path in Rome was called the *cursus honorum*, this was the course of honor which all elite men tried to follow by being elected into offices. Very few of the 300-600 men in the senate could ever attain the chief magistrate position of consul so the competition to stand out was fierce amongst the elites.<sup>288</sup>

The first office in the *cursus honorum* was the position of *quaestor*, which required being 30 years old and having prior military experience. A quaestor was a financial and administrative officer in Rome or in the provinces. In the provinces he was the second-in-command under the governor of the province and the legions placed there. A man was eligible to enter the senate only after holding a quaestorship.<sup>289</sup>

The next position in the *cursus honorum* was the *aedile*. There were two levels of aedile, two were allowed from the plebs and two were from the patrician class. They kept up repairs of the roads and water supply. They were also judges over the affairs of commerce. These men had to be 37 years old and also had to have been quaestors before

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<sup>288</sup> Hans Julius Wolff, *Roman Law: An Historical Introduction*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951, 1987. p. 43. The senate was comprised of 300 men for most of the republic. Sulla in 81 BC increased it to 600, Caesar increased it to around 900, and Augustus brought the number back down to 600.

<sup>289</sup> Wolff, p. 34.

their election. This was an expensive position due to the fact that much of the infrastructural repairs they were charged with came out of their personal expenses.<sup>290</sup> They were also charged with holding festivals at their expense. Because of this the position of aedile was later skipped over by several patricians who did not want to lose so much money.

There was a middle position traditionally open to the plebs only, which was the *Tribune* of the Plebs. By the late republic there were ten Tribunes of the plebs. The Tribunes could veto acts and rulings of all the magistrates. They could veto each other as well so this is how the upper magistrates tried to, maintain balance. Particularly powerful Tribunes could however push extreme measures by using the people to back them against the other Tribunes. In the Republic these men often used street violence to get their way against the assembly and the senate. When Tribunes and generals made alliances it spelled disaster for the checks and balances that were built into the Roman political system.<sup>291</sup> This is a major cause of what tore the republic apart. The ex-consul Marius used the Tribunes to deprive Sulla of his Mithridatic command and give it to him.<sup>292</sup> This started a civil war between the two men that raged on and off for a decade. After Sulla won he attempted to reset many of the laws in the Roman constitution. He removed the power of the tribunes and reduced the power of the equestrians to try criminal cases involving ex-governors. When Pompey became consul for the first time he reinstated the powers of the tribunes and some of the equestrians' judicial powers.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> Wolff, 34

<sup>291</sup> Wolff, 37-8.

<sup>292</sup> Appian, *The Civil Wars*, p. 101-111.

<sup>293</sup> Plutarch, Rex Warner, "trans.," *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1958.1972. p.179.

The next level in the *cursus honorum* open to the patricians was the *praetor*; one had to be 40 years old and have served in all the subsequent positions to qualify. In the republic there were usually 10-12 of these men. The praetor was the second highest magistrate in the city and the first stage of provincial governor (pro-praetor). Praetors were judges inside the city and legionary commanders outside the city and the provinces. They usually commanded smaller provinces and were over one legion.<sup>294</sup>

The next level of magistrate was the *consul*, this was functionally the highest position in the Roman state. There were two consuls who presided over the senate as equal colleagues. They were the heads of the senate, the chief justices, and the highest military commanders. When sent to provinces they were sent alone and were called pro-consuls. They commanded larger provinces and could normally command 2-4 legions.<sup>295</sup>

There was a position technically above the consuls, this was the *censor*. Two were elected every five years to conduct the census and to ‘censor’ the senate (to clean out the roles of those who were no longer worthy due to economics or unethical behavior).<sup>296</sup> These men had no legislative, judicial, or military power. Though they had the power over who was accepted or removed from the senate.

In times of an emergency a *dictator* could be appointed by one of the consuls to bring order back to the state. His office was to last until the emergency ended or after six months. There was little limits to his power. The character of this position changed under Sulla and Caesar who used it to show they had attained the highest prestige of the state with or without an emergency.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Wolff, p. 33.

<sup>295</sup> Wolff, p. 32-33.

<sup>296</sup> Wolff, p. 35-36.

<sup>297</sup> Wolff, p. 36-7.

The three highest officials (dictator, consuls, and praetors) who held civic and military power possessed what Romans called *Imperium*. *Imperium* was the absolute power of the commander-in-chief over his army and his territory.<sup>298</sup> This power gave him control over the life and death of all under his authority. This power was only checked within the sacred boundary of the city of Rome, (the *Pomerium*). The body of guards, called *lictors*, surrounding the chief magistrates and military commanders carried the symbol of imperium, the *fascēs*, the rods and axes. The axe blades turned outward showed that the magistrate had the power to execute a person under his command, if they were turned inward, inside Rome, he did not have the power to execute a citizen without checks by other legislative bodies or magistrates' intervention.<sup>299</sup> While a magistrate or military commander held imperium he was immune from prosecution. This is a major factor that made several Roman generals seek governorships and magistrate offices continually in the later republic. It gave them prestige but it also made them immune to their enemies in the senate who may have prosecuted them for legal discrepancies in their commands and provincial dealings.

## **APPENDIX B: ROMAN VOTING ASSEMBLIES**

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<sup>298</sup> Wolff, p. 28

<sup>299</sup> Wolff, p. 29.

The Roman voting assemblies used blocks or divisions within each assembly. These blocks would vote amongst themselves and then each block was given one vote in the assembly ( this worked similarly to the electoral college of the US). There were three original assemblies in addition to the senate. Each struggled to maintain and increase their legislative powers against the other assemblies.

The Curiate Assembly (*comitia curiata*) was originally based on the clans that made up Rome. By the late Republic this assembly only had the power over domestic family law, adoptions and wills. It still existed but mostly as a symbolic body, later on it was filled by 30 lictors who were the proxy voters in that assembly.<sup>300</sup>

The Century Assembly (*comitia centuriata*) was based on the concept of breaking up the people into centuries (hundreds) for military purposes. All five of the classes were placed into centuries based on their property qualifications and added to 18 equestrian centuries. Originally the first class and equestrians made up the majority with 98 centuries of the total 198. The number was increased to 350 centuries between the First and Second Punic War.<sup>301</sup> The first century and the equestrians voted first giving the elite and wealthy land owners more influence. The centurion assembly became very important in the republic electing all the chief officials, the praetors, consuls, and the censors. The assembly could only be called by the consul and they met outside the city in the military parade ground (*Campus Martius*) as a symbol of their military foundations.

The Tribal Assembly (*comitia tributa*) and the Peoples' Assembly (*concilia plebis*) were the same except that in the plebian council only plebeians were allowed to vote. These assemblies were divided into local districts called *tribus*. Originally there

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<sup>300</sup> Wolff, p. 39.

<sup>301</sup> Wolff, p. 39-41.

were four; this was increased to thirty-one rural and four urban tribes by 241 BC.<sup>302</sup> A citizen could only be a member of one tribe within this assembly. This assembly elected the lower ranking officials, quaestors, aediles, and Tribunes of the plebs. Any magistrate below the rank of the consul could introduce legislation in this assembly. This assembly passed the majority of the legislation in Rome after 287 BC. These laws were often given by the senate to tribunes who would push them through the assembly.<sup>303</sup>

The Roman Senate was legally only an advisory body but due to its influential members it did involve itself in the making and passing of laws through manipulation of the other legislative bodies. The senate though was responsible for all foreign policy and receiving of embassies.<sup>304</sup> Initiatives in the senate could only be brought up by the magistrates. The senate had the authority to invest prolonged imperium on a magistrate by appointing him to a province making him either a pro-consul or pro-praetor.<sup>305</sup> This is where much tension arose during Pompey's appointments to the pirate command and the Mithridatic commands. Both were passed by Tribunes and the assemblies, not the senate who had the traditional authority to do so.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> Wolff, p. 41.

<sup>303</sup> Lily Ross Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. P. 66

<sup>304</sup> Wolff, p. 42-45.

<sup>305</sup> Wolff, p. 45

<sup>306</sup> Taylor, p. 18, 78.

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