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Quantifying Trust and Reputation for Defense against Adversaries in Multi-Channel Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

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Date Issued:
2015
Abstract/Description:
Dynamic spectrum access enabled by cognitive radio networks are envisioned to drivethe next generation wireless networks that can increase spectrum utility by opportunisticallyaccessing unused spectrum. Due to the policy constraint that there could be no interferenceto the primary (licensed) users, secondary cognitive radios have to continuously sense forprimary transmissions. Typically, sensing reports from multiple cognitive radios are fusedas stand-alone observations are prone to errors due to wireless channel characteristics. Suchdependence on cooperative spectrum sensing is vulnerable to attacks such as SecondarySpectrum Data Falsification (SSDF) attacks when multiple malicious or selfish radios falsifythe spectrum reports. Hence, there is a need to quantify the trustworthiness of radios thatshare spectrum sensing reports and devise malicious node identification and robust fusionschemes that would lead to correct inference about spectrum usage.In this work, we propose an anomaly monitoring technique that can effectively cap-ture anomalies in the spectrum sensing reports shared by individual cognitive radios duringcooperative spectrum sensing in a multi-channel distributed network. Such anomalies areused as evidence to compute the trustworthiness of a radio by its neighbours. The proposedanomaly monitoring technique works for any density of malicious nodes and for any physicalenvironment. We propose an optimistic trust heuristic for a system with a normal risk attitude and show that it can be approximated as a beta distribution. For a more conservativesystem, we propose a multinomial Dirichlet distribution based conservative trust framework,where Josang's Belief model is used to resolve any uncertainty in information that mightarise during anomaly monitoring. Using a machine learning approach, we identify maliciousnodes with a high degree of certainty regardless of their aggressiveness and variations intro-duced by the pathloss environment. We also propose extensions to the anomaly monitoringtechnique that facilitate learning about strategies employed by malicious nodes and alsoutilize the misleading information they provide. We also devise strategies to defend against a collaborative SSDF attack that islaunched by a coalition of selfish nodes. Since, defense against such collaborative attacks isdifficult with popularly used voting based inference models or node centric isolation techniques, we propose a channel centric Bayesian inference approach that indicates how much the collective decision on a channels occupancy inference can be trusted. Based on the measured observations over time, we estimate the parameters of the hypothesis of anomalous andnon-anomalous events using a multinomial Bayesian based inference. We quantitatively define the trustworthiness of a channel inference as the difference between the posterior beliefsassociated with anomalous and non-anomalous events. The posterior beliefs are updated based on a weighted average of the prior information on the belief itself and the recently observed data.Subsequently, we propose robust fusion models which utilize the trusts of the nodes to improve the accuracy of the cooperative spectrum sensing decisions. In particular, we propose three fusion models: (i) optimistic trust based fusion, (ii) conservative trust based fusion, and (iii) inversion based fusion. The former two approaches exclude untrustworthy sensing reports for fusion, while the last approach utilizes misleading information. Allschemes are analyzed under various attack strategies. We propose an asymmetric weightedmoving average based trust management scheme that quickly identifies on-off SSDF attacks and prevents quick trust redemption when such nodes revert back to temporal honest behavior. We also provide insights on what attack strategies are more effective from the adversaries' perspective.Through extensive simulation experiments we show that the trust models are effective in identifying malicious nodes with a high degree of certainty under variety of network and radio conditions. We show high true negative detection rates even when multiple malicious nodes launch collaborative attacks which is an improvement over existing voting based exclusion and entropy divergence techniques. We also show that we are able to improve the accuracy of fusion decisions compared to other popular fusion techniques. Trust based fusion schemes show worst case decision error rates of 5% while inversion based fusion show 4% as opposed majority voting schemes that have 18% error rate. We also show that the proposed channel centric Bayesian inference based trust model is able to distinguish between attacked and non-attacked channels for both static and dynamic collaborative attacks. We are also able to show that attacked channels have significantly lower trust values than channels that are not(-) a metric that can be used by nodes to rank the quality of inference on channels.
Title: Quantifying Trust and Reputation for Defense against Adversaries in Multi-Channel Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks.
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Name(s): Bhattacharjee, Shameek, Author
Chatterjee, Mainak, Committee Chair
Guha, Ratan, Committee Member
Zou, Changchun, Committee Member
Turgut, Damla, Committee Member
Catbas, Necati, Committee Member
University of Central Florida, Degree Grantor
Type of Resource: text
Date Issued: 2015
Publisher: University of Central Florida
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: Dynamic spectrum access enabled by cognitive radio networks are envisioned to drivethe next generation wireless networks that can increase spectrum utility by opportunisticallyaccessing unused spectrum. Due to the policy constraint that there could be no interferenceto the primary (licensed) users, secondary cognitive radios have to continuously sense forprimary transmissions. Typically, sensing reports from multiple cognitive radios are fusedas stand-alone observations are prone to errors due to wireless channel characteristics. Suchdependence on cooperative spectrum sensing is vulnerable to attacks such as SecondarySpectrum Data Falsification (SSDF) attacks when multiple malicious or selfish radios falsifythe spectrum reports. Hence, there is a need to quantify the trustworthiness of radios thatshare spectrum sensing reports and devise malicious node identification and robust fusionschemes that would lead to correct inference about spectrum usage.In this work, we propose an anomaly monitoring technique that can effectively cap-ture anomalies in the spectrum sensing reports shared by individual cognitive radios duringcooperative spectrum sensing in a multi-channel distributed network. Such anomalies areused as evidence to compute the trustworthiness of a radio by its neighbours. The proposedanomaly monitoring technique works for any density of malicious nodes and for any physicalenvironment. We propose an optimistic trust heuristic for a system with a normal risk attitude and show that it can be approximated as a beta distribution. For a more conservativesystem, we propose a multinomial Dirichlet distribution based conservative trust framework,where Josang's Belief model is used to resolve any uncertainty in information that mightarise during anomaly monitoring. Using a machine learning approach, we identify maliciousnodes with a high degree of certainty regardless of their aggressiveness and variations intro-duced by the pathloss environment. We also propose extensions to the anomaly monitoringtechnique that facilitate learning about strategies employed by malicious nodes and alsoutilize the misleading information they provide. We also devise strategies to defend against a collaborative SSDF attack that islaunched by a coalition of selfish nodes. Since, defense against such collaborative attacks isdifficult with popularly used voting based inference models or node centric isolation techniques, we propose a channel centric Bayesian inference approach that indicates how much the collective decision on a channels occupancy inference can be trusted. Based on the measured observations over time, we estimate the parameters of the hypothesis of anomalous andnon-anomalous events using a multinomial Bayesian based inference. We quantitatively define the trustworthiness of a channel inference as the difference between the posterior beliefsassociated with anomalous and non-anomalous events. The posterior beliefs are updated based on a weighted average of the prior information on the belief itself and the recently observed data.Subsequently, we propose robust fusion models which utilize the trusts of the nodes to improve the accuracy of the cooperative spectrum sensing decisions. In particular, we propose three fusion models: (i) optimistic trust based fusion, (ii) conservative trust based fusion, and (iii) inversion based fusion. The former two approaches exclude untrustworthy sensing reports for fusion, while the last approach utilizes misleading information. Allschemes are analyzed under various attack strategies. We propose an asymmetric weightedmoving average based trust management scheme that quickly identifies on-off SSDF attacks and prevents quick trust redemption when such nodes revert back to temporal honest behavior. We also provide insights on what attack strategies are more effective from the adversaries' perspective.Through extensive simulation experiments we show that the trust models are effective in identifying malicious nodes with a high degree of certainty under variety of network and radio conditions. We show high true negative detection rates even when multiple malicious nodes launch collaborative attacks which is an improvement over existing voting based exclusion and entropy divergence techniques. We also show that we are able to improve the accuracy of fusion decisions compared to other popular fusion techniques. Trust based fusion schemes show worst case decision error rates of 5% while inversion based fusion show 4% as opposed majority voting schemes that have 18% error rate. We also show that the proposed channel centric Bayesian inference based trust model is able to distinguish between attacked and non-attacked channels for both static and dynamic collaborative attacks. We are also able to show that attacked channels have significantly lower trust values than channels that are not(-) a metric that can be used by nodes to rank the quality of inference on channels.
Identifier: CFE0005764 (IID), ucf:50081 (fedora)
Note(s): 2015-08-01
Ph.D.
Engineering and Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Computing
Doctoral
This record was generated from author submitted information.
Subject(s): Trust Metrics
Trust and Reputation Scoring
Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
Cognitive Radio Networks
Bayesian and Machine Learning based Trust Models
Wireless Network Security
Information Assurance
Robust Fusion
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0005764
Restrictions on Access: public 2015-08-15
Host Institution: UCF

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