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 Title
 CATEGORICAL PROPERTIES OF LATTICEVALUED CONVERGENCE SPACES.
 Creator

Flores, Paul, Richardson, Gary, University of Central Florida
 Abstract / Description

This work can be roughly divided into two parts. Initially, it may be considered a continuation of the very interesting research on the topic of LatticeValued Convergence Spaces given by Jäger [2001, 2005]. The alternate axioms presented here seem to lead to theorems having proofs more closely related to standard arguments used in Convergence Space theory when the Lattice is L=.Various Subcategories are investigated. One such subconstruct is shown to be isomorphic to the category of...
Show moreThis work can be roughly divided into two parts. Initially, it may be considered a continuation of the very interesting research on the topic of LatticeValued Convergence Spaces given by Jäger [2001, 2005]. The alternate axioms presented here seem to lead to theorems having proofs more closely related to standard arguments used in Convergence Space theory when the Lattice is L=.Various Subcategories are investigated. One such subconstruct is shown to be isomorphic to the category of Lattice Valued Fuzzy Convergence Spaces defined and studied by Jäger . Our principal category is shown to be a topological universe and contains a subconstruct isomorphic to the category of probabilistic convergence spaces discussed in Kent and Richardson when L=. Fundamental work in latticevalued convergence from the more general perspective of monads can be found in Gähler . Secondly, diagonal axioms are defined in the category whose objects consist of all the lattice valued convergence spaces. When the latter lattice is linearly ordered, a diagonal condition is given which characterizes those objects in the category that are determined by probabilistic convergence spaces which are topological. Certain background information regarding filters, convergence spaces, and diagonal axioms with its dual are given in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 describes Probabilistic Convergence and associated Diagonal axioms. Chapter 3 defines Jäger convergence and proves that Jäger's construct is isomorphic to a bireflective subconstruct of SLCS. Furthermore, connections between the diagonal axioms discussed and those given by Gähler are explored. In Chapter 4, further categorical properties of SLCS are discussed and in particular, it is shown that SLCS is topological, cartesian closed, and extensional. Chapter 5 explores connections between diagonal axioms for objects in the sub construct δ(PCS) and SLCS. Finally, recommendations for further research are provided.
Show less  Date Issued
 2007
 Identifier
 CFE0001715, ucf:47292
 Format
 Document (PDF)
 PURL
 http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0001715
 Title
 THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM.
 Creator

Gonzalez, Ariel, Rodgers, Travis, University of Central Florida
 Abstract / Description

Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an...
Show moreMany contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a fullblooded theory of agentcausal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agentcausal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
Show less  Date Issued
 2014
 Identifier
 CFH0004628, ucf:45292
 Format
 Document (PDF)
 PURL
 http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFH0004628