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- Title
- CHANGING TRADITIONS: EXAMINING THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE PROBABILITY OF BIDDING TO HOST THE OLYMPIC GAMES OVER TIME.
- Creator
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Dickens, Jessie R, Hofler, Richard, University of Central Florida
- Abstract / Description
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In September 2017, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that, for the first time in its history, it would award the hosting of two different Olympic Games at the same time, giving the 2024 and 2028 Summer Olympic Games to Paris and Los Angeles respectively. As a result, the question is raised as to why the IOC broke tradition in its host city selection process. The break of tradition is presumably due to a lack of candidates to host the 2028 Summer Olympics. With prior host...
Show moreIn September 2017, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that, for the first time in its history, it would award the hosting of two different Olympic Games at the same time, giving the 2024 and 2028 Summer Olympic Games to Paris and Los Angeles respectively. As a result, the question is raised as to why the IOC broke tradition in its host city selection process. The break of tradition is presumably due to a lack of candidates to host the 2028 Summer Olympics. With prior host cities reporting astronomical costs and high debt balances associated with hosting, many cities have retracted their bids or have refused to submit candidature bids altogether. The Olympics are one of the largest, most economically impactful mega-events in modern culture. While hosting does provide a nation with the opportunity to show off its infrastructure and culture before millions of people worldwide, the costs to host the event have steadily risen as the Olympics have become a larger and larger spectacle. This study uses a logistic regression model to determine the relative factors that determine a city's willingness to bid and uses the results to draw conclusions as to why the willingness to host has fluctuated across time. The results show a definite change in the probabilities of a potential city bidding to host the Olympic Games across time and also provide insight into the factors that determine these changes in probabilities. By determining these conclusions, this study hopes to provide insight into ways that hosting the Olympics can become accessible to all prospective host cities so that there is increased competition in the host city selection process.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2018
- Identifier
- CFH2000293, ucf:45727
- Format
- Document (PDF)
- PURL
- http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFH2000293
- Title
- TWO ESSAYS ON BIDDING IN MULTI-UNIT COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS.
- Creator
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Shao, Minjie, Schnitzlein, Charles, University of Central Florida
- Abstract / Description
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This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second setting where bidders are capacity constrained. We document downward sloping demand curves for individual bidders. Bidders shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. The winner's curse is...
Show moreThis dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second setting where bidders are capacity constrained. We document downward sloping demand curves for individual bidders. Bidders shade their bids by submitting quantity-price pairs and spreading their bids. The winner's curse is strong in the unconstrained treatment, but we find no evidence of the winner's curse when bidding constraints are imposed. Unconstrained bidders shade bids significantly more and their quantity-weighted prices are much lower than those in the constrained treatment. Interacting with the information structure, the capacity constraint has a significant impact on the auction results including the market clearing price, market efficiency, and the degree of market concentration. We provide evidence that efficient price discovery in multi-unit auctions with diverse information is possible, but careful attention to auction design will make this outcome more likely. Essay two examines how the introduction of a noncompetitive bidding option affects outcomes in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The experimental design incorporates many of the characteristics of the markets that pertain to the issuance of new equity securities. Important features of the bidding environment include endogenous bidder entry, costly information acquisition, bidders that differ by capacity constraint, and substantial uncertainty with respect to the intrinsic value. We use a standard uniform-price auction as our baseline setting where only competitive bids are accepted. Our results show that introducing the noncompetitive bidding option improves auction performance by increasing revenue and reducing price error. Underpricing is found in both treatments, but is less severe in the presence of the noncompetitive bidding option. The incorporation of this option significantly increases both the small bidder participation rate and allocation, and reduces the incentive for small bidders to free ride by submitting extremely high bids. Under both treatments, information acquisition increases large bidders' profits but proves unprofitable for small bidders, and pricing accuracy is increasing in the rate of information acquisition.
Show less - Date Issued
- 2010
- Identifier
- CFE0003234, ucf:48526
- Format
- Document (PDF)
- PURL
- http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0003234


