Current Search:  Compatibilism (x)

View All Items

  • CSV Spreadsheet
(1 - 2 of 2)
Measuring Player Perceptions of Freedom and Control in Modded and Unmodded Versions of Bethesda's Skyrim: A Qualitative Play Study
Title
Measuring Player Perceptions of Freedom and Control in Modded and Unmodded Versions of Bethesda's Skyrim: A Qualitative Play Study.
Creator
Kretzschmar, Mark, Salter, Anastasia, Stanfill, Mel, Janz, Bruce, Postigo, Hector, University of Central Florida
Abstract / Description
This interdisciplinary dissertation explores perceptions of control in modded and unmodded versions of Bethesda's sandbox video game Skyrim. Sandbox games are known for greater choice options that suggest greater perceptions of control for gamers. Sandbox games also generally encourage the use of user-generated creations called modifications (mods) that users can download to personalize their games. While we need philosophy to understand and define control as a concept, we also need...
Show moreThis interdisciplinary dissertation explores perceptions of control in modded and unmodded versions of Bethesda's sandbox video game Skyrim. Sandbox games are known for greater choice options that suggest greater perceptions of control for gamers. Sandbox games also generally encourage the use of user-generated creations called modifications (mods) that users can download to personalize their games. While we need philosophy to understand and define control as a concept, we also need psychology to understand how users perceive control in media studies. At present, qualitative academic research that measures gamer perceptions of control is non-existent as is research on how users articulate their experiences with mods. Interviews were conducted with twenty-seven individuals who identified as gamers to analyze these perceptions of control in a game like Skyrim. The first chapter is introductory and outlines key terms for the dissertation as well as the play study's methodology. The second chapter examines philosophical and psychological perceptions of control that correspond with negative freedom (freedom from) and positive freedom (freedom to). While no game can promise radical free will because they have been programmed in advance, the information here may be used to demonstrate how perceptions of control might influence game design. The third chapter continues this exploration of perceived control through genre analysis, revealing the relationship between greater perceptions of control and mod support in sandbox video games. The fourth chapter presents the first two findings from the play study that demonstrate how mods influence player perceptions of control. The fifth chapter reveals how gamers of the play study discuss their perceptions of control video games in their own words with an emphasis on positive and negative freedom and generic conventions. The final chapter provides challenges for game design and scholarly qualitative analysis for future research based on findings in the play study.
Show less
Date Issued
2019
Identifier
CFE0007479, ucf:52673
Format
Document (PDF)
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0007479
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM
Title
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM.
Creator
Gonzalez, Ariel, Rodgers, Travis, University of Central Florida
Abstract / Description
Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an...
Show moreMany contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
Show less
Date Issued
2014
Identifier
CFH0004628, ucf:45292
Format
Document (PDF)
PURL
http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFH0004628