Current Search: Moral Responsibility (x)
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Title
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THE IMPACT OF CONTINUING EDUCATION MODULES ON THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS.
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Creator
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Modell, Sandy, Stanlick, Nancy, University of Central Florida
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Abstract / Description
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Increased life expectancies and a significant reduction in the number of corporate pension plans nationwide have made the prospects of retirement a challenge for many of us. The burden of funding retirement will move from the corporation or government to the individual. Those individuals with limited financial experience will most likely need the guidance of a financial advisor. Can we trust and rely upon them? Following the 2004 late trading scandal and the 2008 financial meltdown, the...
Show moreIncreased life expectancies and a significant reduction in the number of corporate pension plans nationwide have made the prospects of retirement a challenge for many of us. The burden of funding retirement will move from the corporation or government to the individual. Those individuals with limited financial experience will most likely need the guidance of a financial advisor. Can we trust and rely upon them? Following the 2004 late trading scandal and the 2008 financial meltdown, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") implemented Continuing Education requirements at the advisor level. The intent was to improve the quality and integrity of advisors' interaction with clients. I have interviewed forty-one advisors at four separate financial services firms to examine the impact of this training on the moral obligations and responsibilities of financial advisors
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Date Issued
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2011
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Identifier
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CFE0003907, ucf:48715
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Format
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Document (PDF)
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PURL
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http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFE0003907
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Title
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THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PHYSICALISM.
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Creator
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Gonzalez, Ariel, Rodgers, Travis, University of Central Florida
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Abstract / Description
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Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an...
Show moreMany contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O'Connor's reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
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Date Issued
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2014
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Identifier
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CFH0004628, ucf:45292
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Format
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Document (PDF)
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PURL
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http://purl.flvc.org/ucf/fd/CFH0004628
